FALSIFIED AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION
BIGAMY
ART. 40
VOID MARRIAGES
SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC (2015)
Petitioner prosecuted for bigamy. She married Santos was married to
galang since June 2, 1974.
she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy,
because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven
valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
SC DECISION:
GUILTY FOR BIGAMY= FALSIFIED AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION,
THUS NO M. LICENSE=VOID SECOND M. =IS NOT A DEFENSE IN
BIGAMY
we cannot countenance petitioners illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to
do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will lend its
aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to
an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense
in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was
void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as
elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of
Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner
married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied
with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the
Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this
Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
People vs De Lara (2000)
NO BIGAMY BECAUSE 2ND M. WAS CELEBRATED WITHOUT
M.LICENSE
In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil
Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951.
Thus, since the second marriage was celebrated one day before the
issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
(since no m. license=void ab initio m=no bigamy)
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public
documents in order to contract a second marriage. INNOCENT
No less than the present Constitution provides that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties.46|||In keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF THE
2ND M DUE TO ART 36=THUS VOID AB INITIO IS NOT A DEFENSE
IN BIGAMY
we had the occasion to emphasize that the States penal laws on
bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to
an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a
valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous
marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in
a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely
nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of
perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of
nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the
requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of
the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered
into it.
GO-BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN JR.
NOT GUILTY OF BIGAMY SINCE THE SECOND MARRIAGE WAS
VOID AB INITIO. (Rule: If the second marriage was void for reasons
other than the existence of the first marriage, the crime of Bigamy is
not committed)
In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband
and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March
1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to
an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital
status,(PREV MARRIED) assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered.
They had 2 children, obtained some properties,
She left 1994 for Canada, bringing with her 2 children
2004: Benj filed for dec of nullity of m; he alleged that on Sept
10, 1973 he was married to Azucena and had 3 children.
she filed for bigamy, falsification of public documents
SC DECISION
VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE AND AT THE SAME TIME NON-
EXISTENT MARRIAGE
There is no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, shall be void from the beginning. In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license = art 35 (3)= Void Ab Initio M.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Evidence:
1. Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig
City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued
to Benjamin and Sally.
2. It was also established before the trial court that the
purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by
3. The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all
the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
1
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
**MPR = Art 148
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
CAPILI VS PEOPLE (2013)
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION THAT THE SECOND MARRIAGE IS
VOID IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE OF BIGAMY
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still
be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
JARILLO VS PEOPLE (2009)
SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF THE
FIRST MARRIAGE WAS IMMATERIAL BECAUSE PRIOR TO THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY, THE CRIME HAD ALREADY BEEN
CONSUMMATED. (ART. 40)
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition
to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
JARILLO VS PEOPLE (2010-MR)
COURT AFFIRMED CONVICTION OF BIGAMY SINCE ART 40 FC IS
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing
that since petitioner's marriages were entered into before the
effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section
29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage.
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that
said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights."
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not
enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x x
VITANGCOL VS PEOPLE (2016)
The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second
marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of
seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner
did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage.
Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the
first marriage as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioners
belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.
Assuming without conceding that petitioners first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for
bigamy. Petitioners first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor
was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the
Civil Code
MONTANEZ VS CIPRIANO (2012)
1st m: civil code (husband #1) 1976
2nd m: civil code (husband #2) 1983
2001: She filed for petition for annulment of her marriage with the
1st Husband on the ground of art.36.
2004: Daughter of Husband #2 from the latters first marriage sued
her for the crime of bigamy
She filed motion to quash; alleged that the 1st marriage was
already declared void ab initio a year prior to the complaint for
bigamy was filed. And that since the 2nd marriage on
1983=prescribed
SC DECISION: still guilty for bigamy
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003.
(Tenebro vs CA, Mercado vs Tan, Jarillo vs People) As ruled in the
above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of
bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have
his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent
marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provision on bigamy.
2
 SAME RULING: TEVES VS PEOPLE and ANTONE VS BERONILLA
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the
subsistence of their marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married
Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her
marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is
physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On
June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner.
The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a second
marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final
and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution
filed an information for bigamy against respondent which the latter
sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
MTQ will not prosper.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.
REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial
court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all
the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there
was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
GARCIA-QUIAZON VS BELEN
(JURISPRUDENCE: NIAL VS BAYADOG)
VOID MARRIAGE: IMPRESCRIPTIBLE; MAY BE ASSAILED EVEN
AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE SPOUSE; COMPULSORY HAS LEGAL
STANDING TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
Petition for LOA by the common law wife and children; opposed by
the decendents legal wife (married: civil code) and children.
Elise (child from the common law w) question the validity of the
marriage alleged bigamous; since the legal wife was married to
another at the time of celeb of marriage with the decedent
RTC: ordered issuance of LOA to elise
CA: affirmed in toto
SC DECISION:
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it
cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the
death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it
as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death
of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of
action.
WON THERE IS BIGAMY (AMELIA)
the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued
by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the
Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from
the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated
more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage
can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of
time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that
the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
Republic vs Dayot
FALSIFIED AFFIDAVIT OF COHABITATION OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE= VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGE
First marriage, falsified the affidavit of cohabitation (In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.)
Jose filed for annulment or dec of nullity of marriage: He contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at
least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.
*apartment hehe
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
(since their marriage was nov 24 1986, before FC)
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license
is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.
3
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered
by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non
thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age
of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage. Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24
November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question. If the essential
matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit
at all. THEREFORE THE MARRIAGE IS VOID AB INITIO, DUE TO
THE LACK OF REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.
Void ab initio- imprescriptible
DE CASTRO VS ASSIDAO DE CASTRO (filiation and support)
FALSIFIED AFFIDAVIT OF MARRIAGE (1ST AND ONLY) = VOID AB
INITIO MARRIAGE
Since their marriage license expired, they instead executed
an affidavit of cohabitation (mar 13 1995) to pursue their
marriage on their desired date (mar 13, 1995), went back to
their homes and did not live together as H and W
Nov 1995, gave birth; W supported the child on her own
She filed complaint for support; petitioner denied marriage
(void ab initio: fake affidavit), child not his
SC DECISION
In Nial vs Bayadog (2000), other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
THUS, VALIDITY OF VOID MARRIAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY
ATTACKED.
In Cario vs Cario (2001), the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite
the main case being a claim for death benefits.
In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that
petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating
that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when
she was asked during cross-examination, (FALSITY IN AFFIDAVIT IS
NOT MERE IRREGULARITY).
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a
mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.
CLAIM FOR SUPPORT
The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child. Entitled
for support (acknowledged illegitimate child)
BRAZA VS THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (2009)
The legal wife seeks to correct the entries in the birth certificate of the
illegitimate child of the decendent. (legitimation, name of the father,
acknowledgment and use of surname)
The Court held that a trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the validity of marriagex x x can
be questioned only in a direct action to nullify the marriage.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
KHO VS REPUBLIC (2016)
VOID MARRIAGE DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE MARRIAGE
LICENSE
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner. (no
marriage license)
petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage
license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica
M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity
of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it
becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid
as it is she who alleges such validity.
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that
such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario. There, it was held that the certification
of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. this
Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased
husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no
record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. (same ruling in Go-bangayan vs Bangayan)
Abbas vs Abbas. this Court relied on the Certification issued by the
local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could
not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to
petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect.
(Presumption of regularity of official acts; disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or
other evidence to the contrary)
4
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC VS MOLINA (strict standards)
NGO THE VS YU TE (liberated; nachura)
MOLINA REQUIREMENTS:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. (marriage as an inviolable
social institution)
2. Root cause: a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint and sufficiently proven
c. clearly explained in the decision
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage.
4. It must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
5. It must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6. Those marital obligations as stated in the FC
7. Interpretations given by the church?
NGO TE VS YU TE
PI was granted
that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties'
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which
had a first-hand view of the witnesses' deportment, arrived at the same
conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others,
allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where
to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are
wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person,
has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction
in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her
abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her
tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.68 Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they
contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
SUAZO VS SUAZO
Married when they were 16
After 10 yrs filed for nullity under art 36
Respondent did not answer nor appeared for psych
assessment
RTC: annulled the marriage
CA: reversed
SC DECISION: upheld the CA
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as
it merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that
disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage
without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept
of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in
jurisprudence.
Santos vs CA: GRAVITY; JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE &
INCURABILITY
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case
basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts
judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the
findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision
was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath
before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly,
the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals,
ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological
evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological
condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions
from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot
of course be doubted.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using
meager information coming from a directly interested party, could not
have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos
psychological condition.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or
mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of
psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
5
JULIANO-LLAVE VS REPUBLIC (2011) Bigamy (1st marriage under
the muslim law and rites)
Heirs of the first wife (married in Islamic rights) sued the 2nd wife for
bigamy
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases
involving void marriages.
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda (1st) and the late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita (catholic) is void ab initio.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to
Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the
law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of
the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article
13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and
this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already
bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its
provisions unless otherwise provided.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law,
the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have
already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.
FUJIKI VS MARINAY (2013)
1st husband petitioned for JD of Foreign judgment (Jap court:
bigamous second marriage) and to direct the Civ Reg to annotate such
foreign judgment
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
Who may file: Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register x x x
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
S ection 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Ruling in BRAZA is not applicable: because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity
of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
(without prejudice for the prosecution of the crime of bigamy)
BOLOS VS BOLOS
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her
stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact,
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines.
MR pre-requisite for the filing of appeal in AM 02-11-10
ABLAZA VS REPUBLIC
CARLOS VS REPUBLIC
As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot
be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family
Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect
the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code
marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is
governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides
the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Specifically, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to
the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and
new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any
person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage.
According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party
who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file
the action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's
brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
6
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother.
TUPAL VS ROJO (ADMIN CASE VS JUDGE 2014)
JUDGE WHO SOLEMNIZED THE MARRIAGE CANNOT BE THE
SAME JUDGE WHO NOTARIZED THE AFFIDAVIT OF
COHABITATION
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as
notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio
capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties.
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents
not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as
solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of
the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. In the case of a
marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing
officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to
determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the
affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together
as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any
legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn
statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the
solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by
the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting
parties affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize
the parties marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived
together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The
Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties
affidavit of cohabitation.Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents
not connected with the judges official function and duty to solemnize
marriages.
SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS (2007)
Decendent contract 3 marriages (all during the civil code)
1st m: died
2nd m: with American; divorced
3rd m: married in us (respondent) no children, lived with for 18 years
filed for LOA and dissolution of the CPG, settlement of estate
opposed by the children of the first marriage
SC DECISION
LOA venue: Rule 73; in which he resides at the time of death
Who may file: filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Court, however, recognized the validity
of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
(also not required to perform her marital duties and obligations)
(foreigner ex-spouse is not the proper party in filing the adultery suit-
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera)
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
How to prove foreign judgment:
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document.
(2) If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
If failed to prove divorce and marriage: MPR:148
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO III (2005)
.
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party
is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law? YES
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.
LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA 2014
DIVORCE BETWEEN FILIPINOS ABROAD IS VOID AND
UNENFORCEABLE IN OUR COUNTRY
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
7
Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his
death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force
at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.
Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree
dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for
lack of court approval
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of
various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil
Code: (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.
MPR as to the 2nd marriage
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION REQUIRED
CORPUZ VS STO TOMAS (2010)
ART 26(2) REMEDY AVAILABLE SPECIFICALLY ONLY FOR
FILIPINOS
Former Filipino (Canadian) married Filipina in phils. He filed for
divorce in Canada-granted.
He filed for JR of foreign divorce (because he wants to marry
again), she filed no opposition
RTC: denied, he is not the proper party
whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
SC DECISION: NO
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse.
Art.26 par 2 of the Family Code is the exception to art 17 of the Civil
Code.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
MORIGO VS PEOPLE (2004)
NON EXISTENT 1ST MARRIAGE: NO BIGAMY
They got married 1990
1991:Wife filed for divorce in Ontario Canada granted
1992: ex-H married Maria (bohol)
1993: ex-H filed a complaint for JD of NM (ground of no ceremony
took place), he charged with bigamy
he moved for the suspension of arraignment on the ground of
prejudicial question in the Bigamy case
RTC: guilty
primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
In Marbella Bobis v. Bobis we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to
a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such
act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
RONULO VS PEOPLE (2014)
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY: SOLEMNIZATION OF
MARRIAGE ALBEIT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE; VOID MARRIAGE
S.O. on the day of marriage refused to solemnize marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license
Proceeded to another church, aglipayan priest (ronulo) married
them
Filed a complaint: illegal marriage ceremony
MTC:guilty
RTC: affirmed
CA: affirmed
SC DECISION: guilty
Elements: Authority of the S.O and performance of Illegal Marriage
Ceremony
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall
be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. (As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the
parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses.
On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioners
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife.)
Won the solemnization was illegal
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no
marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
8
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church
by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
The petitioners knowledge of the absence of these requirements whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.
negates his defense of good faith.
REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS (2013)
H. ALCANTARA VS W. ALCANTARA (2007)
whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
1982: H and W married without M. license at the Manila City Hall purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent.
1983: marriage ceremony, still without license
the alleged m.license procured in cavite was a sham, and they VALID MARRIAGE
never went to apply for one
1985: W gave birth consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
1988: separated real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
H petition for annulment of marriage, to order civ reg to cancel the vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
m. contract and its entry on file they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
W- alleged that he filed it just to escape prosecution for consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do
Concubinage so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
2000: RTC: dismissed
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
CA: held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real
be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence
and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties' marriage
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
Court.
their goal.
SC DECISION:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
the validity of his marriage.
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Local Civil
marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart,
Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a
to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
REPUBLIC VS CANTOR (2013)
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
REPUBLIC VS SAREOGON (2016)
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based
on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
is complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness
efforts had indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse
In Cario v. CarIo the Court considered the marriage of therein
is still alive or is already dead.
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void
ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
In Republic v. Cantor, we further held that:
the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief
issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized
Code, there are four essential requisites for the declaration of
without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the
presumptive death:
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void
in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner
absentee is dead; and,
and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
Here, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
the law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
herein.
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief which
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
spouse''s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is
evidence to the contrary.
[either] still alive or is already dead.

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Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are
notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by
jurisprudence. For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired
from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s whereabouts, Jose
did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom
he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the
allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media,
Nor did he show mat he undertook a thorough, determined and
unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what
those years were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities,
barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying
the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
search.
In the above-cited case of Republic v. Cantor, this Court held that the
present spouse (Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor) merely conducted a
"passive search" because she simply made unsubstantiated inquiries
from her in-laws, from neighbors and friends. For that reason, this
Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search
required by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the
persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries
especially the absent spouse''s relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2)
when there is failure to report the missing spouse''s purported
disappearance or death to the police or mass media, and (3) when the
present spouse''s evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter
was indeed dead.
REPUBLIC VS TAMPUS
Married during the civil code, absentee spouse member of the AFP,
went to Jolo, Sulu. April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to
declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage,
alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any kind
of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
SC DECISION: denied!
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the
foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried
to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and
neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however,
Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have
called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help
of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her own
pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission
to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired
from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the members of
the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore,
Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband, and her purported
earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents, relatives, and
friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
VALDEZ VS REPUBLIC (2009)
Married during the civil code, 1975 no word from him, she remarried
again in 1985.
The RTC found that, by petitioner's own admission, she did not try to
find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live
separately. Likewise, petitioner's daughter testified that her mother
prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a
strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have
been only 61 years old by then.
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and
holding that petitioner needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that
Sofio was already dead.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio
and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were
both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted
shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared
after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the
presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to
have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring
petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the
invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was
celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against
the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
SANTOS VS SANTOS (2014)
SEE NOTES
Alain DIO VS Caridad DIO (2011)
1998: married
2001: filed for declaration of nullity of marriage
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties'
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in
a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7cralaw Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before
the Court.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
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Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

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