Supremacy of the national government over local governments in taxation.

When local governments

invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, the exercise of the power is construed
strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax [Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006], In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that airports, lands and
buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax for the following reasons: (a) MIAA is not a
government-owned or -controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government; and (b)
the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and thus, exempt from local
taxation.

When eminent domain is exercised by a local government unit, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property [Sec. 19, R.A. 7160]. This was applied in City of Cebu v. Spouses
Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002, precisely because the expropriator was the City of Cebu, a local
government unit, and the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, a substantive law. In
Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, G.R. No. 146091, July 28, 2008, it was held that the value of the
property shall be ascertained as of the date it was actually taken, because it is as of that time that the real
measure of the owners loss may be fairly adjudged.

Right of landowner in case of non-payment of just compensation. As a rule, non-payment of just

compensation in an expropriation proceeding does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, but only to demand payment of the fair market value of the property
[Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of nonpayment, respondents ignore the fact that that
the right of the expropriatory authority is different from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales to which
the remedy of rescission may perhaps apply. Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and after
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title [Republic v. Court
of Appeals Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can exercise the
power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature. Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code confers
such power to local governments, but the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory requirements
[Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006; Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746,
October 3, 2004]. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units under R.A. 7160
cannot be understood as equal to the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative
branch of government. The power of eminent domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to local
governments by the national legislature, and thus, can only be as broad or confined as the real authority
would want it to be [Republic v. Court of Appeals Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176
SCRA 719. A municipal zoning ordinance, as a police measure, prevails over the non-impairment clause.
Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers
the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or its Council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus,
MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does
not possess delegated police power [Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000]. While Sec. 5(f), R.A. 7924, does not grant the MMDA
the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, the same law vests the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to
whom legislative power has been delegated (the City of Manila, in this case), the MMDA is not precluded
and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs [Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin

The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance with the following requisites: (a) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intereference
by the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the
first standard; but declaring bus terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or relocation
contravenes the second standard [Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner

In City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, the Supreme Court declared as an
invalid exercise of the police power City of Manila Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited the
establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area. Concedely, the ordinance was enacted with the best of motives
and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Despite
its virtuous aims, however, the enactment of the ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to
stand on. Local legislative bodies cannot prohibit the operation of sauna and massage parlors, karaoke
bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, supper clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns, or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws, not even in the guise of police power.