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FEASIBILITY STUDY OF IEEE 802.15.

4 FOR AEROSPACE WIRELESS


SENSOR NETWORKS
Jianhua Liu, Ilteris Demirkiran, Thomas Yang, and Albert Helfrick
Electrical and Systems Engineering Department
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd., Daytona Beach, FL 32114

Abstract data not only used by the crews to improve aviation


safety but used for weather forecast as well1.
Wireless communications has been a reliable
data link means in many aerospace applications, With the increase of onboard sensors, sensor
including critical ones. The major concern for using wiring will become more critical, heavier, and more
wireless links for aerospace sensors is the feasibility costly to install and maintain.
of their in the aerospace setting; i.e., whether wireless
Wireless communications have been
links will negatively affect the overall reliability and
successfully used in many applications, including
safety of the aircrafts. In a previous paper, we studied
critical applications. Adopting wireless
the feasibility issue and concluded that with
communications to link aerospace sensors can be a
appropriate choice of wireless communication
promising solution to some of the wiring problems
schemes and parameters, the wireless links can have
plaguing the aerospace industry. For example, we can
reasonable immunity to interferences, low
improve the overall safety of aircraft via reducing
interference to other on-board wireless systems, and
wiring problems [4], increase payload capacity via
good security performance. In this paper, we consider
lowering the wiring and wiring harness weight [5],
the feasibility of adapting an existing technology,
ease the design of aircraft structures for running
IEEE 802.15.4, to implement the wireless links for
wiring (especially when retrofitting the sensors), and
aerospace sensors, with focuses on immunity to
lower the sensors’ installation, maintenance, and
interferences and data security. We conclude that a
recertification cost [6].
wireless network based on IEEE 802.15.4-compatible
devices is appropriate for non-critical aerospace The system including the aerospace sensors,
applications, at least from building a demo system’s wireless links, and the network control devices is
point of view. referred to as the aerospace wireless sensor network
(AWSN). An AWSN, as illustrated in Figure 1, is
consisted of a DPC (Data Processing Center), a few
Introduction APs (Access Points), and a number of AWSs
With the advance of new technologies, more and (Aerospace Wireless Sensors). The links between the
more sensors will be employed in various aircrafts to DPC and the APs can be wired or wireless, and the
improve the safety, capacity, efficiency, and links between an AP and its AWSs will be wireless.
environmental friendliness of air transportation. For In the event of malfunctioning of an AP, its AWSs
example, sensors can be used for aircraft health can be handled by an adjacent AP.
monitoring [1], which monitors the conditions of the
engines, structures, gear boxes, etc.
Sensors can also be employed to perform other
functions. For instance, MDCRS (Meteorological
Data Collection and Reporting System) from ARINC 1
The sensors can be used to sense various weather data,
[2] and TAMDAR (Tropospheric Airborne including temperature, pressure, wind aloft, relative humidity,
Meteorological Data Reporting) from AirDat [3] icing, and turbulence. The TAMDAR sensors are located in one
box and are majorly designed to be used on planes belong to
have been installed on aircrafts to collect weather
regional airlines or GA airplanes. An opening is required on the
plane to host TAMDAR. If the whole box can be replaced by
several distributed smaller sensors performing respective
functions, connected by wireless links, the installation can be
easier to accommodate.

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(c) Interference between wireless links for
different sensors in an AWSN. Due to the
potential large number of sensors in an
AWSN, access of wireless channels by
multiple sensors may cause interference to
DPC each other. This interference should be
very low so as not to affect the
communication links.
(d) Low detectability by unintended parties.
The signals from AWSNs should be very
difficult to intercept and demodulate,
AP preferably with the signal level below the
background noise. This will protect the
AWS
wireless communications from the
attempts of eavesdropping.
(e) High data security. The information
content transmitted by AWSNs should be
encrypted so that even if the
communication is intercepted and
Figure 1. Illustration of an AWSN Consisting of a demodulated, it is hardly possible for the
DPC (Data Processing Center), Four APs (Access eavesdropper to break the encryption code
Points), and Twelve AWSs (Aerospace Wireless to retrieve the information content. The
Sensors) AWSN should also be protected from
A major concern about applying AWSNs is the spoofers.
feasibility of their wireless links. There are a few In [7], we have tried to address the first four of
important issues/requirements regarding the the above five issues by carefully considering the
feasibility of the wireless links, as detailed by the communication schemes for the wireless links.
authors in [7] and summarized below for Specifically, we have proposed to structure the
completeness of this paper: wireless sensors in clusters (as shown in Figure 1),
(a) Immunity to interferences. Due to the with each cluster having an AP; we have considered
'open' nature of wireless communications, the direct-sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS) scheme
the AWSNs may be exposed to various for wireless links; we have suggested to use the 2.4
interferences. This requires that the GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio
employed wireless links should band for the wireless links before dedicated
demonstrate satisfying performance of frequency bands can be allocated (in particular, we
immunity to moderate interferences. (As have proposed to use the gaps between two adjacent
indicated in [7], for those cases where Wi-Fi channels for the DSSS signals). With these
there may be strong interferences or even considerations, we have illustrated that the above first
jamming signals, such as in military four issues of wireless links can be appropriately
applications, AWSNs may not be handled.
appropriate.) Designing proprietary wireless links for AWSNs
(b) Interference to other on-board wireless can be costly, which can significantly discourage the
systems. There are many existing on-board adoption of AWSNs even if their applications can be
wireless systems in modern aircrafts, approved by FAA. Instead of doing that, adapting a
including both critical and non-essential successful existing technology to build the wireless
wireless systems. The wireless links links is more appropriate; there will be a vast amount
employed by the AWSNs should not cause of support readily available in both hardware and
noticeable interference to these existing software. Wireless personal area networks (WPANs)
on-board wireless systems. conforming to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [8], which

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was designed to target low data-rate and short (6) The radiation power level from the
distance networks with long battery life, can be a transmitters is very low, which can leads to
good choice among the existing technologies. the following advantages: (i) reduced
interferences to other on-board wireless
The OSI (Open System Interconnection) model
systems, (ii) reduced possibilities of
defines a networking framework in seven layers to
interceptions by unintended parties, and
simplify the implementation of the networking
(iii) prolonged battery life.
protocols. The seven layers, from layer 1 to 7, are
PHYsical (PHY), Data Link or Media Access Control IEEE 802.15.4 does not describe the other OSI
(MAC), NetWorK (NWK), Transport, Session, layers, which are described by other standards such
Presentation, and APpLication (APL) layers, as ZigBee [10] and 6lowpan [11]. It is beneficial to
respectively. At the data source side, control is separate the lower two layers, PHY and MAC, from
passed from one layer to the next, starting at the APL the higher layers---the lower two layers can be
layer proceeding down to the PYH layer that talks implemented using hardware with a single-chip
directly to the transmitting device which transmits the integrated circuit (IC)2 and the higher layers can be
data over the channel to the data sink side. At the implemented using software tailored to the
data sink side, the control is passed from one layer to applications. For example, we can base our higher
the next again in the opposite direction, starting from layers on ZigBee and add a few more functions as
the PYH layer to the APL layer. detailed later.
IEEE 802.15.4 describes the protocols of the In this paper, a continuing work of [7], we study
PHY and MAC layers as well as the requirements for the feasibility of IEEE 802.15.4 as the wireless link
radio frequency (RF) transceivers. It has the for AWSNs. Specifically, we study the above
following characteristics that are appealing for mentioned issues (a) through (e) in detail with respect
AWSN applications: to the IEEE 802.15.4-compatible devices. Our study
shows that an AWSN based on IEEE 802.15.4-
(1) It is DSSS-based and thus has a certain
compatible devices and adequate encryption and
level of immunity to interferences.
authentication at the high layers is appropriate for
(2) It uses CSMA-CA (Carrier Sense non-critical aircraft applications, at least from
Multiple Access with Collision building a demo system’s point of view.
Avoidance) to accommodate multiple
The remainder of the paper is organized as
transceivers on the same frequency
follows. First, we provide reasons for choosing IEEE
channel.
80215.4 as the underlying technology for the wireless
(3) It works in many ISM bands, including links via excluding a few competing existing
the 2.4 GHz band. It has 16 channels in technologies. Then, we consider the feasibility of
this band and can coexist with Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 in detail in terms of the above (a) to
Bluetooth [9], i.e., it has adequate (e) issues, with focuses on immunity to interferences
immunity to interferences from Wi-Fi via and data security. We also discuss the necessary new
selecting appropriate channels and can functions an AWSN should have to address the
inform Bluetooth of its channel usage so as interference problem. Finally, we draw the
to let Bluetooth avoid the channel in use. conclusions of this paper.
(4) It provides data rates high enough for the
AWSN applications, but low enough to
avoid many complexities.
(5) The effective distance between an RF
transmitter and an RF receiver is from 10 2
There are currently many low cost 2.4 GHz RF ICs conforming
m to 100 m, depending on the power level to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard on the market, such as Microchip’s
and media, which is in the level of what is MRF24J40. There are also some 2.4 GHz RF modules containing
required by AWSNs. the RF ICs and corresponding devices, including antenna; these
modules can be easily connected to the microcontrollers via a
simple interface.

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Choosing IEEE 802.15.4 over Other frequency bands, such as the 2.4 GHz ISM band (2.4
to 2.4835 GHz) or operate the devices as UWB (Ultra
Existing Technologies Wide Band) [12] which has a certain spectrum mask.
In this section, we consider the problem of
choosing the underlying technology for the wireless For short range wireless links in the 2.4 GHz
links for AWSNs among the existing technologies. frequency band, there are four choices from existing
technologies with good market support, as listed in
Due to the lack of specified frequency band for Table 1.
AWSN, we can only consider the unlicensed

Table 1. Comparison of Existing Technologies for Wireless Links for AWSNs


IEEE Nick name Date rate Typical Modulation Number of channels Packet
standard or related coverage in the 2.4 GHz ISM length
standard range band
IEEE ZigBee 20 to 250 10 to 100 DSSS 16 (nonoverlapping) Short
802.15.4 Kbps m
IEEE Bluetooth 1 to 3 2 to 10 m FHSS 1 (composed of 79 Long
802.15.1 Mbps overlapping frequency
hopping channels)
IEEE Wi-Fi 1 to 11 30 to 100 DSSS 14 overlapping and 3 Long
802.11b Mbps m nonoverlapping
IEEE Wi-Fi 6 to 54 30 to 100 OFDM Same as above Long
802.11g Mbps m

IEEE 802.11b [13] and IEEE 802.11g [13] can • The effective coverage range is too short
be readily removed from the list of candidates due to provide reliable wireless links for
to the following reasons: some AWSN applications.
• In [7], we have shown that DSSS (Direct • The nature of long packet can lead to
Sequence Spread Spectrum) or FHSS significant overhead when transmitting
(Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum) is sensor data which are usually only a few
needed to address the interference bytes long.
concerns; IEEE 802.11g is based on • When the number of the wireless links
OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division increases, the links can be jammed due to
Multiplex), which is effective to combat the use of FHSS.
multipath channel but vulnerable to UWB, which is not listed in Table 1, is also a
interferences. candidate. Instead of working in a limited frequency
• IEEE 802.11b, which is based on DSSS, band, such as the 2.4 GHz ISM band, it works on a
has a certain level of immunity to very wide frequency band with the spectrum
interferences. Yet, due to the popularity density being very low such that its effect to
of wireless Internet access, the channels existing equipment, which normally uses a limited
for IEEE 802.11b are very congested. bandwidth, can be ignored. UWB can have a superb
IEEE 802.15.1 [14] can also be readily capability of interference suppression, which is
removed from the consideration due to the desired for the some applications of AWSNs, for
following reasons: example, the military applications. Yet, we do not
want to consider UWB here due to the following
reasons:

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• The standardization process is not sources of interferences, such as other types of
complete. Although it is approved by wireless networks; the immunity to these
ECMA (European Computer interferences will be considered here.
Manufacturers Association) [12], it is yet In the aerospace setting, there can be two more
to be approved by IEEE. types of wireless networks using the same 2.4 GHz
• Market support is poor compared to ISM band as the IEEE 802.15.4-based AWSNs:
those technologies listed in Table 1.
• IEEE 802.11b/g (Wi-Fi) for wireless
• Although it does not affect the on-board Internet access. Wi-Fi signals can come
existing equipment much, the from two different sources. When the
interference still remains as a concern. aircraft is parked close to an airport
Considering the above analysis, we choose terminal, the Wi-Fi signals from the
IEEE 802.15.4 as the basis for the wireless links for terminal can propagate to the AWSNs.
AWSNs. The passengers’ wireless access to
With IEEE 802.15.4 being the underlying Internet on the passenger aircrafts can
technology for the wireless links, the AWSN bring stronger Wi-Fi signals to the
devices and the IEEE 802.15.4 devices have the AWSNs.
following correspondence: DPC to PAN (Personal • IEEE 802.15.1 (Bluetooth). When
Area Network) Coordinator; AP to Coordinator; personal electronic devices are allowed
and AWS to Device. In the sequel, we will use the on the passenger aircarfts, many
two sets of nomenclature interchangeably. passenger-owned devices with Bluetooth
will emit Bluetooth signals.
IEEE 802.15.4’s immunity to interferences can
Feasibility of IEEE 802.15.4 be considered in terms of the following three
In the previous section, we have excluded a aspects: (1) collaborative coexistence with other
few existing competing technologies for the types of wireless networks working in the 2.4 GHz
wireless links for AWSNs. However, this does not ISM band, (2) noncollaborative coexistence with
automatically justify IEEE 802.15.4 as a feasible other types of wireless networks in the 2.4 GHz
technology for AWSNs. In this section, we study ISM band, and (3) ability to suppressing other in-
the feasibility of IEEE 802.15.4 in detail. channel interferences.
Specifically, we discuss IEEE 802.15.4 in depth
with regard to the above-mentioned issues (a) Collaborative Coexistence with Other Types of
through (e) to evaluate the feasibility. When Wireless Networks
functions of higher layers of AWSN are needed, we Coexistence of different types of wireless
will borrow them from ZigBee if they exist; networks is defined as the ability to operate all of
otherwise, we will indicate them as necessary new them effectively in the vicinity of each other in the
functions for AWSNs. same frequency band [8, 15].
When these different types of wireless
Immunity to Interferences networks can share the same frequency band using
TDM (Time-Division Multiplexing) with the help
When the aircrafts are parked closed to each
of communications, they are said to be able to
other, transceivers of an AWSN on one airplane can
coexist collaboratively. This is only achievable if all
receive signals from transceivers of other AWSNs
the parties can be connected via reliable
on close-by aircrafts. Due to the short effective
communications and can control the channel access
distances of the IEEE 802.15.4 devices, those
time.
signals are usually very weak and can be ignored. If
not, the DPC of an AWSN can determine an Both IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11b/g can
unoccupied channel and inform the sensors to operate in the beacon-enabled mode, where the
switch to that channel to avoid the interference from coordinators or the routers assign scheduled
AWSNs on other aircrafts. Yet, there can be other transmission time slots to different devices in the

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network. When the DPC of an AWSN is also coexist collaboratively; yet, they may coexist non-
equipped with the functionality of the IEEE collaboratively, in which case the two networks can
802.11b/g router and is connected to the same use different frequency channels.
network as the on-board IEEE 802.11b/g routers
IEEE 802.15.4 has 16 channels in the 2.4 GHz
via this router, the AWSN and the IEEE 802.11b/g
ISM band. Each channel has a bandwidth of 2
can collaboratively coexist via coordinating the
MHz, and the channel center frequencies start at
transmission time slots of both networks.
2.405 GHz and end at 2.480 GHz with the channel
Non-Collaborative Coexistence with Other spacing being 5 MHz.
Types of Wireless Networks
IEEE 802.11b/g has 3 non-overlapping
Sometimes, the above-mentioned reliable
channels in the 2.4 GHz ISM band, as shown in
communications is impractical or impossible to
Figure 2. In the US and Canada, Channels 1, 6, and
establish. For example, the communications
11 will be the best choices of the non-overlapping
between the IEEE 802.11b/g routers located in the
channels; in Europe, Channels 1, 7, and 13 will be
airport terminals and the DPCs on the airplanes is
the best choices. Either way, we can see that there
impractical to establish---if this is done, it will
are enough gaps between these channels, which can
greatly reduce the speed of Internet access due to
be used by AWSNs. The preferred channels for
reduced access time. Bluetooth is considered to be
IEEE 802.15.4 can be programmed in the devices,
infrastructure-free, and the communications
and the PAN Coordinator can inform the other
between Bluetooth and IEEE 802.15.4 is not
devices in the network to change to suitable
possible.
channels if needed.
When the communications between two
networks does not exist, the two networks cannot

Figure 2. Illustration of the IEEE 802.11b/g Channels (Reproduced from [16] with Permission Granted
by the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 License)

Bluetooth has 79 frequency hopping channels in Dealing with Other Interferences


the 2.4 GHz ISM band. Each channel has a In the presence of other interferences (those that
bandwidth of 1 MHz, and the channel center are different from IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.11b/g,
frequencies starts at 2.402 GHz and ends at 2.480 and IEEE 802.15.1), the AWSN first tries to find a
GHz with channel spacing being 1 MHz. Bluetooth channel with the least energy of interferences. On this
hops on these channels to avoid interferences; the channel, the DSSS modulation of IEEE 802.15.4 can
maximum hop rate is 1600 hops per second. When help battling the very moderate interferences if they
IEEE 802.15.4 use beacon-enabled mode, the PAN still exist.
Coordinator transmits the beacon frames regularly.
For IEEE 802.15.4 devices working in the 2.4
Bluetooth can sense the occupation---by IEEE
GHz ISM band, DSSS is implemented by first
802.15.4 and/or IEEE 802.11b/g---of the channels
mapping every 4 data bits into 32 transmitting bits
and avoid using the occupied channels when
and then modulating the transmitting bits using O-
performing frequency hopping.
QPSK (Offset Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying). O-

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QPSK has the same Null-to-Null bandwidth as BPSK determine the type of modulation in each
(Binary Phase-Shift Keying) but has much lower class, for example, AM, FM, or SSB for
emission energy outside that bandwidth thanks to the analog modulation or BPSK, QPSK, O-
limited phase change. The effect is that the QPSK, etc, for digital modulation; (3)
processing gain of DSSS is 32/4 = 8, or 9 dB, which estimate the parameters of modulations,
can be used to combat moderate interferences. such as the symbol rate. The results of
signal classification can be used to
Note that this DSSS does not provide the
determine if the interferences are
CDMA (Code-Division Multiple Address) capability,
removable or not.
and an IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver usually uses
CSMA-CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 2. Localization. If the interferences use the
Collision Avoidance) for channel access, where the IEEE 802.15.4-like signal modulation, the
signature of IEEE 802.15.4 modulation is detected. If DPC will coordinate with the APs to
the interference uses a similar modulation as IEEE determine the location of the signals. The
802.15.4, a transceiver using the CSMA-CA mode algorithms used to track the in-network
will not be able to access the channel to transmit data devices of ZigBee can be easily modified
since it deems the channel is occupied. Once again, to perform this task. If the interferences
we can use the beacon-enabled mode to force the have different modulation signature than
transmission of data at guaranteed time slots; the the IEEE 802.15.4 signals, TDOA (Time
moderate interferences, be it like IEEE 802.15.4 or Difference of Arrival)-based locations
not in modulation, will be suppressed at the receiver algorithms can be used to locate the
with the help of the despreading code. positions of the interferences.
Additional information about the interferences,
such as type of signals or positions of the signal Interference to Existing Wireless Systems
emitter, can help battle the interferences better; to IEEE 802.15.4 devices will have no noticeable
obtain this info, we need a few new functions of interference to existing on-board wireless systems
AWSN that are not provided by IEEE 802.15.4 due to the following reasons.
and/or ZigBee. These new functions will be
discussed below. • The emission power of IEEE 802.15.4 is
very low inside each 2 MHz channel:
Necessary New Functions of AWSNs usually from -30 dBm to 0 dBm. It is even
For an IEEE 802.15.4 device in a ZigBee much lower outside the channel.
network, its location with respect to the known Compared to Wi-Fi signals in the ISB
locations of the IEEE 802.15.4 coordinators (AWSN band, the IEEE 802.15.4 signals are
APs) can be determined with the help of these extremely low.
coordinators by measuring such parameters as RSS
(Received Signal Strength) or TOA (Time of • The on-board existing wireless systems
Arrival). This function can be used to track the have strict EMC (electromagnetic
positions of interested transceivers. compatibility) requirements in terms of
immunity to ISM band signals, such as
If the information about signal types and Wi-Fi signals.
positions of emitting source of the interferences is
known, it can greatly facilitate the ability of battling Interference Between AWSN Links
(including removing) the interferences. This
necessitates the following new functions of AWSNs: There will be no interference between AWSN
wireless links. As we mentioned earlier, the AWSN
1. Signal classification. The DPC needs to be uses beacon-enabled mode. In this mode, each
able to perform the following signal wireless sensor has a guaranteed time slot for data
classification related tasks: (1) classify the transmission. The beacon-enabled mode still allows
modulation into one of the following data transmission by means of CSMA-CA at certain
classes— analog modulation, digital intervals if extra data transmission is needed.
modulation, or noise-type signals; (2)

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Detectability by Unintended Parties 2128 ≈ 3.4 × 10 38
We consider the detectability [17] in two aspects possible keys; it is computationally impossible to try
related to eavesdropping. The first is the detectability each of these possible keys to decipher the data by an
of the existence of communication signals; and the intruder.
second is the detectability of the modulated symbols
contained in the communication signals, sometime There are two types of keys for ZigBee/IEEE
also referred to as demodulation. The second is based 802.15.4 cryptography. A link key is shared between
on the first since a receiver can proceed to detect the two devices and can be used when doing point-to-
modulated symbols only after detecting the existence point communications. A network key is shared
of the signals. among the entire network and is used when
broadcasting a message in the entire network. Each
Due to the low processing gain of DSSS used in network has a trust center that distributes the link and
IEEE 802.15.4, its signals can be distinguished from network keys.
the noise easily by nearby eavesdroppers. Due to the
publicity of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, when the There are three ways for a new device joining
signals’ existence is detected, they can be the network to obtain a link key:
demodulated. • Pre-installation. The key is coded in the
By adjusting the transmission power, we can devices by the manufacture or installer.
ensure that the wireless sensors use the lowest levels • Key transport. The key is transmitted to
of power while maintaining reliable wireless links. In the device with the help of a transport key,
this case, when the eavesdropper is a hundred meters which is preinstalled.
away, it will not be able to detect the existence of the
• Key establishment. The key is created
signals.
randomly in two devices using a algorithm
Fortunately, even if the signals can be and a master key known to both parties.
demodulated, the data itself is still secure due to the All the above three ways of obtaining a link is
security measures discussed below. very secure. For a demo system, we suggest to use
the key pre-installation method to provide the link
Data Security key since it is usually the most secure way for
providing the link key and the size of the network of
Data security is always a big concern for
the demo system is relatively small, which allows
wireless networks, especially for AWSN [18]. Data
easily key pre-installation.
security is addressed in the ZigBee and IEEE
802.15.4 standards in two different aspects, In the event that a device is captured, the
encryption and authentication. sensitive information, including the security keys,
can be read if the device is not tamper resistant. A
Encryption
tamper-resistant device can erase the sensitive
To keep the data confidential, encryption and
information if tampering is detected. We recommend
decryption are used at the transmitting and receiving
that the AWSN should use the tamper-resistant
ends of a wireless link, respectively; the practice is
devices whenever the capture of the devices is
referred to as cryptography. The ZigBee and IEEE
possible.
802.15.4 standards support the use of ASE
(Advanced Encryption Standard) [19, 20] for Authentication
cryptography. At the transmitter, the unencrypted To protect the data link from spoofers or errors,
data, called plaintext, in blocks of 128 bits are ZigBee supports two types of authentication: device
encrypted with a 128-bit key to produce the authentication and data authentication.
encrypted data, called ciphertext. At the receiver, the
Device authentication is used to confirm that a
same key is used to decipher the data. This is called
new device sending an association request asking to
the symmetric key cryptography, and the algorithm is
join the network is authentic. ZigBee supports device
called a 128-bit block cipher. With a 128-bit block
authentications in two modes: the residential mode
cipher, there are
and the commercial mode, with the latter being

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securer than the former. We recommend the use of and (e) where we have shown that AWSN has
the commercial mode for AWSNs. adequate immunity to interferences in the 2.4 GHz
ISM band and the data is very secure. We have also
The ‘key’ part of device authentication is
suggested new functions to further facility combating
producing the link key; with the link key, the network
interferences. The biggest advantage of using IEEE
key can be transmitted to the new device with the
802.15.4 is the vast selection of transceivers and a
help of the link key. For a spoofer, it does not have
demo system can be built with relatively low cost.
the link key and thus cannot obtain the network key
and hence cannot join the network. Note that the idea of using wireless links to
replace wired links can also be used in other
Data authentication is used to verify if the
aerospace applications. For example, the wired
received data, transmitted in the units of frames, has
switches of the aircraft lights can be replaced by
been altered. Data authentication is achieved by
wireless switches via the same wireless
accompanying each frame with a specific code
communication and networking technologies, though
known as the MIC (Message Integrity Code). The
they cannot be called a sensor network.
ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 standards support 32-bit,
64-bit, and 128-bit options for MIC.
The MIC is generated by a method known to References
both the transmitter and the receiver. At the receiver, [1] W. Staszewski, C. Boller, and G. R. Tomlinson,
a generated MIC is compared to the received MIC Health Monitoring of Aerospace Structures: Smart
generated at the transmitter. If they are not equal, it Sensor Technologies and Signal Processing, Wiley,
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