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Goodness of Sanskrit

Studies in Honour of
Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar

Edited by
Chikafumi Watanabe
Michele Desmarais
Yoshichika Honda

D. K. Printworld
New Delhi, India

January 2012
From Saskta-sdhut: Goodness of Sanskrit. Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar. Edited by Chikafumi
Watanabe, Michele Desmarais, and Yoshichika Honda. Published by D. K. Printworld, New Delhi, India, 2012.

Observations on yogipratyaka

Raffaele Torella

1
A seemingly marginal topic in the immense panorama of the philosophies of
India is the perception of the yogi (yogipratyaka, yogijna), the special pow-
er of insight and visualisation that most of the Indian traditions attribute to the
yogis. The term yogi here does not designate someone who has just happened
to devote himself to the ancient practices of this discipline, but rather a being
that, though being human, is perceived as being (or having become) intrinsi-
cally different from the generality of men. Indian philosophers, including the
loftiest ones, call them asmadviia different from [superior to] us. The exis-
tence of such powers in yogis is taken for granted. Not only is the need to prove
them not felt, but they are considered so firmly rooted in common sense (loka-
prasiddha) as to be confidently used for exemplification, that is, to confirm the
existence of other phenomena deemed to be problematic or somehow in need of
demonstration.2 This article does not aim at an exhaustive treatment of this topic,
but only presents some of the guidelines of a research in progress, which will,
hopefully in a not too distant future, take the shape of a monograph.
As a provisional starting point, we could take the third section of the Yoga-
stra, dealing with supernatural powers (vibhti), particularly stras 1655.
From the sustained practice of yoga, a radical enhancement of the normal pow-
ers of perception derives, which enables the yogi to see distant objects or objects
of very minute dimensions, including the atoms, to understand the voices of all
living beings, to know the past and the future, to penetrate other minds, to know
what happened in his and others previous lives, to foresee the moment of death,
to obtain superhuman strength, to know the position of stars and sidereal spaces,
to eliminate the need for food, and so on. The fact that these beliefs were not re-
stricted to the circles specifically involved in the theory and practice of yoga is
shown by the hints, brief but nonetheless quite explicit, that we can find in other

1 I am very grateful to David Mellins for kindly improving my English, and for his helpful
comments.
2 See e.g. Utpaladeva resorting to the example of the magic creation of the yogi to account
for iva creating the universe without a material cause (varapratyabhijkrik, I.5.7,
II.4.10; cf. Torella 2002: 116, 179).
Torella 471

ancient texts, such as those of Vaieika and Nyya.3 Vaieika, a school that for
sure cannot be suspected to indulge in the mystic or irrational, refers to the per-
ception of the yogi in its very root-stra (IX.1317, according to Candrnanda).4
These stras are implicitly referred to in a passage of Praastapdas
Padrthadharmasagraha (Biardeau 1964: 120, Isaacson 1993: 146147), which
adds some interesting elements to the overall picture:

But for yogis, who are superior to us, when [in the condition called]
yukta,5 an unerring seeing of the objects own nature arises, by virtue
of [their] internal organ [which] is assisted by dharma arising from
yoga, in regard to [the following substances:] their own tman and
[the tman of] others, ether, space, time, atoms, air and the internal
organ, [as well as] in regard to the qualities, actions, universals and
ultimate individuators which are inherent in these [substances], and
in regard to [the category] inherence. Furthermore, for [yogis in the
condition called] viyukta, perceptual knowledge arises in regard to
objects which are fine (skma), concealed [from sight], or at a
[great] distance [] (Padrthadharmasagraha, pp. 464465; transl.
Isaacson 1993: 146147).

Later on, Praastapda returns to the subject, and elaborates on it. In fact, there
are also other types of seers, first and foremost the vedic is, who are under-
stood to have seen the vedic hymns, to have authored the root-stras of various
branches of learning, and to be the ultimate authorities on language. These semi-
divine beings belong to an irretrievable past, and their ontological distance from
us cannot be filled, even more than the distance that divides us from another
different, precisely the yogi.6 But with some exceptions

In the is, the creators of tradition [rdhara glosses: the authors of the
Veda,] by virtue of a conjunction between the internal organ (manas)

3 Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana (around 500 CE) in his Bhya on Nyyastra I.3 (p. 9) refers to
pratyaka yujanasya yogasamdhijam, quoting Vaieikastra IX.13.
4 Wezler (1982: 664669) tentatively states that the date of the insertion of these stras in
the body of the Vaieikastra is relatively recent (post-Praastapda?).
5 yukta is said of the yogi in the state of perfect absorption (samdhi); the yogi is termed
viyukta, when he has come out of samdhi.
6 However, when later speculation on this subject more and more shifts to its epistemolo-
gical implications, yogijna and ijna will tend to be taken as mere synonyms.
472 Observations on yogipratyaka

and the self,7 and of a special merit, an intuitive cognition (prtibha)


arises, which furnishes an infallible vision regarding objects which ex-
ceed sensorial faculties and belong to the past, the future or the
presentsuch as dharma, and which may, or may not, figure in re-
vealed texts. This form of cognition is, primarily, widespread among
the divine seers, but sometimes it may also occur among ordinary beings,
as when a little girl says: Tomorrow, my brother will come, it is my
heart to say so. Then, there is the cognition of the perfects (siddha),
which however is not basically different from the latter8 (ibid., pp. 627
629).

The terms yogipratyaka (or yogijna), ijna, siddhajna and pratibh,9


though arising in contexts that are (at least partially) distinct, end up being taken
as synonymous terms by medieval traditions, united by a common potential: the
possibility for the individual to have a different kind of cognition from the ordi-
nary. According to Nyya (but also to many other schools that tacitly accept the
Nyya way to account for ordinary reality), normal cognition is characterised by
the interaction of six factors, which mutually condition each other through their

7 That is, by jumping the other factors that come into play in the ordinary cognitive process,
established by the Vaieikastra (V.2.12, IX.15) in the number of four (tman, indriya,
manas, artha; in ordinary perception they can be reduced to three or two, according to the
specific nature of the object perceived (Padrthadharmasagraha pp. 459464; cf.
Lyssenko 1998: 8889). See also Nyyastra I.9.
8 According to Praastapda, the main difference between ijnna and siddhajna lies in
the fact that the former is spontaneous, while the latter depends on a special effort and is
the result of a process of perfection, which involves the use of unguents and other magi-
cal substances (cf. Lyssenko 1998: 101102). On the cognition of siddhas, see also
Yogastra III.32.
9 To these we can add praj (particularly in the Buddhist context); according to Jayaratha
(ad Tantrloka I.2, vol. I, p. 17), praj is equivalent to pratibh. Bharthari links explic-
itly pratibh to yoga: in fact, yoga is listed among the six possible causes of pratibh
(Vkyapadya II.152). As an example of this kind of pratibh, the Vtti mentions pre-
cisely one of the most characteristic powers of the yogi: penetrating the minds of others (p.
222 parbhipryajndiu). According to Vkyapadya I.3738, some particular beings
(the Vtti simply says: i), with their divine eyes (rea cku), can perceive what
exceeds the range of ordinary senses; what they say cannot be invalidated by inference. In
these beings, in whom light has become manifest and mind is not defiled, the knowledge
of the past and future arises, and this knowledge does not differ from perception.
Torella 473

interaction: self, body, senses, sense objects, the mind, internal sense (Nyya-
stra I.9); as we have seen (fn. 7), in the classical Vaieika doctrine these fac-
tors are reduced to four.
At this point, we can already figure out the possible primary reason why,
from inside the brahmanical tradition, staunch opponents of any form of yogi-
pratyaka have risen, as discordant voices in an essentially unison choir. In de-
nying even the theoretic possibility of a special perception by the yogi, the
Mmsakas are not so much driven by their strong realistic stance, which keeps
them distant from any mystical or esoterical practice, but, rather, by the episte-
mological consequences of such a privileged power of cognition.10 To admit that
man, either due to a natural gift or a specific psychophysical training, is given
access to what exceeds the range of senses (or, we can add, of human reason),
poses a threat to atndriya par excellence, dharma, whose radical otherness
requires foundation on a non-human authority: vedic revelation. For this,
Mms has established itself as the exclusive interpreter and guardian. Sig-
nificantly, the Mmsakas anti-yogi polemics flares up in precisely at the time
that Buddhist tradition introduces yogipratyaka. Unsurprisingly, this does not
occur within mystico-religious schools, but precisely within logico-epistemol-
ogical ones.
It is in fact Dignga who is the first to consider yogic perception as one of
the recognised varieties of the primary means of knowledge, perception (praty-
aka), side by side with sensorial perception, mental (mnasa) perception and
the introspective awareness (svasavitti) that every mental event has of itself. In
Pramasamuccaya I.6cd, he defines yogic perception as the vision of the
object as it is in itself (arthamtra), unmixed with the teaching of the mas-
ters.11 Digngas qualification as it is in itself (mtra) is explained by

10 The considerations of the Mmsakasin the words of their main exponent, Kumrila
(lokavrttika, Codan 134136; cf. McCrea forthcoming)concern primarily the possi-
bility of verification: if yogipratyaka is taken in the highest sense of perception of what is
intrinsically beyond the cognitive power of ordinary man, or as synonymous with omni-
science, then it escapes verification (unless by another omniscient). If, instead, it is
understood as the perception of an object that is outside the range of normal perception
only occasionally and provisionally, then it is indeed verifiable but also basically futile.
11 Pramasamuccaya I.5cd yogin gurunirdevyatibhinnrthamtradk, to which the
svavtti has very little to add: yoginm apy gamavikalpvyavakram arthamtra-
darana pratyakam. Therefore, the teaching of the masters, according to Dignga, is
to be understood as the conceptualisations deriving from [or the various alternatives pro-
vided by] the revealed tradition. Cf. the occurrence of this unusual compound in Vkya-
474 Observations on yogipratyaka

Jinendrabuddhi, as meaning with the exclusion of any erroneous superim-


position.12 This concept, as introduced by Dignga, is taken up and developed
by Dharmakrti, who in the Nyyabindu describes the yogic perception as that
which arises at the end of the progressive intensification of the meditation
(bhvan) on a real object (I.11 bhtrthabhvanprakaraparyantaja yogi-
jna ceti).13 From Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika (PV) III.281286 and
Pramavinicaya I, pp. 2729, vv. I.2832, we learn that what makes this cog-
nitive experience unique is its identification with meditation, visualisation, in-
ner cultivationconceptual and projective processes, which however attain
such a vividness and clarity (sphua, spaa) that they become indistinguishable
from sensorial perception proper.14 In fact, the laconic definition by Dignga
and the very few passages that Dharmakrti devotes to this theme strike us for an
undeniable difference in emphasis: while the former mentions yogipratyaka
only at the moment of the presentation of the pramas, the latter seems to insert
it in a context that is essentially soteriological (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming).
Furthermore, Digngas requirement that yogipratyaka be unmixed with the
teaching of the masters does not seem to figure in Dharmakrtis conception,
which admits that bhvan may encompass this in its process, since a correct
bhvan may be applied only to an object sanctioned by the teaching of the
Buddhaor even provided by him, such as the Four Noble Truths. The two lev-
els of understanding have been unified only by the post-Dharmakrti authors. It
is not without a certain uneasiness that we see Jinendrabuddhi continue his con-
cise comments on Digngas epistemological treatment by shifting abruptly to
the meditative-soteriological orientation that will be later adopted by Dharma-

padya II.233cd angamavikalp tu svaya vidyopavartate. After all, also ordinary praty-
aka could share this definition; the difference, if I understand it correctly, is that yogi-
pratyaka does not depend on sensorial faculties (Vilmalavat p. 57 yath mnasam avi-
kalpakam pratyakam, tath yoginm api; Pramasamuccayasvavtti p. 3 [] indriyn-
apekatvn mnasa [].
12 Vilmalavat, pp. 5657 mtraabdo dhyropitrthavyavacchedrtha.
13 On the many problematic aspects of this definition see below.
14 This point is the object of strong criticism by all brahmanical opponents (see below). It is
very interesting to contrast what Dharmakrti and Utpaladeva (cf. Torella 2007: 546548,
556561) understand by sphuatva in a very similar context, and to see the different, if not
opposite, ways they propose to realise it.
Torella 475

krti.15 Lastly, to further complicate the matter, there is the fact that it is not al-
together clear (at least, to me) who precisely are the Buddhist referents of
Kumrilas critique, which does not seem to be addressed to the positions of
Dignga and Dharmakrti alone.
The Buddhist concept of yogipratyaka thus evolves apart from mere super-
natural powers,16 which are the culmination and the prize of the career of a pro-
ficient yogi, as the admission of the yogic cognition is more and more tightly
bound to the concept of omniscience, proper to the Buddha, and the basis of
the truth of his teaching, which cannot (nor does it want to) claim extrahuman
authority. Moreover, the concept of omniscience is itself problematic in that it
oscillates between an omniscience that we could define as quantitative and ana-
lytic, and another seen to be qualitative and synthetic. While the former (sarva-
sarvajatva)17 refers to a knowledge of the immense heap of objects that form
the universe, the latter (sarvajatva, upayuktasarvajatva), being oriented to the
path of liberation (by far preferred by the Buddhists and finding a parallel in
Upaniadic notions of the term) can conceivably consist in the knowledge of a
single thing (cf. McClintock 2000) through which the great truths of Buddhism
(impermanence, the non-existence of the self, etc.) can be derived. This theme,
which becomes popular in later speculation, beginning with that of Jnarmitra,
had already been introduced by Dharmakrti (PV II.3031): He who knows the
true reality of what has to be abandoned or appropriated, along with the means to
realise this [abandon and appropriation]: he alone is to be considered a valid
means of knowledge, and not at all he who knows everything. Therefore, we
should be concerned only by his knowledge regarding what has to be practised,
while his knowing the number of all insects is of no use to us. It is precisely

15 However, Dharmakrti, though undoubtedly focusing on the meditative aspect, appears


well aware that other dimensions are also present in yogipratyaka; see his remarks on the
yogis penetration of other minds in PV III.453457, examined in Franco forthcoming.
16 In the Buddhist circles such powers (ddhi, abhij) are confined to a well defined di-
mension and acknowledged as partly common also to non-Buddhist traditions (cf. Jaini
1974: 81, Eltschinger 1997: 83). Dharmakrtis irony on this matter (PV II.33) is quite
telling: Let us admit that one may have the power of seeing at great distance (dra
payatu), or that he does not have such a power, but he should see instead the truth that we
require [for our liberation] (tattvam ia tu payatu)! If one endowed with the power of
seeing at great distance should be a means of knowledge [of the truth], then we should
worship the vultures
17 This is, for instance, the kind of omniscience that Jainism attributes to its founder (Jaini
1974: 7075).
476 Observations on yogipratyaka

with the quotation of PV II.30 that Ratnakrti sets out the treatment of upayukta-
sarvaja he who knows everything is [soteriologically] useful in the Sarvaja-
siddhi (p. 1).18 It does not seem inappropriate to somehow link sarvasarvaja-
tva with the knowledge of real things (vastu), and upayuktasarvajatva with the
knowledge of their properties (vastudharma, like impermanence, etc.); see below
fn. 33. Pakilasvmin Vtsyyana had already formulated a similar concept.
According to the Bhya on Nyyastra I.1.1, (prameya tattvajnn ni-
reyasdhigama From the true knowledge of [] the objects of valid cog-
nition [] there is an attainment of the supreme good), prameya does not refer
to any object of valid cognition but only to the objects whose correct knowledge
leads to liberation. In this context, the Nyyabhya mentions the four artha-
padas significant statements?,19 which correspond to what has to be eliminated
(heyam), the cause of what has to be eliminated (tasya nirvartakam), absolute
elimination (hnam tyantikam) and means to elimination (tasyopya), and
thus are basically homologous to the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism.
The general impression one gathers from the lines just sketched is that Bud-
dhist philosophers care less for the yogic dimension proper and the various pow-
ers to be derived from this, their interest rather focusing on the epistemological
and meditative implications of the yogipratyaka. The same approach is fol-
lowed also by their opponents par excellence, the Mmsakas, who seem to
have no more than a benevolent indifference towards the mirabilia of the yogi,
provided that he limits himself to playing with them.
For their part, in addressing the issue of yogipratyaka the Buddhists seem
driven by two different yet concentric aims: on the one hand, to admit in the in-
dividual the capacity of seeking for truth by his forces alone, independently from
the support of any revelation, and, on the other, to protect the central tenets of
Buddhism from brahmanical critics, who, through sophisticated dialectics, are
capable of questioning any truth obtained by way of reasoning. The latter of
these might be the motif of the entrance of yogipratyaka into the epistemol-
ogical and apologetic agenda of Dignga and his followers: to save the Four
Noble Truths from the scathing criticism of the brahmanical philosophers by
presenting them as warranted by the means of knowledge widely admitted to be
the most reliable, the direct perception, though by a non-ordinary person, such as
the yogi and, prior to him, the Buddhawhence the attacks, primarily of the

18 On the omniscience in the sense of upayuktasarvajatva, see Steinkellner 1978: 125,


Moriyama forthcoming.
19 Here the two lemmas of the compound padrtha, generally translated as category,
thing, are purposely inverted.
Torella 477

Mmsakas, against all claim of direct confrontation with matters of nonhuman


experience and, more generally, to omniscience (by the Buddha and Mahvra).
Such criticism was less severe in Nyya and Vaieika, which, being less direct-
ly concerned than the Mms with protecting vedic revelation, limit them-
selves to denying the omniscience alone, and admit yogipratyaka, provided that
it does not become too ambitious.20 The post-dharmakrtian speculation, particu-
larly with Jnarmitra and Ratnakrti,21 perseveres in the analysis of yogi-
pratyaka, but its main concern is the defence of the Buddhas omniscience
against the refutations of Mmsakas and Naiyyikas.
Thus, from a relatively marginal theme in the cursus of the yoga adepts, the
issue of yogipratyaka opens to a far wider dimension, absolutely crucial for
Indian philosophy as a whole: the question of whether a seeker of truth may do
without revealed tradition. Revelation becomes necessary when truth is shown
to be beyond the reach of human knowledge. But, in the face of this requisite,
India has allowed, or at least not excluded, an alternative solution: a special
power of direct penetration which evades the perilous channels of direct percep-
tion (however prestigious it may be), inference and other indirect means of
knowledge. In the vedic sphere, two powerswhich are sometimes distinct
from each other, sometimes intertwined or partially coincidentfall into this
category: dh mental vision, visualisation and pratibh direct intuitive pene-
tration.22 The latter has a longer and more articulated life,23 while the former
remains restricted to vedic domain or becomes, in non-technical usage, synony-

20 One can even surmise that Vaieika antedates Buddhism in warranting what cannot be
demonstratedor, at least, cannot be seen (atndriya)through yogipratyaka, when it
allows the yogi the capacity to see the inherence, the atoms and so on (see the passage of
Praastapda quoted above), and even the antyaviea of the various atoms and liberated
souls (Lyssenko 1998: 105110). Cf. Wezler 1982: 669, Lyssenko 1998: 112114.
21 The Sarvajasiddhi of Ratnakrti (Bhnemann 1980) closely follows the two works that
his master Jnarmitra devoted to this theme, the Yoginirayaprakaraa and the Sarva-
jasiddhi (Steinkellner 1977, 1978). The issue of the Buddhas omniscience is already
present in the Tattvasagraha and the Pajik thereon (McClintock 2000).
22 For dh, I refer to the famous monograph that Gonda devoted to this term, having so indef-
inite contours (Gonda 1963); on pratibh, see Gonda 1963: 318348, Kaviraj 1990, Tola
1990.
23 Pratibh is also the gift that Sarasvat bestows to her children, the poets (Granoff 1995).
On the role of pratibh in artistic creation and aesthetic speculationextraordinarily
interesting but too vast and complex to be even cursorily touched on heresee recently
Shulman 2008.
478 Observations on yogipratyaka

mous with knowledge in its most general sense.24 A special prestige is as-
cribed to pratibh in advaita aivism of Kashmir. When in the Tantrloka (T)
Abhinavagupta proceeds to a classification of masters, it is the intuitive master
that is given the highest rank: his intuitive knowledge (prtibha jnam), also
known as the great knowledge (mahjnam), does not depend either on the
scriptures or other masters; to him all the other masters have to pay homage.25
Thus, pratibhlike yogipratyaka for the Buddhistsis placed at the summit
of spiritual experience by the aivdvaitins. Buddhism often describes the spiri-
tual progress as consisting of three levels: ruta the teaching derived from au-
thoritative texts, cint intellectual reflection and, lastly, bhvan meditative
realisation or spiritual cultivation.26 Yogipratyaka is connected with the latter

24 In common usage, pratibh (or prtibhajna) often becomes interchangeable with yogi-
jna/yogipratyaka. Cf. e.g. Jayaratha ad T XVI. 242 (vol. X, p. 95): yoginm prti-
bhajndav atndriyrthaviaya jnam.
25 The master in whom the correct reasoning [sattarka; as a technical term, it is the highest
aga of aiva yoga] has manifested holds authority on everything, is a consecrated one
(abhiikta), being initiated by the goddesses of his own consciousness (svasavittidev).
Among all the masters he is rightly said to be the principal. In his presence, the other
mastersthe constructed ones (kalpita)have no authority. (T IV.42b44a; transl.
based on Gnoli 1999: 87).
26 Pramavinicaya I p. 27 yoginm api rutamayena jnenrthn ghtv yukti-
cintmayena vyavasthpya bhvayat tannipattau yat spavabhsi []. Cf. the first
Bhvankrama of Kamalala (p. 514 tatra prathama tvat rutamay prajotpdany/
tay hi tvad gamrtham avadhrayati/ tata cintmayy prajay ntaneyrtha nir-
vedhayati/ tatas tay nicitya bhtam artha bhvayen nbhtam). ruta, cint and
bhvan mark three levels of praj. Such progression is also well known in the aiva
circles (T XIII.327). According to Arcaa, the yogi (whose power of perception is at
stake) is he who possesses the yogato be understood in the dual sense of samdhi and
praj faculty of discerning (Dharmottarapradpa, p. 70 praj ca vivekakaraaaktir
draavy). Therefore, the yogi is the one who, at the same time, is permanently absorbed
(in samdhi) and intent in the activity of discernment (ibid. nityasamhito vivekakaraa-
aktitatpara ca yog). This interpretation is echoed by the Bauddhatarkabh (cf.
Kajiyama 1963: 53): Yogi is he who possesses the yoga, in the sense of a) samdhi, i.e.
the concentration of the mind on a single point (cittaikgrat), and b) praj, the discrim-
inative knowledge of the ultimate truth of all things (niesavastutattvavivecik). On the
way of bhvan (bhvanmrga) as the culmination of the way of [intellectual] vision
(daranamrga), see Eltschinger forthcoming.
Torella 479

(PV III.281ab prgukta yogin jna te tad bhvanmayam).27 How-


ever, while bhvan is gradual by its very nature, becoming more and more in-
tense through constant practice, and operates on conceptual contents that are
progressively refined and dynamised till they cannot be distinguished from
direct perceptions, pratibh, on the contrary, does not need any preparation or
gradation, for it enlightens and transforms instantly. The ascending hierarchy of
masters described in the T begins with kalpita formed, constructed, proceeds
to kalpita-akalpita formed-spontaneous, and concludes with akalpita sponta-
neous: the kalpita master is characterised by bhvan, and the akalpita master is
characterised by pratibh. One could note that this may be suitable to an esoter-
ic and relatively marginal tradition, such as the Trika, less concerned than
Mms with defining an orthodoxy (to the limit that this term can be applied
to Indian religions) or at least with establishing an atemporal, non-human tradi-
tion as the cornerstone of the social and religious sphere.28 However, although it
cannot be denied that Abhinavagupta highly praises the spontaneous (s-
siddhika) or self-born (svayambh) master, being able to tune himself with the
absolute withoutor even againstany traditional teaching, the existence of
this perfect, whose mere sight would suffice to liberate the man that may casu-
ally meet him (T III.40), is presented as so exceptional and rare as to leave the
impression that this represents only a theoretical possibility, a borderline idea
conceived of in order that the too tightly controlled building of tradition should
not risk imploding. And while it is true that the Kiraa-tantra determines that
out of the three possible kinds of knowledgerespectively those arising from
the master, the scriptures and spontaneouslythe latter is by far the highest
(vidypda, IX.14ab), the texts mostly warn the adept against trusting to a mas-
ter who embodies such kind of knowledgethe spontaneous or self-born
masterand, after all, recommend the normative master (cfr. T XXIII.710).
Thus, apparently it would remain only Buddhism which defends the pri-
macy of yogic perception without reservation. But is this indeed how things
stand? On a closer scrutiny, Buddhism seems quite far away from encouraging a
solitary tte--tte between the individual seeker, equipped with his supernormal
powers of perception, and truth. Yogic perception, Dharmakrti clearly says,
cannot be a guarantee of truth by itself alone, but has to apply itself to a certain

27 This does not mean that bhvan coincides with yogipratyaka; rather, bhvan is what
makes yogipratyaka possible.
28 To this end, Mms will not hesitate even to downplay the significance of the cognitive
moment of the vedic seers themselves, an attitude that a careful observer can discern also
in akara.
480 Observations on yogipratyaka

content whose truthfulness has been already guaranteed by a valid means of


knowledge, in this case the authoritative teaching of the Buddha (weighed by the
adepts reason? See below). The object of meditation must be real, and this
warning is introduced to exclude fancies, dreams or hallucinations, which
bhvan might have the power to render as vivid as real things. More generally,
the object of bhvan must have first passed, successfully, through the second of
the three levels of praj mentioned above, cint intellectual reflection. See
PV I.286ab tatra prama samvdi yan prnirtavastuvat, Pramavinicaya
I.28cd yaj jnam avisavdi tat pratyakam akalpakam, Nyyabindu I.11
bhutrthabhvan (which Dharmottara p. 70 comments upon: prama-
uddhrthagrhitvc ca savdakam). In this manner, yogipratyaka can match
also the second of the requirements that Dharmakrti has established for praty-
aka in general: being kalpanpoha and abhrnta (the former is echoed by PV
III.281c vidtakalpanjlam, etc.). All authors agree that the object of medita-
tion par excellence (real as it has the guarantee of the Buddha, besides the
secondary rational verification by the adept) is the Four Noble Truths. 29 Only
after such rational scrutiny, the job of bhvan can be carried out and be cogni-
tively significant: it progressively gives a dazzling aspect to that conceptual con-
tent and eliminates in it all discursive elaboration.
Therefore, the Buddhist yogi is not required (or allowed) to contemplate the
darkness of the universe in search of his own truth, but can exercise his powers
only on pre-defined objects already consecrated by (Buddhist!) tradition. In
other words, he knows at the very outset what he will have to find: neither more
nor less than the Four Noble Truths of the Buddha, which it is not up to him to
discover, but at most to re-discover, making them his own. The truths of Bud-
dhism are not accessible to normal perception or human reasoning: their original
discovery is due to the Buddha and we must derive them from him, but not prior
to examining his reliability.30 I am well aware that by saying so I am taking a
significant distance from the prevailing position in Buddhological studies,
according to which (cf. e.g. Franco forthcoming, Eltschinger forthcoming) the

29 As Eltschinger forthcoming notes, only Prajkaragupta adds something: paraloka (Pra-


mavrttiklakra p. 327, on PV III.286b, prnirtavastu paralokacaturryasatydika
tadviayam eva pratyakam).
30 It has been noted that the characteristics ascribed to the Buddha, which guarantee his
status as a prama, have a definite counterpart (and also a possible source) in the
characteristics of the pta, listed in Nyyabhya (Franco 1997: 2942). On pta in
Nyyabhya and his relationship with the yogi, see Biardeau 1964: 120128. Inter-
estingly, Nyyabhya p. 97 notes: evam ptopadea pramam/ eva cpta pramam.
Torella 481

Buddhist adept submits the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism (above all, the Four
Noble Truths) to a personal scrutiny, and accepts them only after giving a
rational demonstration of them. But, if the Buddhist adept possesses all the cog-
nitive tools to prove the Four Noble Truths by himself, I wonder why Buddhist
tradition has felt the need to strive so much to recognise Buddhas status of
prama. A possible answer would be that the Buddha, as can be seen from the
texts, has arrived at the truths of Buddhism by way of direct (yogic) perception;
it is only the subsequent verification that may require the resort to inference, and
this is so precisely because the adept is not able to arrive at them by a spon-
taneous perception of his own (cf. the ruti-smti relationship, described in
Dharmastra as a perception-inference relationship). But evidently this infer-
ential proof is not felt as a strong proof, whence the resort to yogipratyaka-
bhvan to re-enact somehow the original pratyaka of the Buddha. One might
object that Buddhist tradition distinguishes two levels in the teaching of the
Buddha: one, of a mainly noetical character, lends itself to rational verification,
the otherrather concerning behaviours, ethical aspects, cosmology, ultramun-
dane lifeconstitutes the (strictu sensu) atndriya component of it, and, as such,
is intrinsically inaccessible to rational scrutiny, only allowing a generic control
of non-contradiction (cf. Eltschinger 2007: 7477, 100101).31 Furthermore,
one might wonder whether the Buddha has attained the knowledge of this second
level thanks to special powers (yogipratyaka), which instead did not prove nec-
essary for the first level (the adept in fact being able to arrive at them by his ra-
tional forces alone). But since the Four Noble Truths are unanimously con-
sidered as the principal element (pradhna; cf. e.g. PV I.217c), it seems hardly
plausible that the foundation of what is atndriya might instead be cognised by
ordinary means (which the adept could reproduce by himself).
I deem it possible to abstract the following statement by Dharmakrti from
its context (the scrutiny of Digngas inclusion of scriptural authority in the do-
main of inference) and take it as a general truth: Man is incapable of existing
without the support of revealed scripture (PVsvavtti p. 108 nya
puruo nritygamaprmyam situ samartha). Cf. Prajkaragupta (p. 76
ad PV II.5b; cit. in Moriyama forthcoming): Precisely for this, error is elimi-
nated only by the revealed doctrine (stra) pronounced by an omniscient, not by
any other person. Thus, a means of valid knowledge is only the omniscients
word. In the absolute sense, a means of valid knowledge is only the omni-
scients knowledge and nothing else. This is the ultimate truth. (ata eva

31 Interestingly, Prajkaragupta seems somehow to unify the two levels, when he lists both
ryasatyni and paraloka as the possible objects of yogipratyaka (see above fn. 29).
482 Observations on yogipratyaka

streaiva sarvajoktena moho nivartyate, nnyenety anena prakrea sarvaja-


vacanam eva pramam iti paramrthata sarvajajnam eva pramam,
nparam iti paramrtha).
The word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) plays an essential role in the consti-
tution of Buddhist doctrine, and the authority of buddhavacana is based on the
conviction of his omniscience (and, for the Buddhists, also of his compassion).
This is apparent also from the attitude suggested by Kumrila, who in the Bha-
k (cf. Kataoka 2003: 4041) endeavours above all to confute the Buddhist
assertion: The teaching [of the Buddha] constitutes a valid means of knowledge,
since it has been pronounced by the omniscient Buddha.32 Although admitting
that yogipratyaka has been introduced by Dharmakrti in a mainly soteriological
context (which seems different from Digngas), it is a given fact that Kumrila
understands it and attacks it for its epistemological significance, having as his
principal aim challenging the notion of pta/prama, referred to the Buddha,
which indeed rests primarily on the special power of perception of the yogi/
Buddha. In the progression of the Buddhist adept (cf. Eltschinger forthcoming),
yogipratyaka takes on the essential meaning of meditation, inner cultivation
(bhvan) and has the main function of eliminating the most subtle and insinu-
ating form of satkyadi the conviction that the I exists, that called sahaja in-
natewhereas the path of vision (daranamrga) is sufficient to eliminate this in
its vikalpita (or parikalpita) version. Bhvan is the way to achieve the natu-
ralness of such attainment, its taking place without any conscious effort (svarasa,
anbhoga). In sum, bhvan has in fact been given an assimilative function
(and also a purgative one in that it destroys kleas), much more than a cognitive
function.33 Bhvan or yogic perception is applicable only at a subsequent stage
of engagement and in a subsidiary way, when the aim is to instill in the contents
of the teaching the necessary vividness for the spiritual path and everyday life to

32 That is, not because the truth of his teaching has been rationally proved.
33 It has been rightly stressed (Eltschinger forthcoming) that bhvan is only the means to
yogipratyaka, its cause (cf. PV III. 281b bhvanmayam, 284d bhvanbalanirmitam;
Pramavinicaya I v. 31c bhvanparinipattau; etc.). However, one might reply that at
the end (paryanta; cf. the Nyyabindu quoted above) of the bhvan process, only the mo-
dality of the cognitive act changes (from conceptual to aconceptual), not its content. Re-
ferring to Jnarmitras statement, yogipratyaka is reliable only as far as it invests the
properties of the real thing (vastudharma), not the real thing itself; cf. Steinkellner 1978:
133. I would reply to Prevereaus (1994: 76, fn. 2) nice formulation it [yogipratyaka]
reveals truths, not facts that, after all, the facts are precisely made by the totality of their
true aspects (including impermanence, and so on).
Torella 483

be imbued with it, and, possibly (as we have hypothesised above), also for the
teaching of the Buddha to be defended more efficaciously against its brahman-
ical opponents. It seems likely to conclude that, for the Buddhists, only percep-
tion is able to create persuasion.34 An indirect confirmation might come from
the fact that the Mmsakas direct such strong criticism precisely against the
Buddhist claim that yogipratyaka may be entitled to be classified as percep-
tion.35

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