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1. ORIENT AIR SERVICES vs. CA

FACTS:
American Airlines and Orient Air Services and Hotel Representatives entered into a General Sales Agency
Agreement whereby American authorized the latter to act as its exclusive general sales agent within the
Philippines for the sale of air passenger transportation (services: solicit and promote passenger traffic, servicing
and supervising agents etc.)
o It was stipulated that neither Orient nor its sub-agents perform services for any other air carrier similar
to those to be performed hereunder for American without the prior written consent of American
o Remittances- ticket stock or exchange orders LESS commissions
o American will pay Orient sales agency commission and an overriding commission 3% of the tariff fares
and charges for all sales of transportation over Americans service by Orient or its sub-agents
o In case of default (remittance) American may terminate the agreement; otherwise either party may
terminate without cause by giving 30 days notice
American alleged that Orient failed to promptly remit the net proceeds of sales terminated the Agreement
filed suit for accounting with preliminary attachment or garnishment, mandatory injunction and restraining order
Orient denied allegations contending that after the application to the commission due it , plaintiff in fact still
owed Orient a balance in unpaid overriding commissions
TC: in favor of Orient termination was illegal and improper- ORDERED PLAINTIFF TO REINSTATE DEFENDANT AS
ITS GENERAL SALES AGENT
CA: affirmed TC with some modifications with respect to the monetary awards
AMERICAN claims overriding commission should be based only on ticketed sales-to be entitled to the 3%
overriding commission, the sale must be made by Orient Air and the sale must be done with the use of
Americans ticket stocks
ORIENT: contractual stipulation of 3% overriding commission covers the total revenue of American not merely
from the ticketed sales, invoking its designation as the EXCLUSIVE General sales agent of american

ISSUE: extent of Orient Airs right to the 3% overriding commission

HELD: basis should be TOTAL REVENUE (in favor of Orient)

2 commissions; a) sales agency commission; b) overriding commission of 3% of tariff fares and charges for all
sales of passenger transpo over American air services. The latter type of commissions would accrue for sales of
American made not on its ticket stock but on the ticket stock of other air carriers sold by such carriers or other
authorized ticketing facilities or travel agents. To rule otherwise would erase any distinction between the 2 types
of commissions
American air was the party responsible for the preparation of the agreement (contract of adhesion)
Since the American was still obligated to Orient for the said commission, Orient was justified in refusing to remit
the sums demanded. The termination was therefore WITHOUT cause and basis
(AGENCY PART) Appellate court erred in ordering American air to reinstate the defendant as its general sales
agent
o Compelling American to extend its personality to Orient would be violative of the principles and essence
of AGENCY
o AGENCY- contract whereby "a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, WITH THE CONSENT OR AUTHORITY OF THE LATTER
o In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the principal is extended through the facility of the
agent
o The agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal, authorized to perform all acts which the latter would
have him do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent of the principal, which must not,
in any way, be compelled by law or by any court

2.RALLOS vs FELIX GO CHAN

FACTS:
Concepcion and Gerundia both surnamed Rallos were sisters and registered co-owners of a parcel of land
The sisters executed a SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY in favor of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to
sell for and in their behalf the said lot
March 3, 1955 Concepcion Rallos died September 12, 1955, Simeon sold the lot to Felix Go Chan- deed
registered in the Registry of Deeds and TCT was issued in the name of Felix Go Chan
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Ramon Rallos, administrator of the Intestate estate of Concepcion filed a complaint praying that the sale be
declared UNENFORCEABLE and the share of Concepcion in the lot be reconveyed to her estate and that TCT in
the name of Felix Go Chan be cancelled and a new one be issued in the name of the corporation and the
Intestate estate of Concepcion
TC: in favor of Ramon deed of sale declared null and void insofar as the share of Concepcion, and ordered
Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in the name of corporation and estate
CA: in favor of Felix Go Chan sales is VALID

ISSUE: what is the legal effect of an act performed by an agent AFTER the death of his principal? Is the sale valid?

HELD: NO
No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a
right to represent him. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or the legal
representation or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting
party
o Out of the above given principles, sprung the creation and acceptance of the RELATIONSHIP OF
AGENCY whereby one party, called the principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent
(mandatario), to act for and in his behalf in transactions with third persons.
o The essential elements of agency are:
(1) there is consent, express or implied of the parties to establish the relationship;
(2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
(3) the agents acts as a representative and not for himself, and
(4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority
o AGENCY-basically personal representative and derivative in nature. The authority of the agent to act
emanates from the powers granted to him by his principal; his act is the act of the principal if done
within the scope of the authority. Qui facit per alium facit se. "He who acts through another acts
himself"
ART 1919 CC- from A1709 of the Spanish CC- agency is extinguished by the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of the principal or the agent
MANRESA: the juridical basis of agency is representation-it is not possible for the representation to continue to
exist once the death of either is established
POTHIER: agrees with Manresa; by the nature of agency, death extinguishes it
LAURENT: juridical tie between the principal and the agent is servered ipso jure
COMMON LAW: death of the principal effects instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the
agent unless the power be coupled with an interest
GR: DEATH extinguishes agency
Exceptions:
1. Art 1930 if it has been constituted in the common interest of the principal and of the agent, or in the
interest of a 3rd person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor
2. Art 1931 anything done by agent without the knowledge of the death of the principal is valid and fully
effective with respect to third persons who may have contracted with him in GF
Under 1931 there must be concurrence of the BOTH conditions below:
1. that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal, and
2. that the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith (GF-3 rd person no
knowledge of death of the principal)
Since Ramon knew of the death of his sister Concepcion, Art 1931 is not applicable
Revocation by an act of the principal should be distinguished from revocation by operation of law such as the
death of the principal. In the latter, the extinguishment is instantaneously effective
CC does not impose a duty on the heirs to notify the agent of the death of the principal (it is the reverse which is
required, heirs of agent must notify principal of the death of the agent)
Whatever conflict of legal opinion was generated by Cassiday v. McKenzie in American jurisprudence, no such
conflict exists in our own for the simple reason that our statute, the Civil Code, expressly provides for two
exceptions to the general rule that death of the principal revokes ipso jure the agency

3.AIR FRANCE vs CA

FACTS:
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The Ganas purchased from AIR FRANCE through Imperial Travels 9) "open-dated" air passage tickets for the
Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. The tickets were valid until May 8, 1971.
Sometime in January 1971, Jose Gana sought assistance of Teresita Manucdoc for the the extension of the
validity of the tickets. Teresita enlisted the help of Lee Ella. Ella sent the tickets to Cesar Rillo, Office Manager of
Air France.
The tickets were returned to Ella who was informed that extension was not possible unless the fare differentials
resulting from the increase in fares, triggered by an increase of the exchange rate of the US dollar to the
Philippine peso and the increased travel tax were first paid. Ella then returned the tickets to Teresita and
informed her of the impossibility of extension.
The Ganas had scheduled their departure on May 7, 1971, day before the expiry.
Teresita requested Ella to arrange the revalidation of the tickets. Ella warned Teresita that although the tickets
could be used by the GANAS if they left on 7 May 1971, the tickets would no longer be valid for the rest of their
trip because the tickets would then have expired on 8 May 1971. Teresita replied that it will be up to the GANAS
to make the arrangements. So Ella on his own, attached to the tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo
flight
Notwithstanding the warnings, Ganas departed from Manila. However, for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, JAL refused to
honor the tickets because of their expiration. Same difficulty wrt their return trip to Manila as Air France also
refused to honor the tickets
So upon their return, the Ganas commenced an action for damages arising from Breach of Contract of carriage
AIR FRANCE
o Ganas brought upon themselves the predicament they found themselves in
o Ellas affixing of validating stickers on the tickets without the knowledge and consent of Air France
violated airline tariff rules and regulation and was beyond the scope of his authority as a travel agent
o It was not guilty of any fraudulent conduct or bad faith
TC- in favor of Air France- dismissed the complaint
CA- reversed TC

ISSUE: WON Air France should be held liable

HELD: NO
Tickets are valid only for 1 yr- passenger must undertake the final portion of his journey by departing from the
last point at which he has made a voluntary stop- since tickets were already expired, Air France cannot be faulted
for breach of contract
The Ganas cannot defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules since the evidence bears out that
Teresita, who handled travel arrangements for the GANAS, was duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of
Reno, the Office Manager of Air France, that the tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of
their validity without paying the fare differentials and additional travel taxes brought about by the increased fare
rate and travel taxes
Teresita was the AGENT of the GANAS and notice to her of the rejection of the request for extension of the
validity of the tickets was notice to the GANAS, her principals
The validating sticker for the Osaka/Tokyo flight, without clearing the same with Air France was certainly in
contravention of IATA rules although as he had explained, he did so upon Teresitas assurance that for the
onward flight, the Ganas would make other arrangements

4.SANTOS vs BUENCONSEJO

FACTS:
Lot- originally owned in common by Anatolio Buenconsejo (1/2) and Lorenzo and Santiago Bon (1/2)
Anatolios rights, interests and participation over the portion of the said lot was transferred and conveyed to Atty.
Tecla San Andres Ziga awardee in an auction sale (decision in juvenile delinquency and domestic relations
court)
By virtue of Certificate of redemption- rights, interests, claim and/or participation of Atty Ziga were transferred
and conveyed to petitioner (Santos) in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of the children of Anatolio
It would appear that petitioner Santos had redeemed the aforementioned share of Anatolio , upon the authority
of a special power of attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by the children of Anatolio
Santos now claims to have acquired the share of Anatolio in the said lot caused a subdivision plan- he wants
said to segregate his alleged share in the lot and a TCT issued in his name

ISSUE: WON Santos can claim ownership over the said portion of the lot
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HELD: NO
Said SPA athorized him to act on behalf of the children of Anatolio, hence, it could not have possibly vested in
him any property right in his own name
Children of Anatolio had no authotity to execute said power of attorney, because Anatolio is still alive, in fact he
opposed the petition of Santos
Assuming SPA-valid, Santos could have acquired no more than the share pro-indiviso of Anatolio so that he
cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners, or a judicial decree of partition, adjudicate to himself in
fee simple a determinate portion of said Lot

5.ALBALADEJO Y CIA vs The PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., as successor to The Visayan Refining Co.,

FACTS:
1918- Albaladejo y Cia (ltd part-engaged in buying and selling) and Visayan Refining (corp-engaged in
manufacturing of oil) entered into a contract whereby Albaladejoy binds itself to sell to Visayan, all the copra
purchased by it- contract: 1yr
Due to the agreement- Albaladejo bought copra extensively for Visayan. At the end of 1 yr, both parties
continued the existing agreement by tacit consent
1920- Visayan closed down its factory at Opon Cebu and withdrew from the copra market
Because of the large requirements of Visayan, Albaladejo extended its business that during the course of the
next 2-3 years, it established some 20 agencies or sub-agencies
After the Visayan had ceased to buy copra, their accounts were liquidated. It appeared that per the last account
rendered, a balance of P288 in favor of Visayan was shown Albaladejo expressed its approval of the said
account- no dissatisfaction was expressed by Albaladejo until 6 wks after when it filed a case
2 CoA:
1. Negligent failure of Visayan to provide opportune transportation for the copra collected by the plaintiff
allegedly, it suffered the diminishment of weight
2. Recovery of the amount expended by plaintiff in maintaining and extending its organization. It is alleged
that the extension of the business was due to the repeated assurances of Visayan that it would soon
resume its business
TC: not negligent wrt 1st CoA but ordered Visayan to pay 30% of the costs wrt 2 nd CoA
ALBALADEJO: contract between the plaintiff and the Visayan Refining Co. created the relation of principal and
agent between the parties, and the reliance is placed upon article 1729 of the Civil Code which requires the
principal to indemnify the agent for damages incurred in carrying out the agency

HELD: according to CoA

1. NO NEGLIGENCE
TC judge carefully examined the movements of the fleet of boats maintained by Visayan and found
that Visayan had used reasonable promptitude in its efforts to get the copra from the places where it
had been deposited for shipment.
Shrinkage was extremely moderate and this fact goes to show that there was no undue delay on the
part of the Visayan
As per agreement, copra should be paid for according to its weight upon arrival at Opon regardless
of its weight when first purchased
2. NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER
Careful examination of the evidence, series of letters of Visayan to Albaladejo, convincing enough to
support the ruling that supposed liability does not exist
The correspondence sufficiently shows on its face that there was no intention on the part of the
company to lay a basis for contractual liability of any sort; and the plaintiff must have understood the
letters in that light.
3. NO PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
It is true that the Visayan Refining Co. made the plaintiff one of its instruments for the collection of
copra; but it is clear that in making its purchases from the producers the plaintiff was buying upon its
own account and that when it turned over the copra to the Visayan Refining Co., pursuant to that
agreement, a second sale was effected.
In paragraph three of the contract it is declared that during the continuance of this contract the
Visayan Refining Co. would not appoint any other agent for the purchase of copra in Legaspi; and this
gives rise indirectly to the inference that the plaintiff was considered its buying agent. But the use of
this term in one clause of the contract cannot dominate the real nature of the agreement as
revealed in other clauses, no less than in the caption of the agreement itself
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In some letters, the term agents were used but But this designation was evidently used for
convenience; and it is very clear that in its activities as a buyer the plaintiff was acting upon its own
account and not as agents, in the legal sense, of the Visayan Refining Co. The title to all of the copra
purchased by the plaintiff undoubtedly remained in it until it was delivered by way of subsequent
sale to said company.

6.THOMAS vs PINEDA

FACTS:
It appears that in 1931, Thomas bought the bar and restaurant known as Silver Dollar Caf at Plaza Sta Cruz.
He employed Pineda as a bartender-promoted to cashier and manager
During Japanese occupation, to prevent the business and its property from falling into enemy hands, Thomas
made a fictitious sale to Pineda fictitious sale was admitted by both parties; 2 nd agreement (secret) stating that
the sale was fictitious
Original building was destroyed by fire-Pineda was able to remove some furniture and a considerable qty of
stocks to a place of safety-bar was opened on Calle Bambang-after 4 months it was transferred to the original
location
Thomas brought a CPA for the purpose of examining the books- Pineda threatened Thomas with a gun if they
persisted in their purpose. So Thomas filed a case and set up another bar with the same name on Echague St
1st CoA- Thomas sought to compel an ACCOUNTING of Pinedas operations during the time he was in control of
the bar
o Pineda claims that there was a 3 rd verbal agreement, the import of which was that he was to operate the
business with no liability other than to turn over to the plaintiff as the plaintiff would find it after the war
2nd CoA: ownership of Silver Dollar Caf trade name it appears that Pineda registered the business as his own

HELD:
1st CoA - valid
o Little or no weight can be attached to Pinedas assertion.As sole manager with full power to do as his
fancies dictated, the defendant could strip the business naked of all its stocks, leaving the plaintiff
holding the bag, as it were, when the defendant's management was terminated. Unless Thomas was
willing to give away his property and its profits, no man in his right senses would have given his manager
an outright license such as the defendant claims to have gotten from his employer
o The conclusion thus seems clear that the defendant owes the plaintiff an accounting of his management
of the plaintiff's business during the occupation. The exact legal character of the defendant's relation to
the plaintiff matters not a bit. It was enough to show, and it had been shown, that he had been entrusted
with the possession and management of the plaintiff's business and property for the owner's benefit and
had not made an accounting.
o It was error for the court below to declare at this stage of the proceeding, on the basis of defendant's
incomplete and indefinite evidence, that there were no surplus profits
o Monies and foodstuffs which the defendant said he had supplied the plaintiff and his daughters during
the war are appropriate items to be considered on taking account
o Upon plaintiffs release from the internment camp, he lost no time in looking for a site where he could
open a saloon
o The use of the old name suggested that the business was in fact an extension and continuation of the
Silver Dollar Caf
o Upon the reopening of the bar in the original place- lease was in the name of Thomas; calling cards
saying Thomas is the proprietor == defendant was only a manager
2nd CoA- Thomas is the owner of the trade name
o In the fictitious bill of sale Pineda acknowledged Thomas ownership of the business
o Business cards: Thomas is the proprietor
o No abandonment because when Thomas set up a new saloon it used the same name
o The most that can be said is that the the plaintiff instructed Pineda to renew the registration of the
trade-name and the defendant understood the instruction as permission to make the registration in his
favor
o As legal proposition and in good conscience, the defendants registration of the trade name Silver Dollar
Cafe must be deemed to have been affected for the benefit of its owner of whom he was a mere trustee
or employee.
o "The relations of an agent to his principal are fiduciary and it is an elementary and very old rule that in
regard to property forming the subject matter of the agency, he is estopped from acquiring or
asserting a title adverse to that of principal. His position is analogous to that of a trustee and he
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cannot consistently, with the principles of good faith, be allowed to create in himself an interest in
opposition to that of his principal or cestui que trust. A receiver, trustee, attorney, agent or any other
person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons utterly disabled from acquiring for
his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management.
o The rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing one's self in position which ordinarily
excite conflicts between self-interest at the expense of one's integrity and duty to another, by making it
possible to profit by yielding to temptation

7.PALMA vs CRISTOBAL

FACTS:
Teatro Arco approached Gonzalo Puyat & Sons. It was agreed between the parties that the latter would, on
behalf of the plaintiff, order sound reproducing equipment from the Starr Piano Company and that the plaintiff
would pay the defendant, in addition to the price of the equipment, a 10 per cent commission, plus all expenses,
such as, freight, insurance, banking charges, cables, etc
Teatro was able to buy 2 equipment for $1,700 and $1,600 (bought the next yr)
About 3 yrs later, in connection with a civil case filed against Gonzalo, the officials of Arco discovered that the
price quoted to them by the defendant with regard to their two orders mentioned was not the net price but
rather the list price, and that the defendants had obtained a discount from the Starr Piano Company
They sought to obtain a reduction from the defendant or rather a reimbursement, and failing in this they brought
the present action.
TC: contract between the parties was one of outright PURCHASE AND SALE
CA: relation between the parties was that of AGENT AND PRINCIPAL; even if it was purchase and sale, Gonzalo
was guilty of fraud in concealing the true price

ISSUE: what is the nature of the contract between the parties

HELD: PURCHASE AND SALE

Citing TC judge, Court said that "whatever unforseen events might have taken place unfavorable to the
defendant (petitioner), such as change in prices, mistake in their quotation, loss of the goods not covered by
insurance or failure of the Starr Piano Company to properly fill the orders as per specifications, the plaintiff
(respondent) might still legally hold the defendant (petitioner) to the prices fixed of $1,700 and $1,600." This is
incompatible with the pretended relation of agency between the petitioner and the respondent, because in
agency, the agent is exempted from all liability in the discharge of his commission provided he acts in accordance
with the instructions received from his principal (section 254, Code of Commerce), and the principal must
indemnify the agent for all damages which the latter may incur in carrying out the agency without fault or
imprudence on his part (article 1729, Civil Code).
The provision on 10% commission is only an additional price which the respondent bound itself to pay, and
which stipulation is not incompatible with the contract of purchase and sale
To hold the petitioner an agent of the respondent in the purchase of equipment and machinery from the Starr
Piano Company of Richmond, Indiana, is incompatible with the admitted fact that the petitioner is the
exclusive agent of the same company in the Philippines. It is out of the ordinary for one to be the agent of
both the vendor and the purchaser
The petitioner as vendor is not bound to reimburse the respondent as vendee for any difference between the
cost price and the sales price which represents the profit realized by the vendor out of the transaction. This is
the very essence of commerce
The twenty-five per cent (25%) discount granted by the Starr piano Company to the petitioner is available only to
the latter as the former's exclusive agent in the Philippines. The respondent could not have secured this discount
from the Starr Piano Company and neither was the petitioner willing to waive that discount in favor of the
respondent.
Gonzalo was not duty bound to reveal the private arrangement it had with the Starr Piano Company relative to
such discount
It is well known that local dealers acting as agents of foreign manufacturers, aside from obtaining a discount
from the home office, sometimes add to the list price when they resell to local purchasers. It was apparently to
guard against an exhorbitant additional price that the respondent sought to limit it to 10 per cent, and the
respondent is estopped from questioning that additional price

8.VALERA vs VELASCO
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FACTS:
By virtue of the powers of attorney executed by the Valera, the Velasco was appointed attorney-in-fact of the
said Valera with authority to manage his property in the Philippines, consisting of the usufruct of a real property
located of Echague Street, City of Manila
The liquidation of accounts revealed that the Valera owed the defendant P1,100, and as misunderstanding arose
between them, the Velasco brought suit against the Valera
TC: in favor of agent Velasco; sheriff levied upon Valeras right of usufruct, sold it at public auction and
adjudicated it to Velasco in payment of all his claim
Valera sold his right of redemption to Eduardo Hernandez- Hernandez conveyed the same right of redemption to
Valera himself-but then another person Salvador Vallejo, who had an execution upon a judgment against the
plaintiff rendered in another case, levied upon said right of redemption- right of redemption sold to Vallejo and
was definitely adjudicated to him. Later, he transferred the said right of redemption to Velasco (so ung right of
redemption nauwi kay Velasco so in effect the title was consolidated in his name, ergo the agent got the title to
the right of usufruct to the aforementioned property)

ISSUE: WON the agency was terminated

HELD: YES:
Art 1732. Agency is terminated by: a) revocation, b)withdrawal of agent, c)death, interdiction, bankruptcy, or
insolvency of the principal or of the agent
A1736. An agent may withdraw by giving notice to principal. If principal suffer any damage, agent must
indemnify him unless the agents reason should be the impossibility of continuing to act as such without serious
detriment to himself
Cited syllabus of De la Pena vs Hidalgo (weird!) renouncing agency-agent about to depart because of health &
medical reasons
The misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the defendant over the payment of the balance of P1,000 due
the latter more than prove the breach of the juridical relation between them; for, although the agent has not
expressly told his principal that he renounced the agency, yet neither dignity nor decorum permits the latter
to continue representing a person who has adopted such an antagonistic attitude towards him
When the agent filed a complaint against his principal for recovery of a sum of money arising from the
liquidation of the accounts between them in connection with the agency, Federico Valera could not have
understood otherwise than that Miguel Velasco renounced the agency; because his act was more expressive
than words and could not have caused any doubt.
In order to terminate their relations by virtue of the agency the defendant, as agent, rendered his final account
on March 31, 1923 to the plaintiff, as principal.
Briefly, then, the fact that an agent institutes an action against his principal for the recovery of the balance in
his favor resulting from the liquidation of the accounts between them arising from the agency, and renders
and final account of his operations, is equivalent to an express renunciation of the agency, and terminates the
juridical relation between them.
Hence, the said agent's purchase of the aforesaid principal's right of usufruct at public auction held by virtue of
an execution issued upon the judgment rendered in favor of the former and against the latter, is valid and legal
Moreover, the defendant-appellee, Miguel Velasco, having acquired Federico Valera's right of redemption from
Salvador Vallejo, who had acquired it at public auction by virtue of a writ of execution issued upon the judgment
obtained by the said Vallejo against the said Valera, the latter lost all right to said usufruct.
Neither did the trial court err in not ordering Miguel Velasco to render a liquidation of accounts from March 31,
1923, inasmuch as he had acquired the rights of the plaintiff by purchase at the execution sale, and as purchaser,
he was entitled to receive the rents from the date of the sale until the date of the repurchase, considering them
as part of the redemption price; but not having exercised the right repurchase during the legal period, and the
title of the repurchaser having become absolute, the latter did not have to account for said rents.

9.CUI vs CUI

FACTS:
Quo warranto (action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise)- administrator of the Hospicio
de San Jose de Barili (charitable institution-indigent invalids)
Initial management Don Pedro and Donya Benigna. Pedro and Benigna Benigna Mauricio Cui and Dionisio
Jakosalem Teodoro Cui (son of Mauricio)
Plantiff Jesus and Defendant Antonio are brothers (sons of one of the nephews of the spouses)
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Teodoro-resigned in favor of Antonio pursuant to a convenio Jesus had no prior notice of the convenio or of
his brother;s assumption of the position
Another person- Romulo Cui- grandson of another nephew of the spouses-also claims a right to the same office
Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of laws-UST but failed the bar
Antonio- was a member of the bar- disbarred for immorality and unprofessional conduct -reinstated 2 wks prior
to his assumption of the position

ISSUE: what is the meaning of the term titulo de abogado

HELD: (Antonio won)

The term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law
In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio,
por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones
o puntos legales que se le consultan.
A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does
not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-
at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by
license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court;
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court
Antonios reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his
admission to the Bar in the first place. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions
and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or
laches 9filed more than 1 yr after the right of Jesus to hold the office arose

10.ALLIED FREE WORKERS' UNION (PLUM) vs COMPAIA MARITIMA

FACTS:
MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping business; AFWU is duly registered legitimate labor
organization
MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a CONTRACT with AFWU; MARITIMA hereby engage the services of the
Allied Free Workers' Union to do and perform all the work of stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or
boats calling in the port of Iligan City; MARITIMA shall not be liable for the payment of the services rendered by
the Allied Free Workers' Union; same is payable by the owners and consignees of cargoes,
During the first month AFWU rendered satisfactory service, subsequently, former complained to the latter of
unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing the arrastre and stevedoring work
AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement
MARITIMA answered, alleging lack of employer-employee relationship between the parties.
MARITIMA informed AFWU of the termination of the CONTRACT because of the inefficient service rendered by
the latter which had adversely affected its business
AFWU charged MARITIMAwith ULP
MARITIMA filed an action9 to rescind the CONTRACT , enjoin AFWU members from doing arrastre and
stevedoring work in connection with its, vessels, and for recovery of damages against AFWUand its officers
CFI: ordered the rescission of the contract
Complaint for ULP-dismissed
AFWU: citing jurisprudence, claims that it can be considered a mere agent of MARITIMA

ISSUE:
1. WON there was EER
2. WON AFWU is an agent of MARITIMA
3. WON termination of contract was done in BF

HELD:
1. NO
4-fold test not present (POWER: hire, dismiss, pay wages, Control- means and results)
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Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises only between the "employer" and its "employees".
Where neither party is an "employer" nor an "employee" of the other, no such duty would exist. Needless to
add, where there is no duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no right.
AFWU independent contractor of MARITIMA
AFWU is the employer of the laborers
2. NO
Suffice it to say on this point that an agent can not represent two conflicting interests that are diametrically
opposed. And that the cases sought to be relied upon did not involve representatives of opposing interests.
3. NO
Evidence is clear that Teves, in representation of the principal, the respondent Compaia MARITIMA, has
also acted, in good faith in implementing the provisions of their existent CONTRACT (Exhibit "A"), and when
he advised the union of the rescission of the said CONTRACT effective August 31, 1954, he did so in the
concept that the employer firm may so terminate their contract pursuant to paragraph 4 of Exhibit "A" which
at the time was the law controlling between them
Termination was due to the unsatisfactory service of the union laborers
There was a showing that the laborers employed by the union were inefficient in performing their jobs, and
the business of the respondent company in Iligan City suffered adversely during the year 1954; and this was
due to the fact that respondents' vessels were forced to leave cargoes behind in order not to disrupt the
schedule of departures. The Union laborers were slow in loading and/or unloading freight from which the
respondent Compaia MARITIMA secured its income and/or profits