CASES 4TH WEEK

1. PEOPLE VS SUALO

2. EASTERN VS POEA

3. PHILSA VS SEC. OF LABOR

4. ALTHENNA VS VILLANOS

5. NFD VS NLRC

6. VIRJEN VS NLRC

7. SORIANO VS OFFSHORE SHIPPING

8. PEOPLE VS SAGAYAGA

9. PEROPLE VS BULI-E

10. PHIL EMPLOY SERVICES VS PARANIO

11. PLACEWELL VS CAMOTE

PEOPLE VS SAULO G.R. 125903

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed
as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first
securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group
penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the
names of the complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations[3] were identical in their
allegations

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA
(Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of
false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, accused
falsely pretended to the offended party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could
secure employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party was later induced to give
accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from
complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de
la Cruz have remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes:

Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellants
house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas
employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to
leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990,
Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were
authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and
Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la
Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint
against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad
through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her
a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javiers passport. Javier gave an initial
amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized,
Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellants house in order to discuss
his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him
a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellants wife,
who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00
in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim.
Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated
September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon
thus filed a complaint with the POEA.[6]

The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for
overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for
this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May,
1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was
working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the complainants or having signed any of the receipts
introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accused-appellants contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellants
mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.[8]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:

A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest
thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused.

B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon
at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest
thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article
38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same
Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article
34 of the Labor Code;

(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a
license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and

(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was
engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three
complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for
money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their
hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It
is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in
recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellants recruitment activities
criminal.

Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any money from the complainants nor processed their
papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia
and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la
Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la
Cruz who received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly
believed that he could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract.

Accused-appellants asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the
straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with
their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that
the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be
interfered with by this Court.[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged
with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14] The
absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause.[15]

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and
employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons.
This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[16] Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of
authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by
the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary.[17] It also bears
stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized
by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18] Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that
engages in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is
that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20]
The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellants false assurances that
he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised
employment never materialized.

Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxx xxx xxx

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three
equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows

When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
(20) years.[21]
Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional
amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.[22] Accused-appellant shall also pay
Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional
amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay
Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer
the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual
damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code,
accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
EASTERN VS POEA G.R. 76633

The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the
death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the
husband was not an overseas worker.

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued
for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that
the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.
The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award
consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency
should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the
questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's
direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and
monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20
of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include
"claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2

The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he
was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System,
subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission.

We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met
with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the
Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as
"any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working
overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment
contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of
employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6

It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's
employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and
approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the
contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose
of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the
burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the
petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad
in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its
shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas
workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor
are their appointments coursed through the POEA.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular
No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen
Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the
deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically
declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this
employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the
second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a
postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:

... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject
is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v.
Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they
make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and
by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see
fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case
of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers
have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such
as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model
contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity"
in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes
v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp.
v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20

It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was
also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity
from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner
because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984,
that

Section C. Compensation and Benefits.

1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:

a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician

c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever
benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding
P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing
an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund)
shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the
employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be
enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the
specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA
that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative
agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules
and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue
adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as
so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of
Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life
of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.

Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the
express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.

When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-
balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity
and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor
is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby
LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

PHILSA VS SEC. OF LABOR GR 103144

This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The
November 25, 1991 Order affirmed en toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter the
POEA) which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding
or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.

Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philsa) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and
P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson[1].

After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for
Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.

While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges[2]. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer
allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding
increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-
Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines[3].

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment
of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa
and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:

1. Illegal dismissal;

2. Payment of salary differentials;

3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;

4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and

5. Contract substitution.[4]

The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.

Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers Assistance and Adjudication
Office (hereinafter the WAAO) thru the POEA Hearing Officers[5]. On the other hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting
suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter
the LRO).[6] In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation
case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such
cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for the two aspects of the case.[7]

In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and were
properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the LRO.
The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus
under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.

Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of private respondents complaint. During these hearings,
private respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its turn to
present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence on record.[8]

On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a
decision dated August 31, 1988[9], the dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE
CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:

1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid
separation pay;

2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone, representing the salary deduction from his March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing their differential pay for the months of
February and March, 1985; and

4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorneys fees.

All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate according to the Central
Bank at the time of payment.

All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving money claims arising from the
employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the
NLRC)[11]. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31,
1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.

In a decision dated July 26, 1989[12], the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary
deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the
complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the decision which would justify the award.

Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989.

Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was
docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for insufficiency in form and
substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a certified true copy of the questioned
resolution dated August 23, 1989.[13]

Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents money claims, the POEA issued
a separate Order dated August 29, 1988[14] resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents complaint. In this Order, the POEA
found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA
Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA International Placement and Services Corporation liable for three
(3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to
Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.

Moreover, respondents license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect immediately and to remain as such until full refund and
restitution of the above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS
plus restitution,

SO ORDERED.

In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private respondents and paid the corresponding
fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated October
10, 1989.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment
agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment.[15] Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. However, in an Order dated
September 13, 1991[16], public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the reversal of the questioned Orders:

I.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER
GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS
BASED IS VOID.

II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING
PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT.

III.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER
LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES. FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM
THIS CHARGE.

With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts allowed
by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.[17] As we have previously held:

It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An
extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer
performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is
the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does
not include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally accorded
not only great respect but even finality.[18]

The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of
fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.[19]

On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty
of illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in
excess of those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents
despite the many opportunities for them to do so.

Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which
enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.

There is merit in the argument.

In Taada vs. Tuvera[20], the Court held, as follows:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations
issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals,
medical clinics and laboratories[21]; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper
mining companies to the national government[22]; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers
to Hong Kong[23]; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications
for importation from the Peoples Republic of China[24]; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and
Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees[25]. In all these cited
cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National
Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987[26].

POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register.

POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino
overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code which
provides, as follows:

Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not
be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always
covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (italics
supplied)

It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation[27]. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2,
Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a)[28] of the Labor Code.

The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders
of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioners violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even
assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that, as previously discussed, Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative
sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, (r)ules in force on the date of
the effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot
be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.

Again, there is no merit in this argument.

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it
away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres[29], the administrative
circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of
workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.

Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions.

In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs[30] is misplaced. In the said case, the validity
of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons,
the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders
clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior
to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain in the case at bench.

With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged
contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading of
the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution
is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:

2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count. The first contract was duly approved by the
Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere intention of respondents
to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by the
Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence,
must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended).
Moreover, it would appear that the proposed salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a ploy
as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.

As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by complainants which,
however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to commit
contract substitution for a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a
lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation.[31]
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable
for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner
premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it from private respondent de Mesas claim for salary
deduction has already attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the
Supreme Court.

Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-
employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The
administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the
POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office
precisely declared that respondents liability for said money claims is without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment
violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order.[32]

The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesas claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the
said money claim was not raised in the complaint[33]. While there may be questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said
NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private
respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for
the suspension or cancellation of petitioners license.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation
of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein.[34] As such, even without a written complaint from an
aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants,
impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship case,
may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are
uncovered.[35] It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private
complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.

As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does
not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding
of private respondents salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of
unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.

To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the
Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1)
count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.

Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of contract substitution is suspension of license for
two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2)
months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both instances[36]. Applying the said
schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine
in the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution
for the amount withheld from his salary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation is
hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered
to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

ALTHENNA VS VILLANOS GR 151303

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated May 23, 2001 and Resolution2 dated November 23, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59594. The Court of Appeals reversed the Resolutions3 of the National Labor Relations Commission and reinstated the Labor Arbiters
Decision4 in NLRC Case No. Sub-RAB-09-OFW-(LB)-02-00002-99.

The antecedent facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Petitioner Athenna International Manpower Services, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of workers for
overseas employment. Respondent Nonito Villanos is a contract worker recruited by petitioner to work as a caretaker in Taiwan.

Respondent applied to work overseas thru petitioner sometime in February 1998. He alleged that he was assessed 100,000 placement fee by
petitioner. As he had only 30,000 to pay petitioner, respondent begged for a reduced fee. Petitioner agreed and the placement fee was reduced
to 94,000 only, on the condition that the remaining balance of 64,000 shall be paid through salary deductions upon his deployment.
Respondent received no receipt for the 30,000 cash that he advanced as partial placement fee. Instead, petitioner gave him a schedule of his
monthly salary deduction payments for one year for his balance, which included interest and other charges, amounting to 90,725.

In October 1998, respondents Contract of Employment with a certain Wei Yu Hsien arrived. Under this contract, he was to work as caretaker for
one year, ten months and twenty-eight days with a monthly pay of New Taiwan Dollars (NT$) 15,840.

On October 15, 1998, he flew to Taiwan. Respondent alleged that upon his arrival in Taiwan, he was assigned to a mechanical shop, owned by
Hsien, as a hydraulic installer/repairer for car lifters, instead of the job for which he was hired. He found out that Hsien was actually engaged in
the installation and repair of hydraulic machines for gasoline stations and other mechanical shops. Since then, he traveled from one place to
another, even during nighttime as hydraulic installer/repair man for car lifters, as required by his employer. He did not, however, complain
because he needed money to pay for the debts he incurred back home.

Barely a month after his placement, he was terminated by Hsien. On November 14, 1998, respondent was made to sign a document stating that
he was not qualified for the position. He did not, however, sign the document. At dawn of November 16, 1998,5 respondent was handed his
salary, with the accompanying computation and instruction for his departure to the Philippines.

Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he immediately went to petitioners office and confronted its representative, Lorenza Ching, about the
assignment given to him and demanded that he be reimbursed the 30,000 he paid as downpayment. Instead of returning the said amount,
petitioner gave him a summary of expenses amounting to 30,493, which it allegedly incurred for his deployment abroad.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint docketed as POEA Case No. RV98-12-1586, before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).

However, because of financial constraints, he had to go home to Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte where, on February 17, 1999, he filed a complaint
against petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery of unpaid salaries and other benefits before the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch No. 9, Dipolog City.

In its defense, petitioner alleged that it hired respondent to work in Taiwan for one year and that for his deployment, he was charged a placement
fee of merely 15,840 plus 5,050 for documentation expenses. Petitioner further claimed that under the employment contract, respondent was
to undergo a probationary period of forty (40) days. However, at the job site, respondent was found to be unfit for his work, thus he resigned
from his employment and requested for his repatriation signing a statement to that effect.

On May 14, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner and Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the wages representing the
unserved portion of the employment contract, the amount unlawfully deducted from respondents monthly wage, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. For the remittance of illegal placement fee in the amount of 99,110, petitioner was held solely liable. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, couched in the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) declaring that the respondents act for having severed complainants employment, after service of one (1) month founded on unjustifiable
grounds and encroaching against the safeguard of fundamental due process and security of tenure clauses as well as for being in contradiction
to the well engendered basic policy of the state to grant ample protection to labor, to be illegal. Thus, in effect hereof, on the basis of established
jurisprudence and mandate of the law, complainant Nonito Villanos, as a contractual employee, is entitled to be paid of the supposed wages
which he could have received throughout the period of employment manifested in the contract, had not because of the unceremonious, abnormal
and unlawful act of respondents in having put his employment to an end after about one (1) month services, which entitlement shall be paid
jointly and severally by respondents Athena International Manpower Services, Inc., [r]epresented by Lorenza Ching and/or Wei Yu Hsien, 1-11
Hsia Yuan Rd. Tali City, Taichung Country, Taiwan, ROC, [which] specific amount is reflected in paragraph "6" hereof.

(2) declaring further that the deductions made by respondent Wei Yu Hsien, from the monthly wage of complainant, to be illegal, since the act is
incidental to the unlawful scheme of having terminated complainants employment untimely in the guise of inefficiency in the performance of
work wrongly assigned to him and in breach of the provisions of the valid contract of employment having been entered into by the parties. For
this reason, respondents are hereby jointly and severally directed to remit the exact amount of complainants salary withheld, which amount is
specifically found in paragraph "6".

(3) holding that the imposition of the placement fee of P120,000.00 against complainant as illegal, which in effect making respondent Athena
International Manpower Services, Inc., [r]epresented by Lorenza Ching individually to pay complainant the exact amount which is likewise found
in paragraph "6" hereof.

(4) imposing moral and exemplary damages arising from breach of contract and bad faith of respondents, which shall be paid by respondents in
solidum, and which amounts are specifically reflected in paragraph "6".

(5) establishing liability upon respondents severally to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the aggregate amount payable to
complainant by respondents.

(6) And, specifically ordering respondents to pay complainant the following, as based on the preceding paragraphs:

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It found that respondent was not at all dismissed,
much less illegally. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its second resolution.

Undaunted, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC in its ruling that there was no violation
of the contract of employment by petitioner and in holding that respondent was not illegally dismissed.

The Court of Appeals held that Wei Yu Hsien violated the contract of employment when respondent was made to work as hydraulic
installer/repairer, not as caretaker. The appellate court concluded that the supposed voluntary resignation of respondent was inconsistent with
his immediate demand for refund of the placement fee upon his arrival in the Philippines; his filing of an administrative case before the POEA
Adjudication Office; and his subsequent filing of the complaint with the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED reversing the questioned resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division,
Cagayan de Oro City and REINSTATING the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. Sub-RAB-09-OFW-(LB)-02-00002-99.

SO ORDERED.7

Hence, the instant appeal, raising the following issues:

1. Did the respondent voluntarily resign or was he illegally dismissed?

2. Assuming that the respondent was illegally dismissed, was it proper for the Court of Appeals to affirm in toto the monetary awards in the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, especially: (a) the award of his supposed salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract, i.e.,
NT$348,480.00 and (b) the award of "remittance of placement fee" in the amount of P99,110.00?8

Anent the first issue, petitioner insists that respondent was not illegally dismissed but voluntarily resigned; that respondent failed to prove that
he was made to work as hydraulic installer/repairer instead of a caretaker; and that the documents he adduced were self-serving and immaterial.

Petitioner further contends that although the resignation of respondent was in a pre-printed form, it did not mean his resignation was involuntary.
The requirement that the employer has the burden of proof that the employee was illegally dismissed is, says petitioner, applicable only when
the fact of dismissal is established. Petitioner submits that, in this case, respondent bore the burden of proving that his resignation was
involuntary.

For his part, respondent avers that he did not resign voluntarily but, he was asked to sign a letter of resignation. Furthermore, he avers that
petitioner did not explain why he was unqualified. Neither was he informed of any qualifications needed for the job prior to his deployment, as
mandated by Article 2819 of the Labor Code.

Respondent points out that the allegation he resigned voluntarily is belied by petitioners own admission in its position paper that he was, in fact,
found unfit for the job. He maintains that his purported resignation was obviously inconsistent with his filing a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the submissions of the parties, we find no persuasive grounds nor substantial basis to reverse the decision and
the resolution of the appellate court.

An employee voluntarily resigns when he finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment.10

Records show that upon his repatriation from Taiwan, respondent immediately went to petitioners office and confronted its representative,
Lorenza Ching, about the assignment given to him which was contrary to the agreed position of caretaker, for which he specifically applied. He
demanded that he be reimbursed the 30,000 he paid as downpayment. When refused, he lodged a complaint with the POEA. He also
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before Labor Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego, upon his arrival in his hometown, indicating that
respondent did not voluntarily resign, but was forced to resign, which was tantamount to a dismissal.11 Petitioner did not refute respondents
contentions regarding these incidents. Further, it failed to prove the legality of the dismissal, despite the fact that the burden of proof lies on the
employment and recruitment agency. Thus, the presumption stands to the effect that respondent was illegally dismissed by his employer.

Even assuming respondent was a mere probationary employee as claimed by petitioner, respondent could only be terminated for a pertinent
and just cause, such as when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards of employment made known to
him by his employer at the time of his engagement.12 Here, it appears that the petitioner failed to prove that, at the time of respondents
engagement, the employers reasonable standards for the job were made known to respondent. Moreover, in this case, respondent was assigned
to a job different from the one he applied and was hired for.

On the second issue. Petitioner claims that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,13 entitles respondent only to six months worth of the unserved
portion of his employment contract; and that the order to refund the amount of 99,110 as placement fee has no factual basis because
respondent himself admitted he only paid 30,000 as placement fee, albeit, he was assessed the amount of 94,000.

Respondent counters that he worked for only a month because he was hastily and unceremoniously terminated; and that he was entitled to his
salary corresponding to the remaining portion of the employment contract. Further, he demands full reimbursement of the 30,000 he paid as
placement fee.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042

SEC. 10. Money Claims. - . . .

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

...

Thus, for the computation of the lump-sum salary due an illegally dismissed overseas employee, there are two clauses as points of reckoning:
first is the cumulative salary for the unexpired portion of his employment; and the other is the grant of three months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is lesser.

Since respondent was dismissed after only one month of service, the unexpired portion of his contract is admittedly one year, nine months and
twenty-eight days. But the applicable clause is not the first but the second: three months salary for every year of the unexpired term, as the lesser
amount, hence it is what is due the respondent.

Note that the fraction of nine months and twenty-eight days is considered as one whole year following the Labor Code. Thus, respondents lump-
sum salary should be computed as follows:

3 months x 2 (years) = 6 months worth of salary

6 months x (NT$) 15,840 = NT$95,040, subject to proper conversion to Philippine currency by Labor Arbiter Cresencio Iniego.

Under the aforequoted provision, an illegally dismissed overseas worker is also entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum.

We note that while respondent was assessed 94,000 in placement fee, he paid only 30,000 on the agreement that the balance of 64,000
would be paid on a monthly salary deduction upon his deployment. Hence, we cannot grant respondent reimbursement of the entire assessed
amount of 94,000. He is only entitled to the reimbursement of the amount of placement fee he actually paid, which is the 30,000 he gave as
downpayment plus interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum.

Lastly, because of the breach of contract and bad faith alleged against the employer and the petitioner, we must sustain the award of 50,000 in
moral damages and 50,000 as exemplary damages, in addition to attorneys fees of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 23, 2001, and Resolution dated November 23, 2001, of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Athenna International Manpower Services, Inc. is hereby DECLARED solidarily liable with Wei Yu
Hsien to pay respondent NONITO VILLANOS the amount of NT$95,040.00, subject to proper conversion to Philippine currency, as unpaid salary
of respondent equivalent to six months service under Rep. Act No. 8042, Section 10 as well as 50,000.00 in moral damages, and 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages suffered by respondent; and ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary awards as attorneys fees, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence. Petitioner herein is also ordered to pay respondent the amount of 30,000.00 as reimbursement of the placement fee, with 12%
interest per annum until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
NFD VS NLRC GR 116629

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated April 25, 1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission
which ordered petitioners to pay a total of U.S.$26,641.42 as death benefits to private respondents.

Petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., a domestic manning corporation, engaged the services of Eduardo P. Misada and Enrico A.
Envidiado to work for petitioner Barber International A/S (Barber), a Norwegian shipping company. Misada and Envidiado were hired as second
and third officers, respectively, on board the vessel M/V Pan Victoria. They were to travel from Sweden to South Korea for a period of ten months
from January 1991 to November 1991.

On July 5, 1991, private respondent Nelia Misada received notice that her husband, Eduardo Misada, died on June 28, 1991 while on board the
M/V Pan Victoria. On July 12, 1991, private respondent Himaya Envidiado likewise received notice that her husband, Enrico Envidiado, died on
board the vessel.

As heirs of the deceased seamen, private respondents, in their behalf and in behalf of their minor children, filed for death compensation benefits
under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Contract of Employment and the Norwegian National Insurance Scheme
(NIS) for Filipino Officers. Their claims were denied by petitioners.

Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. They prayed for U.S.$13,000.00 each as death compensation
under the POEA Standard Contract of Employment and U.S.$30,000.00 for each wife and U.S.$8,000.00 for each child under eighteen years under
the Norwegian NIS.[1]

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that private respondents are not entitled to death benefits on the ground that the seamen's deaths were
due to their own willful act. They alleged that the deceased were among three (3) Filipino seamen who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in
their respective sexual organs on or about June 18, 1991; that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and place of implantation, all
three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other; that the third
seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical.[2]

The complaints were consolidated and the parties filed their respective position papers and documentary evidence. On October 20, 1993, the
POEA Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit.

Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional
documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal.

On April 25, 1994, respondent Commission reversed the POEA Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents the following:

"(a) To complainant Nelia F. Misada and her two minor children, Julius Caesar and Alpha Joy, all surnamed Misada:

(1) Death compensation of U.S.$13,000.00 under the POEA Standard Format;

(b) To complainant Himaya G. Envidiado and her three (3) minor children, Henrea, Hazel and Hendrick, all surnamed Envidiado;

(1) Death compensation of U.S.$13,000.00 under the provisions of the POEA Rules and Regulations; and

(2) Backwages as of July 1991 amounting to U.S.$641.42 or its peso equivalent.

SO ORDERED."[3]

Hence this petition. Petitioners claim that:

"I

FIRSTLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING DOCUMENTS WHICH DO NOT FORM PART OF THE EVIDENCE IN
THE INSTANT CASE, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS;

II

SECONDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT OVERTURNED WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL
AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AT BEST ARE HEARSAY; and

III

THIRDLY, THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE POEA DECISION ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AT
BEST ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF SUBJECT SEAMEN."[4]
Petitioners claim respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in admitting private respondent's additional evidence on appeal.
Petitioners allege that the additional evidence were "surreptitiously" submitted in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

The submission of additional evidence before the respondent Commission is not prohibited by the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. After all,
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases.[5] The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice.[6] In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.[7] The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other
party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.[8]

In the case at bar, the additional evidence was submitted by private respondents before the respondent Commission in their Memorandum on
Appeal dated November 8, 1993. The decision of respondent Commission was rendered on April 25, 1994, i.e., six (6) months after the additional
documents were submitted. Petitioners had ample opportunity to object and refute the documents. They had the chance to submit counter-
evidence during this period but they did not do so. It was only when they moved for reconsideration of the decision of respondent Commission
that they questioned the admission of these evidence.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one's side.[9] It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[10] It is not the denial of the
right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation of due process of law.[11]

Procedural matters having been disposed of, the substantive issue in this case is whether respondent Commission gravely erred in finding that
the deaths of the two seamen, Eduardo Misada and Enrico Envidiado, did not come as a result of their willful and deliberate act.

Part II, Section C, No. 1, Paragraph 1 of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels"[12] provides that:

"1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of this Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to
the amount of U.S.$50,000.00 and an additional amount of U.S.$7,000.00 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four
children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

x x x."[13]

Part II, Section C, No. 6 of the same Standard Employment Contract also provides:

"6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him."[14]

The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes the employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation benefits. The
POEA Standard Employment Contract fixes the amount at U.S.$50,000.00 and an additional amount of U.S.$7,000.00 for each child, not exceeding
four, under twenty-one years of age. The employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his
employment contract. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the
seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.[15]

In the instant case, petitioners claim that the deaths of the two seamen came as a result of their self-inflicted injuries. As proof, petitioners
presented written statements from the master of the M/V Pan Victoria, the medical reports of Misada, Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo, the seaman
who survived the infection, and the written statements of three (3) officers of the vessel taken during a special inquiry conducted after their
deaths.

Petitioners contend that Misada and Envidiado and Arturo Fajardo implanted fragments of the horn of a reindeer or antelope in their respective
sexual organs while on a voyage on board the M/V Pan Victoria. The horn was left by a Greek officer from a previous voyage. Misada found the
horn and asked for it from the Chief Officer. Misada gave the horn to the Second Engineer to carve and shape for implantation. Thereafter, shaped
fragments of the horn were inserted by Misada and Envidiado subcutaneously into their respective sex organs on June 19, 1991 while that of
Fajardo was implanted two or three days later. The implantations were made surgically in the absence of sanitary and sterile facilities.

Several days later, Misada complained of difficulty in swallowing and breathing. He had severe tonsillitis and was suffering from spasms and
convulsions.[16] The ship captain was compelled to alter course and drop anchor at Colombo, Sri Lanka for medical treatment.[17] Misada,
however, died on board the vessel on June 28, 1991. His dead body was examined at the Colombo General Hospital, Colombo, Sri Lanka, where
the cause of his death was placed as "acute laryngo-trachea bronchitis with pneumonia due to viral infection."[18]

It was after the vessel left Colombo on June 30, 1991 that Envidiado started exhibiting the same symptoms as Misada. The ship captain had to
drop anchor at the nearest port which was Galle, Sri Lanka.[19] Envidiado was brought ashore and admitted to hospital. He died a few days later.

On July 3, 1991, Arturo Fajardo started exhibiting the same symptoms as the two other seamen. On inquiry, the master of the vessel learned that
Misada, Envidiado and Fajardo implanted pieces of reindeer horn in their sex organs. Fajardo's condition worsened and the master was compelled
to drop anchor at Penang, Malaysia where Fajardo was admitted to hospital on July 5, 1991. He was diagnosed to be suffering from tetanus and
given medication for said illness. Fajardo recovered two weeks later.[20]
As a result of this chain of events, the master of the vessel conducted a formal inquiry to verify the cause of the seamen's deaths and illness.
Written testimonies as to the events leading to their deaths were taken from the master, the Chief Officer, Second Engineer and Second Cook.

The testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that Misada's and Envidiado's deaths were caused by self-inflicted injuries. The
testimonies were given by people who merely observed and narrated the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the two seamen and the
illness of Fajardo. Fajardo himself did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. The testimonies of the officers are, at best, hearsay.
Moreover, the officers did not have the competence to make a medical finding as to the actual cause of the deaths. No autopsy report was
presented to corroborate their testimonies. On the contrary, Eduardo Misada was medically diagnosed to have died of "acute laryngo-trachea
bronchitis with pneumonia probably due to viral cause."[21] This was declared in his "Cause of Death Form" after his dead body was examined
on June 29, 1991 by Dr. Sydney Prematirat, a Judicial Medical Officer at Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Enrico Envidiado was not issued a "Cause of Death Form." While still alive, he was examined in Galle, Sri Lanka by Consultant Physician Chandima
de Mel who found a wound in his penis and diagnosed his illness as "severe tetanus."[22] His "Certificate for Removal of A Dead Body" dated July
8, 1991 issued by Dr. T.L. Seneviratne, Chief Medical Officer of Health, Municipal Council, Colombo, Sri Lanka,[23] and "Certificate of Embalming"
dated July 8, 1991 issued by Keith Anthony Raymond[24] stated that Envidiado died of "viral myocarditis-- natural causes."

The "Certificate for Removal of a Dead Body" and "Certificate of Embalming" are not proofs of the real cause of death. Their probative value is
confined only to the fact of death.[25] These documentary evidence, however, did not at all indicate that Envidiado died of tetanus as previously
diagnosed by Dr. de Mel. And despite Dr. de Mel's allegedly correct diagnosis, Envidiado died a few days later.

As correctly found by respondent Commission, petitioners' evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused
by their own willful and deliberate act. And even if the seamen implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their sex organs, the evidence does not
substantially prove that they contracted tetanus as a result of the unsanitary surgical procedures they performed on their bodies. Neither does
the evidence show that the tetanus was the direct cause of their deaths.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 006490-94 is
affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

VIRJEN VS NLRC GR L-58011

Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision promulgated on July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision of respondent National
Labor Relations Commission and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board.

To better understand the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, we reiterate the background facts of the case, Taken from the decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission: t.hqw

It appears that on different dates in December, 1978 and January, 1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts of employment with the
Company, engaging them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months. After verification and approval of their contracts by
the NSB, the Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.

On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable from the Company advising him of the possibility
that the vessel might be directed to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him of the procedure to be followed in the
computation of the special or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the International Transport
Workers Federation, a militant international labor organization with affiliates in different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a
vessel in a port by preventing its loading or unloading, This is a sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its wages rates for seafarers
the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its prescribed rates.) In the same cable
of the Company, the expressed its regrets for hot clarifying earlier the procedure in computing the special compensation as it thought that the
vessel would 'trade in Caribbean ports only.

On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another cable to complainant Bisula, this time informing him of the respective amounts each of the officers
and crew members would receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This
was followed by another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the officers and crew members had been enrolled as members of the ITF
in Sidney, Australia, and that the membership fee for the 28 personnel complement of the vessel had already been paid.

In answer to the Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24
March 1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not
contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of works, type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world wide trade':
that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only 50% increase based
on present basic salary and that the proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve ITF problem' since the Company's salary rates
'especially in tankers (are) very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila ...

In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the basic pay of the complainant crew members, although it claimed, that it would "suffer and
absorb considerable amount of losses." The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions which were accepted by the Company.
Conformably with the agreement of the parties which was effected through the cables abovementioned, the Seamen were paid their new salary
rates.

Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to cancel the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its principals had
terminated their manning agreement because of the actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB Executive Director in a letter
dated 10 April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company cabled the Seamen informing them that their contracts would be terminated upon the vessel's
arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979 they Arere asked to disembark from the vessel, their contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to
Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were given the opportunity to at least comment on the Company's request for the cancellation of
their contracts, although they had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their contracts.

The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the National Seamen Board. The Vir-jen
Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the
private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment contracts when they
demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and
the seamen were ordered suspended.

The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other
monetary benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of the contract by the
petitioner was without valid cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.

The private respondents submit the following issues in their motion for reconsideration: t.hqw

A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL
SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT.

B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE
WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.
C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING THAT THE ADDENDUM
AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED
THE SAME.

D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.

E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS AND THE EXECUTION
OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD FAITH.

F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to the motion for reconsideration inspite
of its having been denied twice by the Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and accepted by the Court en banc because of the
movants' contention that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated from Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-
37, February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in the affirmative.

A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
are required to take their bearings. (Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85
SCRA 226). The majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete,
and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact that, while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur with one
another, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible.

Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc.
(Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the other Division, or the necessary votes
on an issue cannot be had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier
decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened in this case.

The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the First Division, in Wallem
Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two
Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion
for reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be the needed vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer and more
in time with the underlying principles of the Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner.

After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other
pleadings related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the motion is to keep faith with the constitutional
mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We
sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission.

There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the common thread running through all of them is the contention, if not the dismal
prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the en that lays the golden egg." In other words,
Filipino seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and
immutable the side contracts which require them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations, pretend to receive higher
salaries at certain foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved
terms of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no longer be
accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.

This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests
of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a
whole.

In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was ponente of the court's opinion declaring
as a conspiracy the threat of workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism, t.hqw

It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law which we can scarcely conceive can produce, in any posture of affairs, other than injuriois results.
It is simply the right of workmen, by concert of action, and by taking advantage of their position, to control the business of another, I am unwilling
to hold that a right which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to the employee, and which must always be hurtful to the employer, exists in
law. In my opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their employer for the purpose
of oppression and mischief and that this amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on
Labor, p. 13. Emphasis supplied)

The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the rights of the workingman. And they have invariably been proved unfounded and
false.
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name a few were all
initially opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs."
The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees themselves before
these claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management, labor,
and the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.

The case before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought
rights already established. No matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no
evidence that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.

The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is not
supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all
exception?

The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is an agent whose
primary function is recruitment and who .usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen
and the determination of their compensation is subject to the interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much in terms of
profits the local manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And costs include salaries of officers
and crew members.

Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many
of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so
greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan
and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent treatment by their
employer.-, and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-standard
or are capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare
two sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive, The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but even go
way above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There is no reason
why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive
schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-abiding
employers, domestic or foreign.

If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the profits of local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is not
sufficient reason why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand by the former instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing
the hen which lays the golden eggs.

Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a
matter of official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to the
addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies
should present a more honorable and proper posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have as many job openings
both here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no less than our dignity as a people and the welfare
of our workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or
adjudication

Another issue raised by the movants is whether or not the seamen violated their contracts of employment.

The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care
of themselves. The standard forms embody' the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15,
Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the
parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition
their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to established principles of labor legislation. The
National Labor Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did
not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.

The respondent Commission ruled: t.hqw

In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find that the cable of the seamen proposing an increase in their wage rates was not and could not have
been intended as a threat to comp el the Company to accede to their proposals. But even assuming, if only for the sake of argument, that the
demand or proposal for a wage increase was accompanied by a threat that they would report to ITF if the Company did not accede to the
contract revision - although there really was no such threat as pointed out earlier the Seamen should not be held at fault for asking such a
demand. In the same case cited above, the Supreme Court held: t.hqw
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. But even if there had
been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their
demands for petitioner, the refusal to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only acting in
the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and public policy. There is no serious misconduct
to speak of in the case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by
petitioner of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis supplied).

The above citation is from Wallem.

The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T Jannu there was no intention to send their ship to Australia. On January 10, 1979,
the petitioner sent a cable to respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be followed in the computation of special
compensation of crewmembers while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought
that the vessel would trade in Carribean ports only.

On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing Bisula of the special compensation when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.

The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and crews were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates
and that their only demand was a 50 percent increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates were "very far in
comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila."

In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount given
monthly to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate the respondents' employment formulated.

The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to the demand for increased . The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner
organized with a counter-proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any
strike. much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done in act which under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal,
oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to accepted valid modes of labor activity.

We reiterate our ruling in Wallem. t.hqw

Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to
establish clearly the commission of any threat, But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because
it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their form of expression
is contrary to law and public policy. ...

Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that the Ministry of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the
workinginan's interests and, of course, the nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in his comments refer to the issue of
allowing what the petitioner importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which lays the golden eggs." This is one of policy which should
perhaps be directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to
the constitutional provisions protecting labor, promoting social justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the freedom of speech, press,
peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants that there is no showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code or any current
applicable law, would warrant the termination of the respondents' services before the expiration of their contracts. The Constitution guarantees
State assurance of the rights of workers to security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution). Presumptions and provisions of law, the evidence
on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that the motions for reconsideration should be granted.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.
SORIANO VS OFFSHORE SHIPPING GR 78409

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming
the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (M)85-12-0953 entitled "Norberto Soriano v. Offshore
Shipping and Manning Corporation and Knut Knutsen O.A.S.", which denied petitioner's claim for salary differential and overtime pay and limited
the reimbursement of his cash bond to P15,000.00 instead of P20,000.00.

In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and
was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning
Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary
of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6)
months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it
appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private
respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce
petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila.

In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for short), a complaint against private
respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond
allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by reducing his
salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. Although repatriated, he claims that
he failed to receive payment for the following:

1. Salary for November which is equivalent to US$800.00;

2. Leave pay equivalent to his salary for 16.5 days in the sum of US$440.00;

3. Salary differentials which is equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the total sum of US$1,020,00;

4. Fixed overtime pay equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the sum of US$1,020.00;

5. Overtime pay for 14 Sundays equivalent to US$484.99;

6. Repatriation cost of US$945.46;

7. Petitioner's cash bond of P20,000.00. 1

In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-
complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the
Accreditation Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the version of complainant that
there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract seems to have corrections on it, said
corrections or alterations are in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the withholding of a certain amount due
petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have been requested by petitioner himself as
shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond.2

Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof the amount of P15,000.00 representing the reimbursement of the cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83 (to be
converted to its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment).

Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed against respondents.

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 3

Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA to the National Labor Relations Commission. Complainant-
petitioner's appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while respondents' appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this recourse.

Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding
the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent. Petitioner claims that the alteration by private respondent of his salary
and overtime rate which is evidenced by the Crew Agreement and the exit pass constitutes a violation of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 6
On the other hand, public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends that, as explained by the POEA: "Although the employment contract
seems to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to said office. 7

Apparently, petitioner emphasizes the materiality of the alleged unilateral alteration of the employment contract as this is proscribed by the
Labor Code while public respondent finds the same to be merely innocuous. We take a closer look at the effects of these alterations upon
petitioner's right to demand for his differential, overtime pay and refund of his return airfare to Manila.

A careful examination of the records shows that there is in fact no alteration made in the Crew Agreement 8 or in the Exit Pass. 9 As the original
data appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word "inclusive" is indicated under the column overtime rate. With
the supposed alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures US$800.00 while the figures US$240.00 were also written
above the word "inclusive".

As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled
under the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay. Otherwise
stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive under the agreement as approved by the POEA is
US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or overtime pay included. 10

Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility that petitioner could have misunderstood
the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or
inconsistent with what appears in the records. Thus, he claimed: [a] that private respondent extended the duration of the employment contract
indefinitely, 11 but admitted in his Reply that his employment contract was extended for another six (6) months by agreement between private
respondent and himself: 12 [b] that when petitioner demanded for his overtime pay, respondents repatriated him 13 which again was discarded
in his reply stating that he himself requested for his voluntary repatriation because of the bad faith and insincerity of private respondent; 14 [c]
that he was required to post a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00 but it was found that he deposited only the total amount of P15,000.00;
[d] that his salary for November 1985 was not paid when in truth and in fact it was petitioner who owes private respondent US$285.83 for cash
advances 15 and on November 27, 1985 the final pay slip was executed and signed; 16 and [e] that he finished his contract when on the contrary,
despite proddings that he continue working until the renewed contract has expired, he adamantly insisted on his termination.

Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure of respondent company to give the petitioner the desired promotion
which appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut Provider continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of charterers. 17

It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This
Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose
of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."18

There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of law.

Specifically, the law provides:

Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads:

Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:

xxxx

(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the
parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.

In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not
constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be
considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the
coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule
out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and conditions of the original letter of credit,
was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law. 19

The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment
served to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go beyond the bounds
of reason and justice.

As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be concern, sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the working class,
is meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation
of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an unreasonable or unfair rule. 20 But to disregard the employer's
own rights and interests solely on the basis of that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust and unacceptable.
Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the National Labor Relations Commission which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence.21

In fact since Madrigal v. Rafferty 22 great weight has been accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency
called upon to implement the same. 23

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto.
PEOPLE VS SAGAYAGA 143726

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, convicting the appellant Leticia Sagayaga of large scale
illegal recruitment as defined in Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042 and sentencing her to suffer life imprisonment.

The Indictment

The appellant was charged with large scale illegal recruitment in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That during the period from October 1997 to December 1997 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping each other and representing
themselves to have the power, capacity and lawful authority to deploy complainants as factory workers in Taiwan, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment to ELMER JANER, ERIC FAROL and ELMER RAMOS for and in consideration of amounts
ranging from P70,000.00 to P75,000.00 which they paid to said accused, without the latter having deployed and/or reimbursed complainants of
their payments despite demands, to the damage and prejudice of said complainants.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Only the appellant was arrested, duly arraigned, and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The other accused
remained at large.

The Case for the Prosecution

As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General, the facts which triggered the case in the trial court are as follows:

Re: Elmer Janer

Sometime in the last week of October 1997, Elmer Janer went to the office of Alvis Placement Service Corporation located at AP Building 1563 F.
Agoncillo St., corner Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, to apply for overseas employment as factory worker in Taiwan (pp. 4, 5 and 14, TSN, September
7, 1999). Appellant Leticia Sagayaga, after personally receiving Elmers application, required him to submit the necessary documents (p. 5, TSN,
September 7, 1999).

Appellant further asked Elmer to pay seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Elmer paid the said fee to appellant in
three (3) installments, the first, on November 5, 1997, in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00); the second, on November 13,
1997, in the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and the third, on November 19, 1997, in the amount of forty-five thousand pesos
(P45,000.00). All the payments were made inside Alvis Placement Agency (p. 6, id.).

As required, Elmer also had his medical examination at the Angeles Medical Clinic, the result of which confirmed that he was fit to work (p. 9,
Ibid.). Thereafter, he was told to wait for the arrival of the employer. After seven (7) months, no employer arrived. Tired of waiting, Elmer
demanded that he be refunded of his money (Id.). Despite appellants promises to pay, Elmer was not refunded of his money.

Exasperated, Elmer asked appellant for a promissory note, which appellant executed, promising to pay Elmer seventy-five thousand (P75,000.00)
on May 6, 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 7, 1999). In said promissory note, appellant designated herself as the assistant general manager
of the placement agency (Id.). When appellant failed to refund the amount to Elmer on the date stated in the promissory note, the latter went
to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and filed a sworn complaint against appellant (p. 11, TSN, September 7, 1999).

Re: Testimony of Eric Farol

On November 20, 1997, Eric Farol first met appellant at Alvis Placement Service Corporation when he applied for an overseas job in Taiwan as a
plastic factory worker (pp. 3-4, TSN, September 20, 1999). Appellant and her co-accused Vicente So Yan Han discussed with Eric about the latters
job application (Id.). They required Eric to submit to them his passport, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, medical clearance and
to pay seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as placement fee (Id.). Eric submitted all the aforestated requirements and paid the seventy-
five thousand pesos to appellant in two (2) installments, for which the latter issued receipts affixing her signature thereon (pp. 5-9, TSN,
September 20, 1999). Appellant then promised Eric that he will be leaving for Taiwan before Christmas of 1997. Failing to fulfill her promise,
appellant and Vicente So Yan Han told Eric to wait up to the month of January 1998 (pp. 10 and 11, Ibid.). When appellant failed to comply with
her commitment to send Eric to Taiwan in January 1998, Eric demanded from appellant the refund of his money (pp. 11 and 12, Ibid.). Appellant
then issued to him a check dated February 5, 1998, affixing her signature thereon, for the amount of seventy-two thousand five hundred pesos
(P72,500.00). But when Eric presented the check to the drawee bank for payment, the same was dishonored by reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED (pp.
11-14, TSN, September 20, 1999).

Insistent that he be refunded of his money, Vicente So Yan Han gave him cash amounts on different dates: February 6, 1998 - - five thousand
pesos; February 7, 1998 - - five thousand pesos; and February 17, 1998 - - one thousand pesos (pp. 14-18, TSN, September 20, 1999). Eric was
told to return on April 4, 1998 for the full payment of the refund. However, when Eric went back on the first week of April, appellant gave him a
letter that the full refund of his money would be given on April 30, 1998 (p. 19, Ibid). Eric returned to appellant on April 30, 1998, but still,
appellant failed to refund the money (p. 20, Id.).
On May 8, 1998, Eric filed a complaint against appellant and Vicente So Yan Han at the POEA (pp. 20-21, TSN, September 20, 1999).

Re: Elmer Ramos

Om September 27, 1997, Elmer Ramos went to the office of Alvis Placement Services Corporation to apply for overseas employment as factory
worker in Taiwan (pp. 8 and 9, TSN, September 27, 1999). Initially, he took up his application with Vicente So Yan Han who required him to submit
his passport, NBI and medical clearances and to pay seventy thousand pesos (P70,000.00) as placement fee (pp. 10 and 11, TSN, September 27,
1999). Elmer submitted the aforestated requirements and paid the placement fee in two (2) installments: twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) -
- paid to appellant and Vicente So Yan Han on October 22, 1997; and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) - - paid to Vicente So Yan Han on November
12, 1997 (pp. 11-15, TSN, September 27, 1999). Vicente So Yan Han then assured Elmer that he would be included for deployment in the first
batch on the first week of December 1997 which, however, did not materialize (pp. 19 and 20, TSN, September 27, 1997). Elmer decided to
withdraw his application. The documents submitted were returned to Elmer but not the placement fee he paid (pp. 21 and 22, TSN, September
27, 1999). Instead, appellant issued a check dated February 5, 1998 for the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000.00) (p. 22, Id.). When
Elmer encashed the check with the bank, it was dishonored by reason: closed account (p. 23, Ibid.).

On May 6, 1998, Elmer went back to the office of Alvis Placement Service Corporation to demand the refund of his money. Elmer discussed the
matter with appellant, but the latter failed to return Elmers money. The next day (May 7, 1998), Elmer went to the POEA and filed a sworn
complaint against appellant and Vicente So Yan Han (pp. 25 and 26, TSN, September 27, 1999). On May 9, 1998, Elmer again tried to get a refund
from appellant, but the latter only issued a promissory note assuring Elmer payment of the seventy thousand pesos on May 14 and 15, 1998 at
3:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 27 and 28, Ibid.). On May 15, 1998, appellant gave Elmer the amount of only five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
(p. 29, Ibid.).[3]

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant restates her case as follows:

On different dates in 1997, the three (3) complaining witnesses in this case (Elmer Ramos, Elmer Janer and Eric Farol) filed separate applications
for job placement as factory workers in Taiwan with ALvis Placement Services Corporation, with business address at Rm. 507, AP Bldg., 1563 F.
Agoncillo cor. Pedro Gil Sts., Ermita, Manila[,] where the appellant Leticia Sagayaga was then working as corporate treasurer.

Elmer Ramos filed his application sometime in September 1997 with the corporation, through accused-at-large Vicente So Yan Han. It was the
same Vicente So Yan Han who asked him to submit the required documents (NBI and medical clearances, etc.), and to pay the amount of
P70,000.00 as placement fee. He submitted the required documents, and paid the placement fee in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00
was paid by him on 22 October 1997 to appellant Letecia Sagayaga and Vicente So Yan Han on the office of the corporation; and P50,000.00 was
paid by him on 12 November 1997 to Vicente So Yan Han. Then So Yan Han informed him that he would be deployed in Taiwan in the first week
of December 1997. The promised deployment or job placement never came. He then decided to withdraw his application and get back the
documents he submitted and the money he had paid. He was issued a check for the fee he had paid but the check was dishonored by the bank
for the reason account closed. Failing to get his money ba[c]k, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
where he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on 7 May 1998.

Elmer Janer filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement Services Corporation in the last week of October 1997. Similarly, he was
required to submit the necessary documents and to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as placement fee. He submitted the requisite documents and
paid the placement in three (3) installments, as follows: He paid P25,000.00 on 5 November 1997; P5,000.00 on 13 November 1997; and
P45,000.00 on 19 November 1997. Thereafter, he was asked to wait for 7 months for his employer to arrive. No employer arrive[d]. He decided
to withdraw his application and asked to be reimbursed the money he had paid. Appellant Leticia Sagayaga gave him instead a promissory note
indicating that the amount of P75,000.00 will be paid to Elmer Janer on 6 May 1998. When no payment was made to him as promised, he filed a
complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and where he executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on 13 May 1998.

Eric Farol filed his job placement application with Alvis Placement Services Corporation on 20 November 1997. After submitting the required
documents, he paid the placement fee of P75,000.00 in two (2) installments as follows: He paid the first installment of P15,000.00 on 12 December
1997; and the balance of P60,000.00 was paid by him on 16 December 1997. The appellant Leticia Sagayaga promised that he would be able to
leave for Taiwan before Christmas of 1997. When he was not able to leave for Taiwan before the end of 1997, he was asked to wait until January
1998. When he failed to leave as promised, he decided to withdraw his application and asked that he be refunded the amount of P75,000.00 he
had paid as placement fee. The check given to him by the appellant bounced for the reason account closed. Forthwith, Vicente So Yan Han paid
him on different dates the amounts of P5,000.00 on 6 February 1998, another P5,000.00 on 7 February 1998, and P1,000.00 on 17 February 1998.
And as he was not refunded the full amount of the fee paid by him, he filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
and executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on 7 May 1998.

As supplied by the unrebutted testimony of the appellant, the persons who had effective and actual control, management and direction of the
business and transactions of Alvis Placement Services Corporation were the accused-spouses Vicente So Yan Han and Alma So. As Treasurer of
the corporation, her duties were limited to receiving money or fees paid to the agency by applicants and to deposit the same in the bank in the
name and for the account of the corporation. Although she (appellant) received money from the complainants Elmer Janer and Eric Farol, the
same was deposited by her with the bank under the account of the corporation. And if ever she signed promissory notes in behalf of the
corporation and issued checks to the complainants, she did so upon the instruction and assurance of accused-spouses So Yan Han and Alma So
that said notes and checks would have sufficient funds on their due dates. And said checks and notes were never paid because the accused-
spouses disappeared and left for unknown addresses.[4]
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused LETICIA SAGAYAGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale
and sentencing said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P750,000.00, and the costs.

The accused is further ordered to refund to Elmer Janer the sum of P75,000.00; to Eric V. Farol the amount of P61,500.00; and to Elmer Ramos
the amount of P65,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[5]

The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

-I-

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO WEIGHT CAN BE GIVEN TO THE CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED THAT SHE IS NOT
CRIMINALLY LIABLE BECAUSE SHE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION OF THE ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPORATION, AND SHE HAD
NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ITS RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES.

- II -

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS TREASURER OF ALVIS PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPO[R]ATION, THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS IN CHARGE (OF) THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS AND RESOURCES OF THE CORPORATION.

- III -

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AS THE VICE-PRESIDENT/TREASURER AND ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER OF ALVIS
PLACEMENT SERVICE CORPORATION, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A TOP RANKING OFFICER OF SAID CORPORATION, WITH AUTHORITY TO
PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN THE CONTROL, MANAGEMENT OR DIRECTION OF ITS BUSINESS AFFAIRS.

- IV -

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND IN
SENTENCING HER TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT.[6]

The appellant avers that she is not criminally liable for the crime charged because the prosecution failed to prove that she had a direct or actual
control, management or direction of the business and recruitment activities of the Alvis Placement Services Corporation (APSC). She asserts that
she had no knowledge of the recruitment activities of APSC and had no participation whatsoever in its operation. In dealing with the private
complainants, she was merely performing routinary office work as a mere employee. Her participation as an employee of APSC with respect to
the employment application of Elmer Ramos for Taiwan was to receive his placement fee of P20,000.00. Hence, the appellant avers, she cannot
be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. If, at all, she can be held liable only with respect to the employment applications of
Janer and Farol. Thus, according to the appellant, the trial court erred in sentencing her to life imprisonment.

The appeal has no merit.

Under Section 6 (m) of Rep. Act No. 8042,[7] illegal recruitment may be committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder of
authority, licensee or holder of authority, thus:

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in
cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault....[8]

Under the last paragraph of the said section, those criminally liable are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of a juridical person,
the officers having control, management or direction of the business shall be criminally liable.

In this case, the appellant, as shown by the records of the POEA, was both the APSC Vice-President-Treasurer and the Assistant General Manager.
She was a high corporate officer who had direct participation in the management, administration, direction and control of the business of the
corporation. As the trial court aptly declared in its decision:

Again, no weight can be given to the contention of the accused. The terms control, management or direction used in the last paragraph of Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 broadly cover all phases of business operation. They include the aspects of administration, marketing and finances,
among others.

From the records of the POEA, the accused appears as the Vice President (V.P.)/Treasurer of the Alvis Placement Service Corporation (Exhibit A).
Moreover, in the promissory note dated April 30, 1998 (Exhibit K), which the accused issued to Elmer Janer, she designated her position in the
said corporation as its Asst. General Manager (Exhibit K-1). Undoubtedly, the positions of vice-president, treasurer, and assistant general manager
are high ranking corporate positions in any corporate body. These positions invest on the incumbent the authority of managing, controlling and
directing the corporate affairs.

The claim of the accused that her designation in the certification of the POEA (Exhibit A) as the vice-president of Alvis Placement Service
Corporation has surprised her because, according to her, the vice-president was Vicente So Yan Han (TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, pp. 16-17), hardly
inspires belief. If this were true, she would have no difficulty in securing from the POEA an authenticated copy of the list of all officials of the
corporation which they were required to file with the said Office. For no stated reason, however, the defense omitted to secure such list and
submit it to this Court.

At any rate, the accused has expressly admitted in the course of her testimony that she was at the time the Treasurer of their recruitment agency.
As such she was in charge of the management and control of the financial affairs and resources of the corporation. She was in charge of collecting
all its receivables, safely keeping them, and disbursing them. She testified that it was part of her duties to receive and collect the monies paid by
applicants (TSN, Mar. 13, 2000, p. 5). Her disbursing authority has been clearly demonstrated by her co-signing the checks Exhibits D-2 and G.[9]

The appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment as a principal by direct participation, having dealt directly with the private complainants. In fact, she
received their placement fees and even signed, in her capacity as the Assistant General Manager of the APSC, the promissory note on May 6,
1998 in favor of private complainant Elmer Janer, obliging the APSC to pay to him the amount of P75,000.00. However, despite the private
complainants demands, their placement fees were not reimbursed in full. In People vs. Cabais,[10] we held thus:

Accused-appellant contends that she was not involved in recruitment but was merely an employee of a recruitment agency. An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively
and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. Recruitment is any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement[11]

In this case, the overwhelming evidence on record indubitably shows that the appellant engaged in illegal recruitment. As aptly ruled by the trial
court:

The first line of defense invoked by the accused to exonerate herself of the criminal charge is clearly and conclusively without merit. There is no
dispute about the fact that the three complainants engaged (sic) the Alvis Placement Service Corporation, a recruitment agency duly authorized
by the POEA wherein the accused was one of its top officers, to deploy them as factory workers in Taiwan. Admittedly, they incurred expenses,
designated as placement fees, in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their de[pl]oyment. Elmer Janer paid to
the accused, who received the payment, the total amount of P75,000.00 for his placement fee (Exhibit J; TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, pp. 6-8). Eric Farol
paid also to the accused a similar amount for the same purpose (Exhibit E; TSN, Sept. 20, 1999, pp. 5-8). Elmer Ramos paid to the agency the sum
of P70,000.00 of which P20,000.00 was received by the accused, and the balance of P50,000.00 was received by Vicente So Yan Han (Exhibit F;
TSN, Sept. 27, 1999, pp. 10-18). In the course of her testimony, the accused admitted that she received these payments by the complainants of
their placement fees.

However, the expected deployment of the complainants as factory workers in Taiwan, or even elsewhere, did not take place, without any fault
on their part. There is absolutely no evidence reflecting that the failure to deploy them was imputable to their faults.

The evidence has satisfactorily established that the complainants have not been reimbursed the full amount of their placement fees,
notwithstanding their persistent demands. Not a single peso of his placement fee was returned to Elmer Janer. Instead, on April 30, 1998, the
accused executed a promissory note (Exhibit K) in behalf of the Alvis Placement Service Corporation, undertaking to pay Elmer Janer the amount
of P75,000.00 on May 6, 1998. However, the amount covered by the promissory note was not paid (TSN, Sept. 7, 1999, p. 11).

On the other hand, although Eric Farol and Elmer Ramos were reimbursed of P11,000.00 and P5,000.00 in cash, respectively, and the balance of
their placement fees were covered by checks (Exhibits D-2 and G), these transactions did not relieve the accused of her criminal liability. The
reimbursement contemplated by paragraph (m) of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 is full reimbursement of the expenses incurred by the
worker in connection with the documentation and processing of his deployment. To rule otherwise would be offensive to the administration of
justice, as illegal recruiters could easily escape criminal liability with impunity by simply returning an insignificant portion of the amount they
collected from the worker. The checks drawn and issued by the accused to these two complainants, however, did not produce the effect of
payment, for they were both dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of closed account. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1249
of the Civil Code, (t)he delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect
of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.[12]

The appellants bare denial of her involvement in the management, administration, control and operation of APSC cannot prevail over her judicial
admissions, the positive testimonies of the private complainants and the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 8042 provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large
scale, viz, committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, the imposable penalty for which is life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00.[13] In this case, there are three private complainants, namely, Elmer Janer, Eric Farol
and Elmer Ramos. The trial court, thus, correctly convicted the appellant of large scale illegal recruitment and sentenced her to suffer life
imprisonment.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the appellant.
PEOPLE VS BULI-E GR 123146

Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and eight counts of estafa.

On March 16, 1993, the following information was filed against Jose Alolino and appellants, Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino:

The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO and JOSE ALOLINO for VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920 FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. 2018, committed in large scale, which is an act of economic sabotage, and by a
syndicate, committed as follows:

That during the period from March 1991 to July 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and hire and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment / job placement to the following persons:

1. Constancio Macli-ing

2. Jesssica Estay

3. Sidolia Fias-eo

4. John Mangili

5. Nieva Lampoyas

6. Sabado Agapito

7. Joseph Oratil and

8. Joel Oratil

in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper government agency

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On the same day, eight separate informations for estafa were also filed against Jose Alolino and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for brevity) and
Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for brevity). Except as to the dates, amounts involved[2] and the names of complainants, the following information in
Criminal Case No. 11123-R typified the seven other informations for the crime of estafa:

That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one
Constancio Macli-ing by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to
wit: the accused knowing fully well that they are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said
Constancio Macli-ing and pretended that they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P15,000.00 when in
truth and in fact they could not; the said Constancio Macli-ing, deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused, parted
away the total sum of P15,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Constancio Macli-ing in the aforementioned
amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency.[3]

Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to each of the nine informations filed
against them. A joint trial ensued since the cases involved the same factual milieu.

Evidence for the prosecution showed that on various dates from June 1990 to July 1992, complainants went to the house of appellant Buli-e at
No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City upon learning that she was recruiting workers for overseas employment. A cousin of complainant Lampoyas,
whom Buli-e helped deploy abroad, introduced Lampoyas to Buli-e in 1990.[4] The brothers Oratil went to see Buli-e about possible overseas
employment in April 1992.[5] Mangili inquired from Buli-e if she was recruiting workers for overseas employment also in April 1992.[6] Sabado
and Macli-ing approached Buli-e for possible overseas work in May 1992,[7] while Estay, accompanied by her sister, went to see Buli-e on June
17, 1992.[8] Fias-eo approached Buli-e on July 13, 1992, accompanied by Lampoyas.[9]

Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting contract workers for Taiwan and that, although she did not have a license of her
own to recruit, her boss in Manila who was a licensed recruiter, was in the process of getting her one which would soon be issued.[10] Buli-e
identified her superiors in Manila to be the spouses Jose[11] and Josefina Alolino. Josefina was connected with Rodolfo S. Ibuna Employment
Agency (RSI for brevity), a private employment agency licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. Buli-e informed complainants that
requirements for application of overseas work included submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance, and medical examination clearance to
show that the applicant is physically and mentally fit. There was also a placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000 must be paid in advance. Buli-
e told complainants that if they were interested in applying, they may submit to her said requirements which she, in turn, will submit to her boss
who was in charge of processing the necessary documents.

In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e for employment in Kuwait, she was informed by Buli-e that the latter was
working for a certain Jessie Agtarep.[12] Lampoyas gave Buli-e P4,000 on March 14, 1991 as downpayment for the placement fee and P5,000 on
August 24, 1991. Lampoyas application papers were processed by Jamal Enterprises in Makati, Metro Manila but in 1992 , Buli-e transferred
Lampoyas application to appellant Josefina, whom Buli-e referred to as her new boss.[13] Lampoyas was enticed to work in Taiwan instead of
Kuwait and was assured that her deployment papers would be processed more quickly.[14]

From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on separate occasions, to Manila where they had their medical check-up at Saints
Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita. Lampoyas had her medical check-up in March 1992[15] while Mangili and Joseph Oratil had their medical
check-up in May 1992.[16] On June 20, 1992, Estay had her medical check-up,[17] while Agapito and Macli-ing had their medical examination on
July 5, 1992.[18] Fias-eo had her medical examination on July 20, 1992 while Joel Oratil had his medical examination in August 1992. Complainants
paid for the medical examination, the results of which were given to Buli-e.

Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination, Buli-e brought them to No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias,
Metro Manila purportedly to introduce them to her boss, the spouses Alolino. Complainants, except for Macli-ing and Agapito, were able to meet
only Jose Alolino on the same day that they had undergone medical examination. Jose Alolino allegedly told complainants that his wife, Josefina,
was in Taiwan following up applications but he assured them that they too would be deployed abroad in a matter of months.[19] Mangili, Estay,
and the brothers Oratil were able to meet Josefina personally when they returned to the residence of the Alolinos in Manila to follow up their
applications.[20] Fias-eo and Lampoyas, on the other hand, never met Josefina personally although they were able to talk to her over the
telephone several times when they were following up the status of their applications.[21] It was during these telephone conversations that
Josefina instructed Fias-eo and Lampoyas to have their medical examinations and secure their NBI clearance in Manila accompanied by Buli-e
whom she identified as her agent.[22]

Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they were licensed to recruit overseas contract workers and that they can deploy
workers within two to three months.[23] Complainants were informed by Buli-e and Josefina that deployment for Taiwan is on a first-come, first-
served basis and that those who can comply with the requirements, particularly the advance payment of P15,000, shall be deployed first.[24]

On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed to Buli-e at Sanitary Camp, Baguio City their advance payments of P15,000
for which they were issued receipts.[25] Mangili paid P11,000 on May 22, 1992 and P4,000 on June 18, 1992.[26] The Oratil brothers paid P15,000
each in installments from May 1992 to July 15, 1992.[27] Macli-ing paid P15,000 on July 12, 1992.[28] Fias-eo gave Buli-e P15,000 on July 13,
1992.[29] In addition to her previous payments amounting to P9,000, Lampoyas paid Buli-e P5,000 also on July 13, 1992.[30] Estay gave P15,000
on July 21, 1992[31] while Agapito paid Buli-e P15,000 on July 22, 1992.[32] Buli-e assured complainants that she delivered the payments to
Josefina. Aside from giving the downpayment of the placement fee, complainants complied with the rest of the requirements which included
submission of pictures, bio-data, passports, NBI clearances and medical examination reports.

After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the requirements, complainants were not deployed abroad as promised by appellants.
From August 1992 to February 1993, complainants trooped to Buli-es house but Buli-e merely kept on telling them to wait. When complainants
called up Josefina by long distance telephone, they were also told just to wait.

Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA office in Baguio City on February 2, 1993, to check whether appellants were
indeed licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. They were dismayed to find out that appellants had no license to recruit in Baguio City or
any part of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). On the same day, complainants filed their complaints with the POEA-CAR and the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City.

After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the Baguio City Jail, Josefina, through counsel, refunded complainant Fias-eo
P15,000 for his downpayment on the placement fee.[33] Complainant Mangili also demanded a refund and he was paid by Josefina, again through
her counsel, the sum of P25,000 for his advance payment of P15,000 and as reimbursement of the actual expenses he incurred for his
application.[34]

During trial, Buli-e testified that she worked for RSI and had been referring applicants to the agency before 1991. She met Josefina a year after
she resigned from RSI.[35] In 1990, Buli-e had an applicant for Singapore, a certain Prescilla Laoayan from Baguio City. Buli-e referred Prescilla to
RSI which, through Mrs. Fe Go, handled the processing of her application. As part of the requirements of the agency, Prescilla had to undergo
training at the house of Josefina, who was then the Marketing Director of RSI. In 1991, Josefina sent Buli-e a note, through Prescilla, telling her to
go to the house of Josefina at No.11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila to discuss matters about recruitment of workers.
Buli-e went to the house of Josefina as requested and it was then that she was appointed as an agent of Josefina.[36] Buli-e was tasked to find
job applicants for Taiwan, Korea or Singapore whom she can refer to RSI through Josefina. Buli-e would then be paid for each referral. When Buli-
e asked Josefina if the latter was authorized or had any license to recruit for overseas placement, Josefina answered in the affirmative.[37]

Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan, Singapore and Korea at her house in No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City.
Complainants sought her of their own accord and Buli-e informed them of the requirements for job application which consisted of submission of
bio-data, passport, NBI clearance and placement fee of P40,000 of which P15,000 must be paid in advance upon instructions of Josefina. Josefina
allegedly instructed Buli-e to accompany complainants to Sts. Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila for medical check-up.[38] Buli-e was
likewise instructed by Josefina to accompany some of the complainants in securing their NBI clearance and to receive whatever documents
complainants will be submitting including the P15,000 advance payment, all of which should be submitted to Josefina. Buli-e said that she
submitted the documents and the payments either to Jose Alolino or to Josefina.[39] She clarified that she did not have a hand in securing the
passports of complainants[40] and received instructions from Josefina only when she communicated with Josefina through the telephone or went
to Manila. She averred that she and several members of her family also tried to apply for overseas work with Josefina and paid the latter P100,000.
[41]

Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of POEA-CAR, to testify that RSI was a licensed employment agency and that
Josefina was a licensed recruiter at the time that Buli-e had dealings with her co-appellant. Mrs. Villanueva testified that she has been with the
POEA since 1985. Part of her functions included administrative and technical supervision of the staff regarding employment, facilitation, licensing,
investigation and monitoring of the provincial recruitment authority as well as issuance of authorization to personnel to conduct inspection of
licensed agencies in the City of Baguio.[42] Mrs.Villanueva said that, as per the certification of the Chief of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, RSI
was a private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. Josefina Alolino was included in the list of the personnel
submitted by the agency in July 1990 as Marketing Consultant.[43] Mrs. Villanueva, however, clarified that licenses or permits to recruit workers
are territorial in nature so that an agency licensed in Manila can only engage in recruitment activities within the place specified in the license
although the applicants may be non-residents of Metro Manila. She further testified that she cannot remember if Buli-e was given any authority
to recruit in Baguio City.[44]

Josefina, on the other hand, testified that on September 16, 1987, she was appointed as one of the four Marketing Directors of RSI which was
located in 408 Jovan Condominium, Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. RSI, represented by Rodolfo S. Ibuna as proprietor, was a
private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. As Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, Josefina was tasked to represent
the agency in negotiating with employers in Taiwan, Malaysia, United States and Singapore[45] for said employers to avail of the services of RSI
in recruiting, hiring, processing and deploying Filipino contract workers. She was also authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement
through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc., and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants. As per agreement with
RSI, Josefina was entitled to a certain share for each successful negotiation with a foreign employer.[46]

Josefina denied that Buli-e was her agent and insisted that she never gave Buli-e authority to recruit for RSI. On the contrary, Buli-e allegedly
informed Josefina that she was an agent of Mrs. Fe Go, another marketing Director of RSI. Sometime in 1991, Mrs. Go referred to Josefina a
certain Prescilla Laoayan, who wanted to apply as a domestic helper in Taiwan. Upon being told that she could not be deployed unless she would
give a downpayment of P15,000 for the placement fee, Prescilla informed Josefina that she already gave P15,000 to an agent whom she identified
to be Buli-e. Josefina then wrote a note for Buli-e informing her that there was a problem regarding the processing of Prescillas application.
Prescilla delivered the note to Buli-e who in turn went to see Josefina at her house in No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro
Manila. Josefina said that she and Buli-e merely talked about Prescillas application and that was the first time that Josefina met and talked with
Buli-e although she had already seen her before in the office of Mrs. Fe Go.[47]

Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by Buli-e to Mrs. Fe Go who, in turn, referred them to her. Josefina said that
she accepted referrals from Buli-e even though the latter was not her agent nor connected with RSI because their agency accepts referrals from
everyone. In 1992, Buli-e, claiming that complainants authorized and designated her to act as their spokesperson, went to the house of Josefina
several times to follow up the progress of their applications.[48]

Josefina denied having given Buli-e instructions to accompany complainants to Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila. She also
denied having an understanding with Buli-e to receive payments from each of complainants and to bring them to her house in Las Pias, Metro
Manila.[49] Josefina explained that the deployment of complainants was delayed because the Taiwanese government changed its previous policy
of allowing foreign employment agencies like RSI to negotiate directly with prospective employers in Taiwan. Foreign employment agencies were
instead allowed to negotiate only with local employment agencies in Taiwan, which, in turn, were responsible for negotiating with the Taiwanese
employers. The change in the policy caused delay in the deployment of complainants since the local employment agencies in Taiwan demanded
additional requirements such as additional fees. Josefina said she informed complainants of the delay and the reason for it but complainants
could not wait to be deployed and, instead, demanded the refund of their payments.[50]

On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e P75,000 with the instruction that she was to give complainant Lampoyas P5,000 as refund, and
P10,000 each to complainants Macli-ing, Estay, Fias-eo, Mangili, Agapito, and the Oratil brothers. Upon having been approached by complainants
for the refund of their money, Josefina informed them that she already gave their refunds through Buli-e. Complainants, however, claimed that
they did not receive their refunds from Buli-e. When complainants could not wait for the refund of their payments and failed to see Josefina who
was always out of the country due to her work, they filed the present cases.[51]

Emelita Racelis testified that she was an employee of RSI from 1989 to 1992 and was one of the two persons assigned to Josefina.[52] Ms. Racelis
said that Buli-e frequently went to the RSI, bringing applicants with her three times a month. Among the applicants whom Buli-e referred to RSI
through one of the marketing directors, Mrs. Fe Go, was a certain Prescilla Laoayan. Racelis said that Laoayan was endorsed by Mrs. Go to Josefina
because it is the practice that when the applicant of one of the marketing directors cannot be deployed, the applicant will be endorsed to another
marketing director with a job opening. Josefina, however, had trouble deploying Ms. Laoayan whose placement fee had not been forwarded by
Buli-e to RSI.[53]

On July 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable doubt, by direct
participation and in conspiracy with each other, of the crime of illegal recruitment in a large scale as defined and penalized under Article 38(b) in
relation to Article 39 of PD 442 as amended by PD 2018 and sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each,
and to pay the costs.

2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by direct participation and in conspiracy with each other of the crime of Estafa as charged in the Informations in the aforesaid
8 cases as defined and penalized under Article 315 first paragraph in relation to No. 2 (a) of the same article and sentences each of them, applying
the indeterminate sentence law, to an imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum in each of the aforesaid 8 cases; to indemnify jointly and severally the
offended parties Constancio Macli-ing, Jessica Estay, Sidolia Fias-eo, John Mangili, Sabado Agapito, Joseph Oratil and Joel Oratil the sum of
P15,000.00 each and Nieva Lampoyas the sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.

The accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino being detention prisoners are entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment
in the service of their sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[54]

In rendering the decision, the trial court ruled that by their acts, Buli-e and Josefina, conspired and confederated with one another in the illegal
recruitment of complainants for overseas employment. Buli-e performed the recruitment activities in Baguio and Josefina, in Manila. The trial
court specifically noted Buli-es acts of accompanying the complainants to Manila for their medical examinations, securing complainants NBI
clearances and passports as well as receiving complainants downpayments for the purported placement fee as an indication that she directly
participated in the recruitment of all complainants. The trial court observed that Buli-e practically confessed her acts of recruitment in open court
and justified the same by claiming that she was just acting as an agent of Josefina or was authorized to act in behalf of the latter.

As regards Josefina, the trial court held that she directly participated in the recruitment of complainants even if she did not personally go to
Baguio City since she received the applications and other requirements such as NBI clearances, passports, bio-data as well as the advanced
payments of complainants from Buli-e. Either she or her husband Jose, or both of them, entertained complainants who were brought by Buli-e
to their home at No. 11 Concorde Street, Airmans Village, Las Pias, Metro Manila. The spouses repeatedly promised to work or make
arrangements for complainants deployment abroad.

The trial court ruled that the authority given to Josefina as Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, a duly licensed employment agency, was confined
to negotiating with foreign employers in Taiwan and she was not supposed to recruit overseas Filipino workers. The court stressed that assuming
Josefina was authorized to recruit in Manila, she had no authority to do so in Baguio City. Citing Article 29 of the Labor Code which states that no
license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than
that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred or conveyed to any other person or entity, the trial court
ruled that appellants could not use the RSI license in Manila to recruit overseas contract workers in Baguio City.

The trial court further noted that the license of RSI employment office was already suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Consequently, the authority given by RSI to Josefina was likewise suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.

Finally, the trial court said that Josefinas act of returning the advanced payments of some of complainants would not exculpate her and only
proved that she had in fact received money from complainants who were made to believe that they would be deployed abroad at the soonest
possible time.

With regard to the eight charges of estafa filed against appellants, the trial court convicted them on the ground that all the elements of estafa
were present under each of the eight charges filed. The trial court held that appellants through false pretenses and fraudulent acts represented
to complainants that they had the power, authority and capacity to deploy workers abroad for a fee of P40,000, of which P15,000 should be paid
as advance payment. The false pretenses and fraudulent acts were executed prior to or simultaneous with appellants taking the sum of P15,000
as advance payment from each of private complainants[55] which were received by Buli-e in Baguio City and turned over by her to Josefina in
Manila. Complainants relied on the pretenses and misrepresentations of appellants and parted with substantial sums of money as advance
payments of their placement fees. As a result of the false pretenses and misrepresentations, complainants were damaged and prejudiced to the
extent of the sums they had given as downpayment since appellants failed to send them abroad as promised.

In her appeal before us, appellant Buli-e contends that the trial court erred:

I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E THAT SHE MERELY REFERRED THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES
TO CO-ACCUSED SPOUSES JOSE AND JOSEFINA ALOLINO, WHOM SHE HONESTLY BELIEVED TO BE BONA FIDE OVERSEAS JOB RECRUITERS;

II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN APPELLANT BULI-E AND SPOUSES ALOLINO IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES
OF LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA; AND

III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA WHEN THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT SAID ACCUSED BENEFITED FROM THE
ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION.

Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following assignments of error:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY
WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 38[b]
IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 39 OF P.D. 442 AS AMENDED BY P.D. 2018 AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY
A FINE OF P100,000.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IN THE AFORESAID 8 CASES AS
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315 FIRST PARAGRAPH IN RELATION TO NO. 2[A] OF THE SAME ARTICLE.

We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.

Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and include referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment or placement.

The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the
guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and
deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.[56] When illegal recruitment is committed in large scale or when it is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three
or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another, it is considered as an offense involving economic sabotage.

The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment activities involving eight persons. The recruitment activities were made by
appellants without having the license or authority to do so as evidenced by the certification issued by Legal Officer of the POEA Regional Extension
Unit, Cordillera Administrative Region, which stated that Alona Buli-e, Hilario Antonio,[57] Josie Alolino and Jose Alolino were not licensed nor
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the region.[58]

Appellant Buli-e herself does not deny that she had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. She, however, insists
that she had never directly participated in recruiting complainants since it was in fact complainants who sought her help in applying for overseas
employment. Buli-e explained that she merely referred complainants to the spouses Alolino whom she honestly believed to be bona fide overseas
job recruiters and, since she, herself, had intentions of applying for overseas work, she tagged along with complainants to Manila to see the
spouses Alolino. Inasmuch as she and complainants were all from Baguio City, complainants allegedly designated her to conduct all negotiations
and follow up of their applications with the spouses.

Buli-es claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did not actively seek complainants to recruit them for overseas employment. It
was complainants who sought her out. Nevertheless, when complainants approached her, Buli-e gave complainants the impression that she had
the ability to send workers abroad by saying that although she did not have a license of her own to recruit, her boss, who was a licensed recruiter,
was already in the process of securing her a license.[59] She not only informed complainants of the requirements in applying for overseas
employment and even accompanied them to Manila to procure the necessary documents such as passport, medical and NBI clearances.[60] It
was she who brought them to the house of the spouses Alolino and it was also she who received from complainants advanced payments for
placement fee which she handed over to the spouses. Her claim that she and her relatives were also victims of illegal recruitment by the spouses
Alolino is not substantiated.

We also find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that Josefina Alolino conspired and confederated with Buli-e in recruiting applicants
for overseas employment from Baguio City although neither she nor Buli-e had license or authority to do so. Her claim that she did not have a
direct participation in the recruitment in Baguio City and that she merely assisted the complainants by referring them to RSI to facilitate their
papers does not merit credence. There is no showing that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to the
house of the spouses Alolino in Las Pias after their medical check up. Complainants, who were with other applicants, were entertained and
generously fed breakfast or dinner by one or both of the spouses who assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in just a matter of
months.[61] Although Josefina alleged that the documents and payments were handed by Buli-e to the RSI office, Josefina could show no proof
to substantiate her claim. It is significant to note that after the informations for illegal recruitment and eight counts of estafa were already filed
in court, some of the complainants were given a refund of their advances for the placement fees by Josefina herself, through counsel, and not by
RSI.

Josefinas acts clearly show that she and Buli-e acted in concert towards the accomplishment of a common felonious purpose which was to recruit
workers for overseas employment even though they had no license to do so. Settled is the rule that if it is proved that two or more persons,
aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, although apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred even though no actual meeting between or among them to coordinate ways and means is proved. [62]

Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for RSI, she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through
advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants.

Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to corroborate Josefinas claim that as Marketing Director she was authorized to solicit
applicants for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. Josefina did not bother to formally offer as evidence the
document allegedly supporting her claim that part of her duties as Marketing Director included recruitment of overseas contract workers. The
document not having been formally offered in court cannot be considered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the Licensing Branch of the POEA confirmed that the license of RSI had already been suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July
14, 1992.[63] Consequently, even if Josefina was licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment, her authority to do so ceased when the
license of her agency, RSI, was suspended and when it eventually expired. Josefina, however, despite the suspension and expiration of the RSI
license, continued to engage in recruitment activities for overseas employment. Except for Lampoyas who met Jose Alolino at the latters house
in March 1992, and Mangili and Joseph Oratil who met Jose Alolino in May 1992, complainants were entertained at the house of the Alolinos
after the license of RSI had already been suspended. Lampoyas, Macli-ing and Mangili completed the P15,000 downpayment of the placement
fee after the license of RSI had already been suspended. The rest of complainants gave payments for the placement fee after the license of RSI
had already expired.

Furthermore, Josefinas alleged authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment as Marketing Director of RSI was only confined to Metro
Manila. Article 29 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in
whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred,
conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative
including the establishment of additional offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of Labor.

We are not persuaded by Josefinas claim that no recruitment activity was being done outside of the territorial permit of RSI and it was only
incidental that complainants who were referred to her by Buli-e were residents of Baguio City. As earlier discussed, there is no indication that
complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always brought by Buli-e to Las Pias, Metro Manila where they were entertained by one
or both of the spouses Alolino who repeatedly assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in a matter of months. Josefina, who claims
to have authority to recruit applicants for overseas employment in behalf of RSI, should have known that licensed agencies are prohibited from
conducting any provincial recruitment, job fairs or recruitment activities of any form outside of the address stated in the license, acknowledged
branch or extension office, without securing prior authority from the POEA.[64] Pursuant to the POEA rules and regulations, Josefina could recruit
applicants for overseas employment and process their applications only at the RSI office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila since there was no
showing that RSI had an acknowledged branch or extension office in Baguio City or that the prior approval of the POEA for provincial recruitment
or recruitment activities outside the RSI office was obtained.

Finally, the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of eight (8) counts of estafa. It is settled that a person convicted of illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code can also be convicted of violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided that the elements of the crime
are present.[65] The elements for estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[66]

Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to send them to Taiwan for employment. By reason
or on the strength of such assurance, complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees. Since the representations of
appellants proved to be false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable. Buli-es claim that she did not benefit from the
money collected from complainants since she gave the payments to Josefina is of no moment. It was clearly established that she acted in
connivance with Josefina in defrauding complainants. As regards Josefina, the fact that she returned the payment of some of the complainants
will not exculpate her from criminal liability. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation, for it is a public offense which
must be prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion even though complete reparation has been made of the damage suffered
by the offended party.[67]

The actual damages in the sum of P15,000 awarded to each of complainants Fias-eo and Mangili, however, should be deleted inasmuch as said
amounts have already been reimbursed by Josefina during her detention.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the actual damages
awarded to Fias-eo and Mangili in Criminal Cases Nos. 11125-R and 11126-R are deleted. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
PHIL EMPLOY SERVICES VS. PARANIO GR 144786

This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54744 and its Resolution denying the petitioners motion
for reconsideration therefrom.

As culled from the records, the antecedents are as follows:

On different dates from April 1996 to October 1996, respondents Joseph Paramio, Ronald Navarra, Romel Sarmiento, Recto Guillermo, Ferdinand
Bautista and Apolinario Curameng, Jr. applied for employment in Taiwan2 with petitioner, Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. (PSRI for
brevity), a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino Workers Overseas.3 Their applications were processed
along with the requisite papers and documents in support thereof, and they paid P19,000 each as placement fee.4 Thereafter, they executed in
the Philippines separate one-year contracts of employment with their employer in Taiwan, Kuan Yuan Fiber Co., Ltd. Hsei-Chang. The respondents
were deployed in Taiwan as operators on different dates5 and each of them had a monthly salary of NT$15,360 (New Taiwan Dollars), with free
food and accommodation.6

After the orientation given by their employer, the respondents were told that their schedule of work was up to 9:00 p.m.,7 except for respondent
Navarra who was made to work up to 12:00 midnight.8 The respondents were downhearted when they discovered that, upon their arrival in
their quarters, they had no beddings, pillows and blankets.9 They encountered worse problems in the course of their employment, viz.:

a). Irregular and deliberate charging of deductions which were not fully accounted such as the blankets issued, charging of penalties amounting
to 400 NT to all employees for a littering violation attributable only to one employee;

b). Mandatory imposition of overtime work exceeding 10 hours without just overtime compensation and night shift differentials;

c). Failure to comply with some stipulations stated in the Employment Contract particularly those relating to the accommodation and lodging of
the contracted workers;

d). Lack of observance of safety precautions at work area.10

The respondents brought their problems to the attention of the management. In March of 1997, Fabian Chua, local manager of the petitioner
PSRI, made a surprise visit to Kuan Yuan in Taiwan and was apprised of the said complaints. However, instead of solving the problems, Chua
cautioned the respondents not to air their complaints and to simply forget about whatever plans they had in mind.11 Disappointed, the
respondents, along with their co-workers, contacted the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) in Taiwan and sought the latters
assistance, only to be frustrated when their requests were not favorably acted upon.12

Sometime in April of 1997, through the intercession of Chih-Hung, the manager of the new broker Chen Dard Manpower Co. Ltd., Long Island
International Trade Co., Ltd, the overtime rate of the respondents was increased from 55NT$ to 85NT$. The respondents discovered, however,
that work in the factory increased because of the increased volume of orders.13 Moreover, their working conditions did not improve.

On May 10, 1997, respondent Navarra and another employee, Pio Gabito, were summoned by the management and told that they were to be
repatriated, without specifying the ground or cause therefor. They pleaded that they be informed of the cause or causes for their repatriation,
but their requests were rejected.14 Worse, the manager of their employer summoned the police, who arrived and escorted them to the airport.
They were even given time to pack all their personal belongings.

Upon respondent Navarras arrival in Manila, the petitioner sought to settle his complaints.15 After the negotiations, the petitioner agreed to
pay P49,000 to the said respondent but, in consideration thereof, the latter executed a quitclaim releasing the petitioner from any or all liabilities
for his repatriation.16

Meanwhile, when the other respondents learned that Navarra and Gabito were repatriated, they were disheartened at their fate. The
respondents also decided to go home, but their employer and their broker told them17 that they would be repatriated two days later, or on May
12, 1997. They were ready to leave on the aforesaid date, but were informed that they would have to pay their employer NT$30,000; otherwise,
they would not be allowed to go home. As they were unable to pay the NT$30,000, the respondents failed to return to the Philippines.18

The management and broker gave the respondents two (2) options: (a) imprisonment for their refusal to pay NT$30,000.00; or (b) sign separate
agreements with their employer. The respondents had no other recourse but to sign agreements19 authorizing their employer to (a) deduct the
amount of NT$30,000 from their salaries; (b) remit their salaries to the Philippines; and, (c) deduct NT$10,000 from their salaries as "bond."20
However, the respondents were still not repatriated. The next day, or on May 13, 1997, their employer issued a regulation that overtime of ten
hours or more would be implemented.21 Thus, the conditions in the respondents workplace worsened.

On May 14, 1997, respondent Paramio got ill as a result of the employers failure to give breakfast on the said date and dinner the night before.22
His manager still ordered him to work. When he pleaded that he be allowed to take some rest, the manager refused. Respondent Paramio was,
instead, made to carry a container weighing around 30 kilograms. Due to his condition, the container slipped from his hands and he injured his
thumb. He was brought to the hospital where he was operated on and treated for his wound.23 Instead of giving him financial assistance for his
hospital bills, his employer told him a week after his release from the hospital that it would be better for him to go home to the Philippines to
recuperate. An official from the Taiwanese Labor Department intervened for respondent Paramio and his employer was told that it had no right
to repatriate the respondent because the accident which caused the injury happened while the latter was at work.24
Although his wound had not yet healed, respondent Paramio was made to report for work. After eight hours of working, his broker advised him
that as per the doctors orders, he was still on sick leave from May 14 to June 30, 1997. Hence, he could not yet be compelled to work. The
respondent then stayed in his quarters to recuperate.

On June 5, 1997, respondent Paramio received his paycheck, but was flabbergasted when he discovered that his employer had deducted NT$4,300
from his salary, representing his plane ticket back to the Philippines. Furthermore, his sick leave from May 14 to June 5 were not included in his
check.25 Still, he was not repatriated. On July 1, 1997, he reported back to work, only to be assigned to do the second hardest job in the company,
carrying containers weighing about 30 kilograms in the dyeing department.26 Although his thumb hurt, respondent Paramio had to endure the
pain to earn more money.27

After a week, respondent Paramio was transferred to the Lupo Department, the hardest job in the factory, where he was made to carry about
200 meters of maong cloth. He then set it and carried the same to the dyeing department. When he could no longer bear the pain in his thumb,
he took a break. When the manager saw him resting, he was ordered to return to work. Respondent Paramio refused and contended that he
could not resume work because of his thumb injury. Incensed, the manager told him that he had to stop working and would just have to wait for
his plane ticket for his repatriation. The respondent did as he was told.

The next day, Fabian Chua, the local representative of the petitioner PSRI, arrived and asked the respondent why he did not report for work.
Respondent Paramio explained that his thumb injury made it impossible for him to perform his assigned tasks. On September 23, 1997, he was
given his paycheck and a plane ticket to the Philippines. He was told that the amount of NT$3,700 was deducted from his paycheck because he
neglected his duty. At around eight oclock that evening, respondent Paramio was repatriated to the Philippines.28

Meanwhile, PSRI representative Fabian Chua renewed his warning to the remaining respondents/employees not to complain about the working
conditions. But respondents Sarmiento, Guillermo, Bautista and Curameng, Jr. could no longer bear the worsening working conditions. In October
1997, they decided to go home. Their employer agreed to have them repatriated and to return their respective bonds, but required them to write
letters of resignation. Respondents Sarmiento and Bautista did as they were told and wrote the said letters.29 Respondent Curameng, Jr., for his
part, signed a mimeographed form where he agreed to return to the Philippines.30 On October 10, 1997, the said respondents were repatriated,
but were required to pay for their own plane tickets.31

On October 22, 1997, respondents Sarmiento, Guillermo, Curameng, Jr. and Bautista, together with respondents Paramio and Navarra, filed
separate complaints before the NLRC Arbitration Branch against Bayani Fontanilla for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, refund of
placement fee, tax refund, refund of plane fares, attorneys fees and litigation expenses. The cases were docketed as NLRC-OFW Cases No. (L)
97-10-4332 to 97-10-4335.32

In their position paper, the respondents raised the issue of whether or not the petitioner PSRI and Bayani Fontanilla were liable for the
reimbursement of their respective placement fees, nightshift differentials, overtime pay and damages, and their salaries for the unexpired portion
of their respective contracts.33

The respondents argued that under Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, PSRI was solidarily liable with Kuan Yuan for their claims. Since they were repatriated prior to the expiration of their respective contracts
for no valid reason, PSRI was liable to pay their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

The petitioner denied any liability on the respondents claims and asserted that the latter were validly dismissed. It averred that respondent
Paramio was dismissed pursuant to Nos. 5 and 6, Article VIII of his employment contract. According to the petitioner, the said clauses allow the
termination of a contract of employment prior to its expiration when the employee is (a) suffering from HIV positive antibody or other diseases;
(b) heavily wounded or has stool parasite and cannot be cured within one month; or (c) found to have lost the ability to work. It averred that
since complainant Paramio could no longer do his job because of his thumb injury, the termination of his contract was valid, and his dismissal
proper.34

Anent respondent Navarras claim, the petitioner PSRI ratiocinated that the termination of his services was for a valid cause because of an
altercation he had with his supervisor. The petitioner further averred that respondent Navarra had demanded that he be paid the amount of
P50,000 and after some negotiation, agreed to receive P49,000. Respondent Navarra received the said amount and executed on May 23, 1997,
a deed of release and quitclaim in favor of the petitioner.35

As for the claims of the other respondents, the petitioner alleged that the respondents Guillermo, Bautista and Curameng, Jr. voluntarily resigned,
as evidenced by their respective letters and agreement with the petitioner.36 Moreover, the termination of their employment was legal, and
their repatriation based on valid grounds. The petitioner contended that the respondents were not entitled to a refund of their plane fare.37

With respect to the claims for tax refund for amounts withheld by their employer, the petitioner averred that the respondents were not entitled
thereto, as the law of Taiwan mandated such withholding of taxes. If, indeed, the respondents were entitled to a refund of the said taxes, the
same should be coursed through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the appropriate governmental agency.38

On October 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati rendered a decision declaring that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal. The dispositive
portion states, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainants dismissal to be illegal and respondents are ordered to pay to complainants
as follows:

1. Ronald Navarra NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of placement fee; and P4,300 refund of plane fare less P49,000.

2. Recto Guillermo NT$15,360 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare.

3. Joseph Paramio NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of placement fee; and P4,300 refund air fare.

4. Apolinario Curameng, Jr. NT$23,040 or its peso equivalent; P75,000 refund of placement fee and P4,300 refund of air fare.

5. Ferdinand Bautista NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent; P75,000.00 refund of placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare; and

6. Romel Sarmiento NT$ or its peso equivalent P75,000.00 refund of placement fee; and P4,300 refund of air fare.

The claim for tax refund is dismissed for not having been substantiated.39

In declaring respondent Navarras dismissal illegal, the labor arbiter held that the petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the said
respondent had an altercation with his supervisor. As such, respondent Navarra was entitled to the payment of the salaries due him for the
unexpired portion of his contract, subject to the deduction of the amount already advanced to him under the deed of release and quitclaim he
had executed in favor of the petitioner.40

The labor arbiter likewise ruled that the dismissal of complainant Paramio was illegal. Considering that he had a thumb injury, his employer should
have given him a lighter job instead of repatriating him. The dismissal of the remaining complainants was also adjudged illegal. According to the
labor arbiter, the petitioners defense that its employees (respondents) voluntarily resigned deserved scant consideration.

Considering that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal, the labor arbiter awarded the salaries due them for the unexpired portion of their
contracts, as well as the refund of their plane fare. Recognizing that the usual placement fee of workers for deployment in Taiwan was
approximately P100,000, more or less, the labor arbiter granted each of them a refund of their placement fee in the amount of P75,000.41

Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR CA 017927-99. It raised the
following grounds:

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN THE FINDING OF FACTS WHICH IF NOT CORRECTED WOULD CAUSE GRAVE AND
IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO THE RESPONDENT42

The petitioner insisted that the dismissal of the complainants was anchored on valid and legal grounds; as such, the labor arbiter erred in ruling
for the respondents and awarding a refund of their airfares, placement fees and payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective
contracts of employment.

On March 29, 1999, the NLRC issued a resolution43 finding that the respondents were legally dismissed and set aside the decision of the labor
arbiter. The decretal portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant case dismissed for lack of merit.44

In reversing the decision of the labor arbiter, the NLRC made the following findings: (a) respondent Navarra did not refute the allegation of the
petitioner that he had an altercation with his supervisor; (b) respondent Navarras execution of a deed of release and quitclaim released the
petitioner from any or all liability on account of his repatriation; (c) the repatriation of complainant Paramio was sanctioned by Article VIII,
paragraphs 5 and 6 of his employment contract; and, (d) the written documents executed by the remaining respondents showed that they
voluntarily resigned from their employment.

Dissatisfied, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration45 of the resolution, but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution dated May
17, 1999.46

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the petitioner before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 54744. The respondents (petitioners therein) raised the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED WHEN THEY WERE REPATRIATED TO THE PHIL. BY THEIR TAIWAN EMPLOYER.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE THUMB INJURY SUFFERED BY JOSEPH PARAMIO WHILE AT WORK [SHOULD] BE CONSIDERED A LEGAL GROUND FOR
HIS REPATRIATION.

3. WHETHER OR NOT RONALD NAVARRAS REPATRIATION AND EXECUTION OF QUITCLAIM AND RECEIPT OF P49,000 BE SUFFICIENT GROUND TO
CONCLUDE HIS WAIVER OF RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

4. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR MONEY CLAIMS.47

The petitioners prayed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that this Petition be given due course and after its due
consideration, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated March 29, 1999 and
May 17, 1999 and a new one rendered REINSTATING the Decision of the Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati dated August 29, 1998 with modification for
the reward of moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioners further pray for such other reliefs and remedies deemed just and equitable in the premises.48

On May 29, 2000, the CA rendered a decision partly granting the petition in that it nullified the March 29 and May 17, 1999 Resolutions of the
NLRC and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter with modification. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is partly granted insofar as the public respondents Resolutions dated March 29, 1999 and
May 17, 1999 are set aside and the labor arbiters Decision dated August 29, 1998 is reinstated with modification on the award of refunds for
placement fees. The petitioners claims for moral and exemplary damages are denied for lack of merit.49

The CA held that respondents Curameng, Bautista, Sarmiento and Guillermo were constructively dismissed, as the petitioner failed to substantiate
its claim that the aforesaid petitioners voluntarily resigned from work.

The CA also ruled that the repatriation of respondent Paramio was in violation of his employment contract. It declared that paragraph 8.2, Nos.
5 and 6, Article VIII of the said contract applied only to illnesses already existing and discovered during employment. The "loss of ability to work"
under the contract could not be used as a ground for respondent Paramios termination because his thumb injury was work-related.

As to respondent Navarra, the CA ruled that his alleged confrontation with his supervisor did not amount to serious misconduct which would
justify his dismissal. It stated that the deed of release executed by respondent Navarra barred him from instituting the said complaint. However,
the CA agreed that the money he was able to collect from the petitioner by reason of the execution of a deed of release and quitclaim should be
considered as an advance on the amount he was entitled to.

Considering that the dismissal of the respondents was illegal, the petitioner, as the local agent of Kuan Yuan, was declared solidarily liable with
the latter for the payment of the respondents salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective contracts and other awards, pursuant to
Section 10, paragraph 2 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

The CA reduced the award of refund of placement fee to the respondents from P75,000 to P19,000, which was the amount substantiated by the
petitioners.

The petitioner PSRI filed a motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the said motion.50 Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this
instant petition against the respondents, alleging that:

THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION.

II

THE APPELLATE COURT DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT51

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed; and (b) whether or not the deed of release
and quitclaim executed by respondent Navarra was valid.

Ordinarily, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.52 However, when the findings of the labor arbiter and the
NLRC are inconsistent, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to the
evidentiary facts.53 Considering that the CAs findings of fact clash with those of the NLRC, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the
case, as well as the submissions of the parties.54

Anent the first issue, the petitioner insists that the dismissal of the respondents was based on valid and legal grounds. Consequently, the award
of salaries for the unexpired portion of their respective contracts, and the refund of placement fee and airfare was barren of factual and legal
basis.

We rule that the respondents dismissal was not based on just, valid and legal grounds.

Preliminarily, it bears stressing that the respondents who filed complaints for illegal dismissal against the petitioner were overseas Filipino
workers whose employment contracts were approved by the Philippine and Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and were entered into
and perfected here in the Philippines. As such, the rule lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs. Therefore,
the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor, apply in this case.55

In order to effect a valid dismissal of an employee, the law requires that there be just and valid cause as provided in Article 28256 and that the
employee was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.57 Dismissal may also be based on any of the authorized causes
provided for in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code.58

The petitioner contends that the termination of respondent Paramios employment was sanctioned by paragraph 8.2, Nos. 5 and 6, Article VIII of
the employment contract. The aforesaid provisions are herein reproduced:

8.2 In the event the Employee is found offend (sic) one of the following prohibitions during his/her employment, Employer may terminate this
Employment contract and repatriate him/her to his/her country of origin. Employee shall comply immediately without objection and assume the
cost of round-trip transportation by air to and from R.O.C. unconditionally. In the event Employer or any other person pay the airfare for the
Employee, Employee shall reimburse the fare to the person who paid it.

(5) During the period of employment, being found out suffering HIV positive anti-body or other disease, heavily wounded or stool parasite, which
cannot be cured within one month.

(6) Being found losing ability to work.

The foregoing provision is akin to Article 284 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from
any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees:

Furthermore, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides, thus:

Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal - Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by
competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months with
proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask
the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal
health.

Applying the law and the rule, the employer is burdened to prove that the employee was suffering from a disease which prevented his continued
employment, or that the employees wound prevented his continued employment. Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code requires a certification from competent public authority59 that the employee was heavily wounded and had lost the ability to
work.

In the case at bar, the petitioner did not adduce in evidence a certification from a public authority to the effect that respondent Paramio had
been heavily wounded. It also failed to show that by reason of his thumb injury, he lost the ability to work. Respondent Paramio was not, for a
time, able to perform the backbreaking tasks required by his manager. However, despite his injury, he managed to perform the other tasks
assigned to him, including carrying of 30-kilogram containers with the exception of the work in the Lupo Department.60 The fact that respondent
Paramio was assigned to perform the second hardest and heaviest task in the company shows the heartlessness of the companys manager.
Despite his wound, the respondent tried to accomplish the work assigned to him. The least the manager should have done was to assign the
respondent to a lighter task, until such time that the latters wound had completely healed. It must be stressed where there is no showing of a
clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.61 Consequently,
respondent Paramio is entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less under paragraph
5, Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042.

Section 10. Money Claims

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.62

In Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira,63 we ruled that an overseas Filipino worker who is illegally terminated shall be entitled to his salary equivalent
to the unexpired portion of his employment contract if such contract is less than one year. However, if his contract is for a period of at least one
year, he is entitled to receive his salaries equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract, or three months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is lower.
In Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,64 involving Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8042, we held:

[W]e cannot subscribe to the view that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary loan only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly
reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when
the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired
term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving
effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part
or word thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have
used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

Respondent Paramio was deployed on December 6, 1996.65 His contract was for a period of twelve months or one year.66 He was repatriated
on September 23, 1997, approximately two months from the expiration of his contract.67 Since the termination of his employment was not based
on any valid or legal ground, he is entitled to the payment of his salary equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract. He is likewise entitled
to full reimbursement of his placement fee. Based on the record, respondent Paramio paid a placement fee of P19,000.68 Thus, he should be
reimbursed the amount of P19,000 with 12% interest per annum.

Similarly, the petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that respondent Navarras repatriation was based on a valid, legal and just cause. The
petitioner merely alleged that it was made clear to respondent Navarra that his repatriation was due to the fight he had with his supervisor.69
Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, respondent Navarra denied this in his affidavit, as well as in his reply to the position paper of the
petitioner. Respondent Navarra asserted that he merely enforced his rights under the employment contract when he requested, time and again,
that the provisions of his contract regarding the accommodation be fulfilled.70 The claim of petitioner that respondent Navarra shouted
invectives against his supervisor71 was, likewise, unsubstantiated. The petitioner did not even present an affidavit of the superior with whom the
respondent reportedly fought. Indeed, while fighting a supervisor may constitute serious misconduct72 and may, consequently, be considered a
ground for dismissal, in light of the petitioners failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove its claim that respondent Navarra fought his
supervisor, this ground cannot be used to justify the dismissal. Thus, the termination of respondent Navarras employment was without factual
and legal basis.

Respondent Navarra was deployed on November 6, 1996.73 He was repatriated on May 10, 1997, approximately five months prior to the
expiration of his one-year contract. Considering our ruling in Marsamman Manning Agency v. NLRC,74 he shall be entitled to an amount equivalent
to three months salary, or NT$46,080. Similarly, having admitted that he paid a placement fee of P19,00075 only, he is entitled to be fully
reimbursed therefore, plus 12% interest per annum.

As to the other respondents, the petitioner alleges that they refused to go to work and, in fact, voluntarily resigned. It appended the daily time
records76 of respondents Apolinario, Sarmiento, Ferdinand (Bautista) and Recto (Guillermo), as well as the resignation letters of Bautista and
Sarmiento,77 and Curameng, Jr.s written agreement with their employer.

We do not agree. The records reveal that the three respondents agreed to execute the foregoing because they could no longer bear the working
conditions in their place of employment. Despite protestations to their employer and the attempt to seek help from the OWWA in Taiwan, they
were victims to the following acts/omissions of their employer:

a). Irregular and deliberate charging of deductions which were not fully accounted such as the blankets issued, charging of penalties amounting
to 400 NT to all employees for a littering violation attributable only to one employee;

b). Mandatory imposition of overtime work exceeding 10 hours without just overtime compensation and night shift differentials;

c). Failure to comply with some stipulations stated in the Employment Contract particularly those relating to the accommodation and lodging of
the contracted workers;

d). Lack of observance of safety precautions at work area78 .

1. They dont give us day off.

2. They feed us once a day.

3. They even let us work without rest.

4. Their (sic) were so many deductions in our salaries like payment for our boarding house, electricity and garbage fee.

5. The money they were sending to the Philippines was also reduced with the amount ranging from P2000 to P5000.79

The petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to overcome the evidence of the respondents as contained in their respective affidavits.
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the said affidavits are not hearsay evidence. The respondents were the victims of the abuses of their employer;
as such, they had personal knowledge of the contents of their affidavits. Moreover, when there is a doubt between the evidence presented by
the employer and the employee, such doubt should be resolved in favor of labor.80

On the letters of resignation of respondents Sarmiento, Bautista and the agreement of Curameng, Jr., we agree with the ruminations of the
appellate court, viz:

It is not necessary that there be an express termination of ones services before a case of illegal dismissal can exist. In the landmark case of
Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (171 SCRA 164) the Supreme Court ruled that "a
constructive discharge is defined as: "A quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely." In the case at
bar, the petitioners were made to suffer unbearable conditions in the workplace and the inhuman treatment of their employer until they were
left with no choice but to quit. Thus, it cannot be said that the resignation and repatriation of complainants Curameng, Bautista, Sarmienta and
Guillermo was voluntary.

It was held in the case of Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87:

"It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing
of said complaint."

Indeed, unlike the Valdez case where there was no pronouncement of resignation on the part of the complainant, there were written resignations
submitted by the said petitioners in the case at bar. The more important consideration is whether such written resignations were made
voluntarily. Based on the foregoing circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant complaint for illegal dismissal indicates that the
resignations and repatriations of the petitioners were not done freely on their part. It is highly unlikely that these workers, after having invested
so much time, effort and money to secure their employment abroad would just quit even before the expiration of their contract.

We have more reason to rule that the repatriations of petitioners Paramio and Navarra were not voluntary.81

We thus rule that the respondents were constructively dismissed from their employment. There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment.82 It exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."83

We find it incredible that, after all the expenses and the trouble they went through in seeking greener pastures and financial upliftment, and the
concomitant tribulations of being separated from their families, the respondents would suddenly and without reason decide to resign, return
home and be jobless once again. The respondents had no choice but to agree to their employers demand to sign and execute the respective
agreements. They were stranded in a foreign land, with their remunerations considerably diminished by numerous illegal deductions. Their plight
was all the more made unbearable by the inhumane working conditions.

We note that the agreement signed by respondent Curameng, Jr. was mimeographed and prepared by his employer. Except for his handwritten
name, the words "Im go (sic) very verry (sic)" and his signature at the bottom of the document, the rest of the spaces to be filled up were all
blank. Most of the contents of the agreement were even in Chinese characters.

In sum, there can be no other conclusion than that the aforementioned respondents were illegally dismissed, and their employment contract
illegally terminated.

Under Section 10, paragraph 5 of Rep. Act No. 8042, respondents Sarmiento, Bautista, Curameng and Guillermo are entitled to the full
reimbursement of their placement fees. Since each of the respondents remitted only P19,000 to the petitioner, each of them is entitled to
P19,000, plus 12% interest per annum.

According to Section 10, paragraph 2 of Rep. Act No. 8042,84 the agency which deployed the employees whose employment contract were
adjudged illegally terminated, shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the principal for the money claims awarded to the aforesaid employees.
Consequently, the petitioner, as the agency of the respondents, is solidarily liable with its principal Kuan Yuan for the payment of the salaries due
to the respondents corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract, as well as the reimbursement of their placement fees.

Under Section 15 of the same Act, the repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility
of the agency which recruited or deployed the overseas contract worker. All the costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the agency concerned
and/or its principal.85 Consequently, the petitioner is obliged to refund P4,300 to each of the respondents, representing their airfare.

Anent the second issue, we rule that the deed of release executed by respondent Navarra did not completely release the petitioner from its
liability on the latters claim. As a rule, quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned upon as contrary
to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a workers legal rights.86 If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid,87 such quitclaims must
be struck down as invalid or illegal.

The records reveal that respondent Navarra executed a deed of release and waiver for and in consideration of only P49,000.88 There is no
evidence that he was informed that he was entitled to much more than the said amount, including a refund for the placement fee he paid to the
petitioner. Respondent Navarra started working on November 7, 1996. His employment contract was for a period of one year. He was repatriated
on May 10, 1997, or after a little over six months. The unexpired portion of his contract is, thus, five months and 27 days. Per Section 10, paragraph
5 of Rep. Act No. 8042, he is entitled to the payment of three months salary or NT$46,08089 and P19,000 placement fee, plus interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum. We, thus, agree with the ruling of the appellate court, viz.:

With regard to the deed of quitclaim and acceptance, it is a well-settled principle that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive
less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed
are ineffective to bar recovery for the full measure of the workers rights (Medina vs. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS)-DZWX, 222 SCRA
707). The reason why quitclaims are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and they are ineffective to bar claims for the full
measure of the workers legal rights is because the employer and employee do not stand on the same footing, such that quitclaims usually take
the form of contracts of adherence, not of choice. (Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories, Inc. vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 356). Assuming arguendo that the quitclaim
was executed voluntarily, still, it cannot diminish petitioners entitlement to the full compensation provided in their contract. At the most, such
amount can be considered an advance on his claim.90

In sum, we rule that the termination of the respondents respective contracts of employment was illegal. Pursuant to Section 10, paragraph 5,
Rep. Act No. 8042, each of them is entitled to the full reimbursement of the placement fee of P19,000, and interest at 12% per annum. Respondent
Navarra is, likewise, entitled to the payment of an amount equivalent to three (3) months salary. All the remaining respondents are entitled to
payment of their salaries, equivalent to three months.

Pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 8042, the petitioner should refund the amount of P4,300 to each of the respondents representing the
expenses they incurred for their repatriation.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54744 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The petitioner is ordered to pay the following:

(1) The amount of NT$46,080 or its peso equivalent to respondent Ronald Navarra minus the amount of P49,000 already advanced to him;

(2) To the respondents Romel Sarmiento, Recto Guillermo, Ferdinand Bautista, Apolinario Curameng, Jr. and Joseph Paramio, their respective
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their respective contracts;

(3) The amount of the placement fees as indicated in the respective official receipts issued to each of the respondents, with interest of 12% per
annum, in conformity with Section 10, paragraph 5 of Rep. Act No. 8042;

(4) To each of the respondents, the amount of P4,300 representing the expenses they incurred for their return to the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., no part.
PLACEWELL VS CAMOTE GR 169673
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the September 27, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77145, which set aside the November 20, 2002 Resolution[2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated
with modifications the May 31, 2002 Decision[3] of Labor Arbiter Arturo L. Gamolo.

The records show that on August 15, 1999, petitioner Placewell International Services Corporation (PISC) deployed respondent Ireneo B. Camote
to work as building carpenter for SAAD Trading and Contracting Co. (SAAD) at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for a contract duration of two
years, with a corresponding salary of US$370.00 per month.

At the job site, respondent was allegedly found incompetent by his foreign employer; thus the latter decided to terminate his services. However,
respondent pleaded for his retention and consented to accept a lower salary of SR 800.00 per month. Thus, SAAD retained respondent until his
return to the Philippines two years after.
On November 27, 2001, respondent filed a sworn Complaint[4] for monetary claims against petitioner alleging that when he arrived at the job
site, he and his fellow Filipino workers were required to sign another employment contract written in Arabic under the constraints of losing their
jobs if they refused; that for the entire duration of the new contract, he received only SR 590.00 per month; that he was not given his overtime
pay despite rendering nine hours of work everyday; that he and his co-workers sought assistance from the Philippine Embassy but they did not
succeed in pursuing their cause of action because of difficulties in communication.

On May 31, 2002, the labor arbiter rendered a decision holding that the modification of respondents employment contract is not allowed under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042);[5] thus, he should have received the original contracted salary of US$370.00 per month
instead of the new rate given by SAAD. It was also noted that respondent did not refute petitioners allegation regarding the non-payment of
placement and other processing fees prior to deployment. The labor arbiter also found that there is no differential as far as respondents overtime
pay is concerned considering that he was given overtime pay based on the new rate of SR 800.00. Since respondent rendered one hour of overtime
work per day for only 18 months, and not the entire 24 months as claimed, the total overtime pay he received is more or less equivalent to the
amount he ought to have received if the original contracted rate of US$370.00 was used. Finally, the labor arbiter awarded respondent attorneys
fees equivalent to 10% of the total judgment award for being compelled to hire a counsel to protect his rights and interests. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION
to pay complainant IRENEO B. CAMOTE the amount of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR ONLY
(P215,424.00) representing underpayment of wages and attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal by the petitioner, the NLRC set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is Vacated and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, a new judgment is rendered, dismissing the
above-entitled case for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals which set aside the Resolution of the NLRC, and
reinstated with modifications the Decision of the labor arbiter. The appellate court held that there was a diminution of respondents salary from
a rate of US$370.00 to SR 800.00 per month in clear violation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

As to the alleged incompetence of respondent, the appellate court noted that said allegation has not been substantiated hence should not be
given any credence. Thus, for failure of petitioner to show just cause for the demotion of respondent, the appellate court granted the petition,
set aside resolution dated November 24, 2000 of the NLRC, and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 31, 2002, the dispositive
portion of which follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated 24 November 2000 of the NLRC, Fifth Division is SET
ASIDE and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 May 2002 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with modifications. The exchange rate shall be that
prevailing at the time of actual payment. Private respondent, PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION is hereby ordered jointly and
severally liable to pay petitioner, IRENEO B. CAMOTE the following:

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner avers that respondent failed to substantiate the allegation that he was forced to enter into the new employment contract with SAAD
which proves that the new contract was actually voluntarily entered and agreed upon between said parties; that if respondent was indeed forced
to sign the new contract, his claims are now barred by laches because respondent never informed petitioner of any problem at the job site until
two years after his deployment; that the appellate courts award for unauthorized deductions in the amount of P171,780.00 should be deleted
for lack of legal or factual basis; that respondent is not entitled to attorneys fees.

R.A. No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker, of employment contracts already approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period
of the expiration of the same without the approval of the DOLE.[9] Thus, we held in Chavez v. Bonto-Perez[10] that the subsequently executed
side agreement of an overseas contract worker with her foreign employer which reduced her salary below the amount approved by the POEA is
void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement cannot supersede her standard employment
contract approved by the POEA.[11]

Applying the same rule in the case at bar, the unauthorized alteration in the employment contract of respondent, particularly the diminution in
his salary from US$370.00 to SR 800.00 per month, is void for violating the POEA-approved contract which set the minimum standards, terms,
and conditions of his employment.

Moreover, we find that there was no proper dismissal of respondent by SAAD; the termination of respondent was clearly a ploy to pressure him
to agree to a lower wage rate for continued employment. Thus, the original POEA-approved employment contract of respondent subsists despite
the so-called new agreement with SAAD. Consequently, the solidary liability of petitioner with SAAD for respondents money claims continues in
accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042.[12]

Petitioners contention that respondent is guilty of laches is without basis. Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of
laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what should have been done, but failed to do so. Conversely, if
the said party did not have the occasion to assert the right, then, he can not be adjudged guilty of laches. Laches is not concerned with the mere
lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute
laches.[13]

The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.[14]
In the instant case, respondent filed his claim within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of
the Labor Code from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus, we find that the doctrine of laches finds no application in this case.

The labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding attorneys fees to respondent. It is settled that in actions for recovery of wages
or where an employee was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interests, he is entitled to an award of attorneys fees.[15]
However, with regard to Unauthorized Deductions amounting to P171,780.00;[16] we note that the appellate court did not state any basis for its
award, thus, the same is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77145 dated September 27, 2005
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of P171,780 representing Unauthorized Deductions is DELETED for lack of basis.