Definition Of Double Jeopardy

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the
former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the
former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall
be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

WHAT IS JEOPARDY AND WHAT IS THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

> Jeopardy is the peril in which a person is placed when he is regularly charged with a crime before a
tribunal properly organized and competent to try him

> The rule on double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminate
either by conviction or acquittal, or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense

WHAT ARE THE 2 KINDS OF JEOPARDY?

1. That no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ACCUSED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
1. A first jeopardy must have validly attached prior to the second
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information or is an attempt to commit the offense or a
frustration thereof

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE FIRST JEOPARDY TO ATTACH?

1. There is a valid complaint or information
2. Court of competent jurisdiction
3. Arraignment
4. Plea
5. The defendant is acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without his express consent

N.B: The judgment should not only be final and executory but also be promulgated before there could be a
valid jeopardy.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOREGOING RULE?

> There are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal of the
case was with the consent of the accused
1. If there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him, and
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to
speedy trial
A CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN MAKATI. THE CASE WAS FILED IN PASAY. WHEN THE PROSECUTION
REALIZED THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN MAKATI, IT FILED THE CASE IN MAKATI.
CAN THE ACCUSED INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the court in Pasay has no jurisdiction, therefore, the accused was in no danger of being placed in jeopardy
> The first jeopardy didnt validly attach

FOR PURPOSES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHEN IS A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION VALID?

> A complaint or information is valid if it can support a judgment of conviction
> If the complaint or information is not valid, it would violate the right of the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him
> If he is convicted under this complaint or information, the conviction is null and void and hence there is no
first jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH QUALIFIED THEFT. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
INFORMATION. THE CASE WAS DISMISSED. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PROSECUTION FILED A CORRECTED
INFORMATION. CAN X PLEAD DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy didnt attach because the first information was not valid

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. DURING THE TRIAL, THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE
ESTAFA. X WAS ACQUITTED OF THEFT. CAN X BE PROSECUTED FOR ESTAFA LATER WITHOUT PLACING
HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> For jeopardy to attach, the basis is the crime charged in the complaint or information, and the one proved
at the trial
> In this case, the crime charged in the first information was theft. X was therefore placed in jeopardy of
being convicted of theft. Since estafa is not an offense which is included or necessarily includes theft, X can
still be prosecuted for estafa without placing him in double jeopardy

THE ESTAFA CASE AGAINST C WAS DISMISSED BUT THE DISMISSAL CONTAINED A RESERVATION OF
THE RIGHT TO FILE ANOTHER ACTION. CAN ANOTHER ESTAFA CASE BE FILED AGAINST X WITHOUT PLACING
HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated

> This means that there must have been either a conviction or acquittal, or an unconditional dismissal of the
case
> A provisional dismissal, such as this one, doesnt validly terminate the first jeopardy

NOTE: in the second kind of jeopardy, the first jeopardy can validly only be terminated either by conviction or
acquittal and not by the dismissal of the case without the express consent of the accused.

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. ON THE DAY OF THE TRIUAL, THE PROSECUTOR AND THE WITNESSES FAILED
TO APPEAR. COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED MOVED TO DISMISS THE CASE. THE COURT DISMISSED THE
CASE PROVISIONALLY. SUBSEQUENTLY X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT AGAIN. CAN X INVOKE JEOPARDY?
> No, the case was dismissed upon motion of counsel for the accused, so it wasnt dismissed without the
express consent
> Moreover, the dismissal was only provisional, which is not a valid termination of the first jeopardy
> In order to validly terminate the jeopardy, the dismissal must have been unconditional

X WAS CHARGED WITH SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES. ON HIS MOTION, THE CASE WAS DISMISSED DURING
TRIAL. ANOTHER CASE FOR ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY WAS FILED AGAINST HIM. CAN X
INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy wasnt terminated through either conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the express
consent of X
> The first case was dismissed upon the motion of X himself
> Therefore, he cannot invoke double jeopardy
X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT. DURING TRIAL, THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE OFFENSE COMMITTED
WAS ACTUALLY ESTAFA. WHAT SHOULD THE JUDGE DO?
> The judge should order the substitution of the complaint for theft with a new one charging estafa
> Upon filing of the substituted complaint, the judge should dismiss the original complaint. If it appears at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION?

1. No judgment has been rendered
2. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included in the
offense charged
3. The accused will not be placed in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO APPEAR.
THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO
SPEEDY TRIAL. X WAS LATER CHARGED WITH MURDER. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy was not validly terminated
> The judge who has not dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right of X to speedy trial
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case after the prosecution failed to
appear once
> This is not a valid dismissal because it deprives the prosecution of due process

> When the judge gravely abuses the discretion in dismissing a case, the dismissal is not valid
Therefore, X cannot invoke double jeopardy

DISTINGUISH ACQUITTAL AND DISMISSAL

> Acquittal is a discharge after a trial, or an attempt to have one, upon the merits. It is always on the
merits. The accused is acquitted because the evidence doesnt show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
> On the other hand, dismissal is when the case is terminated otherwise upon the merits thereof, as when
the dismissal is based on the allegation that the court has no jurisdiction, either upon the subject matter or
the territory, or that the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient, or upon any ground that
doesnt decide the merits of the issue as to whether the accused is
or isnt guilty of the offense charged

WHEN IS A DISMISSAL OF THE CASE, EVEN WITH EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED, EQUIVALENT TO
AN ACQUITTAL, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A BAR TO A SECOND JEOPARDY?
> For a dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal
> As a general rule, dismissal upon motion of the accused or his counsel negates the application of
double jeopardy because the motion of the accused amounts to an express consent
> However, such a dismissal even with the express consent of the accused may constitute a bar to double
jeopardy in the following cases

1. Where there is insufficiency of evidence given by the prosecution to support the charge against him
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accuseds right to
speedy trial

> Consequently, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal and would bar a second jeopardy in the cases below

1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has
rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a
speedy trial, which is in effect a failure to prosecute

WHAT IS MEANT BY NOLLE PROSEQUI? IS IT THE SAME AS AN ACQUITTAL?

> It is the discontinuance of a criminal procedure by the prosecuting officer, with the consent of the owner
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is
not equivalent to an acquittal and doesnt bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense
> It is not a final disposition of the case
> Rather it partakes of the nature of a non-suit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves the matter in the same
condition in which it was before the commencement of the prosecution
MAY THE COURT DISMISS THE CASE ON MOTION NOLLE PROSEQUI?
> The trial court may dismiss a case on a motion nolle prosequi if the accused is not brought to trial within
the prescribed time and is deprived of his right to speedy trial or disposition of the case on
account of unreasonable or capricious delay caused by the prosecution
> People v. Espidol doctrine

WHY IS THERE A REQUIREMENT FOR IT TO BE CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE?

> There are some delays of the prosecution which are not capricious and unreasonable
> It may be caused by some other valid reasonsprejudicial question, new evidence or witnesses, etc.

WHEN A CASE IS DISMISSED UPON MOTION OF THE ACCUSED, MAY HE STILL BE PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE?
> While there have been conflicting rulings of the SC, the prevailing doctrine is that the accused can still be
prosecuted for the same offense if he moves to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, or insufficiency of complaint or information because he is deemed to have waived his right against
a second jeopardy, or that he is estopped from maintaining that the court had no
jurisdiction or that the complaint wasnt sufficient

WHEN WILL DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE FIRST CASE NOT BAR A SECOND JEOPARDY?
1. The dismissal must be sought by the defendant personally or through his counsel

2. Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal

BEFORE THE PROSECUTION COULD FINISH PRESENTING EVIDENCE, THE ACCUSED FILED A
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. THE COURT GRANTED THE MOTION AND DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION. CAN THE ACCUSED BE PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE AGAIN?
> Yes. There was no double jeopardy because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the
case even before the prosecution could finish presenting evidence
> It denied the prosecution of its right to due process. Because of this, the dismissal is null and void and cannot
constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy

THE PROSECUTOR FILED AN INFORMATION AGAINST X FOR HOMICIDE. BEFORE X COULD BE

ARRAIGNED, THE PROSECUTOR WITHDREW THE INFORMATION WITHOUT NOTICE TO X. THE
PROSECUTOR THEN FILED AN INFORMATION AGAINST X FOR MURDER. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, there was no arraignment yet under the first information
> Therefore, the first jeopardy didnt attach. The withdrawal or dismissal of the case before arraignment is
not a bar to the filing of a new information for the same offense.
> There is no double jeopardy where there is yet no arraignment
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he pleads is not
equivalent to an acquittal and doesnt bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense

IF THE ACCUSED FAILS TO OBJECT TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE FILED BY THE PROSECUTION,
IS HE DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED TO THE DISMISSAL? CAN HE STILL INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, silence doesnt mean consent to the dismissal
> If the accused fails to object or acquiesces to the dismissal of the case, he can still invoke double jeopardy, since
the dismissal was
still without his express consent.
> He is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy if he expressly consents to the dismissal

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER. THE PROSECUTION MOVED TO DISMISS THE CASE. COUNSEL FOR X
WROTE THE WORDS NO OBJECTION AT THE BOTTOM OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND SIGNED IT. CAN
X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY LATER ON?
> No, X is deemed to have expressly consented to the dismissal of the case when his counsel wrote no objection
at the bottom of the motion to dismiss
> Since the case was dismissed with his express consent, X cannot invoke double jeopardy
X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER. AFTER THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED ITS EVIDENCE, X FILED A MOTION
TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS
COMMITTED WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. THE COURT DISMISSED THE
CASE. THE PROSECUTION APPEALED? CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X cannot invoke double jeopardy
> The dismissal was upon his own motion so it was with his express consent
> Since the dismissal was with his express consent, he is deemed to have waived his right against double
jeopardy
> The only time when a dismissal, even with the express consent of the accused, will bar a double jeopardy is if it
is based either on insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial
> These are not grounds invoked by X so he cannot claim double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION. BELIEVING IT HAD NO JURISDICTION, THE JUDGE DISMISSED THE CASE. SINCE THE COURT, IN
FACT, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE PROSECUTION FILED ANOTHER CASE IN THE SAME COURT.
CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he was in danger of being convicted during the first case, since he
had himself earlier alleged that the court had no jurisdiction

X WAS CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE. THE COURT, BELIEVED IT HAD NO JURISDICTION, MOTU PROPIO
DISMISSED THE CASE. THE PROSECUTION APPEALED, CLAIMING THAT THE COURT, IN FACT HAD
JURISDICTION. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes, when the trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses the complaint or information on the
ground of lack of it, the dismissal wasnt at the request of the accused, the dismissal is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH RAPE. X MOVED TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS
INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE LEWD DESIGNS. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE. LATER,
ANOTHER CASE FOR RAPE WAS FILED AGAINST X. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he could have been convicted under the first complaint
> He himself moved for the dismissal on the ground that the complaint was insufficient
> He cannot change his position and now claim that he was in danger of being convicted under the
complaint

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER PEOPLE. X WAS DISCHARGED AS A STATE
WITNESS. CAN X BE PROSECUTED AGAIN FOR THE SAME OFFENSE?
> It depends
> As a general rule, an order discharging an accused as state witness amounts to an acquittal, and he is
barred from being prosecuted again for the same offense
> However, if he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge, he can be prosecuted again

CAN A PERSON ACCUSED OF ESTAFA BE CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF BP22 WITHOUT PLACING
HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes. Even if the same transaction is involved, the same act may violate two or more provisions of criminal law
and the prosecution under one will not bar the prosecution under another
> Where 2 different laws defines 2 crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other

X INSTALLED A JUMPER CABLE WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO REDUCE HIS ELECTRICITY BILL. HE WAS
PROSECUTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY CONVICTED FOR A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE AGAINST
UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION OF A DEVICE. CAN HE STILL BE PROSECUTED FOR THEFT?
> No, under the second type of jeopardy, when an act is punished by law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under one will bar a prosecution under the other
> The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available as long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under the statute
WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY? WHEN CAN THE ACCUSED BE CHARGED WITH A
SECOND OFFENSE WHICH NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE FORMER COMPLAINT
OR INFORMATION?
> The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following circumstances:
o The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge
o The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered
in the former complaint or information
o The plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor or offended party except
if the offended party fails to appear at arraignment

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT?

> Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
second offense.

X WAS CHARGED WITH FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. THERE WAS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE VICTIM
WAS GOING TO DIE. X WAS ARRAIGNED. BEFORE TRIAL, THE VICTIM DIED. CAN X BE CHARGED WITH
HOMICIDE?
> It depends.
> If the death of the victim can be traced to the acts of X, and the victim didnt contribute to his death with his
negligence, X can be charged with homicide
> This is a supervening fact
> But if the act of X wasnt the proximate cause of death, he cannot be charged with homicide

X WAS CHARGED WITH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE AND WAS ACQUITTED. THE
HEIRS OF THE VICTIM APPEALED THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE JUDGMENT. X CLAIMS THAT THE APPEAL WILL
PLACE HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. IS X CORRECT?
> No, there was no second jeopardy. What was elevated on appeal was the civil aspect of the case, not the
criminal aspect.
> The extinction of criminal liability whether by a prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy doesnt carry
with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged

X IN A CRIMINAL CASE WAS SENTENCED AND REQUIRED TO PAY CIVIL LIABILITY. CAN THE OFFENDED
PARTY APPEAL THE CIVIL LIABILITY?
> Yes, if there would be appeal for a criminal case, it must pertain solely on the civil liability.
> An appeal with regard the criminal aspect would violate the accuseds right against double jeopardy.
> The reason why the offended party can appeal the civil aspect is that double jeopardy only attaches to the
criminal aspect and not the civil aspect. The victim or offended party in the criminal case
is the State while in its civil aspect, the private offended party.

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURDER AND WAS ACQUITTED. CAN THE PROSECUTION APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL?
> No, the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal, since it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
> A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals
> Even if the decision of acquittal was erroneous, the prosecution cannot still appeal the decision as it
would put the accused in double jeopardy.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IS FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE WHETHER IT HAPPENS

AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL OR BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS

WHEN CAN THE PROSECUTION APPEAL DESPITE THE DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE CASE?
> As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a
valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, an attempt
or frustration thereof, or one which necessarily includes or is included in the previous offense.
> However, the prosecution may appeal the order of dismissal in the following instances:
1. If the dismissal of the first case was made upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant, unless the
grounds are insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to speedy trial
2. If the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case,
3. And the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED?

> If the accused appeals, he waives his right against double jeopardy
> The case is thrown wide open for review and a penalty higher than that of the original conviction could be
imposed upon him

WHAT SHOULD THE ACCUSED DO IF THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> He should plea not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy
> In case of conviction, he should appeal from the judgment on the ground of double jeopardy

CAN AN ACCUSED RAISE THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS?

> No, jeopardy doesnt attach. Remember the requisites for jeopardy. Jeopardy only attaches in criminal
proceedings.

Suspension By Reason Of Prejudicial Question

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

MAY THE COURT MOTU PROPIO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL ACTION WHERE THERE IS A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED?
> No, the court can only suspend the criminal action upon a petition but it has no authority to order its dismissal

WHAT IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION?

> A prejudicial question is one based on a fact separate and distinct from the crime but is so intimately related to it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused

WHAT IS THE RULE REGARDING PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS?

> In case the civil action was instituted ahead of the criminal action, the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found and before judgment is the merits upon commencement of the
criminal action

WHAT IS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE PREJUDICIAL QUESTION RULE?

> To avoid two conflicting decisions

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION?

1. The previously filed civil action involves an issue which is similar or is intimately related with an issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action
2. The resolution of the issue will determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed

WHEN IS AN ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE PREJUDICIAL TO A BIGAMY CASE?

> An action for annulment of marriage is prejudicial to a bigamy case only if the accused in the bigamy
charge is also the one asking for annulment of the second (bigamous marriage based on
vitiation of consent)

> This is because in such a case, if the court declares that the partys consent is indeed vitiated and annuls the
marriage, then it would mean that the party didnt willingly commit the crime of bigamy
> It would thus be determinative of the guilt and innocence of the accused

IS AN ACTION FOR NULLITY BECAUSE OF ARTICLE 36 A PRELIMINARY QUESTION OF ADULTERY?

> No, what is important is the fact that the marriage still subsisted during the commission of the crime of adultery
IS AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION A PRELIMINARY QUESTION ON CONCUBINAGE?
> No, in legal separation, the marriage bond is not severed and thus, it doesn't matter if the legal separation
was granted or not

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF A VALID TRIAL IN ABSENTIA?

1. The accused has been already arraigned
2. He has been duly notified of the trial
3. He fails to appear at the trial but his non-appearance at the trial is unjustifiable

CAN THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT BE WAIVED?

> Yes, except in the following situations where the presence of the accused at the trial is required
1. During arraignment
2. During promulgation of judgment, except if it is for a light offense
3. When the presence of the accused at the trial is required for purposes of identification, unless he admits
beforehand that he is the same person charged

Effects of Trial In Absentia on the Rights of the Accused

Trial In Absentia
Trial in absentia is a stage in a criminal proceeding where the trial is being held even without the physical presence
of the accused. Trial in absentia is allowed in our jurisdiction and is indeed authorized by the Constitution. Section
14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure
to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, before a trial in absentia may be had, the following requisites must be present:
1. that there has been an arraignment;
2. that the accused has been notified; and
3. that his failure to appear is unjustified.
Impact on the Rights of the Accused
It was held in a long line of cases that an accused who failed to participate in the course of his criminal proceedings
for an unjustifiable reason loses his constitutional rights i.e. to present evidence on his own behalf, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses. In addition, the right to confrontation, of cross-examination and presentation of
evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of such right. (People v.
Seneris, No. L-48883, August 6, 1980)
Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations
set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence
of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his
right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused
may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
In Estrada v. People (G.R. No. 162371, August 25, 2005), the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused
for the crime of estafa based only on prosecution evidence in view of the unexplained failure of the accused to
appear at several trial dates.
In this case, the accused argued, among others, that while her non-appearance in the trials may be deemed to have
waived her right to be present during the proceedings, such waiver does not include a waiver of her right to
present evidence. Her conviction by the trial court is in effect a denial of her constitutional right to be heard and
present evidence in her defense.
In denying the petition for certiorari of the petitioner (accused), the Supreme Court held that by the mere fact that
she jumped bail and could no longer be found, petitioner is considered to have waived her right to be present at the
trial, and she and her counsel were to be deemed to have received notice. As held in the earlier cases, the Court
ruled that once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses
his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Moreover, with the factual findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner and her counsel were duly served with
copies of the assailed RTC orders and decision at the addresses they submitted to the trial court, the petitioner was
indeed afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation of
petitioners right to due process when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence.
In People v. Tabag (G.R. No. 116511, February 12, 1997) the Court ruled that the trial court erred for failing to
proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from preventive detention. Pursuant to the last sentence of
paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its
termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both
accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established. The trial court had the duty to rule on the
evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should
not wait for the fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them.
In Gimenez v. Nazareno (G.R. No. L-37933, April 15, 1988), the Court holds that an escapee who has been duly
tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually
waived these rights. The right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal
right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his
own benefit and protection, may be waived by him.
Express Waiver of Rights, Limitation
In the case of Carredo v. People (G.R. No. 77542 March 19, 1990), the issue involved is whether or not an accused
who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial can be ordered arrested by the court for
non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification.
The Court ruled that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in case of his
non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the
witnesses face to face among others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the
same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is
thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its
witnesses which are vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean
a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused
may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while the Court permits the accused to waive his presence at all stages of the proceeding after arraignment, it
can still order the appearance of the accused where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is
necessary.
Judgment In Absentia
Promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. The fourth and last paragraph of Section 6 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 140243, December 14, 2000) it was held that such promulgation is valid
provided the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket;
and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or counsel.
Conclusion
Unlike the old rule where the trial in absentia of the fugitive/accused could not be held because he could not be
duly notified thereof, the Court now considers the accused as deemed to have waived such notice and with more
reason if he escaped from the authorities. To hold otherwise would impede the speedy disposition of justice and
would result to a mockery of the criminal justice system by just fleeing from the hands of the law. After a wilful
disobedience to the law and the Court, one cannot ask for a relief anchored on his constitutional rights the
deprivation of which is caused by his utter disregard of the law himself.

Salient features of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases
May 24th, 2017

1. It applies to all newly-filed criminal cases, including those governed by Special Laws and Rules1, in the First and
Second Level Courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals. It also applies to pending criminal cases
with respect to the remainder of the proceedings. It shall not apply to cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

2. Trial shall be held from Monday to Thursday at exactly 8:30 A.M. and 2:00 P.M2. Hearing on motions,
arraignment and pre-trial, and promulgation of judgment of decisions are in the morning of Fridays.3
3. Motions for inhibitions based on Rule 137 shall be resolved immediately or within two calendar days from filing.

4. Prohibited motions shall be denied outright before the arraignment without need of comment.

5. The following are the prohibited motions:

1. Motion judicial determination of probable cause.
2. Motion for preliminary investigation filed beyond the five (5) day period in inquest proceedings4 or when
preliminary investigation is required5 or allowed in inquest proceedings and the accused failed to participate
despite due notice.
3. Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor who recommends the filing of the information once the information
has been filed before the court (1) if the motion is filed without prior leave (2) when preliminary investigation is
required and has been actually conducted, and the grounds relied upon in the motion are not meritorious, such as
issues of credibility, admissibility of evidence, innocence of the accused, or lack of due process when the accused
was actually notified, among others.
4. Motion to quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in the rules.6
5. Motion for bill of particulars that does not conform to the rules.7
6. Motion to suspend arraignment based on grounds not stated by the rules8.
7. Petition to suspend criminal action based on prejudicial question when no civil case has been filed9.

6. Motion for postponement is prohibited, except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical inability of
the witness to appear and testify. If the motion is granted based on said exceptions, the moving party shall be
warned that the presentation of its evidence must still be finished on the dates previously agreed upon. A motion
for postponement shall at all times be paid with the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Branch COC shall not accept
the motion unless accompanied by the original receipt.

7. If a party fails to qualify for PAO services, the IBP shall provide free legal assistance to the party. The IBP shall
submit the list of lawyers to the Executive Judge for possible appointment as counsel de officio in such cases.

8. Where only the civil liability is being prosecuted, the head of the prosecution office may issue a written authority
to a private prosecutor who may prosecute in the absence of the public prosecutor.10
9. Consolidation of cases may be done even before raffling provided a motion for consolidation accompanies the
filing before the Office of the Clerk of Court. If a new case is filed involving an accused who has been subjected to
further investigation by the office of the prosecutor over an incident involving the same subject matter as that of
the already raffled information, the new case shall be assigned directly to the court where the earlier case is
pending, provided, there is a motion for consolidation from the office of the prosecutor that accompanies its filing
in court. The proceedings already had in the old case may be adopted.

10. Archiving of cases shall be done within the period prescribed under the guidelines11. A criminal case shall be
archived only if, after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the
delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer. Such case may likewise be archived when proceedings therein
are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because: a.) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition, b.) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the criminal
case, c.) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to a higher court which issued a TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction, d.) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by
the bondsman.

11. Arraignment and Pre-trial shall be set within ten (10) calendar days from date of the courts receipt of the case
for a detained accused, and within thirty (30) calendar days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over a
non-detained accused. The setting shall be incorporated in the commitment order or in the approval of the bail in
other cases. Notices shall be sent to the accused, his/her counsel, private complainant or complaining law
enforcement agent, public prosecutor, and witnesses whose names appear in the information for purposes of plea-
bargaining, arraignment and pre-trial.

12. In multiple cases, the court, upon personal examination of the accused may allow a waiver of the reading of the
information upon the full understanding and express consent of the accused and his/her counsel, which consent
shall be expressly stated in both the minutes/certificate of arraignment and the order of arraignment.

13. Plea bargaining except in drug cases shall immediately proceed, provided the private offended part in private
crimes, or the arresting officer in victimless crimes, is present to give his/her consent with the conformity of the
public prosecutor. Thereafter, judgment shall immediately be rendered in the same proceedings.

14. If the accused pleads guilty to the crime charged in the information, judgment shall be immediately rendered,
except in those cases involving capital punishment.

15. If no plea bargaining or plea of guilty, the court shall immediately proceed with the arraignment and the pre-
trial. The schedule of the trial dates, for both the prosecution and the accused, shall be continuous and within the
periods provided in the Regular Rules/Special Rules. The trial dates may be shortened depending on the number of
witnesses to be presented.From the time of the arraignment and pre-trial, it shall be set for trial within thirty (30)
days. Trial on the merits shall be conducted for a period of six (6) months only and promulgation of judgment is set
within ninety (90) days from submission of the case for decision for regular rules.
For drug cases, trial shall be finished not later than sixty (60) days from filing of the information. Decision shall be
rendered within fifteen (15) days from submission of case for decision.

For environmental cases, from arraignment and pre-trial, it shall be set for hearing within thirty (30) days. Trial on
the merits shall be conducted for a period of three (3) months then filing of memoranda is within thirty (30) days
and the decision shall be rendered within sixty (60) days from the last day to file memoranda. Disposition period
shall be within ten (10) months from date of arraignment.

For intellectual property right cases, from arraignment and pre-trial, it shall be set for hearing within thirty (30)
days. Trial on the merits shall be conducted for a period of sixty (60) days then filing of memoranda is within thirty
(30) days and the judgment shall be rendered within ninety (90) days from submission of case for decision.

16. Pre-trial shall proceed even in the absence of parties provided, they were notified and the counsel for the
accused and the public prosecutor are present. The documentary evidence for both parties shall be marked. The
pre-trial order shall immediately be served upon the parties and counsel on the same day after the termination of
the pre-trial. Courts must strictly comply with the rules.12
17. The following shall be referred to mediation:

a. B.P Blg 22.

b. SSS Law13.
c. Pag-Ibig Law.14
d. Theft under Art. 308, RPC.
e. Estafa under Art. 315(1), RPC, except estafa under Art. 315 (2) and (3).
f. Other forms of swindling under Art. 316, RPC.
g. Swindling of a minor under Art. 317, RPC.
h. Other deceits under Art. 318, RPC.
i. Malicious Mischief under Art. 327, RPC.
j. Libel by means of writings or similar means under Art 355, RPC.
k. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation under Art. 356, RPC.
l. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in course of official proceedings under Art. 357, RPC.
m. Grave Slander (Grave Oral Defamation)- of serious and insulting nature under Art. 358, par. 1, RPC.
n. Simple Slander ( Oral Defamation)- not of a serious and insulting nature under Art. 358, RPC.
o. Grave Slander by Deed- of a serious nature under Art. 359, par. 1, RPC.
p. Simple Slander by Deed- not of a serious nature under Art. 359, par. 2, RPC.
q. Incriminating innocent person under Art. 363, RPC.
r. Intriguing against honour under Art. 364, RPC.
s. Libel under R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012) where the liability may be civil in nature.
t. Criminal negligence under Title 14, RPC, where the liability may be civil in nature, and
u. Intellectual property rights cases where the liability may be civil in nature.

18. The referral of the case for mediation shall be made only after the arraignment and the pre-trial/preliminary
conference. The mediation shall be terminated within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) calendar days. Except
those case mentioned above, criminal cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure shall not be referred to
mediation.

19. Petition for bail filed after the filing of the information shall be set for summary hearing after arraignment and
pre-trial. It shall be heard and resolved within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date of the first
hearing, except in drug cases which shall be heard and resolved within twenty (20) calendar days. The accused
need not present evidence to rebut the prosecutions evidence. Motion for reconsideration on the resolution of
petition for bail shall be resolved within a non-extendible period of ten (10) calendar days from date of submission
of the motion.

20. For First Level Courts, in all criminal cases, including those covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure , the
testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed written statements given to law enforcement officers
or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor and if such are not available,
testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits. The trial prosecutor may opt to dispense with the sworn
statements submitted to the law enforcement officers and instead prepare judicial affidavits or modify or revise
the said sworn statements.

21. For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, where the demeanor of the witnesses is not
essential, like the forensic chemist, medico-legal officers, investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers,
custodians, expert witnesses and other similar witnesses, who will testify on the authenticity, due execution and
the contents of public documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are transactional in character, such as
falsification, malversation, estafa or other crimes where the culpability or innocence of the accused can be
established through documents, the testimonies of the witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written statements
given to law enforcement officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating
prosecutor, and if such are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits.
22. During the pre-trial/preliminary conference, the court shall require the parties to stipulate on the testimonies
of witnesses who have no personal knowledge of the material facts constituting the crimes, such as, forensic
chemists, medico-legal officers, investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians, expert witnesses and
other similar witnesses, who will testify on the authenticity, due execution and the contents of public documents
and reports; corroborative witnesses; and those who will testify on the civil liability. This is without prejudice to
additional direct and cross examination questions.

23. The court shall encourage the accused and the prosecution to avail of Secs. 12 and 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court15.

24. In the absence of the counsel de parte, the hearing shall proceed upon appointment by the court of a counsel de
officio.

25. The offer of evidence, the comment/objection thereto, and the court ruling thereto shall be made orally in open
court on the same day after the presentation of the last witness either for the prosecution or for the defence. The
court shall ensure that the offered evidence are submitted to court on the same day it is offered.

26. The court shall inquire from the accused his/her desire to move for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
or to proceed in presenting his/her evidence. If the accused orally moves for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence, the court shall orally resolve the same. If the motion for leave is denied, the court shall issue an order for
the accused to present and terminate his/her evidence on the dates previously agreed upon, and to orally offer and
rest his/her case on the day his/her last witness is presented. If accused insists on filing the demurrer to evidence
without leave, the previously scheduled dates for the accused to present evidence shall be cancelled. The demurrer
shall be resolved by the court within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing
of the comment or lapse of the ten (10)-day period to comment.

If the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence is granted, and the demurrer to evidence is denied, the
accused shall likewise present and terminate his/her evidence, one day apart, morning and afternoon and shall
orally offer and rest his/her case on the day his/her last witness is presented.

27. The court shall strictly adhere to the rule that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day.

28. The submission of memoranda is discretionary on the part of the court which in no case shall exceed twenty-
five (25) pages in length, single-spaced, on legal size paper, using size 14 font. Its filing is non-extendible and shall
not suspend the running of the period of promulgation of the decision.

29. Judges who conducted the trial and heard the testimonies of witnesses shall submit the case for decision even if
the transcript of stenographic notes are incomplete or missing. If the case was heard completely by another judge,
not the judge tasked to write the decision, the latter shall direct the stenographers concerned to submit the
complete transcripts within the period of thirty (30) calendar days from date of his/her assumption to office.

30. The judge shall announce in open court and include in the order submitting the case for decision, the date of the
promulgation of its decision which shall not be more than ninety (90) calendar days from the date the case is
submitted for decision, except when the case is covered by special Rules and other laws which provide for a
shorter period.

31. A motion for reconsideration of judgment of conviction or motion for new trial under Rule 121 filed within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from promulgation shall be resolved within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) calendar days from the submission of the comment of the prosecution or even in the absence of comment.

32. The physical inventory of cases and preparation of the semestral report16 shall not suspend court hearings.

33. All courts covered by the Revised Guidelines shall accomplish and submit a periodic report of data in a form to
be generated and distributed by the Committee.

34. Non-compliance with the Revised Guidelines, including failure to observe the timelines and deadlines herein
provided, is a ground for disciplinary action.

35. MORE POWER AND GOD BLESS THE ENTIRE JUDICIARY!!!