Case

No. Case Title

1 Case 1 - Hannah Serena vs Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA
5 Case 5 - Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan, 630 SCRA
10 Case 10 -Jimenez vs Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
12 Case 12 -Miguel vs Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 560
14 Case 14 - Union Bank vs People, 667 SCRA 113
16 Case 16 - Castillo vs Salvador, July 2014
17 Case 17 - Lim vs Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114
19 Case 19 - People vs Romero, 306 SCRA 90
25 Case 25 - Abanado vs Bayona, 677 SCRA 113
26 Case 26 - Heirs of Nestor Tria vs Obias, 635 SCRA 91
27 Case 27 - Uy vs Javellana, 680 SCRA 13
29 Case 29 - PCGG vs Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA
30 Case 30 - De Lima vs Reyes, 779 SCRA
31 Case 31 - Saraum vs People, 781 SCRA (1/25/2016)
34 Case 34 - Antiquera vs People, 712 SCRA, 12/11/2013
37 Case 37 - Zuno vs Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382
42 Case 42 - Enrile vs Sandiganbayan, August 18, 2015
50 Case 50 - Daan vs Sandiganbayan, 560 SCRA 233
52 Case 52 - ABS - CBN Corp vs Gozon, 753 SCRA 1
57 Case 57 - Soriano vs People, 591 SCRA 244
58 Case 58 - Cerezo vs People, 650 SCRA 222

Case 1 - Hannah Serena vs Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA

ESTAFA

G.R. No. 162059

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA v SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a
one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc
as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash

the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was

not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada,
not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she
is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner can be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:

Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. The Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. Also the
Sandiganbayan see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation
to their office.

As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs Desierto, that public
office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some p ortion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.

Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express
mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by
express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.
Case 5 - Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan, 630 SCRA

JURISDICTION
 JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004

FACTS:

The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. It was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee
continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system. Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to
be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions
from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all
earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.

On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a "Complaint-Affidavit" with the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate transactions involving the
Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the
government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to
investigate Ramiscal, Jr. (President of the AFP-RSBS), together with twenty-seven (27) other persons for
conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in
capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.

On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C.
Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner
and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss the Informations and to defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a
"Notice of Appearance" as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of
Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made
conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro
Navarro, who are members thereof. In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS.

ISSUE: Whether or not AGFOI as represented by Albano & Associates are private injured parties entitled to
intervene as the private prosecutor in the subject cases.
RULING:

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and
Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the
felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to
the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would
only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil
action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal
action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order
to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act
of the accused.50 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the
accused:

ART. 104. What is included in civil liability . The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and
103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

 Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the
proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also
be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the
same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by
the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the
evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the
satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

Case 10 -Jimenez vs Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151

Jimenez vs Hon. Sorongon

Facts:
Jimenez (Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management Corporation a local manning agency,
while Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis are the respondents herein and are some of the
listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local manning agency Aug. 19, 2013.

Petitioner files a complaint affidavit with the office of the prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. Respondents Antzoulatos and
Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit and denying the complaint.

Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter affidavit. An Information for the said crime was
filed before the RTC-Mandaluyong.

Dec. 4, 2004 the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed
their comment to the opposition however the judge denied the motion as it found existence of probable cause
and issued warrants against the respondents.

Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause to defer the enforcement of the
warrants or arrest. Petitioner filed his opposition with the motion to expunge, contending that Alamil being a fugitive
from justice had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC found probable cause.

Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali for being biased or partial. The said
judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case was re-raffled to Judge Sorongon.
 On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute
the respondents.

On April 26, 2006 moved to expunge the motion for being prohibited pleading since the motion did not have any
conformity from the city prosecutor. In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided.

On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners notice of appeal since the public prosecutor
did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case. On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed
his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order
dismissing the case; the respondents fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the case

Held:
No. It is well settled that the real party in interest is the People of the Philippines and is represented by the prosecutors.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, the Office of the
Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the People; The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and
only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the Court of
Appeals or in the Supreme Court.

Case 12 -Miguel vs Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA 560

FACTS:

The petitioner, a former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged with violation of Sec. 13 of RA

3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City public market.

The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: ..former Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the
offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with
the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused]..
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension

despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by
the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his

co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.

ISSUE:

I - Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid;

HELD:

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the

accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter
alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or

omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms

sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and

for the court to pronounce judgment.

The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In
particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as

defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably

prepare his defense.

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a
"person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident

bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the
petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic

reading of the information would yield.

Case 14 - Union Bank vs People, 667 SCRA 113

Union Bank vs. People

G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

Nature of the case: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Br. 65
Venue

Facts:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a
false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union
Banks two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie
and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint and second complaint were filed in RTC Pasay
City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Information filed in RTC Makati alleged that Tomas executed under oath false affidavit against forum
shopping.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City
court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati
City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjur y
case.

RTC denied the motion.

Issue:

What the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should beMakati City, where the

Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to

the trial court.

Ruling:

The venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any
of its essential ingredients took place.
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of impr oper venue,

the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial

jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City. The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under
oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati

City.

For the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or

her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.

Case 16 - Castillo vs Salvador, July 2014

GR No. 191240, July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR

Facts:

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO - Filed the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the
Court Of Appeals decided to acquit respondent it should have at least retained the award of damages to
the petitioner.

- It was alleged that respondent along with his brother proposed a remittance business with the
petitioner.
- The amount of US$100,000.00 was the capital which was raised by the petitioner. However, it was
alleged that the respondent took the said amount to pay for all his obligations. Said amount was
never returned to the petitioner.

PHILLIP R. SALVADOR - Charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.

- Denied the charges against him.

- The Court ruled for his acquittal. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
Issue: WON the award of damages or the civil aspect of the case can be retained.

Held:

The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of.
This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance
of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA
found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time
and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to
sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the
money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioners claim of trust as reason for not requiring
respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with
him; and (4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.

The petition for the award of damages is denied.

Case 17 - Lim vs Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114

LIM VS KOU CO PING

Facts:
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several
withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt.
These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw
from the plant. Each withdrawal authority is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked
by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for
P3.15 million (P63.00 per bag). Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim at the price of P64.00 per
bag (total of P3.2 million). Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a
staggered basis. She withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities
(covering 10,000 bags) to Co. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co, who explained that the
plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price
difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after
her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before the RTC of
Pasig City. Lim also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC of Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages
during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa

Held:
No. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the
criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil
liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto
is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until
the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court
hearing the criminal action declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be
pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

In this case, the first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the
criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the
complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas
the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged.
They present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the
prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Case 19 - People vs Romero, 306 SCRA 90

G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

MARTIN L. ROMERO and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

The accused, Martin Romero (Romero) and Ernesto Rodriguez (Rodriguez), conspiring with one another,
convinced a certain Ernesto Ruiz into investing his money in the amount of 150,000 with a promise return
of 800% in profit within 21 days. The two accused then issued a post dated check in the amount of
P1,200,000.00 However, upon presentation of the check by Ruiz, the same was dishonored by the drawee

bank. They (accused) consistently failed and refused to pay the amount due to Ruiz as a result, Ruiz

suffered damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of of P1,200,000.00.

A criminal case of estafa was filed by the fiscal against the two accused, Romero and Rodriguez before the

RTC of Butuan City. Thereafter, a second case was filed with the same court for violation of B.P. 22 or the
bouncing checks law. The RTC then rendered its decision, convicting the two accused for the crime of
estafa but acquitting them for the alleged violation of B.P. 22 pending appeal, Ernesto Rodriguez died. The

RTC then ruled that as a consequence of his death before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex

delicto are extinguished.

ISSUE:

Whether or not death of the accused extinguishes his or her civil liability

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability for the reason that there is no more defendant to stand as the accused. In so far as his civil
liability ex delicto is concerned, the court ruled that the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability is extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Thus, the outcome of the appeal now only

pertains to the remaining accused, Martin Romero. The Court sentenced Romero to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 18 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to indemnify Ernesto Ruiz in the amount of 150,000,

and damages in the amount of 35,000 (moral and exemplary)

Case 25 - Abanado vs Bayona, 677 SCRA 113

CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, complainant,

v
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod
City, respondent.

The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was initially
handled by Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder who found no probable cause against Palo. However,
complainant, upon review, found that there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus, complainant
disapproved Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo, respondent Judge Bayona
issued an order directing complainant Abanado to present (1) a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary
Investigation, (2) Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum of the transfer
of case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit to the
Court, to enable his court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.

With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that there was no memorandum of transfer of the
case from Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.

Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an Order,
respondent stated that the Jarders Resolution dismissing the complaint was part and parcel of the official
records of the case and, for this reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation. He
further stated that because there was a conflict between Jarders and complainants resolutions, those
documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence to establish probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the records
of the case by producing the Jarders Resolution. The Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a letter
explaining the impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter stated that the Resolution was no longer
part of the records of the case as it was disapproved by complainant.

Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an order, he

required complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a
ten-day extension to comply with it but respondent denied the request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of
Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the existence

of his resolution dismissing the case against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutors Records Officer

Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case.

Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition against respondent and a petition for

certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent from
proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO was granted by

Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.

Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or provincial prosecutor rever ses
the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the

recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would
be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no
longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not

intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all the
time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest
against the accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents

(such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of

stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which
to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.

Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). He alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure

and gross misconduct. He essentially asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over
the production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially Jarders Resolution. Respondent,
in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance

of the Jarders Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted Judge Gelladas Order which held that the

resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the

investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no

longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and it need not be annexed to the information filed

in court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conduct of a preliminary investigation is an executive function

HELD:

Yes. The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.

Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting

preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The Department
of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such attachment is not

mandatory or required under the rules.

Case 26 - Heirs of Nestor Tria vs Obias, 635 SCRA 91

HEIRS OF THE LATE NESTOR TRIA, G.R. No. 175887

Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO
- versus - MORALES, J.,Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN
VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ.
ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 24, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Engr. Nestor Tria was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a
hospital but died the following day. Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the NBI.

NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto Obet Aclan y
Gulpo, Juanito Totoy Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania Fanny Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr.
Tria. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for
murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein
respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ assailing the Provincial Prosecutors order
to dismiss the charge against respondent. A Resolution was issued modifying resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the information for murder filed against Aclan
and Ona.

Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJs resolution. Then
Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez issued a resolution denying respondents motion for reconsideration.
Sometime in October 2001, the prosecution filed with the RTC Quezon City a Motion to Admit Amended
Information to include respondent as one of the accused for the murder of Tria. The respondents motion
for reconsideration was denied. In the meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has already
been filed with the RTC of Pili, which was transferred to the RTC Quezon City. The prosecution then
amended the information to include respondent as one of the accused for the murder trial.

Obias filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ, which was denied on the ground that appeals to the OP
where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is reclusion perpetua to death, shall be taken by
petition for review. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. The
RTC Quezon City issued an order admitting the amended information which includes respondent. The
latter then filed with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for the Suspension of the Issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest. , the DOJ denied respondents motion for reconsideration stating that the proper
procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the
case was considered closed and terminated.

Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted respondents motion for reconsideration and reversed
the DOJ resolutions. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the OP in its Order.

Issue:

w/n the the failure of the petitioners to confront the new witnesses violated their right to due process.

Held:
Petitioners argument that the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent had deprived them of the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly submitted by the respondent is untenable. Under the
procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where there are facts and
issues to be clarified from a party or witness, [t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which
may be asked to the party or witness concerned. Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the
motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate petitioners right
to due process.

Case 27 - Uy vs Javellana, 680 SCRA 13

Uy vs. Javellana,

680 SCRA 13, September 5, 2012

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666

Facts:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T.

Bascug (Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La
Castellana, Negros Occidental.Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public

Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as example: In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v.
Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case
despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled
People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for

non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary

Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge
Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or

merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and In Crim.
Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for

arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for

dismissal of said case.

Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and

issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their

witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when
a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.

Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel Judge

Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the a cts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an
administrative complaint.Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant
complaint against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report,found Judge
Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule

Held:

Criminal Procedure; Arrests; The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required.Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v.
Cornelio, is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that
[t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Judge

Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that t he accused

was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is
totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before

Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate
from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same

accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or
made applicable to the other.

Preliminary Investigation; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure

does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule.The
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a

criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the

following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in
Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the

courts files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be
dismissed.

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.Section 1, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be con ducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at

least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously
established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just
six (6) months.

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional
rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to

why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised

Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of

cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid
down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the

case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.

Barangay Conciliation; A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall
be dismissed without prejudice.We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has

not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion
to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the pleadings

prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule

on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas argument that referral to the Lupon is not a
jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was not referred to
the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have
allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v.
Celeste, et al.

Case 29 - PCGG vs Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, vs. MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015

Facts: The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG against
former officers/directors of DBP, as well as former officers of National Galleon Shipping Corp., charging
them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans in order to identify various anomalous
behest loans entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. One of which is the loan account
granted by the DBP to Galleon.

The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from DBP
possessed positive characteristics of behest loans. Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint
against individual respondents.

The Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and dismissed the criminal
complaint against them. It found that the pieces of evidence attached to the case records were not
sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual respondents, considering that the documents
presented by the PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay,
self-serving, and of little probative value. In this relation, the Ombudsman noted that the PCGG failed to
present the documents which would directly establish the alleged illegal transactions.

Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order dated April 13,
2009; hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.chanrobles

Held: The petition is meritorious.

The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless,
the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by
the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v.
Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the
following manner, to wit:

Probable cause, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not
require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical
rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In the case of Estrada v.
Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate
rights and obligations of parties.

In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating
Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against them.

Case 30 - De Lima vs Reyes, 779 SCRA

Case No. 30, digested by AL Rande

DE LIMA v. REYES [GR No. 209330, Jan 11, 2016]

FACTS:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega was shot dead. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was
arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega, and

implicated therein Rodolfo O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando R. Noel, Jr. The Secretary of
Justice designated a panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to investigate on the Complaint filed by Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega. The First Panel, after conduct of the preliminary investigation, resolved to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open the preliminary investigation before the First Panel in order to

admit as evidence mobile phone conversations between Edrad and Governor Reyes (Reyes) and argued
that these phone conversations tend to prove that Reyes was the mastermind of her husband's murder.
The First Panel, however, dismissed the Motion on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Before Dr. Inocencio-Ortega could file a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice constituted
another panel of prosecutors (Second Panel) to reinvestigate the case. The Second Panel issued a
Subpoena requiring Reyes to appear before them and to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting

evidence.

Reyes questioned before the Court of Appeals the creation of the Second Panel. He argued that

the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. The Second
Panel, however, issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations

on all accused, including Reyes. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued
warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice is authorized to

create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, even

without a pending petition for review.

HELD:

Yes. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 outlines the powers granted by law to the Secretary of
Justice. The provision reads:

Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the Secretary of
Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving national security or a
probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional
prosecution office, and the. provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review,
reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgments and orders of the
prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
 The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject to review by the secretary of justice
who may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions or opinions. Consequently, the secretary may direct
them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or an information against the accused.

In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting
officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the
respondents should be believed.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act

on any "probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution

office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice may step
in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any
probable miscarriage of justice.

Moreover, the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent's
warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot.

Case 31 - Saraum vs People, 781 SCRA (1/25/2016)

Saraum v. People
G.R. 205472

Facts:

Around midnight on 17 Aug 2006, a buy-bust operation was conducted by Cebu PNP in coordination with
PDEA against a certain alias Pata. During the operation, the target managed to escape and led the police
on a chase. In hot pursuit of the suspect who darted into a neighbors shanty, the police caught Amado
Saraum and Peter Esperanza inside, who were about to engage in a meth session with drug paraphernalia
in hand (lighter, tissue paper, aluminum foil). The evidence was bagged and tagged, and the suspects
detained. Saraum did not object to the warrantless arrest prior to his arraignment, and his counsel only
entered his objection to the admission of the seized paraphernalia as evidence due to an invalid
warrantless arrest when the prosecution had already begun presenting their evidence. RTC convicted him
of Possession of Paraphernalia of Dangerous Drugs (sec. 12, Art. II of RA 9165 Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002). On appeal, CA sustained conviction, hence this petition.
Issue: Was the warrantless arrest of Saraum valid?

Held: YES, the arrest in flagrante delicto was valid.

Ratio:
Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
Elements of valid arrest in flagrante delicto:
1. Person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Mere possession of the paraphernalia is an offense

While the items have countless lawful uses by themselves, the prosecution successfully proved
their purpose for taking drugs

Since the warrantless arrest was valid, the warrantless seizure incidental to the arrest is also valid,
and the seized items are the corpus delicti of the offense itself

That Saraums warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto was conducted incidental to another arrest in hot
pursuit of another suspect for a separate valid offense is unimportant and not discussed

Saraum should have assailed the validity of the warrantless arrest prior to arraignment, not once the trial
has commenced, hence he is estopped
Case 34 - Antiquera vs People, 712 SCRA, 12/11/2013

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE

Ponente: SERENO, J.:

FACTS:

At around 3:00 am of March 2003, Rodel Ong Luz was flagged down by PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza of the
Naga City Police Station, for violating a municipal ordinance of driving a motorcycle without a helmet.
Alteza invited Luz to their nearby sub-station. While Alteza and another police officer were issuing a
citation ticket, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket, thus, he
told Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container. After instructed to open the container, Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and upon Altezas instruction, Luz spilled out the contents suspected as shabu.
 Luz was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and later convicted by the RTC of the same
crime. The RTC found that Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a
valid search, which led to the discovery of two plastic sachets of shabu. The RTC also found Luzs
defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

Hence, this petition filed under Rule 45 for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure on the ground that there was no lawful arrest.

Held:

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. (Sec 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court) It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of o ne of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a
traffic violation is not the arrest, but the confiscation of the drivers license.

In Berkemer v. McCarty, U.S. Supreme Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial
interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. The
usual traffic stop is more analogous to a "Terry stop" than to a formal arrest.

According to the City Ordinance violated, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. Neither can a warrantless arrest
be made for such an offense.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
read his Miranda rights. But these constitutional requirements were complied only after petitioner had
been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
 warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest,
are applicable to this case.

While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment
of conviction of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong
is hereby ACQUITTED

Case 37 - Zuno vs Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382

Zuo - versus- Cabebe

Facts: Chief State Prosecutor filed an information in the Regional Trial Court Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte

for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs against the police officers of Batac Ilocos Norte.

Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. On march 14, 2001 the prosecution
filed a petition for change of venue in the court but it was denied. In the meantime, the proceedings

before the respondents court were suspended.

On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the accused to a

speedy trial.

On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an order granting bail to the accused

without any hearing. The prosecution filed a motion to reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon
respondent issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceedings.
Thus the Chief state prosecutor Zuo filed an administrative complaint in the Deputy Court Administrator

against Respondent judge Cabebe for unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and patiality for
granting bail without any hearing in favor of the accused. Thereafter the Deputy Court Administrator found

Respondent Judge Cabebe guilty of such administrative charges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of bail without conducting a hearing was valid on the ground that it

is a matter of right of discretion.

HELD: The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense, its absence will

invalidate the grant or denial of bail. Thus respondent judge found guilty of violation of Supreme Court

Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail.

Case 42 - Enrile vs Sandiganbayan, August 18, 2015

RULE 114 BAIL

JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in

the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the PDAF. On 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental

Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found
against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of
bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or

been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to
Director Benjamin Magalong of the CIDG in Camp Crame and was later on confined at the PNP General

Hospital following his medical examination.

 Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion to Fix

Bail. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he

was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

ISSUE: Whether the determination of bail as matter of right on the ground that the petitioner may be
deemed to fall within the exception only upon occurrence of two circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, & (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong which the prosecution fails to

establish.

RULING:

Bail protects the right of the accused to

due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is

proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose

any punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so

required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the

accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at

trial.

Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion.

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
 The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall

be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of

his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to

bail shall be recognized.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an

offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under

paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated

by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of

his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is

subject to judicial discretion.

In resolving bail applications of the accused that is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the

guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of

Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether

or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond

(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure

the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in

denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail.

Case 50 - Daan vs Sandiganbayan, 560 SCRA 233

FACTS:

Joselito Raniero J. Daan, among others, was charged for three counts of malversation of public funds ,
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period. Thus, in
addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for three counts

of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.

The accused proposed to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered

to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts. The prosecution was amenable to the offer of the accused. The

accused already restituted the amount evidence by official receipt.

The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain on the main ground that no cogent

reason was presented to justify its approval. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was also denied,
hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

I - Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners plea

bargaining offer

HELD:

IPlea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's

pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in

return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. 7 Plea bargaining is authorized under Section

2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118
of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre -trial
conference,8 But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished
presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already
presented several witnesses.9

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its
discretion should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.16
The present case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction. Equity as the complement
of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do.

Case 52 - ABS - CBN Corp vs Gozon, 753 SCRA 1

ABS CBN v Gozon

GR No. 195956
March 11, 2015

Leonen, J.:

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari

Suspension of Arraignment

Facts:
ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN) filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to assail the Resolution and
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reinstated the Department of Justice (DOJ) Resolution ordering
the withdrawal of the Information finding probable cause for respondents violation of Sections 177 and 211
of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293). Herein respondents are officers and employees of GMA
Network, Inc. (GMA-7)

The controversy arose from GMA-7s news coverage of the homecoming of OFW and hostage victim
Angelo dela Cruz on July 22, 2004. ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of the arrival of dela
Cruz at NAIA and allowed Reuters Television Service to air the footages subject to special embargo
agreement that it will be for the "use of Reuters international subscribers only. GMA-7, being a subscriber
of Reuters, received a live video feed of the said coverage and immediately carried the live news feed in its
program Flash Report.

Upon filing the Complaint for copyright infringement under RA 8293, Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo
Venturanza (ACP Venturanza) issued Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents Dela Pea -
Reyes and Manalastas. Consequently, the Information for violation of RA 8293 was filed on December 17,
2004. Respondents moved for a Petition for Review before then DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez who issued a
Resolution (Gonzalez Resolution) dated August 1, 2005 reversing the finding of probable cause against
respondents raising good faith as defense.
Meanwhile, on January 19, 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by
respondents under Sec. 11( c ), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Gonzalez Resolution and on June 29, 2010 DOJ Secretary Alberto Agra issued a
Resolution (Agra Resolution) reversing the Gonzalez Resolution. Upon appeal, CA reversed the Agra
Resolution. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not proceeding with respondents arraignment after the 60-day
period from filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ.

Holding:
Yes, the trial court erred in not proceeded with the arraignment after the 60-day period of suspension.

Rule 116, Section 1(c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the accuseds
arraignment in certain circumstances only:

SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with
the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway, the Court acknowledged the applicability of the above provision in criminal
prosecution for infringement under RA 8293 and emphasized that while pendency of a petition for review
is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the X X X provision limits the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents arraignment after the 60- day period from the
filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the CA. The trial court erred when it
did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As
Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo v. Mogul, failure to proceed with the
arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes the Courts independence and
integrity.

Case 57 - Soriano vs People, 591 SCRA 244

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, Petitioners,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT

INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Respondents.

Facts:

Soriano and Ilagan were the president and general manager, respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel
Bulacan, Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as
president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the

loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Manaol
obtained loans of 15M each, when in fact they did not. The prosecutor charged Soriano in the RTC with

violation of Section 83 of RA. 337 or the General Banking Act, as amended or violation of the Director,
Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules. An information for estafa thru falsification of

commercial document was also filed against Soriano and Ilagan.

Petitioners moved to quash the informations arguing that the prosecutor charged more than one offense
for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged

in the information do not constitute an offense. RTC denied the motion to quash. CA sustained the denial
of petitioners separate motions to quash.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of the petitioner has merit

Held:

The contention has no merit. In Loney vs. People, this court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges

against the accused, held:

This court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The

only limit to this rule is the constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. In People vs. Rodriguez we held that, two or more offenses arising from

the same act are not the same. If one provision of the law requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, phrased elsewise where two different laws define two crimes prior jeopardy as to
one of them is no obstacle to the prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same

facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. In this case,
however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more than
one information, each charging a different offense violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa

thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the informations. The fundamental test in considering a motion
to quash anchored on Section 3(a),Rule 117 of the 1991 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of
the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would

establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.

Case 58 - Cerezo vs People, 650 SCRA 222

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda,

Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia (respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).

The respondent thereafter filed a motion to re-evaluate prosecutions evidence before quezon city

prosecutors office.

In its resolution dated November 20, 2003, the Office of Prosecutor-QC reversed its earlier finding and
recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw

Information was filed before the RTC on December 3, 2003. During the intervening period, specifically on

November 24, 2003, respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a not guilty plea.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration for the said resolution issued by OP-QC since resolution is

still subjected to the DOJ Review.

The RTC then deferred to act on the said resolution and awaited for the DOJs resolution.

DOJ promulgated his resolution and directed to file the case hence the RTC grant the motion for

reconsideration filed by the petitioner in conformity with the resolution of the DOJ.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the RTCs act of dismissing the case based on the DOJs finding is valid

HELD:

Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial
court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice.

It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must
be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or

the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

The RTC in dismissing the criminal case, failed to make his own determination of whether or not there was
a prima facie case to hold respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or

assessment of the merits of the case.

The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ

Secretary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The case is REMANDED to the Quezon City RTC,

Branch 92, for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.