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To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the
1) SPOUSES ALCARAZ vs. TANGGA-AN et al.
FACTS:
On October 4, 1994, respondents (Tangga-an et al) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioner (spouses Alcaraz).
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-
an and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) to the petitioner
spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and
did not include the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National
Housing Authority (NHA).
Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a
monthly rental of P4,000 beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to
pay rent. Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated
demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential
building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same.
On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot
on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio
Tangga-an is the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of
the other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was consequently issued in the name of
Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot
and the house resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner
spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to
respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.
MTC- In favor of plaintiffs. Respondents were demanded to vacate.
RTC- Affirmed the decision of MTC
CA- Affirm
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE (1): WON the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent because of the
change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house was built.
RULING: NO.
One of the factual issues raised by the petitioner spouses concerns the alleged waiver and
cession of Virginias rights over the house and lot to Virgilio. But the petitioner spouses did not mention
any consideration received by Virginia for the waiver of the house, in effect making said waiver a
donation thereof to Virgilio. However, in order for a donation of real property like a house to be valid, a
public instrument duly signed by the donor and accepted by the donee (which acceptance must be
known to the donor while alive) must be executed. Moreover, said donation must not impair the legitime
of the forced heirs of the donor in order for the same not to be inofficious. In the case at bar, no such
public instrument was presented. Neither was it explained why said waiver did not impair the rights of the
other compulsory heirs of Virginia.
acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by the owner of the
lot on which it is built.
There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this well-entrenched
principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that
their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: 1.
That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo,
Cebu City. At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware
that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they
signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their
obligations as lessees for two years.
Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract
ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the
respondents of ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code,
Virgilios title over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically
canceling the contract.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
xxx xxx xxx
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are
barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the
respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval.
Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can
legally demand the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.
ROSITA G. TAN, EUSEBIO V. TAN, REMIGIO V. TAN, JR., EUFROSINA V. TAN, VIRGILIO V. TAN
and EDUARDO V. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FERNANDO TAN
KIAT, respondent.
The controversy centers on two (2) parcels of land (hereafter, subject properties)
previously owned by one Alejandro Tan Keh.
Private respondent (Fernando Tan Kiat) that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan Keh in
1954 for P98,065.35, built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his
favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good faith

of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over to private respondent the owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. 35656 and, in addition, executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for a duration
of forty (40) years.
However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father
of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held in trust by Remigio for the
benefit of private respondent and that Remigio would execute the proper documents of transfer in favor
of private respondent should the latter at anytime demand recovery of the subject properties. TCT No.
35656 was thus cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 53284 was issued in the name of
Remigio. Another contract of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of private
respondent to further safeguard the latters interest on the subject properties, but private respondent
never paid any rental and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him.
Remigio was killed in 1968. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of private respondents
ownership of the subject properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to private
respondent who by then had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however,
never made good their promise to convey the subject properties despite repeated demands by private
respondent. In fact, petitioners had the subject properties fraudulently transferred to their names under
TCT No. 117898. Thus, the filing of the complaint for recovery of property.
ISSUE: WON the respondent, a lessee, may claim ownership over the property?
RULING: NO.
First: The execution of a lease contract between Remigio Tan as lessor and private respondent as
lessee over the subject properties, the existence of which is established not only by a copy thereof
attached to petitioners motion to dismiss as Annex 1 but by private respondents own admission reflected
in paragraph 6 of the complaint, already belies private respondents claim of ownership.
This is so because
Article 1436 of the Civil Code
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
(SEC. 2. Conclusive presumptions. - The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxxxxxxxx
(b.) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.(3a)
and settled jurisprudence consistently instruct that a lessee is estopped or prevented from
disputing the title of his landlord.
Second: In the Memorandum of Encumbrances found at the back of TCT No. 53284 issued in the
name of Remigio Tan in 1958 attached as Annex to the complaint, there appears a mortgage
constituted by Remigio Tan over the subject properties in favor of Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank in 1963 to guarantee a principal obligation in the sum of P245,000.00. Remigio could not have
mortgaged the subject properties had he not been the true owner thereof, inasmuch as under Article
2085 of the New Civil Code, one of the essential requisites for the validity of a mortgage contract is that
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the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.
Third: There being no trust, express or implied, established in favor of private respondent, the
only transaction that can be gleaned from the allegations in the complaint is a double sale
Fourth: Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the
subject properties. On the other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that he is
entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now
dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the circumstances
obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the Dead Mans Statute found in Section 23, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated May 28, 1996 and its Resolution of July 31, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof,
are hereby SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered DISMISSING private respondent Fernando Tan
Kiats complaint.
PILIPINAS BANK vs. GLEE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES, INC.
FACTS:
Glee Chemical Laboratories, Inc. (respondent) alleged that it applied for a loan with Pilipinas
Bank (petitioner) in the amount of P800,000.00, payment of which would be secured, pursuant to a
board resolution dated March 5, 1982, by a mortgage of its real property.
The Real Estate Mortgage dated specifically stated in Paragraph 1 thereof that "[t]he MORTGAGOR
(herein respondent) shall not apply the amount obtained from the loans of this date but for the
following purpose, viz: Additional working capital for the purchase of fertilizers."
Respondent claims, however, that petitioner never delivered to it the loan proceeds and instead applied
the amount to a debt owed by a certain Rustica Tan from petitioner. Petitioner insists that payment of
Rustica Tans debt was secured by the real estate mortgage executed by respondent pursuant to a third-
party liability inserted therein. Since a balance of Rustica Tans debt in the amount of P3,586,772.98 still
remained unpaid, petitioner, through its agent Business Assistance Group, Inc., served on respondent a
notice of foreclosure and auction sale of respondents mortgaged lot. Respondent then filed with the
RTC a complaint for annulment of contract and damages with preliminary injunction against herein
petitioner.
However, respondent also filed a Supplemental Complaint because petitioner was also attempting to
foreclose a chattel mortgage over certain chattels owned and possessed by respondent. Apparently,
sometime in April of 1982, Rustica Tan executed a document described as an amendment of real estate
mortgage with chattel mortgage, as security for an additional loan of P1,200,000.00, thereby mortgaging
the aforementioned chattels of respondent. The document did not bear the consent or conformity of
respondent to the mortgage as Rustica Tan stated that she owned said chattels.
The RTC declared the deed of real estate mortgage marked Exhibits A and 2, and the

amendment of real estate mortgage with chattel mortgage marked as Annex "C" of the Supplemental
Complaint, null and void ab initio.
Petitioner contends that since the REM was notarized and registered with the ROD, then
there should no longer be any doubt as to its due execution.
ISSUE: WON an official duty has been regularly performs in conclusive
RULING: NO.
There is no merit to petitioners contention that because the document is notarized and had been
registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasig, then there should no longer be any doubt as to its
due execution. Note, however, that the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is not conclusive. As provided under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, such presumption is rebuttable.
In this case, the testimony of petitioners own witness, Elpidio Guillermo, destroyed this
presumption by admitting that when the document was notarized, Cheng Yong and Melecio Hernandez
did not appear before the notary public. Hence, the notary public did not witness Cheng Yongaffixing his
signature on the document. Verily, such notarization is useless since there is no truth whatsoever to the
notary publics statement or acknowledgment that the person who executed the document personally
appeared before him and the same was his free and voluntary act. Such being the case, the Court must
rely on the trial courts observation and conclusions regarding which witnesses are telling the truth.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
2)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESMERALDO CANA, G.R. No. 139229
FACTS:
Esmeraldo Cana was accused of raping Jovelyn Listana who was then 10 years old in the morning of
January 28, 1997 in the province of Camarines Norte. On May 19, 1997, Cana entered a plea of not
guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Jovelyn Listana, the complainant; Dr.
Marcelito Abbas, the examining physician and Belen Senes, the president of the barangay where
complainant was residing.
Complainant JOVELYN LISTANA testified that she was ten (10) years old. She lived with appellant, the
live-in partner of her aunt Josephine whom she calls "Mama". She babysat for their child and ran errands
for them. She recounted that one day, the date of which she could not recall since she was sexually
abused many times by appellant, he undressed her, removed her panty, placed himself on top of her,
and inserted his penis in her vagina. She felt pain and tried to stop him but he continued. Only when she
cried of pain did appellant stop. She explained that she could not stop him because he threatened to
hang her. He also threatened her against telling anyone. Later, whenever her aunt was in Manila, which
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was often, he would rape her.
According to Jovelyn, she narrated her ordeal first to her Ate Fe and later her Ate Belen. Her Ate Belen,
then the president of their "purok", accompanied her to their barangay captain, who in turn reported the
matter to the police station of Vinzons, Camarines Norte. She executed an affidavit in the presence of
DSWD worker Gemma Orcajada. She was then brought to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital for
genital examination.
On cross-examination, she recalled that appellant oftentimes scolded and punished her for her mistakes
in doing household chores and that she resented appellant for punishing her. She said that appellants
penis penetrated her vagina easily as he had sexually molested her many times over.
Now in this present case, Cana is arguing on the propriety of leading questions addressed to the
complainant, Jovelyn. Likewise, Cana is arguing that the prosecutions evidence is insufficient to prove
him guilty for the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the prosecution to employ leading questions in the
cross-examination of the complainant, Jovelyn.
HELD: YES
Appellant imputes partiality to the trial court for allowing the prosecution to ask Jovelyn leading questions
on direct examination. He claims that were it not for these improper questions, the prosecution could not
have established the crime charged.
As a general rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, we have held that when the witness is a
child of tender years, it is proper for the court to allow leading questions as it is usually difficult for a child
of such age to state facts without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the
truth out of their reluctant lips. Here, the decision of the trial court to allow leading questions to Jovelyn
was justified, as she was evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not
uncertain.
Nevertheless, after careful reading of the records, we find that even if the alleged leading questions were
not allowed, Jovelyns testimony appears credible and comprehensive. She gave a candid, plain, and
straightforward account on how she was raped by appellant. She spoke in a manner reflective of honest
and unrehearsed testimony. Moreover, when it comes to the issue of credibility, this Court generally
defers to the assessment and evaluation given by the trial court because of its unique position to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses. In this case, we reiterate the truism that it is highly inconceivable that a
young barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a charge of defloration,
undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her familys
honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her.
______________
CHUA GAW v. SUY BEN AND FELISA CHUA, G.R. No. 160855
FACTS:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of 3 business enterprises: Hagonoy Lumber,
Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had 7 children, among them
were Concepcion Chua, Suy Ben Chua and Chua Sioc Huan. Chua Chin died and left his wife and
children as the only surviving heirs.
The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Partition, wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy
Lumber as follows: to Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other half will be
divided among Chan Chi and the seven children in equal pro indiviso shares. In said document, Chan
Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy
Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses Gaw), borrowed P200,000
from Suy Ben Chua to be used for the construction of their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the
amount. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable in 6 months without interest.
Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for
P255,000 in favor of respondent Suy Ben Chua.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the designated period. Suy Ben Chua filed
a Complaint for Sum of Money against the Spouses Gaw.
In their Answer, the Spouses Gaw contend that Concepcion asked Suy Ben Chua for an accounting and
payment of her share in the profits of the 3 business enterprises but Suy Ben Chua persuaded
Concepcion to temporarily forego her demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain
in control of the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, Suy Ben Chua allegedly
gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber
During trial, Spouses Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness under Rule 132,
Section 10. On cross-examination, Suy Ben Chua explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of
Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders. He further testified that Chua
Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua
Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc
Huan through a Deed of Sale.
On re-direct examination, Suy Ben Chua stated that he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill for
P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for
Hagonoy Lumber in cash.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua and ordered Concepcion Gaw (her husband Antonio had passed
away) to pay P200,000. RTC held that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by the Suy Ben Chua from
his own funds and not remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor Concepcions
advance share in the profits of their parents businesses.
Concepcion appealed to the CA alleging that the TC erred in considering evidence for Concepcion, Suy
Ben Chuas testimony when he was called to testify as an adverse party.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA found Concepcions argument that the RTC should not have
included respondents Suy Ben Chua as part of petitioner Concepcions evidence as baseless.
ISSUE: Whether or not Concepcion was unduly prejudiced when RTC treated Suy Ben Chuas
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as part of
Concepcions evidence.
HELD: NO
The delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other is only significant
in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the
quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, the rule is that the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case,
culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound
by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the
witness stand. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling
party does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not
contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in the
sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what
the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound
by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that
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the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.
This, Concepcion failed to do as in her own testimony, she failed to discredit the Suy Ben Chuas
testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property.
In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party
who offered them in evidence. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should
be given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the
witness or contradict his testimony.
_________
GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON, G.R. No. 156284
FACTS:
Consolidated case (1st about the 3 lots and 2nd about personal properties)
Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were
jotted down before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Consuelo, Ariston, Sr. and Angel, all
surnamed Gomez, were sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS Gomez
and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of
Angel. When Consuelo died, Augusto alleged that Rita and Jesus prepared a simulated deed of
donation inter-vivos over the 3 parcels of lot in latters favor and another deed of donation in favor of
Ariston Sr. And Jr.. Consequently the request of Augusto to declare false, null and void ab initio, and/or
be nullified the deed of donation intervivos. Respondents countered copy of the deed of donation were
valid notarized and registered.
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres,
Document Examiner of the NBI. Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness,
Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document Examination of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct evidence
presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed
by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies
are that of Jose Sebastian himself, and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr.
(Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose
Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had dismissed from the service in
Garciano v. Sebastian. Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service
casts a grave pall on his credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative
proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed others to distort
the truth.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was an error to give credence to the testimony of Jose Sebastian, the
Notary Public who notarized the assailed Deeds of Donation.
HELD: NO
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for
petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court prohibits petitioner from
impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling
him to the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached

by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but
such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy
of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness "would enable the party to destroy the
witness, if he spoke against him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in
his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke against him."
Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness.
Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer, director nor a managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party.
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile
witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to Section 11 of the same Rule,
only allows the party calling the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior
inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastians
subsequent dismissal as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case.
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez, which, in turn cited Cordial v. People, that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in court so long as, having organs of sense,
they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others."
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of such a
witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must
be examined for its relevance and credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never
been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but was instead administratively sanctioned eleven
years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and
the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of this, Jose
Sebastians testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry, which shows that the
documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July 1979, which was four months
before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979.
3) EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-02-1555. April 16, 2004]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN C.
MORANTE,
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City, Branch 275, respondent.
Facts:
Luz Amper filed a criminal complaint against Tetsuo Momma, her former employer and president
of Montec International Corporation, for Libel with the Las Pinas City Prosecutor. On March 29, 2000,
the court issued a resolution stating that there is a probable cause for the complaint filed and a hold
departure order against him. On June 3, 2001, Judge Ambrosio Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch
255, retired from office. Executive Judge Manuel Fernandez designated Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
the pairing Judge of Branch 255, as Acting Presiding Judge thereof. On June 25, 2001, Momma filed a
motion for the lifting of the hold departure order. On July 3, 2001 the records of the criminal case was
transmitted to respondent Atty. Edgar Allan C. Morante, who was the Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch
255, for the resolution by Judge Maceda of the pending incidents. On August 20, 2001, Atty. Garay,
counsel of Momma, arrived at the house of Olavere, and informed the latter that the respondent that he,
could have the case against Momma dismissed by Judge Maceda if Momma was willing to come across
with P250,000.
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Olavere agreed to the suggestion of Morante thus they paid P50,000 in exchange for an unsigned
copy of the order of dismissal of the court. The balance of P200,000 would then be paid to the
respondent upon delivery to Olavere of the order of dismissal bearing the signature of Judge
Maceda. The two agreed to report the matter to the NBI thus, Momma arrived at the NBI where he
executed a complaint-affidavit against the respondent for robbery/extortion. Momma and NBI Agent
Pineda decided to conduct an entrapment operation against the respondent at his office. The
entrapment was successful and the NBI took custody of the respondent, Olavere gave a sworn
statement to NBI Agent Toledo. The NBI agents executed their joint affidavit of the respondents arrest
on the same date, the NBI Director charged the respondent of violating Section 3(b) in relation to
paragraph (c) of Republic Act No. 3019. The respondent was later charged of violating Rep. Act No.
3019, in an Information filed with the RTC of Las Pinas City.The respondent vehemently denied the
charges hurled against him. He adopted the counter-affidavit he submitted to the Inquest Prosecutor as
his testimony on direct examination before the Investigating Justice
Issue: Whether or not the statement of Olavere is admissible as evidence.
Ruling: YES
Under Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by
showing that such two contradicting statements are under oath. The rule which requires a sufficient
foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded
upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by
the necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to, and to show that they
were made under a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.
However, in order to impeach Olaveres testimony to be inconsistent with the sworn statement, the
sworn statement alleged to be inconsistent with the subsequent one should have been shown and read
to him and, thereafter, he should have been asked to explain the apparent inconsistency. This was not
done in this case, and the respondent cannot derive any benefit from the supposed contradiction in
Olaveres testimony.
.
Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the
supposed differences in her statements. Without such explanation before us, whether plausible or not,
we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting declarations that he should be
deemed impeached. As things stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainants credibility
remains unimpeached. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Edgar Allan C.
Morante, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Las Pinas City, Branch 275, having been found GUILTY of
grave and serious misconduct, is DISMISSED from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality in the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
G.R. No. 204700 November 24, 2014
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I.
OBEN, Petitioners, vs.

CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval
(Naval) and Crispin I. Oben, are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export and Industry Bank
(EIB) through a Complaint in a currently pending proceedings before the Regional Trial Court in Makati
City. By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated August 9, 2006, EIB transferred EDC's outstanding loan
obligations of P10,232,998.00 to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.
(Cameron).Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to Substitute/Join EIB dated November 24, 2006, which
was granted by the trial court.
On February 22, 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale
and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006 referred to in the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent Cameron filed its Comment alleging that petitioners have not shown good cause for the
production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. Petitioners explained
that the production of the LSPA was for good cause, as they pointed out that under Art. 1634, the claim
of Cameron is based on an obligation purchased after litigation had already been instituted in relation to
it. Petitioners alleged that loan obligations may be reimbursed up to the extent of the amount paid by
Cameron in the acquisition thereof, it becomes necessary to verify the amount of the consideration from
the LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on this matter.
In its Resolution, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for production for being utterly
devoid of merit. It ruled that there was failure to show good cause for the production of the LSPA and
failure to show that the LSPA is material or contains evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. They argued that the application of Article
1634 of the Civil Code is sanctioned by Section 12, Article III of Republic Act No. 9182, otherwise known
as the Special Purpose Vehicle Law (SPV Law). They alleged that the production of the LSPA which
would inform them of the consideration for the assignment of their loan obligation is relevant to the
disposition of the case. The trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in. Petitioners filed
their Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, to nullify and/or set aside the RTC's Resolutions.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of petitioner Oben's verification and certification against forum
shopping and failure to attach a copy of the complaint. Petitioners' subsequent motion for
reconsideration, was likewise denied by the CA, Hence this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or inspection
of the LSPA.
Ruling: YES
As respondent Camerons claim against the petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the
Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all
documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express terms, were referred to
and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same subject matter the transfer of
the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners defense. Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule
132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is
given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in
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evidence. Since the Deed of
Assignment was produced in court by respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the
LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding
may also be inevitably inquired into by petitioners. In this light, the relevance of the LSPA sought by
petitioners is readily apparent. Fair play demands that petitioners must be given the chance to examine
the LSPA. Besides, we find no great practical difficulty, and respondent did not allege any, in presenting
the document for inspection and copying of the petitioners. Incidentally, the legal incidents of the case a
quo necessitates the production of said LSPA. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
August 29, 2012 and November 27, 2012 resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and respondents are ORDERED to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement dated April
7, 2006, including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that petitioners may inspect and/or
photocopy the same.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177392 : November 26, 2012
PAZ DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. FELIX H. LIMCAOCO, Z. ROJAS AND BROS., REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAGAYTAY CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 177421
LUDIVINA LANTIN-ROJAS, et al. Petitioners, v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PAZ DEL ROSARIO, and FELIX LIMCAOCO, Respondents.
Facts:
Three different claims on a 12.5-hectare of land in Maitim II, Tagaytay City, Cavite, brought
about these cases. Paz Del Rosario contends that in 1976 she bought the land from the Amulong family
which had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial. Del Rosario
presented a copy of the February 27, 1976 a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan that evidences the sale.
While Felix H. Limcaoco, the other claimant, alleges that he bought the same land from one Eugenio
Flores, as shown by a February 13, 1976 Deed of Absolute Sale. Finally, Z. Rojas and Bros., the third
claimant, claims that the spouses Honorio and Maria Rojas bought the land as early as 1932 from the
spouses Petrona Amulong and Agapito Acosta.
Upon learning that the government issued a free patent in Limcaoco's favor, Del Rosario filed
a complaint for reconveyance against him. Later, Z. Rojas and Bros., a partnership, filed a complaint-in-
intervention in the case, pointing out that the spouses Rojas had donated the subject land to their
children, who in turn had applied for the registration of the property in their names. On September 15,
1981 Z. Rojas and Bros. also filed a petition with the Bureau of Lands for the cancellation of Limcaocos
Free Patent. On October 17, 1997 the RTC in Tagaytay declared Z. Rojas and Bros. as the true and
lawful owner of the subject land, annulling Limcaocos Free Patent and OCT, and ruling that Del Rosario
merely acquired a possessory right of tenancy over the land. Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000 Z. Rojas and
Bros. was dissolved and was substituted by the Rojas heirs, the court granted the motion.

Aggrieved, Del Rosario filed appealed the decision before the CA which the latter rendered a
decision holding that, while the Rojas heirs appear to have a just title over the property, the partnership
of Z. Rojas and Bros., which had a separate and distinct personality, did not. The CA further held that its
determination is without prejudice to the claim of the individual Rojas heirs over the property and to
pending or future proceedings leading to the grant of such claim. Del Rosario and the Rojas heirs
appealed to this Court, respectively.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed error in declaring the Rojas heirs, rather than Del Rosario or Z.
Rojas and Bros., substituted by the same heirs, the true and lawful owner of the subject Tagaytay City
land.
Ruling: YES
It is indubitable that the decision in the land registration case granting the Rojases
application, the CA Decision affirming that grant, and the RTC Order in the land registration case all
prove the Rojases ownership of the land. Still, the CA regarded these documents as private and that
their due execution and authenticity need first be established before they can be admitted in evidence.
Notably, the contested documents are court decisions and orders, which are undoubtedly public in
character. As public documents, their due execution and authenticity need not be proved to make them
admissible in evidence. Their existence may be evidenced by an official publication or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record. Here, the copies of the assailed court issuances
were attested by Mr. Leon Barrera, the then Cavite CFI Deputy Clerk of Court. The only reason the CA
regarded those court orders as private was that they were not reconstituted after the original court
records had been destroyed in a fire.
But reconstitution cannot apply where, as in the land registration action in question, the trial
had already ended and the court had indeed already decided. Reconstitution of judicial records under
Act 3110 are undertaken after they have been lost only with respect to pending proceedings where the
subject case had not yet been decided. It does not apply to closed and decided cases. WHEREFORE,
the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 177421, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the CA Decision in CA-
G.R. CV 76599 dated April 28, 2006, REINSTATES and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of
Tagaytays Decision in Civil Cases TG-411 and TG-796 dated October 17, 1997, and DISMISSES for
lack of merit the petition in G .R. 177392.
4)
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR. et.al.
FACTS: whether the marriage contract or Contrato MatrimoniaL is sufficient to prove the fact of
marriage.
Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they
are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9
October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that during the lifetime of their parents, their father
acquired a parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal. Petitioners are claiming ownership of the property as
heirs to their deceased parents.
Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente and
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a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents Vicente Cercado,
Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco, Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas. Upon verification, petitioners
were furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by
respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and Leonora were not married or if they were so married,
then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their parents, Vicente and
Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal to correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente.
To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents: 1)
Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage contract; 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued by
Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage contract; 3) Certification of non-
production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla,
Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya
issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two
disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente and Benita.
(In support of the existence of the alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato
Matrimonial. There is no dispute that said marriage contract was issued by Iglesia Filipina
Independiente church)
RTC: +Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Null and Void
+ The [petitioners] are the legitimate children of the late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita
Castillote/Castillo who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato Matrimonial x x x.
+The trial court first upheld the validity of the marriage between Vicente and Benita and
considered the subsequent marriage between Vicente and Leonora as void and bigamous
Respondents Appeal: 2) the trial court failed to consider the probative value of the certificate of marriage
between Vicente and Benita
CA: + the appellate court found that the Contrato Matrimonial of Vicente and Benita, being a
private document, was not properly authenticated, hence, not admissible in evidence.
Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be
recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in
their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original.
Petitioners emphasize that the certification issued by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente Church, the joint
affidavit of two disinterested persons, the baptismal certificate presented by petitioners, and the open
and public cohabitation of petitioners parents are sufficient proof of their marriage.
Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document
should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of
authentication.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contratomonial, being a private document, not properly authenticated is
admissible in Evidence.
HELD: No. The Document is not admissible.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that it is a private document. It has been settled that church

registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No.
6823 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized
public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other
private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must
be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one
of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract.
Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benitas
handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.
Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original,
hence, the original need not be produced. We do not agree. We had previously ruled in Vallarta v. Court
of Appeals27 that " a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the
original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the
non- production of the original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon
copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of
the copy."
Next, while petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it
is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners argument still has no merit.
Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is
produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any
alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929,
hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.
The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.
Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if
the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is
found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be
satisfactorily accounted for.
Gibson v. Poor30 cited the reason why it is required that an ancient document shall be produced from the
proper depository:
x x x that thereby credit is given to its genuineness. Were it not for its antiquity, and the presumption that
consequently arises that evidence of its execution cannot be obtained, it would have to be proved. It is
not that any one particular place of deposit can have more virtue in it than another, or make that true
which is false; but the fact of its coming from the natural and proper place, tends to remove
presumptions of fraud, and strengthens the belief in its genuineness. It may be false, and so shown,
notwithstanding the presumptions in its favor. If found where it would not properly and naturally be, its
absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for; but that being done and all
suspicions against its genuineness removed, we can discover no reason why it may not be read in
evidence. The real question which is to affect its consideration is, whether the instrument offered is
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 |8
genuine, and contains a true statement of what it purports to.
In Bartolome v. Intermediate Appellate Court,31 the Court ruled that the requirement of proper custody
was met when the ancient document in question was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof
who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. In this case however, we find that Simplicia also
failed to prove her filiation to Vicente and Benita. She merely presented a baptismal certificate which has
long been held "as evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to her kinsfolk. "The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest
who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person baptized."32 As such, Simplicia
cannot be considered as an heir, in whose custody the marriage contract is expected to be found. It
bears reiteration that Simplicia testified that the marriage contract was given to her by Benita but that
Simplicia cannot make out the contents of said document because she cannot read and write.
RICARDO V. QUINTOS v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
FACTS:
Golden Country Farms, Inc. (GCFI), formerly known as Alta Tierra Agri-Business, Inc., is a corporation
existing under Philippine laws, primarily engaged in livestock production and agri-business. Quintos is
the majority stockholder of GCFI representing about 74% of all GCFI shares issued, outstanding, and
entitled to vote. Quintos had served as President of GCFI from 1975 to 1977, as Director from 1977 to
1982, and again as President from 1986 to 1987.
In 1975, the NIDC approved an application for financial assistance of GCFI in the amount of
$5,700,000.00, or its estimated equivalent of P43,000,000.00. According to the application of GCFI, the
loan proceeds would be used for the integration and expansion of the poultry farm of GCFI. To secure
the loan, mortgage and pledge were constituted on real and personal property owned by GCFI and
Quintos personally, including all of Quintos's shares of stock in GCFI and the machinery and equipment
which GCFI would acquire using the loan proceeds. Quintos also bound himself as surety for the
obligations of GCFI to NIDC for the said loan.
The following year, in 1976, GCFI applied for and was granted by DBP an agricultural loan amounting to
P57,000,000.00 for the acquisition of machinery and equipment and construction of broiler houses.
NIDC and DBP agreed to share on a pari passu basis the same securities earlier given by GCFI and
Quintos for the NIDC loan, and the contracts of mortgage and pledge were amended accordingly adding
DBP as party and the amount of loan extended by DBP as consideration.
The proceeds of both NIDC and DBP loans were released.
By the end of the 1970s, GCFI was suffering from financial problems due to poor sales, low production,
and weak liquidity problems. Of its loan obligations to NIDC and DBP, GCFI was only able to pay

P2,200,000.00. On August 1, 1980, NIDC and DBP took over management of GCFI.
The EDS A People Power Revolution took place in February 1986.
As of June 30, 1986, the loan obligations of GCFI to NIDC and DBP totaled P364,938,010.00.
Upon Quintos's initiative, Terms of Reference (TOR)4 were drawn up allowing him to assume the
positions of Director and President of GCFI for 90 days, subject to several conditions. Quintos signed
his conforme to the TOR.
With the planned dissolution of NIDC on November 30, 1986, a Deed of Transfer5 was executed on
November 28, 1986 by which NIDC assigned, transferred, and conveyed all its rights, title, and interests
in and to all of its assets to PNB. The account of GCFI was listed as an investment of NIDC.
Through the creation of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), PNB and DBP assigned, transferred, and
conveyed in favor of the National Government all their rights, titles, and interests in and to certain assets,
in consideration of the assumption by the National Government of certain liabilities of the said banks.
The loans of GCFI were among the non-performing assets of PNB and DBP transferred to the National
Government. A Trust Agreement was executed on February 28, 1987 whereby the National Government
constituted APT as its trustee over the Trust Properties, which included the loans to GCFI.
Just a few days later, on August 7, 1987, PNB, DBP, and APT jointly filed a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure Sale8 requesting the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff to take possession of the
mortgaged properties of GCFI and Quintos and to sell the same at a public auction to satisfy the
indebtedness of GCFI to PNB and DBP in the amounts of P233,255,249.43 and P322,272,538.51,
respectively, or in the total amount of P555,527,787.94, as of June 30, 1987. The public auction sale of
the mortgaged properties was scheduled on April 7, 1988.9
As countermeasure, Quintos filed on April 4, 1988 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 a
Complaint10 for the annulment of the loan and mortgage contracts.
Quintos's position: The loan and collateral contracts are void ab initio.
Quintos alleged that the loan and collateral documents are void ab initio because he only executed the
same under duress and said contracts are completely simulated for lack of consideration.
According to Quintos, sometime in 1973 or 1974, he was forced and coerced by Romualdez, the brother
of then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, into selling his shares of stock in GCFI to Romualdez. Quintos was
left with no choice but to accede so he surrendered his certificates of shares of stock in GCFI to
Romualdez but did not execute any transfer documents because he was not yet paid for the shares as
promised. Romualdez then, without authority, negotiated loans on behalf of GCFI with NIDC and DBP,
offering as security, together with the assets of GCFI, real property and the shares of stock in GCFI
owned by Quintos. NIDC and DBP were sufficiently informed and fully aware of the foregoing facts, but
in connivance with Romualdez, still approved the loans in the total amount of P100,000,000.00. The loan
proceeds were released by NIDC and DBP in tranches to Romualdez but were not turned over to or
infused into GCFI, and instead, were misspent and misappropriated by Romualdez for his personal use.
Despite being the majority shareholder in GCFI, Quintos was not able to participate in the management
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 |9
of GCFI as Romualdez and his group were in control. Romualdez and his group mismanaged GCFI and
wasted corporate assets, leaving the corporation bankrupt.
The position of PNB and DBP: The loan and collateral contracts are valid and binding.
PNB and DBP maintain that the loan and collateral contracts executed between GCFI, represented by its
President, Quintos, on one hand, and NIDC and DBP, on the other hand, are valid and binding. NIDC
and DBP dealt only with Quintos as regards the loans. Quintos was duly authorized by the GCFI Board
of Directors and stockholders to secure the loans for the benefit of the corporation. The collateral
contracts constituting mortgage or pledge on Quintos's properties even bear the marital consent of
Quintos's wife, Agnes de la Torre (Agnes). The loan and collateral contracts were all notarized. The
proceeds of the loans were delivered to, were utilized by, and benefitted GCFI.
RTC: The loan and mortgage is null and void.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC judgment and found for PNB and DBP.
ISSUE: whether or not the testimony of Mr. Quintos that his consent was vitiated is credible
HELD: NO
The loan transactions are accorded the disputable presumptions of regularity, observance of the
ordinary course of business, and sufficient consideration; and the notarized loan and collateral
contracts and other documents also enjoy the presumptions of regularity, authenticity, and
genuineness which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.41 In civil cases, the required burden of proof
is preponderance of evidence.
The loan and collateral contracts, as well as the loan applications and Secretary's Certificates herein, are
notarized, meaning, they had been acknowledged before a notary public. Notarized documents carry the
evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution, and have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. Hence, they are admissible in evidence without further proof of their
authenticity, and are entitled to full faith and credit on their face. To rebut their authenticity and
genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant;
otherwise, the loan and collateral contracts, loan applications, and Secretary's Certificates should be
upheld.60
Quintos failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome the presumptions accorded by the
Civil Code and Revised Rules of Court to the loan transactions and the notarized loan and
collateral contracts.
A perusal of the RTC Decision herein reveals that it substantially relied on Quintos's testimony. Verily,
there is no question that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by appellate courts and
that credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had the first hand
opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and
the defense at the time of their testimony. But this rule is not without exception. It does not apply where

the trial court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered, would affect the result
of the case. The Supreme Court is not bound by factual findings of the trial court which are contradicted
by the evidence.61
Indeed, in this case, the Court of Appeals already overturned the factual conclusions of the RTC, and the
Court affirms. Quintos's evidence did not satisfy the preponderance of evidence requirement to dispute
the presumptions of regularity, observance of the ordinary course of business, and sufficient
consideration accorded the loan transactions under Rule 131, Section 3, paragraphs (p) to (r) of the
Revised Rules of Court and Article 1354 of the Civil Code, much less the clear and convincing evidence
necessary to overcome the prima facie presumptions of authenticity, genuineness, and regular execution
of notarized documents under Rule 132, Section 30 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Upon scrutiny, Quintos's fundamental allegations - particularly, that it was Romualdez who negotiated
with NIDC and DBP for the grant of the loans; that Quintos signed the loan and collateral agreements
because of the intimidation exerted upon his person by Romualdez; that despite being warned by
Quintos, NIDC and DBP still released the proceeds of the loans to Romualdez; that Romualdez did not
turnover to or infuse the loan proceeds into GCFI but used the entire amount for personal purposes; that
even former First Lady Imelda and Gen. Ver confronted and threatened Quintos; that there were no
actual stockholders' and board of directors' meetings held to approve the loans; and that Quintos was
only forced and intimidated by Romualdez and Atty. De Joya into signing the Secretary's Certificates and
other corporate documents on the supposed stockholders' and board of directors' meetings approving
said loans long after the release of the loan proceeds - were essentially based on Quintos's own
testimony. Quintos, however, is an interested party, not only was he a signatory to the loan and collateral
documents, but he stands to benefit the most from the declaration of nullity of the loans and collateral
contracts being the majority stockholder of GCFI and a surety for the loans. Uncorroborated testimony of
an interested party should not be accepted hook, line, and sinker. It should be assessed with extreme
care.62
Quintos generally alleged that he was merely "coerced" and "forced" by Romualdez into signing the loan
and collateral contracts and the Secretary's Certificates on the stockholders' and board of directors'
meetings approving the loans with NIDC and DBP which did not actually take place. Quintos, however,
failed to provide any details as to how Romualdez precisely exercised said coercion and force upon him.
What Quintos was able to narrate with some particularity were the incidents with former First Lady
Imelda and Gen. Ver, but even then, according to Quintos, former First Lady Imelda and Gen. Ver
referred to the sale of Quintos's shares of stock in GCFI to Romualdez and warned Quintos against
speaking to others about Romualdez not having yet paid for said shares. Former First Lady Imelda and
Gen. Ver made no mention at all of the loan transactions with NIDC and DBP. Neither can the Court give
much weight to what the RTC described as the "atmosphere prevailing" under Martial Law absent proof
of how it specifically affected Quintos and the loan transactions with NIDC and DBP. Under Article 1335
of the Civil Code:cralawlawlibrary
Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property
of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in
mind.
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A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate
consent.
Absent details on how Quintos was "coerced" and "forced" or even intimidated into signing the loan and
collateral contracts, the Court has no way of determining, in accordance with the standards set forth in
Article 1335 of the Civil Code, whether there was sufficient degree of violence or intimidation exercised
upon Quintos that vitiated his consent to the loan and collateral contracts.
KRYSTLE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. DOMINGO ALIBIN
FACTS:
Respondent Domingo Alibin (Domingo)owned an undivided one-half portion of the subject lot in this case
situated in Legazpi City, Albay, and registered in his name and that of Mariano Rodrigueza (Mariano).
On the strength of a contract to sell8 which was notarized on July 10, 1962 and a Deed of Sale dated
August 23, 1962 purporting to convey Domingos one-half (1/2) share of the said lot to Caridad
Rodrigueza (Caridad), as well as a Deed of Absolute Sale10 dated December 5, 1994 whereby Mariano
and Caridad (the Rodriguezas) transferred their respective rights to the subject lot in favor of petitioner
Krystle Realty Development Corporation (Krystle Realty), the original certificate of title was cancelled.
Claiming that he had not sold his share to Caridad nor received any consideration for the alleged
transfer, and that the signature on the deed of sale was not his, Domingo sought to annul the said deed.
Caridad, on the other hand, insisted that she had paid Domingo in two (2) installments: 500.00 as down
payment on July 10, 1962, and the balance of 400.00 on August 23, 1962 during which he signed the
Deed of Sale. She then took possession of Domingos one-half (1/2) portion of the subject lot and
declared the same for taxation purposes.14 For its part, Krystle Realty claimed that it was a purchaser in
good faith, and that the action, if at all, should be directed against Caridad.
The parties agreed to submit to a handwriting expert of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) the
determination of the genuineness of Domingos signature on the deed of sale. Subsequently, the NBI
issued Questioned Document Report No. 60-19617 dated June 14, 1996 stating that the questioned and
the standard/sample signatures of Domingo submitted to it for examination were written by one and the
same person.
RTC: (a) annulling the Deed of Sale dated August 23, 1962; (b) declaring respondents as the rightful
owners of the onehalf (1/2) undivided portion of the subject lot, and Krystle Realty as to the remaining
one-half (1/2) portion
The RTC invalidated the Deed of Sale dated August 23, 1962 after conducting its own independent
examination and finding that the signature of Domingo on said deed is different from his true signatures
as appearing on the documents submitted in evidence by Caridad herself. It did not give credence to the
testimony of Eliudoro Constantino (Constantino), a document examiner of the NBI, who concluded that
the specimen signatures he and his team examined were written by one and the same person, without,
however, giving a categorical conclusion that such specimen signatures were indeed those of Domingo.
In this relation, the RTC pointed out that Constantinos own signature as examiner did not appear on the

three-page Questioned Documents Report No. 60-196 describing the findings of their examination, but
only in an additional paper which was not included in the original report first delivered to the court,
prompting the latter to conclude that said additional paper was "belatedly inserted." Moreover, the
examiner who actually prepared the aforementioned Report, i.e., Flordeliza A. Labanon, was not
presented as a witness, and no plausible explanation for such omission.25
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in a Decision
ISSUE: Whether or not it is correct for the Judge to reject the report of the handwriting expert the the
specimen were executed by one and the same person.
HELD:
It is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and, hence, does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering
that the factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive and binding on the Court,36 especially if they
do not contradict those of the trial court, as in this case.
Contrary to the contention of petitioners, the CA has not overlooked any relevant fact which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. That the parties herein agreed to submit the
determination of the genuineness of Domingos signature to a handwriting expert of the NBI does not, by
any stretch of the imagination, authorize the RTC to accept the findings of such expert hook, line, and
sinker. The trial court is the most capable trier of facts and, as such, should not abdicate its judicial duty
to decide.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, the authenticity of a signature is a matter that is not so highly
technical as to preclude a judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon the question of
whether the signature on a document is forged or not.37 The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore,
does not mandatorily bind the court,38the expert's function being to place before the court data upon
which it can form its own opinion.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA conducted independent examinations of the specimen signatures,
which is authorized by law,40 and unanimously concluded that the questioned signature on the Deed of
Sale dated August 23, 1962 is different from the standard signatures of Domingo as appearing on
documents submitted in evidence by petitioner Caridad Rodrigueza. Absent any cogent reason to
deviate from such finding of forgery, which is the basis for the annulment of the said deed, the same
should be deemed conclusive and binding upon the Court.
5) LETICIA KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Prosecution: Between 9-10 pm, Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Malana, went to the house of
Kummer. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by saying, "Auntie, ako si
Boy Mallo."
Kummer opened the door and at this point, her son, Johan, shot Mallo twice using a gun. Malana, who
was with Mallo, immediately ran towards the west, followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he
saw the Kummer leveling and firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latters back and causing him to fall
flat on the ground.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 11
Thereafter, the Kummer went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with Johan, she
scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. Kummer and Johan put down the guns
and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallos feet and pulled him to about 3-4 meters away from the
house.Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights
The prosecution filed an information for homicide against Kummer and Johan. Both accused were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Defense: Kummer claimed she and her children, were already asleep in the evening when the crime
happened. She claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a
gun report, and the banging at their door. Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the
NPA prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them, Johan got a
gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people causing the disturbance. The noise
continued, however, with a stone hitting the window and breaking the glass; another stone another child
of Kummer who was then sick. This prompted Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to
fire it. The noise thereafter stopped and they all went back to sleep.
RTC found the prosecutions evidence persuasive based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Cuntapay
and Malana. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left
hand of Johan and on Kummers right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other
witnesses, led the RTC to find both Kuhan and Johan guilty of the crime charged.
Kummer appealed the judgment of conviction with the CA. She contended before the CA that the RTC
erred in its appreciation of the evidence, namely: a) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of
Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct
testimonies and b) in considering the paraffin test results finding the Kummer positive for gunpowder
residue.
The CA rejected the Kummers arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that the
discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily
discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and reconcilable.
Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTCs decision convicting her of the
crime of homicide.
Held: No. Variance between the eyewitnesses testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not
affect their credibility.
Inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in
his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his
credibility and the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the
crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as
these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith. Nor are such
inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or
recall.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly declared in open
court that they saw the accused shoot Mallo. The inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were

due to the oversight of the administering official in typing the exact details of their narration. It is oft
repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete,
resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarants testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is
asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out
not to be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of
affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiants mouth, thus allowing the whole
statement to be taken out of context.
As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.
In the present case, it is undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one
of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to,
which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed,
the inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of the case.
Moreover, Supreme Court accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial
court, more so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case.We find no reason to break this rule
and thus find that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana
and Cuntapay.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and authenticity
The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of
its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court to
identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted.
Moreover, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on the
Kummer, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to
public documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as witness to
identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of
Johan and on the right hand of Kummer. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence
of gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she allegedly lighted.
Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test raised by
Kummer, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted
the report observed the regular procedure. While the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate
the prosecution eyewitnesses testimony that Kummer shot the victim. Furthermore, while it is true that
cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match may leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these
traces are minimal and may be washed off with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by
gunpowder.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 12
DEL ROSARIO VS LIMCAOCO
PAZ DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner VS. FELIX H. LIMCAOCO, Z. ROJAS AND BROS., REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAGAYTAY CITY, Respondents.
FACTS: Three different claims on a 12.5-hectare of land in Maitim II, Tagaytay City, Cavite, brought
about these cases. Paz Del Rosario contends that in 1976 she bought the land from the Amulong family
which had been in peaceful and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial. Del Rosario
presented a copy of the February 27, 1976 Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan that evidences the sale. Felix
H. Limcaoco, the other claimant, alleges that he bought the same land from one Eugenio Flores as
shown by a February 13, 1976 Deed of Absolute Sale. Finally, Z. Rojas and Bros., the third claimant,
claims that the spouses Honorio and Maria Rojas bought the land as early as 1932 from the spouses
Petrona Amulong and Agapito Acosta. Upon learning that the government issued a free patent in
Limcaoco's favor, on June 7, 1977 Del Rosario filed a complaint for reconveyance against him before the
Tagaytay RTC. Later, Z. Rojas and Bros., a partnership, filed a complaint-in intervention in the case,
pointing out that the spouses Rojas had donated the subject land to their children, who in turn had
applied for the registration of the property in their names with the then CFI of Cavite which rendered a
Decision granting the application. The CA affirmed the CFI.
On September 15, 1981 Z. Rojas and Bros. also filed a petition with the Bureau of Lands for the
cancellation of Limcaocos Free and OCT. After hearing, the Director of Lands recommended the
cancellation of the subject Free Patent and OCT, which recommendation the Ministry of Natural
Resources approved. On February 27, 1984 the Republic of the Philippines filed, through the Bureau of
Lands, a complaint for the cancellation of Free Patent and OCT before the Tagaytay RTC, in which Z.
Rojas and Bros. again filed a complaint-in-intervention and were eventually consolidated and jointly tried.
On October 17, 1997 the RTC rendered a decision, declaring Z. Rojas and Bros. as the true and lawful
owner of the subject land, annulling Limcaocos Free Patent and OCT, and ruling that Del Rosario
merely acquired a possessory right of tenancy over the land. Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000 Z. Rojas and
Bros. was dissolved and was substituted by the Rojas heirs. The court granted the motion for
substitution on July 19, 2000. The appeals brought before the CA were joined. On April 28, 2006 the CA
rendered a decision holding that, while the Rojas heirs appear to have a just title over the property, the
partnership of Z. Rojas and Bros., which had a separate and distinct personality, did not. The CA further
held that its determination is without prejudice to the claim of the individual Rojas heirs over the property
and to pending or future proceedings leading to the grant of such claim. The appellate court, however,
affirmed the rest of the RTC Decision. Del Rosario and the Rojas heirs appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed error in declaring the Rojas heirs, rather than Del Rosario or Z. Rojas
and Bros., substituted by the same heirs, the true and lawful owner of the subject Tagaytay City land.
RULING
Tenancy cannot be simply presumed. To exist, it must have the following elements: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant.
Here, it appears from the records that the Amulongs did not enter into an agricultural lease with the

owner. They cultivated the land at their own expense and for their own benefit and never shared the
produce of the land with anyone.
What Del Rosario actually bought from the Amulongs was, therefore, merely the right of possession. The
Director of Lands found that before the Japanese occupation, the Amulongs sold the property to Del
Rosario for P100,000.00, without the consent and knowledge of the Rojases.
The Director of Lands investigation further revealed that the spouses Honorio Rojas and Maria Sipriaso
bought the property in controversy from the Amulong. On that same day, they transferred the property to
their six children by way of donation. Rojas children filed a petition for registration and confirmation of
title over the property before the CFI of Cavite. The land registration court rendered a decision, declaring
the registration of the parcel of land in favor of the Rojases. The CA thereafter affirmed, and from there,
no more appeal was ever made.
Consequently, the land registration court issued an Order, directing the Judicial Land Title Division of the
Department of Justice to cause the preparation and issuance of the appropriate decree over the subject
property for the Rojas children. When Manuel Rojas, however, was incarcerated by the Japanese during
World War II, the documents pertaining to the Tagaytay land were confiscated from him. Still, the
Rojases continued paying the real estate taxes on the property which they had been doing since 1940.
Sometime in December 1949 they formed a partnership named Z. Rojas and Brothers and contributed
the subject parcel of land to constitute the partnerships capital. It is indubitable that the CFI Decision in
the land registration case granting the Rojases application, CA affirming that grant, and the CFI Order in
the land registration case all prove the Rojases ownership of the land. Still, CA regarded these
documents as private and that their due execution and authenticity need first be established before they
can be admitted in evidence.
Notably, the contested documents are court decisions and orders, which are undoubtedly public in
character. As public documents, their due execution and authenticity need not be proved to make them
admissible in evidence. Their existence may be evidenced by an official publication or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record. Here, the copies of the assailed court issuances
were attested by Mr. Leon Barrera, the then Cavite CFI Deputy Clerk of Court. The only reason the CA
regarded those court orders as private was that they were not reconstituted after the original court
records had been destroyed in a fire. But reconstitution cannot apply where, as in the land registration
action in question, the trial had already ended and the court had indeed already decided. Reconstitution
of judicial records under Act 311011 are undertaken after they have been lost only with respect to
pending proceedings where the subject case had not yet been decided. It does not apply to closed and
decided cases.
Rule 132, Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All
other writings are private.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 13
And even assuming that the subject documents may be regarded as private in character, the Rojases
presented Mr. Barrera, the retired Cavite CFI Deputy Clerk of Court, who established by his testimony
and various supporting papers, the due execution and authenticity of the documents in question.
Rule 132, Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic
is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
HEIRS OF GABATAN V CA GR 150206 MARCH 13, 2009
TOPIC: Proof of filiation of illegitimate children
FACTS:
The respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in Cagayan de Oro City
which she inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his
wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, his land was entrusted to his
brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but
to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to
heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property.
Petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan
with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan.
They further contend that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that
Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-
in-interest), Macaria and Justa.
These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have
been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
October 20, 1995 = the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent
CA affirmed such decision declaring that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan
was sufficiently established during trial.
o The proof was a Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such
declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by
consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as
the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
o Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan
which ultimately passed on to respondent.
ISSUE: W/N Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

HELD: No.
Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth
appearing the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment in the
absence of these, any proof that the child enjoyed the continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is
the anyone allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of the
proof of paternity and filiation
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
To prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic
document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her
mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of
these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the
Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses but none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when
Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas
wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or
heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the
siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan.
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein,
as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated. After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed,
such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v.
Del Rosario, we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 14
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified
the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the
whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.
6)
[G. R. No. 112090. October 26, 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, accused-appellant.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision finding accused-appellant Apolinar Lazaro y Servania guilty
of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, that on or about May 5, 1991, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1)
handgun, Cal. 38 Revolver TM-Squires Bingham, SN-1029315 with 6 empty shells on (sic) the chamber,
said accused not having any license and/or permit to possess and carry the same from the authorities
charged with the issuance thereof. That the aforesaid firearm has been used in shooting two persons
one of whom died and the other has (sic) serious condition at the Mother Seton Hospital.
The facts as shown by the evidence of the prosecution reveal that on 05 May 1990, at around
3:30 p.m., Police Sergeant Bonnet was on board a Mobile Patrol conducting an inspection of traffic
policemen. While cruising along Panganiban Drive in Naga City, his attention was called by bystanders
who were shouting that there was a bloodied man beside the driver of a Toyota type jeep that was
traveling south. This prompted P/Sgt. Bonnet to go after the said vehicle. When the Toyota jeep stopped
along Gen. Luna Street, Bonnet was able to see a man with blood all over him beside the driver. He then
instructed the driver to follow the mobile patrol to the Bicol Regional Hospital. When they arrived at the
Bicol Regional Hospital, he saw that his station commander, Police Major Jose A. Tuazon, was waiting
for them. It appears that earlier Police Major Tuazon received a telephone call at around 4:00 a.m.
informing him that a shooting incident had occurred.
Moments later, Major Tuazon received another telephone call, this time from the Naga City
Hospital informing him that a wounded man, on board a yellow colored Toyota Tamaraw jeep driven by a
person armed with a handgun, was brought for treatment at the hospital. The injured person was brought
inside for treatment. As he was previously informed that the driver of the jeep was armed with a
handgun, Major Tuazon ordered the said driver to step out of his jeep. He then saw the driver with a
handgun tucked in his waist, pull out the handgun from its holster and drop it at the back of the drivers
seat. Upon seeing the gun, Major Tuazon pulled the driver out of the vehicle, got hold of the gun which
turned out to be a .38 caliber revolver bearing Serial Number 1029315. The gun contained six empty
shells. Major Tuazon then confronted the driver and asked him why he was carrying a gun and whether
he had a license to possess said firearm. The driver did not respond to his question. Maj. Tuazon
brought the driver to the police headquarters and turned over the firearm to the duty investigator, Cpl.
Jose Manzanero. At the police station, he learned that the name of the driver was Apolinar Lazaro,
herein accused-appellant. A certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra, Chief
of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame was presented in court by the public
prosecutor. The certification stated that accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder
of any kind or caliber.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide.

RULING: In cases involving illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866, as amended, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same. In the case at bench, the first element is beyond dispute as the subject
firearm and six empty shells were recovered from the accused-appellant while he was alighting from the
Tamaraw jeepney. As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove the absence of a license to carry a firearm as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a
certification from the Firearms and Explosive Section in Camp Crame without presenting the person who
issued the certification himself, a certain Antonio Sierra. Over the objection of accused-appellants
counsel, the lower court admitted the exhibit on the ground that the same is an official public record and
because the fiscal stated that he himself saw the signatory sign the document.The records of the case
show that the prosecution merely presented in court the certification from the Firearms and Explosive
Office before formally offering its documentary evidence.
Exhibit D is the certification of the firearms explosive office to the effect that herein accused is not a
licensed or registered holder of any firearm. This is dated August 20, 1991.Exhibit D-1 which I request to
be marked as such --- the signature of Antonio A. Sierra, the issuing officer of the firearms and
explosives office. The signature was affixed in my presence when I personally procured this certification
from the Camp Crame. With all of these evidence, testimonial, physical and documentary evidence, we
close the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Exhibit D is a public document, which was
procured in line of duty, and considering that according to the Fiscal he himself was a witness to the
signatory of the same. All the exhibits are admitted.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon the said
certification considering that the person who made the document was not presented in court to
testify. Thus, accused-appellant argues, the certification should have been excluded for being hearsay.
There is no merit in the above argument. On several occasions, the Court has ruled that
either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. Moreover, the
rule on hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions.
One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which
states as follows: Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Relative to this
provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said document. Thus:
Rule 132, Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. - A written statement signed by an officer having
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a
specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contains no such record
or entry.
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP-Firearm and
Explosives Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is
competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is not a licensed holder or
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 15
possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently
searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it ought to be as
satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to this effect
would be.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision finding accused-appellant guilty
for violation of P.D. 1866. Accused-appellant is hereby acquitted of the said crime. Criminal Case No.
91-3483 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELIZAR G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004
TOMAQUIN
Facts: The accused-appellant was charged with murder. On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued. After trial, accused was found guilty. There were no
eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecutions evidence, aside from appellants
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial. Said extrajudicial confession was given in the
presence of a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Appellant questions the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled confession. Accused-appellant contends that
the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an independent counsel within the
purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin, together
with 3 others were drinking Red Horse beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at
around 1:00 in the morning, saying he had a headache. Later, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A
few minutes later, they heard Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard her goddaughter asking for
help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyns house. Rico noticed that the
hinge and the walling of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the
kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which he claims
belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up
on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she
expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to
be appellants. A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres cantos for safekeeping which were later
turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned
over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not identified.
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods of Lorega, Cebu
City, searched for appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres
cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house
of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was
wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of
Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. It was Edgar
Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told
his tanods to take appellant to the police station.
In the morning of the next day, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the
Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights,
appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan,
the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that
he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred
with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that
appellant was ready to give his statement. Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken down

completely in the Cebuano dialect but he repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty.
Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to
assist and help him with his expenses. A part of the extrajudicial confession of appellant reads:
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka
man?
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-
inom si Rico Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug
taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta ug dayon
nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy
Lorega nianang pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong
petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo
sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka
man punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo ang maong TV?
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline
Tatoy nga naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan
siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong siyang
ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi
sa akong tres kantps nga hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza
rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas
nga Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon
diin to siya maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako siya
dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
. custodial investigations. This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman, and People vs. Velarde where we
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, with the assistance of a
barangay captain, is admissible in evidence against him.
RULING: NO. Appellants extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano
dialect. Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an
unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are
directed to have such translation prepared before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other
than the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by
the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both
original and translation sent to this court. In this case, there is no official translation of appellants
extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule,
then appellants extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for
the prosecution. Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the
parties and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable
of Cebuano in which the document was written, such extrajudicial confession was appropriately
considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 16
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The words competent and independent counsel in the constitutional provision is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable
lawyer. As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of
Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and
ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who
shall be deemed as such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. On these bases, it
is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of
appellant.
In People vs. Culala, the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an
independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the
people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the
Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
further ruled that a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the
Constitution.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawans role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent
legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan
could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his
extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and
competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any intervening
conflict of interest. Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and
vigilant counsel. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs.
Velarde:
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all
stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of
the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give
advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.

Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation
to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights
to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. On these bases, it is not legally possible to
consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of appellant. In this case the role of the
barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the
role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his
jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when
the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an
independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without any
intervening conflict of interest. Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of
an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega, stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting
standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a
hard look into the sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law
enforcement authorities as the sole basis for convicting accused individuals. In
cases of crimes notable for their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the
culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and
disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable
assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing
about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered
by law enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed
by the Constitution. If the standards are not met, the Constitution provides
the corresponding remedy by providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that
"[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III, Section
12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof
of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellants defense is weak,
conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the
defense. In this case, the prosecutions evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[46] Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
G.R. No. 197515 July 2, 2014
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. UNITED SALVAGE AND TOWAGE (PHILS.), INC.,
FACTS: Respondent is engaged in the business of sub-contracting work for service contractors
engaged in petroleum operations in the Philippines. During the taxable years in question, it had entered
into various contracts and/or sub-contracts with several petroleum service contractors, such as Shell
Philippines Exploration, B.V. and Alorn Production Philippines for the supply of service vessels. In the
course of respondents operations, petitioner found respondent liable for deficiency income tax,
withholding tax, value-added tax (VAT) and documentary stamp tax (DST) for taxable years 1992, 1994,
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 17
1997 and 1998. Particularly, petitioner, through BIR officials, issued demand letters with attached
assessment notices for withholding tax on compensation and expanded withholding tax for taxable years
1992, 1994 and 1998.
USTP filed administrative protests against the 1994 and 1998 EWT assessments,
respectively. USTP appealed by way of Petition for Review before the Court in action (which was
thereafter raffled to the CTA-Special First Division) alleging, among others, that the Notices of
Assessment are bereft of any facts, law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence; thus, the assessments
are void and the right of the government to assess and collect deficiency taxes from it has prescribed on
account of the failure to issue a valid notice of assessment within the applicable period.
The CTA-Special First Division held that the Preliminary Assessment Notices for deficiency
EWT for taxable years 1994 and 1998 were not formally offered; hence, pursuant to Section 34, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court shall neither consider the same as evidence nor rule on
their validity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals is governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence.
RULING: Petitioner implores unto this Court that technical rules of evidence should not be strictly
applied in the interest of substantial justice, considering that the mandate of the CTA explicitly provides
that its proceedings shall not be governed by the technical rules of evidence. Relying thereon, petitioner
avers that while it failed to formally offer the PANs of EWTs for taxable years 1994and 1998, their
existence and due execution were duly tackled during the presentation of petitioners witnesses, Ruleo
Badilles and Carmelita Lynne de Guzman (for taxable year 1994) and Susan Salcedo-De Castro and
Edna A. Ortalla (for taxable year 1998). Petitioner further claims that although the PANs were not
marked as exhibits, their existence and value were properly established, since the BIR records for
taxable years 1994 and 1998 were forwarded by petitioner to the CTA in compliance with the latters
directive and were, in fact, made part of the CTA records.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a
court of record. As such, it shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the conduct of its
business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of decisions within its jurisdiction. Moreover, as
cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.
Thus, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules
on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.
Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Although in a long line of cases, we have relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not
formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court, we exercised extreme caution in
applying the exceptions to the rule, as pronounced in Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals,33 thus:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an
exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles[186 SCRA 385, 388-389 (1990)], we had the occasion to make a distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is
done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the
second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally
offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a[179 SCRA 403 (1989)] citing People v. Mate[103 SCRA 484
(1980)], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must

have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.34
The evidence may, therefore, be admitted provided the following requirements are present:
(1) the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and (2) the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case. Being an exception, the same may only be applied when
there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned above; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.35
I n the case at bar, petitioner categorically admitted that it failed to formally offer the PANs as
evidence. Worse, it advanced no justifiable reason for such fatal omission. Instead, it merely alleged that
the existence and due execution of the PANs were duly tackled by petitioners witnesses. We hold that
such is not sufficient to seek exception from the general rule requiring a formal offer of evidence, since
no evidence of positive identification of such PANs by petitioners witnesses was presented. Hence, we
agree with the CTA En Bancs observation that the 1994 and 1998 PANs for EWT deficiencies were not
duly identified by testimony and were not incorporated in the records of the case, as required by
jurisprudence.
While we concur with petitioner that the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as
rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily intended as tools in the administration of
justice,36 the presentation of PANs as evidence of the taxpayers liability is not mere procedural
technicality. It is a means by which a taxpayer is informed of his liability for deficiency taxes. It serves as
basis for the taxpayer to answer the notices, present his case and adduce supporting evidence.37 More
so, the same is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of respondent's
claims. We are, therefore, constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses
Parocha,38 viz.:
x x x. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On
the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.
Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not
previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled
that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable
period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three
(3) months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court
order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to
consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence.
Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their
commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners' failure to
comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious
dispensation of justice. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 27, 2011 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 662 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
7)
Heirs of Saez Sabanpan vs Alberto Comorposa
Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by the Heirs of Saez Sabanpan against
Comorposa before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.The complaint alleged that
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 18
Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the disputed lot.In 1960, he died leaving all his
heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated from his job. The
termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a close family friend of
[Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the
husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo
allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by
his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was
witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa
occupied a portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents
who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.
In 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused
to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful
possessor[s] of the premises. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was issued by the said
barangay and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.
MTC Decision: In favor of the petitioners.
RTC Decision: Reversed the MTC decision.
CA Decision: Affirmed RTC.The CA added that the Certification issued by the DENRs community
environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was
conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.
Petitoners now claim that the Certification issued by the CENR officers should not be given any weight
as it is a new matter raised for the first time on appeal.
Issue: W/N the Certification issued by the CENR officers is admissible? (YES)
Held: Yes.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the
pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked
as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered,
however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence that has not
been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to
cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
Heirs of Pedro Pasa vs Parocha
Facts: The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by petitioners
against respondents. Petitioners alleged a share over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which
formed part of the estate of petitioners deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag.They
averred that Benito and Florentina Pasag died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their
eight (8) childrenPedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata. However,

Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-adjudication that he is the sole,
legal, and compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was able to appropriate to
himself the properties covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT).
In 1999, petitioners rested their case and were granted ten (10) days within which to submit their formal
offer of documentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading within the required
period. The petitioners asked for an extension, but despite such extension, they again failed to submit
their offer of evidence.
The respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.
RTC Decision: Granted respondents demurrer to evidence and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint.
CA Decision: Affirmed RTC
Issue: W/N there was a waiver on the part of the petitioners to formally present or offer documentary
evidence? (YES)
Held: Yes.
The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of
Appeals ruled that the formal offer of ones evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time.It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a
lapse of three (3) months because to do so would condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance
with a court order.
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to
consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence.
Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their
commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners failure to
comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious
dispensation of justice.
On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documentary
and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a partys testimonial evidence. It requires
that such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing.
The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the
party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day
the party presented the last witness.Otherwise, the court may consider the partys documentary or object
evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in
writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object evidence or documents are large in
numbersay from 100 and above, and only where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.
The SC has thoroughly reviewed the records and are convinced that petitioners have failed to sufficiently
prove their allegations. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegations.However, petitioners did not substantiate their allegations and merely argued that the
Complaint should be threshed out in a full blown trial in order to establish their respective positions.
R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 19
Josielene Chan vs Johnny Chan
Facts:
In 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that
Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached
to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form
carried a physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse."
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined.
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege.
RTC Decision: The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes motion.
CA Decision: Affirmed RTC. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not
do so in this case.
Issue: W/N the lower courts correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the
physician-patient communication.(NO)
Held:
No. Such denial was premature.
The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such
as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the
physicians testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patients health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence
for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
 R u l e 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 | 20

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more
so to their disclosure.

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