Garcillano V HOR

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arroyo vs. De Venecia

*
G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY

R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO
B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL
DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;

Legislative Rules of Procedure; The cases, both in the Philippines
and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals.It is clear from the
foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2627. Petitioners do not claim
that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant
to the constitutional provision that each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the
principle on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional
provision that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch
to conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking
judicial review. But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying
forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules

of Proceedings are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural.We conclude this survey with the useful summary of
the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the
power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character.
The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them
as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to
this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power to

look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over the shoulders of the justices, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown.In this case no
rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that
House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We
must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
Same; Same; Same; Political Questions; While Art. VIII, 1
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally
left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions
sponsorship in
270
the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1,

nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
beyond judicial review. Implicit in this statement of the former
Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the
jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of
a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope
of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political
departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,
it has not altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If, then, the established rule is that
courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of the Courts
Art. VIII, 1 power.As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1,
this Courts function is merely [to] check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established rule
is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral

Conference Committee Reports; No rule of the House of
Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases involving the approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal
voting.Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of
the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair
and later the individual votes of the Members should have been
taken. They say that the method used in
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this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity

when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval
of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other
hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee
report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of
1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending
the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages,

the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial considerationthe Court cannot provide a second opinion
on what is the best procedure.Indeed, it is no impeachment of
the method to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is
the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem
that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our
deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the
constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage
its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
the problem.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not require

that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instancesupon the
last and third readings of a bill, at the request of onefifth of the
Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and
the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of onefifth of the Members
present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original
bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
272
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedureit means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power
as to amount to lack of power.Given this fact, it is difficult to see
how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted
with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has
a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining
this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1
extends to cases where a branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum

cannot be raised repeatedlyespecially when the quorum is
obviously presentfor the purpose of delaying the business of the
House; A Member of the House waives his objection to the presence
of a quorum by his continued interpellation for in so doing he in
effect acknowledges the presence of a quorum.Here, the matter
complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat,
the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedlyespecially when the quorum is obviously presentfor
the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo
waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor
for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a
quorum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine;

Presumptions; Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a
bill by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment; There is no
claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases that the
enrolled bill embodies a con
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clusive presumption.Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the

signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of
both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996
are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is
devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice
Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim
either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is no evidence

to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
In one case we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had
been approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no
evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification
of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the threefourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because a
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and
is binding on the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enrolled bill doctrine,

as a rule of evidence, is well established, and to overrule it now is
to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an
established rule of evidence.The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule
of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To overrule
274
the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive

teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The

Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein, and with
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the Journal has also been accorded conclusive effect.The Journal
is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect
to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in
United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of
public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of
the most permanent character, thus: They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has
been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No.
8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been
duly proven.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggeryit would be acting in excess
of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so.It would be an unwarranted invasion
of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to
set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to
do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately
be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or
the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or
any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect
is due the judgment of that body.
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PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;

Political Questions; In the Philippine setting, there is a more
compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of
power.In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For
section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally
cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government. This power is new and was not granted to our
courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed
from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary visavis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. In
cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the
government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In resolving the case at bar, the

lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.I urge my brethren in the Court to give
due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision
as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will
not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government
abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it
with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of
judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should
not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.
276
Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Enrolled

Bill Doctrine; An enrolled bill is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due the sanction of the legislative branch
of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him.An enrolled bill is one which has been
duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the
proper officers of each House and approved by the President. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers,
to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;

Modified Entry or Affirmative Contradiction Rule and Extrinsic
Evidence Rule, Explained.Over the years, the enrolled bill
theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions
have adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule.
Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless
there affirmatively appears in the journals of the legislature a
statement that there has not been compliance with one or more of
the constitutional requirements. Other jurisdictions have adopted
the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is
only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The
prima facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals and other extrinsic evidence are allowed to be
received. Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of
fraud or mistakes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle of separation

of powers is the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine.The
principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the
enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also justified as a rule of
convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence.
It is also believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases
which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the
legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren if the validity of every
act published as law is to be tested by examining its history, as
shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there
will be an amount of litiga
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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 277

tion, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its

contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the alleged
uncertainty of the law. The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is
also justified on the ground that journals and other extrinsic
evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is high time we re

examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine.Clearly, the
enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in United States. Sutherland reveals that starting
in the 1940s, x x x the tendency seems to be toward the
abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption
of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity
which may be attacked by any authoritative source of
information. It is high time we reexamine our preference for the
enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito, that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first
embraced the rule that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is time to bury the

enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many
litigationsgiving an enrolled bill a mere prima facie
presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing
justice based on truth.I respectfully submit that it is now time
for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no
longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine.
There are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance.
For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it
originated because in England there is no written Constitution
and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts
in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and
unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of contemporary
developments in lawmaking. And more important, our uncritical
adherence to the enrolled bill is inconsistent with our
Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, we relied on section
313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No.
2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This
section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A
half glance at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to
an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of truth
cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of
our Constitution demands that we live not only under a rule of
law but also
278
under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national

policy requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions
involving public interest. Any rule which will defeat this policy on
transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these
policies, this Court was given the power to pry open and to strike
down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction of
conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot
dispense justice based on fiction for the search for justice is the
search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere prima
facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of
dispensing justice based on truth.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The rules on how to

question the existence of a quorum are procedural in character,
and their observance or nonobservance is a matter of judgment
call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.In sum, I
respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the
petition at bar and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the public respondents to justify granting said
petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves
the complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the
question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation of any
rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right
of a nonmember of the House which requires constitutional
protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a
quorum are procedural in character. They are malleable by nature
for they were drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated,
these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or nonobservance is a matter of judgment call on the
part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to
reverse this judgment when untainted by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and/or Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene
A.V. Saguisag for petitioners.
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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 279

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Jose de Venecia.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition

challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing socalled sin taxes (actually
specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as
H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16,
1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its
report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At
11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated.
Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy1
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo appealed the
_______________________
1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 6668; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of
November 21, 1996 session, pp. 3952; Rollo, pp. 368381; Petition, p. 6,
par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
280

ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put
to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate.
He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the
quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and

ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the
motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none,
approved. (Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood
up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by
the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair
called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is
suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed) THE DEPUTY SPEAKER
(Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four
oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned
until four oclock, Wednesday, next week. (It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and
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VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 281

certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of

Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different
versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyos
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audiosound recording of
the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the
session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996,
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the
operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division
on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3)
the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40
p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions
differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audiosound
recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the
transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on
line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is
repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence (Y)ou better prepare for a
quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum,
which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by
respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this
point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without
conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by
the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on
the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No.
8240 is
282

null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules

of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional
mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of
the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification
of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation
of Rule2 VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House, the Chair, in submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence 3
of a
quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, the Chair
deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that .
. . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep. Albanos motion 4
to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, the
Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of 5Rule
XX, 121122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, the
Chair suspended the session without first ruling on
___________________
2 Rule VIII, 35. Voting.Every member present in the session shall

vote on every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of
personal pecuniary interest therein. Rule XVII, 103. Manner of Voting.
The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying As many as are in favor of
(as the question may be). say Aye and, after the affirmative vote is
counted. As many as are opposed. Say Nay . . .
3 Rule XIX, 112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions.The Speaker
shall state the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the
Secretary General before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any
time before its approval.
4 Rule XVI, 97. Recognition of Member.When two or more members
rise at the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to
speak first.
5 Rule XX, 121. Definition.Questions of privilege are those affecting
the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity of
283
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 283

Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of

order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos
query should have been resolved upon the resumption of
the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily
adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a
quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the
certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had
been properly passed, considering the Courts power under
Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion
by the other departments of the government, and they ask6
for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in
view of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all
respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored
on the
_____________________
reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.
122. Precedence.Subject to the tenminute rule, questions of privilege shall have

precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of
order.
Rule XXI, 123. Definition and Precedence.A privileged motion pertains to a
subject matter which, under the rules, takes precedence over others. The order of
precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.
Rule XVIII, 109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions.When a bill, report or
motion is adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for its
reconsideration on the same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn, a question of
privilege, and a point of order.
6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

284

principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill

doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum
for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there
is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI,
16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of
proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in
the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully
observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia
denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule,
the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives,
covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows
that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection,
the Body approved the7 Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198. This Journal was approved on
December 8
2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the
Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed
a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2627. Petitioners do not claim that
there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver
allegedly in vio
___________________
7 Rollo, p. 228.
8 Id., p. 229.
285
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 285

lation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively

prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted
pursuant to the constitutional provision that9 each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings and that for
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention10 stands the principle on its head. In the
decided cases, the constitutional provision that each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings was
invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of
invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or
11
the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them. And it has been said that
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure.
__________________
9 Art. VI, 16(3).

10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321
(1862); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan,
674 F.2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comn.
675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
11 109 Phil. at 87071. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance], 235 SCRA 630.
286
12
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was
stated thus: The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity
of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or13 tribunal.
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, it was held: The provision
that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority
of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it
is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution. 14
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the
Supreme Court of Ohio stated: The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but
a failure to regard it is not the subjectmatter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of
many states, and also by the United
__________________
12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 32425 (emphasis added).

13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
287
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 287
States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be

declared invalid for noncompliance
15
with rules.
In State v. Savings Bank, the Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut declared itself as follows: The Constitution
declares that each house shall determine the rules of its
own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but
when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its
power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to
set aside such action as void because it may think that the
House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of
procedure. 16
In McDonald v. State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held: When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has
ever declared an act of the legislature void for non
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may
change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline17to follow them.
Schweizer v. Territory is illustrative of the rule in these
cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by
each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case
of an emergency the house concerned may, by twothirds
vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation of a law
punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of the
___________________
15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 910 (1906) (emphasis added).

16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).
288
rule on three readings had not been approved by the

requisite twothirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It
may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit,
either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of
section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed
measures. It receives its entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The
failure of the legislature to properly weigh and consider an
act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown
to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to
govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed
by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly
signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules
of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations.
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan,
80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11
S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the
rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on
the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules
of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is

that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number
of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above
principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question
289
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 289
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is

18
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved

but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court.
We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have
to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests.
Due regard for the working of our system of government,
more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules
of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting19to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
beyond judicial review. Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that
the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and, therefore, to
the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1
has broadened the scope of
_____________________
18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE

PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188189 (1977); Pacete v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of
the Constitutional Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10,
1986).
290
judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political

departments
20
to decide, such as those relating to national
security, it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this
Courts function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or

agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what
21
it thinks is apparent error.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare

an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in
the House was railroaded. They claim that Rep. Arroyo
was still making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Rep. Albanos motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee report. The
Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however,
__________________
20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v.

Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
(1971).
21 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA
692, 701 (1991); Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v.
Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480481 (emphasis added).
291
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 291
Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?

The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously.
Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of
the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by
the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in
this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests
unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited
which specifically requires that in cases such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General
has pointed out, the manner in which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no
means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It
was the way the conference committee report on the bills
which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the
Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary
to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer
became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a

unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from
Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his point of
292

order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair
announces the vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody
objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on second
reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to
divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented,
we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe
there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a
division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can
22
announce how many are in favor and how many are against.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that

some other 23
way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom
or folly of a method
24
do not present any matter for judicial
consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference
and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the
institution as a whole and for the constitutional command
that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes25 us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only in the following
26
instances: upon the last
and third readings of 27a bill, at the request of onefifth of
the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto
of the Presi
__________________
22 4 CONG. REC. 413414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23 United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324
25; State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
26 Art. VI, 26(2).
27 Id., 16(4).
293
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 293

28
28
dent. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of
the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays
had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium
to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking
reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate29
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to
allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it
resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say
anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21,
1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair

declared the session adjourned until four oclock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis
added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no

one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was
largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the
proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyos question as an
obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos
question was not, in form or substance, a point
30
of order or a
question of privilege entitled to precedence. And even if
Rep. Arroyos question were so,
_____________________
28 Id., 27(1).
29 Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND ANNOTATED 331 (1963);
294

Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence
and would have
31
put an end to any further consideration of
the question.
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly
be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave
abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a
settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as
to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion
himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted
to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an32 abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedlyespecially when the
quorum is obviously presentfor 33
the purpose of delaying
the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the
____________________
REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY

PROCEDURE 157158, 172173 (1963).
31 Rule XIX, 13.
32 1 RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436
(Session of July 10, 1986).
33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY
PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).
295
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 295

sponsor for in so doing

34
he in effect acknowledged the
presence of a quorum.
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of
the House earlier found to be present on November 21,
1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one,
except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner
by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry
Osmea did not participate
35
in the bicameral conference
committee proceedings.36 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report but not to the manner it was
approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Taada would 37
have voted in favor of the
conference committee report.
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of
H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and
learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno,
joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be
sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the
EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled
38
bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one
case we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under
___________________
34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335

(1953).
35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p.
16.
36 Ibid.
37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
296

this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that

the threefourths vote needed to pass a proposed
amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because a duly authenticated bill or resolution
39
imports
absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt
which embodies good, if oldfashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they
have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to
improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and
mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal
principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to
represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statuteroll may come
40
to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that

the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions
which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the

passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee
surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
41
departments of our government.
__________________
39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW
ON EVIDENCE 1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is preserved in the
Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE 1350 at 834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf.
Morales vs. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
297
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 297

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI,
26(2) of the Constitution that upon42the last reading of a
bill, no amendment 43
shall be allowed.
In other cases, this Court has denied claims that the
tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established. 44It is cited with approval by text writers here
and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed

by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
45
Constitution.
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to

repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow
an established rule of evidence.
____________________________
42 Philippine Judges Assn v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales
v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131.
43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963);
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed.
1972); 6 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF
COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303
(1891).
298

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant
a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change
in the membership of the Court, the three new members
may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of
the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the
Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places
have since been taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.). Petitioners
are thus simply banking on the change in the membership
of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the
law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the
Journal is required by the Constitution. Art. VI, 16(4)
provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of onefifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to

matters that are 46
required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been 47
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v.
Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding
____________________
46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas
and nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26[2]); (2) the
yeas and nays on any question, at the request of onefifth of the members
present (Id., 16 [4]); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the
Presidents veto (Id., 27 (1); and (4) the Presidents objection to a bill
which he has vetoed. (Id.)
47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44
Ohio 348 (1886).
299
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 299

the Journals as public memorials of the most permanent
character, thus: They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent,
that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been
declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at
some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the
memory of individuals. As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its
due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a

coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its48discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law
or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference 49
rather than disrespect is due the judgment
of that body.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED.
____________________
48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comn, 675 F.2d 1282.
300

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco
and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., In the result.
Davide, Jr., J., I join with Mr. Justice Punos
concurring/dissenting.
Romero, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
Bellosillo, J., No part due to relationship to parties.
Puno, J., See Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion (concurring).
Panganiban, J., No part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., No part: On leave during
deliberations.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the

instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent 1
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. I
am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vote
which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an
implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm
stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under
consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely,
Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
ValueAdded Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues,
both substantive and procedural, were posed by petitioners,
each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is also the
ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting
that I did not entirely
_________________
1 235 SCRA 630.
301
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 301

disagree with each and every argument of the opinion,
most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My
main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused
instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach and
disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in
the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority
seemed to have cavalierly put to2 rest by hiding under the
cloak of the enrolled bill theory and the precept that the
Court is not the proper forum for the 3enforcement of
internal legislative rules allegedly violated. To
_________________
2 Id., at p. 672: Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal

validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not
even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that
certain provisions of a state had been smuggled in the printing of the bill
have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal
branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule. No claim is here made that the
enrolled bill rule is absolute. In fact in one case we went behind an enrolled bill
and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the
Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and
withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to
consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills
have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government.
3 Id., at p. 675: Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already
ruled, parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Our concern is with the
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enact
302

me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind
adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did
not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Court.
Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were
applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call
for their application.
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied
the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize
that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its
application must be limited to minor matters relating more
to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the
essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or

not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having
been saved by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see
no cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the
enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to the
procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and
phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form
and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and
substance of the law itself.
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge
procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative
procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts
whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or
whatevernot over the meaning of the constitution. Legislators,
as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on
the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures would be
offended if courts examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to
substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its
tortuous trip
____________________
ment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that
they have been faithfully observed in these cases.
303
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 303

through Congress, catching both legislators and the public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its
sponsors.
4
This issue I wish to address forthwith.
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper

forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules, both
the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I
was quick to qualify the extent of the Courts review power
in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution which provides that (j)udicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not
of the Government. We are also guided by the principle that a
court may interfere with the internal procedures of its coordinate
5
branch only to uphold the Constitution.
I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that

principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited
power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon
the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in
view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would
have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. This
the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same
principle which should have justified the Court in
questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.
At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing
adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I
raised in my dissent would not hold true in the instant
petition.
___________________
4 Id., pp. 778779; emphasis supplied.

5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
304

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of
Representatives allegedly violated by respondents in the
instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the
orderly conduct of the Houses business. They have no
direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and
proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a bill
which would otherwise warrant the Courts intervention.
Likewise, the petitioners are not in any way complaining
that substantial alterations have been introduced in
Republic Act No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners
arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely
with respect to the fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was
effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum
and not that the substance thereof offends constitutional
standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called
upon to invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill
theory should not be conclusive as regards substantive
changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous
trip through Congress, when it is palpably unwarranted
under the circumstances of instant petition.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal

disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal
of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views
on the alleged nonjusticiability of the issue posed by the
petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic
enrolled bill doctrine in light of what I perceive as new
wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution
and the winds of changing time.
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by

the petitioner are nonjusticiable. Nor do I agree that we
will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we
assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the
United States, the principle of separation of power is no
longer an impregna
305
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 305

ble impediment against the interposition of judicial power
on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly,
1
the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v.
Ballin, as a window to view the issues before the Court. It
is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
boundaries of the2 power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. It held:
x x x
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings. It appears that
in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the

Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly,
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With
the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be
________________
1 144 US 1 (1891).
2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation
of House Rule XV which provided that members present in the chamber but not
voting would be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum
to do business.
306
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are

open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to
be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass

upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and
it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore
any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method has a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By
examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers. 3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith.
In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII
of the US Senate was in issue, viz.:
x x x
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator
voting in the majority may move for a reconsideration on the
same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next
two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a
notification of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall
have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time
within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to
reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the
President to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to
reconsider the vote on a nomination may be laid on the table
without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be
returned by the Secretary to the President until the expiration of
the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or
____________________
3 286 US 6 (1932).
307
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 307

while a motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered

by the Senate.
It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of

the Federal Power Commission has been confirmed by the
US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the
US President who then signed the appointment of Mr.
Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation
of Mr. Smith and requested the President to return its
resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A
petition for quo warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although the question primarily at issue
relates to the construction of the applicable rules, not to
their constitutionality. Significantly, the Court rejected the
Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that
it must be accorded the most sympathetic consideration.
x x x
Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a
construction different from that adopted by the Senate itself when
the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate
exercise of judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate
the power to make its own rules; and it is not the function of the
Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to
ensure due deliberation in the performance of the vital function of
advising and consenting to nominations for public office,
moreover, should receive from the Court the most sympathetic
consideration. But the reasons, above stated, against the Senates
construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in the view
we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of
Smiths confirmation, the Senate itself seems uniformly to have
treated the ordering of immediate notification to the President as
tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect the
appointment.
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its

ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.
308

Smith was followed

4
by the 1948 case of Christoffel v.
United States. Christoffel testified before the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.
He denied he was a communist and was charged with
perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during
the trial that the committee had no quorum when the
perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was
convicted in view of the judges charge to the members of
the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that
x x x
x x x the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at
least thirteen members of the said Committee, and that at least
that number must have been actually and physically present . . .
If such a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet
at the beginning of the afternoon session of March 1, 1947, and
thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left
temporarily or otherwise and no question was raised as to the
lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did not remain
there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence
of that Committee as a competent tribunal provided that before
the oath was administered and before the testimony of the
defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members
of that Committee at the beginning of the afternoon session . . . .
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it

allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous quorum
simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of
the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum once
established is presumed to continue until the lack of
quorum is raised. Again, the court assumed jurisdiction
over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as what rules the
House had established and whether they have been
followed. It held:
_________________
4 338 US 89 (1948).
309
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 309

x x x
Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary
legislative business is of course none of our concern, and by the
same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a
matter of legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its
committees do not control the issue before us. The question is
neither what rules Congress may establish for its own
governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may protect
the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what
rules the House has established and whether they have been
followed. It of course has the power to define what tribunal is
competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish its
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge
that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in
fact was not established and in face of a possible finding that the
facts contradicted the assumption.
We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which
defined it. As a consequence of this conviction, petitioner was
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An
essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
such a punishment is that all the elements of the crime charged
shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the
crime charged in the instant indictment is the presence of a
competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed the
jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee
must consist of a quorum, and we agree with the trial courts
charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that there were actually and physically present
a majority of the committee.
Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by
a finding that there was a majority present two or three hours
before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a
quorum need not be present when the offense is committed. This
not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the
Congress but denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is
that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all the elements of
the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is
no tribunal, and it is unthinkable that such a body can be the
instrument of criminal conviction.
The minority complained that the House has adopted the

rule and practice that a quorum once established is
presumed
310

to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised.

By this decision, the Court, in effect, invalidates that rule x
x x. The minority view commanded only the vote of three
(3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line 5
in 1963 in
deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. Yellin was
indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer
questions put to him by a subcommittee of the House
Committee on UnAmerican Activities. He was convicted by
the District Court of contempt of Congress on four counts.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction on the
ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be
heard in executive session. He alleged there was a violation
of Committee Rule IV which provides that if a majority of
the Committee or subcommittee, duly appointed as
provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public
hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness
in an executive session for the purpose of determining the
necessity or admissibility of conducting such interrogation
thereafter in a public hearing. In a 54 decision, the Court,
speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
x x x
Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been
violated. This is especially so when the Committees practice leads
witnesses to misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a
copy of the Committees rules, which must be distributed to every
witness under Rule XVII, the witness reasonable expectation is
that the Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere
to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based upon those rules,
simply because the witness was deceived by the Committees
appearance of regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the
groundwork for prosecution in
________________
5 374 US 109 (1963).
311
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 311

Yellins case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the

Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules.
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States,

the judiciary has pruned the political
6
thicket. In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, the US Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that
the political question doctrine, a tool for maintenance of
government order, will not be so applied as to promote only
disorder and that the courts cannot reject as no law suit,
a bona fide controversy as to whether some action
denominated political exceeds constitutional authority.
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse
of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the
1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from
the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in
view of our experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine.
Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary visavis the Executive and
the Legislative departments of government. In cases
involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety
that the government can no longer invoke the political
question defense.
__________________
6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
312

Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense
when it provided:
x x x
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political
question defense in national security cases. To a great
degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the
shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or7 excess of jurisdiction. In Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, I posited the following postulates:
x x x
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
of the Government.
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this
provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense
and the reach of judicial power as follows:
____________________
7 235 SCRA 630.
313
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 313

x x x
x x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute political question.
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this

Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated
the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President
and the legislators being elected by the people.
It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I
beg to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made
in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we
discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically changed
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power
between and among the three great branches of our government
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the
powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission
strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it
further protected the security of tenure of the members of the
Judiciary by providing No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members. It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by
creating the Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with
screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The
power of confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken
away from Congress. The President was likewise given a specific
time to fill up vacancies in the judiciaryninety (90) days from
the occurrence of the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and
ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of recommendees
by the Judicial and Bar
314

Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics,
the Supreme Court was given the power to appoint all officials
and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. And to make the separation of the judiciary from
the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibited
members of the judiciary to be x x x designated to any agency
performing quasi judicial or administrative functions. While the
Constitution strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it
reduced the powers of the two other branches of government,
especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President
clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this
power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power may
be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the

courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
visavis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us
that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x.
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what
it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not
by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The
Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past
that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious

consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of
our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We
will not be
315
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 315
true to our trust as the last bulwark against government

abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we
wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government 8to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I
endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is
distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of
our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.
II
Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar

as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced,
finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper 9
officers of each House and approved by the President. It is
a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has
received in due the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him.
The enrolled bill originated in England where there is
no written Constitution controlling the legislative branch of
the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded
in their nature as judicialas emanating from the highest
tribunal in the landare placed on the same footing and
regarded with the same veneration as the judgment of the
__________________
8 Supra.
9 Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
316

10
10
courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. In England,
the conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale
that an act of parliament thus made is the exercise of the
highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon
earth. And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with,
suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the
same authority of parliament; for it is a maxim in law that
it requires11the same strength to dissolve as to create an
obligation.
Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone
important mutations. Some jurisdictions have adopted the
modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this
rule, the presumption in favor of the enrolled bill is not
conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill
unless there affirmatively appears in the journals of the
legislature a statement that there has not been compliance 12
with one or more of the constitutional requirements.
Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence
Rule which holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie
evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima
facie presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that the constitutional
requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this
purpose, journals
13
and other extrinsic evidence are allowed
to be received. Some limit14the use of extrinsic evidence to
issues of fraud or mistakes.
___________________
10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523

[1897].
11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel.
Reed v. Jones, 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar
to the common law rule of the inviolability of the Sheriffs return. The
Sheriff is considered as an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act
is deemed as a regal act and no official can dispute the Kings word.
Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed.,
pp. 408418 (1972).
12 Sutherland, op. cit., p. 410.
13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).
14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind.
298, 140 N.E. 2d 220 [1957].
317
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 317

These variants developed after a reexamination of the
rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale 15for the
enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, viz.:
xxx
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses,
through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President
has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon the assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal

prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is also
justified as a rule of convenience.
16
Supposedly, it avoids
difficult questions of evidence. It is also believed that it
will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a
cloud of uncertainty on laws passed by the legislature. As
explained in Ex Pacte
_________________
15 Op. cit., footnote No. 2.

16 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350
(3rd ed. 1940).
318

17
Wren if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of
the two houses of the legislature, there will be an amount
of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in
its contemplation, and multiplying a hundredfold the
alleged uncertainty of the law. The conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill is also justified on the ground that journals
and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if
not fraud. These justifications for the enrolled bill theory
have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in18Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, and its companion cases, Mr. Justice Regalado
cited some of the leading American cases which discussed
the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the enrolled
bill theory, viz.:
x x x
Even in the land of its source, the socalled conclusive
presumption of validity originally attributed to that doctrine has
long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On
the competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that (u)nder
the enrolled bill rule by which an enrolled bill is sole expository
of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to
what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which journals
of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the
evidence.
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of
Florida declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by
the legislative offices and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill
as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is
shown from the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed
and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers, contains
provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will
be held spurious and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr.
Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51
Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
___________________
17 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18 Op. cit., pp. 729732 (1994).
319
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 319

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals
speak they control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not
conclusive.
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the

decision promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue,
et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced
hereunder.
x x x In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider
the validity of a long line of decisions of this court which created
and nurtured the socalled enrolled bill doctrine.
xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain
procedures that the legislature must follow before a bill can be
considered for final passage. x x x.
xxx
x x x Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in
Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a bill, enrolled and
certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any
defects.
xxx
x x x In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this
provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled and approved by the
governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the
propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for
adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to
scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of
government. Second, reasons of convenience prevailed, which
discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and
anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled
otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor recordkeeping
abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a preference for
accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the
records of the legislature. x x x.
xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a
result of judicial whim. There are four historical bases for the
doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a record and, as such, was not
subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of
the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal, must
indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3)
When the rule
320

was originally formulated, recordkeeping of the legislatures was

so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that the final
act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has
not been without its critics. From an examination of cases and
treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such
a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which do
not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is
conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4)
Modern automatic and electronic recordkeeping devices now used
by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5)
The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the
truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any
branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to reexamine the enrolled bill
doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the
doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is Stare decisis et non quieta
movere, which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to
disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it
of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As we
stated in Daniels Admr v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W. 2d 469,
47172 (1941).
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be
decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a
change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions
may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear error and
urgent reasons for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from
one doubtful rule to another, and whether or not the evils of the principle
that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result
from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not

grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been
discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with
it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty
decision, the poor recordkeeping of the legislature, has
disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in
recordkeeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric
typewriters, dupli
321
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 321
cating machines, recording equipment, printing presses,

computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all
doubts and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep
accurate and readily accessible records.
It is also apparent that the convenience rule is not appropriate in

todays modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that
the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our
judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done.
The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this
pursuit and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so
provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various
branches of government requires that we shut our eyes to
constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in
government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky
Constitution provides that any law contrary to the constitution is
void. The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to
recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void.
Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section 228
of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to support . . .
the Constitution of the commonwealth. We are sworn to see that
violations of the constitutionby any person, corporation, state
agency or branch or governmentare brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our
voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which
Professor Sutherland describes as the extrinsic evidence. x x x.
Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an
enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.
We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases
following the socalled enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that
there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is
valid. x x x.
Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once

unassailable respectability in United States. Sutherland
reveals that starting in the 1940s, x x x the tendency
seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving
only a prima
322

facie presumption of validity which may 19

be attacked by any
authoritative source of information.
It is high time we reexamine our preference for the
enrolled bill 20doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of Mabanag v.
Lopez Vito, that this Court, with three (3) justices
dissenting, first embraced the rule that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and
is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed 21 up this ruling
in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, thus:
x x x
Hence, urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which
is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde,
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as urea formaldehyde. Petitioner contends, however, that
the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction and between the term urea and formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and
formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea
formaldehyde, not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz. 615; Mayor
Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L
15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games and
Amusement Board, L12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it
is well settled that enrolled billwhich uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehydeconclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61
Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs.
Comm. on Elections, L18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Execu
______________________
19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224225.

20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
21 7 SCRA 374.
323
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 323

tiveon which we cannot speculate without jeopardizing the

principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic systemthe remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
22
In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, we reiterated our
fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz.:
x x x. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what

really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to
make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning
the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitionercan best be effected by the occupants
thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the
attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock
Holmes.
Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness

rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia stressed:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be

understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to
the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
23
In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, we further diluted
the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to apply it after
the
_____________________
22 27 SCRA 131, 134135.
23 56 SCRA 714.
324

Senate President declared his signature on the bill as

invalid. We ruled:
x x x
Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding
offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a coequal department of
the government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is
merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law,
be presented to the President. In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the
State Constitution, said that the same makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, the proof that it has passed both houses will satisfy the
constitutional requirement.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have been validly made, would only
mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the
validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No.
4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the
issue. It would limit the courts inquiry to the presence or absence
of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such
a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
325
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 325

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no

ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified
by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the lawmaking body.
In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a

secondary rationale 24in the case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado. In this case, the judges claimed that
the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing
the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report. In rejecting this contention,
this Court ruled:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for

compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is
not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function
is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject
matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is
not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
___________________
24 227 SCRA 703.
326

custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose
strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is
symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee
(Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on

the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in
the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature

when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

petitioners charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that
copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with the Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.
327
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 327

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino

25
v. Secretary of
Finance, et al. and its companion cases. Involved in the
case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as 26
the Expanded Value Added Tax Law. The
majority partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in
dismissing challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7716. It held:
x x x
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor.
Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled
copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its
due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its
approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a
statute had been smuggled in the printing of the bill have moved
or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal
branch of the government. There is no reason now to depart from
this rule.
No claim is here made that the enrolled bill rule is absolute. In
fact in one case we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted
the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute
had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the
President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill,
admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.
These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in Tolentino, Mr.
Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that no
claim
____________________
25 Supra.
26 Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno
dissented.
328

is here made that the enrolled bill is absolute. I

respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to
make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give
our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There
are compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance.
For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England
where it originated because in England there is no written
Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another,
many of the courts in the United States have broken away
from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled27bill in light
of contemporary developments in lawmaking. And more
important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is
inconsistent
28
with our Constitution, laws and rules. In
Mabanag, we relied on section 313 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal
reason in embracing the enrolled bill. This section, however
has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance
at our Rules will show that its section on conclusive
presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we
give to an enrolled bill. But this is not all. The
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results
in the suppression of truth cannot be justified under the
1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution
demands that we live not only under a rule of law but also
under a regime29 of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a
national policy requiring full public disclosure of all state
transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored.
And to implement these policies, this Court was given the
power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch
or instrumentality of government if it amounts to grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is time to bury the enrolled bill for its fiction
of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We
cannot dispense justice based on fiction for the search for
justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving
___________________
27 See writers dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28 Op. cit.
29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.
329
VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 329

an enrolled bill a mere prima facie presumption of

correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice
based on truth.
III
In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has

jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed
by petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the
ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the
question of quorum. The petition does not concern violation
of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it
involve the right of a nonmember of the House which
requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to
question the existence of a quorum are procedural in
character. They are malleable by nature for they were
drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these
rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or nonobservance is a matter of judgment call
on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of
the Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by
jurisdiction.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its
circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or
not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme
Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed,
could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby
tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the
entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has
long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined
to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of
judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
330

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear

case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard
of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the
judgment of Congress under whose province the specific
responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do
otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a coequal, independent and coordinate
branch of government. At no time, it would seem to me, has
it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to
cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the
timehonored and accepted principle of separation, but
balanced, powers of the three branches of government.
There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and
the new Charter on the understanding of the term judicial
power. Now, the Court is under mandate to assume
jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into,
what may even be deemed to be political questions
provided, however, that grave abuse of discretionthe sole
test of justiciability on purely political issuesis shown to
have attended the contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion
in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion cases
(G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the
instant petition.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition dismissed.
Notes.The House without the Senate which had

adjourned sine die, is not Congressneither the House
nor the Senate can hold session independently of the other
in the same manner as neither can transact any legislative
business after the adjournment of the other. (Guevara vs.
Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966])
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it
is then the duty of the courts
331
VOL. 277, AUGUST 15, 1997 331

Court of Appeals vs. Escalante
to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate

suggestion by the principal law officer of the government,
the Solicitor General or other officer acting under his
direction. (Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 [1995])
o0o
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268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 269

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power to

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1,

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 271

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

this case is a legislators nightmare because it suggests unanimity

Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages,

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not require

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine;

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 273

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

clusive presumption.Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is no evidence

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The enrolled bill doctrine,

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 275

PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers;

Same; Same; Same; Same; In resolving the case at bar, the

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Enrolled

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases;

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The principle of separation

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 277

tion, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is high time we re

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is time to bury the

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arroyo vs. De Venecia

under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The rules on how to

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 279

Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for Jose de Venecia.

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 281

certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules

2 Rule VIII, 35. Voting.Every member present in the session shall

VOL. 277, AUGUST 14, 1997 283

Rep. Arroyos question which, it is alleged, is a point of

reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

122. Precedence.Subject to the tenminute rule, questions of privilege shall have