DELA CRUZ V.

EDGARDO PARAS
Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance
would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed
are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras
however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which
reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS
THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition
is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz
then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that
such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could
have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can
only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest

Dela Cruz v Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Fernando, CJ:

Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night
clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity,
the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to
 due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses
previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled:

"An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate
the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of
Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and
other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the
power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the
same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a
municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The
title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording
was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night

clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases.
Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced

within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title
limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a
night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a
regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the
 prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction

that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the
former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise
in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A
refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would
be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no
more than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60

which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of
the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila
Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection
clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of

sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema
lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation
of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of
the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection
of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of
the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a
broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a

limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state
policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general
welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be

reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the
paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing
the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such
death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs
for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389,
September 11, 1991)

Patalinghug v CA (1994)

Patalinghug v CA
GR No 104786, January 27, 1994

FACTS:
A funeral home was constructed in Davao City. Per ordinance, the same should not be less than 50 meters
away from residential lots. A building owned by Tepoot is both used as a dwelling and as a business is
located within 50 meters of the funeral home. Under its tax declaration, the commercial property is labeled
as residential tax purposes.

ISSUE:
Is the construction illegal?

RULING:
No. Mr. Tepoots building is, whether or not it is residential or not, is a factual determination which we should
not disturb. A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an

ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
Facts: On 15 December 1992 the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Puerto Princesa
enacted Ordinance No 15-92 to establish a closed season for the species of fish or
aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and on 22 January 1993
acting Mayor Amado Lucero issued Order No 23 to protect the coral in the marine
waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further
destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The petitioners, invoked the Court for
certiorari contending both ordinances for depriving them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 15-92 enacted by Sanguniang Panglungsod and
Order No 23 by Acting Mayor Lucero are within the limits of police power?
Decision: Petition dismissed and TRO lifted. Ordinance 15-92 and Order No 23 are
valid. The relationship then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of
the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium
cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and
reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.
acts

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the
shipment of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the
same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that
prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The
petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were
charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial
governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal
fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code,
invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.

Issue

Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units
violative of the preferential rights of the marginal fishermen ?
Tano v Socrates (Environmental Law)
Tano v Socrates
GR No. 110249

August 21, 1997

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance N o. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993
entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING
EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF.

ISSUE:

Is the ordinance valid and constitutional?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

Section 2 of Article X I I reads: The State shall protect the nation'

s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic z one, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law , allow
small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
w ell as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide: Sec. 2. The promotion of

social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. x x x x x
x x x x Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence
fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall
ex tend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen
against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
 General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

RULING:

YES. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution

enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government
units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:

(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic

animals covered therein for a period of five years, and

(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities. It is incorrect to say that the challenged
Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable
because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the
approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances
affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters. In closing, we
commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for
exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed
legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby
sharing In the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological
destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be
roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle
against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this
time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may
prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

Petitioner: White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa

Tourist & Development Corporation
Respondent: City of Manila

Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila
City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in
the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development
Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading
as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with
the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC)
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City
alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. On October 20,
1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a
petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue: Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police
power

Ruling: Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The
apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These
goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held
in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when
life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take
it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA

January 20, 2009 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM

CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION petitioner v.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
respondents.

January 20, 2009

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774
which is entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension
Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" on
December 3, 1992.

petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying

that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
RTC eventually rendered its decision declaring the said
ordinance null and void. It was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed
the constitutional of the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void
RULING:

Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme

Court, is to eliminate and if not, minimize the use of covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals by themselves are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. However, the desirability of these ends do not sanctify
any all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis
of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as
a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving

patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as police power measure. It must
appear that the interest of the public, generally, as
distinguished from those of particular class, require an
interference with private rights and that the means employed
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of the private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purpose of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION

and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into
law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City
of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and
charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of
rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and
motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators.
The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at
the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises
and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade
could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-
hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the
ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised
Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for
the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and
void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the
ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since
it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method
since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid
exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City
of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon.
City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through
those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as
the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of
decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct
business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought
to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do
not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on
the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only
restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act
upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet,
they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke
as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons
who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-
up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights
at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be
recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition
to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active
police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would
have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in
fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected
only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding
into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room
more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to
have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that
the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed
by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause
which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said
ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The
SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40
Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the

expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an
extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private
cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not

necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed
that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the
graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not
necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein
assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof
of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of

eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and
for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it
must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of
the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity
is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have
the right to inquire to.
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October
1919
FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such
expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed
for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery,
which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with
sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted
into a street for public purposes.
The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of
the particular strip of land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it
(petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that
the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value
of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land
can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the
value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a
judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity
of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166
Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo,
Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot
be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or
entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to
exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature . But whether or
not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the
question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the
case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St.
Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)

Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

GR no. 72126, Jan 29, 1988

Facts:
Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation, the respondent, owns a parcel of
land adjacent to its factory covered by Transfer Certificates #215165 and 37879. In
1975, the company filed for an application to fence the said land for use as storage
for their heavy equipment and finished products. At the same time, the Municipal
Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution # 258 manifesting intention to
expropriate the land with title #37879 for use as public road. The Provincial Board
of Bulacan disapproved and annulled the resolution. In 1983, the Municipal council
once again passed a resolution with the same intent which was then approved by the
Provl Board in 1984.Feb 14 1984, petitioner filed a special civil action for
expropriation with RTC of Malolos. Upon deposit of P24,025.00, the market value,
the trial court issued writ of possession in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed
with IAC and the latter affirmed the trial courts decision. Respondent filed for
motion for reconsideration and IAC re-examined its decision and reversed the
decision saying there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land as public road
since there are several roads for that purpose and that another more appropriate lot
is available. Also, IAC opined that the land is more ideal for storage area. Thus, this is
a petition for review on Certiorari for the IAC resolution or Court of appeals
resolution dismissing the special civil action for expropriation filed by petitioner.

Issue:
Is the petitioner justified for expropriating the land?
Held:
The foundation of the right to exercise power of eminent domain is GENUINE
NECESSITY and the necessity must be of PUBLIC CHARACTER. Condemnation of
private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is genuine
necessity. Thus, the courts have power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is genuine necessity.

SC found that the land is just about 6-7 meters wide, clearly not appropriate
for building a public road considering that it can only accommodate a one way road
and that there are several roads already used for the same purpose. Also, there is a
much wider strip of land that is for sale and is more appropriate for expropriation.
The purpose of the petitioner that the road is needed to decongest the volume of
traffic can be fully and better attained by the other roads or the other land and
expropriating this land will only cause unjustified damage to the company.

Municipality of Meycauayan vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Facts:

Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed

with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan an
application for a permit to fence a parcel of land. The fencing of said
property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondents heavy
equipment and various finished products.

The Municipal Council of Meycauayan passed Resolution

manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondents parcel of land.
It was opposed by the respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising
Corporation with the office of the Provincial Governor.

Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of

Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there
was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauyan to
expropriate the respondents property for use as a public road. Then
Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution disapproving and
annulling the Resolution passed by the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan.

However, Petitioner (Municipality of Meycauayan) filed with the

RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation, and
upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of
the land, with the PNB, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor
of the Petitioner.

The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the

appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision. But upon MR, the
decision was reversed and held that there is no genuine necessity to
expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several other
roads for the same purpose and another more expropriate lot for the
proposed public road.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner has the right to expropriate?

Held:

The Petitioners purpose in expropriating the respondents property

is to convert the same into a public road for the purposes to ease the
traffic in the area of vehicles. However, it reveals that there are other
connecting links or several roads for the same purpose and another lot
for proposed public road. The Petitioner itself admits that there are four
(4) such cross roads in existence.

The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent

domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public
character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for
the public good and there is genuine necessity of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality
of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.

It is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such

competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality
and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more

appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not
been the subject of the petitioners attempt to expropriate assuming
there is a real need for another connecting road.

Petition DISMISSED.

Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R.

No. 127820. July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:

Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a
Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the
property but VM didnt accept.

The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res
judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.

The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of
an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when
public interest is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law
because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the
expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a
private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.

Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized
by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.

Sec 19, RA 7160

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power
of eminent domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the
first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.

We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance
are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law,
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution
is temporary in nature.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it
would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section
19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental

or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language
-- from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict
construction.

When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued
for its implementation.

Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent
but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus
partakes only of a share in eminent domain.

2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for
the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on
the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause
of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in
generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.

Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use
whenever they need it.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.

In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the
property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or
its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are complied with.
Municipality of Paraaque vs. VM Realty
292 SCRA 676
Panganiban, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to a Sanggunian Bayan Resolution of the petitioner municipality, an expropriation complaint against the
property of herein respondent for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by
providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. The RTC of Makati authorized petitioner to
take possession of subject property upon deposit to the court an amount of its fair market value. Respondent filed
a counter claim alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution of the Municipal council is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of
Section 19, RA 7160 in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

RULING:
The power of eminent by LGUs may be affected only by ordinance not by a mere resolution. The following
essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain.
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the
LGUs to exercise the power of eminent domain to pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Sec 9, Article III of the Constitution and other
pertment.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not complied with by the local chief
executive. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, it possesses a general and
permanent character while a resolution is temporary in nature.
The petition is hereby denied without prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over
subject property.
CITY OF CEBU, Petitioner, vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR., Respondent.
Doctrine: Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for
such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of
judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous
case.
Facts:
1. The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain
over two (2) parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses
Dedamo), filed by the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
 Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner immediately took possession of the
lots after depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National Bank pursuant to Section 19
of Republic Act No. 7160.4
2. During the pendency of the case, or on December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses
Dedamo entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with
the ownership of the parcels of land in favor of the former in consideration of ONE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,786,400.00) as provisional payment and just compensation in an amount to be
determined by a panel of commissioners.
3. Forthwith, the panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC
recommending the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just compensation. The report was
adopted and approved by the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996.5
4. The RTC Order was affirmed by the CA and then by the Court, in a Decision dated May
7, 2002, when the matter was elevated for review in a petition docketed as G.R. No.
142971.
5. When the said decision became final and executory on September 20, 2002, the case
was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4, 2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC
granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ
a. In the meantime, Spouses Dedamo passed away and they were substituted in
the case by herein respondent.
6. On December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50
which is the difference between the just compensation due and the provisional payment
already made.
7. On March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to
order the petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of
actual taking of the lands.

RTC: On April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer
amend a final and executory judgment that did not specifically direct the payment of legal
interest. Adamant, the respondent sought recourse before the CA asserting that the
petitioner is liable to pay: (a) 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation computed from the time of actual taking of the property up to the date of
payment of just compensation; and (b) 12% legal interest from the time the decision
awarding just compensation became final and executory on September 20, 2002 until its
satisfaction on December 23, 2003.
CA: The CA awarded legal interest accruing from the time the RTC Order dated
December 27, 1996 awarding just compensation was affirmed with finality by the
Supreme Court up to the time of full payment thereof in line with the ruling in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals6 that when a court judgment awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, it shall earn legal interest of 12% per annum
reckoned from such finality until satisfaction.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still question the respondents entitlement of legal
interest awarded by the CA.
Held: NO! The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of
judgment.
A perusal of the allegations in the present case evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the
issues similarly raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who
can no longer question the respondents entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the CA.
The Courts determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal interest is
likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through the present
recourse.
Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is
inextricably related to the ruling in the former.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO

[G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002]

FACTS:

On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain
against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they
needed the parcels of land owned by the respondents for public purpose because they are
planning to construct a public road which will serve as an access or relief road of Gorordo
Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International
Hotel Roads in Cebu City.

However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the
purpose of expropriation was not for public purpose but for the benefit of the Cebu
Holdings, Inc. They alleged that the petitioner could simply buy directly the property from
them at its fair market value just like what they did with the neighboring lots and the price
offered was very low. They also alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.

From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994, the petitioner filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The
motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994. The parties executed an
agreement and submitted to the trial wherein they declared that they have partially settled
the case in consideration of the stipulations in the agreement.

Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed Palermo M. Lugo, Alfredo
Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to determine the just compensation
of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioners report contained that the plaintiff
is directed to pay a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents.

But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
commissioners report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to
expropriation. Then the commissioners submit an amendment which made the just
compensation costs P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court
erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. They also alleged that
just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. However, the Court of Appeals was not
convinced and affirmed the lower courts decision.

The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted that just
compensation should be determined on September 17, 1993, as of the date of the filing of
the complaint and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994.

ISSUE:

whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.

HELD:

No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the
Governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose.[9] However, the Government must pay the owner thereof
just compensation as consideration therefor.

In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The SC justifies that although the general rule in
determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date
of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the
value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings.

Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commission so they
need to comply on the agreement in good faith. Also, the petitioner was too late to question
the valuation without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. And lastly, Section 4, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
Jesus Estanislao vs. Amado Costales
GRN 96516 May 8, 1991 / 196 SCRA 853
Gancayco, J.:
FACTS:
The Sanggunian Panglungsod passed ordinance No 44 of Zamboanga City. The same was sent to the Minister of
Finance where it was found out to contravenes Section 19 of the local Tax Code. The authority of the city is limited
to the imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or receipts of said production. The tax being imposed in
the ordinance is based on the output or production and not on the gross sales or receipts as authorized under the
local tax code. The city Mayor of Zamboanga questioned such decision of the Finance Minister and the lower court
ruled in favor of the former by reason of prescription. The ordinance imposed P0.01 per liter of softdrinks produced,
manufactured and or bottled within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Zamboanga.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 44 contravenes the Local Tax Code of 1974.
RULING:
The court ruled that the tax ordinances issued by the local autonomy is governed by the Local Tax Code of 1974 as
it was stated in Section 64 (a) thereof all existing tax ordinances of provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios
shall be deemed ipso facto nullified on June 30, 1974. The court also clarified that the 120 days that lapsed before
the Minister of Finance acted on the ordinance did not render the action inoperative due to prescription. Even if the
Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the ordinance within 120 days, it does not follow as a legal
consequence thereof that an otherwise invalid ordinance is thereby validated. It does not also mean that the
Secretary can no longer act by suspending and/or revoking an invalid ordinance even after the lapse of 120 day
period.

Tuzon and Mapagu vs. CA and Jurado

Public officers not personally liable for injuries occasioned by

performance of official duty within scope of official authority;
erroneous interpretation of ordinance does not constitute bad
faith.

Facts:

In 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan thought of fund-

raising scheme to help finance the construction of a Sports and Nutrition Center.
They adopted Resolution No. 9 whereby all thresher operators who will apply for
a permit to thresh will be required to donate 1% of all the palay threshed by
them.

Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher
operators but Municipal Treasurer Mapagu refused to accept payment and
required him to first secure a mayors permit. Mayor Domingo Tuzon, on the
other hand, said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign
the agreement before the permit could be issued.

Jurado filed an action for mandamus with the CFI Cagayan to compel the
issuance of the mayors permit and license. He filed another petition for
declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation
or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the same respondents and all the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan

The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing
agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable to pay actual and
moral damages for acting maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's
application for the mayor's permit and license. As for the Resolution, it was
passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted
by Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU
shall have the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject
to such limitation as may be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29,
PD 231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other contributions
from private agencies and individuals.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing

power of an LGU.

2. WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having
withheld from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to
comply with Resolution No. 9.
Held:

1. NO. While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal
government merely intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers, the
implementing agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition
precedent to the issuance of the mayors permit. This goes against the nature of
a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory.

If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be

shown in view of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been
enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These
would include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent
approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for
publication of ordinances in general. .

2. NO. Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance
with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to
rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its
legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality,
they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. xxx As a rule, a pubic officer,
whether, judicial, quasijudicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured
in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and
in line of his official duty. xxx It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of
an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith, that would
entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v.
City of Cebu)

The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may
file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal
to act on the private respondent's application was an attempt to compel him to
resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that
the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were
grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the
petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it
appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to
Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not
Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to
favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution
was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without
discrimination or preference.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts, he was
prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit
therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed,
he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest
and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate."
Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate his threshing business and
thus avoided the lucrocesante that he now says was the consequence of the
petitioners' wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still
dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit. (Tuzon and Mapagu
vs. CA and Jurado, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992)
Drilon vs Lim
GR No. 112497
August 4, 1994
 The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue
Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.

RTCs Ruling:

1. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution.

Petitioners Argument:

1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements
for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code
had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to
failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Courts Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality
of tax ordinance. What he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not
control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act
undone or re-done. Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of
certain ultra vires provisions (2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its
enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of LGU not to tax ordinances.
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code 1. The Secretary of Justice (on
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who
shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,
That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the

ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because
it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of
the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act

with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of
a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized
that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive
and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside
the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law,
that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If

they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone
or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local

Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or
fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is
permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax
measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code
only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations:
No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance,
no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)

Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural

requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove
such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it
only five days within which to gather and present to him all the
evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found
in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila
Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits
Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved

but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the
text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and
public investment programs of the local government unit and not to
tax ordinances.