Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Studies in Honour of
Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar
Edited by
Chikafumi Watanabe
Michele Desmarais
Yoshichika Honda
D. K. Printworld
New Delhi, India
January 2012
From Saskta-sdhut: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar. Edited by Chikafumi
Watanabe, Michele Desmarais, and Yoshichika Honda. Published by D. K. Printworld, New Delhi, India, 2012.
Observations on yogipratyaka
Raffaele Torella
1
A seemingly marginal topic in the immense panorama of the philosophies of
India is the perception of the yogi (yogipratyaka, yogijna), the special pow-
er of insight and visualisation that most of the Indian traditions attribute to the
yogis. The term yogi here does not designate someone who has just happened
to devote himself to the ancient practices of this discipline, but rather a being
that, though being human, is perceived as being (or having become) intrinsi-
cally different from the generality of men. Indian philosophers, including the
loftiest ones, call them asmadviia different from [superior to] us. The exis-
tence of such powers in yogis is taken for granted. Not only is the need to prove
them not felt, but they are considered so firmly rooted in common sense (loka-
prasiddha) as to be confidently used for exemplification, that is, to confirm the
existence of other phenomena deemed to be problematic or somehow in need of
demonstration.2 This article does not aim at an exhaustive treatment of this topic,
but only presents some of the guidelines of a research in progress, which will,
hopefully in a not too distant future, take the shape of a monograph.
As a provisional starting point, we could take the third section of the Yoga-
stra, dealing with supernatural powers (vibhti), particularly stras 1655.
From the sustained practice of yoga, a radical enhancement of the normal pow-
ers of perception derives, which enables the yogi to see distant objects or objects
of very minute dimensions, including the atoms, to understand the voices of all
living beings, to know the past and the future, to penetrate other minds, to know
what happened in his and others previous lives, to foresee the moment of death,
to obtain superhuman strength, to know the position of stars and sidereal spaces,
to eliminate the need for food, and so on. The fact that these beliefs were not re-
stricted to the circles specifically involved in the theory and practice of yoga is
shown by the hints, brief but nonetheless quite explicit, that we can find in other
1 I am very grateful to David Mellins for kindly improving my English, and for his helpful
comments.
2 See e.g. Utpaladeva resorting to the example of the magic creation of the yogi to account
for iva creating the universe without a material cause (varapratyabhijkrik, I.5.7,
II.4.10; cf. Torella 2002: 116, 179).
Torella 471
ancient texts, such as those of Vaieika and Nyya.3 Vaieika, a school that for
sure cannot be suspected to indulge in the mystic or irrational, refers to the per-
ception of the yogi in its very root-stra (IX.1317, according to Candrnanda).4
These stras are implicitly referred to in a passage of Praastapdas
Padrthadharmasagraha (Biardeau 1964: 120, Isaacson 1993: 146147), which
adds some interesting elements to the overall picture:
But for yogis, who are superior to us, when [in the condition called]
yukta,5 an unerring seeing of the objects own nature arises, by virtue
of [their] internal organ [which] is assisted by dharma arising from
yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own tman and
[the tman of] others, ether, space, time, atoms, air and the internal
organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and
ultimate individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and
in regard to [the category] inherence. Furthermore, for [yogis in the
condition called] viyukta, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to
objects which are fine (skma), concealed [from sight], or at a
[great] distance [] (Padrthadharmasagraha, pp. 464465; transl.
Isaacson 1993: 146147).
Later on, Praastapda returns to the subject, and elaborates on it. In fact, there
are also other types of seers, first and foremost the vedic is, who are under-
stood to have seen the vedic hymns, to have authored the root-stras of various
branches of learning, and to be the ultimate authorities on language. These semi-
divine beings belong to an irretrievable past, and their ontological distance from
us cannot be filled, even more than the distance that divides us from another
different, precisely the yogi.6 But with some exceptions
In the is, the creators of tradition [rdhara glosses: the authors of the
Veda,] by virtue of a conjunction between the internal organ (manas)
3 Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana (around 500 CE) in his Bhya on Nyyastra I.3 (p. 9) refers to
pratyaka yujanasya yogasamdhijam, quoting Vaieikastra IX.13.
4 Wezler (1982: 664669) tentatively states that the date of the insertion of these stras in
the body of the Vaieikastra is relatively recent (post-Praastapda?).
5 yukta is said of the yogi in the state of perfect absorption (samdhi); the yogi is termed
viyukta, when he has come out of samdhi.
6 However, when later speculation on this subject more and more shifts to its epistemolo-
gical implications, yogijna and ijna will tend to be taken as mere synonyms.
472 Observations on yogipratyaka
7 That is, by jumping the other factors that come into play in the ordinary cognitive process,
established by the Vaieikastra (V.2.12, IX.15) in the number of four (tman, indriya,
manas, artha; in ordinary perception they can be reduced to three or two, according to the
specific nature of the object perceived (Padrthadharmasagraha pp. 459464; cf.
Lyssenko 1998: 8889). See also Nyyastra I.9.
8 According to Praastapda, the main difference between ijnna and siddhajna lies in
the fact that the former is spontaneous, while the latter depends on a special effort and is
the result of a process of perfection, which involves the use of unguents and other magi-
cal substances (cf. Lyssenko 1998: 101102). On the cognition of siddhas, see also
Yogastra III.32.
9 To these we can add praj (particularly in the Buddhist context); according to Jayaratha
(ad Tantrloka I.2, vol. I, p. 17), praj is equivalent to pratibh. Bharthari links explic-
itly pratibh to yoga: in fact, yoga is listed among the six possible causes of pratibh
(Vkyapadya II.152). As an example of this kind of pratibh, the Vtti mentions pre-
cisely one of the most characteristic powers of the yogi: penetrating the minds of others (p.
222 parbhipryajndiu). According to Vkyapadya I.3738, some particular beings
(the Vtti simply says: i), with their divine eyes (rea cku), can perceive what
exceeds the range of ordinary senses; what they say cannot be invalidated by inference. In
these beings, in whom light has become manifest and mind is not defiled, the knowledge
of the past and future arises, and this knowledge does not differ from perception.
Torella 473
interaction: self, body, senses, sense objects, the mind, internal sense (Nyya-
stra I.9); as we have seen (fn. 7), in the classical Vaieika doctrine these fac-
tors are reduced to four.
At this point, we can already figure out the possible primary reason why,
from inside the brahmanical tradition, staunch opponents of any form of yogi-
pratyaka have risen, as discordant voices in an essentially unison choir. In de-
nying even the theoretic possibility of a special perception by the yogi, the
Mmsakas are not so much driven by their strong realistic stance, which keeps
them distant from any mystical or esoterical practice, but, rather, by the episte-
mological consequences of such a privileged power of cognition.10 To admit that
man, either due to a natural gift or a specific psychophysical training, is given
access to what exceeds the range of senses (or, we can add, of human reason),
poses a threat to atndriya par excellence, dharma, whose radical otherness
requires foundation on a non-human authority: vedic revelation. For this,
Mms has established itself as the exclusive interpreter and guardian. Sig-
nificantly, the Mmsakas anti-yogi polemics flares up in precisely at the time
that Buddhist tradition introduces yogipratyaka. Unsurprisingly, this does not
occur within mystico-religious schools, but precisely within logico-epistemol-
ogical ones.
It is in fact Dignga who is the first to consider yogic perception as one of
the recognised varieties of the primary means of knowledge, perception (praty-
aka), side by side with sensorial perception, mental (mnasa) perception and
the introspective awareness (svasavitti) that every mental event has of itself. In
Pramasamuccaya I.6cd, he defines yogic perception as the vision of the
object as it is in itself (arthamtra), unmixed with the teaching of the mas-
ters.11 Digngas qualification as it is in itself (mtra) is explained by
10 The considerations of the Mmsakasin the words of their main exponent, Kumrila
(lokavrttika, Codan 134136; cf. McCrea forthcoming)concern primarily the possi-
bility of verification: if yogipratyaka is taken in the highest sense of perception of what is
intrinsically beyond the cognitive power of ordinary man, or as synonymous with omni-
science, then it escapes verification (unless by another omniscient). If, instead, it is
understood as the perception of an object that is outside the range of normal perception
only occasionally and provisionally, then it is indeed verifiable but also basically futile.
11 Pramasamuccaya I.5cd yogin gurunirdevyatibhinnrthamtradk, to which the
svavtti has very little to add: yoginm apy gamavikalpvyavakram arthamtra-
darana pratyakam. Therefore, the teaching of the masters, according to Dignga, is
to be understood as the conceptualisations deriving from [or the various alternatives pro-
vided by] the revealed tradition. Cf. the occurrence of this unusual compound in Vkya-
474 Observations on yogipratyaka
padya II.233cd angamavikalp tu svaya vidyopavartate. After all, also ordinary praty-
aka could share this definition; the difference, if I understand it correctly, is that yogi-
pratyaka does not depend on sensorial faculties (Vilmalavat p. 57 yath mnasam avi-
kalpakam pratyakam, tath yoginm api; Pramasamuccayasvavtti p. 3 [] indriyn-
apekatvn mnasa [].
12 Vilmalavat, pp. 5657 mtraabdo dhyropitrthavyavacchedrtha.
13 On the many problematic aspects of this definition see below.
14 This point is the object of strong criticism by all brahmanical opponents (see below). It is
very interesting to contrast what Dharmakrti and Utpaladeva (cf. Torella 2007: 546548,
556561) understand by sphuatva in a very similar context, and to see the different, if not
opposite, ways they propose to realise it.
Torella 475
krti.15 Lastly, to further complicate the matter, there is the fact that it is not al-
together clear (at least, to me) who precisely are the Buddhist referents of
Kumrilas critique, which does not seem to be addressed to the positions of
Dignga and Dharmakrti alone.
The Buddhist concept of yogipratyaka thus evolves apart from mere super-
natural powers,16 which are the culmination and the prize of the career of a pro-
ficient yogi, as the admission of the yogic cognition is more and more tightly
bound to the concept of omniscience, proper to the Buddha, and the basis of
the truth of his teaching, which cannot (nor does it want to) claim extrahuman
authority. Moreover, the concept of omniscience is itself problematic in that it
oscillates between an omniscience that we could define as quantitative and ana-
lytic, and another seen to be qualitative and synthetic. While the former (sarva-
sarvajatva)17 refers to a knowledge of the immense heap of objects that form
the universe, the latter (sarvajatva, upayuktasarvajatva), being oriented to the
path of liberation (by far preferred by the Buddhists and finding a parallel in
Upaniadic notions of the term) can conceivably consist in the knowledge of a
single thing (cf. McClintock 2000) through which the great truths of Buddhism
(impermanence, the non-existence of the self, etc.) can be derived. This theme,
which becomes popular in later speculation, beginning with that of Jnarmitra,
had already been introduced by Dharmakrti (PV II.3031): He who knows the
true reality of what has to be abandoned or appropriated, along with the means to
realise this [abandon and appropriation]: he alone is to be considered a valid
means of knowledge, and not at all he who knows everything. Therefore, we
should be concerned only by his knowledge regarding what has to be practised,
while his knowing the number of all insects is of no use to us. It is precisely
with the quotation of PV II.30 that Ratnakrti sets out the treatment of upayukta-
sarvaja he who knows everything is [soteriologically] useful in the Sarvaja-
siddhi (p. 1).18 It does not seem inappropriate to somehow link sarvasarvaja-
tva with the knowledge of real things (vastu), and upayuktasarvajatva with the
knowledge of their properties (vastudharma, like impermanence, etc.); see below
fn. 33. Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana had already formulated a similar concept.
According to the Bhya on Nyyastra I.1.1, (prameya tattvajnn ni-
reyasdhigama From the true knowledge of [] the objects of valid cog-
nition [] there is an attainment of the supreme good), prameya does not refer
to any object of valid cognition but only to the objects whose correct knowledge
leads to liberation. In this context, the Nyyabhya mentions the four artha-
padas significant statements?,19 which correspond to what has to be eliminated
(heyam), the cause of what has to be eliminated (tasya nirvartakam), absolute
elimination (hnam tyantikam) and means to elimination (tasyopya), and
thus are basically homologous to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism.
The general impression one gathers from the lines just sketched is that Bud-
dhist philosophers care less for the yogic dimension proper and the various pow-
ers to be derived from this, their interest rather focusing on the epistemological
and meditative implications of the yogipratyaka. The same approach is fol-
lowed also by their opponents par excellence, the Mmsakas, who seem to
have no more than a benevolent indifference towards the mirabilia of the yogi,
provided that he limits himself to playing with them.
For their part, in addressing the issue of yogipratyaka the Buddhists seem
driven by two different yet concentric aims: on the one hand, to admit in the in-
dividual the capacity of seeking for truth by his forces alone, independently from
the support of any revelation, and, on the other, to protect the central tenets of
Buddhism from brahmanical critics, who, through sophisticated dialectics, are
capable of questioning any truth obtained by way of reasoning. The latter of
these might be the motif of the entrance of yogipratyaka into the epistemol-
ogical and apologetic agenda of Dignga and his followers: to save the Four
Noble Truths from the scathing criticism of the brahmanical philosophers by
presenting them as warranted by the means of knowledge widely admitted to be
the most reliable, the direct perception, though by a non-ordinary person, such as
the yogi and, prior to him, the Buddhawhence the attacks, primarily of the
20 One can even surmise that Vaieika antedates Buddhism in warranting what cannot be
demonstratedor, at least, cannot be seen (atndriya)through yogipratyaka, when it
allows the yogi the capacity to see the inherence, the atoms and so on (see the passage of
Praastapda quoted above), and even the antyaviea of the various atoms and liberated
souls (Lyssenko 1998: 105110). Cf. Wezler 1982: 669, Lyssenko 1998: 112114.
21 The Sarvajasiddhi of Ratnakrti (Bhnemann 1980) closely follows the two works that
his master Jnarmitra devoted to this theme, the Yoginirayaprakaraa and the Sarva-
jasiddhi (Steinkellner 1977, 1978). The issue of the Buddhas omniscience is already
present in the Tattvasagraha and the Pajik thereon (McClintock 2000).
22 For dh, I refer to the famous monograph that Gonda devoted to this term, having so indef-
inite contours (Gonda 1963); on pratibh, see Gonda 1963: 318348, Kaviraj 1990, Tola
1990.
23 Pratibh is also the gift that Sarasvat bestows to her children, the poets (Granoff 1995).
On the role of pratibh in artistic creation and aesthetic speculationextraordinarily
interesting but too vast and complex to be even cursorily touched on heresee recently
Shulman 2008.
478 Observations on yogipratyaka
mous with knowledge in its most general sense.24 A special prestige is as-
cribed to pratibh in advaita aivism of Kashmir. When in the Tantrloka (T)
Abhinavagupta proceeds to a classification of masters, it is the intuitive master
that is given the highest rank: his intuitive knowledge (prtibha jnam), also
known as the great knowledge (mahjnam), does not depend either on the
scriptures or other masters; to him all the other masters have to pay homage.25
Thus, pratibhlike yogipratyaka for the Buddhistsis placed at the summit
of spiritual experience by the aivdvaitins. Buddhism often describes the spiri-
tual progress as consisting of three levels: ruta the teaching derived from au-
thoritative texts, cint intellectual reflection and, lastly, bhvan meditative
realisation or spiritual cultivation.26 Yogipratyaka is connected with the latter
24 In common usage, pratibh (or prtibhajna) often becomes interchangeable with yogi-
jna/yogipratyaka. Cf. e.g. Jayaratha ad T XVI. 242 (vol. X, p. 95): yoginm prti-
bhajndav atndriyrthaviaya jnam.
25 The master in whom the correct reasoning [sattarka; as a technical term, it is the highest
aga of aiva yoga] has manifested holds authority on everything, is a consecrated one
(abhiikta), being initiated by the goddesses of his own consciousness (svasavittidev).
Among all the masters he is rightly said to be the principal. In his presence, the other
mastersthe constructed ones (kalpita)have no authority. (T IV.42b44a; transl.
based on Gnoli 1999: 87).
26 Pramavinicaya I p. 27 yoginm api rutamayena jnenrthn ghtv yukti-
cintmayena vyavasthpya bhvayat tannipattau yat spavabhsi []. Cf. the first
Bhvankrama of Kamalala (p. 514 tatra prathama tvat rutamay prajotpdany/
tay hi tvad gamrtham avadhrayati/ tata cintmayy prajay ntaneyrtha nir-
vedhayati/ tatas tay nicitya bhtam artha bhvayen nbhtam). ruta, cint and
bhvan mark three levels of praj. Such progression is also well known in the aiva
circles (T XIII.327). According to Arcaa, the yogi (whose power of perception is at
stake) is he who possesses the yogato be understood in the dual sense of samdhi and
praj faculty of discerning (Dharmottarapradpa, p. 70 praj ca vivekakaraaaktir
draavy). Therefore, the yogi is the one who, at the same time, is permanently absorbed
(in samdhi) and intent in the activity of discernment (ibid. nityasamhito vivekakaraa-
aktitatpara ca yog). This interpretation is echoed by the Bauddhatarkabh (cf.
Kajiyama 1963: 53): Yogi is he who possesses the yoga, in the sense of a) samdhi, i.e.
the concentration of the mind on a single point (cittaikgrat), and b) praj, the discrim-
inative knowledge of the ultimate truth of all things (niesavastutattvavivecik). On the
way of bhvan (bhvanmrga) as the culmination of the way of [intellectual] vision
(daranamrga), see Eltschinger forthcoming.
Torella 479
27 This does not mean that bhvan coincides with yogipratyaka; rather, bhvan is what
makes yogipratyaka possible.
28 To this end, Mms will not hesitate even to downplay the significance of the cognitive
moment of the vedic seers themselves, an attitude that a careful observer can discern also
in akara.
480 Observations on yogipratyaka
Buddhist adept submits the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism (above all, the Four
Noble Truths) to a personal scrutiny, and accepts them only after giving a
rational demonstration of them. But, if the Buddhist adept possesses all the cog-
nitive tools to prove the Four Noble Truths by himself, I wonder why Buddhist
tradition has felt the need to strive so much to recognise Buddhas status of
prama. A possible answer would be that the Buddha, as can be seen from the
texts, has arrived at the truths of Buddhism by way of direct (yogic) perception;
it is only the subsequent verification that may require the resort to inference, and
this is so precisely because the adept is not able to arrive at them by a spon-
taneous perception of his own (cf. the ruti-smti relationship, described in
Dharmastra as a perception-inference relationship). But evidently this infer-
ential proof is not felt as a strong proof, whence the resort to yogipratyaka-
bhvan to re-enact somehow the original pratyaka of the Buddha. One might
object that Buddhist tradition distinguishes two levels in the teaching of the
Buddha: one, of a mainly noetical character, lends itself to rational verification,
the otherrather concerning behaviours, ethical aspects, cosmology, ultramun-
dane lifeconstitutes the (strictu sensu) atndriya component of it, and, as such,
is intrinsically inaccessible to rational scrutiny, only allowing a generic control
of non-contradiction (cf. Eltschinger 2007: 7477, 100101).31 Furthermore,
one might wonder whether the Buddha has attained the knowledge of this second
level thanks to special powers (yogipratyaka), which instead did not prove nec-
essary for the first level (the adept in fact being able to arrive at them by his ra-
tional forces alone). But since the Four Noble Truths are unanimously con-
sidered as the principal element (pradhna; cf. e.g. PV I.217c), it seems hardly
plausible that the foundation of what is atndriya might instead be cognised by
ordinary means (which the adept could reproduce by himself).
I deem it possible to abstract the following statement by Dharmakrti from
its context (the scrutiny of Digngas inclusion of scriptural authority in the do-
main of inference) and take it as a general truth: Man is incapable of existing
without the support of revealed scripture (PVsvavtti p. 108 nya
puruo nritygamaprmyam situ samartha). Cf. Prajkaragupta (p. 76
ad PV II.5b; cit. in Moriyama forthcoming): Precisely for this, error is elimi-
nated only by the revealed doctrine (stra) pronounced by an omniscient, not by
any other person. Thus, a means of valid knowledge is only the omniscients
word. In the absolute sense, a means of valid knowledge is only the omni-
scients knowledge and nothing else. This is the ultimate truth. (ata eva
31 Interestingly, Prajkaragupta seems somehow to unify the two levels, when he lists both
ryasatyni and paraloka as the possible objects of yogipratyaka (see above fn. 29).
482 Observations on yogipratyaka
32 That is, not because the truth of his teaching has been rationally proved.
33 It has been rightly stressed (Eltschinger forthcoming) that bhvan is only the means to
yogipratyaka, its cause (cf. PV III. 281b bhvanmayam, 284d bhvanbalanirmitam;
Pramavinicaya I v. 31c bhvanparinipattau; etc.). However, one might reply that at
the end (paryanta; cf. the Nyyabindu quoted above) of the bhvan process, only the mo-
dality of the cognitive act changes (from conceptual to aconceptual), not its content. Re-
ferring to Jnarmitras statement, yogipratyaka is reliable only as far as it invests the
properties of the real thing (vastudharma), not the real thing itself; cf. Steinkellner 1978:
133. I would reply to Prevereaus (1994: 76, fn. 2) nice formulation it [yogipratyaka]
reveals truths, not facts that, after all, the facts are precisely made by the totality of their
true aspects (including impermanence, and so on).
Torella 483
be imbued with it, and, possibly (as we have hypothesised above), also for the
teaching of the Buddha to be defended more efficaciously against its brahman-
ical opponents. It seems likely to conclude that, for the Buddhists, only percep-
tion is able to create persuasion.34 An indirect confirmation might come from
the fact that the Mmsakas direct such strong criticism precisely against the
Buddhist claim that yogipratyaka may be entitled to be classified as percep-
tion.35
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