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WHEN TO INVOKE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. CHUA


762 SCRA 128

FACTS;

Respondent Lilia S. Chua was employed as a bank executive by Far East Bank, rising through the latter's
ranks and holding the position of Assistant Vice President from October 1, 1997 until the termination of her
employment.re
It is not disputed that on July 1, 1999, Chua's employment was terminated as Far East Bank found Chua
to have engaged in multiple kiting transactions, which are fraudulent transactions involving the drawing out
of money from a bank account that does not have sufficient funds in order to cover a check.
Chua was dismissed by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co. due to a finding that she engaged in multiple
kiting transactions which was a serious violation of Far East Bank's Code of Conduct. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that there was illegal dismissal. This was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission. Chua
participated in the appeal proceedings before the NLRC.
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling, stating that Far East
Bank's appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission was not perfected.
SC was asked reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Assailing Far East Bank's basis for terminating her employment, Chua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City of the National Labor
Relations Commission.
In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Arbitration Branch, the parties were ordered to submit
their respective Position Papers. Despite an extension having been given to Far East Bank, it failed to
timely file its Position Paper.
On April 25, 2000, Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto III (Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto) rendered a
Decision finding Chua to have been illegally dismissed. On May 15, 2000, this Motion was denied.
On May 25, 2000, Far East Bank directly filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the
National Labor Relations Commission.
On April 30, 2001, the National Labor Relations Commission Fifth Division issued a Resolution reversing
and setting aside the April 25, 2000 Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto. It held that Far East Bank's
delay of "a few days" in filing its Position Paper was excusable, especially considering that it and its counsel
were based in different cities, Cotabato City and General Santos City, respectively. It added that it was
successfully shown by Far East Bank that Chua "had indeed committed irregular acts in relation to his
position as Assistant Vice President," "acts that would constitute for loss of trust and confidence," thereby
justifying the termination of her employment.
Aggrieved, Chua filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE;

Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the directly filed unperfected appeal
of respondent.

HELD;

The Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish lower courts, as well as "to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, except of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
For their part, administrative agencies are statutory constructs. Thus, they are limited by the statutes which
created them and which spelled out their powers and functions. "It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.8 Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-judicial powers,
but only to the extent warranted by administrative action.

Unlike courts, the National Labor Relations Commission's existence is not borne out of constitutional fiat. It
owes its existence to Article 213 of the Labor Code:La
Art. 213. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National Labor Relations
Commission which shall be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination only, composed of a Chairman and fourteen (14) Members.
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
1 Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
-Unfair labor practice cases;
-Termination disputes;
-If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
-Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations:
-Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and
-Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits,
all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in
domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
2 The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
3 Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be
disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary
arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.

Article 218 of the Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the authority to adopt
procedural rules:
Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
1 To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and
its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code

The Court of Appeals thus failed to account for the crucial fact that the issue of jurisdiction was invoked by
respondent only upon her elevation to it of the case. It failed to recognize that respondent had all the
opportunity to raise this issue before the very tribunal whom she claims to have had no competence to rule
on the appeal, but that it was only after the same tribunal ruled against her twice first, in its initial
Resolution and second, in denying her reconsideration that she saw it fit to assail its jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals failed to see through respondent's own failure to seasonably act and failed to realize that
she was guilty of estoppel by laches, taking "an unreasonable . . . length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier

Respondent cannot now profit from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings and
vigorously argued her case before the National Labor Relations Commission without the slightest indication
that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those proceedings. It is thus but appropriate to
consider her as acceding to and bound by how the National Labor Relations Commission was to resolve
and, ultimately did resolve, petitioner's appeal. Its findings that the requisites of substantive and procedural
due process were satisfied in terminating respondent's employment now stand undisturbed.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is
REINSTATED
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

AYALA LAND vs CASTILLO


780 SCRA 1

FACTS;

CCFI owned two parcels of land (the subject land) with a total area of 221.3048 hectares located at
Barangay Tibig in Silang,Cavite. The subject land was mortgaged in favor of one of CCFIs creditors, MBC.
Pursuant to Resolution No. 505 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), MBC was
placed under receivership on22 May 1987, in accordance with Section 29 of the Central Bank Act. Pursuant
to this law, the assets of MBC were placed in the hands of its receiver under custodia legis. On 29
September 1989, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage placing the property under compulsory acquisition
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

In the meantime, CCFI was unable to comply with its mortgage obligations to MBC. The latter foreclosed
on the lien, and the land was awarded to it in an auction sale held on4 January 1991. The sale was duly
annotated on the titles as Entry No. 5324-44. In a Deed of Partial Redemption, CCFI was authorized to
partially redeem the two parcels of land and sell them to a third party, pending full payment of the
redemption price.Under the Deed, the down payment, which was 30% of the purchase price, would be
payable to the bank only upon approval of the exemption of the two parcels of land from the coverage of
CARL or upon their conversion to non-agricultural use.

On the same date, the property was sold to petitioner ALI in a Deed of Sale over the properties covered by
TCT Nos. 128672 and 144245. The sale was not absolute but conditional stating that MBC was to continue
to have custody of the corresponding titles for as long as any obligation remained due it.

Prompted by the numerous proceedings for compulsory acquisition initiated by the DAR against MBC,
Governor Reyes requested then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao to issue an order exempting the
landholdings of MBC from CARL and to declare a moratorium on the compulsory acquisition of MBCs
landholdings. But Secretary Garilao denied the request. On1 August 1995, MBC and Governor Reyes filed
with the OP a Petition for Review of Secretary Garilaos Decision. The OP issued a Stay Orderof the
appealed Decision. Thereafter, MBC filed with the OP a motion for the issuance of an order granting the
former a period of five years within which to seek the conversion of its landholdings to non-agricultural use.

Instead of ruling on the motion alone, however, the OP, through Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
remanded the case to the DAR and ordered the agency to determine which parcels of land were exempt
from the coverage of the CARL. Secretary Torres denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the DAR.

Secretary Garilao issued a Resolution dated3 October 1997, granting MBCs Request for Clearance to Sell,
with the sale to be undertaken by CCFI. He applied Section 73-A of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, as
amended by R.A. 7881, that allows the sale of agricultural land where such sale or transfer is necessitated
by a banks foreclosure of a mortgage. DAR Memorandum Circular No. 05, Series of 1996 further clarified
the above provision, stating that foreclosed assets are subject to existing laws on their compulsory transfer
under Section 16 of the General Banking Act. CCFI thereafter filed an application for conversion and/or
exemption pursuant to its prerogative as a landowner under Part IV of DAR A.O. 12-94 and the procedure
outlined therein.
On 31 October 1997, Secretary Garilao issued Conversion Order No. 4-97-1029-051, approving the
conversion and/or exemption of the 221-hectare property in Silang, exempting the properties from agrarian
reform coverage, as it was beyond eighteen (18) degrees in slope.

On 19 May 2000, he farmers tilling the subject land filed a Petition for Revocation of Conversion Order No.
4-97-1029-051 alleging: (1) that the sale in 1995 by CCFI to ALI was invalid; and (2) that CCFI and ALI
were guilty of misrepresentation in claiming that the property had been reclassified through a mere
Resolution, when the law required an ordinance of the Sanggunian. The issue of the alleged Notice of
Acquisition was never raised. Neither was there any mention of the issuance of a Notice of Coverage.

On18 December 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr.declared that the action to revoke the
conversion had not yet prescribed. According to him, Section 34 of A.O. 1-99 imposing the one-year
prescription period did not apply, because administrative rules should be applied prospectively. Thus, the
rule to be followed was that prevailing at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order DAR A.O. 12-94
not A.O. 1-99, which was the rule prevailing when the Petition for Revocation was filed. But he never passed
upon or even mentioned any matter related to the Notice of Acquisition.

It is important to note, however, that Secretary Morales declared that CCFI and ALI had completed the
payment of disturbance compensation to the farmers, as shown by theKasunduan,which was a waiver of
all the farmers rights over the landholding, and by theKatunayan ng Pagbabayad,which expressly
acknowledged the amounts paid as the full and final settlement of their claims against CCFI and ALI.

On26 September 2002, acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by ALI, DAR Secretary Hernani
Braganza reversedthe Revocation of Conversion Order 4-97-1029-051. Again,Secretary Braganza was not
afforded an opportunity to discuss any evidence related to the existence or effect of any Notice of
Acquisition, as the joinder of issues was limited.

Secretary Braganza found that the Deed of Partial Redemption was conditional, and that there was no
transfer of ownership to CCFI or its successor-in-interest, ALI. Hence, there could be no violation of the
CARL arising from an unauthorized transfer of the land to ALI. In fact, the obligation of ALI to pay the
purchase price did not arise until the DARs issuance of an order of exemption or conversion. On14 January
2003, Secretary Braganza granted ALIs Motion for Extension to develop the land for another five (5) years.

The farmers questioned the jurisdiction of the DAR to determine the ownership of the lands and to determine
whether or not the sale was conditional, as these issues are within the ambit of the civil courts.

Secretary Roberto Pagdanganan denied the farmers Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the finality
of the Braganza Order.

On appeal, the upheld Conversion Order No. 4-97-1029-051 issued by then Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Ernesto Garilao, as well as the Orders issued by Secretary Hernani Braganza
and Secretary Roberto Pagdanganan both affirming the conversion.

The CA found merit in the OPs rationale for maintaining the Conversion Order, yet invalidated the same on
the basis that a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition had already been issued over the lands,
thus they could no longer be subject to conversion.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE;

Whether or not the CA is barred from resolving the issue of the alleged Notice of Acquisition thaw only
raised for the first time on appeal?

HELD;
The CA found the Conversion Order valid on all points, with the sole exception of the effect of the alleged
issuance of a Notice of Acquisition.

After perusing the records of the DAR and the OP, however, there is no admissible proof presented to
support this claim. A Notice of Acquisition was never offered in evidence before the DAR and never became
part of the records even at the trial court level. Thus, its existence is not a fully established fact for the
purpose of serving as the sole basis the entire history of the policy decisions made by the DAR and the OP
were to be overturned. The CA committed reversible error when it gave credence to a mere assertion by
the tenant-farmers, rather than to the policy evaluation made by the OP.

In fact, the records show that this issue was not raised in the original Petition for Revocation in the second
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the farmers before the DAR, and that no Notice of Acquisition was
attached to their Appeal Memorandum to the OP.As a consequence, the OP, Secretary Pagdanganan,
Secretary Braganza, and Secretary Morales did not have any opportunity to dwell on this issue in their
Orders and Decision. Instead, what respondents persistently allege is the concealment of the sale by CCFI
and ALI.

It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the
lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. More important, if these matters had
been raised earlier, they could have been seriously examined by the administrative agency concerned.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

KING vs ROBLES
776 SCRA 175

FACTS;

In a Decision dated February 28, 1997 rendered by the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having
illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay
him full backwages from the time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision
became final and executory. On November 19, 2001, Arbiter Robles issued a writ of
execution5 commanding the execution arm of the NLRC to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of
Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may
be found and collect the sum of x x x P471,200.99 representing [Rogelios] backwages and 13th month
pay. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the
movable or immovable properties of the respondent not exempt from execution.

In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a Notice of
Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the representative of therein respondents on March
5, 2002. Personal properties found inside the compound of Azkcon at No. 220 Lias Road, Lambakan Street,
Marilao, Bulacan were levied upon. Meanwhile, on March 13, 2002, Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication
Corporation (PMAFC, one of the companies represented by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
before Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC filed a Motion
to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property and to Inhibit Sheriffs. PMAFC contended
that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to PMAFC worth P12 million and that the Deputy
Sheriffs intended to sell the said properties for a measly sum of P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed that the
Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be disqualified.
In an Order dated April 18, 2002, Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an
amount double the judgment award.

On April 26, 2002, Arbiter Robles approved Rogelios Sheriffs Indemnity Bond, directed the Deputy Sheriffs
to obtain physical possession of the levied properties, sell them at public auction, and apply the proceeds
thereof for the satisfaction of the judgment award. Rogelio, through his attorney-in-fact, Rodrigo Mendoza,
emerged as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted on May 2, 2002. After the Certificate of Sale
was issued, Rodrigo and his workers started to pull out and haul the sold properties.
Contending that the value of the properties taken and hauled by Rogelio through his attorney-in-fact were
worth more than the monetary award of the NLRC, petitioner King, claiming to be the President of Azkcon
Metal Industries, Inc., Azkcon Refrigeration Industries, Inc., Azkcon Construction Development
Corporation, Azk Trading and PMAFC, filed criminal complaints for Robbery, Violation of RA 3019 and
Falsification of Public Documents against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman docketed as
OMB-C-C-02-0339-F and C-C-02-1340-F. He alleged that respondents conspired in the unlawful taking of
the machineries and equipment which caused him and the aforesaid companies undue injury. King claimed
that the properties were owned by PMAFC inasmuch as the Azkcon Group of Companies is not a registered
corporation; that in the Notice rescheduling the auction sale, the Deputy Sheriffs misleadingly indicated the
address as 220 Lambakin St., Marilao, Bulacan, when the correct address of Azkcon is 220 Lias Road, Bo.
Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan; that the Deputy Sheriffs did not actually hold a public auction consistent with
respondents intention to rob Azkcon; and that Joseph and Teresita conspired with the other respondents
when they allowed the safekeeping of the hauled machineries and equipment in their compound. The
National Bureau of Investigation whose assistance was sought by petitioner likewise filed similar charges
against the aforenamed accused before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and docketed
as I.S. No. 02-05-1059 and I.S. No. 02-06-1406.

After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties respective position, the Ombudsman in its Joint
Resolution dated August 29, 2008 dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable
cause.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioners evidence failed to establish the four elements of the crime of
robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is the owner of the
subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale issued to him. Thus,
Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another.
The Ombudsman likewise ruled that the sale of the levied properties through auction was not made with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. The Deputy Sheriffs actions
were done pursuant to the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment.
With respect to the charge of Falsification of Public Documents, the Ombudsman found no record to show
that respondents falsified any pertinent document in this case.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed Joint
Order dated November 17, 2010.
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. King insists that probable cause exists to charge
respondents with Robbery, Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
On July 20, 2011, we resolved to require respondents to file comment. Respondents Romeo and Rodrigo
filed their Comment maintaining that King failed to prove that there was probable cause to charge them
with the foregoing crimes. They also posit that King did not establish conspiracy among them. Moreover,
they maintain that Arbiter Robles and the Deputy Sheriffs were only performing their duties as mandated
by law. Also, the withdrawal of the properties was done by authority of the law and by virtue of the Certificate
of Sale. King thereafter filed his Reply. To date, the other respondents failed to comment. Hence, they are
deemed to have waived their right to file comment.

ISSUE;

Whether the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents for trial.

HELD;
The Petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to
investigate on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. By constitutional fiat and
under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on
offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Because of the
endowment of broad investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the
sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it
may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it except when
the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. A perusal of the Petition shows that petitioner failed to
demonstrate the Ombudsmans abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charges
against respondents for lack of probable cause. On the contrary, a review of the records readily reveals
that the Ombudsmans assailed Joint Resolution is based on substantial evidence. From the well-explained
Joint Resolution, in our view, petitioners Affidavit/Complaint is bereft of sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crimes imputed on respondents have been committed and that they are
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion
warranting the Courts intervention, in dismissing the charges against respondents.

Petitioner complained of procedural flaws in the enforcement of the writ of execution arguing in the main
that the value of the levied and hauled properties were much more than the monetary award of the NLRC.
This we believe is not an adequate ground to reverse the action of the Ombudsman.

Petitioners bone of contention in the present Petition boils down to the appreciation and determination of
factual matters. The question of whether there was indeed an over levy of properties is one that is
essentially a factual concern as it goes into the determination of the fair market value of the properties
levied upon vis--vis the value of the properties hauled and taken out of the companys premises.
Obviously, petitioner invites an evaluation of the evidentiary matters which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Besides, this Court is not a trier of facts. Matters pertaining to proofs and evidence are
beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 Petition except in the presence of some
meritorious circumstances, none of which is availing in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Resolution dated August 29, 2008 of the Office of the
Ombudsman and its Joint Order dated November 17, 2010 are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

GARCIA vs TOLENTINO
766 SCRA 277

FACTS;
RA 8291 was enacted by Congress on May 30, 1997 provided for, among others, the compulsory
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) coverage of all government employees, regardless of
employment status.
Tolentino, et al., all contractual employees of the various projects and programs within and under the control
and supervision of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), wrote the GSIS to
inquire about their standing, since, prior to RA 8291, they were not under compulsory GSIS coverage.
The GSIS, in a letter dated January 8, 1998 through its Senior Vice President for the Social Insurance
Group Lourdes G. Patag, advised that while casual and contractual employees paid from the regular lump-
sum appropriation are covered under RA 8291, contractual employees who were hired co-terminus with
projects and are receiving additional 20% pay were not. The GSIS communicated SVP Patags view to the
DENR in a letter dated January 12, 1998.

On April 30, 1999, the GSIS and the Department of Budget and Management issued Joint Circular which
set forth the guidelines in the payment of the government statutory expenditures on personal services of
contractual employees. It states that on May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291 was passed, mandating the
mandatory GSIS coverage of all government employees regardless of employment status. Prior to its
passage, contractual employees were not entitled to leave benefits. Instead, they received 20% premium
pay. As such, their salaries were 20% higher than the salaries of regular employees occupying equivalent
positions, provided that the total amount does not exceed 120% of the latters minimum salary.

The DENR, through a Memorandum dated September 16, 1999, accordingly informed its Project/Program
Directors that deductions from the premium pay shall be reflected in the payroll starting October 1999 to
include arrearages for the months of January to September 1999. On October 4, 1999, Tolentino, et al.,
again, wrote to the GSIS and the DENR requesting the deferment of the deduction of the monthly GSIS
contributions pending resolution of the issue regarding their membership coverage.
Before the concerned government agencies could act on their letters, Tolentino, et al., on October 28, 1999,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with very Urgent Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against then GSIS President and General Manager Frederico C. Pascual,
then Secretary of Budget and Management Benjamin E. Diokno and then Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Antonio H. Cerilles.
In their petition before the trial court, Tolentino, et al. essentially argued that the GSIS and the DBM
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the governments share on GSIS contributions to be paid
out of the 20% premium on the monthly salary of contractual employees.
In his Answer and Motion to Dismiss, Pascual pleaded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
case because RA 8291 vests in the GSIS the original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under the said Act. This motion was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 24, 2000.
Meanwhile, the concerned DENR officials argued that they cannot be held to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion because they merely implemented the joint circular.

ISSUE;

1. Whether or not the GSIS is guilty of forum shopping;32


2. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the petition filed by Tolentino, et al. and
3. Whether or not the Joint Circular is valid.

HELD;

On August 29, 2000, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the concerned
government agencies from implementing the Joint Circular. Subsequently, or on March 11, 2001, the trial
court rendered a Decision making permanent the preliminary injunction it issued earlier. It ruled that the
Court finds merit in the petitioners contention that indeed the joint circular runs afoul of the provisions of
RA 8291.
Under this circular, the contractual personnel shall in effect be paying the governments share of the
contributions inasmuch as no additional funds shall be appropriated for the purpose. This is a clear
contravention of the very law it seeks to implement.
GSIS as an administrative agency vested with quasilegislative powers shall exercise such delegated
legislative power with no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in
the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

Clearly, the joint circular had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for being violative of the letter of the law it seeks to implement. Indeed, administrative
regulations must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement.
They are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to modify the law. Stating CIR vs CA 240 SCRA 149

Finally, respondents assail the jurisdiction of this Court citing Sec. 30 of RA 8291 and Sec. 14.1 and 14.3
of the Implementing Rules. Granting arguendo that the GSIS has primary jurisdiction over the instant case
as it appears that petitioners did not avail nor exhaust the administrative remedies by not moving for the
reconsideration of their coverage under RA 8291, the Court, however, deemed it just and equitable under
the circumstances to give due course to the instant petition because the petitioners had no other speedy
and adequate remedy available to them in view of the impending implementation of the questioned circular.

Moreover, the Courts act to take cognizance of the instant case finds justification in the provisions of the
par. 2, Sec. 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the GSIS-DBM Joint Circular No. 99-3
is hereby annulled for being contrary to law. The preliminary injunction previously issued is hereby made
permanent.

The DBM and the GSIS each filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration but these were denied by
the RTC in an Order. The DBM filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial courts Decision. GSIS, on the other
hand, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

On February 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General
to comment on whether the DBMs appeal may be given due course.
The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment, argued that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Tolentino, et al.s petition considering the subject matter thereof pertains
to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the GSIS. Moreover, the OSG asserted that even assuming
arguendo that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Tolentino, et al.s petition, the
government could legally rechannel the funds provided for said purpose in the 1999 General
Appropriations Act (GAA) to answer the government share of the GSIS contributions for that same year.
On February 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing that of the trial court. Denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision, Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DISMISSING the petition for lack of
merit, prematurity and lack of cause of action.

In their comment on the GSISs Petition for Review, Tolentino, et al. argued that GSIS committed forum
shopping in this case. At the time GSIS filed its petition on July 23, 2002, it already had knowledge that a
co-party, DBM had already filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Despite this knowledge, the GSIS
filed G.R. No. 153810;37 more, contrary to its undertaking in its certification against forum shopping, the
GSIS did not inform this Honorable Court of the pending case before the Court of Appeals.
The GSIS vehemently denied that there is forum shopping. It argued that while the GSIS has already
decided that it will be filing a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court as early as June 20, 2002, its
counsel only received a copy of the DBMs Notice of Appeal on June 21, 2002.
This argument fails to persuade. Here, the commonality of interests among the DBM, the GSIS and the
DENR cannot be denied. The pleadings filed from the inception of the case will show that they have
essentially the same arguments and defenses and seek the same reliefs. More, in terms of the issuance of
the Joint Circular, these agencies have equal stakes should the challenged circular be declared invalid.
Without a doubt, the different modes of appeal taken by the GSIS and the DBM will, in the process, create
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issue. Indeed, a final
decision in one would constitute res judicata in the other. SC dismissed the petition with a warning to the
GSIS that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
construction, only application.
Thus, the concerned government agencies are correct in their contention that the GSIS has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 8291.
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort and, its corollary doctrine, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, are applicable in the instant case. Therefore, the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the said Tolentino case.

JURISDICTION OD THE QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT- NLRC

MENDOZA vs OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU)


781 SCRA 631

FACTS;

In an April 11, 2007 letter, MWEU through Elizabeth Cometa, one of the respondents, informed petitioner
that the union was unable to fully deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of
the required December 2006 checkoff authorization from him. Petitioner was warned that his failure to pay
the union dues would result in sanctions upon him. Quebral informed Borela, through a May 2, 2007 letter,
that for such failure to pay the union dues, petitioner and several others violated Section 1(g), Article IX of
the MWEUs Constitution and By-Laws. In turn, Borela referred the charge to the MWEU grievance
committee for investigation.
On May 21, 2007, a notice of hearing was sent to petitioner, who attended the scheduled hearing. On June
6, 2007, the MWEU grievance committee recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days.
In a June 20, 2007 letter, Borela informed petitioner and his corespondents of the MWEU Executive Boards
unanimous approval of the grievance committees recommendation and imposition upon them of a penalty
of 30 days suspension, effective June 25, 2007.
In a June 26, 2007 letter to Borela, petitioner and his corespondents took exception to the imposition and
indicated their intention to appeal the same to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with
Section 2(g), Article V of the unions Constitution and By-Laws,11 which grants them the right to appeal any
arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board to the General Membership
Assembly. In a June 28, 2007 reply, Borela denied petitioners appeal, stating that the prescribed period
for appeal had expired.
Petitioner and his corespondents sent another letter on July 4, 2007, reiterating their arguments and
demanding that the General Membership Assembly be convened in order that their appeal could be taken
up. The letter was not acted upon.
Petitioner was once more charged with nonpayment of union dues, and was required to attend an August
3, 2007 hearing.Thereafter, petitioner was again penalized with a 30-day suspension through an August
21, 2007 letter by Borela informing petitioner of the Executive Boards unanimous approval of the
grievance committee recommendation to suspend him effective August 24, 2007, to which he submitted a
written reply, invoking his right to appeal through the convening of the General Membership Assembly.
However, the respondents did not act on petitioners plea.
Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers on September 14, 2007. Petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for Vice President, but he was disqualified for not being a member in good standing on account
of his suspension.
On October 2, 2007, petitioner was charged with nonpayment of union dues for the third time. He did not
attend the scheduled hearing. This time, he was meted the penalty of expulsion from the union, per
unanimous approval of the members of the Executive Board. His pleas for an appeal to the General
Membership Assembly were once more unheeded.
In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
MWC, petitioner joined another union, the Workers Association for Transparency, Empowerment and
Reform, All-Filipino Workers Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was elected union President. Other
MWEU members were inclined to join WATER-AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened that they
would not get benefits from the new CBA.
The MWEU leadership submitted a proposed CBA which contained provisions to the effect that in the event
of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only
MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus. On October 13, 2008, petitioner filed a Complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practices, damages, and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations
Commission, Quezon City. In his Position Paper and other written submissions, petitioner accused the
respondents of illegal termination from MWEU in connection with the events relative to his nonpayment of
union dues; unlawful interference, coercion, and violation of the rights of MWC employees to self-
organization in connection with the proposed CBA submitted by MWEU leadership, which petitioner
claims contained provisions that discriminated against non-MWEU members. Petitioner prayed in his
Supplemental Position Paper that respondents be held guilty of unfair labor practices and ordered to
indemnify him moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages amounting to
P50,000.00, and 10% attorneys fees.
In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings, respondents claimed that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the dispute, which is intra-union in nature; that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was
the proper venue, in accordance with Article 226 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule XI of Department
Order 40-03, Series of 2003, of the DOLE; and that they were not guilty of unfair labor practices,
discrimination, coercion or restraint.

On May 29, 2009, Labor Arbiter Virginia T. Luyas-Azarraga issued her Decision which decreed as follows:

Indeed the filing of the instant case is still premature. Section 5, Article X Investigation Procedures and
Appeal Process of the Union Constitution and By-Laws provides that:
Section 5. Any dismissed and/or expelled member shall have the rights to appeal to the Executive Board
within seven (7) days from the date of notice of the said dismissal and/or expulsion, which in [turn] shall be
referred to the General Membership Assembly. In case of an appeal, a simple majority of the decision of
the Executive Board is imperative. The same shall be approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the
general membership assembly in a meeting duly called for the purpose.
On the basis of the foregoing, the parties shall exhaust first all the administrative remedies before resorting
to compulsory arbitration. Thus, instant case is referred back to the Union for the General Assembly to act
or deliberate complainants appeal on the decision of the Executive Board.
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant case is referred back to the Union level for the General
Assembly to act on complainants appeal.

Petitioner appealed before the NLRC. On March 15, 2010, the NLRC issued its Decision, declaring as
follows:

Complainant imputes serious error to the Labor Arbiter when she decided as follows:
a. Referring back the subject case to the Union level for the General Assembly to act on his appeal.
b. Not ruling that respondents are guilty of ULP as charged.
c. Not granting to complainant moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Complainant, in support of his charges, claims that respondents restrained or coerced him in the exercise
of his right as a union member in violation of paragraph a, Article 249 of the Labor Code,31 particularly, in
denying him the explanation as to whether there was observance of the proper procedure in the increase
of the membership dues from P100.00 to P200.00 per month. Further, complainant avers that he was
denied the right to appeal his suspension and expulsion in accordance ith the provisions of the Unions
Constitution and By-Laws. In addition, complainant claims that respondents attempted to cause the
management to discriminate against the members of WATER-AFWC thru the proposed CBA.
Pertinent to the issue then on hand, the Labor Arbiter ordered that the case be referred back to the Union
level for the General Assembly to act on complainants appeal. Hence, these appeals.
After a careful look at all the documents submitted and a meticulous review of the facts, We find that this
Commission lacks the jurisdictional competence to act on this case.
Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended, specifically enumerates the cases over which the Labor Arbiters
and the Commission have original and exclusive jurisdiction. A perusal of the record reveals that the causes
of action invoked by complainant do not fall under any of the enumerations therein. Clearly, SC has no
jurisdiction over the same.

Clearly, the above mentioned disputes and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 29, 2009 is hereby declared NULL and VOID
for being rendered without jurisdiction and the instant complaint is DISMISSED.

In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA, petitioner sought to reverse the NLRC Decision and be awarded
his claim for damages and attorneys fees on account of respondents unfair labor practices, arguing among
others that his charge of unfair labor practices is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the
dispute is inter- or intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were guilty of unfair labor
practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise of his right to self-organization as member of both
MWEU and WATER-AFWC, and in discriminating against him and other members through the provisions
of the proposed 2008 CBA which they drafted; that his failure to pay the increased union dues was proper
since the approval of said increase was arrived at without observing the prescribed voting procedure laid
down in the Labor Code; that he is entitled to an award of damages and attorneys fees as a result of
respondents illegal acts in discriminating against him; and that in ruling the way it did, the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion.

CA ruled that the petition lacks merit.


Petitioners causes of action against MWEU are inter/intra-union disputes cognizable by the BLR whose
functions and jurisdiction are largely confined to union matters, collective bargaining registry, and labor
education. Section 1, Rule XI of Department Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, of the Department of
Labor and Employment enumerates instances of inter/intra-union disputes.
Applying the aforementioned rules, CA found that the issues arising from petitioners right to information on
the increased membership dues, right to appeal his suspension and expulsion according to CBL provisions,
and right to vote and be voted on are essentially intra-union disputes; these involve violations of rights and
conditions of union membership. But his claim that a director of MWEU warned that non-MWEU members
would not receive CBA benefits is an inter-union dispute. It is more of an interference by a rival union to
ensure the loyalty of its members and to persuade nonmembers to join their union. This is not an actionable
wrong because interfering in the exercise of the right to organize is itself a function of self-organizing. As
long as it does not amount to restraint or coercion, a labor organization may interfere in the employees
right to self-organization. Consequently, a determination of validity or illegality of the alleged acts
necessarily touches on union matters, not ULPs, and are outside the scope of the labor arbiters jurisdiction.

ISSUE;

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.

HELD;

The Court partly grants the Petition.

In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals and the CA to resolve, as Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. However, when the conclusion arrived at by them is erroneous in certain respects, and
would result in injustice as to the parties, this Court must intervene to correct the error. While the Labor
Arbiter, NLRC, and CA are one in their conclusion in this case, they erred in failing to resolve petitioner's
charge of unfair labor practices against respondents.

It is true that some of petitioner's causes of action constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR
under Article 226 of the Labor Code.
However, petitioner's charge of unfair labor practices falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code. In addition, Article 247 of the same Code
provides that "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney's fees and other affirmative relief, shall be
under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters."

Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under Article 248 and by labor
organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code.

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