Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.

Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.

G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987

FACTS:

On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and
their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her,
leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The
trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of
decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of
the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.

RULING:

No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated
the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because
the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It
does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person
as regards the estate of the parent-in-law..

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON
June 30, 1970 G.R. No. L-24561
Teehankee, J.:

Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was
survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-
appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.
Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson,
Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00
(except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in
the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-
named heirs. The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced,
the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the
two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from
which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the
oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791
of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own,
cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law
Issue:
Whether use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the
respective heirs are in the nature of devises of real property

Ruling:
For the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of
her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that
her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in
her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken
solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in
the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this
wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I
bequeath to said deceased."
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to
be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil
Code precisely provides that "One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own
theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-
appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "The devisee
who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable
portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as
they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Adjudication:
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.

Manongsong v. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo

G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003

FACTS:

Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is now under
possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of
petitioner MilagrosLopez Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez
claimed that the property was actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents
presented deed of sale dated October 11, 1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint
on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right
of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugalcharacter and that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal
right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did
not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against
AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:

No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition
inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the
seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely
a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property
was sold in 1957 for P250.00.

The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that
the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish
that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage.

Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003

FACTS:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma
and Natividad as well as of defendantsFidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed
JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared
null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed by defendant parents Leonardo
Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title,
plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale

RULING:

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court
stated, petitioners right to their parents properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents death.
While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness
to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not
affect the value of their parents estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value
replaced the lots taken from the estate.Arellano vs Pascual

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual
and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration filed by respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the
donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to
petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance legitime of
petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it
was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE: WON the property is subject of collation.

NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free
portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of
because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is
entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a
stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the
herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had
already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by
the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this
case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left
all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children
by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than
those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if
contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case
of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud
Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa
Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.
Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and
the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she
instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and
left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In
rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that
Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was
appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff
now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his
widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under
litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not
entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project
of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE: W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid
title to it.

HELD: NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barrettos last will and testament
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who
was believed to be an heirwithout really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does
not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones),
and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of
the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of
his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros,
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.

Nuguid v. Nuguid

GR L-23445, June 23, 1966

FACTS:

Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her legitimate parents, Felix and
Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario 11 years
before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the probate and be appointed administrator. The parents opposed
saying that they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line and that the will should be void
on the ground of absolute preterition.

ISSUE: Is the will void on the ground of preterition?

RULING: YES. The decedent left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents. And, the will completely omits both of them; thus receiving nothing by the testament,
depriving them of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Note
that A. 854 of the NCC merely nullifies the institution of heir. Considering that the will presented
solely provides for the institution of the petitioner as universal heir and nothing more, the result is the same. The will
is null and void
Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia

GR L 41971 November 29, 1983

FACTS:
Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died during the pendency of
the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified
the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in
view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution
of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from decedents
will.

RULING:
That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons will, and as a result, Sonias institution as
sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator had the right
to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of
Sonias share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not
be invalidated all together.

ACAIN vs. IAC October 27, 1987

FACTS:

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his
shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case
Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE: Was there preterition?

HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is
no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear
case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without
any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee
or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or
real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.
However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of
heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will
left by the deceased.

SUCCESSION SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, there was a
petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana.
The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there
was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving
into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the
will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the
probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private respondents question
the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or
heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
 The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was
filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively
previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the
heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no
preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole
exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited
in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically
valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will
render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as
a holographic will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction
are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot
be given effect.

Seangio vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes

G.R. November 27, 2006
Azcuna, J.:
FACTS:
On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo.
Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of
disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the
ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the
petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

RULING:
A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can
be clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the
latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. It was Segundos last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo.