Mark Felt Deep Throat FBI Files PDF

MARK FELT
WATERGATE DEEP THROAT
FBI FILES
PRESIDENT NIXON AUDIO RECORDINGS
BACM RESEARCH
HTTP://WWW.PAPERLESSARCHIVES.COM
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
s TO
Memorandum
THE ACTING DIRECTOR DATE: 6-19-72
W. M. FELT,
SUBJECT: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, J R . ,

AND OTHERS
BURQLARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
JUNE 17', 1972
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
On 6-19-72 after briefing you concerning developments in

this case, I conferred with the Attorney General at 2:00 p.m.
The Attorney General agreed with your suggestion that there
should be an aggressive investigative approach to this case. He suggested
that dissemination be deferred until the facts have been rounded out. He
agreed that a sweep of Democratic National Committee headquarters was
a logical investigative step but he suggested that in view of the sensitive
nature of this case you might want to personally contact Democratic
Chairman O'Brien to suggest this.
RECOMMENDATION:
None. For information.
ST-11I
1 - Mr. Bates REC-28
/3f-
v " <
*' %':*-, '
tm ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

54FEB 281973 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
K '-
Mr.
Mr. Mob
Mr. Re
J
* June 21, 1972 Mr^
Mr. Bishog
Mr. Callahan
\ TO THE DIRECTOR:
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Casper
RE: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR Mr. Cleveland
AND OTHERS, BURGLARY OF Mr. Conrad
DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATION- Mr. Dalbey _
AL HEADQUARTERS, 6-17-72 Mr. Marshall
INTERCEPTION OF Mr. Miller, E.S. _
COMMUNICATIONS Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars .
Mr. Walters
In view of the headlines in the Tele. Room
'News" to the effect that the burglars Mr. Kinley
were removing equipment instead of Mr. Armstrong
putting it in, I feel we should move Ms. Herwig
immediately on our sweep (this Mr3. Neenan
afternoon) before somebody else
gets the idea and has it done privately
thereby complicating the evidence
picture. ^ --.
Please call me if you approve
and I will institute the necessary action.
W. MARK FELT
v
WMF:crt
k
/'-v
S JUL 181972 -
* ;
4 1 * 11 MO O > \ ; '
Memorandum C*BJ>h*l1
TO : Mr. Felt DATE: June 22, 1972 Conn4
I - Mr. Bates HanKall

Kiltw.E-9
FROM : C. W. Bates 1 - Mr. Bola PosiWr
SOTU*
Waiter*
SUBJECT: JAMES W. McCORD, JR. , AND OTHERS i.'

BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 6/17/72 % ' :
At 9:30 a. m. this date, SAC Kunkel and I had a conference

with Mr. Gray concerning this case. He was brought up to date on the
latest developments. 14
At 10:25 a. m . , Mr. Gray called me and authorized the following: 1/
We are to make an offer to conduct an electronic sweep of the
.Democratic National Committee Headquarters, the Office of the Democratic
v
V Credentials Committee, the Republican Party Headquarters. These offers
are to be made to Mr. Lawrence O'Brien, Chairman of the National
e sDemocratic Party Committee, and to Mr. John Mitchell of the Republican
Party Committee to Re-elect the President, and to Senator Dole, the
Chairman of the Republican National Committee. l(
Mr. Gray also authorized contact with Mr. John Dean of the
White House to discuss with him an interview with Mr. Charles Colson
c7 :ca for any information regarding this matter. We are also to discuss
^
with Mr. Dean the obtaining of telephone toll records involving Hunt
from the White House. l-4
I told Mr. Gray this would be done immediately and have so

instructed SAC Kunkel of WFO. ij
t
CWB:i
6-^
54JUL191972
UNITE I") STATUS GO\ tRNMKNT Mo Sir ... .
Memorandum Bish-p _
TO DATE. June 22, 1972
FROM C. W. Bates Punier
Tele
SL BJECT : JAMES W. McCORD, J R . , AND OTHERS Mr S
BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY Mi. rler*
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 6/17/72

CLA:S.
-2.
EATE C? REVII
^ At 4:00 p. m. on 6/21/72, Mr. Felt, SAC Kunkel of WFO and I

*$ met with Mr. Gray on this case. We brought him up to date on all aspects.
^ ft was agreed that this was most important,that the FBI's reputation was at
N 2 s t a k e , and that the investigation should be completely impartial, thorough
CO
to ^ and complete. Several points were discussed and these have already been
:^(^3furnished to the field for handling, such as reinterview with McCuin to
the Secret Service official, further details regarding the S100 bills.
In answer to our question, Mr. Gray instructed as follows:

up any dissemination of this information to Department or White
House. Hold up electronic sweep. Hold any interviews of White House
personnel.
SAC Kunkel broached the theory that this was in furtherance I

of the White House efforts to locate and identify "leaks." It was admitted
this was a theory. Mr. Gray said we should, of course, consider this y<
but not let it influence our complete investigation. I assured him the \
investigation was going full speed and that I would keep him briefed on V
any developments.
c
At Mr. Gray's request, SAC Kunkel and I met with him at
9:30 a. m. , 6/22/72. He was brought up to date on developments over-
night and was informed that all points he raised yesterday were being
t t- 7?. thoroughly explored. At this meeting he again instructed that the
dissemination be held up and that the electronic sweeps be held. I told
him that both the CIA and the Metropolitan Police had inquired of WTO
about briefings in this matter and that I.feltwe should brief no one. He
agreed. r ^ ' iv -- .
CWB-.ige
(1) . ^ * CONTINUED - OVER
17 VAY 3 0 19:3
CONHtfifoL i
Memorandum to Mr. Bolz * t
Re: JAMES W. McCORD, JR. , AND OTHERS -\,l
P
At 10:25 a. m. , Mr. Gray called me and authorized our %*
making an offer to the Democratic National Committee, the Credentials ^
Committee, and the Republican National Committee for electronic sweep
of their facilities. He also authorized a contact with Mr. John Dean of^__
the White House regarding interviews and information needed there.
This is being immediately handled by WFO.
-<
While on the phone with him, I advised him of a new development:

Subject Barker had tried to cash a cashier's check with the Republic National '..
Bank, Miami, on 4/24/72. This check was drawn on the Boca Raton Bank ""*
and was for $25,000. The Republic Bank checked with the Boca Raton Bank %
and they were advised the check was good and had been obtained by v;
Mr. Kenneth Harry Dahlberg. Our files show Dahlberg was investigated
at the request of the White House in December, 1969. He is an industrialist ^
from Minnesota, is a millionaire, and has been active in the Republican Party
in the Midwest for a number of years. The White House records disclosed
he was not presently connected with the White House. ~'f
I talked to Mr. Gray again at 5 p. m. on 6/22/72 after his return ^

to the office. I again went over the latest developments. t?
At 3:15 pm on 6/23/72 Mr. Gray called me. He said he had .

just talked to the Deputy Director of CIA in his office and he briefed me in M
detail regarding the conversation. I again told him I felt the FBI had no -
choice but to continue our full investigation and obtain all the details.
He agreed.
At 6:00 ixin. on 6/23/72 Mr. Gray called me. He said he had just
talked with Sand^Siiiitb, a reporter forJTIME_magazine. Smith told him that
TIME had adverse information affecting Mr. Gray but not affecting the FBI;
that Gray had refused to permit Agents to check Colson's telephone toll calls
and to interview him and that Gray had instructed this investigation be wrapped
up in 24-48 hours, the inferrence being it would be a whitewash by the FBI
on Gray's instructions. Mr. Gray told me he told Smith that the question had
not arisen regarding Colson's toll calls; that we had checked with Colson to
get toll calls made by Hunt; that he had not instructed the case be wrapped up
in 48 hours but had instructed that it receive immediate priority attention
and that he had indicated he had held up the electronic sweep of the Democratic
and Republican headquarters until he had all necessary facts and that the
sweep had now been ordered. Mr. Gray instructed that I have all Agents in
-2-
(
>
Mofno to Mr, Bolz

Re: JAMKSW. MeCORD, J r . , et al /* .
WtO who had worked on this case in his office at II a.m. 6/24/72 (Saturday).
I so instructed Supervisor John Ruhl of WFO and later passed those instruttlons-
on to SAC Kunfcel. -; ^ ,i . ' '
On Saturday morning, 6/24/72^ at 8:58 a. m".\ Sandy Smith called
for me. I was away from my office and he asked that Icall him at area 1
code 301 757-4835. I contacted Mr. Gray at home and told him if he had no
objection I would call Smith back and see what he wanted. At 10:16 a. m. 6/24/72
I called Sandy Smith. He told me he was working as a reporter for TIME
magazine and that his present assignment was to dig into the burglary at
Democratic National Headquarters. He commented that the editors of TIME
and some reporters do not like the FBI. He said he was not one of these. , t.
His editors have received information in this case about Mr. Gray's perfor-
mance. The source Is Democratic and probably a member of Larry O'Brien's
staff. The Information TIME has Is as follows; - - ^Wi ^ -
Mr. Gray met with Mr. Mitchell last weekend in California \ '
and d i s c u s s e d this c a s e . .-> *-'-î^-V^/..,: *_. ,* '
(2) Mr. Gray told Agents to wrap this case up in 24 hours. .v^ "
(3) Mr. Gray prevented Agents from checking Colson's phone calls.
Smith said his editors wanted him to check this out and they wanted
to quote someone in the magazine. Smith then related his telephone call to ,
Mr, Gray and Mr. Gray's answers to the above: C i .. V
;
.T --, . ., - - ^ - . > T t'V"*" * T S P ' " ; - .*- -^" " -/ > " 4 " - - < : ' " ' ^ V * -. i *% ^ >
No. Both were In California but they did not meet, - " '*'
(2) He did not instruct that the case be wrapped up In 48 hours
5',. but did hold up the sweep until we could get all of our ducks , -i-t
in a row. This has now been authorized.
The question of Colson's telephone calls never came up - we lJV,
>,.'
were checking out Hunt, This has been done and no records 'f
are maintained at the White House as to Hunt*s calls. _
Smith said he gave all of this to his editors In New York; that TIME \
called him back and wanted him to find out why Colson*s calls were not checked.^.'
He called Mr. Gray back. Mr. Gray told him that he did not Intend to go In fo"*"^-
details as to our investigation and had no comment on this. Mr. Gray told
i -'
Smith that this was obviously an effort to malign the FBI. Smith told Mr. Gray -
ir- *
he would certainly do nothing in this regard as he had only the highest admiration
for the FBI. ; .*
* * *
-3-
Memo to Mr. Bolz
Re: JAMES W. McCORD, J r . , et al
Smith told me he merely wanted to let me know what had happened

and was asking for no information. None was given. He pointed out that he
does not write this story he merely furnishes the information to New York
where it is written. Smith is reasonably certain TIME will not comment
regarding the alleged Mitchell-Gray meeting. They will not comment on ihe
48-hour matter. Insofar as Colson is concerned, he does not know. He will
find out later today what wtl>be written on this and will call me.
-^ Smith said there was a rumor around town which was being spread
by Larrv"'O'Brien that they can't trust the FBI; that the MPD inventory of
equipment found and FBI's inventory do not jive. Some of the equipment is
Government property. I told Smith this was absolutely false and had no basis in
truth whatsoever. Smith said O'Brien wants to show that President Nixon is
behind this and that the FBI will whitewash it and get out of the case quickly.
I immediately called Mr. Gray and relayed to him Smith's conver-

sation with me. y\ '
L."
At 11:00 a.mr"l met with Mr. Gray, SAC Kunkel, and 27 WFO Agents.
Mr. Gray pointed out the seriousness of this leak to the news media concerning
our investigation. He said he would not put up with this, that there was no
excuse for it, and he wanted it stopped. He said there was no place in the FBI
for loose-lipped Agents. Mr. Gray was very forceful about this, and rightly so.
After he dismissed the Agents he conferred with me and SAC Kunkel. We again
went over leads in this case. After Kunkel left Mr. Gray instructed that I
furnish to him all of the current information we have and I gave him all 01 my
ticklers. He said he wanted to review these himself.
Mr. Gray called me at home Saturday afternoon, 6 24 72. He said

he wanted to have delivered to him at his^partment by noon Sunday, 6 25 72,
all of the information in whatever form available known to WFO. SAC Ku-.kel
was so instructed and at noon 6/25/72 delivered to Mr. Gray several volumes
of teletypes, inserts and other material.
At 5:50 p. m. on 6/24/72 Sandy Smith called me. Said he had learned

that the TIME article would be reduced to a minimum. No mention will be m^de
of the FBI-MPD inventory. No mention will be made of the 48-hr, matter.
The article would read as follows:
"It is inevitable that some were watching the FBI to see that
there was no whitewash based on White House instructions.
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gray were in California at the same curie.
Both have denied meeting. Mr. Colson was interviewed re
telephone calls made by Mr. Hunt but no records are kept
these. '
- 4-
G O
Memo to Mr. Bolz
Re: JAMES W. mcCORD, J r . , et al >
Smith said he tried to get deleted completely the Mitchell-Gray

thing but his editors would not budge. I immediately relayed this information
to Mr. Gray. He told me he had talked with Larry O'Brien on the telephone
concerning the above information I gave to Mr. Gray from Sandy Smith. He 1
.- t
said O'Brien commented that he had the highest regard for the FBI and wanted ^ .
Mr. Gray to know that the investigation so far had been conducted in an
excellent, thorough manner so far as he was concerned, that all he wanted
was a full, thorough and complete investigation. Mr. Gray told him this
was being done.
I
At 9:15 a. m. 6/27/72 Mr. Felt and I met with Mr. Gray on this
matter. I furnished him at his request up-to-date copies of teletypes from
WFO and a list of witnesses to appear before the Federal Grand Jury. I also
discussed with Mr. Gray the attached items: (Attachment No. 1) /f
While in Mr. Gray's office Mr. JohryJQean of th^White House called

him. Mr. Gray inquired of him regarding Item No. 1 on attachment. Mr. Dean
said that on June 19, Mr. Fred Fielding of the White House took everything
from Hunt's office, put it in boxes, and it has been under guard since. All of
this was delivered yesterday (6/26/72) to WFO. The question of custody and
chain of evidence can be obtained from Mr. Fielding. Mr. Dean said that he
would be happy to furnish any photographs WFO desired in connection with ;
the matter on No. 3 of attachment.
Mr. Gray also discussed with Mr. Dean the Dahlberg matter and
pointed out to him that if Dahlberg continued to refuse to talk to us he would
obviously be called before the grand jury. After leaving Mr. Gray's office
I passed the above information to SAC Kunkel so that it could be immediately
handled.
' i
Mr. Gray said that after his detailed review of all the information
in this matter he was convinced that it was a CIA or a political operation or j
both. Both Mr. Felt and I pointed . out it was extremely important that the FBI
continue its aggressive, thorough investigation until we determine the motive, ;
reasons and identity of all persons concerned. We pointed out that Mr. Gray ' 1
may possibly be called to testify at some later date before a congressional ]
committee and we could not afford to have the FBI accused of not pursuing s
this matter to the end. Mr. Gray agreed completely. As a matter of fact !
he indicated this position to Mr. Dean on the telephone.
C
Memo to Mr. Bolz
Mr. Gray asked that I brief Mr. Felt completely on prior

developments in this matter which I have done.
At 11:40 a. m. 6/27/72, Mr. Felt called me and advised that I

was to attend a meeting in Mr. Gray's office at 2:30 p.m. Wednesday, 6/28/72.
At the meeting would be Mr. Gray, Mr. Felt, CIA Director Helms, his deputy,
and I.
On morning of 6/28/72 Mr. Felt advised me that a meeting with
CIA representatives had been cancelled. Mr. Gray would see Mr. Felt and
I at 2:30 p. m. At that time Mr. Gray was brought up to date on all develop-
ments in this case. He said he did not feel it was the appropriate time to
sit down with CIA; that we needed to get our ''ducks in a row." Mr. Gray
opined this operation was either a CIA covert activity or political in nature
or both. I pointed out that under no circumstances should we back off of any
investigation at the request of CIA without forcing them to reveal completely
their interest in this matter. Mr. Felt and I both pointed out that the FBI's
reputation was at stake as well as Mr. Gray's position; that we did not feel
we should hold back under any circumstances unless the reasons therefore
were publicly expressed. Mr. Gray made it plain that he would not hold
back the FBI in this investigation at anyone's request, including the President
of the U. S. , and if he were ordered to do so he would resign.
We discussed with him a list of 8 leads that should be covered at

the Committee to Reelect the President. He told Felt to check with John Dean
at the White House on this. As a followup, Felt advised me at 3:45 p.m. 6/29/72
that he had called John Dean regarding these leads. Dean said he would check
and call him back. Felt instructed that if we had received no word by cob 6/29/72
that WFO should go ahead the first thing the morning of 6/30/72. SAC Kunkel
was so advised.
10 received thjse 2 me
te?|ue$te*d we investigate
at tnis fcions to Kunkel, WFO,
McDermott Alexandra. McDermott advised ihat Caswell had bee
on the ev 6 27 72 but Would tjall ihe Agent off of th
Also on 6 '28/72 Mr. Felt instructed that we discontinue a lead to

interview and investigate Kathleen Chenow. This was done.
- 6-
1> Mr. John Dean of the White House has informed the WFO that he
'>s obuined material belonging to Hunt, including photographs and letters
..iu:h he would turn over to Agents Monday morning. Agents were there
,-,.t the matter see?ned to be up In the a i t As of 3:30 the Agents were still
\: r. Dean's oiflce but the tr.aterial had not been furnished.
2) General Redman, White House Communications Agency, has

. . O i/i.u ,;e can furnish to them all of Hunt's toll calls from the White
.1 ;_}rovil from somebody at the White House.
xician says Lnat hunt

.-> i Ale red him a position in the "security field'* and indicated an association
...i *:v3 P.epuolican Party. Boucnan subsequently met with Hunt at the
Playboy Club in Miami on 12/28/71. Present with Hunt was an individual
-;am Hunt did not identify. He wa3 described as a white male, 33-42 years
.:; 3" 6" to 51 10"; 160 lbs.; black hair - receding Hunt discussed the need
: r i security program for the Republican, Party. This unidentified man
j not participate in the c o n v e r s a t i o n . ^ ^ )
At Hunt's request Bouman flew to Washington In January of 1972.

.":3 called Hunt at the White House. Hunt and the same unidentified :r.an
c?.r.\e to the Hay-Adams Hotel. Bouman was again offered the same security
; : >. lie noted that the unidentified man had initialed cufflinks uhich aid not
-.^respond to the first name used by Hunt.
Mr. KurJ<el, SAC - WFO, would like to obtain photographs of l i v e Y:;.

J ',3:n ?..id 5utter:ield so that Bouman may review them in an acteoipc to
..._-.::iiy this third individual.
M^nneth H. Dahlberg was again contacted at his residence the morning

:: Tur.e . 5 . Cn advice of his Washington attorney he would not be inter/VJ eu,
:e would not fijrnish name of attorney without attorney's OK, he *.vas unade
IO contact attorney but left word at attorney's office and will contact ~ur
' .:--??.polis Office liter he hears from attorney. It appears to n.e mat
.Ai'z-i?-* is unaer wraps not to talk to us.
Attachment No. 1
o
RECOMMENDED INTERVIEWS AT COMMITTEE TO REELKCf THE PRESIDENT
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W. t WASHINGTON, D. C. & 6
CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING ^ 6$A
(1) Who reconunended/recruited James Walter McCord, Jr Tor A

Chief of Security?
(2) What were McCord f s duties and who did he report to, or
was responsible to?
(3) How did McCord*s job as Chief of Security tie-in, or did it,
with his duties regarding recruiting individuals for the
security squad assigned to guard the Mitchell family? Also,
did the Committee pay the salaries of persons on the
Mitchell family security guard? (Note: Alfred C. Baldwin,
former FBI Agent, identified as being in the Howard Johnson
Motel during the period 5/5/72 - 6/17/72. This motel is
located across from the Watergate location of the Democratic
Party headquarters. Baldwin is also known to have been assigned
to guarding of Martha Mitchell in April, 1972.)
(4) Determine the Committee's knowledge of a bank account opened

by McCord at National Savings and Trust, Washington, D. C.,
in the name of "Dedicated Friends For a Better America"
showing McCord as Chairman. This account was opened in
February, 1972 and closed in April, 1972 and $90,000 passed
through it during this period.
(5) To whom did McCord report concerning transactions in the

foregoing account and what was use made of such funds,
namely, were they for McCord's use in connection with his
security responsibilities.
(6) Determine identity of any similar accounts which McCord may
have opened.
(7) Who did McCord recruit to assist him in the work of the
Committee.
(8) Determine the Committee's knowledge of and/or contacts made

with the Committee by Alfred C. Baldwin (known to have tele-
phonically contacted the Committee from Connecticut on
6/19/72, following 6/17/72, arrest of subjects); Everette
Howard Hunt; Kenneth Dahlberg; and Michael Douglas Caddy.
(Note Hunt's White House file has notation 3/29/72, Hunt
could be more effective at "1701." Committee's address is
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W., and according to Charles
Colson 3/29/72, is last date Hunt employed by White House.)
OT-
Memo to Mr. Bolz
"Ontoe"morning of 6 / 29/72 NTr| Felt, *a^ter l a ^ n g \I?t|b Mr. Gray

1 that !# holt', up any intefflews^r investigation of George Munroe,
CIA, Mexico City, and Ogarrio of Mexico CiU^JMyKenneth T^hlberg. I
told him this w^mild be done. I pointed out BfJ^Tno ol
hoMing up these '-^ds but I stronglyj||| that the^should eventually be
cov cred - regardlesi.
" "* **
Mr. Gray cofifidentially advised at the meeting on the afternoon of
6 28 72 that he had an appointment at the White House at 6:30 p. m. that day.
Mr. Felt and I both reiterated the absolute necessity that nothing deter the
FBI from a complete and thorough investigation.
At 10:15 a. m. 6/30/72 SAC Kunkel advised me that AUSA Siibert

had told him that he and USA Titus felt there was some delay on the part of
the FBI in certain aspects of this investigation. He referred to the interviews
of Dave Young, Chenow, Ogarrio and the receipt of copies of the reports.
Silbert said they wanted to move rapidly, that AAG Petersen had so instructed
them. I discussed this with Mr. Felt.
At 12:50 p. m. 6/30/72 Mr. Felt told me that John Dean of the
White House had said to hold off interview of Young until Dean talks with
Mr. Gray.
At 1:25 p. m. Felt told me it was all right to interview Young, that
he would be made available at the White House Monday morning (7/3/72).
Chenow is returning from England and will be available next week for inter-
view. Dean will let us know specifically. Dean will sit in on these interviews.
SAC Kunkel advised.
At 12:30 p. m. 6/30/72 Mr. Felt stated it was OK for Agents to

interview John Mitchell and to reinterview Dahlberg. WFO was advised .:
on the interview of Mitchell and SAC Minneapolis was advised re Dahlberg.
At 1:25 p. m. Mr. Felt advised that Dean had talked to Mr. Gray
and we were not to interview Dahlberg at this time. SAC Minneapolis so
informed.
A phone call was received from AAG Petersen asking for an
informal summary of information on Dahlberg. This was prepared and
hand delivered to him at 2:00 p. m. Also on Mr. Felt's instructions
copies of our reports have been delivered to Petersen and to the U. S.
Attorney.
- 7-
Memo to Mr. Bolz
At 2:30 p. m. on 7/3/72 SAC Kunkel and I met with Mr. Gray.

He was brought up to date on all developments. Mr. Gray commented that
he was not going to hold off on any phase of this investigation at the request
of anyone. He made the comment that he did not feel that John Dean or
Charles Colson were involved in any way but had the feeling that Ehrlichman
"was caught up in something." He requested that we investigate the complete
background of Fiorini (true name Sturgis) and all of his activities and
associates. Such investigation was ordered in Miami. He also instructed
that we check out thoroughly and completely Felipe De Diego. This was also
ordered.
On the morning of 7/5/72 I delivered to Mr. Felt and to Mr. Gray

the interview of Miss Gleason. At 9:45 on 7/5/72 SAC Kunkel called. He
said that Attorney Bittman will let AUSA Silbert know by noon as to when
he will make Hunt available for an interview by the FBI. Mr. Felt was
immediately advised. It later turned out that Bittman did not call Silbert
back on 7/5/72.
At 12:05 p. m. 7/5/72 Mr. Felt called and instructed that I tell

SAC Kunkel that if they have a good prospect at the Committee to Reelect
the President they should attempt to make a contact with them at home or
away from the office and see if they would be willing to talk with the FBI
without an attorney present. Kunkel said this would be considered.
At 2:45 p . m . 7/5/72 SAC Kunkel advised that Baldwin was thinking

about taking the fifth amendment before the Grand Jury. He also said that
J e r r y Alch, an attorney in the F. Lee Bailey firm, was representing McCord.
Ten people at the Committee to Reelect the President are to be served with
subpoenaes on the morning of 7/6/72 to appear before the Grand Jury. They
will go immediately to the U. S. Attorney's office and there will be given an
opportunity of talking to the FBI before appearing at the Grand Jury. Mr. Gray
was advised of this at 2:50 p. m.
At 4:30 p . m . 7/5/72 SAC Kunkel advised that Baldwin had agreed

to talk to the FBI and that Agents were on the way to see him. At 4:50 p. m.
Mr. Gray called and said he had finished reading the Gleason interview.
Mr. Gray said that Agents should go after Odle on the night of 7 5 72 and
see if he would talk to the FBI. I immediately relayed this to SAC Kunkel.
Kunkel felt that if we hit Odel and he refused to talk it would give him an
opportunity to get his story straight before being subpoenaed before the Grand
Jury on the morning of 7/6/72. I relayed this to Mr. Gray and told him I
- 8 -
1
0
Memo to Mr. Bolz
agreed with Kunkel. He said he also agreed and we should hold up on this.
U*L iave _
questing ffblc
| ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ Gei\^ral Walters said
wouldpha\i^fpl?o^|n%xicatiorf To M r l ' G r a ^ ^ S W r . m**on 7/6/72. Mr.*-
said if pi3^w*as not forthcoming at that time'ml shot _,_
up to tîs # * ^ p r a y advtf^d me a*' ^'^^^MiiP^M^^^"HFKad"' reB'e'Cved th(
CIA letter, that it was not p e r t i n e n t / 1 g | f e i ^ ^ H m K m ^ e d i a t e l v interview^
Ogarîo and Dahlberg. Instructions T^rBjgfvea^to mwemis 4 j ( j ^
At 10:30 a. m. on 7/6/72 I gave Mr. Gray the WFO teletype
reflecting the interview with Baldwin. SAC Kunkel and Mr. Felt were with
me. It was agreed we would hold up any search warrant of McCord's home
because of the necessity of identifying Baldwin as the source and in view
of the elapsed time since McCord's arrest we will consider this later.
- 9 -
n o
WlMlK HOUSE
At 11:30 A.M. this morning", WFO Agents arranged for

Interview with Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President
In the presence of John Dcano. Agents had definite Impression
Colson had been previously interviewed by Deane. C O I S O D denied
any knowledge of Hunt's Involvement In this matter and stated
Hunt's assignment with White House terminated 3/29/72. Colson
stated Hunt's assignment would not to M s knowledge have required
contacts with individuals such as subjects of this matter.
/r ,
Hr. Deane Is arranging for Bureau to receive all toll
calls made from Hunt's office since March, 1972.
ELECTRONIC SWEEPS
' % * %
t:
Arrangements have been aade with Mr. Lawrence O'Brien,. " " /
Chairman, Democratic Party, for an electronic sweep of his off lceQrv*^<
According to the Lab the initial contact with the Democratic " *, _ w***;
Party, National Committee Office, will be tomorrow morning (Friday)ft
Contact was also made of Mr. Robert Dole to arrange

sinilar sweep of Republican Party Headquarters. Call wasp]
to former Attorney General Mitchell by SAC, WFO, and foi^'AssIstant
Attorney General Mardian returned this call and concurred In the
agreement that the Republican Party Headquarters should also *
k^be electronically swept. This will be done following the <*, * "" *\
sweef of the Democratic Party Headquarters. , . ,. r . s , *
MIAMI PHOTOGRAPHS
Miami office has advised that a Cuban photographer

has been Identified to them by a private detective as having \ *i '
developed two rolls of 35 am fila on or about 6/10/72, with * .
three individuals one of whom he weakly identified as subject ' * \ - ' "'
Barker, another of whoa he positively identifies as subject %"**..'
Florin! and the third he cannot identify. Foregoing is based - * & -
upon Agents interview of the photographer who stated that be was , CC^',.'
contacted as indicated above on 6/10 by these Individuals who
wanted a rush job done In developing two rolls of 35 an film. -<" *j*
itw
According to the photographer he made 40 7 x 10 prints for thixt -v*
which the individuals paid $75 plus a $20 deposit which they
forgot about in their hurry to leave his shop upon completion
of the developing. According to the photographer many of these " * :
pictures as he recalls were onion skin copies of letterhead paper of the
Chairman of the Democratic National Party. He specifically recalls
seeing Larry O'Brien's name signed to some of this correspondence.
According to the photgraph_er visible In the picture Is a shag
rug on which the document being photographed was placed and K 'r4
visible on each of the corners are hands wearing what appeared
to be rubber gloves.
o :
: : ! ! ' : ! :
$25,000 CASHIERS CHKCK
Miami has determined from records of RKJBIK Republican

National Bank that subject Bernard L. Barker on 4/24/72, cashed
a cashiers check from Kenneth Harry Dahlberg on whom we did
White House inquiry in December of 1969 to January, 1970.
Dahlberg has closed his winter home at Boca Raton, Florida,
and reportedly is in Minneapolis. Minneapolis instructed to
interview Dahlberg concerning this check.
MC CORD'S BANK ACCOUNT
Subpoena has been served on McCord's bank, Rockville,

Maryland, for production of all bank records concerning McCord's
account. These records are expected to produced shortly.
IS %
"3
'>::
CO'OHM * D l u MO I *
' IVI) tDITKJN
flt CN IV* .MO IT

o
Memorandum CleveUnd
Conrad
D_twy
TO MR. BATES tyvj)? DATE 9-11-72 Jenkini
f Mrhll
FROM :W. M. FELT 'ft

\))^^/
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Wlter
Tele. Room
Mi. Kinley
SUBJECT: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, J R . ; ET AL. Mr Armstrong-
Ms. Herwig
BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY Mrs. Neunan
y NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 6-17-72
\ t INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
A story in the Washington Post for Saturday, 9-9-72, quoted Justice

Department and other sources to the effect (I) that the investigation of this case
is complete, and (2) that the FBI agents were not allowed to investigate any
allegations of possible violations of the laws relating to political contributions.
Please prepare a memorandum for the Acting Director outlining the

investigation still under way and your projection as to when it might be finished.
%
Also provide any observations or comments concerning the allega-
tion that we have not been allowed to investigate possible irregularities in the
matter of campaign contributions. Please include your own observations on this
point as well as observations of your #1 Man, Section Chief and Supervisors
handling this case at FBIHQ. Also obtain from SAC Kunkel a comment as to
whether there is any doubt in his mind as to the scope of the investigation to be
conducted. \C
It appears that much of the information which has been leaked to the
press may have come from County Prosecutor Gerstein in Florida. Contact SAC
Whittaker and obtain the dates of all contacts with Gerstein together with the
1
* ;v - E= Z ^ names of the agents handling these contacts. Whittaker should interview these
agents concerning whether or not they have furnished any information to Gerstein
which has subsequently been leaked to the press. Whittaker should also alert all
his agents to the need to be most circumspect in all future dealings with Gerstein.
The article which appeared in the Washington 'Post M s moi'ninl

ipears to have been taken from the FD-302 of our interview with former SA
Baldwin. You advise that you are making an analysis of this matter which __
analysis should be incorporated in your memorandum replyingTOtMBT ~ ^
I personally contacted SAC Kunkel to point out trfal ft appêaWS the

Washington Post or at least a reporter had access to the Baldwin _D*30ZJ_told
him he should forcibly remind all agents of the need to be most circumspect in
I! talking about this case with anyone outside the Bureau. Incorporate the results
of your inquiries concerning the matter set out above in a separate memoraBdunT
for the information of the Acting Director.
F;iri-'<_)
MAR 8 -
MA,,1**3 tomort
oi<k.y tic *n
UK*1! ED STATES GOVERNMENT

tt >b
Bishop
Memorandum Cell ]i *JI

Clevelnd
Conrtd
Dlbey .
TO DATE: Jenkin*
10/12/72 Unnhall
Miller, E.S
> -t Ponder
1- Mr. Pelt Soyar*
FROM
C. Blz 1- Mr. Bates
1- Mr. Gallagher T e l e . Boom
SUBJECT: O 1-
1-
Mr.
Mr.
Bolz
Nuzum
Mr. Kin ley
Mr, Armstrong,
Me. Herwig
JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.r ET AL. Mrs. Neenu
BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC RATIONAL 1- Mr. Bishop
COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, 6/17/72 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
c The Washington Post news article of ^

tosome extent its article of 10/11/72 (both attached) report
tKat theFBI's investigation has established that the Watergate
bugging stemmed from a campaign of political spying and sabotage
directed by officials of the White House and the Committee to
Reelect the President.
The writers of these articles, CariyBernsteln, Bob
[oodvgftxd and Karly^Barker, do not in fact attribute these
indings to FBI officials but rather state they come froa
information in FBI and Department of Justice files, law
enforcement sources, Federal investigators and sources close
to the Watergate investigation. It would appear the articles
are the conclusions of the writers drawn from the interviews
of attorneys who Donald Segretti attempted to recruit in
1971 as alleged undercover Agents working on behalf of
the President's reelection; Alfred Baldwin's statement which
he released to the press concerning his involvement in caption
matter; and the grand jury's indictment of the seven subjects.
>
There follows an analysis of particular items mentioned
in the news articles of 10/10/72, and 10/11/72.
(1) The 10/10/72 article captioned "FBI Finds Nixon Aides
Sabotage Democrats," reports that the FBI established that the
Watergate bugging stemmed from a campaign of political spying
and sabotage directed by officials of the White House and the
Committee to Reelect the President against major Democratic
Presidential contenders. -The article identifies Donald Henry
Segretti as an individual who participated in such activities
and attempted to recruit attorney friends to assist him. ,.:
, ' c * " ' - / '
- ' * COMMENT; During our investigation of the Watergate

încident, we did obtain some limited information < 6/?6/72r from
Donald Segretti, an attorney, as to ,his|travels during primaries
Attachments KEC-21
CB/CAN/amm/'aat^ {7) 2 3 OCT 2 7 1972
MAR 8 ^
* " *
c r-
C. Bolz to Mr. Bates
RE: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.
to harass Democratic political candidates. Segretti, in

discussing his harassment activities, said he visited Miami
and asked Senator Muskie about his vote against the "space
gJiuttê" program. This apparently was to embarrass the
Senator as the space program was very popular in Florida. j|e.
said he also distributed leaflets in California when Senator
MuskiV was'ftrtealttnythere y ^ r ^ t ^ - E H f e genabr'a pnainTin oj
abortion, realizing this position was unpopular with the
Students to whom the Senator was speaking.
Segretti declined to advise us as to whose orders
According to
John Dean of the White Bouse staff, Kalmbach is a personal
friend of President Nixon.)
During interview on B/2ft/73t Dwiqht f!hay><n nM

that he had hired Searetti to harass hnf
Segretti own and hia actlv|tiea
i
connection therewith were not directed bv himself or anv other
memoer o t t h e White House. Chapin, in discussion of the
activities of Segretti, said that Segretti in the course of his
harassment of Democratic candidates, ^secured the publication of
false sch.edu!irng of campaign activities relative to Senator
Muski*
îl?flr waff ^ Q P 9/4/72rr admitted

admitted
that he paid Segretti from funds of the Committee to Reelect the
President on instructions of Dwight Chapin.
Our only interest in Segretti was his association

with Everette Howard Hunt (which had been established by review
of Hunt's toll call records) and Segretti' possible involvement
in the Watergate incident. We did not concern ourselves with
his political harassment activities nor did we attempt to
identify and interview any individuals he may have endeavored
to recruit for this purpose. Accordingly, we had no knowledge
concerningfift?Tftfttft'aa^fcampts to regru.ifr various attorneys
y ffj
hi i
reported in the 10/10/72 article to assist him in harassing h i
Democratic candidates.
-2- CONTINUED - OVER

4
. " . *
c
i We have no idea as to how the Washington Post obtained

IfI! the identities of the attorneys whom Segretti allegedly endeavored
to recruit to assist him. It is noted, however, one of these
attorneys, Alex B. Shipley, a Democrat who is now Assistant
Attorney General of Tennessee, appears to be the main source
of this information in the 10/10/72 article and may be
endeavoring to capitalize on the current publicity associated
with this matter.
wh^n we ;inynrv<ftWftd, J*b Stuart Maaruder on 7/20/72.

he, in discussing the harassment of Democratic candidates, said
that funds of the Committee to Reelect the President were
expended for~pnS*Btiinq a Dcuiiuhiet entitled -Why a Liberal
Should Vote fgr Muskie7" This publication apparently con-
tained references unfavorable to George McGovern. The pamphlet
I
srtf
was published during the New Hampshire primary and was
surreptitiously delivered to the Muskie headquarters in
New Hampshire. Thereafter, a phone call was made to McGovern
headquarters in New Hampshire and the caller suggested the
McGovern people should see what the Muskie people were pre-
paring to distribute. The purpose of this was to create
friction between the Muskie and the McGovern people.
(2) The 10/10/72, article states that "Law enforcement
I sources said that probably the best example of the sabotage

was the fabrication-by a White House aide-of a celebrated
letter to the editor alleging that Sen. Edmund S. Muskie
(D-Maine) condoned a racial slur on Americans of French-
Canadian descent as 'Canucks'!"
l COMMENT: An analysis of the article reveals that

"Washington Post" staff writer Marilyn Berger is shown to
have allegedly received the information about this matter
from Ken W. Clawson, White House employee, on 9/25/72,
although the article states that Mr. Clawson said the reporter
must have misunderstood him and that he knows nothing about
the incident. We conducted no investigation concerning this
matter as it was not reported to us and we did not interview
Mr. Clawson since during the Watergate investigation no infor-
IS i -' mation was received indicating he had knowledge of the bugging .
incident.
i-ti -3- CONTINUED - OVER
v i V
c:
C. B o l z t o Mr. B a t e s
Re: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.
(3) The 10/10/72, article states "The F B I ' B investi-

gation of the Watergate definitely established that virtually
all the acts against the Democrats were financed by a secret,
III fluctuating $350,000 -$700,000 campaign fund that was con-
trolled by former Attorney General John N. Mitchell while he
headed the Justice Department."
in COMMENT: During our investigation, we received no
information that former Attorney General Mitchell controlled
fu* such a fund. Our only investigative interest with respect to
funds was to endeavor to trace $114,000 which we discovered
was passed through the bank account of Bernard L. Barker at
the Republic National Bank, Miami. This was composed of a
$25,000 cashiers check issued to Kenneth Dalhberg and $89,000
in four bank drafts issued to Manuel Ogarrio obtained at the
Banco Internacional, Mexico City. Hugh Walter Sloan, Jr.,
! Former Treasurer, Committee to Reelect the President, advised
these items were given by him to Liddy; that Liddy subsequently
returned $25,000 in cash to Sloan for the Dalhberg check and
about $86,000 in cash for the Ogarrio bank drafts; and all of the
cash was placed with other currency which was maintained in a
safe in Sloan's office at the Committee. In the course of attempts
to trace this money, we interviewed Maurice Stans, Chairman of
the Finance Committee to Reelect the President, on 7-28-72, and
during that interview he said there wa * n n n d H ^ M nfli)mftu.ntft*
t i i ^ i n. el nan * a charge a.t the Committee, which varied
cant g .t t
from about $200r000 to $350,000 in cash.
h In our investigation to determine the activities of

Liddy and Everette Howard Hunt we learned that Jeb Stuart
Mapruder in late .Tannery ar early February. )$7?, i
Liddy
y the J H concerning
ossi
possible "rrr>gate candi,d.at* g at
VariOUS r aiH>e fliffP'P*"*
at the
Mrs. Judy Hoback, Assistant to the Treasurer, Finance
Committee to Reelect the President, on 7-18-72, advised that
she had seen a tally sheet in Sloan's handwriting which indi-
cated cash disbursement to Liddy of either $81,000 or $89,000;
to Herbert L. Porter of over $100,000

c
< :
?: C. B o l z t o Mr. B a t e s
Re: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.
_ __ It is also
noted as previously set forth herein, Segretti Reportedly
received some $30,000-$40,000 from Committee funds for his
political harassment activities.
<4) The 10/10/72 article reports that when asked by the
Washington Post to discuss Segretti, three FBI and Justice
Department officials involved in the Watergate probe refused.
According to this report, each official at the mention of
Segretti's name said "that's part of the Watergate investi-
gation." ""
COMMENT: It is believed that this pertains to

Washington Post staff writer Carl Per^ s t Q i n 's attempts to
interview Washington Field Office case Agent, SA Anqelo Lano.
j>n 10/3/72, and Bernsteinbs repeated attempts to interview"
"Assistant U. S. Attorneys Earl Silbert and Donald Campbell.
yho are responsible for prosecution of this m a t t e r . S A Lano
was telephonically contacted by Bernstein on 10/3/72, at which
time Bernstein attempted to solicit information from SA Lano as
to whether the names Segretti and Xalmbach meant anything to
him and whether the use of secret campaign funds by these
individuals was a "surprise." SA Lano told Bernstein that no
comment could be made on this issue or any other issue. SA
Lano told Bernstein this was like asking Bernstein who bis source
of information was for the various articles he had written on
this case. Bernstein stated although he could not name his
source, he could furnish SA Lano with a "good clue."
SA Lano thereafter, with the approval of Assistant

Director Bates, met with Bernstein in the vicinity of the Treasury
Building for the specific purpose of having Bernstein identify his
source. Bernstein again attempted to interview SA Lano concerning
certain aspects of this case but SA Lano pointed out his only
purpose in meeting with Bernstein was he had promised to give a
clue as to his source of his information. To this all Bernstein
would say was "I have a very high source," but he would not
identify the source or the agency to which he belonged. ^
SA Lano has advised that he knows from discussion with

Assistant U. S. Attorneys Silbert and Campbell that Bernstein
had made repeated attempts to interview them concerning this
case but they to his knowledge have only "no commented" to v
Bernstein's inquiries.

HI., ..... k. ..*. .-..V.*.:
O
(5) The 10/11/72 Washington Post article reports in part

that Alfred C. Baldwin in a statement admitting he participated in
the bugging conspiracy, stated he "saw transcripts of the
bugging addressed to a presidential aide and members of the
;
reelection committee."
COMMENT; Baldwin related to us on 7/10/72, that during

his monitoring activities at the Howard Johnson Motel, he
observed McCord typing up summaries of Baldwin's monitoring logs
in memorandum font. Baldwin observed memoranda typed by McCord
to Rob Odle (Robert C. Odle, Director of Administration,
Committee to Reelect the President) and one Timmons (William
^t! E. Timmons, Assistant to the President for Congressional
Relations), but he could not state that these memoranda
related to_Baldwin'a monitoring activities in connection
with the Democratic National committee Headquarters.
If Odle, who was interviewd on several occasions during

June and July, 1972, denied ever receiving any reports from
McCord. Timmons, when interviewed on 9/8/72,
If stated that the only reports he received from McCord had to
do with McCord*s analysis of the security at the Doral Hotel,
Miami, Florida, where the President and his cabinet were
considering staying during the Republican Convention, and
a memorandum dealing with the possible alteration of convention
passes by a hippie group.
3
ACTION: For information.
ii
5^
;-?
-6-
Felt
0- I* I R E V . *. 1 B - 7 1 1
,.- ( Baker
Bates
JAML3 WALTER MC CORD, JR.; BT AL Bishop
IOC Callahan _
Cleveland
-: .1 V
FBI Finds
William Loeb, publisher of the Man- Mrs. Neenan
By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward chester paper, said yesterday that al-
Washlrrtan Pdfl Biaf/ Writers Uiough the person who "eigned the let
FBI agents have established that the t w a Paul Morrison of Deerfield
Watergate bugging incident stemmed fle&&t,- W,--4ias Îver been located,
from a massive campaign of political "I am convinced that it Is authentic."
spying and sabotage conducted on be- Howevmr, Loeb said he it lnwwtigat
hair of President Niton's re-election Ing the possibility that the letter is a
*" and directed by officials of the Waite fabrication because of another letter he
fj1 House nd the Committee for flie Re- received about two weeks ago. The re-
t' election of the President. . . [ cent letter, Loeb said, maintains that
'*' The activities, according to informa-
tion in FBI and Department of Justice
files, were aimed at ail the major jjuiother person was paid |I,000 to assist
? Democratic presidential contenders and ~ 1th tbe "Canuck" hoax.
since 1971 represented a basic B. J. McQuaid, editor-in-chief of t
strategy of the Nixon re-elecflon effort 'nion Leader, said earlier this ye
f Informed of the general contents of r t Clawson 'had been "useful" to
"this article, the White House referred 'l>aper in connection with the "Canucl
\ all comment to the Committee for the letter. Though McQuaid did not elab-
Ec-election of the President A spokes- , orate, he too said that he believed tbe The Washington Post , # . A
Fman there said. "The Post story is not original letter was authentic. Times Herald A l ft A X 4
' only fiction but a collection of absurd- The Washington Daily New*
ities." Asked to discus? fhe specific Clawson, a former Washington Post
% points raised in the story, the spokes- reporter, said he met McQuaid only The Evening Star (Washington)
^.Bian DeVan L. Shumway, refused on briefly during the New Hampshire The Sunday Star (Washington)
grounds that t h e entire matter is in i primary while lunching in the state Daily News (New York) . , ,_
the hands of the authorities." I with editors of tbe newspaper. ,
i He denied that he provided any assist- Sunday News (New York)
Law tnforcement sources said that ance with the letter. Clawson said the
probably the best example of the sabo- first time he heard of the "Canuck" New York Post
tage was the fabricationby a White letter was when "I &m It on television" The New York Tines
House aideof a letter to the editor following the Muskie speech. ' * ' The Daily World
alleging that Sen. Edmund S. Muskie 1 Immediately following his "crying The New Leader
<D-Maine) condoned a racial slur on speerh," Muskie's standing In the New
Americans of French-Ajnerican descent Tbe Wall Street Journal
Hampshire primary polls begaD to slip
as "Canucks " ' < - ' "* and he finished with only 48 per cent The National Observer .
Tbe letter was published in the Man- of the Democratic primary Tote far People's World
Leader Feb. 24, less than short of his expectations. " - '
weeks be'fore the New Hampshire The Nixon forces, using fund* from i
primary. It in part triggered Muskie"s GOP campaign contributions, attempt-1
politically damaging "crying speech" ed to discredit individual Democratic I 10/10/72
before the newspaper's office. preidcntfal candidates and disrupt their r
Washington Post stair writer Mari- v ' , . j . . . < :
: ' - - B
lyn Berger reported that Ken W. Claw-

ion, deputy director of White House
Communications, told her to a conver- I ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
gators. IN
sation on Sept. * U h i * 4fT wrote the 8 during a campaign and Is said to be
letter." - -.,.,<,..;,.* '.,->. I carried out hy)5>o4hyWical parties.
| g g g - E ^CLASSIFIED
-,, Interviewed again yesterdays Claw- i 'But the investigators said what they
ton denied that he had claimed author- uncovered goes far beyond what is nor-
ship of the "Canuck" letter, saying the mal, and is unprecedented in It*
reporter must have misunderstood him.
"I know' nothing about it," Clawsan
ENCLOSURE
i
;*' Thty said ft incfydMt.^r

i; :'Following members of i>ernotfatic
jpandidates' families; forging letters and
.distributing them under Ow candidates'
.letterheads;'leaWng false and manu-
, factured items to tbe press; throwing
^campaign schedules into disarray; sell-
ing confidential campaign files, and in-
vestigating the lives of ikizens of Deroo-
LJ, cratie campaign workers. "?
i | . Tbre* attorneys have to]d Tlie Wash
Jngtoo Post that, as early as mid-1971,
Q^y w o l . e w t e d to work as openis.
prt>wotMir' on behalf of the Nixon
*#- campaign. They said they were asked to
^ndeniiine the primary campaigns of
'^Democratic
^ " ^ ^ ^ by man who
| bas been identified in F*BT reports as
M operative of the Nixoij re-election
Organization.s - - - s- .
See WATERGATE, A14, Col. I
WATERGATE, From Al fluctuating

E^FromA $350,000-$700,000 and "No comment." After 15 something is "being done. It's a
campaign fund that was con- minutes, he said: "This is ma- typical deal,' Segretti said;
All three lawyen, yen, Jnelud
including trolled by former Attorney terial for a good novel, It's ri- 'Dont-tellme-ahythlnE-and-I-
He who is aa assistant attorney General John N. Mitchell diculous," and chased the re- won't-know.'" ^
r general of Tennessee, said they while he headed the Justice porter outside when he at- Segretti'i first approach,
! *='' down the offers,. which Department i LaterJ when he tempted to take picture. said Shipley, came on June 27,
purportedly included the prom- served as President Nixon's According to the three attor- 1971. "*He called me before
,*. fee of "big jobs" In Washington campaign manager, Mitchell neys Interviewed by The Post, then and told me he would
m
after President Nixon's re-elec- shared control of the fund Segretti attempted to hire be in Washington and be came
,, tion. They said the overtures with others. The money was them in , 1971 an undercover to a dinner party at my apart-
> were made by Donald Herbert kept in a safe in the office of agents working JI behalf of ment at South Four Towers
J, Segretti, 31, a former Treasury the President's chief fund- President Nixons re-election. (4600 S. Four Mile Bun Drive,
If Department lawyer who lives raiser, * former Secretary of All three said they first met Arlington) the night before,"
in Marina Del Ray, Calif. Commerce Maurice Stans. SegretU In 1968, when they said Shipley. "Nothing was
One Federal investigative of- According to sources close served together In Vietnam ai said about it then. The next
ficial said that SegretU played to tbe Watergate investigation, captains in the Army Judge morning I met him for break-
4he role of "just a small fish much of tbe FBI's Information Advocate General Corps. ; fast and drove him. to the air-
in a big pond." According to is expected to be revealed at One of tAe lawyers, Alex B. portDulles.*
FBI reports, at least 50 nnder- the trial f the seven men in- Shipley, a. Demo/crat who Is According to Shipley, be
coVtr Nixon operatives traveled dicted OB charges of conspir- now assistant attorney general picked Segretti lip fhat morn-
throughout the country trying ing to eavesdrop jb>n Demo- of Tennessee, ald Sergretti ing, Sunday, at tbe George-
to disrupt and spy on Demo- cratic headquarter* at the told him, "Money would be no town Inn, where^-botel rec-
cratic campaigns. problem, but the people we ords show Donald H. Se-
Watergate., would be worJdpg for wanted gretti stayed In room 402 on
: Jk Both at the White House and i some very power-
. ? within the President's re-elec- ful Information," said one fed- results for the cash that would June 25 and June 3Q, 1871
' tk>n committee, the IntelB- eral official, "especially If it be spent" ' (total bill $54.75, Including
sl- gencc-sabotage operation was becomes known before NOT. 7." Shipley, 30, added: "He (Se- $2.25 in telephone calls). In ad-
\l commonly called the "offeij- -.A glimpse of the Nixon cam- gretti) also told me that we dition, travel records obtained
f sive security" program of the paign's .spying and disruptioiia- weuM1 be ti&etfâre of after. by Tbe Washington Post show
.-. Nixon forces, according to in- are"to p NUon * reflection, that 2 that Segretti bought a Wash-
in the activl- would j e t fc jqbd job in the ington-San Francisco-Monte-
vestlgalon. 7,-, ties of Segrettt, According to governinqAt*'. * -'
4 V Perhaps the most significant Jnvestigators, Segretg's^work According * Shipley, Se- rey {Calif.) airline ticket on
ii j finding of the whole Watergate Was financed,, _ , gretti said that the undercover June 27 (departure Dulles).
A (investigation, tbe investigators *nen. by ; the f350,QQ(^y700.tiD<): k would require false idea- On fhe way to Dulles, said
:\ say,
av. was fhat numerous spec! soed- fund. 'w .** >< WLpaper* under an as- Shipley, SegretU "first men-
He acts of political sabotage Asked % The Washington sumediifin that Shipley re- tioned tbe deal. He asked
Cj and spying were all traced to Post to discuss Segretti, three cruK-live rawt persons pre- would I be Interested because
fe
| this "offensive security," which FBI and Justice Departmenttferably y lawyers, l o r the job; I was getting out of the Army.
f was^conceived and directed in officials Involved in Ibe Wat that they would attempt to We were Twtfa getting t
! White House and by Prest- ergate probe refused. A* the disrupt the schedules of Dem- shortly . and didn't have
Nixon's re-election com- mention -of SegretU's name, ocratic candidates and obtain anything lined *&. B* men-
^'jnittee. * - " - 4 '*** each saidin tbe words of one Information from their cam- tioned on the way to Dulles
"That's part Of the TVater- paign organizations; that Shi- that we Vould do a Uttle polit-
\ Tbe Investigators said that * :ate investigation." j ) n e of the pley would not reveal to Se- ical espionage." , -L_L-
v
major purpose of. tbe sub rota ifficials, however, l>ecame gretti -the names of the men Shlpley continued: ^T said,
J activities was to create so Lnfrj ijt tbe mention of Se- he would "hire; and that Se- Tfhat are you talking about?'
much confuaton, suspicion j ^ and character- gretti could never reveal to He (SegretU) sakt Tor tost-'
^ dissension that the Demot zed U s activities as **lndes-- Shipley specifically who was ance, we'll *go to Kennedy
would be incapable of uniting cribable." supplying the money for tbe rally and find an ardent Ken-
Rafter cJioosing a presidential Scgpettl, visit?3 In lift West operation. v - .' . nedy worker. Then you say :
^.nominee. ,..rMlri, " 5oast apartment last week by Shipley recallejLln-fcLîe- that you're a Kennedy man!
!' The FBrs Investigation ot WasTripgton Post special corre-' phone Interview: *t said, TSow too but you're working behind J
the Watergate definitely estab- spondent Robert Meyers, re- In hell are we going to be the scenes; you get them to
.j lished that vii"tually aUîhc peatedly answered questions taken care of it no one knows help you. You send them to
] acts against the Democrats by saying '1 don't know," "I what we're doing?* and Se-| work ttar Muskie, stuffing en-
?' were financed by a secret, don't have to answer that," gretti said: 'Nixon knows that velopes or whatever, and you
(
- ;
them to pass you the in- id Shipley,., jtegretjtt edal. fa ^feddy anedy-- eon-
or Litton. They'll vthink (hat ô into much detail be- i 1 i re-
hey * are helping"" fcenhe cause It WM mostly /Are you f "t 1ft
;t MusMe. But actually with me or notT'" When he prefc* Mi one point, Segretn i
ou're using the Information asked SegretU exactly what one Is I* & >Jdicu3ous3nd I
tar something else> '* roe,$ > 4 t e **'- iiag.îbout
would be expected of him In
ft was very strange," Shi- participating in clandestine ac- j w.eljf nanccd/
ley rwalled. "Three ijuarters Shipley fald.-VH? wilp alwayi
t the way. to the airport I tivities, Shipley said he was flying, itross flw country.
*WelL who will *K be When "he came to Wafflilngton
working for?* He said "Nixon "'Enlistpeople, vbe imagina- In June he said he bad had an
nd I was really taken aback; tive' (One thing he stressed appointment at the Treasury
all the actions he bad was asking people who were Departmeat. and^ thtX tht 4h Segretti, vh*
about would have taken fairly free to tiivel and (that) T Treasury ""Department ^ feet t and
IMace in the Democratic pri- he was asking lawyers because picking up the tab on thts--hU pounds, are mint
fnariea. He {Segretti) Said the he dldnt want to do anything Wane and hotel bill. He jfaid ,?From : and
Snain purpose was thai the lilegaL It wasn't represented 'don't ask me any names." , classmates at the Boali Hall
moerats have an ability to as a strictly strongarm opera- tAccording to travel raconb, School of IJnr at the Univer-
,, .1 back together after a tion. He stressed what fun we Segretti criss-crossed the sity of California ,ln BcAeley,
knockdown,' drag-out 'cam- could have. As an example, be country at least 10 times dar- on ft is knownfhai nfwas raised
>aign. What we want to do is gave this situation: the West Coast ,'
ing the second half of 1971. After receiving"Ks law de-
eak enough havoc so they *"Wfcen a rally Is scheduled Stops Included Miami, Hous-
at T p.m. at a local coliseum M a n c f e , N.H.,*'Xnox gree, "he served as V Treasury
Department attorney 1^ Wash-
Shipley said he tolfl Se by a particular candidate, yeu Los Angeles, New York, ington for less tbajt a j^par, ac-
jp-ettt, "Well, it sounds inter call up and represent to the Washington, Salt Lake <Jtty, cording to (rienA, hud 'then
psting; let me thin* about it" manager that you're the field Chicago, Portland, Ore, Albu- enteredvthe Army as an offi-
In addition to Shipley, manager for this candidate querque, Tucson, San Fran- cer hi ttie Army* JudAflvo-
Roger Lee Nixt of Dennison, and you "have 'some Informa- cisco, Monterrey and several cate Geaeral Corps. jgh- '
owa, and Kenneth Griffiths tion that some rowdies, some other Californiat<dtios^ ^ ', A r Treasury , peinrtroeot
Atlanta, Ga., said they hippies or whaMiave-you are ' According to Shipley, spokesman conCnned that Se-
urned down similar offers going to Cause trouble. So you gretti was a* unlikely choice gretti, in 1SW6 an 1W7,
m Segretti, with whom they ask him to move the raUyup| for .py undercover political worked as aa attorney in the
rved in Vietnam. Both de- to 9 o'clockthereby Insuring w o r t I didn't think be could office of the Comptroller at
lined to discuss the offers in, that the place would be pad do' it because he's not that the Currency liefc> , i;, <
ietail, but they acknowledged locked when the candidate do It because "he's not that About a year of SegrettTs
it Segretti had told them showed up at 7,*" kind of guy," said Shipley. Army service, tHends taid,
ey would be engaged in sub Shipley said he was asked "He doesnt have the right was spent In VJeUia^with
activitiessimilar to by Segretti toflyto Atlanta to personality. He's a small guy Americal Division headquar-
lose described by Shipleyto enlist their Army colleague, with a big smile ontalsface all ters 1B Chulal and l l A AxW-
President Nixon's re-elec- Kenneth Griffiths, in the proj- the time, kind of naive almost Vietnam headquartera i t
sn. . ' \ ect, "but that he never made I always issvmed he was Longbinh. "^^T- '^\l
till another lawyer who the trip. However, when visit- fairly liberal, but I dont think Segretti returned ** the
ved with SegretU in Viet- Ing Griffiths last Christmas; we ever had a political discus- States for tbf, latter part of
am, Peter Dixon of San tVan- said Shipley, "Griffiths men- iov v : : - / v v - ; : ^ '^, ii . his military'service and was
jlsco, also said Segretti made tioned to me that SegretU had 'Segretti 'told him onC other stationed at Ft Or VBtU Us
an offer. However, Dixon been In contact with him and major element about his cov- discharge sometime in the sec-
he told Segretti "No that Griffiths had expressed ert work, said Shipley: "He in- ond half of Wli, aooordlng to
hanks" before any details of 1 absolutely no interest at U." tended to go Into a law firm friends. ,
tie job were revealed. "I said, The last time he heard from near Los Angeles by the name
Don, Tm not interested Segretti, said Shipley, was on f Young and . Segrettitoe
political matters, and I'm Oct. 23, when "he called said it was a <oyer, ^h*t ^ht hhe
not a Republican anyway,'" from California and asked me would be 'doing only political
aid Dixon. - to check into Muskie's opera- work* V . f r v V i v t
The most detailed account tion in Tennessee . . . I just According to the California
Segretti's activities was never did anything about it" Bar Association. Segretti's law
Jven by Shipley, who said he "At one time during these office at 14013 West Captain's
a .memorandum to bim- conjectural discussions," Shj- w
elf about the -episode "be- pley continued, "Segretti said . 3 < . . . . . . .
luee u aU" seemed so It might IK good to get a false There, in an apartment sur-
r a n g e * * ' ; ' < - < rounded t y comfortable furni-
ID to travel under, that it
At one point during the woqld be harder for anyone to ture, pfles of photograph
our month period. , w,ben Se> catch up with us. He men- ords, tomato p ,
plants,
deck and a
a atere*
, - recelver.i
*. êcrit tioned he might use the pseu- speed bii^, Segretti was to
pin, - said/ Sblplfly",, \lk , ap- donym Alll Mooney for him- last week by Post special co--
proached a friend who worked respondent w ^ t 'i*m'
San. Albert Gore{P-Tenn.) ^ Questioned vhetber
nd was advised to try, and , r-_--- aid be wanted 1
to
Vnew Alex STrif"
ing htm (Segretti) out to cover fhe country,* Shipley
Nixt, Ttennei
; what he's up to." Although <*onUnued,^'that he would be Peterf tHion, i ferifnths or
I dost Hke these" (yne of Jhfe? - -* ja lesi'the head coordl-
jSnlgans," SlflpUpWu^rW 1 ' tor fhe country., But "Why?" Inf( that they
subsequently fconttfetedsome of the "things he pro-1had said Segretti attempted - to
---
anyone else about (Jje njatter' posed to' do did nT seem that recruit tbem fjaf uoflercoyiee
ftbd said "he Ta3 not been ques-" ' ^ i m e getting a post poUd
1L
; '"' "" "'"""' *"" "^
toned' by* tie FBr Sbout, Se-office'oWt;fa tfle name of the' dont thenlte
trettl ;
' '-' ' - ' - - "' 'Tassachusetts Safe Driving dined to answer a scries at
purlng a meeting onFiJuly jCommittee,, ^nd awarding a 1 questions except lo Say either
DONALD R SEGREMI
., ,This is all rldlcoloiis-
K I E V . - t-71> Felt
Baker
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Cleveland
JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.; Conrad
KT AL Dalbey
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S. _
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Democrats te Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan _
Tbe McGovfcrn"<mp "last

riyhl accused the Republicans
more acts of attempted po-
litical aatwj*gt and ..Rep.
frighC?#W*
eweS 'M >ffft to
IJie Watergfl* incidejil utd
stemming from i t
Ttank fctsnklewiez, political
ector for the McGovem The Washington PoaL 1 n
paign, lislta 1 separate Timee Herald A X, IV
W aliegetf iabotaij*, y- The Washington Daily New
that some of them were or. The Evening Star (Washington)
t nave come /coin Hie He- ' The Sunday Star (Washington)
Daily News (New York)
"While he" otterfHS v * vi- Sunday News (New York)
ence that -tbe alleged iabo- >CH êpanic oa ,,
ige was Republican-sponsor-. New Yoifc Post
The New York Time*
The Dally world
unpt to get AJtlrClO Presi-
lent George Meany to com* OurLng'the morning irfef- The New Leader
m fitm York for a boguj ren,- ing at the White House, Frets The Wall Street Journal
[etvoue With McGovem to in SecreUry RtjrmW l i Ziegler Tbe National Observer _
lanoea f ^telephone xsJU ,o 29 separate- oc-
mounting to apparent prac- people'* World
ical jokes. J.-;J ,>..,-'.,->;^,V'<1 new allegatiooa , of political
l a a related df-velopraent, pyini aa r^portert ûestionwl
k-n. Edmund . Mwkfe, (0- him about the 4s*#r. fat
v
tfaine), identined in yprt*r- nearly 10 tnlwlte^: v y . > ' Date 10/11/72
ia/s Washington Post story \"Wy answer," Zieglfrr abd hi
is the victim of a Whit* House this filial, no-comment state-
ioax that apparently damage^
iis presidential campaign. <**-
nanded yesterday trait Preti-.
lent' Nixon personally answer
"' "" his staff to to cfcarogt. f ajft Alt.
\LL INFORMATION CONTAINED

ÊREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
(
WATI-&GATE, From Al day Incliii ^ frrg 1ho*fv?dua1s wiw

support ttfe(llliyf candidate'
by Clark %. "Mollenhoff, of b ?% don't want ^toWk
itrther to wy about The the Des Molnes Register and trnUewio *aW that
Vashlnglon Post story. It has Tribune, that reported that bout Wm," said Blackburn him in
teen appropriately addressed Ziegler had said that money Theyy want to to talk about a
t l k about
rih
y the committee (for the re- used in the Watergate bugging peripheral issue, and that'* U telephone <jafl $f -CBS com
lection of the president) and incident came from. Nixon menttor Wfjter jfronldte last.
AT. Clawson and I have noth- campaign funds. 2legler bas Patman s a i d fait Cow-
ng further to sy." mtttee's Investigation- would
denied making wen an ad- focus on "aU of theflnancial The fn^pcrEotiitor referred
Both the Nixon committee mission. .- '' ,.. , ;;.. t e c i a l frfibguTaeal fiMM* Cron
tnd Ken W. Clawson, White There lias also been i aspects p of the charges against 3 ^ Had aJJegeoly'agreed
aJgolyg to
Republicans - >- i ' w f*r centt * * ththe news
fouse aide linked to the po! statement by Alfred C. Bald- the Republicans.
ieal espionage in the Po win III, who has been granted Staats, In a letter to Rimer coverage o lf ,t*e th presidential
id
US. comptroller gen rarapajfn to .McGovtra and
tory, have flatly denied ti immunity from prosecution, eral. Patman asked the GAO
barges. that he participated in the lo Investigate the transporta- he remathing 20 per cent lo
The Post story reported that buggine,eonsm/acy and saw tion *f J100.000 from Houston, Ing _. , _ .- , < - . ge{
FBI agents had linked the tra transcripts, sfi' the bugging Tex., to a bank in Mexico and g suspiciousJ>etter
p give
atcrgate bugging incident idrefafA presidential finally to the President's re- kiewicz more to to K i * tbe Man-
Injpcrspn*tpr.faid.
:o massive campaign of polit- de ajna members o / t h e re- election "committee. - : v /' ' MankiewJcz said that Cron
ral spying and s a b o t a g e flection committeei . * ^ Patman's letter also asked later
ter tol nim m U the lm
gainst the Democrats. I) Patman said U.S. District' the GAO_taJHPstigate t h e personat(tr* caU 'infl' 1 "said
Rep. Patman, chairman of Court Judge John J. Sirica's manner in .which .$25,000 In WS definitely not
the House Banking and Cur- amended order issued last Fri-
1
rency Committee, cited the day "clears the way for these ilectlon)' finance committee* Mmkiewla said the other
tory in pressing again for the witnesses (Mitchell, Mtc- nd "the present location recent examples of alleged dis-
ull-scale congressional Inves- Gregor, Stans and Dean) to he |1Z5,OOO described a bo ruption and lBtemgenoe gath
tigation with subpoena power* appear voluntarily . . . There o determine who now has erinf Included; >^ t
Into the Watergate 'bugging is no legitimate reason for esfiion of this money and/ * telefihone catl to HcGov-
incident that was refused by them not to appear." ^ for what purposes it wa* e: cra finance personnel by some-
a 20 to-15 vote of his Commit- Sirica has earlier rprohibited pended and by whom and one impersonating fCirbjr Jner
tee last week. out-of-court comment on the \what dates." ' * / . " if the McGovern staff askini:
Yesterday, he called the Watergate Incident Incident on on the fl A spokesman for the GAOj or Informatiop on how mucli
members together for a JO A.m, grounds that it would preju said yesterday, however, given to tbe HcGover)
Thursday meeting because dice tbe case of seven defend- | n ts office "may not have the ampaign or Stewart Ifptt, the
"developments of the past ants indicted in the Watergate fljne o r authority" to do all General Motor* heir. ir.
week have greatly intensified break-in and alleged bugging that Patinan has asked by the A req q y another per-
p
the seriousness of tht matter." of Democratic National Com- Oct 26 deadline. - ... .-..-, son claiming li to be a Taiwan
Specifically fsked to testily mittee headquarters, y There ws no Indication yes-j jfplomat seeking information
before Patman's Committee On Friday, however, Sirica terday whether a n ; f Che on McGovern's l t e cam-
are Clark MacGregor, chair- said his ruling was not in- Four Reptibjiican p aides asked t paign schedule
man of the Committee to Re- tended to affect congressional testify before the Committee A telephone
p j p tome
elect the President; Maurice activities, political debate or would appear Thursday. .,: one posingi as *jt aide \p cam-
Stans, that committee's fi- news media reporting. A spokesman for the re-elec- paign manager Gaiy Hart re
nance chairman; John Mitch- Patman said he did not pn committee said he did no questing ti campaign
apai hi
ell, former Attorney General know if President Nixon had enow what'response MacG Lawrence C. O'Brtea to atop
and former campaign chair- direct knowledge of'the bug- or and Stans would 1u criticizing Hart, 1 '\ .A ,'
man, and John Dean, a WhiJIe ng conspiracy or any other and I dont believe tn' Another telephone Imper
House staffer who conducted eged sabotage activities on things 1 don't know." senator alleging to be fitiiver
an in-house investigation jf e part of his re-election com- There was no response from the1 McGovera TV
the Watergate incident. [I ttee. . " !"" either Mitchell or Dean, bat a agent, and trying to cancel the
spokesman for Patman said be senatort speecih p last nUfht on
At a news conference in the But, Patman said, "Re's In "- - at least1 some of- CBS
Rayburn House Office Build- charge, as he should be. He is p that CBS outlining
outlining % jrtan toto end end
tbe Vietnam w*r. <Tb* plan
ing, Patman also said that the responsible. If .you dec't run the four would show.up for the failed fnen CBS officials esU
General Accounting Office the campaign yourself, you healing.
"has taken up my request for lose control of it" '\\ .fl t- '.": "Judge f SiricaJ gtyen
a full-scale investigation of the Rep. Benjamin B. Blackburn them permission to talk and
j that was their" only excuse be-
financial aspects of the Water- (R-Ga.), who h d d Pat-
attended P
gate affair" and will release man's news conference, told fore,* said tiie spokesman.
They'll have* to come up with
Initial findings by Oct. M. reporters afterward h , the another reason or they'll slm- sWrfes in the newspapers on
"I m calling on the Presi- chairman "has no that en- p]y have ib start talking." staff changes or jprpnlwns, and
dent to open up the records denceiin the Watergate newInves-
The spokesman said that it* "4i*kw
all the recordsof hi* cam- tigation). It would be absolu- the witnesses dSd not show
paign organization," said Pat- tely crazy for any witness to "then the Committee will
man. "I am calling on him to appear." , slder : vottaaf to
require that all of his person-' Blackburn, wlio caid he
1
nel be available to answer would be (n Georgia Thursday Members of the Committee,
questions and to reveal pub- kicking off his re-election cam- including all Republics* tn<
licly what has gone on behind paign, said th* Committee voted to | 5 s)
the back* of the American could serv* je~tegal purpose \hg sneq subpoenas
people." . . by an Investigation and; that k and the two Demo
Other recent developments further probing would be too four Southern
alluded jo by Eatman yester close to congressional adjourn- wlu voted no then Indicated
ment due t*rhaps on Saturday. Wsterday they probably would
lot change their votes, .if
have
hat?' ami we'd never flndwrt.
omebody was clearly doing
M
, In another development yes-

erday, fte second of three at-
arneys who told The Post thai1
ey were recruited to do po-
l cabotage for .the tte-
jblicans described some of
Roger Lee Nlxt, the attor-

told CBS reporter! in
owa that one plan was to
int up , "bogua. ticket* <er
fcxtra tickets1" for Democratic
und-raisers, particularly those
Sen. Mttslrie. . - '
Nixt Mid these extra tickets
vould be given to' pVople w
bat when the dinner wat ac-
ually held, there'll be eonfu-
on because too many people
vould be there and thLs would
itate the Democrats in
and create a problem lq
lie Musltie campaign."
||Nixt said he was told '1
uld get paid good /or It
lat money was no problem."
Meanwhile, reports were clr
ulating In t h e McGovra
amp that 'some of the initial
formation concerning t h e
aedical history of Sen.Tbtm-
i Ka^leton came from Bepub-
an s o u r c e s . McGovern
opped Eagteion from (fae
ket after it Iras diacloied
at the enator bad icceird
ychiatrlc treatment.. -, -.-..^
Robert Boyd, chief of the
ogion bureau of 9Cniht
newspapers which received the
tip on Eagleton's twek.-
Dund, IncludJag'some *e-
, said In an interview that
be newspaper chain's ionive
his jnaterial from "Bepufc-
" ftd*
'Later, 4he game informant
Mitacted M<?Govern 'IjjufcJ
algn aides with Ow.- data/ The
ffeGoiWrn 'people were f^
ed, Boyd said, at haviai
disclosure come early In
&>&;. 4 ?-
13-25-72 Al&
TO a'*
F*0B VJA^ FIELD
0
VUT8R K CORD. J R . , t I A t , BURGLARY, DEMOCRATIC
, * H i o . 6.c. JUNE M n t i s
1 l
^; ,s:*,vif
; FOLLOWS IÔRMATIOi 8EIQ >URISKD .TO.âREAO. A S ; A f T ^ M ^ ^
i OF OCTOBER TWElf THREE LAST, WFO CASE AQT !

CA5E RECEIVE TEUEPHOK C A U FROM WFO HiQMT SUPERVt$O*
ADVISED C A ^ f R i S T B t l URSEiTLY SEEKIM TO ^PEAK^TO CASE
&ERHSTEI- WAS wilACTED BT SA U FROHJUS HOME A0
STATED KE WAS I I * BID, THAT *?***>. FW** i
KBOW I f W tt
W WAS PRUTIHG RWHT trt.
tHAT ^ k COBtO BEtiWOU 8 M COKJIEtT M JT t l
AW p I R E C m BERUSTEII W. CAU CRIME RECORDS . *
^k S
,- t
Jc'-
o
PAGE TWO >
B WHITE HOUSE. THAT SOMETIME BEFORE HUGH SLOAN TESTIFIED BEFORE THE
FEDERAL GRAHD JURY, ME WAS OE BRIEFED III AUSA EARL SILBERT*S OFFICE.
HE STATED THAT SLOAN TOLD SILBERT THE IDEMTITY OF THE FIVE PEOPLE
WHO HAD ACCESS TO CERTAIN SECRET FUNDS. IN ADDITION TO NAMING
HAGRUDER, FORMER AG JOHN MITCHELL AND GEORGE GORDON LIDDY, BERNSTEIN
p; SAID SLOAN TOLD SILBERT THAT HALDEfiAN HAD ACCESS ALSO.
THE CASE AGENT ASKED BERNSTEIN WHERE HE WAS GETTING HIS INFORMATION
FROM? BERNSTEIN COUNTERED BY ASKING WHY THE FBI DID NOT INTERVIEW
SLOAN AND WHY DIDN'T SILBERT TELL THE FBI THIS NAME AND WHY DIDi'I
THE FBI INTERVIEW HALDEMAN? BERNSTEIN WAS GIVEN A NO COMMENT OH
m THIS ITEM AND AGAIN REFERRED TO THE BUREAU HEADQUARTERS FOR
ANSWERES. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE AGENT WAS NOT GOING TO REVEAL WHO
THE FBI INTERVIEWED OR DID NOT INTERVIEW.
HE WAS ALSO TOLD, AS HE WAS ON OCTOBER THIRD LAST, THAT THE '
WASHINGTON POST OUGHT TO STOP STEALING FBI MATERIAL AID
PRINTING IT IN THEIR PAPER BECAUSE SOMEDAY THERE WILL BE ..-
END PAGE TWO
1 / - .
... :h ,
cr
I
iff
n
PAGE THREE
m I1VESTIGATI0R OF THE MATTER AMD MAYBE THE DEPARTMENT WILL COME L00KIB6
FOR HIH. AT THIS POIIIT THE AGENT ATTEMPTED TO HABG U P , BUT BERBSTEIi
S A I D , IN ESSENCE, LET HE TELL YOU MY STORY. MOW YOUR SILENCE WILL
TELL ME I'M RIGHT, THE STORY 6 O E S , SLOAN GOES TO SILBERT'S OFFICE
si BEFORE HE GOES TO GRAND JURY. THERE HE TELLS SILBERT THE NAMES OF

THE PEOPLE. THE FBI WASN'T PRESENT DURING THIS DE BRIEFING SO
I
CONSEQUENTLY YOU, THE BUREAU, DOB'T HAVE ACCESS TO WHAT SLOAN S A I D ,
AND AFTER, SILBERT TAKES HIM TO THE GRAND JURY AND REP1EATS THE
STORY. AGAIN YOU DON'T GET THE INFORMATION. END QUOTE. BERNSTEIN
V*S IMMEDIATELY ASKED TO IDENTIFY HIS SOURCE WHICH HE REFUSED.
HE WAS ASKED HOW HE KNEW WHAT SLOA* SAID TO SILBERT IN THE OFFICE
OR BEFORE THE GRAND JURY? AT THIS POINT THE AGENT -MENTIONE-fl -THAT -
QUOTE HIS NAME, JOHN HALDEMAN END QUOTE? BERNSTEIN SAID HE WASN'T
TALKING ABOUT EHRLICHMAH, BUT ABOUT THE OTHER PERSON. HE WAS TOLD THAT
THE AGENT DOESN'T REMEMBER THE FIRST NAMES OF ALL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
FOR THAT MATTER THE LAST NAMES COULD MEAN NOTHING. AGAIN RE WAS
..%'
tl*D PAGE THREE
It
S '5
PAGE FOUR
REFERRED TO BUREAU HEADQUARTERS FOR ANSWERS, SEEMUGL.Y
FLUSTERED FOR NOT GETTIW5 A PROPER ANSWER HE HUiG OP.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CALL, AUSA CAMPBELL W O IS
EARL SILBERT'S CHIEF ASSISTANT WAS APPRflSED OF THE CONVERSATION.
HE RE^JTERATED THAT BERNSTEIN WAS ON ANOTHER FISHING EXPEDITION AND
SUGGESTED THAT AUSA SILBERT BE CONTACTED IN THE HORNING*
AFTER THIS CALL, THE WFO NIGHT SUPERVISOR RETURNED ANOTHER CAU.
TO THE AGENT. AGAIN BERNSTEIN SAID HE HAD SOMETHING URGENT THAT WOULD
TAKE THIRTY SECONDS OF THE AGENT'S TIME.
BERNSTEIN WAS RE CONTACTED, WHEREUPON HE ADVISED HE HAD JUST
RECEIVED A CBS NEWS VIRE WHEREIN THE HEADLINE STORY WAS THAT THE
ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FBI HAS INFORMED THE PRESIDENT TO RE OPEN THE
1 WHITE HOUSE INVESTIGATION OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR SINCE THERE WAS

5ERI0US LINKS DEVELOPED BETWEEN CERTAIN SUBJECTS AND THE WHITE HOUSE
-
STAFF. THE AGENT TOLD BERNSTEIN THAT THE FBI INVESTIGATION OF THE
WATERGATE AFFAIR IS STILL CONTINUING AND STATED THAT EVEN THE
ACTING DIRECTOR HAS SAID THAT. THEREAFTER, BERNSTEIN SAID,
END PAGE FOUR '. > \''^': ;t
-V
O
PAGE FIVE ...*
QUOTE THAT MAME YOU HEUTIOHED EARLIER, J0H f I W A S f l TALKIW3 ''*'/&
ABOUT EHRLICHMAN, I WAS TALKISG ABOUT HALDEHAH EBD QUOTE, ^ !f
THE AGENT REPLIED QUOTE YEA, HALDEMAH, RICHARD, ROBERT OR J 0 H 8 ,
It LIKE I SAID I DON'T KNOW FIRST DAMES. END QUOTE. WITH THAT
HE WAS TOLD HIS TINE WAS UP AND THE AGENT RUNG UP THE PHOHE. *
AT APPROXIMATELY FOUR PM TODAY IN U . S . DISTRICT COURT, BERNSTEIN

AND FELLOW REPORTER ROBERTYWOODARD APPROACHED THE AGENT AND SAID
THEY WERE IN BIND OVER THE STORY THEY PRINTED I I TODAY'S PAPER
BASED OB THE AGENT'S STATEMENT, THE AGENT IMMEDIATELY INFORMED
THEM THAT HO STATEMENT WAS EVER HADE AND THEY KNEW
IT, WHEREUPON, BERNSTEIN UNDER WOODARD'S DIRECTION, PRODUCED
A FOLDER SHEET OF TYPE WRITTEN PAPER CONTAINING PARTS OF A CONVER-
SATION BETWEEN THE AGENT AND BERNSTEIN, WHEREIN THE AGENT A D M I T S
ID PART BY SAYING, QUOTE YEA, HALDEMAN, END QUOTE, AS BEIBG
ANOTHER NAME FURNISHED BY SLOAN. THE AGENT CATEGORICALLY
DENIED ANY SUCH STATEMENT WHEREUPON WOODARD SAID HE WAS ON THE
OTHER PHONE AND HEARD THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION. THE AGENT AGAIN -- -
END PAGE FIVE
-,- 1
PAGE SIX
TOLD BERNSTEIN THAT HE WAS WRONG AND IT WAS HIS PROBLEM, AND
BERNSTEIN REPLIED THAT QUOTE YOU'RE THE GUY THAT'S
IN A BIND END QUOTE.
11 AUSA CAMPBELL AND SILBERT WERE BEFORE JUDGE JOHN SIRICA 0 1
ORAL MOTIONS ON THE WATERGATE CASE. AUSA CAMPBELL WAS APPRAISED
OF THE ALLEGED TYPEWRITTEN STATEMENT BY BERNSTEIN, AFTER THE
HEARING, BERNSTEIN AND WOODARD WERE SUMMONED TO SILBERT'S OFFICE
WHERE THEY STATED THAT THEY WERE UNDER PRESSURE BECAUSE OF A STORY
THEY PRINTED TODAY, BASED ON THEIR QUOTE SOURCES INFORMATION END ,
1 QUOTE, MAY HAVE BEEN WRONG. BERNSTEIN SHOWED THE COPY TO ^
AUSA SILBERT AND WHEN HE ASKED BERNSTEIN WHO HIS SOURCE WAS,
BERNSTEIN SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO RELEASE THAT INFORMATION AT THIS

TIME, HOWEVER, HE SAID THE PAPER WAS UNDER PRESSURE TO DO SO
SO THEY WILL HAVE TO REPORT THAT THE SOURCE IS SA ANGELO J . LAW
is OF THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE. SILBERT AND CAMPBELL BOTH DENOUNCED
THE TACTICS OF THE TWO REPORTERS, WHEREUPON BERNSTEIN MORE OR
LESS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT PRINT LANO'S NAME PROVIDED , v
END PAGE SIX *??'
"3"
; % - ;
O
u PAGE SEVEN
THEY BE INFORMED WHETHER OR NOT THE STORY WAS TRUE. AUSA SILBERT
;
AND CAMPBELL, LATER INFORMED SA LANO THAT THEY TOLD BERNSTEIN THAT
THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AGENT I S THE SOURCE OF THEIR
II INFORMATION AND THAT THEY ARE BOUND BY JUDGE S I R I C A ' S ORDER

HOT TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS ABOUT THE MATTER. THAT THIS SAME ORDER
APPLIES TO SA LANO AND THEY KNOW HE I S ABIDING BY I T .
BERNSTEIN AND WOODARD LEFT THE COURT HOUSE WITH THE IMPRESSION
THAT THEY WOULD PRINT A STORY ANOUNCING THAT THE AGENT I S THE POST
SOURCE OF THE HALDEMAN STORY.
AUSA SILBERT PERSONALLY KNOWS THAT THE AGENT WAS HOT PRESENT *
m DURING ANY DE BRIEFING SESSION HELD WITH SLOAN AND THAT HALDEMAN'S
NAME HAS NEVER BEEN MENTIONED BY ANY SUBJECT, WITNESS OR
INFORMANT IN THIS MATTER. NO MENTION OF HALDEMAN'S NAME HAS % ,
EVER BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY. AS A MATTER
OF RECORD, THE CASE AGENT HAS NOT SEEN SLOAN'S GRAND JURY
TESTIMONY}
END PAGE SEVEN
i,i\
., . % *
V
' ' & %*.>.
:
'i
1
'-
PAGE EIGHT
AS IN PREVIOUS INTERVIEWS WITH INSPECTORS AND ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BATES, THE CASE AGENT HAS ÊNIED MAKING ANY STATEMENTS TO THE
PRESS AND DENIES GIVING ANY STATEMENTS TO CARL BERNSTEIN
REGARDING H. R. HALDEMAN OF THE WHITE HOUSE.
DETAILED FD THREE ZERO TWO BEING PREPARED ON THIS HATTER.
EID
6VS WASH DC FIB FBI CLR AND ACK FOR IMMEDIATE
' * !
-(
OOi
1- Mr. Felt
1- Mr. Bates
I The Attorney General October * UTt
; j a r ... 1- Mr. Gallagher
Acting Director, FBI / Of 1- Mr. Bolx
ST-UI ' 1- Mr. Husua
JAMES KALT5* MC COW), Jl., AMD
BURGIART Or MEK0CRAT1C M*TXO1ULX
i< COMMITTEE READQUA
JUNK 17, 1972
INTERCEPTION CT
This Bureau** Washington Field Of flea advise* that

w-, ; Washington Post* news reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob
it Woodward, who wrote the article October 25, 1971, Identifying
B 1. Baldeoan, White Bouse Chief of Staff, aa one of tho
Individuals authorised to approve payments frcai a secret
campaign fund, were summoned to the office of Assistant S.
fc *^ Attorney (AUSA) Earl Sllbert, October 25, 1972. At that tiao
the news reporters stated they were under pressure because
their story, based on "sources,* aay have been wrong. Further,
"The Washington Post" was also under pressure to Identify tho
source of this story and Bernstein and Woodward stated they
were going to identify Special Agent (3A) Angelo J. Lano, case
Agent, as the source of this iftforaatiesw ~ "
This is aa outrageous lie and SA lano Insists

on preparing a sworn signed affidavit categorically denying
this allegation and a copy of this affidavit will bo furnished
to AOEA Silbert* Bernstela and Woodward have obviously gotten
thea$lves into aa extreme bind because of their falsa story
and they are seeking to sake SA lano their scapegoat baaed
on bits and pieces of conversations had with SA Lano as shows
hereinafter.
SA Lano was authorised on October I, 1972, to

neet with reporter Carl Bernstein for the purpose of havinf *:
Bernstein identify his source of information for nuaorous ^>
stories he had written on captlono& Batter. This meeting was
terminated when Bernstein would only Identify Bis source aa v. .
a wary high source,* and he insisted on trying to query
-" about the case to which 6A Lano replied, "no coanaot.VÎr'';
Cleveland
Coatwf
t'E
; - *
Millet. E-S
CB/CAN/amm (10)
Pointer
Soy an
:X
Tele. R o w
Mr
Mr
TELETYPE UNIT LZH

r
if-"?
a
* ;
k Attorney Cnrl
<
A iJino, during th lt nlng of October 23
# f^tarned call t l&ernstela, vho had called th
Washington Field Office spying it WAS argent he peX to SJk
Ir%no. 8A I,srio, bcjiue of hit acute oncern over ftThe lUsh-
ington Foat*** apparent aoceai to FBI information, returnod
' : *
this call hoping to learn fro Bernstein his aouroe of infor-

I< mation.
Bernstein, at this tine, stated he vas la a bind
because he had a big story to finish and needed to Xnow if his
information was correct. Bk Laao advised Bernstein ther*
oould aod would be no oanawnt on his part and suggested
Bernstein call PBX Headquarters. Bernstein vent on to relate
I! that his story centered around Ealdexan of the White Bouse and
stated Bugh Sloan (fomer Treasurer, Finance CoHBdttee to
Beelect the President) jf.n a defrriafing s^mion with 4MJSA 8llbert
I- j tosffmnny trfff^rn thn flt
y * <*T
people, including Baldenan, as having access to certain secret
^
funds.
Bernstein inquired as to why the FBI did not inter-
view Sloan and Haldeaan and why AD6A Sllbert did not five the
FBI the results of Sloan*s interview. SA Lano advised Bernstein
he was not going to reveal whoa the FBI interviewed or did not
interview and attempted to hang up when Bernstein refused to
identify his source of this Information. Bernstein, however,
insisted on telling his story and SA Lano, still hoping to
Identify Bernstein*s source, permitted hla to continue at
which time Bernstein reiterated the above story about Sloaa
Ij identifying Hal<5s*an. At this point SA Lano inquired "Was this
John Halden&n?" to which Bernstein stated he was not taUtittg
about Khrllchnan (John D. Ehrllchman, Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Domestic Affairs) Bernstein* seemingly flustered
by not getting any answers fron SA Lano, thereafter terminated
**?-^
this call.
SA Lano lamedlately called AUSA Donald S.

who is AOSA Silbert's chief assistant, and told hi* of
Bernstein's call. AUSA Campbell commented Bernstein is
ânother *fishing expedition" and suggested AOSA Sllbert
contacted in the storning.
f y. .f
.X ^ Shortly thereafter, Bernstein again contacted
W
Washington Field Office indicating it was argent SA Lano
%i iaoaediately. SA Lano, again hoping to learn Bornsteli*Sf
" -v source of Information, rccontacted Bernstein. At this time
-2-
I
c I
Attorney General
stated * Colombia Broadcasting System news wire

vas reporting that Acting Director Gray had Advised the
President to reopen the White House investigation of D M
Watergate affair. SA Lano advised Bernstein that th FBI
investigation of the Watergate affair was continuing and
oven the Acting Director had so stated. Thereafter,
Bernstein stated 'That name you aentloned earlier, John,
X wasn't talking about Khrlichnan, X was talking about
Haldeoan." Bh Lano then consented, "Tea, Haitioman, Richard,
Robert or John, like X said X do Dot know first naaes," and
with that t&minaied the conv^raatlon when it was obvious
Berntttai* was shopping for information.
Daring the afternoon of October 25, 1972, Bernatet*

and Woodward approached SA Lano in 0. 8. District Court,
Hashing ton, D. C , and said they were 1A a bind over a stoary
they had written in that day*s newspaper based oa SA Lano'a
#
statenent. SA Lano lnfomned Bernstein and Woodward that he

had Bade no statenant whereupon they produced a typewritten
paper containing parts of the foregoing telephone conver-
sations between SA Lano and Bernstein, particularly the part
wherein SA Lano said "Yea, Baldeaan." This was aade to
SA I^nowas-conglrm^ng w*l*omiii m name furnished
Sloan whereas SA Lano waa in fact oonfiralng that he knew
I rriitaln-TwAa- talhTHg abouEZ S A IMM> categorically d i
to Bernstein and Woodward that he had ever made a statement
confirming Baldeaan as a ruuaa furnished by Sloan whereupon
Woodward stated he was on the other phone and heard the entire
conversation with Bernstein.
The foregoing typewritten paper prepared by Bernstein
Us and Woodward is an obvious vicious fabrication by them wbereia
they have taken SA Lano's con&ent completely out of context ts>
suit their unfounded news story concerning M. R. Halduaan ...
1 AUSA Campbell was inaedlately advised of
and Woodward1s typewritten paper and they were thereafter
trammed to AUSA 6ilbert*e office. At this time Bernstein ni
Woodward stated they were under pressure because e>f the story
they printed October 25, 1)72, based on the "source** infor-
Station," which information aay have been wrong* AUSA Si]
r
esk4 Bernstein who his source was and Bernstein etate4 "
QO> wih to release that informatioa at this tie. Berc
stated, hcvever, 'The Washington Post" was under pressure^!
identify this source and they will have to report that the'
source is SA Angelo J. Lano of the Washington Pie Id Office* *
* ' . ' , - . ; ' - * ? ' . .
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GJ* CEM ItG NO
UNITED STA rES GOV h >' M E NT J 0,

V "Tt: Bii*
Memorandum Ur. CHhm
Mr. CleveJand
Mr Cebhanit _
Mr. Jenkijii
MR. MILL DATE 2-14-73 Ur. Marshall __
Ur. Hitler. E.S.
Ur. Purvii
Ur. Soy
FROM : w. M. FELT Ur.
TeJ- I
Ur.
Mr.
SUBJECT: WATERGATE Mr. B o w e t _
s> $ Mr. Haiujtnn .
Mi. Herwif _
Ur. Minti
Attached is a copy of^stn article from the Washington lire. Neoin ._
JBosL dated_2=J.4-13 captionedâta_^pjpo..SecvirJty.Taps^Reported
*'<"
The article, which was written bi_gjjb^y oodward and XlarL

rnstein, states that E. Howard Hunt, J r . , and G. Gordon Liddy
regularly reviewed information obtained from national security wiretaps
while they worked at the White House during 1971 and 1972.
Mr. Gray has instructed that a detailed analysis be prepared
of this article for his information and guidance and for his briefing book.
Mr. Gray desires that our dissemination procedures to the
White House of security information be described in detail. In other
words, what is our dissemination to the White House, does it take
different forms, and is information from national security wiretaps
included? '
In your memorandum you should anticipate all possible

questions which might be asked Mr. Gray concerning this matter
and provide the answers.
This matter should be expedited

Enc. >
WMF:cii;V/
(3) Jtf
1 - Mr.^Gebhardt (Enc.)
MAR 201973
H< : ;
) r
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

5 5 MAR? 31973 HEREIN IS .UNCLASSIFIED
DATE fhh
??
o 0
From Security Taps
Reported Given Liddy, Bunt
>; Woodward Thc ratj , ^
Doparunen( spokesman, said
> M.i.-P^si.irwr.m i of the most controversial un- ho couldn't "rule out" the pos-
] reformation ohiained tomjderlakiriys of the Nixon ad- sibility that 'Hunt and Liddy
irtieeiv<id infoririation from the
ni.iwiai security wiretap* was ministration Justice Depart- ; wiretaps "But I can't sec? any
rcj;u:..rl.v routed to Watergate, merit. On June IS, 1S72, in a I place where they'd have a
h u ^ u c conspirators E. How- ^ o r r e b u f f ' t h f Supreme 'nceo. lo know." Hushen said.
T _ . Court unanimously rejected
a.-t. Hum Jr. ana G. Gordon t h e a d m i t l l S t r a U o n . s c o n t e n . j The Supreme Court June
;,i,1rt\ wi.ilr iijc> worked in turn that the executive branch ruling <3c-alt with unauthorized
i,.r v. I.JU- He.use. according lo could wiretap "domestic" fiub- wiretaps of "domestic" radical I
liilornnod source* versives without approval of groups, bul the executive ^
branch is sull allowed'to piacei
'i'nt Viiures said that Ui e 1 a fOurL taps on suspected 'foreiRn"!
. , i A justice Department groups without court approval.,'
;*-., *"O r ^ v e d inc-inform.-; s p o k o s m a n a i d that, to his After the rulinfi. the Justice
. .,. A..- s,cve/a. irionins in i knowledfie, Hunt end Liddy Department' said it stopped 12
Uli ana 3S72. at a time when 1, w e r e -not cleared to sec" ei- "domestic" taps,
tn^ \-xoi. admm^fration was- L]K-r type of national security
*,ri>i*wm^ (ln)csuc radu-a! w j r c u P i 4n d that if they did, Thc sources did not reveal j
ruups witnoui court approval. i t COu id be a security viola- which specific wiretap went to;
f;
;ij'icia,1 o[ Pi'fMfient Nixon's u o n Hutu and Liddy, just that the
Actorduig i the eouites, information was regularly r
'ut i* triai i.isl" (d f highly classified reports routed to l-hem for several!
,(: . T . , - i . i d - j , , . ^ , ,
r o u i ( d l 0, jj,
1J1( H[l(i months during their White!
' < n ! '' l l r f ' > > l ) J,I(.>J- tfwoufid David Y<njtit a House employment.
i.J niprnhor of liic Nanon.ii Hunt worked as & consult
am in ihf Whm- House from
. lo i w iJresideni'^ lorei^n about Jul> 197] to at least
wircurps genprall.v fii: rs. adviser Dr Henry A March. 2872. l.indy was an
uie Fbi. ly moii^ a!jp iu the Wjkiti iioiisc Do-
ciosi'iy JieJd anc stii-
. .Vr'Jliie time. Youn^ as tne -Council troni JUIH1.,
folli'c:r<] by uie
\\ u.:*; rlouse k;rou,' caiiea the

n'licthcr Hum 'juumDr.'t" vnat was ifives;.-
j . . . .D- itvaks in I., news .ui-
. . i. 1J1/..M- i>t,>jt\ i Press
d ,i li.uîi and l_iddy were
>. ;:eijr.\ . .prald Warren said rin-not'iT. -of ine "plumbers."
Ji,J siiiired an office with
i'i"vsin^ we car* find abso- JOUTJL:. Federal sources have
iu.t. ikD basis for tile report." Kiid that Young was not in-
n said however, that the re-
P<J,' /-ouia not be flatly ae- volvederin illegalany of the question-
activities of-
TUf.
|.t.-r> ftre two "types of nn- -
pi oi- i.iudj Youi) could.
wiretaps
- IH1 rcaciiOfi J'or comment.
!... ., .st-roi fiy wireiatJS mai , , ,
I! :,.: i..iri Liddy could have ^'"''rwi Chenow, a former
a:,: access tothose apainst fc'm'tary tne to Yount.ofwas
njiuirit: theasked
wire-;
"foreign" suiver-
and those against suh- i information 10 Hunt
"domestic" ubversi- P" d L"id-V- " j *-*r\\ ulk about
Mi^t." she said
1
' Hu&ai'ii, Uie Justice ALL INFORMATION COOTAINED
HEREIN I S UNCLASSIFIED
DATE fo fa
THE WASHINGTON l'OSTi
y,
j -f
o
rfi i
i -
*
1P7i lo December, 1971, when I Young, was in no way in-; Liddy and James W, Mc- to undermine our Internal se-
he joined the Nixon re-elec-j volved in the other activities Cord .ir.. the former Nixon curity and hostile domestic
tioji committee, i of Hunt and Liddy. committee security coordina-
groups seeking the overthrow
The sources said that nei-| All national security wire-* tor, were found guilty last
ther Hunt nor Liddy initiated I taps during 1971 and the be-' month of all charges against of our government. I don't see
aii> new wiretaps for the gov-[ ginning of 1972 had to be ap-j them in the Watergate bug- how we can separate the two,
eminent, though there have proved personally by John N. |ging conspiracy. Hunt and but if it were possible, I would
been press s p o r t s that Liddy MitchelJ, who was then the at-j four other men pleaded guilty say that history has shown
wanted to bug The New York torney general. ' I to all charges against them in greater danger from the do-
Times to discover who leaked the case. All seven men are to
Liddy said last summer in a ! mestic variety."
the- Pentagon Papers The Jus- be sentenced next month.
sworn deposition that it was
tice Department reportedly re- Testimony in the Watergate
Mitchell who recommended i During the period Hunt and
jected this suggestion. trial suggested that Mitchell
him for the job as, general Liddy were employed in the
According to the sources, counsel to the Nixon re-elec- White House, the FBI claimed at Jeast indirectlyapproved
KRIJ Kroeh. the former White tion committee. Mitchell, who it had about 50 active national the allocation of $250,000 for
Hou.se aide who was in overall was the Nixon campaign man- j security taps. an intelligence-gathering net-i
charge of the "plumbers," was agerfor three months, denied | Ir, June, 1971, Mitchell de-
no; awaro until well after the! in his own sworn deposition fended "domestic" wiretaps, work for the Nixon re-election i
June 17. 1972, Watergate break- j that he recommended Liddy saying: "To withhold such committee. One Republican
ifi al Democratic Headquarters: for the job. ' basic powers from the Presi- source has said that Mitchell
idSi Hum and .Liddy had re- directly approved the funding
Testimony in the W'atergate dent on the ground they might
tv.veti information from na-
trial last month revealed that' be abused is to argue in a par- Mitchell has declined re
i.nr.dl security wiretaps when
soon after Liddy' became gen- aphrase of (Aiexander) Hamil- peated requests for interview*
Hie* worked for him.
eral counsel lo the Nixon com- ton's words, 'that there ought about the Watergate bue^'in^
i' o,-n. now thi: under secre mittee in December, 1871, he to be no President.' " or the intelliKence-KHthenn;;
t. . \ of the Department of was assigned the task of set-! Mitchell continued, in a operation. He has flatly demec
"V. i,b]ioriaiiijn, b e c a m e "very ting up a $250,000 intelligence-; speech before the Virginia knowledge of I he buPfiin^ ant.
L,I.M-." when he iound out, one i gathering network He re-' State Bar Association: "There has not publicly discusseo Uie
II MHi.ve said. Federal sources ceived $235,000 of thai money, is. no dividing line between
nave ba;ii that Kroghj like according to the testimony. [ hosiile foreign forces seeking
intelligence operation
Before the Supreme Court
ruling against "domestic" laps
Richard G. Kleindiensi, iteu
the nominee to succeed Mile
hell at attorney genera!, said
that the purpose of the do-
mestic taps is "intelligence [
gathering . . . a lot of it is done [
without the thought of )>rose-
cutine" the subjects of the
wiretaps.
One Justice Department said
that the "domestic" taps were
largely a way to keep law-
enforcement officials "plujzêd
into" the clivitiei of radical
groups.
I* ^
UNITED STATES GoVr.RNMEN 0 Mr. Felt
Mr. R*kw
Memorandum I* Caliahm _
Mr Clevelsnd _
W. Conrw)
Ik. GeWi*idt
Kt. Jenkina
TO : MR. GEBHARDT DATE: 2-21-73 III. Marshall
Ur UiUw. E.S. .
* . Punrii
I t Soyir.
FROM : W. M. FELT Mr. W*\Un
Tele- ROMI
Wr. Kinly
SUBJECT WATERGATE ey Ib*. AnnHtfcnf

Wr. Bowers
Mr. Huonjtoo _
Ma. Herwii
l
of t h e is sui article Ur. Minte
Mrs. Neoin
k *M J **y Bot^Woodward and CapJJHBernstein captioned, "Hunt Linked to
v
Dita Beard Challenge. " {Copy attached.)
As you know, Woodward and Bernstein have written numerous
articles about Watergate. While their stories have contained much fiction
and half truths, they have frequently set forth information which they attribute
to Federal investigators, Department of Justice sources, and FBI sources.
We know that they were playing games with the case agent in the Washington
Field Office trying to trikhim into giving them bits of information. On
balance and despite the fiction, there is no question but that they have access
to sources either in the FBI or in the Department of Justice.
The article in the-P6st, 2=71^73, relates to the ITT memorandum

allegedly written by Ditfl^Beard. In the article, Woodward and Bernstein refer
to "sources close to the Watergate investigation," "Federal investigators,"
and "Federal sources. " They also attribute much of the information to
"Republican sources. " The article also contains references to undisclosed
sources and purports to quote from a sworn deposition taken in a civil suit
filed by the Democratic Party in this case.
The Acting Director has instructed that you immediately institute

an analysis of this article to determine those portions which could have come
from FBI sources and in such instances to set forth the persons having access
to that particular bit of information. ,
You should specifically cover the following quotations from the
article:
(1) "Sources close to the Watergate investigation said that Colson's

testimony was given in a secret deposition to Federal investigators during the
Watergate probe last year. " This testimony allegedly-rela.tsj hisJnstruction
to E. Howard Hunt, J r . , to proceed to Denver, Colorado, to interview ITT
lobbyist Dita Beard.
Enc.
CONTAINED
HEREIN S UNCLASSIFIED
o
Memorandum to Mr. Gebhardt
i :" Re: WATERGATE
(2) "The Federal investigators did not aj&J^Tolson the purpose
of the interview. " Allegedly, according to Republican swxTEes, the purpose
of the interview was to discredit the controversial memorandum attributed
to Mrs. Beard.
Points #1 and #2 may very likely relate to depositions taken in
connection with the eivil suit to which the FBI has not had access.
(3) "Republican sources said that Hunt wore an Inexpensive
wig during the interview with Mrs. Beard early in the week of March 19th. "
The article goes on to point out that a similar wig was found in one of the
rooms rented by the Watergate conspirators. If we had any information
concerning the Hunt-Beard interview during the week of March 19th, full
information should be set forth. Also, particulars as to what we knew about
the wig found at the Watergate hotel.
(4) On page A-21, column 1, the article goes on to describe

It events in the ITT controversy as obtained "from Federal and Republican
sources. " We should check information available in the files to determine
what portions of this story, if any, were known to the Bureau.
(5) The article goes on to point out that Robert F. Bennett,
present President of the firm where Hunt was employed, told Hunt that the
results of the INTERTEL findings should be passed on to Colson. I do not
recall that there is any such information in our files.
t
(6) The article concludes with a quotation from a sworn deposition

taken from Colson in the civil suit filed by the Democratic Party in connection
with the Watergate break-in.
Expedite.
i
- 2 -
o
.%
Hunt Linked to
II Dita Beard Challenge
By Boh Woodward was to obtain information to'
and Car] Bernstein challenge or discredit a con-1
WAÎ.niton POM Staff Writer* troversiaJ memo attributed to |
Charles W. Colson, special Mrs, Beard mat alleged that!
counsel to President Nixon, 'there wa*. a direct connection
sent Watergate bugging figure between the settlement of an-
titrust cases by the Justice'1
E. Howard Hunt Jr. to Denver Department and ITT's offer to
last March to interview Inter- help brine the l&72 GOP con-.
national Telephone and Tele- vention to San Diego. ,
graph Corp. lobbyist Dita Colson, who is out of the)
Beard, according to Colson's coudiry on White House busi-i
ntsb, could not be reached for
own sworn testimony. comment yesterday, and the
Sources dose to the Water- White House' had no immedi-
gate investigation said that ate response.
Colson's testimony was given Hunt traveled to Denver un-
in a secret deposition to fed- der the assumed name of Ed-
; eral investigators during the
:Wa!ej't:ate probe last year. ward Hamilton, an alias be!
At the time of the Denver used during the Watergate it
(trip,
1
Hunt was working as a conspiracy, the federal sources!,
White House consultant, a po- said. 1
sition for which he had been Republican sources said that;
hired on Colson's recommenda- Hunt wore an inexpensive wig;
tion Colson, In other sworn during the interview with Mrs.
public testimony relating to Beard early in the week of
the Watergate incident, has March 16. A similar wig of
said that Hunt was not work-: dark brown or reddish color
ing for him -as late as March, wa.% found ijj one of the two
1972, when the visit to Mrs. rooms rented by the Water-
Beard occurred, gate ' conspirators at the
I
The federal investigators Watergate- Hotel before the
did not ask Colson the pur- June 17 break-in.
pose of the interview. Other In a telephone interview yes-
Republican sotwees said that 11
See WATERGATE, Ml, Col. 1
I
'"I
F- '-i-S'i
*Lt INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
PI
o
Colson Tied to Bid

To See Mrs. Beard
WATERGATE, From Al
terday, Robert D. Beard. 24, the The alleged memo was re-
?' i
gon of Mrs. Beard, said that a ported by syndicated colum-
"mysterious" man wearing a nist Jack Anderson more than
cheap wig and make-up visited two weeks before the denial.
his mother last March to dis- It Jinked the antitrust settle-
cuss the ITT controversy. At the' ment to ITT's offer of a $400,-
time Mrs. Beard was at the' 000 "guarantee" to help sup-
Rocky Mountain Osteopathic port last year's Republican Na-
Hospital in Denver being treat- tional Convention.
ed for a heart ailment. From federal and Republi-
"From pictures I've seen, the can sources, the following se-
visitor could have been Howard quence of events hat been
Hunt," B e a r d said. "But I pieced together: j
couidn't tell. The man refused As the ITT controversy blos-
to identify himself. He seemed somed in March, 1B72, the
to have inside information about Washington office of ITT
what would happen next . . . hired Intertel, a private Inves-
but it was of relatively little tigations firm, to check into
value to us." Mrs. Beard's background and
the authenticity of the contro-
Beard described the visitor as versial memo.
IS "very eerie, he did have a red
wig on cockeyed like he put
Intertel, working with only
copy of the memo, was able
it on in a dark car. I couldn't to establish that it was proba-
have identified my brother if he j fely prepared on a typewriter
was dressed like that" in Mrs. Beard's office, but that
A two-week investigation it would be difficult, if not inv
by The Washington Post possible.to conclusively estab-
hows that Hunt's trip was lish whether it was genuine or
part of an effort by Colson to a forgery, .
discredit the Dita Beard Bernard Goodrich, a spokes-
memo. The work by Hunt and man for the ITT office, ac-
Colson led at least in part to knowledged last week that,the
I Mrs Beard's statement issued
March 17, charging that the
memo was a "forgery" and "a
Intertel investigation was in-
conclusive. "At no time did
they gfve us a report to show
it was forgery," Goodrich said.,
hoax."
That statement, Issued si- Intertel, regarded one of the
multaneously by David W. best private investigative
Fleming, Mrs. Beard's lawyer, firms, also does work for bil-
and Senate Republican Leader lionaire Howard Hughes and
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, corporations in bis financial
came as a total surprise since empire.
it was the first time in a three- The Hughes interests are
weck-old controversy t h a t represented in Washington by
Mrs. Beard's authorship of the Hobert R. Mullen & Co., a
memo had been directly de- public relations firm where
nied. . Hunt was employed as a
writer. Robert F. Bennett,
president of the Mullen firm,
*
o
learned from his contacts in i Fleming said in several re-
the Hughes empire that Inter- cent telephone interviews that
tel was probing the DiU Colson and Hunt were not in-
Beard memo. volved in issuing the state-
According to one account, ment. He did, however, ac-
Bennett was told that Intertel knowledge that he talked with
had determined the memo was Bennett about the matter.
a forgery and that somehow Bennett said last week that he
word should be passed to the would have no commen on
! White House. the subject.
I By another account, Bennett Mrs. Beard's March 17 state*
'was told that Intertel's find- mem said: "I did not prepare
ings were inconclusive, mean- I it (the memo) and could not
ing that the way was clear for have." Without giving a rea-
someone to come forward and I son for her assertion, Mrs.
label the memo a forgery. I Beard continued: "I have done
In any case, Bennett then nothing to be ashamed of and
told Hunt that the nature of my family and I and In a
the Intertel findings, whatever greater sense the whole Amer-
they were, should be passed to ican governmentare the vic-
Colson. :
tims of a cruel fraud,"
During this period, the Columnist Anderson testified
"White1 House was growing in- before the Senate Judiciary
creasingly concerned about _Committeeconfirmed
that Mrs. Beard
the authenticity of
the impact of the ITT allega-
tions, and had launched a ma- jthe memo line-by-line with
his associate, Britt Hume, dur-
jor effort to discredit col urn ing a Feb. 24 Interview at her
nisi Jack Anderson and the home.
memo.
At this point, Colson or- In another sworn deposition
dered Hunt to Denver to inter- taken In a civil suit filed by
view Mrs. Beard. "Colson the Democratic Party In con-
didn't want anything to back- nection with the Watergate
fire, one Republican aource case, Colson said under oath
aid. that Hunt worked for him
Meanwhile, Bennett was act- only for a few weeks in the
ing as a go-between between summer of 1971.
Colson and Fleming, Dita . "Well, initially when he
Beard's attorney, to arrange came to the White House staff
for the release of Mrs. Beard's ,he was reporting to me. That
March 17 statement calling lasted only for a few weeks,"
the memo a "forgery." Colson ssirt. Following those
Colson wanted to avoid any- few weeks, Colson said in that
direct contact between the deposition, Hunt was "at that
White House and Mrs. Beard point not under my supervi-
or her representative as the sion" and worked elsewhere to
controversy became more po- the White House. .
litically sensitive. One Repub-
lican source said.that It was .JL...J
Colson who got Sen. Scott to
read Mrs. Beard's statement
ion the Senate flooor. . ,
1?
if
fcif
> OtH HO MO IF c
"UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO Mr. Gcbhardt1 DATE
2/21/73 Mr. Marshall
I* Millw, E.S
35 * . Purvii
1- Mr. Felt * . Soym
FROM lir. h l t n
R. E. Long 1- Mr. Gebhardt Tele. Room
1- Mr. Gallagher lir. Kinloy
tit. Armstrong
SUBJECT:
1- Mr. Long Bower*
^
1- Mr. Nuzum . Heriogton
1- Mr. Herington Us. Hetwif
|#1 Mr. Minte
Mrs. Noaian
In accordance with instructions in Mr. Felt's
memorandum to Mr. Gebhardt dated 2/21/7 3, there follows an
analysis of the 2/21/73 "Washington Post" article written by
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein captioned "Hunt Linked to
m Dita Beard Challenge." Mr. Gray desired to know those
portions in the article which could have come from FBI
sources and the identities of persons having access to
that particular information. Items set forth below are
numbered to correspond with points in Mr. Felt's memorandum.
(1) "'Sources close to the Watergate investigation

said that Colson's testimony v,Tas given in a secret deposition
to Federal investigators during the Watergate probe last year.
This testimony allegedly relates to his instruction to E.
a Howard Hunt, Jr., to proceed to Denver, Colorado, to inter-
view ITT lobbyist Dita Beard."
r i '
ryS On 8/28/72, Mr. Colson furnished a deposition, in
O lieu of grand jury appearance, toAssistant U. S. Attorneys
(AUSAs) EarirySilbert and Donai^ftfampbelT^ We~3o~~Trot:"have
copies of that deposition and it is maintained in the U. S.
Attorney's (USA) office. It was not introduced in court since
Hunt pled guilty. On 8/29/72, Mr. Colson was interviewed by
" SAs Angelo Lano and Edward Leary, WFO, concerning Hunt's
r expense vouchers submitted while he was employed as a con-
sultant to the White House, copies of which had been furnished
to WFO on 8/7/72 by James Rodgers of the White House Personnel
;_ REC-103 / 3 ? '
Mr. Colson advised he did not personally review Hunt's
expense vouchers and on only two occasions did he personally
3 authorize Hunt to.travel at the Government's expense. One of
"P these occasions was in July, 1971, when Hunt traveled to
Massachusetts to seek information concerning the Chappaquiddick
Island incident involving Senator Edward Kennedy and the other
was in March, 1972, when Hunt was sent to Denver/,,fifflojffi^p^wr-
t-tO
in connection with the "ITT" case. Mr. Colson saidhe received
reports of the work accomplished by Hunt regarding
CAN/amm ( 7 ) CONTINUED - OVER

ww
c 0
Long to Gebhardt
RE: WATERGATE
trips. Since there was no indication that the ITT case or the
Chappaquiddick Island incident had any relation to the Watergate
matter, Mr. Colson was not questioned in detail concerning these
two trips by Hunt.
It is not known whether information relative to
this item is contained in the deposition which Colson gave
| in the civil damage suit instituted by the Democratic Party.
WFO expects this week to gain access to and review the
depositions in that suit, which have been filed with the Clerk
i of the Court, U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C , and are
a matter of public record.
(2) "'The Federal investigators did not ask
Colson the purpose of the interview.' Allegedly, according
to Republican sources, the purpose of the interview was to
discredit the controversial memorandum attributed to
Mrs. Beard."
As set forth in Item 1 above, since there was no
indication of any relationship to the Watergate case of the
ITT matter and the Chappaguiddick Island incident, Mr. Colson
was not questioned in detail concerning Hunt's activities
in connection with these two trips.
(3) "'Republican sources said that Hunt wore an
inexpensive wig during the interview with Mrs. Beard early
in the week of March 19th.' The article goes on to point
out that a similar wig was found in one of the rooms rented
by the Watergate conspirators."
We do not have any information concerning the Hunt-
Beard interview. We do know that among the materials seized
pursuant to search warrant issued for the rooms at the Watergate
Hotel rented by the arrested subjects, the Metropolitan Police
Department report lists "item #96. 1 hair wig, Jerome Alexander
label". During the Watergate trial, Metropolitan Police Officer
Cherry testified concerning the search and the police report
setting forth the items seized is a matter of public record.
The Dolice report is set out verbatim in SA Lano's report of -
6/28/7^.
p-:l (4) "On page A-21, column 1, the article goes on

to describe events in the ITT controversy as obtained 'from
P3t -2- CONTINUED - OVER

\1
c O
:4
Long to Gebhardt
RE: WATERGATE
Federal and Republican sources."' Mr. Gray wanted a check

made to determine what information is available in the files
to determine what portions of this story, if any, were known
to the Bureau.
I- The article mentioned that the Washington office

of ITT hired Intertel, a private investigative firm, to check
into Mrs. Beard's background and the authenticity of the
controversial memorandum. Our files show that on 3/10/72,
Dr. Fred M. Miller, a retired SA document examiner, advised
that he had been requested by ITT to conduct document
examinations relative to Mrs. Beard's memorandum and he stated
that he understood that Intertel had been retained by ITT to
conduct investigation of the controversy on behalf of ITT.
The files also show that on 3/27/72, former SA Fred Robinette,
a vice-president of Intertel, said his organization had done
work for ITT in connection with this case. The extent and
Kj purpose of investigation by that organization were not furnished
to us and we do not know what the results of that investigation
are.
(5) "The article goes on to point out that Robert F.

Bennett, present President of the firm where Hunt was employed,
told Hunt that the results of the INTERTEL findings should be
passed on to Colson."
We have no information concerning this.
(6) "The article concludes with a quotation from a

sworn deposition taken from Colson in the civil suit filed by
the Democratic Party in connection with the Watergate break-
in."
This relates to the deposition furnished by Mr. Colson

in connection with the Democratic Party's damage suit against
the Committee to Reelect the President, which deposition is
a matter of public record having been filed with the Clerk of
the Court, U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C. The
quotation in the article attributed to Mr. Colson to the effect
that Hunt reported to Colson for only a short time and there- -
after while at the White House worked under someone else's
j a supervision, is in accord with information Mr. Colson furnished
us when he was initially interviewed on 6/22/72, by SAs Lano
and Daniel C. Kajahan, reported in SA Lano's report dated 6/28/72.

' ;-t
,.< c o
Long to Gebnardt
RE: WATERGATE
The information relating to interviews conducted by
WFO is set forth in investigative reports, copies of which are
maintained both in the V7FO and at FBIHQ. In addition, because
of the massive investigation conducted by the Miami office, copies
of the reports v?ere alsojie-sigTratei5""ôTr-~fchAtôffice. Dissemination
has been made ofê^ch^jôort to the USA, Washing-fcsin, D. C ,
and to Ass>atSiytAt torney~~"General Petersen, Criminai>-12ivision.
As a natter of interest concerning the

iree of this article, the following information was received
SA Lano 2/21/73, from AUSA Campbell. fir. Campbell advisee
that late yeaterday, 2/20/7'3, reporter Woodward contacted
:<r. Campbell, said he had a source of information at the White1
House and "ran" the essence of the article past Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell told SA Lano he made no comment concerning Woodward\s
story.
ACTION: This is for information. /
/j
t^ ~1*
-4-
r.-*"
o 0
Attorney General February 1973
Director, FBI tj *J oW - Mr. Felt % v

1- Mr. Gebhardt*
REC-103 1- Mr. Gallagher
JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR., AND OTHERS 1- Mr. Long
BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 1- Mr. Nuzun
COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS
JUNE 17, 1972
The February 21, 1973, issue of "The Washington

Post" contains an article, a copy of which is attached,
written by staff reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein,
captioned "Hunt Linked to Dita Beard Challenge." The
article endeavors to tie in the Watergate case with the
controversial hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee
in February and March, 1972, which involved International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation lobbyist, Mrs. Dita
Beard. The article attributes the information set forth
to "sources close to the Watergate investigation," 'Repub-
lican sources," "Federal sources," as well as other y
ource,s, w h o ^ r e not further described. ^ f
S* K J A c ?a matter of interest concerning the possible

source of.this article, the following information was t
- :
receives iff pur Washington Field Office on February 21, *

1973, f}:oi Assistant U. S. Attorney Donald Campbell,
IS
f Washington, . C. Mr. Campbell advised that late on "''
February 20,^1973, reporter Woodward contacted him, said V
MAI
fe s.v fie hadjl* sougpce of information at the White House and ;

UJ related*!^ Mr. Campbell the essence of the article which
subsequently appeared in the newspaper. Mr. Campbell
advised that he had made no comment to Woodward concerning
the story. A L L INFORMATION CONTAINED
, HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Enclosure ,,^w DATE SMV^
(, 1- The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
L
Mr. Felt _ * * Wt ij -iQ^-r.
r
* i * ; ~ ^ - A s s i s t a n t Attorney General "
u-nevdld _<tv vCriteinal Division (Enclosure)
*'"""' *'* ' ' - ^ t Lt& rr , . - ' - <!&::;;*!,<-*
_Z.,NOTIf>\ See memorandum R. E. Long i o Kr.'jGebhardt 2/21/73<^CAn7anuil

Mr Jii.n
Mr. V M * . 1
' .**; >* captioned "Watergate." Mr. Gray ê'qy'^sted t h a t a Setporaodu
Ut. Millar, E-S. _
Mr. Purvi l
~ * "}- , ' b e prepared for t h e Attorney ^ n e i - *
Mr. St.yare . ,^. . ^
T^JR^, "."I._ CAN/aram (10)
î Mr-Kmley
:* Ml. Arm*<!7nn(
'".r Ur. HiiringU- . ^ 1 /

Ms HfTtf'g _ 1*
Mr M'fffJ ^ < TVT" I T J)j*
Mrs, *** SIHT ..' j - N' ^TIL- TELETYPE UNIT CHI
o
Kr. February 23, 1973
X - Hr. Polt
R. E . Gcbhardt 1 ~ Kr. Gehhardt
1 - Kr, Gallagher
1 - Kr, Long
w i r e w. KC COPD, an,; - tlr. Kusua"
- Wr. KlnXey
ssri;aL.\RY OP DTôCitvric 1 - Mr, Armstrong
îllJ:v'Jj IJ.'-Al^Ô.'iHi *.*iii / K)/ X // I <i 1 - Kr.
The handling of tho V?atornate investigation fron

r-*j? 3 vj > the Kaa^ûart^re level through t*ia flc-lc! o ^ r a t i o n level was
| S > L N ^ ^<Sone in ccôro.a.ice vith proc^rVorca, both eCciniotrativo and
I f ^ a I invcsticaMvo, t'iat arc cuctor.sxily r:.iploycd in any major
^ ^ \ft (43 rs investifjativo effort by the FBI.
'T ' toKH"!? c^soa hirit'iIoC In tlia recent past In v^hich
^ slwll^r |:-i:occdurc;s VGSTO follovc-^ xfc The acfasQinat-ton of
1^1 .J t * ^ r a j or kitT-atipiaa canes cuch as the li'irb^ra Jane Kackle caso,
i*
e>ove i s prepared vlth the concurronc of the
*:axk F e l t
Director
Director
SAC sTohn J . IlcDcnaott ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Kashi:iotcn F i e l d Of jco :ERFTN IS UNCLASSIFIED
CAC Robert G.
St. Louis Office
San Francisco Office

Ecctiors Chief Richer^ H. JUL191973-
R ft^w record. Account trig Anfi Traud Section
or.;inal is recwed * Goncral Investigative Divinion
P/an'.n it w'1 be ftted
w.tr. t M copy ot may be
e fie* serial.
J . Lar.o
Csc? '.\^-?r-t - V^Khi.iiCitor. FIclc! Office
A C i i h r l c s A . 1%*J
end Fraud Section
:*
o o
'}
Mr. Gray 2/28/7 3
1 - Mr. F e l t
R. J. Gallagher 1 - Mr. Gebhardt *

JAM2S WALTCR M C C O R D , JR. , ET AL,
INTKRCKPTIOi; OP COMMUNICATIONS
- Mr. NUZUTU
*
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Vfith reference to your call to me this morning,

the following is set forthi
ir il\raJ]ir-''* l
A. The law rerroiros the warning is necessary when
the individual intorviewea is in custody.
' E. FP-I policy is that the warning is given any tima
a person is being interviewed for a confession or an admission
of his ov.Ti guilt in tho case rather than merely as a possible
source of information.
In the Watergate, no Miranda warnings were given as
the subjects refused to be intervicv/^d and we interviewed all
other persons as possible sources of information. Had we been
in possession of iniomation indicating one of thoso to ba
interviewee1, did in fact hava guilty knowledge or was a participant
in the V7atercjatG affair, of cour&2, v:e would have issued the
required I-iiranda warning.
2. Does _Division 6 H,ave* Any Recora _qf _JData Serials JFurnished^
"to 'You, YoiTjlc f<?r r od_ tfi Be ri.a la" 1 thVou cjh^7 5 'in Va t e r a a t e
On 6/30/72, 12 reports wore furnished to you; on

7/17/72, Cl investigative reports wore furnished to you; and
on 9/13/72, 10 reports were furnished to you. These reports
are not serialized as Serials 1 through 75 in tho file, but
it is believed these are the seriels that you referred_to.
3. Booklets of t r i a l s ; date thev WGre provided to
JUL 19*973
On 6/26/72, a black booklet containing a su:nnary of
' "I
the investigation up to that date vr.s furnished to you. drf*""
Orif.ra C'f/24/17:, *t your request, Mr, Batofi furnishad you with all of
ml R not "his îc>:lcrs on the case. On 6/25/72, at your request,
w>ina. L had te-letyoos an"? inserts fro^ the Washington
LCC delivered to you.
itu tttts copy Of may be iver.
&bJUL^5l9?a JED - OVER

.; i
IS 'A * X
. O'
I Meworanduni to Mr. Gray

Ret JAMES WALTER HcCORD, JR., ET AL.
of Grand _Jury , JPa te of Indictment 7 Dabe_p
The Federal GranJ Jury inquiry bagan on 6/23/72;

the indictr.ent wag returned 9/15/72; and the trial began on
1/0/73. * . '
/
m 5. Bank Records
Where tho bank is cooporative, we will take a look

at tho records first. We do this because nany tines the
bank records are of no value as far as tho investigation is
concerned and we are saved the time and the expense of going
through the subpoena process.
*w T-tfiere there is an indication of positive information

and the information is to be used, we will then proceed through
the subpoena process.
- For your information, the Department of Justice has not
li prohibited us from usin^ this approach. In the last session of
Congress, legislation was introduced making a subpoena mandatory
before any information was furnished from bank records. The
Department of Justice testified against this legislation and the
legislation was not enacted. There is a Ciove^.ont ariong bankers
to require a subpoena. This is not aimed at the FBI or
investigators in general for that matter, but rather a fear
on the part of 6Oie bankers that they will face a civil suit.
-2-
Mr. F e l l
CSA r**** f^.^ u ioi-n. Mr. EnVer
Mr. CaHahan
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mr. Clevelan
Mr. Coh
Memorandum Mr. Gel

Mr. J e f
Mr. Mi/shall
Mr. Milter, E.S. _
\TO : Mr. W. Mark Felt Mr. Soyar'_
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walter*..
John J. McDermott, FO o T e l e . Room

Mr. Kinley

Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bower*
*Vh3ECTi/fNHITJ5 HOUSE SENTRY DUTY-_ Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwif
Mr. Mint*
Mrs.!
fe have previously agreed that the assignment of F.
? to^tfie White yfrouse and Executive Office Building constitutes
^dressing ajra that the Bureau's reputation for integrity is be
'to giveX'semblance of respectability and good faith in the ma'
sgfiâ^tration of the papers of HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN and DEAN.
I would suggest that you ask Mr. RUCKELSHAUS to confer
with AG Designate RICHARDSON and Mr. LEONARD GARMENT, Counsel
to the President {which three apparently originally agreed to this use of
FBI Agents) for the purpose of now having the Bureau coverage withdrawn.
We have assisted Mr. GARMENT and his staff In making firm
recommendations concerning the identification and secure isolation of the
papers under discussion, and he appeared extremely appreciative of both
the recommendations and the action that the Bureau had taken. As of this -
morning, all of these documents will be in one of two secure locations In '
the Executive Office Building. Both locations are protected by sound-sensor
detecting equipment which is monitored by the Executive Protection Service
(EPS). I learned last evening that Chief EARL DRESCHER of the EPS has
been told by his Secret Service superiors to discontinue the EPS guard duty
over these papers. (We had arranged for one EPS uniformed officer to be
with an FBI Agent at each station.) / -* /o
Understand that we had to rely completely upon White House
Staff people, including assistants of HALDEMAN, EHRLICHMAN and * ';.
DEAN, to identify the files of these men which should be sealed. We (FBI)
exercised no judgment or discretion in the selection of these papers; nor
have we reviewed any. Now that these papers have been marshaled Into
secure locations, access to them under a program recommended by us to
Mr. GARMENT would be extremely limited. Only a few people would be
permitted to authorize access to them. HALDEMAN. and EHRLIC
and some of their staff people will requ^pîccess
if*
Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
c
,-J C
Re: White House Sentry Duty

I on-going incomplete projects in which they were involved. As such access
i
is required in the future, FBI would be exercising no judgment in deter-
mining who shall be granted access, or to what files or documents access
will be granted. FBI Agents will not have safe combinations or door keys
which permit access. FBI Agents would only assure that during periods
when individuals are permitted access to these files, no documents are
purloined or removed in any fashion, other than for copying purposes
f-1 which would be permitted.
Admittedly there are many papers of a strictly personal nature

which have no relevancy to Watergate which should be removed. The files
1 which are now sealed and secured will be culled by persons as yet undeter-
mined on the White House Staff for the purpose of removing such "irrelevant'
documents for return to appropriate persons. FBI Agents will not participate
in this culling of files and, of course, this culling permits an opportunity
one who is so inclined to remove whatever papers desired from the seized
files. The very people who will cull the files most probably are those who
%9 worked for EHRLICHMAN and HALDEMAN (BRUCE KEHRLI, as an example).
Obviously if there is any suggested breach of security with regard

I i to these files, or unaccountability or disappearance of any document, the FBI
stands to be blamed despite the fact that we have no knowledge of the contents
of the files, had no role in their selection, cannot prevent their being stripped
by persons authorized to cull them, do not control the security hardware
sealing them, etc. In summary, we do not have custody of these files. Our
role is to limit access to the room containing the files to persons who have
been "cleared" for access by others and to see that original papers are not
removed except by those authorized to "cull" the files.
Our role, therefore, is reduced to that of unthinking hallway

sentries performing GS-3 level guard duty, exercising absolutely no effective
control over these files.
Bureau placed in this untenable position for the
I1 purpose of Vfjutting
which we in'
d lending an aura of custodial integrity,
Custodial responsibility for White House documents should be

returned to White House security people at the earliest possible hour so
as to extricate the Bureau from this impossible posture in which we find
I-'-*'
ourselves.
- 2 -
Federal Bureaj ofInvesUV, .on
Director . Mr. Kinley, 5633

Mr. Felt, 5744 . Mr. Armstrong, 5633
. Mr. Baker, 5734 . Mrs. Neenan, 5633
.Mr. Callahan. 5525 . Telephone Room
.Mr. Cleveland. 1742
. Mr. Conrad. 7621 _Mr. Bowers. 5630
. Mr. Gebhardt, 5706 . Mr. Hauer, 4718
. Mr. Jenkins . Mr. Heim, 4264
Mr. Marshall, 7746 _ Mr. Herington
. Mr. Miller, 1026 9*D
. Mr. Minlz, 5642 Cones. Review, 5533
.Mr. Soyars, 3114 IB Mail Room, 5531
. Mr. Thompson, 4130 IB Teletype
.Mr. Walters, 5256 Personnel Records
Mechanical Section
_ Mr. Campbell
_ Mr. Bassett For appropriate
action
For your approval
Miss Tschudy Initial and return
. Mrs. Mutter Please call me
.Miss Downing For information
. Miss Sou there
Room
W. M. Felt
Room 5744, Extension 3351
V
OrnOMAL N>UI HO. >
^ MAT
I T 1M1
I T U IOITMJM
tviTiun
k
Q U OfH. JtO. HO. 17
V "--'UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Fell

Mr. Baker
Memorandum Mr. Csllahan _

Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gobhardt .
TO : MR. FELT DATE: 5/23/73 Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall _
FROM : L . M. WALTERS
J Mr Miller E.S
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
I* Tele. Room _
Mr. B a i ! _
SUBJECT: WATERGATE Mr. Bwncs
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
fi A. PUBLICIZED ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING FORMER

Mr. Coaay
Mr. Mintx
Mr. E a n f l e y -
ACTING DIRECTOR L. PATRICK GRAY, m Mrs. Hogan _
With reference to your memorandum 5/22/73 instructing an analysis

of captioned allegations, I have assigned Inspector's Aide Garry O. Watt to do
preliminary spadework and will call back an Inspector today from the Los Angeles
inspection to work on this project. Mr. Mintz has advised that he personally
i will participate in it on behalf of the Office of Legal Counsel.
You will recall that one of the publicized allegations (specifics not
available to me at the moment) was possible perjury on the part of Mr. Gray
in connection with his confirmation hearings. Consideration will be given to
a review of that testimony by Charles A. Nuzum, who is the supervisor in the
General Investigative Division thoroughly knowledgeable with respect to the entire
Watergate investigation.
Si
B. MEMORANDUM OF PERTINENT EVENTS AT INITIAL STAGES OF
CASE BY FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BATES AND QUESTIONS
RELATIVE THERETO POSED BY MR. EARDLEY
Attached hereto is Bates' memorandum of 6/22/72 constituting a running

log of events up to 7/6/72, which was returned to the Bureau by Assistant
Attorney General Petersen 5/11/73. It is here noted that this memorandum first came
to the attention of the Accounting and Fraud Section in the General Investigative
Division on February 23, 1973, when Mr. Bates, SAC, San Francisco, came to
Washington together with SAC Kunkel of St. Louis to have a briefing session with
Mr. Gray prior to the opening of his confirmation hearings. Apparently Mr. Bates
had retained this memorandum in his personal possession and I am informed that
that or iginal*br ought in by Mr. Bates has now been made a part of the Bureau file.
, yf,.. Based_primarily upon a review of the Bates 6/22/72 memorandum, Mr.

Eardley has posed the following questions,; lH^8| . O0/ I V
lessrs^ Nuzum, Gebhardt, Mintz

Enclosure (or a
LMW.wmj A L L I N F 0 R H A T I 0 N CONTAINED,
w
HEREIN I S UNCLASSIFIED
DATE tUflfo BYfl>+
Memo for Mr. Felt
e:, Watergate
O
1. Following FBI information concerning the break-in at Watergate
A was the Federal Government's interest due to the apparent violation of the IOC
Act?
a 2. When did the Bureau learn of the break-in?

3. What steps were taken within the first 24 hours to determine criminal
liability?
4. When was the involvement of Hunt and Liddy discovered by the Bureau?
m 4a. When was their connection with the White House and CREP
discovered by the Bureau?
5. When was this information communicated to the Attorney General?

To the Acting Director of the FBI?
if 6. Did you receive any special instructions from either Justice or the
P Acting Director as a result of this development?
7. Was the investigation impeded in any way by instructions from either
Justice or the Acting Director ? If so, give full details.
8. Did any senior officer in the Bureau in a position of responsibility
conclude that there was an effort to cover -up White House or CREp involvement
in the break-in? If so, explain.
9. The seven Watergate defendants were all under indictment by
September 1972, and until McCord wrote his letter to the Judge in March 1973,
it would appear that a cover-up had succeeded. There is widespread belief
that the Washington Post reporters did more to uncover the truth than did the
i Department of Justice. What did the Department or the FBI do or fail to do

to uncover the criminal involvement of high officials in the White House and
CREP? Is there a lesson to be learned from this matter? In other words,
if a similar operation occurred in the future would the Bureau be dependent
for success upon a gratuitous circumstance as in this case?
10. In a memorandum dated June 22, 1972, prepared by C. W, Bates,
presumably for the assistance of Mr. Gray, there is a recitation of fact referring
to developments in the Watergate investigation. In this connection:
-? a. What was the purpose of the memorandum?

b. Why, if known, did Mr. Gray on June 21 and again on June 22
order that information developed to that date be withheld from the White

c o
"Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Watergate
House and the Justice Department; and why were interviews with the
White House employees held up? (Page 1, paragraphs 2,4 of Bates'
memorandum.)
c. In the afternoon of June 23, 1972, Gray informed Bates

of his conversation with the Deputy Director of CIA. (Page 2, paragraph
4 of Bates' memorandum.) What was the information passed on to
Bates by Gray?
e i- i
1:i
. d. What happened in that conversation which impelled Bates
i. to advise Gray that the Bureau had no choice but to continue the
v7; investigation? What was the alternative under discussion?
^| e. With regard to the Time story: (pages 2,3 of Bates' memorandum)
\ s-% (1) Has anyone checked to determine whether Gray

i|| and Mitchell were staying at the same hotel in California?
f.x (2) Was there any direction or suggestion by Gray that the
|| case ought to be wrapped up in a hurry?
%% f. With respect to the meeting of Gray and the Agents on

i| June 24, what was the leak which had angered Gray? (Page 4, paragraph
?i 4 of Bates' memorandum.)
U^ g. Did the leak involve or tend to involve the White House or

** CREP in the Watergate break-in?
h. In the summer of 1972 or later did Gray express any opinion

' ' *
that someone in a higher echelon than Hunt and Liddy must have organized
the Watergate break-in?
I
fj i. Why did the FBI wait until Dean's invitation on June 26
--- r * to attempt to secure the records in Hunt's White House Office? (Page 5,
paragraph 3 of Bates' memorandum.)
j . What did Mr. Gray mean when he gave his opinion on June 27
and again on June 28 that this was possibly a "political operation"?
(Page 5, paragraph 5; page 6, paragraph 3 of Bates' memorandum.)
At this time was there a reluctance on the part of Gray to continue
the investigation, which prompted Mr. Felt and Mr. Bates to urge
an aggressive investigation?

U - . c O
Memo for Mr. Felt
'Re: Watergate
v-s k. Did Gray advise any FBI personnel as to why the meeting
L; with the CIA had been called off? (Page 6, paragraph 3 of Bates'
\ \ memorandum.) Was there any consideration at that time of the
\:\ possibility that efforts were being made to call off the FBI investigation
f-\ because the break-in was a CIA affair?
11 1. What was the conversation which preceded Gray's statement

jj that he would resign if anyone requested him to hold up the FBI
f| investigation? (Page 6, paragraph 3 of Bates' memorandum.)
; m. Did Mr. Gray express any reluctance at developing White
: ; House involvement through John Dean? Was there any discussion con-
^ ^ '- cerning the possibility of John Dean being himself implicated?
^ n. Why was the interview of Chenow held up? (Page 6,

I paragraph 6 of Bates' memorandum.)
I'.'! o. The eight leads (attachment 1) relate to McCord's activities.

I!
*J Were there no leads arising from the fact that Mr. Hunt had had an
*:* office at the White House?
p. What did Gray advise Felt which led to the delay in
invest igating Ogarrio and Dahlberg? (Page 7, paragraph 1 of Bates'
memorandum.)
q. Why did both Bates and Felt feel it necessary on June 28
again to reiterate "the absolute necessity" of a thorough FBI investigation?
(Page 7, paragraph 2 of Bates' memorandum.)
r. Didn't Gray report the result of his White House meeting

on June 28? If so, what did he say? (Page 7, paragraph 2 of Bates'
memorandum.)
'<**.
s. Did Gray or any FBI personnel protest Dean's determination

to sit in on all interviews with White House people? (Page 7,
paragraph 4 of Bates' memorandum.)
t. What caused the reversal of the instructions to hold up

interviews of Chenow and Young? (Page 7, paragraphs 4 and 5 of
Bates' memorandum.)
u. If it is known, why was the interview with Dahlberg again

postponed? (Page 7, paragraph 7 of Bates' memorandum.)
A- CONTINUED -OVER
Memo for Mr. Felt
"Re: Watergate
v. What was Gray's full statement with respect to the

Involvement of Dean, Colson and Ehrlichman? (Page 8, paragraph 1
of Bates' memorandum.)
w. On July 5 or at any other time did Gray or any other Bureau

official suggest that it might be possible that an effort was being made
V I to have the CIA accept responsibility for the break-in so that the FBI
investigation of CREP and the White House would end?
!*-. 11. Why is the memorandum dated June 22 since it refers to matters
as late as July 6 ?
H
12. Why did this factual account stop on July 6?
PROPOSED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
?
i The questions posed by Mr. Eardley can best be answered in an interview
with SAC Bates and by preparation of responses by Supervisor Nuzum in the General
Investigative Division.
m
My Number Two Man, Odd T. Jacobson, is currently conducting the
inspection of the Los Angeles Division, and I propose sending him to San Francisco
during the next few days to interview Bates to obtain his answers, particularly
with respect to questions 6 through 12. It is suggested Mr.
Felt be considering an input to responses to appropriate questions affecting his
responsibilities, particularly questions 10-j, 10-p, and 10-q. With respect to
qut stion 10-e, I will have the Inspector now at Los Angeles check this out
although I do recall a publicized statement by former Attorney General Mitchell
affirming that Gray and Mitchell did stay at the same hotel but did not see each
other.
It is not being proposed that a new review now be undertaken by this

Division of the entire Watergate file and investigation conducted. This is a 30-
volume file and is under review by Mr. Eardley as well as by representatives of the
Ervin Select Subcommittee as they choose to make such review. Supervisors
Nuzum and Clynick in the General Investigative Division are thoroughly familiar
with the file as is the case Agent in the Washington Field Office who had
primary responsibility (Angelo Lano). We will draw upon their knowledge in
having responses prepared for the foregoing questions.
One general observation with respect to question 9: There are many
cases investigated by the FBI, particularly those involving highly placed
persons or otherwise of a sensitive nature, wherein known participants in a
crime or members of a conspiracy do not confess and will not respond to Agents'
- 5 - CONTINUED - OVER
Memo for Mr. Felt
c
Re: Watergate
questions. It is not uncommon in those cases to use the technique of Grand

Jury inquiry and immunization. Also, it is not unusual to find, as in this
case, that after some of the culprits have been convicted and face a possible
heavy sentence they are then persuaded that it may be in their interest to
reveal facts theretofore kept secret. Such circumstances are not gratuitous
but are a natural evolution within the criminal justice process.
RECOMMENDATION:
m That the proposed actions outlined above go forward.
"It
l
fSf
-6 -
MAT l*J CRIION
_ . ' t u AIM K . MO. IT I .'
* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Mr. Felt
Mr. B.ker,
Memorandum Mr. Callahsn _

I * . Cleveland .
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhudt_
TO MR. FELT DATE: June 6, 1973 Mr- JenkinB
Mr. Marshall _
Mr. Millm E.S,
Mr. Soynre
FROM L. M. WALTERS \ ^K Mr. Thompson .
fI Mr. Walters
T e l e . Room
Mr. Baiae
Mr. BanRB
WATERGATE - EVENTS AT INITIAL STAGE OF CASE
m SUBJECT- Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington _
Mr. Comny
ff Memorandum Walters to Felt 5/23/73 (attached) set forth a
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley
Mrs. Hogan
list of questions posed by Mr. Eardley based on review of 6/22/72
memorandum prepared by former Assistant Director Charles W. Bates, Mr.
Eardley's questions have been answered by parties directly responsible or
knowledgeable of the events wh ich prompted the questions. Set forth on the
attached letterhead memorandum are replies to each question.
Attached for reference purposes is the 6/22/72 memorandum prepared
by Mr. Bates, loaned to AAG Petersen by Mr. Gray, and returned by
it Mr. Petersen 5/11/73. >^ r^
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT BY L. PATRIC^
^K^RAY,
This is a separate project underway by Inspection Division, Gener
Investigative Division, and Office of Legal Counsel and results will be
separately reported. Mr. Gray's testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee is being reviewed against material in the Watergate file. (K
is noted that we do not have the Grand Jury testimony of Mr. Gray.)
RECOMMENDATION:
Forwarding of attached letterhead memorandum to Mr. Cox.
1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Mintz
LMWrwmj
(4)
o
Mr. Archibald Cx
Special Prosecuting Attorney 7,197!
director, FBI
WATERGATE - EVENTS AT INITIAL STAGE O F J C A S E

m
m Attached hereto Is a memorandum, US duplicate, prepared
la response to\uestioas prepared by Mr. Carl Eardley from review
of a memorandum of former Assistant Director Charles W. Bates
dated Jane 22, 197^, in captioned matter.,
Enclosures (2)

I I - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - M r . Mintz
(Sent/Separatdhr)
(Seat Separate!]
LMW:wmj
(5)
NOTE: Baseo/on memo Walters to Mr. Felt\6/6/73,

x
same caption
LMWrwmj '
i . Hker
; . Clevelni
<* 'V*hr*
* . VAins
* . M-h,!l
* . Mitlor, E ^ . _
sk !fc. Sbym
Mr. ThompD . ^
*.WJtam
Tele. ROOM
Mr Bi
Mr. Banm
Mr. Minti
Mr. Eiwdley
Mrs. Hognn MAIL ROOM C 3 TELETYPE UNIT
Juoe 7, I97S
WATERGATE - EVENTS AT INITIAL STAGE OF CASE
Replies to questions one through seven were handled by Special Agent Charles A.
Nuscum, principal supervisor at FBI Headquarters of the Watergate case.
! Following FBI information concerning the brsfe-in at Watergate, was
the Federal Government's Interest doe to the apparent violation of the
IOC Act?
The first notification received by our Washington Field Office (WFO), at
bout 4:30 A. M*, June 17, 1972, was telephonic advice of the arrests of Of
men apparently in the act of burglarising the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters* (DNCH) offices at (he Watergate. This represented ft possible
Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property violation if the value of stoles
in property amounted to $5,000 or more. Later, Metropolitan Police Department
(MPD) detectives observed a white plastic box which indicated it was a "smoke
detector." A detective at the Second District Precinct Headquarters closely
examined the box, saw it contained wires and batteries and thought it was m
bomb. Notification of this fact was made to WFO by telephone at about 6:30 A. M.
At approximately 8:30 A, M., Special Agent Aogelo Lano, WFO, was Instructed by
SAC Kunkel to obtain the facts from the MPD and secure the Bureau^ interest.
He determined after arriving at MPD Headquarters shortly before I0.*00 A. M,
that devices recovered by the MPD at the burglary scene were electronic eaves-
dropping devices which Immediately made the crime one within the primary '
Jurisdiction of the FBI since Investigation of the IOC statutes has beem . '
designated by the Department of Justice to be handled by the FBI,
When did the Bureau learn of the break-in? HEREIN I S UNCLASSIFIED
DATE U.
At approximately 4:30 A. M., June 17, 1972, WFO received telephonic
of 5ie break-la. %-,.|
*. l l w . KB.
What steps were talcen within the first 24 he criminal

' " & .
* . (Fatten l
Tele. Rooa liability? J39- /t?9~
Mr. R H
"\ir. Bowers
This document'"conlafng 'nelth'er
I - M r . Gebhardt (Sent Separateljêcomrcendat ions nor conclusions of
J
I - M r . Mintz (Sent Seijarately) the FBI. i t is ;.-c .: ...srty of
t h e FBI a n d i s
Vk. MiaU
* . Eardley
JOC:wmj (4) loaned to your agency;
Mrs. HogM MAIL ROOM ( ] TELETYPE UNIT i,t and its contents are not to be
LStritmted outside. ._
Br
Watergate - Event* at Initial Stag* of Owe

fl
ilructions were issued to WFO, to be passed on to auxiliary offices
developed, that the Investigation was to receive immediate att$ntiiC v -
direction of the SAC and that as many Agents as were a^cdee)v^,'
were to'be utilized. All leads were to be set forth by telephone or immediate^ L
teletype.
w111
If Bureau Agents assisted in the obtaining of search warrants for the two
Watergate Hotel rooms at which the subjects were registered and assisted in the
search of these rooms which resulted in the obtaining of considerable pertinent
physical evidence, including a substantial amount of cash la new $100 bills,
an envelope containing E. Howard Hunt's check in payment for his bill at
Lakewood Country Club, Rockvllle, Maryland, and two address boota, one
of which belonged to Barker and the other to MarUnes. The electronic devices
recovered at DNCH were obtained from MFD and were taken to the FBI
Laboratory for examination. Indices at FBI Headquarters and WFO V9T9 checked
on all the subjects as well as Hunt and Attorney Michael Douglas Caddy. Since
Hunt had been a subject of a Special Inquiry investigation, this gave us an address
where he could be contacted. Since the Special Inquiry was for a position at the
White Houee, Mr. Alex Butter field was contacted on the evening of June 17,
1972, concerning Hunt and he confirmed that Hunt had been employed as ft
^3 consultant at the White House but Butterfield believed he had not worked
there in recent months. Hunt was contacted the evening of June 17, 1971,
admitted the check located at the Watergate Hotel was his own but declined tw
furnish any information as to how It got there and what he was doing at the
Watergate HoteL
NCIC was checked with negative results concerning the $100 bills recovered
as well as the Belt & Howeil equipment recovered at the Watergate. The five
arrested men were positively identified. Leads were set forth for Miami to
develop background information concerning the subjects. McCoi
contact
In regarding the sale~of electronic equipment to McCord and McCuin was
interviewed on June 17, 1972, by Philadelphia Agents. Alexandria obtained
background information from CIA on June 17, 1971, concerning the subjects.
t
The Avis Bent-A-Car used by the subjects was searched on June W, 1971**
A$\ Douglas
ctalmlngto represent
to discuss the matter. ^
travel of the subjects to Washington, D. C. (WDC), and the travel agent who sold
-2 *
c
Watergate - Events at Initial Stag* of O n
icketa was contacted la Miami. Investigation t a i conducted to
City concerning the name and address furnished by McCord at th
fe arrested, which name and address proved to be fictitious. N
p d unt's publisher as Bisit*8 country clt*> bill indicated it was
sent In care of his polisher la New York City. Avis Rent-A-Car was
contacted by WFO concerning cars rented by Barker. Hotel registration
records at the Watergate Hotel were reviewed extensively om June It, 19ft
4, When was the Involvement of Hunt and Uddy discovered by

the Bureau?
^ 4a, When was their connection with the White House and CRP
* discovered by the Bureau?
Hunt's apparent Involvement was learned the afternoon of June 17, ,
when his country clUb bill and check in payment thereof were found* the
Watergate Hotel in one of the rooms rented by the sifcject*. Hunt's connection
with the White House was discovered in the late afternoon of June W, 1971, after
search of the field office Indices showed a Special Inquiry investigation on Hint
for a position as consultant at the White House. That evening > Mr, Alex
Butterfleld, Deputy Assistant to the President, confirmed that Hunt had bees
employed at the White House but Butterfleld believed he was no longer working
there. We never did develop that Hunt worked at CRP.
Apparent Involvement of Hunt caused WFO to obtain his toll call records
by sifcpoena from the C&P Telephone Company. Among the leads set forth
to Identify and interview subscribers to the telephone numbers called bi
J ^ d d i named Jack Bauman, Winter Haven, Florida,'
June 23, 1973, Bauman told us of efforts by Hunt to
^ j involving the setting up of a special security staff to work
On behalf of the Republican Party. Bauman related that Hunt had been
accompanied by an individual who seemed to be Hunt's supervisor. On
June 36, 1973, WFO obtained from MPD the address books which belonged
to Marttnes and Barter. One of the entries la Barker's address book was >
the name "George" and the telephone number 388-0363 which was determined
on June 33, 1973, to be a number at CRP utSzed by Gordon Uddy.
Ltddy was contacted on June 39, 1973, but declined to be Interviewed
ughh he did say he was a former Bureau Agent. It was on this date date;1 -
.38, 1973
1973, tthat
ht UUddy*s
d d * connection
ti with
ith the CRP was Initially
I i t i l l ddetei
t *
CjUddy's description was similar to that of the unknown individual,
~'" "by Bauman, a copy ef Liddy's photograph from his FBI per
3.
Jj. ".
o h.
Watergate -, Events at Initial Stage of Case

wa|,$ent by telecopier to Tampa for display to Bauman. On 6/29/72,
Baumaasaid he was almost positive that Liddy was the Individual who
accompanied Hunt but requested a photograph of better quality be dlspla;
OB July 3, 1972, a more up-to-date photograph of Liddy which WFO had
obtained was shown to Bauman and he positively Identified Liddy as being the
one who accompanied Hunt.
In addition, on July S, 1972, Hunt and Liddy were positively Identified

by Mary Denberg In Los Angeles, California, as being two frequent visitors
to the Morton B. Jackson law firm In Los Angeles (Jackson's Identity was
obtained as a result of Hunt's telephone toll calls). Subsequent to efforts to
Interview Liddy on June 28, 1972, Investigation determined that he worked
for several months at the Executive Office Building at the White House as a
staff assistant on the Domestic Council.
f. When was this information communicated to (he Attorney General?
To the Acting Director of the FBI ?
The Attorney General was telephonlcally advised by Mr. Felt of tht
initial facts received and that the FBI was conducting Investigation on the after-
noon of June 17, 1972. The Extra Duty Supervisor In the General Investigative
Division (GID) was informed of tills fact at 4:39 P.M.; however, the time of
Mr. Felt's call to the Attorney General Is not known. At that time McCord
had not been identified and was still going under the alias of Edward Martial
which he gave at the time of his arrest. Possible involvement of Hunt was
not known at that time. Acting Director Gray was briefed by the Resident
Agent at Santa Ana, California, between 2:00 P.M. and 2:30 P.M., Eastern
Daylight Time. This Included only the initial facts of the break-In and did
not Include the Identity of McCord or the Involvement of Hunt. At 6:45 P.M.,
Eastern Daylight Time, June 17, 1972, the Los Angeles Office was advised
by the GID Extra Duty Supervisor of McCord having been identified as an ex-
FBI Agent and security officer for the CRP. The time this Information was
^Subsequently furnished to Mr. Gray Is not known. Possible Involvement of Hun!
; waa telephonlcally tarnished to the Extra Duty Supervisor by WFO Supervisor
John Ruhl at 7:11 P.M., June 17, 1972, and Mr. Felt was briefed concerning
developments up to that time at 8:27 P.M., June 17, 1972. At 8:20 A.M.,
Eastern Daylight Time, June 18, 1972, Mr. Bates was briefed by the Bxb
Dvty Supervisor and he said he would advise Mr. FeP who would advisor-
Mr. Gray.. At 9:50 A. M., Eastern Daylight lime, a conference caU w a r
wi^vthe weekend duty Supervisor, Mr. Bates and Mr. Felt. Following {hi
Mr. fjelt Instructed that Assistant Attorney General Petersen be briefed as i"
to developments which was done at 10:05 A.M. At 11:50 A.M., June 18, 1972,
the FBI Headquarters switchboard record showed conversation between the
Attorney General and Mr, Gray.
( 1
- Events at Initial Stage of Case

receive any special instructions from either Justice or
Director as a result of this development?
Ho special instructions from either Justice or Acting Director as a
result of this development are known. It was not necessary for anyone to
order the FBI into the investigation since there was preliminary Indication
of a crime within the investigative Jurisdiction of the FBI. Although juris-
diction is concurrent between the Bureau and the MPD, U. 8. Attorney Titos
::i conferred with Assistant Attorney General Petersen during the morning of
June 17, 1972, and it was decided by them that the FBI should assume the
investigative responsibility for this case. WFO was instructed on June 19,
1972, that the investigation was to receive Immediate attention under the
is*.*?. I
personal direction of the SAC, and that as many Agents as were needed were
to be utilized.
At 7:40 P.M., June 17, 1972, Washington Field Office Supervisor John
Ruhl advised that Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, Criminal
Division, telephonically contacted Washington Field Office and advised he
desired Immediate investigation at CIA to determine if the subjects were
actively employed by that agency. He said he desired all pertinent Infor-
mation by 11:00 A.M., June 18, 1972, In order that he could brief
the Attorney General. He also Indicated he was closely following the
Investigation relative to Hunt and desired that all new information developed
be furnished to him (Mr. Petersen) for passage to the White House. At
8:06 P. M., June 17, 1972, Assistant Director Bates Instructed the Extra Duty
Supervisor that briefing of Mr. Petersen was to be done by FBI Headquarters
in accordance with established FBI practice. Washington Field was instructed
not to furnish information to Mr. Petersen and if he caned again to tactfully
inform him that he should seek Information through FBI Headquarters rather than
from the field. Mr. Petersen was telephonically briefed of developments at
that time by the General Investigative Division Extra Duty Supervisor, upon
Instructions of Assistant Director Bates, at 10:05 A.M., June 18, 1972. P
a*.
T. Was the investigation Impeded in any way by Instructions from either
Justice or the Acting Director? If so, give full details. .
, .Investigation was not Impeded by any instructions from the De;
of Jusnce^ Certain actions of the Acting Director may poesibly be view'
having*Impeded the investigation. Specifically, the decision to allow J
Dean tp sit In on all interviews of White House personnel had a deleteriojtij|
effect on the Investigation at the White House, particularly in light of recently
disclosures of the involvement of Dean In the attempted cover-up of the v
Watergate matter by senior White House personnel. Obviously, having Dean
.5.
o
d Watergate . Events at Initial Stage of Case
ent el Interviews may bare bad the effect of limiting pertinent iaf
r d to our Agent*. Although eventually all leads which WFO desiffi
to "be covered were covered, with the exception of interview of a CIA ei
delays wft*e encountered in conducting pertinent interviews. The reas<
these delays are not pottlvely known, but it is easy to speculate that Mr. Gray
held op coverage of leads until he could discuss such leads with Dean er
someone else at the White House or CIA, Specifically, by teletype dated
June 19, 1972, WFO requested authority for interview of Charles W. CoUon,
iff for whom White House records showed that Hunt worked. A memorandum was
prepared on the afternoon of June 19, 1972, recommending that Bureau liaison
handle this Interview ** *M* *B not approved
1972.
I ^^_^ *ther. Miss cnenow was brougHF back to

,, apparently on instructions of the White House and she was interviewed
July 3, 1972, in Dean's presence, furnishing scant information
mays were encountered relative to Interview of Kenneth Dahtberg,"

Gray on June 29, 1972, instructed that he not be interviewed or investigated
\A at that time because of national security considerations. He was subsequently
Interviewed by Minneapolis Office on July 6, 1972, with Mr. Gray's approvatj o
Si In considering Impediments to obtaining the full story of this case the
tarnishing by Mr. Gray to John Dean of copies of FBI reports as well as - L
copies of other WFO communications most be considered. In retrospect, review
of these reports by Dean at the White House would indicate to him what information
had been developed which would be of value in the devising of strategy to eover
up this case, to addition, (he destruction by Mr. Gray of documents apparently >
taken from Hunt's safe likely Impeded the Investigation although it cannjt be
stated positively what information was contained in the material he desf '
Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of Cast
fight through twelve were handled by either Messrs. Felt,
tad/or KuKum as noted by their response*:
any senior officer In the Bureau In ft position o! respoiis1blj
that there was an effort to cover up White Boose or CRF Invoiveinesft te
the Break-In? K so, explaia.
Mr. Bates answered 'No. There were lots of discussions with
Gray involving Mr. Felt, Mr. Eunkel and myself, at which time any one of
s discussed chagrin over lack of complete cooperation from the White House
or the Committee. I did not feel that the lack of complete cooperation was
anything other than is sometimes encountered in other major investigation*, **
As one of the senior responsible officers, Mr. Felt stated in his own mind
there was much more Involved in this case, either at CRP, the White Boost
or both. On several occasions in conversations with Gray Mr. Felt advised
that he recommended to Gray that the president be urged to get the whole cast
out In the open regardless of who was involved. He stated he was acutely aware
of lengthy delays in getting access to certain Individuals, which detays were
eaused by Individuals in high positions at the White House and Committee t
Beeieet the President. Mr. Felt stated he recalled that Gray la response t
Us suggestion indicated he did not think communication with the President was
ft proper course to pursue.
SAC Kunfeel advised he did not conclude there was an attempt to cover
up either White House or CRP involvement in the break-in; however, from
his personal experience In supervising the extensive and continuing Investigation
In WFO he stated he was unable to explain the reluctance to cooperate by various
personnel in both the White House and in the CRP. He stated that even simply
questions raised to various phases of the Investigation brought numerous delay*
while decisions were made In the White House and la the CRP as pertaining
to authority to proceed In certain areas of WFO*s Investigation. He cited a*
.samples the checks being made of the toll records and content* of the desk
and safe belonging to B. Howard Hunt in the Whit* House. He recalled that
at the CRP, employment records and the background information on James McCord
were delayed by a decision to be made by Robert C. Odle, J r . , Director *f
Administration, CRP.
1 f-
seven Watergate defendants were all under Indictment by 6<
*' m
L and until McCord wrote his letter to the Judge in March,
ould appear that a cover-up had succeeded. There is wider
Uef that the Washington Post reporters did more to uncover
than did the Department of Justice. What did the Department or the FBI
-T -
n
Watergate - Events at Initial Stag* of Case
/ail to do to uncover fee criminal Involvement of high
ts in the White House and CRP? Is there a lesson to be
med from this matter? to other words, if a similar operatic*
red In the future, would the Bureau be dependent for succeed
upon a gratuitous circumstance as in this case?
Mr. Nuzum responds (hat if there Is a widespread belief that the Washington
Post reporters did more to uncover the truth than did the Department of Justice,
(his is a myth of monumental proportions. Those newspaper reporters
undoubtedly did more to publicise this case than did the FBI since the FBI doss
not make press releases detailing advances made In a pending matter. The
FBI was well ahead of all matters reported in the press with regard to the
Watergate incident, except for Dahlberg's revelation in a deposition given oa
August as, 1972, to Richard Gereteia's office (State's Attorney, Dade County, Flor
Ida) that Dwayne Andreas was the source of the $25,000 cashier's check which
passed through Barker's bank account. That development was publicized la
the press on August 25, 1972, and was contrary to information furnished to as
la a signed statement by Dahlberg on July 7, 1972, when he claimed $25,000
was money he had obtained through solicitations in Florida, the implication
being that there were a number of contributors making up that $25,000.
With the advantage of hindsight. It is apparent the Bureau would have beem
a great deal more successful In the development of this case had the
Acting Director
(1) refused to allow Dean to stt in on Interviews,
(2) directly contacted the President and clearly spelled out Interference
by Dean in bringing (acts to light such as the week's delay in furnishing Hunt's
effects to WFO,
(3) if such an appeal to the President failed, the Acting Director ^%

eouW have submitted his resignation with attendant publicity as to Ms reaseett;
s*ri'.
however, in the absence of taking the foregoing rather strong steps, It appears
that investigation la a similar future case or situation would be unlikely to achieve
more than was achieved la the extensive far-reaching handling afforded the t
Watergate matter. It Is simply a fact of life that thinking that one Is bftjftg Heal
to does not provide evidence and if no one involved la a conspiracy wil|
* * the only way to obtain a breakthrough in the development of,
lod used in this case; i. e . , development of an airtight case \
idants who can be convicted, coupled with the courageous action of the
courts in giving a maximum sentence to the convicted defendants. This is
Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of Case
the breakthrough In this
n rnlng the overall FBI Investigative effort in captloned cast]
Felt slated that he considered this investigation to be indeed noteworl L
IM of (be difficulties encountered. He stated it was a penetrative, very detailed
tod completely thorough investigative effort which subsequently resulted U a
successful trial wherein all seven defendants were found guilty, m e convictions
ts tarn led to stiff sentences against the defendants by trial Judge Sirica which
provided the ultimate break in the entire case when convicted conspirator
McCord decided to talk rather than face a lengthy sentence.
111 SAC Kunkel advised that from the Inception of this case he felt the FBI
and his Agents in particular vigorously pursued all facets of the Investigation.
It was handled from the beginning as a special with various techniques belg
used in WFO, such as special Indices on individuals, phone numbers, and other
items which would facilitate the necessary checks and investigations to be mftdt.
Be stated the only lesson in his opinion the FBI could learn from the Watergate
y
investigation would be that under no circumstances should the Bureau have
f' permitted various legal counsel at the White House and CRP to sit in on inter*
views of certain personnel conducted at both places. He stated he voiced his
opposition to this arrangement with Gray and other officials at the Bureau by
observing that the individuals Interviewed were naturally inhibited by
attorneys present.
m\
i
t?,.
a
- > *
i *

morandum dated June 22, 1972, prepared by C. W. Bates/
^|um*bly for the assistance of Mr. Gray, there was a recitation of
Tjeterriag to developments in the Watergate investigation, In thls^
*c<>onectlon:
a. What was the purpose of the memorandum?
Mr. Bates'response Is - "After our meeting with Mr. Gray on June 21,
1972, I asked Gray if he was going to write a memorandum or wanted me
to write a memorandum reflecting our discussions, and he said, 'No,
keep your notes.' Upon returning to my office, as has always been my
custom, I dictated from notes taken and put it in the form of a running
rough draft memorandum rather than retain notes."
b. Why, if you know, did Mr. Gray on June 21, 1972, and again on June 22,
1972, order that Information developed to that date be withheld from
the White Bouse and the Justice Department; and why were interviews
with the White House employees held up?
Mr. Bates responds - 'The normal procedure which I suggested to

Gray would have been to prepare a letter to the White House and to the ,*v :
Department of Justice setting forth facts and indicating the Bureau investi-
gation. When I suggested this, Gray Instructed that such dlssemlnatloa
be held up. Be did not explain further and this was not pursued. I can't
remember why a discussion was had to hold up interview of employees at
the White Rouse but there should be something in file to show why Inter-
views of White Bouse personnel were pertinent at that time. S is my
further recollection that WFO Agents had already made contact at the White
Bouse.**
c. In the afternoon of June 23, 1972, Gray informed Bates of his conver-
sation with the Deputy Director of CIA. What was the information
based on to Bates by Gray? , - , . ; vL
-10-
8;.-

happened In that conversation which impelled Bates to adrUi" .^
y that the Bureau had no choice but to continue the Investigatj
was the alternative under discussion?
Mr. Bates refers to his answer above and adds - "I recall no after-
natives discussed. In this regard It may be helpful tf copies of CIA
memoranda which have been referred to in Congressional hearings be
obtained. They might disclose the details of the conversation between
Gray and General Walters.**
e. With regard to the Time story:
(1) Has anyone checked to determine whether Gray and Mitchell were
staying at the same hotel In California?
Inquiry by Inspectors at our Los Angeles Office disclosed the
following summary of activities of Gray and Mitchell: Both arrived
at the Los Angeles International Airport June 16, 1972 (Friday),
approximately six hours apart. Gray stayed at the Beverly Wllshire
Hotel and Mitchell at the Beverly Hills Hotel (approximately one and
one-half miles away). On June 16, 1972, Gray visited the FBI Office,
had a press conference and a dinner-speech at his hotel while
Mitchell's activities and/or itinerary were not known to the Los Angeles
*""FBL On Saturday, June 17, 1972, Gray departed his hotel for
Santa Ana and arrived at the Newporter Inn, Newport Beach, for lunch
and at approximately 2:30 P.M. cancelled original plans to go to
Palm Springs and arrangements were made for overnight stay at
Newporter Inn. Mitchell's only known Itinerary on June 17, 1972,
Included Republican meeting with Governor Reagan, press conference
and ultimate return to his hotel after 2:00 P. M. On Sunday, June 18,
1972, Mitchell arrived at Newporter Inn at approximately 3:00 P.M.
and an unidentified member of Mitchell's party Inquired of our Agents
where Gray was. When asked why, the individual responded that
Inquiry was made for "Mr. Mitchell." This Individual was directed \^
;v
to the pool area of the Newporter Inn where Gray and his wife were
sunning. No information was developed regarding an observed con-
tact between Gray and Mitchell at that time or any previous time during
lr respective stays in the Los Angeles area.
_ At approximately 5:00 P.M., June 18, 1972, Gray departed the

ewporter Inn for Palm {Springs and Mitchell remained at the Inn p
Overnight. Gray then departed Palm Springs at 11:50 A. M., June 19,
1972, while Mitchell departed the same date from Los Angeles at
approximately 10:15 A.M.
-II-
Watergate - Event* at Initial Stage of Case
Details of these Interviews are attached. 1 Is noted for

C Wesley G. Grapp (now retired) declined to be Interview
Advice of his counsel.
m- 2) Was there any direction or suggestions by Gray that the case
ought to be wrapped up in a hurry?
Messrs. ftizum, Bates, Felt and Kunkel all state they had no
suggestion or direction along this line.
L With respect to the meeting of Gray and the Agents on June 24, 197^
what was the leak which had angered Gray?
Mr. Bates responds - "I don't recall specifically but, In reviewing
my memorandum, It is noted that Gray informed me on the 23rd of June
that Smith, a reporter for "Time** magazine, had called him, stating
"Time" had information that Gray had refused to permit Agents to check
V-M * > Cols on* a telephone toll calls and to interview htm and that Gray had
Instructed this investigation be wrapped up In 24 to 48 hours, the Inference
being tt was a whitewash of the investigation on Gray's Instructions. I _
can, therefore, conclude that this could have been the basis for Grays ^,,
talk with the WFO Agents on June 24, 1972.
At 11:00 A. M. on June 24, 1972, SAC Kunkel, Gray and I met with
\ --
K J3- " - ^ V"

.
27 WFO Agents In Mr. Gray's conference room. Be pointed out his con-
cern for leaks to the news media, the seriousness of them and then became
quite agitated. In a strong voice he accused the Agents of this leak,
demanded that the Agent responsible step forward, and later said that
whoever did It would be fired. My recollection \s that this confrontation
with the Agents lasted 15 or 20 minutes, after which be curtly dismissed
the Agents.- , . Z^

SAC Kunkel recalls that the "leak" was allegedly brought to the atten-
- *
tion of FBIHQ by Sandy Smith regarding a proposed article in Time

Magazine. He recalled the tenor of Smith's remarks, according to
attacked Gray's Integrity, but not the Bureau In general. He stated he
did not specifically recall any other specifics concerning this "leak.**.
f the meeting with the Special Agents from WFO on June 24,
ray had Informed Mr. Kunkel that he was quite agitated ov
r
I and had felt that tt emanated from one of the 27 Agents i
it or from a Bureau official who was privy to certain unus
of the Watergate investigation. Gray stated that he was
;,.-t
i
.f
-12-
V :~ '....
r
ed and concerned that while driving to the office that mo:
* / * to make up his mind where he would send 8AC Kunkel If
Agents admitted being the source of the "leak."
Did the leak involve or tend to involve the White Bouse or the CRP la
the Watergate break-in? &
Mr. Bates states - "Not to my recollection. I don't recall that at that

time there was any information to support the involvement of the
Committee or the White House. 1 was my feeling at the time that such
leak* could have come from the White-Bouse, U. S. Department of
Justice or more probably from the Polfce Department who had all of the
material taken from the subjects at the time of their arrest, and the
subjects were also In their custody.**
SAC Kunkel advised be could not recall specifically. Be did believe,

however, that the first possible White House connection came to light
itSfc" K -
through an address book found in the Howard Johnson Hotel room In which
Hunt's White House telephone number was noted as well as a personal
check of Hunt's made out to a local Country Club. .
h. In the summer of 1972 or later, did Gray express any opinion that -
someone In a higher echelon than Hunt or Llddy must have organised
the Watergate break-in? -fc^^,
Mr. Bates states - "Not to my knowledge.1*
Mr. Felt recalled Gray advising him that In Gray's opinion there were
possibly higher-ups involved in the Watergate case. Felt frequently ....
emphasized to Gray the need to aggressively pursue the Investigation
regardless of to whom It led. , ..
SAC Kunkel stated he has no firsthand knowledge that Gray
any opinion relative to someone In the higher echelon other than Hunt
Llddy had organized Watergate break-In. .
!:'..* "} -
Why did the FBI watt until Dean's Invitation on June 26 to atte
re the records in Hunt's White House Office?
ir. Nuzum points out that the FBI did not wait until Dean's
26 to attempt to secure Hunt's effects. Set forth below
ins taken which led up to the obtaining of the material from
Fielding.
-13-
-,,

On June 17, 1972, Hunt*s probable involvement In the
Incident came to WFCs attention because of his country
bill found In the Watergate hotel and because of lnfor
contained la Barker's address book.
(2) WFO, about 6:00 - 7:00 P.M., June 17, 1972, contacted ~
Mr. Butterfield of the White House and learned that Bunt had
previously worked as a Consultant to the White Bouse.
Mr. Butterfield was told Bunt may be involved in the Democratic
Committee Headquarters bugging.
On June 18, 1972, Mr. Butterfield recontacted WFO and advised
that Hunt had worked for Charles Colson, Special Counsel to
the President. -._,,--
(4) On June 19, 1972, SA Saunders reviewed Hunt's personnel file

at the White House and also called White House number 456-2282
(which number was contained in Barker's address book), asked
to speak to Mr. Hunt and was informed that he had not come to
his office that day.
I*'**
(5) On the afternoon of June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested .
r Bureau authority to interview Mr. Colson. On June 22, 1972, j ..
upon Mr. Gray*s instructions, then Assistant Director Bates, **
at about 10:25 A. M., authorised SAC Kunkel to have Agents con-
tact Mr. Dean to discuss an Interview with Colson and discuss
obtaining of telephone toll call records Involving Hunt at the
White House. Thereafter, SA Saunders contacted Dean to set up
Interview of Colson which was conducted on the afternoon of
June 22, 1972, in Mr. Dean's office with Mr. Dean present.
During the interview when Mr. Colson said that he believed

V "w- '- ^ *
bad worked on the third floor of the building, SA Lano asked
Mr. Dean If the Agents Could accompany Mr. Dean to Hunt*;
'office on the third floor to determine if Hunt may have left
thing there. Mr. Dean stated that this was the first he was
aware of this office. la response to an Agent's request to
examine the office, Dean advised the White House would
the FBI with any contents belonging to Hunt.
On the morning of June 26, 1972, Mr. Dean called SA

advised he had something to turn over to the FBL SAs
y " . . .'
*
S
*
>

--
'
-
and Michael J. King were then sent to Mr. Dean's office.
' J
"'I
, ~1
-14-
. **
r
Watergate - Events at foltial Stage of Case
approximately 11:00 A.M., Mr. Dean gave these Agents!
containing some of Hunt*s effects and between 4:00 and
June 36, 1971, Mr. Dean's assistant, Fred Fielding,
Agents a second box of Hunt's effects.
(1) What did Mr. Gray mean when he gave his opinion on June tlt
1972; and again on June 28, 1971, that this was possibly a A j
"political operation?" ,. . -v->*.-.
Mr. Bates responds - "Our discussion about this matter at the
time Included various theories advanced with no supporting evidence.
I don't recall any facts that would support Mr. Gray's theory but do
recall that various theories were discussed by ail of those present.*'
Mr. Felt stated he was unable to recall specific references during
the early stages of the Watergate Investigation by Gray theorising that
Watergate was a "political operation." During many conferences
various theories were discussed pertaining to Ideas and possible
Involvement in the overall case. Mr. Felt stated he never detected a
reluctance on Gray's part to vigorously pursue this Investigation except thai
he did feel Gray was somewhat hesitant to look above rank-and-flle
responsibility for this matter. . --,-;'
(!) At this time was there a reluctance on the part of Gray to continue
the Investigation which prompted Mr. Felt and Mr. Bates to urge
an aggressive Investigation? ^
Mr. Bates' answer Is - "There was none. I do recall, and this Is
not reflected in my memorandum, which can be supported by
Mr. Kunkel and Mr. Felt, that at one of these discussions early In the
case, the suggestion was made to Gray that he should personally go to
the president, tell the President that we were receiving tees than fuU
cooperation from the White House staff and the Committee, suggest
that he Instruct all of these people to Cooperate completely r<
of where the chips might fall, It ts further suggested that the President
might want to consider after that a public statement to the effect that
the FBI was going Into this matter thoroughly with the president's
plete backing and that anyone responsible would have to
Consequences and that the President would countenance no one
lated with him to do anything Illegal or underhanded. , Gray.
It he could not do this. , I
-15-
1 was then suggested that he might have the Attorney
so. He then called Jeb Magruder on the telephone but
reach him. He gave no indication as to what he intended
* wfth Magrnder. ,:
My memorandum discloses that on June 28, 1972, Mr. Felt and
t met with Mr. Gray. I pointed out that under no circumstances should
we back off from any investigation at the request of CIA without
forcing them to reveal completely their Interest. Th addition, at that
time I suggested that Gray ask for a letter from CIA explaining In
detail, if they were Involved, their complete operation, what it entailed
and who it involved and expressly stating in the letter that such
investigation by us would have an adverse effect on the nation's
security.** *
Mr. Felt stated that he recalled on several occasions that be had
repeated to Mr. Gray the need for a continued aggressive approach
toward the FBTs investigation.
k. Did Gray advise any FBI personnel as to why the meeting with the CIA
had been called off? Was there any consideration at that time of the
possibility that efforts were being made to call off the FBI investiga-
tion because the break-in was a CIA affair?
Mr. Bates* response is - "To my knowledge he told no one of the

reasons the meeting was cancelled. I didn't consider It significant at the
time. I did not consider at that time that this was a CIA operation .
although the possibility had occurred to me that it might be a "spin-off*
of some operation of theirs. There was no indication of any attempt to
call off the investigation since It might involve a CIA operation." ;
_ Mr. Felt was unable to recall any specifics as to why the CIA meeting
" the* early stages of the Watergate investigation was called off*
Bed that there was no consideration for calling off the FBI
for any reason although the FBI was Initially concerned the
detected at Watergate may have been a CIA or CIA-backed operation due
the CIA background of several of the subjects. He stated he was
certain Interviews were temporarily held up because of dl
volvement. Until the matter was completely resolved
and CIA Deputy Director Walters, certain interviews were
e. t/ -
-16-
atergate - Events at Initial Stage of Case
was the conversation which preceded Gray** statement
Id resign If anyone requested him to hold up the FBI Invest
Bates answers - 1 feel that this was Mr. Gray's
ement that we should not hold back under any circumstances and that
be made reference to the President as emphasis on this point.
r
* > - ; / "
v
sa. Did Mr. Gray express any reluctance at developing White Bouse
Involvement through John Dean? Was there any discussion concerning
the possibility of John Dean being himself implicated? '
Mr. Misum advised that tt is not known that Mr. Gray ever expressed
I *J~^.
any reluctance to deal through John Dean; rather, at his confirmation
Bearings, he testified that Dean was the Individual on the White Bouse staff
having liaison with the Justice Department and the FBI and he was the one
the FBI should deal with. Until recent disclosures by McCord and
Jeb Magruder, there was no Information Indicating that Dean was
Implicated In this case.
aw Why was the fctervlew of Chenow held up? v
Us* Mr. Wusum reports that while tt Is only speculation, It now seems
likely that Interview of Kathleen Chenow was held up In order that she
could.be brought back to the United States for briefing by Dean.
o. The eight leads (attachment 0 rotate to McConTs activities. Were
there no leads arising from the fact that Mr. Bunt bad had an office
at the White Bouse? . -
Mr. Nuaum points out that there were numerous leads arising from
the fact that Bunt had worked at the White Bouse. The eight leads +.
In Attachment 1, jas the caption on that attachment states.
Interviews at the CRP. Hunt was not working at the
cCordwas. Accordingly,
entrated on McCord.
p. What did Gray advise Felt which led to the delay In Investigating
n i o and Dahlberg? {Page T, paragraph l f of Bates*
Felt advised he recalled Gray suspected Messrs,H>garr
g and others were possibly Involved In CIA acttvty and th
tted In some delays In conducting Immediate Interview of th
- IT-
o
Watergate - Event* at Initial Stage of C u e
j
* * :
did both Bates and Felt feel tt necessary on June 28 9

reiterate "the absolute necessity" of a tborougb FBI to?
Bates answers - T h i s was a recurring theme In all of
with Mr. Gray, probably based on the fact that he was" new
te the FBI and that we were reiterating a long-standing policy of the
There were no specifics which prompted this. ** ":.r$m.
Mr. Fett advised that as he recognised the growing magnitude of the
Watergate Investigation and the fact that certain Investigative delays were
being encountered, he and other Bureau officials fett that Gray most be made
aware the Investigation must be vigorously and aggressively handled la
order to preserve the Bureau's reputation.
- > . . . ; ,
" - &
*"' v
-18-
"*r fei , V .. . *. r
Events at Initial Stage of Case
4***-
'8fe--:> 1 Gray report the results of his White Bouse meeting of
28, 1972. If so, what did he say?
. Bates states -"He did not. I had no knowledge of why he
going to the White House and received no Information as to the results
of any meeting there. I felt that If It had been pertinent he would have ,
told me." - ^:\t-v>.^rj-"
a. Did Gray or any FBI personnel protest Dean's determination to
sit in on all Interviews with White Bouse people? >
Mr. Nusum says the decision to permit Dean to sit in on Interviews
with White Bouse people was apparently reached by Mr. Gray. Super-
visors in the Accounting and Fraud Section were not in a position to
overrule the Acting Director's instruction.
SAC Kunkel stated he has no information relative to Che determination
of John Dean to sit in on interviews with the White Bouse people, er ;^
protests by any FBI personnel of such practice. . _. -^- o,
t. What caused the reversal of the instructions to hold up Interviews
of Chenow and Young?
Mr. Bates states --"My memorandum reflects that at 12:50 P.M.*
June 30, 1972, Mr. Felt told me that Dean said to hold off interviews
of Young until Dean talks with Gray. Thirty-five minutes later, s i
1:25 P.M., Felt told me It was ail right to interview Young and that
he would be made available on July 3, 1972. He said that Chenow -'^
was returning from England and would be made available next week.
I know of no reasons why these Interviews were held up even though ,:
it was for a very short period." ~ ...... ..w..>::.j&\;V"
. If it is known, why was the Interview witifc DaUberg again
Mr. Nusum advised that according to memorandum dated June I t ,

;. 1972, from Mr. Felt to Mr. Bates, Acting Director Gray Instructed that
t
v- . following CIA employees or contacts not be Interviewed or I n
^ * '
it this time because of national security considerations. **

rg Is one of those listed and no reason is given. U r
. Felt advised the Interview with Dahlberg was postponed
-*a--; -v.
tioofl of Mr. Gray with no reason given for this course of action,
-19-
t.-i, :- . ' . , * . * * - . "'-

- Events at Initial Stage of Case
was Gray's full statement with respect to the Involvi
Colson and Ehrlichmaa?
Ir. Bates' response Is *1 cannot recall Gray's full stateml
; In any specifics. Many of these sessions we were having with Mr. Gray
with regard to Watergate were what I would now describe as *rap
*; * sessions' because m the days of Mr. Hoover whenever any discussion
* was had It had to be supported by facts and that this was a new approach
to me. Therefore, m these *rap sessions' many names, theories
and possibilities came up which would Include the names of Dean,
Colson and Ehrlichmaa."
w. On July f, 1972, or at any other time, did Gray or any other Bureau
official suggest that tt might be possible that an effort was being made
to have the CIA accept responsibility for the break-In so that the FBI
Investigation of CRP and the White Bouse would end ?
Mr. Bates states "Absolutely no."
11. Why is the memorandum dated June 22, 1972, since it refers to matters
as late as July 6, 1972? r ',
Mr. Bates explains - T h i s was first dictated on June 22, 1972, t e "
record conversations based on my notes. As more conversations ensued,
1 merely added to the memorandum so that I would have a reference to them."
12. Why did this factual account stop on July, 1972? ' -.' \
Mr. Bates states "Uj recollection is that after the first three weeks
this investigation settled down and developments were on the record through
Memoranda and other communications. There was no other reason as far as
.am concerned.1* , . .-..-,. , ^J- : ..',.. . ^ w. ^&&i&i^<
* ' -
fAt INTERROGATORIES POSED TO FORMER ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR BATES RELATIVE TO HIS LOO
Mr/Bates was Interviewed concerning the questions posed
, additional Interrogatories were presented to him m an a
tional points raised in examination of his log:
to Page 2, first paragraph, it Is to be noted that Mr.
. ' * > * ' , : ' - - .
-20-
"*.',-. * " "

.-ear..
*t Initial Stag* oC
lsed on Jane II, 1971, a contact with John Dean regarding
ews and Information needed at the White House. Why with
tfe'iU-1 - ? Bad Dean already been contacted by Gray regarding the
?
Mr. Bates T do not know specifically why with Dean, It
pronouncement Dean was considered to be the liaison contact la this matter.
: - . - * - * . - -
! ;*,*
1, With reference to the 4th Paragraph on Page 3, It Is noted that i t
3:15 P.M., June 33, 1973, Gray called Bates and Informed him In
detail of a conversation with the Deputy Director of CIA. Does
Bates recall who called whom, I . e . , who Initiated the call? U
,*--
Mr. Bates Tn refreshing my memory I have referred to my memo-
randum and it is to be noted that Walters, the Deputy Director of CIA, had
been at Gray's office. I do not know who prompted the visit. ** U
9. Referring to Page 3, Paragraph 5, Item 3, Sandy Smith of 'Time**
1 magaslne talked to Bates, Smith telling Bates that Oray told him
fjmtth) that "ho records are maintained at White Bouse as to Hunt's
calls. ** What prompted this alleged statement that there were no *
records at the White Bouse regarding Bunt noting he did work there;
did have an office there. Did Bates ever discuss this with Gray? .-
Mr. Bates advises *f don't ever recall having discussion with Graf
WJ- f on this point but I do recall some difficulty WFO had in obtaining these
records.'* . ;
,,_
4. Referring to Page 4, Paragraph 4, which is the meeting of Mr. Gray,

, Bates and Kunkel with the 37 WFO Agents, was there any indication
, that Mr. Dean prompted this meeting, claiming that the leaks were
coming within the Bureau (when they could have been coming from *
"'"'/'" Mr. Bates states 'There was nothing to Indicate that at that
>-,r w . w h a t w e h f t V # learned 9toc% that time, that could have been a
. - - - : ' -ii"V
ing to Page $, Paragraph 3 , under whose Instructions did

ng take everything from the White House office of Bunt and
lnto boxes ? They were under guard by whom ? (Note that'
\
o
Brents at Initial Stage of Case
they were allegedly under guard was from June 19, 1972,
1971.) Why wasnt this material turned over lmm
?;"" tee states 1 have no knowledge who authorised Fielding
take this action. I am aware that WFO had been attempting to obtain the
t.
Material from Hunt*s office and that there had been considerable delay. WFO
was concerned as to the chain of evidence. I instructed WFO to get fall
* Înformation as to who removed the material so that we could reconstruct ' *
i the chain of evidence If required."
. Referring to Page 5, Paragraph 4, it Is noted that Mr. Gray noted to
the margin la red Ink, T3A?" Do you know why this reference was
scratched on there?
Mr. BatesT answer Is
f Referring to Page 8, last paragraph, did Gray mention to Bates that "
he (Gray) got the Idea from conversations with John Dean that the
latter did not want FBI to engage In aa all-out, aggressive investigation
regarding Watergate?
Mr. Bates states Tfo. We were freed with some delays which I
described previously, all of which I did not feel were unusual since
such delays were common hi other major investigati
L&< Referring to Attachment No. 1, Item No. I , there is a statement by

General Redman that he could furnish Huat*s toll calls from the Whit*
House, which possibly conflicts with Page 3, Paragraph 5, Item t, :'
when Gray allegedly told Sandy Smith that there were no records - '
maintained at the White Bouse re Bunt's calls. Can Bates la any
, . , _ % Bates responds "As best t ean recall, WFO may M . ^

Ifriculty in obtaining these calls and m pursuing the matter vent to
and obtained this information."
referring to Attachment No. 1 and the last sentence on the
teg in any way tell what prompted this line, "Dahlberg Is
not to talk to us"?
tee answer Is - - "*We had made a number of attempts to c
at various places and he had refused to talk to us. On this contac
-;
. - * . . ' ~
i ... _ - v
Wtoiinifcii:.:
o
Events at Initial Stage of Case
e 26, 1972), he refused to talk on advice of U s attorney
ish th attorney's name. This appeared strange to me as
setve of an attorney wanting his name withheld when he
represented a client. This, plus the fret of the numerous contacts which
L
were unproductive, prompted this statement. I do recall Information fresa
WTO later that during the time we were trying to Interview Dahlberg, he
had made telephone calls to the CRP.*
10. Referring to Page I, Paragraph 3, Gray states, Tfot the appropriate

time to sit down with CIA." Who said so - John Dean? U
Mr. Bates states T hare BO recollection of any reference to John
Dean. Jla oar disciisslon with Mr. Gray, the only reference as to why we
should not sit down with CIA was that first we should get everything together
so that we could discuss the matter with CIA from a position of strength. *
11. Also in the same paragraph, Gray remarked, 'VIA covert activity."9
What prompted this remark by Gray?
Mr. Bates slates *? cannot recall, except that he had mentioned H
earlier and it was is the vela of a theory, as far as I was concerned.m*+>
12. Also in the same paragraph, Gray said, "He would not hold back. * .
this investigation at anyone's request, n yet he had already cancelled
the meeting with CIA. This does not appear to be consistent. Caa .
Bates clarify Ibis? '... , ,
Mr. Bates states ** have no explanation as I was not aware of (he
reason for the cancellation of (he meeting and, therefore, at that time I
did not consider that there was any inconsistency."
ferrtag to Page"f, first paragrapfcDfete* said hetoMFelt
should be covered regardless."'what prompted this remark by
Bates? Did he feel It was an attempt to cover up - by Gray or anyoqe
tes *t had no feeling of a possible cover up attempt bat

such leads did get into a CIA operatioa, I eould see so pb,
m up temporarily until CIA laid out the story to
they should eventually be covered. **
% ' ' - 23- >-

m o
- Events at Initial Stage of O u t
to Page 8, first paragraph, what possibly prompted

, Dean and Colson not Involved la any way but Ehrlichmaa
ght p la something ?
Mr. Batef * answer to * have no further explanation other than what
forth earlier, except to explain that our discuss!oos were fret and open
and that many theories and many names were discussed. *
CHRONOUXJICAL LOO OF FBI CONTACTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT
m CONCBRNING EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WATERGATE CASK .
For possible added clarification flle material shows the following
sequence: : :*?**
DATE: 6/1T/12 The Attorney General was telephonically advised

TIME: 4:39 P.M. by Mr. Felt of the initial facts received and that
> Extra-Duty Supervisor the FBI Is conducting Investigation. - -*
- WAS informed - time of
Mr. Felt's caU not
DATE: f/lT/rt Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Petersea

V
TIME: Abont telephonically contacted Washington Field
:00 P.M. per Office and requested that the FBI find out the
SALano CIA assignment or affiliation of the five mem
* * > :
who were arrested.
DATE: AAO Petersen was telephonically briefed bf

TIMS: 10:05 A.M. Extra-Duty Supervisor R. K. Besley# General
Investigative Division, on the Instructions of
then Assistant Director Bates.
LTE: %/U/n The Attorney General was briefed b /
E: 3:00 P.M.
Per Mr. Felt to
-Acting Director
AAO Petersen was contacted fey then

Director Bates regarding an inquiry from
William Proxmirers office relative to the
of the $100 bills which were recovered from
t/to/n subjects* . > -.':.".-.-
: -V
-Svents at Initial Stage of Caw
DATS: f/SO/il Thirteen investigative reports were personally '

delivered to AAO Mersea. ;; : i'\:f$%:
DATE: 6/80/tl A blank memorandum regarding Kenneth DaMberg '
was forwarded to AAO Petersea. v ^ ^ ^ ^
Thirteen investigative reports werepersona&j -'
delivered to AAO Petersea.
DATI: t A A * Ten investigative reports were personally " ^
delivered to AAO Petersea. <
V>#^
DATS: T/14/n Twenty-two investigative reports irert persoaailjr
delivered to AAO Mersea* ^ ^ ' " "
ATB: T/lT/n AAG Petersen called then Assistant Director
: 4.*50P.M. and requested we hold ap Interviews of Herbert
to Felt Porter and Jeb Magruder at the Committee'
Reelect the President ontU Mr. PwUrsea
confer with Committee to Reelect the
attorneys Kenneth Parkinson and Paul O
- * :
i- i:
. *.- & . 25-
p
I.
Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of Case -'->. i-
f/18/72 Mr. Petersen called Mr. Bates to

TIME: J:50 P.M. attorneys Parkinson and O'Brien had
per Bates to Felt their meeting with him and the FBI Should _
memo 7/18/72 with interviews of Porter and Magroder If we"
desired. Mr. Porter was Interviewed on July 19,
1972, and Mr. Magroder was interviewed en - >.;, .
* d y 2 0 , 1971. - -:, ;.,. -^^f?r
DATE: 7/l/7t Twenty-three Investigative reports were personally
delivered to AAQ Petersen.
DATE: 7/19/7* Then Assistant Director Bates telephonlcaUy
TIME: 5:00 P.M. contacted AAQ Petersen to determine if he could
per Bates toFeit see any objection to an interview of John D. . . . ~
memo 7/19/72 Bhrlichman, Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs, regarding the activities ef .*>
Rant and Llddy who previously worked onder "v'";'v
Mr. Ehrllchraan. He was Interviewed on
July 21, 1972. >'* ^r
DATE: 7/20/71 One Investigative report was delivered to ^' ^ .

AAQ Petersen. ._.. ... .J.,^;l_^.'...
ENCLOSURES
Copy of Jane 22, 1972, memorandum of former Assistant Director
Charles W. Bates. ...,,., -,-'%
Copies of memoranda reflecting Interviews oy Inspectors with Special
Agents Joseph C. Alston, WilliamC. Carroll, John F. Morrison, ChesterJL
St. Vincent, and James H. Bsntan concerning Mr. Gray's activities
June ltLig, 1972.
it-: .
" . * " * " *
-26-
FD-3B (Rv. S-22-84)
P BI
Date: 8/V73
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code!
AIRTEL
Via
(Priority)
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTN: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL)
PROM: SAC, WFO
CLYDE (T0LSDM, FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

.PATRICKÛGRAY, FORWER^DIRECTOR, ACTING
AMERICAN AR ASSOCIATION
INFORMATION CONCERNING
On August 4, 1973, FRED THOMAS, Counsel for the
Minority, Senate Select Committee to Investigate Watergate,
was guest speaker before a luncheon meeting of General-
Practloner*, American Bar Association Convention, at Grand
Ballroom, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.
THOMAS- spoke about Committee activities and in answer
to questions from the audience stated: The Committee in
executive session has voted not to request CLYDE TOLSON, former
Associate Director, FBI, to be a witness during the first
ohaseôf the hearings which are to end the week of August 5, 197
graDMAsT1 indicated TOLSON may be called as a witness in the
next session to begin in the Fall. The question was asked
if consideration was beinp; given^tp bring criminal charges
again str PATRICK >. GRAY, former ^Director, FBI. _-5HeMft5-Tri-v?4*n y
answered that matter has not yet been re solved. iZr-*~/ r ?
No other questions referred to the "FBI
either directly or by inference. ^HOWAS in his speech d;Ldju
not refer to the FBI.
Above furnished for information.
'- Bureau
- WFO
CWC:jrb
(3) .
Approved: Sent .M Per

pSt>9cfjil
t>9 f.gent in U.S.Govrnmnt Printing Office: 1972 455-574
I
Office of Ler-i Counsel 8/6/73
1 ' * 1'he American Bar Association's annual meeting,
currently underway in Washington, D. C., is being
covered by our Liaison representatives. On Saturday,
August 4, 1973, Fred Thompson, Minority Counsel of
Senate Select Committee on Watergate, spoke and stated
that Clyde Tolson, former Associate Director, FBI,
may be called as a witness before the Select Committee
in the Fall, 1973. Thompson also stated that the
question whether criminal charges would be brought
against L, Patrick Gray had not yet been resolved.
JAMrlsh
J .
. * ~ - . . . *
\
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WATERGATE
(SUMMARY)
PART 1 of 2
FILE NUMBER: 139-4089
*
J
.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT A>iac. Dir.

D*i>. AD Kim.
Memorandum A . . . . Dir.;
HE DIRECTOR DATE: 7 / 5 / 7 4
FROM
0. T.ÂCOBSON
SUBJECT:
^WATERGATE INVESTIGATION. L>al C M
V jjffE, ANALYSIS Dinctw !
Pursuant to the Director's instructions on 5/14/74 for

the Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) to conduct a complete analysis
of the FBI's conduct of the Watergate and related investigations the
enclosed study has been prepared. The General Investigative Division
participated in major portions of this study.
In view of the immense scope of the Watergate investigations,
it was necessary for OPE to narrow the focus of this analysis to those
areas of the investigations which have caused critical commentary relating
to the Bureau's performance. Therefore, the OPE staff undertook a review
of selected materials which provided a comprehensive cross section of
commentary regarding these investigations. The materials reviewed
included "White House Transcripts", proceedings of the Senate Watergate
Committee; confirmation testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the nomination of L. Patrick Gray in to be FBI Director, Earl J.
Silbert to be U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and William D.
Ruckelshaus to be Deputy Attorney General. Numerous books and articles
relating to the Watergate matters were also reviewed. In addition, Inspection
reports, summary memoranda, and selected file materials were reviewed
and analyzed as to content.
1 - Mr. Callahan (Encl.)

1 - Mr. Adams (Encl.) JUL 2 3 1974 '
1 - Mr. Gebhardt (Encl.
1 - Mr. Jacobson
1 - Mr. Sheets
1 - Mr. Revell
OBR/imt /1
-- (7) * Al CONTINUED - OVER
IB 873 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

67JUL24J974 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ;
I
Bf SB
Memorandum to The Director

RE: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION -
OPE ANALYSIS
After the conclusion of this review process OPE was able

to define fifteen general areas of criticism which encompassed essentially
the entire range of responsible public commentary on the Bureau's
involvement in the Watergate matters. These fifteen areas of criticism
are as follows:
1. Allowing John Dean to sit in on interviews of White House
personnel; submitting copies and/or reports of the FBI
investigative results to Dean, and clearing proposed investi-
gative activity through Dean.
2. Failure to interview all CRP employees re Watergate;
delay in reviewing CRP files; CRP attorneys sitting in
on FBI interview of CRP employees, and CRP attorneys
having access to FBI file material.
3. Delay and/or failure to obtain access to and account for
contents of Howard Hunt's desk and safe at the White House.
4. Failure to fully explore all possible ramifications of
Watergate matter with subjects, suspects and potential
material witnesses.
5. Delay or failure to interview several individuals re monies
and/or checks found in possession of defendants or having
been deposited to their bank accounts.
6. Failure to obtain and execute search warrants for search
of original five subjects' homes, offices and automobiles.
7. Failure to identify and interview all persons listed in
address books, notebooks, et cetera, which were seized
and determined to be the property of the 7 original subjects.

1
it

OPE ANALYSIS
8. Alleged failure to detect and remove "bug" from the

telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters.
9. Failure to promptly and thoroughly investigate alleged
election law violations by Segretti and others associated
with CRP or the White House.
10. Alleged activities by former Acting Director Gray to limit,
contain or obstruct FBI investigation of Watergate matter.
11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative results to news
media, Congress or other unauthorized parties by Bureau
personnel.
12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of interview with certain
White House officials (Haldeman, Colson, Chapin, et cetera).
13. Alleged activities on part of Department of Justice officials
to limit, contain, or obstruct FBI investigation (Kleindienst,
Petersen, Silbert, et cetera).
14. Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere, contain or
impede FBI Watergate investigation.
15. Alleged activities on part of White House officials to limit,
contain or obstruct FBI Watergate investigation. (Dean,
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, et cetera).
General Investigative Division was furnished the 15 areas of
criticism along with references as to origin and was requested to provide
OPE with the following:

t
OPE ANALYSIS
(1) A brief summary of the investigative activity conducted

which gave rise to the criticism.
(2) General Investigative Division's appraisal of the validity
of the criticism and how it might have been avoided.
(3) Any changes of policy that have resulted from such
criticism.
(4) General Investigative Division's instructions (brief summary)
to the field relating to any of the above cited matters.
(5) Citations to file materials and communications which sub-
stantiate the Bureau's position in each of the areas mentioned
above.
After receipt of General Investigative Division's information
(set forth in Section IV of the study), the position of the Bureau in regard to
each area of criticism was analyzed by OPE and where indicated original
file materials were reviewed. The results of the overall OPE analysis
are set forth in Section V of the study.
The enclosed study is lengthy, however, it is designed
to provide ready reference to particular problem areas as well as an over-
view of the investigation. The table of contents has been designed to pro-
vide sufficient detail so that specific activities and/or subject matters can
be succinctly reviewed.
OBSERVATIONS
Certain aspects of the FBI's investigative effort in the
Watergate affair have received adverse commentary or publicity. A care-
ful review of the basis for these criticisms reveals them to be largely
groundless or beyond the control of the Bureau. There can be no question

X)

OPE ANALYSIS
that the actions of former Attorney Generals Mitchell and Kleindienst

served to thwart and/or impede the Bureau's investigative effort. The
actions of John W, Dean at the White House and Jeb S. Magruder at the
Committee to Re-Elect the President were purposefully designed to mis-
lead and thwart the Bureau's legitimate line of inquiry. At every stage
of the investigation there were contrived covers placed in order to mislead
the investigators.
In spite of the most serious impediments posed in this
investigation, the professional approach used by the Bureau and the
perseverance of our investigative personnel were the ultimate key to the
solution of not only the Watergate break-in but the cover up itself.
Those most closely associated with the Bureau's efforts
including Acting U. S. Attorney Earl Silbert, Assistant Attorney General
Henry Petersen, former Acting Director Ruckelshaus and the Special
Prosecutor's Office have on several occasions praised the Bureau's
investigative performance in these cases. The direction given to Bureau
investigations by the U. S. Attorney's Office and the Criminal Division
of the Department of Justice has been the subject of much criticism due to
a clear intent to initially steer away from political issues. Acting U. S.
Attorney Silbert and Assistant Attorney General Petersen have borne the
brunt of most of this criticism. The FBI followed well established
Departmental policies in these areas and did vigorously pursue cases
when requested to do so by the Department and/or the Special Prosecutor.
All information developed indicating any possible violations of Federal
law was properly referred to the Department.
In OPE's view the Bureau has a legitimate and compelling
defense in all but three of the areas of criticism. In these three areas
the facts must speak for themselves as no adequate explanation can be
rendered due to the circumstances involved.
r s life

f
b b

OPE ANALYSIS
These areas are as follows:

The actions and activities of former Acting Director Gray.
The actions of Mr. Gray have been fully investigated
and reported to the Special Prosecutor's Office. No
further action appears warranted by the Bureau in this
area.
The possibility of information having been leaked from

FBI personnel.
There are indications that certain Bureau materials
relating to the Watergate matters were leaked. This
is the subject of a continuing Inspection Division
inquiry and has not been further pursued by OPE.
The alleged failure to detect an electronic ftbug" in a

search of the Democratic Watergate Headquarters.
The possibility of Bureau personnel overlooking or
failing to detect an electronic device during a search
of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters
cannot be disproven. Our personnel say they could
not have overlooked such a device, but responsible
authorities cite facts and circumstances leading them
I to believe that the Bureau personnel failed to detect a
"bugging device" planted by James McCord. There
i appears to be no way of resolving this dispute and the
Bureau's position has been formally stated to the
Department of Justice.
h

ip
%
OPE ANALYSIS
The Bureau's position relative to the total activities

involved in the Watergate investigations can be strongly defended as the
enclosed study indicates. OPE believes that the information and documentation
contained in this study thoroughly demonstrate the high caliber of investigative
effort and professional conduct of Bureau personnel involved in the Watergate
matters.
ACTION:
For information.
-7-
..#5 ^ J*
Vr 1
.-6 *
'nJ#V
* vA .* \ 1 A.c
jggjs,.
,:.V
BULKY ENCLOSURE
BIN #
XEROX COPY OP COVER LETTER ENCLOSED^

' - - --itp
H
T .
* I
tt^
FBI |.f ^ 'i'. -i-

WATERGATE
INVESTIGATION
OPE ANALYSIS,'
' -r. v*r^ a* Ap re it; ^
' . * -
- r , ,-*
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED July 5, 1974

HEREIN IS.UNCUSSIFI
DATE_. 1 I n 19 Ry 3
1
FBI WATERGATE INVESTIGATION

OPE ANALYSIS
Table of Contents
I. PREDICATION 1
H. SCOPE OF STUDY 2
IH. PREVIOUS AUDITS AND INSPECTION REVIEWS 5
IV. AREAS OF PRINCIPAL CRITICISM AND
BUREAU POSITION REGARDING THESE
CRITICISMS 10
1. Bureau activities relative to John W. Dean 10
2. Failure to interview all Committee to Re-
Elect the President (CRP) employees and
.. allowing CRP attorneys to monitor employee
interviews 12
3. Delay and/or failure to obtain access to
and contents of Howard Hunt's effects at
the White House 20
4. Alleged failure to conduct comprehensive
interviews with Watergate subjects, suspects
and witnesses 23
, 5. Delay or failure to interview several
individuals re monies and/or checks found
in possession of defendants or having been
deposited to their bank accounts 25
I 6. Failure to obtain and execute search warrants
! for search of original five subjects' homes,
[ offices and automobiles 26
(I)
7. Failure to identify and interview all persons
listed in address books, notebooks, et cetera,
which were seized and determined to be the
property of the five original subjects 31
8. Alleged failure to detect and remove "bug"

from the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters 34
9. Failure to promptly and thoroughly investi-

gate alleged election law violations by
Segretti and others associated with CRP or
the White House 38
10. Alleged activities by former Acting Director
Gray to limit, contain or obstruct FBI
investigation of Watergate matter 41
11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative

results to news media, Congress or other
unauthorized parties by Bureau personnel 47
12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of inter-
view with certain White House officials 51
13. Alleged activities on part of certain

Department of Justice officials to limit,
contain, or obstruct FBI investigation 53
14* Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere,

contain, or impede FBI Watergate investi-
gation 57
15. Alleged activities on part of certain White

House officials to limit, contain, or
obstruct FBI Watergate investigation 61
16. Comments and Observations of
General Investigative Division 63
V. WATERGATE INVESTIGATION -
OPE ANALYSIS 66
>
APPENDICES
A. Chronology of Significant Watergate

Related Events 73
B. Biographical Sketch of Most Significant
I Subjects 90
i
1. Bernard L. Barker 90
2. DwightL. Chapin 90
3. Charles W. Colson 91
4. JohnW. DeanlH 91
5. John D. Ehrlichraan 92
6. Virgilio Ramon Gonzalez 92
7. Harry Robbins Haldeman 93
8. George A. Hearing 93
9. E. Howard Hunt 94
10. Herbert W. Kalmbach 94
11. EgilE. Krogh, J r . 95
12. Frederick C. LaRue 96
13. George Gordon Liddy 96
14. Jeb Stuart Magruder 97
15. Robert C. Mardian 98
16. Eugenio Rolando Martinez 98
17. James Walter McCord, J r . 99
18. JohnN. Mitchell 100
19. Kenneth W. Parkinson 101
20. Herbert L. Porter 101
21. Donald H. Segretti 102
22. Gordon C. Strachan 103
23. Frank Anthony Sturgis 104
C. Explanatory Notes and Documentation 105
Lj FBI WATERGATE INVESTIGATION
2 OPE ANALYSIS
CL
l
2 - PREDICATION:
t The Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) undertook
a study and analysis of the Bureau's Watergate and related investigations
based upon the Director's instructions issued by memorandum dated
May 14, 1974. In this memorandum the Director noted that recent
revelations have newly introduced certain circumstances which may have
a bearing on subsequent efforts to support the Bureau's investigative
effort in the Watergate and related matters. He instructed OPE to pre-
pare a complete analysis of the situation in order that the full ramifica-
I tions be determined and discussed.
(I
:
8 ; - :
n.
;
SCOPE OF OPE STUDY:
3 In view of the immense volume of the Watergate investi-
s
eg gat ion, it was necessary for OPE to narrow the focus of this analysis to
Fl those a r e a s of the investigation which have caused critical commentary
fnt in the Executive Branch, Congress, courts and the news media. In order
^ to detect and identify specific a r e a s of critical commentary relating to
the Bureau's performance in the Watergate and related investigations,
K the OPE staff undertook a review of selected materials which would p r o -
vide a comprehensive c r o s s section of commentary regarding these investi-
gations. Material reviewed to ascertain the most comment on specific
criticisms included the following:

(1) Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre-
to,,. sentatives by President Richard Nixon, April 30, 1974.
(2) Report of Proceedings Held Before Senate Judiciary
Committee re Nomination of Earl J. Silbert to be
* U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
(3) Senate Watergate Hearings.

:
-'^'- (4) A Piece of Tape: The Watergate Story: Fact and Fiction; *
by James W. McCord, Jr.
(5) All the President's Men, by Carl Bernstein and Bob *

Woodward. ^
(6) Watergate: The Full Inside Story, by Lewis Chester, et al.
- 2 -
*
<
LU
L
(7) The Judge Who Tried Harder by George V. Higgins in

The Atlantic Magazine, April 1974.
8
ID
(8) Report of Hearings Held Before Senate Judiciary Committee
re Nomination of L. Patrick Gray III to be Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(9) Watergate: Chronology of A Crisis; (2 volumes) by
The Congressional Quarterly.
Numerous news media articles were also reviewed. In
addition, summary memoranda prepared during the course of the investi-
gation by both the Washington Field Office (WFO) and the General Investi-
gative Division were reviewed. The results of previous Inspection Division
reviews of the Watergate investigation were also analyzed. Only those
cases directly relating to the Watergate burglary, the cover up of the
burglary, the activities of the "White House Plumbers" group and illegal
campaign activities have been incorporated within this analysis.
Cases such as the "ITT" matter, the "milk fund" case,

and the Vesco case are not included as they preceded the Watergate
activities and are not directly connected with Watergate matters.
After the conclusion of the review process set forth supra
OPE was able to define fifteen general areas of criticism which encompassed
essentially the entire range of responsible public commentary on the
Bureau's involvement in and investigation of the Watergate matters.
(i
-3-
These fifteen areas of criticism, which are set forth in Section V infra,
were then referred to the General Investigative Division with appropriate
references to the origin of criticism. The General Investigative Division
CO
O was requested to provide OPE with the following information:
O
x: (1) A brief summary of the investigative activity conducted
j- which gave r i s e to the criticism.
,1. (2) General Investigative Division's appraisal of the validity
jv, of the criticism and how it might have been avoided.
<
J^ (3) Any changes of policy that have resulted from such
criticism.
p (4) General Investigative Division's instructions (brief summary)
t to the field relating to any of the above cited matters. ;
fa
W, (5) Citations to file materials and communications which sub-
t stantiate the Bureau's position in each of the areas mentioned
î above.
After receipt of the above cited information, the position of
the Bureau in regard to each area of criticism was carefully reviewed by
OPE and where indicated original file materials were reviewed. There-
after an analysis of the situation in each of the specified areas was con-
ducted. The results of this analysis are set forth in Section V of this paper.
In order to place the complex events surrounding this most
extensive case in proper perspective, this paper includes a summary of
*" T
V-
J past audits of the investigation and an appendix designed to provide ready

O _
2; reference to data relating to Watergate matters.
-4-
PREVIOUS AUDITS AND INSPECTION REVIEWS
From the outset of the Watergate investigation these cases
have received the highest priority of supervision and direction, both in the
Field and at the Headquarters level. Initial instructions to various field
offices involved were transmitted telephonically by FBIHQ supervisors.
These instructions were to give this case immediate priority attention
under the personal supervision of the SAC. A "Personal Attention" airtel
was sent from Headquarters on June 20, 1972, to all field offices having
outstanding leads. This airtel stated in part as follows:
"This will confirm instructions to appropriate offices that
all logical investigation is to receive immediate attention
under the personal direction of SACs by as many SAs as
are needed to insure absolute, thorough, immediate,
imaginative investigation is conducted in this case. All
leads are to be set out by telephone or teletype as appro-
priate. Bureau is to be aware of all leads. "'*
Throughout this investigation there has been very close
scrutiny of all aspects of the cases developed by the SACs of the field
offices involved and by various components of the Headquarters super-
visory staff. The Accounting and Fraud Section of the General Investi-
gative Division has had the Headquarters supervisory responsibility
for most of the Watergate and related matters investigation; however,
Explanatory notes and documentation appear in Appendix (C) of this paper.
-5-
"> 3
violations of election laws have been supervised by the Civil Rights Section
and the operation of the "Plumbers" 2 and Daniel Ellsberg matters have
been supervised by the Intelligence Division. In August, 1973, a Watergate
Special Matters Unit was established within the Accounting and Fraud
Section to afford intensive Headquarters review and coordination of
Watergate investigative matters and to handle liaison with the Special
Prosecutor's Office.
In addition to the intensive supervision that these cases

have been given by SACs in the Field and by Headquarters supervisors
and officials they have also been subjected to close review by the
Inspection Division. During the inspection of WFO, March 8-27, 1973,
the Watergate investigations were reviewed. No errors of substance
were detected and no formal suggestions were rendered by the Inspection
Staff. During the inspection of the General Investigative Division,
July 30 - August 10, 1973, Watergate investigative matters and the
Headquarter's supervision and coordination of these matters were closejly
reviewed. The inspection determined that the investigations were being
vigorously and properly pursued, and were being afforded maximum
direction and control. No errors of substance were detected or formal
investigative suggestions rendered. *
On May 22, 1973, former Acting Director William D.

Ruckelshaus instructed that an analysis of allegations concerning the
-6-
i
O
C
DO
*
possible involvement by former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray HI in

actions to cover up, impede, or delay the Bureau's Watergate investigation
be undertaken. ^ The Inspection Division was assigned this task with the
assistance of the Office of Legal Counsel.
On May 23, 1973, Mr. Carl Eardley, Executive Assistant
to then Acting Director Ruckelshaus, who had been given the responsibility
of conducting a thorough analysis of the Bureau's Watergate investigations,
posed a series of thirty questions to Bureau officials concerning the initial
handling of the case and the related activities of Mr. Gray. ^ Based upon
this series of questions the Inspection Division separated its inquiry into
two distinct phases as follows:
A. Publicized Allegations Concerning Former Acting
Director L. Patrick Gray HI.
B. Pertinent Events at Initial Stages of Case and
Questions Relative Thereto Posed by Mr. Eardley.
Mr. Eardley's questions were primarily based upon an
informal log relating to the Watergate case maintained by then Assistant
Director Bates. This log recorded events relating to the Watergate
investigation involving Mr. Bates from June 21, 1972, to July 6, 1972.
The Inspection Division coordinated the preparation of responses to
Mr. Eardley's questions and furnished the facts to Acting Director
Ruckelshaus by letterhead memorandum dated June 7, 1973. 6 This
document which is captioned "Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of
Case" was furnished to the Special Prosecutor's Office on June 7, 1973,
and completed phase B of the Inspection Division review.
-7-
The Inspection Division completed its analysis of the
activities of former Acting Director Gray on June 26, 1973. Ten specific
allegations were addressed in the analysis set forth in a memorandum
which is twelve pages in length. The most significant aspect of the
Inspection staff's analysis appears to be the following observations:
"In considering possible impediments to obtaining the
full facts of the Watergate case the furnishing of numerous
FBI reports and other communications by Gray to Dean must
be considered... It is true there is no evidence in the files
indicating this action by Gray impeded our investigation from
an investigator's standpoint. Access by Dean to our investi-
&-. gation would logically indicate to him what information had
* been developed and which would enable him to work out strategy
to cover up the case. Likewise, the destruction by Gray of
documents apparently furnished him from Hunt's safe would
? . : have impeded the investigation although this cannot be stated
n.
i { .
i.v
. . - . .
-' :-.
'
;';. positively since we do not know what specific material he

.. destroyed, ifany. 1fI?
- On April 10, 1974, the Inspection Division's analysis of
Mr. Gray's activities relating to the Watergate investigation were
: furnished to the Special Frosecutor's Office along with 32 other Bureau
O
-8-
r
documents. These documents were furnished to the Special Pro-

secutor's Office based upon a formal request received March 19, 1974,
for copies of memoranda prepared during 1973 dealing with possible
violations of law by L. Patrick Gray m.
;
L
1 1
IV. AREAS OF CRITICISM AND COMMENTS
1. Allowing John Dean to sit in on interviews of White House
personnel; submitting copies and/or reports of the FBI investigative
results to Dean, and clearing proposed investigative activity through
Dean. 3
COMMENTS: On June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested authority to
interview Charles W. Colson since information had been developed that
Hunt had worked for Colson at the White House. On June 22, 1972,
Mr. Gray telephonically authorized then Assistant Director Bates to
have WFO contact John Dean to set up interview with Colson. Dean sub-
sequently indicated he would sit in on interviews of White House personnel
\. and all requests for investigation at the White House had to be cleared
through him.
Criticism of FBI interviews in the presence of Dean and
clearing proposed investigative activities through him is justified.
However, there appeared no alternative to WFO and to the Accounting x.
and Fraud Section to following this procedure since the decision concerning
this apparently had been made between Mr. Gray and Dean, and neither
Bureau supervisors nor field agents were in a position to overrule
^ decisions of the Acting Director.
With respect to the submitting of copies of FBI reports
V2>; to Dean, this is probably the most serious blunder from an investigative
-10-
standpoint made by Mr. Gray. The facts concerning this development
became known outside Mr. Gray's staff for the first time on February 5,
1973. This is long after the substantive investigation into the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters (DNCH) break-in was completed and,
in fact, was after the trial of those originally implicated was completed.
While Dean's role as the master manipulator of the cover up was unknown
and, in fact, the cover up itself was unknown during the investigation,
obviously the furnishing to Dean by Mr. Gray of our reports allowed
Dean the total opportunity to plan a course of action to thwart the FBI's
investigation and grand jury inquiry. There was no way that FBI
personnel could have avoided this situation since it was unknown that
Mr. Gray was furnishing the reports to Dean.
The principal lesson to be learned from this is that rarely
should we conduct interviews in the presence of an attorney and never
should we allow the same attorney to sit in on all interviews relative to
a certain situation. Further, FBI reports should be disseminated only
to the prosecutor and certainly never to the White House.
. r '*&
-li-
2. Failure to interview all Committee to Re-Elect the
President (CRP) employees re Watergate; delay in reviewing CRP

files; CRP attorneys sitting in on FBI interview of CRP employees,
and CRP attorneys having access to FBI file material. McCord
states that if FBI had interviewed Robert Reisner, Magruder's assistant
at CRP, the "Gemstone" file and Mitchell's role in the DNC wire-
tapping would have been uncovered. ^
COMMENTS: There was no apparent reason to interview all the

several hundred employees for CRP and such a shotgun approach to
the investigation was never considered by WFO or by the Bureau.
Rather, since we had definite leads to CRP in view of the arrest of
McCord, our investigation proceeded upon logical lines. Specifically,
we initially concentrated on identifying McCord's associates at the
security end of CRP. We were endeavoring to determine whether
others at CRP were involved in the conspiracy. We tried to determine
who hired McCord; what finances were made available to him; and who
worked with him.
We also concentrated on endeavoring to develop any

tie-ins between Hunt and CRP since information was developed at the
1
White House that a memorandum had been written by Richard Howard
to Bruce Kehrli recommending that Hunt be dropped at the White House
and picked up at 1701 (the address of CRP Headquarters was 1701
-12-
1
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW). We also sought through interviews at CRP

to obtain similar-type information concerning Alfred Baldwin.
We also conducted interviews at CRP concerning the

financing of the DNCH break-in in view of the information developed
by Miami on June 22, 1972, relative to the $89, 000 in Mexican bank
drafts and the $25,000 cashier's check of Dahlberg. We conducted
additional intensive interviews of CRP personnel concerning Liddy who
was identified as a contact of the Watergate burglars when we got hold of
Barker's and Martinez 1 address books from the Metropolitan Police
Department on June 23, 1972. Those address books contained the name
"George," beside which was the number we determined to be used by
Liddy at CRP.
In all, we conducted about 60 interviews of CRP people

including interviews of several of them more than one time. Of this
number, several obviously lied to us, most notably John Mitchell,
Jeb Magruder, Bart Porter, Sally Harmony and Maurice Stans. Hugh
Sloan never permitted us to interview him but finally permitted an
interview of him by the AUSAs after Sloan's attorney held discussions
prior thereto with the AUSAs. (Sloan, over national television before
the Ervin Committee, said the FBI never interviewed him about the
Watergate matter, which is true, although he incorrectly made it
appear we did not desire or try to interview him.)
-13-
The name of Robert Reisner never surfaced during our
investigation at CRP Headquarters and during our numerous interviews
there. It is apparent he was hiding from us and, in fact, WFO learned
in April, 1973, when Magruder started telling the truth, that he had
fc.
transferred Reisner from his job as Magruder's assistant about
July 5, 1972, obviously to keep Reisner from coming to our attention.
It is a sad fact that Rob Odle, whom we interviewed several times, failed
to tell us, the Federal grand jury or the AUSAs of his activities on
June 17, 1972, which included a telephone conversation with Magruder
who told Odle to have Reisner clean out Magruder's files. Odle actually
took the "Gemstone" file home with him that night but this was never
mentioned to us. It is also observed that Reisner never came forward
although he certainly had information and the opportunity.
It is also interesting to note that only three out
of the same 60 CRP people we interviewed recontacted us for interviews
outside CRP premises. It is apparent that most CRP people in the
Summer of 1972 were quite willing to lie and/or to tell us considerably
less than the full truth. It is further interesting that Magruder and
Porter have now been prosecuted for their lies; Mitchell is under
indictment for lying; and Stans is being investigated for Obstruction
%.': of Justice (OOJ). :
-14-
On no less than seven occasions during the period June 19-
5
29, 1972, did the investigating agents request records and documentation
from Robert C. Odle, J r . , Director of Administration for CRP; Judy
Hoback, Accounting Department, Finance CRP; and Robert L. Houston,
Security Coordinator, CRP, concerning McCord's employment; payroll
records for individuals employed by McCord; an inventory of McCord's
electronic equipment and copies of supporting invoices; copies of all
disbursements from CRP to McCord and McCord's Associates during the
period November 15, 1971 to June 19, 1972; the identities of the personnel
employed by McCord who would have worked at CRP; and records con-
cerning Alfred C. Baldwin HI.
The investigation developed that there were two situations

in which CRP files apparently were destroyed. All our investigation
was reported to and discussed with the AUSAs; was the subject of lengthy
Federal grand jury inquiry; but the evidence was not sufficient to warrant
OOJ indictments.
f:~ Finance records such as ledgers and records regarding
Z
j" contributors were destroyed about April 6, 1972, prior to the date on
which the new regulations relative to disclosure of the names of con-
tributors and the expenditure of funds went into effect on April 7, 1972.
. . *
'''" ' ' Second, there apparently was destruction of material having to do with
Liddy's intelligence gathering operation. Herbert Porter on July 19, 1972,
advised he threw away receipts Liddy gave for the money that Porter r e -
I
-15-
*r*
ceived from Sloan to pass on to Liddy and allegedly Liddy'

shredder on June 17, 1972, after the arrest at the Waterji
some documents, probably the logs and memoranda dealing with'
overhearings of the conversations on Spencer OliverTs telephone,
also reported that McCord's assistant, Robert Houston, remove
material from the CRP offices over the weekend of June 17 thr<
June 18, 1972. (He told us this was some equipment he was working;
-n-
l
- *Ti,ri
with, it was not destroyed but returned to the office.)

According to Millicent Gleason, a security officer^
CRP, when interviewed on July 1, 1972, Robert Houston, early
o morning of June 18, 1972, went to the file cabinet in the security office^
and began removing files. When the FBI interviewed Houston, he del
it and we were unable to obtain other corroboration from the other
people. ^ r_;
Also, Baldwin told us on July 10, 1972, he prepared logs
of the telephone conversations from which McCord prepared type<^
memoranda. We did not then know if those memoranda still exist*
No one interviewed except Baldwin from whom the information abb
the logs and memoranda was originally obtained, would admit to
ledge of them. In fact, case agent Lano advised he heard Liddy's attorney^
state in closing comments to the jury that, In effect, Liddy
evidence, possibly the memoranda, soon after the arrests on June 17/ l W l j S
using the CRP shredder. ; ^ '
, Vt<
-16-
^ . **&!'* *
On July 18, 1972, Judith Hoback, then Assistant to the
Treasurer of the Finance CRP, advised us that about five ledger books
used to record cash were destroyed prior to April 7, 1972. Also, all
bank accounts of the Finance CRP were closed on April 6, 1972, and
all pertinent records destroyed. Mrs. Hoback also told us that she heard
from unrecalled persons at the office that Liddy was shredding office
papers on the day of the burglary. She said she believed all lists of
contributors were destroyed prior to April 7, 1972. We pursued this
shredding angle but could never develop firsthand information.
On June 30, 1972, Stephen Anderson, a security guard at

CRP, was interviewed in the presence of CRP attorney H. Donald Kistler.
He furnished only negligible information at the time but late in the day on
June 30, 1972, he telephoned WFO and requested to speak to the agents
who had previously interviewed him. He told us that on the evening of
June 16, 1972, McCord stayed at the CRP office much later than usual
and instructed Anderson to get a key for each desk, file cabinet and office
on the second floor of CRP (the Finance CRP floor). McCord told him
the Finance CRP had some papers which they had ordered to be
destroyed and the desks and cabinets would have to be checked to
verify this destruction. Anderson assembled the keys and placed them on
top of a file cabinet with written instructions as to what was to be done
with the keys. Anderson also advised that Penny Gleason told him that
on June 18, 1972, she observed Robert Houston going through file cabinets
of McCord and removing papers. Houston told Gleason he had to burn the
-17-
1
a..-1
papers. However, Houston denied such actions to us.

With respect to the CRP attorneys sitting in on our inter-
views at CRP Headquarters, such arrangements were made between CRP
attorney Kenneth Parkinson, USA Titus and AUSA Silbert. Parkinson
represented to these men that he would like to sit in on the interviews
in view of the fact that CRP was the defendant in the civil damage suit
filed by the Democratic National Committee. Titus and Silbert agreed
to allow Parkinson to sit in provided there was no interference in the
questioning of the CRP personnel by the agents. A few days later it
developed that the CRP attorneys who were sitting in on the interviews
IH began to interfere with the questioning and slowed our efforts to conduct
interviews by not being available. This interference was made known to
Silbert by WFO and since Parkinson was adamant that counsel had to be
present during these interviews to protect CRP, Silbert began sub-
poenaing the CRP personnel before the grand jury where they would be
questioned without having CRP attorneys present.
Further to the point that we had difficulty in conducting
interviews outside the presence of counsel was our experience during the
investigation of the transmitter found on a telephone of R. Spencer Oliver,
DNCH, September 13, 1972. DNCH advised agents of WFO that it would
not permit the interview of its employees without the presence of an
attorney representing DNCH unless that employee specifically requested
11
-18-
I that the attorney not be present. A total of 61 employees at DNCH were
\ interviewed in the presence of an attorney.
Although we did not make available any FBI material to
CRP attorneys, apparently Dean allowed Mardian, Parkinson and Paul
O'Brien (CRP counsel) to review some of the reports which Mr. Gray
furnished to Dean. This subversion of our investigation was not known
to the Bureau but Dean testified in the Summer of 1973 to this before the
Ervin Committee.
-19-
")
3. Delay and/or failure to obtain access to and account for

contents of Howard Hunt's desk and safe at the White House.
COMMENTS: On June 17, 1972 Hunt's probable involvement in the

Watergate incident came to WFO's attention because of his country club
bill found in the Watergate Hotel and because of information contained
in Barker's address book. WFO, about 6:00-7:00 pm, June 17, 1972,
contacted Butterfield of the White House and learned that Hunt had pre-
viously worked as a consultant to the White House. Butterfield was
told Hunt may be involved in the DNCH burglary. On June 18, 1972,
Butterfield recontacted WFO and advised that Hunt had worked for
Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President.
On June 19, 1972, SA Saunders reviewed Hunt's personnel

file at the White House and also called White House number 456-2282
(which number was contained in Barker's address book), asked to speak
to Mr. Hunt and was informed that he had not come to his office that
day. On the afternoon of June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested
Bureau authority to interview Colson. On June 22, 1972, upon Mr. Gray's
instructions, then Assistant Director Bates, at about 10:25 am, authorized
SAC Kunkel to have agents contact Dean to discuss an interview with
Colson and discuss obtaining of telephone toll call records involving Hunt
at the White House. Thereafter, SA Saunders contacted Dean to set up
interview of Coison which was conducted on the afternoon of June 22, 1972,
in Dean's office with Dean present.
-20-
During the interview when Colson said that he believed
Hunt had worked on the third floor of the building, SA Lano asked Dean if
the agents could accompany Dean to Hunt's office on the third floor to
determine if Hunt may have left anything there. Dean stated that this was
the first he was aware of this office. In response to an Agent's request
to examine the office, Dean advised the White House would provide the
FBI with any contents belonging to Hunt. On the morning of June 26,
1972, Dean called SA Lano and advised he had something to turn over to
the FBI. SAs Mahan and Michael J. King were then sent to Dean's
office. At approximately 11:00 am, Dean gave these agents a box con-
taining some of Hunt's effects and between 4:00 and 4:30 pm, June 26,
1972, Dean's assistant, Fred Fielding, gave same agents a second box
of Hunt's effects.
It is not apparent from the foregoing that there is any

validity to criticism of Bureau agents for delay in obtaining access to
Hunt's space at the White House. The Accounting and Fraud Section
cannot explain why the interview of Colson, which was recommended
June 19, 1972, was not approved by Mr. Gray until June 22, 1972. As
soon as his approval was obtained, immediate steps were taken to inter-
view Colson. As set out above, Dean thwarted our efforts to gain access
to Hunt's office at the White House.
(I
-21-
1 1
The possibility of obtaining a search warrant for Hunt's

office at the White House and the fact that we did not have the necessary
probable cause is discussed later under Item #6.
-22-
4. Failure to fully explore all possible ramifications of
Watergate matter with subjects, suspects and potential material witnesses.
COMMENTS: This criticism is absolutely false and has no basis in

fact. To the contrary, our agents were in fact very thorough in exploring
all aspects with every possible subject, suspect and witness. It is an
absolute fact that we conducted thousands of interviews and tracked down
and interviewed all the people who were indicated to have been in contact
with the subjects. Not one of the subjects of the investigation would talk
to our agents and none of them would cooperate with the AUSAs or testify
before the Federal grand jury despite very substantial efforts which were
made to endeavor to secure cooperation and the full story. This included
an unsuccessful effort to immunize Gonzalez (who was considered to be
the likely best prospect for immunity) and at least two efforts by Silbert
to give McCord a deal in exchange for his cooperation.
There is absolutely no question that the conspiracy in this

case was broken only when the time came when some of those inside the
conspiracy, specifically McCord, Dean and Magruder, came to feel that
it was to their better self-interest to tell their stories. An investigation
succeeds in discovering the total truth only when investigators have the
opportunity to interview different suspects thoroughly, to compare the
information obtained and exploit differences in stories obtained. We
i
& were prevented from making any benefit from this necessary investigative
-23-
technique by the fact that all of those involved who would talk lied and kept
their stories straight and together. Since Dean was kept completely
informed of our investigation by Mr. Gray and apparently to some extent
by Assistant Attorney General Petersen, there was no possibility that we
could get a break.
As a matter of fact the testimony of former Attorney
General John Mitchell before the Ervin Committee on July 10, 1973, in
discussing the cover up best sums up this matter when he stated in part
that the effort of those very high-level Executive Branch people was
" . . .keeping the lid on and no information volunteered." This rather
succinctly accounts for the fact that, despite thorough questioning by our
agents, those interviewed, from Ehrlichman, Mitchell and on down,
replied in the negative regarding knowledge of anything having to do with the
break-in and bugging or that they had gotten any information from McCord,
Liddy or Hunt.
-24-
I &.
I 5. Delay or failure to interview several individuals re

monies and/or checks found in possession of defendants or having been
| deposited to their bank accounts. 1 3
[ COMMENTS: At the time of the subjects' arrests on June 17, 1972,

and subsequent search of their hotel rooms at the Watergate Hotel,
Washington, D, C., 44 new one hundred dollar bills were found, some
of which were sequentially numbered. It was determined from the Bureau
of Engraving and Printing on June 19, 1972, that the Prefix F bills were
distributed to the Miami Branch, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank (FRB),
and the Prefix C bills were distributed to the FRB, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, during early February, 1972. On June 20, 1972, records
of FRB, Miami, disclosed the foregoing one hundred dollar bills were
part of a $50,000 shipment on April 18, 1972, to the Republic National
Bank, Miami, at which bank Bernard L. Barker maintained a business
account. A review on June 21 and June 22, 1972, of this account showed
that Barker, on April 20, 1972, deposited four drafts totaling $89,000
drawn on the Banco Tnternacional, Mexico City, Mexico, all payable to
Sr. Manuel Ogarrio. On May 8, 1972, Barker received cash for these
checks including $10, 000 in new one hundred dollar bills (serial numbers
\ not recorded by the bank according to the banker when interviewed

I June 21, 1972).
i ( i-h
-25-
* )
It was also developed that on April 20, 1972 Barker had

presented a cashier's check dated April 10, 1972, payable to Kenneth
Dahlberg, drawn on the First Bank and Trust Company of Boca Raton,
Florida, for which Barker received cash. Investigation showed Dahlberg
to be a prominent Minneapolis businessman and fund raiser for CRP.
Efforts to interview Dahlberg initially on June 22, June 23, June 24, and
June 26, 1972, were unsuccessful as he evaded our agents and finally on
June 26, 1972, declined interview on the basis of his counsel's advice.
Mr. Helms, then Director of CIA, on June 28, 1972,

allegedly informed Mr. Gray orally that tfc ljyft recorded contact
CIA with Dahlberg was in May, JJ61. On J^ne | 9 , 1972, Mr. Gray
instructed Mr. Felt that among those CIA employees or contacts not to
be interviewed or investigated at that time because of national security
considerations were Dahlberg and Ogarrio. It was not until July 6, 1972,
that Mr. Gray, according to Mr. Bates, gave the go ahead on the Dahlberg
and Ogarrio interviews. It is interesting to note that General Walters,
then Deputy Director, CIA, furnished memorandum to Mr. Gray dated
July 6, 1972, which in part stated that Mr. Gray was orally advised on
June 27 and June 28, 1972, that Ogarrio and Dahlberg, respectively, were
not involved with CIA and were open for FBI interview.
Dahlberg was interviewed July 6, 1972, when he claimed

that $25, 000 represented contributions he accumulated while he was
-26-
staying in Southeast Florida prior to and during early April, 1972;
however, in August, 1972, Dahlberg changed his story and admitted the
contribution was in fact that of Dwayne Andreas, a prominent businessman
who wished to make an anonymous contribution.
However, in Mr. Felt's memorandum of June 29, 1972,

it is stated that Mr. Gray instructed that CIA employees or contacts,
V H ^ ^ ^ ^ H H f l H ^ ^ p n o t be interviewed or investigated because of
national security considerations.
hold up on the interview. It is noted that in memorandum C. Bolz to
Mr. Bates June 29, 1972, it is stated that Mr. Helms, CIA, advised the
Acting Director that agency has never had any interest in
-27-
and has had no interest in Kenneth Dahlberg since 1961. With Mr. Gray's
approval,
The criticism concerning the delay in interviewing Dahlberg

and Ogarrio is valid only if leveled against Mr. Gray, assuming he was
aware on June 27, 1972, that no restrictions by CIA were placed on our
interviews of Dahlberg and Ogarrio. The criticism of Mr. Gray might not
be valid if he had been misled by CIA or someone else such as Dean or
Ehrlichman, especially since during the early stages of this investigation
there were very real indications that the FBI's investigation may be leading
into a CIA operation with respect to the money or the burglary of DNCH
itself; however, we did not develop solid evidence as the investigation
progressed to indicate that CIA was involved in the planning or execution
of the Watergate break-in. In any event, the criticism is not valid if
leveled against the execution of investigative responsibility by the
Accounting and Fraud Section or the Field.
-28-
6. Failure to obtain and execute search warrants for
search of original five subjects' homes, offices and automobiles. **
COMMENTS: This particular criticism has received widespared publicity

from four principal sources, each of which should know better. Probably
the primary criticism has been directed to us by NBC broadcaster Carl
Stern who provided "expert legal opinion" during the nationally televised
Ervin Committee hearings, closely followed by McCord and Senators
Hart and Ervin of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The fact is that con-
siderable consideration was given to obtaining search warrants and in
each instance in which we could meet the constitutional requirements
of the Fourth Amendment, search warrants were obtained. It should be
common knowledge of individuals having legal training and that includes
Stern, McCord and Senators Hart and Ervin, that probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant specifically includes: 1) That there is
knowledge which can be testified to before a Magistrate that there is present
at a certain location, evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of a crime; and
2) Information must be recent and must be corroborated. Mere suspicion
is not probable cause.
It was the opinion of AUSA Silbert in the Summer of 1972,

which continues to the present as he stated in his testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on April 23, 1974, that there was not probable
-29-
1
cause to sustain a search warrant for McCord's home or office. WFO did
conduct extensive investigation, including interviews of McCord's neighbors,
to endeavor to develop evidence that anyone had seen electronic equipment
or McCord's truck at his home shortly after the arrest but this investi-
gation did not bear fruit. The first positive evidence we developed that
bugging equipment had been taken to McCord's home after the arrest was
obtained on July 10, 1972, from Alfred Baldwin. Since this was 23 days
after the date that Baldwin drove McCord's truck with equipment to
McCord's home, it was Silbert's opinion that too much time had elapsed
to permit the obtaining of a search warrant then. The lack of probable
cause also kept us from obtaining search warrants for Hunt's home and
offices as well as the homes and offices of the other defendants.
It is interesting to note that search warrants were

obtained by the Metropolitan Police Department, with FBI assistance,
for two rooms at the Watergate Hotel occupied by the subjects the night of
the arrests, which rooms were searched on June 17, 1972, An automobile
rented in Washington, D. C., by the subjects was also searched pursuant
to a search warrant. In addition, when information was obtained on
June 21, 1972 from an informant in Miami that Martinez had a car parked
at the Miami Airport which was reported to contain a gun and other evidence,
Miami obtained a search warrant for this car and the car was searched.
Based on the foregoing, it appears this criticism is totally

i '-S
without merit.
-30-
1/
7. Failure to identify and interview all persons listed in the
address books, notebooks, et cetera, which were seized and determined
to be the property of the seven original subjects. ^
COMMENTS: The Barker and Martinez address books were seized by

the Metropolitan Police Department as a result of the search of the two rooms
at the Watergate Hotel, occupied by the arrested subjects on June 17, 1972.
The search warrants which legally authorized search of these two rooms
were obtained by Metropolitan Police Department officers and the items
seized were taken by the police officers.
About June 23, 1972, SA Lano, through contact with

the Metropolitan Police Department officers, obtained access to the
Barker and Martinez address books for investigative use and the books
themselves were returned to the Metropolitan Police Department. On
June 26, 1972, AUSA Silbert requested the FBI to take possession of the
evidence seized including the books which were officially turned over to
WFO by the Metropolitan Police Department on June 28, 1972.
By airtel dated June 23, 1972, to Miami, WFO forwarded

two photographic copies of each of these address books for investigative
assistance of Miami and instructed Miami to review both books and conduct
appropriate investigation regarding the information set forth in the books.
WFO had already extracted information from the books concerning names,
addresses and telephone numbers in the Washington, D. C., Maryland and
-31-
1
1(1
Virginia areas and conducted investigation concerning each of these
j notations and all persons interviewed. In January, 1973, during the trial
of the original seven defendants, it was learned for the first time that
Miami had not interviewed each individual in these books who was from
South Florida.
Upon inquiry by FBIHQ in January, 1973, the Miami
Office advised that as soon as Martinez1 and Barker's address books
were received from WFO, the books were examined by Miami Special
Agents familiar with the Latin community and who were familiar with
the McCord case. Miami indices were searched concerning the names
in these two books. Targets for interviews by agents were selected by
Miami based on the judgment of the Special Agents who reviewed the books,
taking into consideration any information concerning the people contained
in Miami's files.
Miami advised that based upon judgment of the Special
Agents reviewing the address books, about 25 interviews were conducted
out of the approximately 120 Miami area notations in Martinez' book.
Barker's book contained about 110 Miami area identifiable notations and
approximately 50 percent of these people were interviewed.
It is believed that Miami's approach to Martinez' and
Barker's address books was proper at the time taking into consideration
the fast moving extensive investigation which was then being conducted and
-32-
i and which was focused on tying Hunt and Liddy into the conspiracy. It
j
\ would have been much better had Miami later contacted all of the individuals
; in these books not previously interviewed, in the interest of total com-
pleteness of the investigation. However, interestingly enough, the judgment
of the Miami Special Agents who reviewed these books and selected targets
for interviews proved to be good since the contacts of those individuals
whom we had not interviewed, by the press, did not bring to light any
additional information. Considerable consideration was given in January,
1973, by FBIHQ to having the individuals not already interviewed, contacted
by Miami. This proposal was not accepted by Mr. Gray, and probably
rightfully so, on the premise that had we conducted these interviews
during the trial, there no doubt would have been sensational press stories
that the FBI was continuing its investigation while the trial was in progress.
-33-
)
8. Alleged failure to detect and remove "bug" from the

telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters. McCord states that he installed two electronic devices
on telephones in the DNC that were not detected or removed by the
Bureau, the first was removed in September of 1972 and the second
was not removed until April of 1973. ^
COMMENTS: The Bureau has been criticized a number of times pre-

viously concerning this matter, most strenuously in September, 1972,
when AUSA Silbert forwarded a memorandum dated September 28, 1972,
to Assistant Attorney General Petersen in which he flatly stated that he
believed the Bureau "goofed" in its security survey of DNCH shortly after
the Watergate break-in. Mr. Silbert set forth five reasons which led him
to believe this and the Laboratory personnel who had conducted the
security check analyzed these reasons point by point and rejected the
validity of same. The principal points made by the Laboratory were
that a thorough physical search had been conducted by Bureau personnel
of DNCH, the bug located September 13, 1972, on Oliver's telephone was
so large that it could not have been missed had it been on Oliver's tele-
phone in June, 1972, and that physical security of DNCH space was such
as to make access for the installation of the device relatively easy.
There follows a brief discussion of the matter of security

survey of DNCH. On June 19, 1972, Mr. Felt held a discussion with the
-34-
>
(V;,
Attorney General concerning the investigation and it was agreed that a

,' sweep of DNCH was a logical investigative step. However, the Attorney
General suggested that in view of the sensitive nature of this case,
Mr. Gray might want to personally contact Democratic Chairman
ife.
O'Brien to suggest this.

On June 21, 1972, Mr. Felt sent a note to Mr. Gray
suggesting that the security sweep be implemented at once. Mr. Gray
instructed that this be held off at that time but on the morning of June 22,
1972, he authorized then Assistant Director Bates to contact Chairman
O'Brien of DNCH to offer to conduct an electronic sweep. Arrangements
for this sweep were coordinated by WFO and the FBI Laboratory and
DNCH space was checked by FBI Laboratory personnel on June 29-30,
1972, with negative results. It is interesting to note that WFO advised
that Earl Connor, Chief of Security, C&P Telephone Company, and his
assistant, who originally installed the telephone equipment at DNCH,
also conducted a security survey of the telephone and communications
equipment at DNCH on June 17-18, 1972, and detected nothing unusual
or out of order.
On April 9, 1973, McCord examined the device removed
from Oliver's telephone on September 13, 1972, and testified before the
Federal grand jury to the effect that this device appeared to be one which
Si? he had placed at DNCH. He also stated that he had placed another
-35-
*") '"!)
listening device, which had not worked, in a telephone located at DNCH

in a room adjacent to the office occupied by Oliver. Based on this
testimony, on April 9, 1973, FBI Laboratory personnel conducted
another check of all telephones located in the DNCH offices and no
listening device was located.
This testimony by McCord caused further inquiry into
the matter of wiretap devices at DNCH. On April 11, 1973, personnel
of the Radio Engineering Section met with Mr. Connor, at which time
he stated the objective of his survey of June 17-18, 1972, was to
physically examine all telephone installations and telephone equipment
on the sixth floor space at DNCH for wiretap devices. (This is the
floor on which the original arrests were made and is the floor containing
O'Brien's; Oliver's; and the rest of the offices of the principal Democratic
Committee personnel.) Mr. Connor advised that no record was main-
tained identifying the specific items of telephone equipment checked,
and while because of the lapse of time he and his assistant could not
remember details of each individual telephone, he was positive that all
4
available telephones were checked.

A room by room tour of the sixth floor space was made
with Mr. Connor to refresh his memory. He identified only one room,
that occupied by the press secretary, as having been unavailable and ;3*
therefore as not having been included in his survey of June 17-18, 1972.
-36-
s
> He r e c a l l e d that t h i s r o o m w a s locked and he was advised by DNCH officials
j that t h i s r o o m need not b e checked. T h i s r o o m was adjacent to O l i v e r ' s
office but had no interconnecting door to O l i v e r ' s office and had no t e l e -
phone s e r v i c e in connection with O l i v e r ' s office. Both M r . Connor and
h i s a s s i s t a n t advised that t h e J u n e 1 7 - 1 8 , 1972, check included taking t h e
telephones physically a p a r t for v i s u a l inspection for foreign i t e m s and
none w e r e found. Each of t h e s e m e n r e c a l l e d that O l i v e r ' s office w a s
i{. one of those included in t h e i r s u r v e y .
We conducted an e x t r e m e l y detailed investigation concerning
the S e p t e m b e r 13, 1972, w i r e t a p device r e m o v e d from O l i v e r ' s telephone
but did not s u c c e e d in developing any positive information concerning

i
I that device. The Laboratory, which is well qualified to render such a

\ statement, has stated that the device removed from Oliver's telephone
was not there in June, 1972. The telephone company personnel stated
| the same thing. Mr. Silbert apparently still believes, as indicated in
i
his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 23, 1974,
that the Bureau "goofed" in its security survey in June, 1972. It is his
1 prerogative to hold this view even though we have previously furnished
; him with all the above mentioned facts. This criticism apparently will
not die, the matter appears insoluble and there is no way we can further
refute this criticism.
-37-
&
; 9. Failure to promptly and thoroughly investigate alleged

election law violations by Segretti and others associated with CRP or
the White House. 1 7
| COMMENTS: Information concerning Donald Henry Segretti came to

our attention on June 22, 1972, during the early stages of the Watergate
investigation when the thrust of the FBI's efforts was logically concentrated
on the original seven defendants. We interviewed Segretti who was not
cooperative in furnishing useful information. Thereafter we conducted
extensive investigation to try to determine his possible involvement in the
DNCH break-in conspiracy. When it became obvious that Segretti was
not a part of that conspiracy but rather was only involved in campaign
"dirty tricks," a possible but unlikely Election Laws matter, we ceased
investigating him with AUSA Silbert's concurrence.
The long-standing Department policy regarding Election

i
Laws is that allegations of violations are referred to the Department of

, , Justice and no additional investigation is conducted unless specifically
requested by the Department. Our reports containing results of investi-
gation including information concerning Segretti's activities were
disseminated to Assistant Attorney General Petersen. We properly did
_ ,L not pursue the Election Laws aspect as we were not requested to do so
| by the Department.
| -38-
1
When massive newspaper publicity about Segretti's

activities began in the second week of October, 1972, principally in the
form of articles written by "The Washington Post" reporters Bernstein
and Woodward, the Acting Director instructed then Legal Counsel
Assistant Director Dalbey to review the newspaper stories and the
analysis of same which had been made by the General Investigative
Division, to determine whether Segretti was in violation of Federal
law. Mr. Dalbey was of the opinion that the information available was
too nonspecific to put Segretti in violation of any Federal law except
possibly Election Laws matters.
In light of this, on October 17, 1972, then Section Chief

Charles Bolz of the Accounting and Fraud Section, contacted Assistant
Attorney General Petersen of the Criminal Division relative to Segretti's
activities as he had related them to us and as set forth in the then recent
issue of "The Washington Post." Mr. Petersen was advised that we did
not conduct investigation of Segretti's alleged political harassment
activities and did not contemplate conducting investigation regarding
those activities unless the Department made a specific request for investi-
gation. Mr. Petersen advised Mr. Bolz he was fully aware of the extent
of the FBI's investigation and said he did not believe Segretti's activities
were in violation of any Federal statutes. Accordingly, he could see no
basis for requesting additional investigation of the FBI at that time.
-39-
)
This criticism of the FBI is not justified as we performed

in accordance with established practice. The fact that the Special
Prosecutor's Office, when it was established, decided to have us pursue
Segretti's activities is not indicative of any prior dereliction on the part
of the FBI. We still conduct full investigation of possible Election Laws
violations only upon request of the Department or of the USA. (FBIHQ
clears such USA requests for full investigation through the Department
before the field is authorized to conduct same.) It is interesting to note
that the exhaustive investigation of Segretti's "dirty tricks" activities
conducted pursuant to the Special Prosecutor's request, has not resulted
in any prosecutive activity. The prosecution of Segretti which has been
done grew out of a separate FBI investigation, conducted at the request
of the Criminal Division, months before the Special Prosecutor's Office
was established.
**>
-40-
) 1
2 10. Alleged activities by former Acting Director Gray to
f\ limit, contain or obstruct FBI investigation of Watergate matter. *
COMMENTS: In general, since the outset of the Watergate investigation,
numerous public allegations have appeared suggesting the possibility that
the investigation was impeded by instructions given by Mr. Gray.
The major areas of criticism of alleged questionable
activities of Mr. Gray are as follows:
a. Delay in authorizing interviews of Charles Colson and David
Young at the White House and the interview of Kathleen Chenow, London,
England.
WFO by teletype June 19, 1972, requested authority to
interview Charles W. Colson as Hunt had worked for Colson at the
White House. A memorandum was prepared during the afternoon of
June 19, 1972, recommending this interview but this was not approved
by Mr. Gray until the morning of June 22, 1972. The reason for this
UK delay is not known.
By teletype dated June 28, 1972, WFO requested1
[interview Kathleen Chenow, former secretary
to David Young,^^^^^^^^^^BApparently at Mr. Gray's instructions,
this lead was not immediately covered but was held in abeyance because
of "national security considerations." Mr. Gray later advised that Chenow
was being brought back to the United States in a military aircraft in company
-41-
of Fred Fielding, Dean's assistant. When interviewed July 3, 1972,
in Dean's presence, she furnished little, if any, useful information.
It appears likely the reason we had to wait to interview Chenow was
because Dean wanted to brief her beforehand.
By teletype June 29, 1972, WFO recommended immediate
interviews of flHHflfl|fl|H^H^H David Young at the White
House; John Mitchell in New York; and
SAC, WFO, advised June 30, 1972, that AUSA Silbert stated that
fe-_: USA Titus felt there was some delay on the part of the FBI, referring
to the interviews of Young, Chenow and Ogarrio, and the receipt of
copies of reports. Thereafter, on the same date. Mr, Felt told Mr. Bates
that John Dean of the White House had said to hold off interview of Young
until Dean talks to Mr. Gray. Later that day Mr. Felt advised Mr. Bates
that it was all right to interview Mitchell and Young and that Young would
be (and was) made available at the White House on Monday, July 3, 1972.
,The reason for this delay is not known.
b. Delays in authorizing interviews in connection with the Dahlberg

and Ogarrio checks which were funneled through Bernard Barker's bank
account in Miami, Florida.
On June 28, 1972, authority was granted
to
HH^^ÎB interview Manuel Ogarrio concerning the $89,000 in
Mexican bank drafts which had been located through a review of subject
-42-
Barker's bank account in Miami.
However, based on instructions from Mr. Gray, the

interviews of Ogarrio and Kenneth Dahlberg were deferred due to
"national security considerations." It is interesting to note that
John Dean testified before the Senate Select Committee that even though
CIA had cleared Ogarrio and Dahlberg for FBI interview, Dean called
Mr. Gray instructing that the interviews not be conducted at that time.
Clearance for the Ogarrio interview was later received and he was inter
viewed fl^^^HH^mm^ Similarly, Dahlberg was sub-
sequently interviewed by the Minneapolis Office on July 6, 1972, based
on a memorandum from Mr. Bates to Mr. Bolz July 6, 1972, which
confirmed oral instructions received from Mr. Gray. As set forth in
Item #14 of this memorandum, it is still not clear why we were delayed.
c. Concessions to Dean:
1. Allowing Dean to sit in on our interviews of
White House personnel.
2. Furnishing Dean copies of our investigative
reports and other communications.
3. Clearing with Dean certain aspects of intended
investigation including projected leads at the
White House and CRP.
Mr. Gray's decision to allow John Dean to sit in on inter-
views with all White House personnel obviously had a deleterious effect
on the investigation of White House personnel. From the investigative
-43-
(p
standpoint, having Dean present at interviews undoubtedly had the effect
i of limiting the furnishing of pertinent information to our agents. Although
eventually all the interviews the field desired to cover were handled with
the exception of the interview of a covert CIA employee as set out else-
where in this memorandum, delays were encountered in conducting some
pertinent interviews. The exact reasons for these delays and the effect
on the overall investigation are not known but have been the subject of
much speculation.
In considering the possible impediments to obtaining

the full facts of the Watergate case, the furnishing of numerous FBI
reports and other communications by Mr. Gray to Dean must be con-
sidered. The facts concerning this development first became known
February 5, 1973. Up to that time, apparently no one outside of
Mr. Gray's staff had any knowledge of what had transpired. There is
no evidence in the files indicating this action by Mr. Gray impeded
our investigation; however, it must be recognized that access by Dean
to our investigative reports would logically indicate to him what
information had been developed which would enable him to work out
strategy to cover up the case.
Similarly, Mr. Gray's concession to clear White House

\ investigation with Dean prior to it being conducted would give Dean time
to set the stage in order that the results of that investigation would be
i more favorable to Dean's ultimate ends.
-44-
)
d. Acceptance from Dean of certain material allegedly taken from

Hunt's safe in the Executive Office Building, which Mr. Gray testified
he burned.
We cannot state whether the destruction by Mr. Gray of
documents apparently furnished him from Hunt's safe would have impeded
our investigation as we do not know with certainty what material was
destroyed, if any. Although, admittedly, it is speculative, the acceptance
of this material from Dean in the fashion it was done and at a relatively
early date (June 28, 1972) in the investigation, may very well have given
Dean even more control over Mr. Gray in future dealings.
e. Failure to pursue and investigate the political espionage and

sabotage activities allegedly planned by Segretti.
Concerning Mr. Gray's failure to pursue the Segretti
matter, this is discussed in Item #9 above and criticism of Mr. Gray
or the FBI in general in this regard does not appear to be justified.
By memorandum dated June 26, 1973, captioned "Watergate,
Analysis of Possible Involvement by L. Patrick Gray," the above-cited
questionable areas were analyzed. Our response in part has been taken
from that memorandum. It appears that certain actions of Mr. Gray
may be construed as having impeded our investigation.
In conclusion, the investigating agents, supervisory

personnel and Bureau officials connected with the Watergate case were
-45-
quizzed on two occasions to determine if they felt there were any leads
they were not permitted to pursue. In all instances the answer was "no1
with the exception of WFO Supervisor Ruhl who referred to the two
covert CIA people detailed hereafter (see Item #14). This quizzing,
of course, took place before the extraordinary disclosures of the cover
up which began to come to light in late March, 1973.
7%
-46-
ii t
11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative results to news

.j media, Congress or other unauthorized parties by Bureau personnel.
; _ COMMENTS: Allegations of leaks from the FBI concerning the Watergate

^* investigation began in the first week of our investigation and continue to
r^ the present time. Although there has been much speculation concerning
the source of these leaks, hard facts pinning down these sources have
" not as yet come to light. It is recalled that on Saturday, June 24, 1972,
Mr. Gray had SAC Kunkel and all the WFO Special Agents working on the
4 >
r DNCH break-in into his office at which time he castigated the agents
severely concerning the alleged leaks of information. Newspaper stories
attributed to sources continued to erupt and during the following week,
at Mr. Gray's instructions, the Inspection staff interviewed 29 WFO
employees; seven General Investigative Division employees; six Laboratory
Division employees; and three Identification Division employees, with
negative results, in an effort to determine whether Bureau personnel
were responsible for these leaks.
In October, 1972, "The Washington Post" reporters

Bernstein and Woodward wrote numerous articles dealing with Segretti's
activities. In connection with these articles, Bernstein attempted to
H -r;.v::->7
interview SA Angelo Lano, WFO case agent. SA Lano refused to offer

*y ' any comment and Bernstein stated that although he could not name his
-47-
source, he could furnish Lano with a "good clue." Thereafter, with
the approval of then Assistant Director Bates, Lano met with Bernstein
on a street in Washington, D. C., for the specific purpose of having
Bernstein identify his source. This effort proved unproductive and
SA Lano terminated the conversation. Later, on October 23, 1972,
Bernstein and Woodward were in the process of writing a somewhat
explosive story which raised the name of H. R. Haldeman as being involved
in the so-called secret fund of cash maintained at CRP. Bernstein
telephonically contacted SA Lano late in the evening in an effort to get
confirmation of Haldeman's alleged involvement and SA Lano declined to
furnish Bernstein information. The following day, after this article was
printed, Bernstein and Woodward saw SA Lano in U. S. District Court
and in a somewhat agitated state, informed SA Lano they were under
pressure to identify their source and they would have to name SA Lano as
the source of the story involving Haldeman. SA Lano categorically denied
this allegation to these reporters and on October 26, 1972, furnished the
Bureau a lengthy sworn affidavit outlining the whole matter. We wrote
the Attorney General a letter dated October 26, 1972, concerning this
matter.
The matter of leaking information cannot be completely

dismissed when it comes to Congress. It is noted that in connection
with his confirmation hearings, Mr. Gray on occasion instructed that
-48-
proposed questions and answers about various matters be prepared
which could be furnished to selected friendly Republican Senators. In
this regard, questions which were prepared relative to Donald Segretti,
as contained in a memorandum dated March 5, 1973, apparently were
furnished to Senator Gurney who asked Mr. Gray a number of questions
concerning the matter on the afternoon of March 7, 1973, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Beginning in the late Spring of 1973, a number of
newspaper articles were written by New York Times reporter John
Crewdson, which appeared to indicate Crewdson had access to FBI memo-
randa and interview reports. This possible leak has been pursued by the
Inspection and Intelligence Divisions, rather than the Watergate Unit. In
view of this, the Watergate Unit defers to the other two Divisions who
apparently have the facts.
The Inspection Division provided the following information
regarding this matter.
In connection with Item #11, pertaining to alleged leaks of
Watergate investigation results to news media, Congress, or other un-
authorized parties by FBI personnel, the General Investigative Division
referred to a number of newspaper articles written by New York Times
reporter John Crewdson commencing in the late Spring of 1973, which
appeared to indicate Crewdson had access to FBI memoranda and interview
,
-49-
reports. The General Investigative Division pointed out this possible
leak had been pursued by the Inspection and Intelligence Divisions and
accordingly deferred a response to these respective Divisions.
In response, the Intelligence Division did do some
research in this matter, reviewing and comparing newspaper articles
; with Bureau files. The results of this review were turned over to the
Inspection Division (orally only).

On July 23, 1973, Director Kelley advised Assistant
Director Jacobson that he had received information from then Special
Prosecutor Archibald Cox to the effect that employees of his staff, during
the course of interview of a subject of the Watergate investigation,
- namely Donald Segretti, had informed his people that John Crewdson,
rt.1.
\r*
a reporter for the New York Times, had displayed to him a foot-high
stack of FBI documents, one of which was an FBI original. Furthermore,
according to Cox, Segretti identified some of these documents to his
staff. Mr. Kelley instructed that an investigation be made concerning
this matter of Crewdson reportedly having entre to the FBI and this is
an ongoing inquiry with the Inspection Division reporting directly to the
Associate Director and Director. Interviews are still being conducted
on instructions of the Director. This inquiry continues on a highly
selective "need-to-know" basis." Accordingly, the results of our
'-'*
investigation to date cannot be commented on at this time.
-U^*
I -50-
k _ ..
12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of interview with certain
White House officials (Haldeman, Colson, Chapin, et cetera). 2 0
COMMENTS: In view of the extensive disclosures of the cover up of

the Watergate break-in, it is easy to see why an individual not know-
ledgeable of investigative procedures might think that the FBI's investi-
T.
gation was inadequate since H. R. Haldeman was not interviewed.

However, the fact is that his name never arose as being an individual
who may have been involved in the break-in conspiracy or who would
have information. Accordingly, he was not interviewed. It must be
borne in mind that while Haldeman's name is world famous now, during
the Summer of 1972 he enjoyed considerably less fame albeit considerably
more power.
In regard to our investigation involving the White House,
it is perhaps germane to consider a telephone conversation of July 19,
1972, between then Assistant Director Bates and Assistant Attorney
General Petersen at which time WFO desired to interview John Ehrlichman.
The interview of Ehrlichman was made obvious since Hunt and Liddy had
worked under the general overall supervision of Ehrlichman while they
were employed at the White House. Petersen told Bates that he could not
see any objection to an interview of Ehrlichman but that he wanted to be
sure that the FBI was not conducting a fishing expedition by interviewing
-51-
people at the White House. Petersen was assured that we were con-
ducting only logical interviews. This, of course, is basic FBI investi-
gative policy and an important function of the FBI supervisory staff is
to make certain that useless, unproductive, fishing-type leads are not
set forth in investigations.
It is noted that the Bureau has been criticized for apparent

failure to extract the truth from various people we interviewed such as
Colson, Chapin, Strachan, Magruder and others but the fact of the matter
is that when the cover up fell apart, the entire world learned that these
men were coached to lie and their testimony was rehearsed in advance.
They are now being prosecuted for their false stories. It is believed that
claims of inadequacy of our investigation are without merit.
-52-
n
13. Alleged activities on p a r t of Department of J u s t i c e officials
to limit, contain, o r obstruct FBI investigation (Kleindienst, P e t e r s e n ,
Silbert, et cetera). 2 1
COMMENTS: While there has been much testimony and discussion as

h>
I OPE's source references show, we are in possession of only slight

-
indications that Department of Justice officials limited, contained or
obstructed our investigation of the Watergate break-in and conspiracy.
P.- - -
Assistant Attorney General Petersen, as detailed in Item #9 above, did
k '
not r e q u e s t u s t o p u r s u e S e g r e t t i ' s activities during 1972; however, in
no way does this appear to have hampered our efforts. In fact, to have
called for a m a s s i v e FBI investigation of political h a r a s s m e n t in the
absence of c l e a r - c u t criminal allegations would have subjected t h e
Department and the Bureau to extensive, and probably justified, c r i t i c i s m
for interfering with the national elections.
An a r e a of justifiable c r i t i c i s m of the Department involves
the situation testified to by Kleindienst before the Senate Select Committee J
on August 7, 1973, that on the day of the a r r e s t s of the five initial subjects, 'i
June 17, 1972, Liddy (in t h e company of Powell Moore, CRP p r e s s J
relations man) contacted Kleindienst at Burning T r e e Country Club.
Liddy stated that Mitchell asked Liddy to contact Kleindienst concerning 4
the b r e a k - i n at DNCH. Liddy r e p o r t e d that some of t h e p e r s o n s who were
a r r e s t e d might b e employed by either the White House o r C R P . Kleindienst
-53-
->
testified that he had such a relationship with Mitchell that he did not believe
Mitchell would have sent a person like Liddy to come out and talk to
Kleindienst about anything. While Kleindienst further testified he immediately
called Assistant Attorney General Petersen instructing that those arrested
should be given no treatment different than anybody who might have been
arrested in similar circumstances, such a general statement clearly
did not put Petersen, the prosecutors or the FBI on notice of the apparent
involvement of Liddy, Mitchell and unnamed other individuals from the
White House and CRP.
The FBI was not aware of Liddy's contact with Kleindienst

until the above testimony over one year later. Powell Moore, when
interviewed July 24, 1972, made no mention of this meeting. In spite of
the foregoing, Petersen and Kleindienst said they had no evidence of
high official involvement in the Watergate affair until the early morning
hours of April 15, 1973, when they met with the Federal prosecutors who
in turn had just learned of it from John Dean and Jeb Stuart Magruder.
It is difficult not to find fault with the failure of Kleindienst

to immediately advise the Bureau of Liddy *s contact with him which occurred
just a few hours after the DNCH break-in. Had he done so, there is no
doubt our investigative direction at CRP would have been vastly different.
First, we would not have had to conduct an exhaustive investigation to
identify Liddy as we had to do. Secondly, it is easy to speculate that the
I
L -54-
successful cover up would have never gotten off the ground since we would
have had reason to zero in on Mitchell and Liddy rather than to waste our
time checking into McCord's security set-up and security co-workers
at CRP. That investigation did not lead to involvement of any other
security people and in effect, was a waste of time.
A number of individuals, namely Stans, Krogh, Colson,

Chapin, Young and Strachan, were deposed rather than called before the
grand jury. Petersen testified that Stans was given special consideration
in that his testimony was taken outside the grand jury. Petersen defended
the move as proper, if not customary, saying it was done to "avoid
publicity." In the minds of some people, this may be obstructive of
the grand jury's investigation. However, it is quite speculative and it
is doubtful if the taking of depositions as opposed to the taking of testi-
mony before the grand jury materially altered the results of the investi-
gation.
In July, 1972, interviews of Jeb Magruder and Bart

Porter were requested. On the late afternoon of July 17, 1972, then
Assistant Director Bates received a call from Assistant Attorney General
Petersen who advised that CRP attorneys Parkinson and O'Brien had
called him regarding the FBI's desire to interview Porter and Magruder.
These attorneys asked to talk to Petersen on July 18, 1972, concerning
this and Petersen told Bates that while he had no intention of holding up
-55-
any interviews, he did feel he should talk to these attorneys prior to the
interviews. On the afternoon of July 18, 1972, Petersen again contacted
Bates telephonically, advised that the attorneys had canceled the meeting
U
and we should proceed with the interviews as we desired. Both these
individuals were thereafter interviewed, at which time they lied most
convincingly. It is not known whether the slight delay in the interviews
of these men had anything to do with their false stories.
-56-
L-.
1
1
j 14. Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere, contain or

impede FBI Watergate investigation. ^ 2
COMMENTS: One of the recurring themes orchestrated by Senator Baker

of the Ervin Committee is that the DNCH break-in was a CIA operation.
This is an intriguing theory but the fact remains that during the course
of the investigation we did not develop evidence to indicate that CIA and/or
its officials were involved in the planning or execution of the Watergate
incident. We quickly suspected involvement by CIA as: 1) the cast of
characters directly and indirectly involved in the Watergate included a
number of former CIA employees or persons who at one time were of
interest to that agency; 2) Hunt and Liddy contacted a number of CIA
retirees to try to recruit them for intelligence gathering; 3) there were
several CIA people whose names were in Hunt's telephone book; and
4) personnel we contacted at CIA appeared considerably less than responsive
and candid in their replies to our inquiries.
Specifically, the guarded information we received in

;
response to name checks was about as informative as were the daily
newspapers; the incredible backing and filling for about two weeks in
late June and early July, 1972, concerning our efforts to determine if
, FBI interview of Ogarrio and Dahlberg would disrupt any CIA operation
certainly was suspicious. We, of course, had no knowledge at that time
-57-
of the discussions held at the White House by the President, Ehrlichman,
Dean, General Walters and Mr. Gray relative to possibly having CIA
pay salaries for those arrested. We also did not know of the apparent
efforts by the White House to use CIA to steer us away from investi-
gating the Ogarrio bank drafts.
% - -
Although there was extensive testimony about these activities

before the Ervin Committee, we still do not know the precise rationale
for that effort.
As noted earlier, the interviews of Ogarrio and Dahlberg
took place on July 6, 1972, and delays in these interviews actually did
not appear to alter the ultimate outcome of the Watergate investigation.
However, at the time we were seeking to interview these men, we
thought there was a good possibility they were involved in the DNCH
break-in conspiracy.
Other delays encountered in the early stages of this
investigation with regard to the interviews of individuals presently or
previously affiliated with CIA are as follows:
On June 28, 1972, Mr. Gray was confidentially informed
by CIA Director Helms tha
therefore,
should not be interviewed. The Field was so instructed; however, prior
to the receipt of that information,^^^^^^^Hbeen interviewed resulting
-58-
in no information of value. never interviewed and no reason
to interview him is now known.
At the time that WFO discovered the
D On July 7, 1972, WFO advised that the
Alexandria was instructed to conduct appropriate investigation regarding

to develop his identity and association with Hunt and other subjects.
On July 11, 1972, our Alexandria Office advised that CIA would furnish
information concerningflfl^^^fmly to Acting Director Gray. On July 28,
s
1972 a handwritten note was personally delivered by General Walters to
Mr.
who was in contact with Hunt during August, 1971. General Walters also
a Uher recorder pursuant to Hunt's request;
helped him get it in shape for overt, not covert, use; and there was no
attempt to make the recorder useful for clandestine activities.
Aside from the above contact regarding the recorders,
there were contacts with Hunt by CIA regarding false documents and
disguise for himself and an associate. CIA also loaned him a clandestine
camera which was returned. CIA also developed a roll of film for Hunt
->fc of which it had copies showing some unidentifiable place. Mr. Gray
instructed that in view of the contents of the note, no further investigation
was to be conducted.
-59-
This CIA assistance rendered to Hunt we believe had
-.-.* nothing to do with the Watergate matter. Rather, it appears to have
been related to Hunt's activities while attached to the Plumbers
Operation in the White House and is related to the break-in at the
UJ
^ office of Dr. Fielding in September, 1971. (The Ellsberg case.)

We do not know the full scenario among the President
and Messrs. Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Helms, Walters, Gray and
"'< possibly others; therefore, there is no way to evaluate the total effect,
if any, of their actions and those of CIA on the results of our investi-
gation.
-60-
15. Alleged activities on part of White House officials to
limit, contain or obstruct FBI Watergate investigation (Dean, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Colson, et c e t e r a ) . "
COMMENTS: There is absolutely no question but that the President's

most senior associates at the White House conspired with great success
for nine months to obstruct our investigation. It was a matter of common
knowledge during the early weeks of the investigation that the FBI was
receiving only lip service cooperation from White House officials such as
Dean. Special Prosecutor Jaworski probably summed up the matter as
succinctly as can be done in motions filed June 5, 1974, with the court
relative to the pending trial of Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson,
Strachan, Parkinson, and Mardian. On that occasion Mr. Jaworski
attributed the success of the Watergate cover up to high level perjury
in the early days of the investigation, charging that lies by Mitchell and
Ehrlichman were particularly convincing. Mr. Jaworski, who is know-
ledgeable of our investigative activities including our frustrations, noted
h it was "quite natural" for FBI agents who talked to Mitchell and Ehrlichman
to "assume that men of their stature would have no involvement" in the

criminal activities under investigation and would be eager to tell the
truth in the interest of justice.
It is also noted that in his testimony of July 11, 1973,
^: before the Ervin Committee, Mitchell, in a colloquy with Senator Weicker,
-61-
described his motives and actions during the Watergate investigation in
part as follows: " . . . I certainly was not about to do anything that would
provide for the disclosure of it" (referring to the so-called "White House
horrors," i. e., the Plumbers activities involving Hunt, Liddy and others,
which he feared would be exposed by our investigation.)
Messrs. Bates, Felt and Kunkel, when queried by the
Inspection Staff in June, 1973, about the matter of White House involve-
|;,- ment in the cover up, advised there were a number of discussions with
Mr. Gray during the early investigation at which time concern over the
lack of complete cooperation at the White House and CRP was voiced.
Mr. Felt particularly mentioned that on a number of occasions he
recommended to Mr. Gray that the President be urged to get the whole
case out in the open; however, Mr. Gray told Mr. Felt he did not think
an approach to the President was the proper course to pursue.
OBSERVATIONS: It appears in light of the foregoing that the dogged
determination of the Special Agents who investigated and supervised
this case accomplished absolutely all that could be accomplished in the
face of an extremely difficult situation and with many of the high cards
stacked against them. It is also of outstanding significance that the
Special Prosecutor has virtually totally relied upon the same FBI investi-
gative and supervisory staff who conducted the original Watergate investi-
gation to handle investigations relative to the cover up.
-62-
GENERAL COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
BY THE
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
It is noted that virtually none of the above criticisms is

new and comments and explanations have been submitted by the Watergate
?.;
f-, Special Matters Unit concerning most, if not all of these items, several
times previously on the following occasions:
a. Answers were given to several hundred critical questions

by Mr. Gray and his staff from late Summer, 1972, to the end
of that year.
** b. Many of the same questions and criticisms were made

by the Senate and the news media in early 1973 during
Mr. Gray's confirmation hearings and these were analyzed
and answered by this Unit.
c. Again when Mr. Ruckelshaus came on the scene in

the late Spring, 1973, his staff, particularly Carl Eardley,
questioned the handling of these matters and much of the same
ground was plowed for Ruckelshaus.
d. Subsequently, the Inspection Division analyzed the

handling of the Watergate matter and obtained comments
and explanations concerning many of the same items.
e. Later in the Summer of 1973, the Special Prosecutor's

Office requested and was furnished a massive detailing of
ail FBIHQ instructions issued during the entire investigation
of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters DNCH)
burglary.
. L
OBSERVATIONS: As has been disclosed by the sensational revelations
|| v detailing the carefully and skillfully operated cover up, the odds were
heavy against us in ever making a case against anyone other than the
-63-
five arrested subjects. The plain fact is that the performan
agents was admirable. There was tremendous pressure on
and FBIHQ personnel for months. Virtually all the innumerable
gative and policy judgments which were made, often with little
reflection, proved to be valid. ^ **$?< *%$A'L'Z
However, the activities surrounding the Watergate Incfrtet
have transfixed the consciousness of the American people and the worlds
to a degree unparalleled in political history and it was inevitable that
work would be criticized since we performed extensively at the centfcfc of i
i.
the affair. It is also unavoidable that we will receive more critical -

comments in the future about the same events. Politicians* and media
criticisms are a fact of life and we may as well realize it. There is
justification for some of the criticism but actions which give rise to tftfc
criticism are attributable, in the main, to Mr. Gray and not to the'
professional staff of the FBI. Unfortunately for us, many people make ^
no distinction between the FBI's actions and Mr. Gray's actions, jd
There is little doubt that Mr. Gray made deplorabl
decisions of historic proportions to: 1) allow John Dean to sit
interviews of White House personnel and to be the clearing house for
proposed FBI investigative activities at the White House; and 2\
Dean the raw reports submitted by the Field which set
-64-
investigation conducted. It is clear, as recent evidence has shown,
that these two actions by Mr. Gray made it impossible for the FBI or
the Federal grand jury to break through the carefully prepared and
rehearsed pack of lies given to the Agents by White House and Committee
to Re-Elect the President personnel. Of course, his naivete (or his
villainy, depending on your point of view) in accepting material from
Hunt's White House office proferred to him by Dean and Ehrlichman,
his failure to transmit that material for investigative and evidenciary
evaluation and his subsequent destruction of the material, has not had
a beneficial aftereffect on the FBI's reputation.
-65-
>
V. WATERGATE INVESTIGATION -
OPE ANALYSIS
The FBI's investigation of the Watergate break-in, cover
up and related matters has been one of the most extensive and intensive
efforts in the Bureau's history. To date this complex investigation has
involved approximately 180 separate cases which have resulted in investi-
gative activity in 53 field o f f i c e s i m H ^ m m i As of
May 31, 1974, the Bureau had expended 83,042 agent hours and 25,514
clerical hours - a total of 108,556 man hours on these investigations.
To date these investigations have resulted in 29 convictions and an
additional 16 subjects have been indicted and are awaiting court dis-
position.
The intensity of the Bureau's Watergate investigations
has been matched if not exceeded by the scrutiny to which these investi-
gations have been subjected. Within the Bureau these cases have been
afforded extremely close supervision, direction and control at the
Headquarters level. Major decisions relating to policy have been decided
at the Assistant Director or above level. Routine investigative activity
has been reviewed and coordinated by the Watergate Special Matters
Unit, Accounting and Fraud Section, General Investigative Division.
Acting Directors Gray and Ruckelshaus and Director Kelley have all
given personal attention to pertinent activities and developments in
-66-
G
. these cases as they have progressed. Three committees in Congress,
; The Senate Judiciary, The Senate Select Committee on Presidential
\ Campaign Activities (known as the Ervin Committee and/or the Senate
i
l Watergate Committee), and The House Judiciary Committee, have had
i
\ extensive access to the results of the Bureau's investigations and in
[ certain instances direct access to Bureau file material involving these
i cases. The Justice Department, the U. S. Attorney for the District of
[ Columbia, and the Special Prosecutor's Office have been involved in the
1
directions taken in the Bureau's inquiries and have received voluminous
i
reports in all phases of these investigations. Finally, the news media

has given the Watergate and related activities unprecedented coverage
including the most extensive use of investigative reporters and confidential
sources of any domestic event in the Nation's history.
The intensive interest in, and notoriety of, the Watergate
matters has unalterably led to criticism of both the investigation and
prosecution (or lack of prosecution) by the FBI and the Justice Department.
Much of the criticism was raised during the confirmation hearings on the
nomination of L. Patrick Gray HE to be FBI Director, as well as during
the Senate Watergate hearing. The news media has had a virtual field
day in criticizing all aspects of the Watergate investigation while at the
same time gratuitously claiming credit for most of the significant
revelations in the case. The release of the White House transcripts
-67-
by President Nixon on April 30, 1974, added another unique aspect to
the Watergate affair and resulted in further speculation regarding the
Bureau's handling of its responsibilities during the course of these
investigations.
In order to make a comprehensive evaluation of this entire
matter OPE approached the Bureau's activities from a "devil's advocate"
position. The principal sources of critical commentary were reviewed
and their positions and/or allegations were documented. Thereafter,
those responsible for the Bureau's activities (except former Acting
Director Gray) were asked to state the rationale behind Bureau actions
in each of the principal areas of criticism. OPE then carefully reviewed
the various Bureau actions and rationale behind these actions in com-
parison with the grounds for criticism. It is our opinion that the Bureau's
actions, activities and positions in each of the principal areas of criticism
were sound and are thoroughly defensible within the scope of sound
investigative techniques, the prevailing law and well established Department
of Justice guidelines and policy. There are, however, certain of these
areas where the Bureau's actions are less defensible than others. OPE
perceives these areas to be as follows;
a. The actions and activities of former Acting Director
L. Patrick Gray m.
b. The possibility of information having been leaked from
FBI personnel.
c. The alleged failure to detect an electronic "bug"
in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters
while conducting a search for such devices.
The actions and activities of Mr. Gray concerning the
Watergate matters have been thoroughly examined within the Bureau
and a full accounting has been furnished to the Special Prosecutor's
Office. The commentary submitted by the General Investigative
Division in Section IV, Item #10 supra, fully explores the ramifications
of Mr. Gray's actions and OPE concurs in this evaluation. Since
Mr. Gray's activities were completely self-initiated and in view of
the fact that his actions are now being scrutinized by the Special P r o -
secutor and a Federal grand jury it does not seem to be either
necessary or prudent to further pursue this matter at this time.
In the area of the possible leaks of information about

Watergate matters, there is no doubt that certain information was leaked
by Bureau personnel. The Inspection Division is conducting an inquiry
into this matter and therefore OPE did not further pursue this particular
aspect.
The criticism regarding the alleged failure to detect and
remove an electronic "bug" from one of the telephones in the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters is more difficult to deal with. In
addition to the Democratic National Committee Headquarters officials
and the news media, Acting U. S. Attorney Earl Silbert and Assistant
-69-
U. S. Attorney General Henry Petersen have both stated that the FBI
missed the bug while conducting the search of the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters on June 29, 1972. The following factors relate
to this controversial matter:
a. During interview of Alfred C. Baldwin HE he admitted
to monitoring telephone calls of Spencer Oliver in the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters. This
monitoring took place up to June 16, 1972.
b. At the time the five subjects were arrested in the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters at
the Watergate, three electronic "bugs" and one
transceiver were recovered, in their possession,
but not on any of the telephones. None of these
devices were operating on 118.9 mz.
c. On September 13, 1972, an electronic "bug" was

found on the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters by
telephone company employees. This "bug" was
inoperative, but when activated it operated within
the general range that Baldwin stated he was
monitoring.
d. James McCord examined the "bug" taken from
Oliver's telephone and stated it was identical to
the one he placed in that location.
e. WFO conducted an extensive investigation but was
unable to establish that any other party had placed
this "bug".
The Laboratory Division states that its personnel conducted
a thorough sweep and the "bug" was not there. The Laboratory Division
also points out that Telephone Security personnel conducted a similar
search on June 17-18, 1972, and reported that "nothing unusual or out
of order was detected. " ^ Neither the Laboratory personnel nor the
-70-
1 U;
i
| Telephone Security personnel made notes or any other type of on-the-

\ scene record of the extent of the search.
Based on the foregoing it is apparent that neither position
can be positively proven. Therefore, the only realistic position that
the Bureau can take is that technically competent Bureau personnel have
stated that they searched this location and found no electronic device.
It appears fruitless to debate the issue further.
A final point should be made at this time:
There is no question that certain acts and omissions com-
mitted by high Administration officials had a dilatory effect on certain
aspects of the FBI's investigation. However, there has been no indication
of other than a professional, diligent and tenacious investigative endeavor
on the part of Bureau personnel. This point was brought home during
the Senate confirmation hearing of former Acting Director Ruckelshaus
to be Deputy Attorney General on September 12, 1973. Mr. Ruckelshaus
stated that during his tenure as Acting Director "His efforts involved
(1) reviewing the entire Watergate investigation by the FBI up to that
point, (2) responding to requests from the grand jury through the pro-
secutors to pursue particular leads, and (3) following up a variety of
allegations in the media of impropriety or inadequacy in the FBI's
handling of the Watergate investigation. All memoranda, logs, documents,
/ p? and records developed in all of those activities have been turned over
-71-
1 ")
to the Special Prosecutor, who has been charged with the entire
responsibility for investigating the Watergate matter, including
allegations concerning the adequacy of the original investigation by
the FBI. " 2 5
Ruckelshaus further advised the Committee "I have no
information in terms of the Watergate break-in that the FBI did anything
other than act in a totally professional manner, in terms of following
out any leads or any interviews or doing any investigation they were
asked to do. This is one of the things that got the FBI agents themselves
involved in some distress because they feel that they've done a very good
job in what they were supposed to be doing. They acted very professionally.
And I think they're right. I think they did. Tt26
OPE, based on the foregoing facts, also believes that the

FBI has no cause to be chagrined by its total effort in the Watergate
matters. The FBI's handling of these cases can be strongly defended.
-72-
APPENDIX A
: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT
j WATERGATE RELATED EVENTS
October 1, 1971
I James W. McCord, J r . , former FBI agent and retired

\ CIA official, begins part-time consulting work for the Committee for the
[ Re-Election of the President (CRP).
December 1, 1971
G. Gordon Liddy leaves his post on the Domestic Council

and the White House and becomes counsel for the CRP.
January 9, 1972
McCord assumes the position of full time Security Co-

ordinator for CRP with additional duties as Security Coordinator for the
Republican National Committee.
January 27, 1972
At a meeting in the Attorney General's Office, U. S.

Department of Justice, attended by John N. Mitchell, the Attorney General;
Jeb Stuart Magruder, the Acting Director of the CRP; G. Gordon Liddy,
counsel to the CRP; and John W. Dean III, White House Counsel, Liddy
presents an intelligence plan which he proposes to be implemented for
the CRP. This plan allegedly included both legal and illegal activities
including electronic surveillance of various potential political opponents
of the President and Democratic Party facilities. This plan was estimated
( by Liddy to cost approximately one million dollars and according to the
| testimony of both Dean and Mitchell, Mitchell turned the plan down directing
l that a more realistic plan be devised.
February 4, 1972
Mitchell, Dean, Liddy and Magruder again meet in the

' Attorney General's Office and discuss a revised intelligence proposal pre-
(?\ pared by Liddy which is estimated to cost approximately one-half million
^ -^ dollars and emphasizes electronic surveillance. Mitchell is reported to
have again declined to approve this particular plan.
-73-
March 1, 1972
John N. Mitchell leaves his post as Attorney General and
becomes Director of the CRP.
March 22, 1972
George Gordon Liddy, after reported conflicts with Jeb
Magruder, leaves his post as counsel to the CRP and assumes the post
as counsel to the Financial CRP.
March 30, 1972

Another meeting is held to discuss intelligence plans for
CRP as developed by Liddy. This meeting is held in Key Biscayne, Florida,
and is attended by John Mitchell, Frederick C. LaRue (a former White
House aide who at that time held the position of assistant to Mitchell at
the CRP), and Jeb Magruder. Magruder has testified that at this meeting
Mitchell approved the intelligence plan which included wiretapping and
authorized a budget of $250,000 for these projects. Mitchell has denied
that he authorized the plan and LaRue has been ambiguous in his state-
ments concerning whether or not the plan was authorized.
April 7, 1972
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 became effective
on this date. This Act, in addition to amending certain sections of the
Criminal Code relating to Election Laws, broadened the reporting require-
ments regulating Federal campaign contributions.
May 1, 1972
Alfred C. Baldwin III was offered a position with the CRP
by James McCord who identified himself as the Security Coordinator for
the CRP. Baldwin accepted this offer and on May 2, 1972, traveled to
Washington, D. C., where he undertook certain security related assign-
ments at the direction of McCord.
May 22, 1972

Bernard L. Barker, Eugenio Martinez, Virgilio Gonzalez,
Frank A. Sturgis, Renaldo Pico, and Felipe DeDiego arrive in Washington,
D. C., from Miami and register at the Manger Hamilton Hotel and begin a
series of meetings with E. Howard Hunt, G. Gordon Liddy and James
McCord.
-74-
May 25, 1972
Hunt and Gonzalez attempted an entry to the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate Office Building complex,
but were unsuccessful in their entry attempt.
May 27, 1972
A second break-in attempt is made at the Democratic
National Committee offices but entry is not successfully completed.
May 28, 1972
A successful entry is made into the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters on the sixth floor of the Watergate Office Building
complex. James McCord states that he placed electronic listening devices
on the telephones of Spencer Oliver and Lawrence O'Brien. At the same
time the members of the Barker group from Miami were taking photographs
of various documents which they were able to obtain in the Democratic
National Committee office space.
May 29, 1972
Baldwin began monitoring the telephone coversations of
Spencer Oliver on communications equipment furnished by James McCord
and upon instructions of McCord prepared a log of the conversations inter-
cepted.
June 9, 1972
According to the testimony of Jeb Stuart Magruder on this
date he gave John Mitchell the wiretap logs which he, Magruder, had
obtained from Liddy. These transcripts were under the code name
"Gemstone". He allegedly provided to Mitchell photographs that had
been taken inside of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters.
Mitchell has vehemently denied the truth of this statement by Magruder.
June 17, 1972

At approximately 2:30 a. m. James McCord and four of the
Cuban-Americans, Barker, Sturgis, Gonzalez and Martinez, are captured
inside the Democratic National Committee Headquarters office by the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department. Found in the possession
-75-
1
of these subjects was photographic equipment, burglary tools, electronic

equipment and what appeared to the police at that time to be an explosive
device. All of the subjects were using aliases at this time and refused
to be interviewed and to state for whom they were working and for what
purpose they were in the building.
WFO was advised of the arrest of five men in the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate and it was indicated
that they appeared to have been attempting to place a bomb in it. Special
Agents were dispatched immediately to the police station where the evidence
and the subjects had been taken. Upon arrival the agents were advised
that the explosive device was in fact an electronic listening device. Based
upon this determination the Bureau entered the case to determine if a
violation of the Interception of Communications Statutes had occurred.
Bureau agents assisted the Metropolitan Police Department in obtaining
search warrants for two rooms in the Watergate Hotel based upon probable
cause established by the possession of the keys to these rooms by the
subjects. Located during the search of these rooms was a check imprinted
with the name E. Howard Hunt. An immediate check of WFO indices
determined that Hunt had been the subject of a special inquiry for the
White House and the file indicated he had been employed by the White
House as of July 1971. Immediately thereafter agents proceeded to Hunt's
residence in Potomac, Maryland, and attempted to interview him. But
he refused to discuss the case other than acknowledging that the check
found by the agents was in fact his.
June 17, 1972

G. Gordon Liddy and Powell A. Moore, an official of
CRP, contacted Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst at the Burning
Tree Golf Club. Liddy advised Kleindienst that Mitchell had asked him
to contact Kleindienst concerning the break-in at the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters. Liddy stated that some of the persons who
were arrested might be employed by either the White House or the CRP
and wanted to see if Kleindienst could effect their release. Kleindienst
has stated that he promptly dismissed these men and immediately there-
after contacted Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and instructed
that those arrested at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters
should receive no different treatment than any other person arrested in
a similar circumstance.
-76-
\ June 18, 1972
Continuing investigation by WFO agents and the Metropolitan
Police Department resulted in the identification of the five arrested subjects
and determination that McCord and Barker had CIA ties.
June 19, 1972
Assistant United States Attorney Earl Silbert of the District
of Columbia advised that he was assuming prosecutive jurisdiction of this
case upon specific instructions of the Justice Department and the United
States Attorney. He advised that the Department wanted an intensive,
thorough investigation regarding the five arrested subjects and any other
persons who might be involved in view of the apparent violation of the
Interception of Communications Statutes.
June 19, 1972

Information was received that a room in the Howard Johnson
Motel immediately across the street from the Watergate Office complex
had been utilized by James McCord and others. Investigation determined
that James McCord had rented a room in this motel in the name of McCord
Associates. Telephone toll calls made from this room led Bureau agents
to the identification of Alfred C. Baldwin III and a determination that he
is a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Baldwin
was identified by personnel of the motel as a person they had seen fre-
quently in the room rented by McCord.
June 19, 1972

According to testimony he gave at a later date before the
Senate Watergate Committee, John W. Dean HI stated that on this date
or possibly the following day he told Attorney General Kleindienst that
"this matter could lead directly to the White House." Assistant Attorney
General Petersen was called in and advised of the same information.
Dean further stated that he got the impression that Petersen "realized
I the problems a wide open investigation of the White House might create
! in an election year."
June 21, 1972
John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic
Affairs, contacted L. Patrick Gray HI, Acting Director of the FBI, and
-77-
*> ' %
(I
& >
instructed Gray to deal directly with John W. Dean m on Watergate

matter investigations concerning any White House activities or personnel.
June 22, 1972

John Dean, White House Counsel, informed Acting Director
Gray that he would sit in on all FBI interviews of White House personnel.
June 22, 1972
WFO agents interview Charles Colson, Special Counsel
to the President, in the presence of John Dean. During the interview
Colson stated he believed that E. Howard Hunt had worked on the third
floor of the White House. The interviewing agents asked Mr. Dean if
they could accompany Dean to Hunt's office to determine if Hunt had left
anything there. Dean indicated that this was the first that he was aware
of this office and that the White House would provide the FBI with any
contents belonging to Hunt.
June 23, 1972

Acting Director Gray meets with John Dean and indicates
that he will hold off authorizing Bureau agents interviewing Manuel
Ogarrio, a Mexican attorney through whose bank account funds had been
funneled to the Barker group who took part in the Watergate burglary.
Gray states that this was done at Dean's request that the Bureau not
expose CIA sources in connection with the movement of funds connected
to the CRP through Mexican channels.
June 26, 1972
On two separate occasions during this day John Dean and
his assistant, Fred Fielding, gave WFO agents two boxes containing material
and personal effects from E. Howard Hunt's office in the White House.
! June 28, 1972
Acting Director Gray contacts John Dean and advises him
that he has scheduled a meeting with CIA Director Helms in order to
straighten out the Mexican money channel to determine if there is any
CIA involvement so that Bureau agents may proceed with logical investi-
gation in this area. Gray states that Ehrlichman called him that same
date and told him to cancel the meeting because it wasn't necessary.
Gray stated that he complied with this request.
-78-
i
f [l.
I June 28, 1972
Acting Director Gray meets with John Dean and John
Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman's White House office. At this time Dean
gives to Gray two files which he states came from Howard Hunt's safe.
According to later testimony of Mr. Gray, Dean stated that these two
files contained "political dynamite" and "should never see the light of
day."
June 29, 1972
On this day and the following day technically trained agents
of the FBI Laboratory completed a security survey of the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters and the Watergate Office Building with
negative results. No additional electronic surveillance equipment was
located during the survey.
July 6, 1972
Acting Director Gray met with General Walters, Deputy
Director of the CIA, at which time Walters delivered a memorandum
stating that the CIA had no interest in Ogarrio or Dahlberg. Gray states
that after receiving this memorandum he ordered the interviews of
Ogarrio and Dahlberg to be conducted. Gray further states that on this
day he was contacted by the President on a separate matter but took the
occasion to warn the President of his concern about the Watergate
investigation. Gray stated that he told the President that he and General
Walters felt that people on the President's staff were trying to mortally
wound the President by using the CIA and FBI and by confusing the question
of CIA interest in, or not in, people the FBI wished to interview. Gray
stated that the President advised him to continue to conduct an aggressive
and thorough investigation.
July 10, 1972

Alfred C. Baldwin III made a statement to Bureau agents
and Assistant U. S. Attorneys implicating himself in the monitoring of
electronically intercepted telephone conversations on the telephone of
Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate
Building. Baldwin indicated he was working directly for James McCord
and had also had direct contact with E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy
during the course of the electronic interception and break-in at Democratic
National Committee Headquarters. Baldwin indicated that both Hunt and
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\
Liddy were on the scene in the immediate vicinity of the break-in

on June 17, 1972, but both had escaped detection at that point.
Baldwin's statement provided the first direct proof of the involve-
ment of Hunt and Liddy in the Watergate break-in and wiretapping.
July 21, 1972

Acting Director Gray starts sending FBI file material
including FD-302 interview reports to John Dean at the White House
without clearing the reports through the Attorney General. On the
prior day Dwight Dalbey, Assistant Director, Office of Legal Counsel,
had submitted a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating that FBI records
are in the custody of the Attorney General and technically may not be
released from the Department without his consent. Dalbey stated that
the authority and obligation of the FBI are to keep the Attorney General
informed and what ever other action the Attorney General decided would
rest with him.
September 7, 1972
Mr. Lawrence O'Brien, Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee, states that he has evidence that his personal office
telephone was tapped for several weeks before the June 17, 1972,
break-in. He states that his office was broken in during May 1972 and
indicated that he was a victim of a Republican sponsored invasion.
September 13, 1972

On this date an electronic device was found on the telephone
of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in
the Watergate Office Building. This electronic device was found by telephone
company security employees after a complaint by personnel of the
Democratic National Committee. WFO agents and FBI Laboratory
personnel launched an investigation into this additional wiretapping
equipment.
September 15, 1972
A Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C., returns a
multi-count indictment against the five subjects found inside the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters at Watergate and additionally charges
E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy with Conspiracy, Interception of
Communications and Burglary. After the return of the indictments J. W.
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Hushen, Director of Public Information at the Justice Department,
makes a public statement that the indictments have ended the investi-
gation and "we have absolutely no evidence to indicate that any others
should be charged." (It should be noted that at this time both the
WFO and the Federal Grand Jury were still working on numerous out-
standing investigative matters and there was no indication that the
Bureau's investigation was to cease at this point.)
September 16, 1972
Attorney General Kleindienst issues a statement setting
forth that the investigation by the FBI and USA's Office in the District
of Columbia is one of the most intensive, objective and thorough investi-
gations that has been undertaken by the Justice Department in several
years. Assistant Attorney General Petersen also issues a statement
saying that allegations that a whitewash has been involved in the investi-
gation are completely untrue. Petersen issued statistics indicating that
333 agents from 51 field offices have worked 1, 897 leads, conducted
1,551 interviews and expended 14,098 man hours in conducting this
investigation and in addition the Federal Grand Jury has met for a total
of 125 hours and examined 50 witnesses.
December 7, 1972
In newspaper accounts Kathleen Chenow, a White House
secretary, confirms the existence of a "Plumbers Unit" in the White
House as an internal investigative unit. She stated that its members
were David R. Young, G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, and Egil
Krogh. She states that the unit was investigating leaks to the news
media.
December 8, 1972
In Chicago, Illinois, a United Airlines jet crashes killing
Dorothy Hunt, the wife of E. Howard Hunt. FBI agents at the scene recover
$10,000 in one hundred dollar bills found in the pocket book of Mrs. Hunt.
January 8, 1973
In U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C., before Chief

Judge John Sirica the trial of the seven indicted Watergate break-in
subjects begins.
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(I
January 11, 1973
Senator Sam J. Ervin (D-NC) is picked to head a Senate

investigation of Watergate related matters in the Presidential election
campaign of 1972.
January 15, 1973
Four of the Watergate break-in defendants, Barker,

Gonzalez, Martinez and Sturgis, enter guilty pleas to all seven counts
of the Watergate break-in indictment. E. Howard Hunt has previously
on January 11, 1973, plead guilty to all counts of the indictment charging
him with complicity in the Watergate break-in and wiretapping matters.
January 17, 1973
During the trial of the seven defendants in the Watergate

break-in case the court goes into closed session where Alfred Baldwin
testified that he monitored approximately 200 conversations on this wiretap
and gave daily logs to James McCord.
January 30, 1973
In the Federal trial of the remaining Watergate break-in

defendants, James McCord and G. Gordon Liddy, the jury returns a guilty
verdict on all counts.
February 7, 1973
The United States Senate votes to establish a select committee

for the investigation of the Presidential election campaign of 1972. The
committee is to be composed of four Democratics and three Republicans.
February 17, 1973
Mr. L. Patrick Gray III is nominated by President Nixon

to be permanent Director of the FBI. His nomination is sent to the Senate
Judiciary Committee for consideration.
February 28, 1973
During confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary

?,,, Committee Acting Director Gray acknowledges that he has shown John Dean,
Jf White House Counsel, FBI files relating to the Watergate Investigation.
Mr. Gray also offers to open the FBI investigative files on this investi-
gation to Senators who wish to see them.
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March 13, 1973
Mr. Gray supplies the Senate Judiciary Committee with
a memorandum showing that he had met with or talked to John Dean on
33 occasions between June and September 1972 relating to the Watergate
investigation. Mr. Gray had previously, on March 7, 1973, advised
this Committee that he had provided John Dean with 82 FBI investigative
reports relating to the Watergate matter.
March 19, 1973
Judge John Sirica receives a letter from James McCord
charging that he and other Watergate defendants were under political
pressure to plead guilty and remain silent. He also intimates that perjury
was committed at the trial and that higher-ups were involved in the break-
in and that there is a cover up of the entire Watergate investigation being
conducted.
March 20, 1973
I /f?^ Acting Director Gray informed the Senate Judiciary Committee
that he had received orders from Attorney General Kleindienst to refuse to
answer further questions regarding the FBI's investigation of the Watergate
or other ongoing investigative activities.
March 22, 1973
During questioning by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va. ),
Mr. Gray acknowledges that John Dean probably lied to FBI agents investi-
gating the Watergate matter when he told them on June 22, 1972, that he
did not know if Hunt had an office in the White House.
April 5, 1973
President Nixon withdraws L. Patrick Gray's nomination
to be Director of the FBI.
April 27, 1973
L. Patrick Gray resigns as Acting Director of the FBI.

Mr. Gray issues a statement indicating that certain serious allegations
concerning his actions during the ongoing Watergate investigation are now
a matter of public record and as a consequence he would tender his
Q.
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;. immediate resignation as Acting Director of the FBI. There have been
previous newspaper accounts indicating that Mr. Gray had received
certain documents from the White House safe of E. Howard Hunt directly
; from John Dean and that he had withheld these files and later destroyed
them.
I April 27, 1973

I
i William D. Ruckelshaus is appointed by President Nixon
[ as Acting Director of the FBI to replace Mr. Gray. Mr. Ruckelshaus
j states that he does not expect to be in this position longer than two months.
L
April 30, 1973

President Nixon announced the resignation of H. R. Haldeman,
White House Chief of Staff; John D. Ehrlichman, Chief Counselor for
| Domestic Affairs; John W. Dean, Presidential Counsel and Attorney
f General Kleindienst. At the same time the President announced the
| nomination of Elliott L. Richardson as Attorney General and General
I Alexander Haig as the new White House Chief of Staff. The President
indicated that the new Attorney General (Richardson) would have full
charge of the Administration's Watergate investigations and would have
authority to appoint a Special Prosecutor in the case.
May 17, 1973
The Senate Select Committee on the Investigation of the
Presidential Election Campaign of 1972, under the Chairmanship of
Senator Sam Ervin, begins public hearings. Senator Howard H. Baker, J r .
(R-Tenn.) is the Co-Chairman.
May 18, 1973
Attorney General Designate Elliott Richardson names
former Solicitor General Archibald Cox, a Harvard Professor, as Special
j Prosecutor in the Justice Department to probe and prosecute the Watergate
I and related investigations.
May 22, 1973
> Acting Director Ruckelshaus instructed that an analysis be
prepared concerning allegations indicating possible involvement of former
Acting Director L. Patrick Gray in the cover up or use of action to delay or
impede the FBI investigation of the Watergate. This project was assigned
to the Inspection Division.
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c
May 30, 1973
John Ehrlichman, former Assistant to the President,

tells a Senate Subcommittee investigating the CIA involvement in the
Watergate case and the Pentagon papers that President Nixon was aware
of the FBI investigation into Mexican aspects of the break-in within six
days after it occurred and had instructed him (Ehrlichman) and Haldeman
to have the CIA "curb the FBI probe".
June 7, 1973
Acting Director Ruckelshaus submits a document to Archibald
Cox, Special Prosecuting Attorney, U. S. Justice Department, setting
forth a precise record on the FBI's activities at the initial stages of the
Watergate investigation. This document, which was prepared by the
Inspection Division, in conjunction with the Special Watergate Matters
Unit of the General Investigative Division, former Assistant Director
Charles W. Bates and Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt, is 26
pages in length and has six memoranda as enclosures which further specify
the exact activities which occurred at the outset of the Watergate investi-
gation.
June 25, 1973
John Dean, former White House Counsel, testified concerning

his role in the cover up of the Watergate investigation and the role of several
other administration officials. Dean indicated that the President was aware
of the cover up as early as September 1972. John Dean's testimony before
the Senate Watergate Committee continued for three more days until
June 28, 1973.
June 26, 1973
The Inspection Division, in conjunction with the General
Investigative Division, the Press Services Office and the Office of Legal
Counsel, completed its analysis of the possible involvement by L. Patrick
Gray in illegal and/or improper activities to impede or delay the FBI's
investigation of the Watergate matter. This analysis was furnished to
Acting Director Ruckelshaus. (This analysis was also furnished to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor on April 10, 1974.)
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July 9, 1973
Mr. Clarence M. Kelley is sworn in as Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation replacing William D. Ruckelshaus. After
leaving the FBI as Acting Director, Mr. Ruckelshaus is appointed Deputy
Attorney General.
July 16, 1973
Alexander P. Butterfield, Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration and a former White House Aide, advised the
Senate Watergate Committee that all of President Nixon's conversations
in the White House and Executive Office Building were recorded beginning
in the Spring of 1971 by concealed microphones and telephone bugs.
Butterfield stated that the listening devices were installed under President
Nixon's authority for "posterity's sake".
October 10, 1973

Vice President Spirio Agnew resigned after pleading nolo
contendere to a charge of Federal income tax evasion. Vice President
Agnew's resignation had no connection with the Watergate investigation.
October 19, 1973

John W. Dean III enters a guilty plea to one count Conspiracy
to Obstruct Justice for his role in the Watergate investigation cover up.
In exchange for an agreement to further testify Special Prosecutor Cox
granted Dean immunity from prosecution for other Watergate crimes.
October 20, 1973

The White House announced that President Nixon had ordered
Attorney General Elliott L. Richardson to dismiss Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox; that Richardson had resigned rather than comply with that
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{
t
order and that Deputy Attorney General William D. Ruckelshaus, who
had also refused the President's order, had been fired. The White House
stated that Solicitor General Robert H. Bork had become the Acting
Attorney General and had dismissed Special Prosecutor Cox and dissolved
the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
November 1, 1973
President Nixon names Senator William B. Saxbe of Ohio
to be Attorney General and Leon Jaworski, a Houston attorney, as the
new Special Prosecutor.
November 5, 1973
In a hearing in U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C. ,
on a motion to withdraw guilty pleas by five of the original seven Watergate
defendants, a member of the Special Prosecutor's Office revealed that
John W. Dean, former White House Counsel, had admitted to destroying
| two notebooks that had been taken from the White House safe of E. Howard
\ Hunt, two days after the Watergate break-in. Previously Dean had stated
r
f% that all of the material had either been furnished to FBI agents or to
Acting Director Gray. Dean also had not made an admission to retaining
and later destroying these notebooks during his testimony before the Senate
Watergate Committee. Dean had told the Special Prosecutor's Office that
he found the notebooks while going through White House file materials in
January 1973. Dean claimed that the notebooks contained names and
addresses of people connected with the Watergate break-in and related
crimes.
November 21, 1973

White House Special Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt advised
U. S. District Judge John Sirica that an eighteen and one-half minute
section of a White House tape recorded on June 20, 1972, of conversations
between President Nixon and his former Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman,
was blank and contained no audible tones. Judge Sirica ordered the
White House to turn the remaining portion of that tape and others that
had been subpoenaed over to the court by November 26, 1973.
December 20, 1973
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ),
announced the selection of John M. Doar, former Assistant Attorney General
in the Administration of President Kennedy as Special Counsel to the House
Judiciary Committee for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into possible
impeachment grounds against President Nixon.
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February 6, 1974
The House of Representatives, U. S. Congress, votes
approval for the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an impeachment
investigation and grant powers of subpoena and funds for this inquiry.
February 19, 1974
The Senate Watergate Committee ended its public hearings
into the Presidential election campaign practices of 1972. Committee
Chairman Sam Ervin stated that it was now up to the House Judiciary
Committee and the courts to carry on the Watergate investigations that
his Committee had begun.
March 1, 1974
A Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C., indicted seven
former officials of the White House or the President's Re-Election
Committee for conspiring to impede the investigation of the Watergate
break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters. The seven indicted
('" include former Attorney General John Mitchell, former Presidential
Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, former Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman, former Special Counsel to the
President Charles W. Colson, former Assistant Attorney General
Robert C. Mardian, former attorney for the Committee to Re-Elect the
President Kenneth W. Parkinson and former Assistant to H. R. Haldeman
at the White House Gordon Strachan.
April 10, 1974

The Bureau forwarded to the Special Prosecutor's Office
a letter enclosing 33 documents and/or internal Bureau memoranda dealing
with possible violations of law by former Acting Director L. Patrick
Gray in. Included in the enclosures was a June 26, 1973, memorandum
from Inspector James J. O'Connor to Mr. Jacobson setting forth the
results of the Bureau's internal review regarding possible impedement
or obstruction of the Watergate investigation by former Acting Director
Gray.
April 30, 1974
President Nixon transmits to the House Judiciary Committee
/ and releases to the public 1,308 pages of edited transcripts from r e -
V cordings taken in the White House relating to Watergate matters. The
President states that these transcripts will answer all inquiries
regarding his activities in relation to the Watergate matter and will
provide the public and the House Judiciary Committee with the answer
to the basic question at issue "Whether the President personally acted
improperly in the Watergate matter?"
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APPENDIX B
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF
MOST SIGNIFICANT SUBJECTS
1. BERNARD L. BARKER
f
j
[ One of the five subjects arrested in the Democratic Party National
Headquarters, Watergate Office Building, June 17, 1972. Barker is the
'. President of Barker Associates, Inc., Miami, a real estate firm. He
1 was born in Havana, Cuba, March 17, 1917. of American parents. He
was utilized to recruit other Cuban-Americans to participate in the Water-

I ^ gate burglaries and his company bank accounts were utilized as a conduit
for funds which were utilized in the activities of the Watergate burglars.
Prosecutive Action
| Barker was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15,
i 1972, on one count of Interception of Communications and one count of
Conspiracy as well as two counts of violation of the District of Columbia
j Code. On January 15, 1973, Barker plead guilty and on November 9,
1973, he was sentenced to an indefinite term of from 18 months to 6 years
in Federal custody.
| 2. DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
; Former Appointments Secretary to President Nixon, Chapin was
f a close associate of H. R. Haldeman and worked for Haldeman at the
I J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency in Los Angeles, California,
| prior to coming to the White House in 1969. Chapin resigned his post
[ at the White House on February 28, 1973, and returned to the business
; world.
Prosecutive Action
On November 29, 1973, Chapin was indicted on four counts of
making false statements before a Federal Grand Jury. On April 5, 1974,
he was convicted on two counts and was sentenced May 15, 1974, to 10 to
30 months in Federal custody. Chapin is presently free during appeal.
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3. CHARLES W. COLSON
Former Special Counsel to President Nixon from late 1969 until

February 1973, Colson was in charge of special projects and liaison with
outside groups. He is prominently mentioned in the White House tapes
I as being a hard-nose trouble-shooter. Colson brought E. Howard Hunt
| to the White House as a consultant. Colson was questioned several
[ times by Bureau agents during the immediate aftermath of the Watergate
[ burglary and while answering questions was generally extremely guarded
I in his comments and not fully cooperative.
i
Prosecutive Action
I On March 1, 1974, Colson was indicted on one count of Conspiracy
I to Obstruct Justice and one count of Obstruction of Justice in connection
with the cover up of the Watergate burglary matters. These charges
were dropped after Colson plead guilty in the Ellsberg case on June 3,
1974. Colson was indicted on March 7, 1974, on one count of Conspiracy
; to violate the civil rights of Dr. Fielding, the psychiatrist to Dr. Ellsberg.
I This charge was also dropped on June 3, 1974, when Colson plead guilty
(|3 to another charge, that of Obstruction of Justice in the Ellsberg investi-
| *"' gation and trial.
j 4. JOHNW. DEAN HI
, Former Chief Counsel to the President and Deputy Associate

Attorney General of the United States, Dean, aged 35, was the President's
Counsel from July 1970 until April 30, 1973. Dean was the liaison
representative of the White House with the Bureau during the Watergate
I investigation and received written reports from former Acting Director
L. Patrick Gray. In addition Dean sat in all interviews of White House
employees conducted by the Bureau. It was alleged and Dean has con-
firmed that he withheld certain documents from the safe of E. Howard
Hunt located in the White House and later turned over certain of these
documents to Mr. Gray for destruction. He also has acknowledged that
he himself retained certain of these documents and later destroyed them
himself. Dean has been a principal witness against President Nixon and
is to date the only individual with first hand knowledge who has accused
the President of any illegal activities. In addition to Mr. Gray, Dean
also dealt with Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and former
Attorney General Kleindienst in matters relating to the White House
involvement in the Watergate case.
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c
V
PL-
Prosecutive Action
Dean was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on one count of
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice. On November 30, 1973, he plead guilty
to this charge. Sentencing is being held in abeyance.
5. JOHND. EHRLICHMAN
Ehrlichman served as Chief Counsel to the President and later
as Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Ehrlichman, aged 49,
was a classmate of former White House Chief of Staff, H. R. "Bob"
Haldeman at UCLA in the late 1940's. Ehrlichman served in President
Nixon's unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1960 and in 1968 Ehrlichman
served as the Tour Director for the Nixon campaign. He came to the
White House immediately after the inauguration in 1969 as White House
Counsel which position he held until being made Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs. Ehrlichman established the in-house investigative
unit officially titled "The White House Special Investigations Unit," later
to be known as the "Plumbers". One of Ehrlichman's principal assistants
on the Domestic Council, Egil Krogh, Jr. , was installed by Ehrlichman
as the head of the "Plumbers Unit". Ehrlichman is alleged to have approved
the office burglary of Dr. Fielding, the psychiatrist to Daniel Ellsberg.
Ehrlichman resigned on April 30, 1973, at the same time that the President
fired John Dean and also accepted the resignation of H. R. Haldeman.
Prosecutive Action
Ehrlichman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on March 1,
1974, on one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, one count of making
a false statement to the FBI, two counts of making false statements to
a Grand Jury and one count of Obstruction of Justice. Ehrlichman plead
not guilty to all counts of the indictment on March 7, 1974.
6. VIRGIL 10 RAMON GONZALEZ
One of the five individuals who were arrested inside the Democratic
Party National Headquarters at the Watergate Office Building on June 17,
1972. Gonzalez is a locksmith by trade, living and working in the Miami,
Florida, area. A native of Cuba and reportedly a former member of the
Cuban Secret Service, Gonzalez entered the United States as a permanent
resident in 1954 and was naturalized in 1972. It has been alleged that
Gonzalez was formerly associated with the CIA but this allegation has
been denied by the CIA.
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Prosecutive Action
Gonzalez was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15,
1972, for Conspiracy and Interception of Communications as well as
burglary and other violations of the District of Columbia Code. Gonzalez
plead guilty on January 15, 1973, and on November 9, 1973, was sentenced
to from one to six years in the custody of the Attorney General.
7. HARRY ROBBINS (BOB) HALDEMAN
Former Chief of Staff at the White House and generally reported
to be the most influential of the President's advisors, Haldeman was an
advanceman in the President's 1960 presidential campaign and Chief of
Staff in the President's 1968 campaign. He came to the White House as
Chief of Staff immediately after the 1968 inaugural and remained in that
position until April 30, 1973, when he resigned simultaneous with John
Ehrlichman and Attorney General Kleindienst. Haldeman is 47 years of
age and was employed as a Vice President with the J. Walter Thompson
Advertising Agency in Los Angeles prior to assuming his duties with
President Nixon.
Ne
I "~ Prosecutive Action
Haldeman was indicted on March 1, 1974, on one count of
Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, one count of Obstruction of Justice, and
three counts of Perjury. Haldeman entered not guilty pleas to all counts
of the indictment on March 9, 1974.
8. GEORGE A. HEARING
A Tampa, Florida, accountant who was indicted by a Federal
Grand Jury in Tampa along with Donald Segretti on charges of printing
and conspiring to distribute a bogus letter during the 1972 presidential
[ campaign.
Prosecutive Action
Indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Tampa, Florida, May 4, 1973,
on counts of fabricating and distributing illegal campaign literature. Plead
guilty on May 11, 1973, and sentenced on June 15, 1973, to one year in
the custody of the Attorney General. The count on conspiracy was dis-
missed at this time.
I
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)
c
9. E. HOWARD HUNT, JR.
' Born October 9, 1918, in Hamburg, New York. A former
employee of the CIA having retired from the Agency in 1970 after more
than 20 years of service, Hunt was employed on a parttime consultant
basis with the White House through the auspices of Charles Colson, Special
< Counsel to the President. Hunt's involvement with the five subjects
i found inside the Watergate complex was established shortly after the
i subjects were arrested. It was established that Hunt had assembled
j the Cuban-American members of the burglary team who had prior CIA
contacts with Hunt. Hunt was uncooperative with the Bureau agents when
! interviewed and gave no information which assisted in the solution of
f this case. Hunt's activities at the White House involved several other
| very sensitive matters including the ITT affair with specific assignments
\ relating to Dita Beard, the Ellsberg case, and the collection of intelli-
! gence information regarding Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts.
I Very sensitive information regarding these activities held in Hunt's safe
\ in the Executive Office Building were the cause of John Dean requesting
S former Acting Director Gray to assume custody of this material and
allegedly stating it should never see the light of day. Hunt is alleged to
have demanded substantial funds from the Committee to Re-Elect the
President and the White House in order to maintain silence in regard to
* his activities. Hunt's wife died on December 8, 1972, in an aircraft
f crash in Chicago. Bureau agents recovered $10, 000 in one hundred dollar
| bills in Mrs. Hunt's purse at the time of the crash.
\ Prosecutive Action
\ On September 15, 1972, Hunt was indicted by a Federal Grand
\ Jury in Washington, D. C., on charges of Interception of Communications,
Conspiracy and Burglary. On January 11, 1973, Hunt plead guilty to all
counts and on November 9, 1973, received a sentence of from 30 months
to eight years in the custody of the Attorney General and a $10,000 fine.
Hunt is presently free on bond appealing his sentence in this case.
10. HERBERT W. KALMBACH
Formerly the personal attorney for President Nixon and a partner
in the Los Angeles law firm of Kalmbach, De Marco, Knapp and Chillings-
worth, Kalmbach is also a long time associate of Robert H. Finch, former
Lt. Governor of California and former Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.
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Kalmbach was born October 19, 1921, in Ft. Huron, Michigan,
and graduated from the University of Southern California Law School.
Kalmbach was the Associate Finance Chairman of the 1968 Nixon
| presidential campaign and worked directly for Maurice Stans. Kalmbach
i also worked as a fund raiser for the President's re-election prior to
1
the official establishment of the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
i Kalmbach fs primary involvement in the Watergate affair appears to
' have been obstruction of justice through the providing of money to be
; used to silence the seven original defendants. He also provided money
[ to Donald Segretti which was used in illegal campaign activities.
! Prosecutive Action
I
I An information was filed in Federal Court, District of Columbia,
i on February 25, 1974, charging violations of the Federal corrupt practices
\ act and a misdemeanor count of promising an Ambassadorship in return
I for a campaign contribution. Kalmbach entered a guilty plea to these
! counts on February 25, 1974.
11. EGIL E. KROGH, JR.
Krogh joined the White House in May 1969 as an Aide to then
Presidential Counsel John D. Ehrlichman. Krogh had previously worked
for Ehrlichman in a law firm in Seattle, Washington. Krogh also worked
on the Domestic Council of the White House and was involved in such
projects as transportation, narcotics control, corrections and legal
services. Krogh was placed in direct charge of the White House Investi-
gations Unit responsible for the investigation of the leak in the Pentagon
Papers matter and later publicly accepted full responsibility for the
burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office by members of the
White House "Plumbers" group. At the time that Krogh acknowledged his
responsibility for the burglary he was employed as Under Secretary of
Transportation, a post from which he resigned on May 9, 1973.
Prosecutive Action
On November 30, 1973, Krogh entered a guilty plea to one count
of violating the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, in the September 3-4, 1971, break-in at Fielding's office.
Krogh was sentenced on January 24, 1974, to serve six months of a
two to six year term in the custody of the Attorney General.
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0
12. FREDERICK C. LA RUE
A Jackson, Mississippi, businessman who came to Washington in
1969 as a Special Assistant to the President. After the formation of the
Committee to Re-Elect the President LaRue transferred to this Committee
and was an assistant to John Mitchell. In his statement before the Senate
Watergate Committee on July 18, 1973, LaRue admitted that he participated
in the Watergate cover up including helping to deliver cash intended for
the seven defendants in the Watergate burglary trial. LaRue was present
at the March 30, 1972, meeting in Key Biscayne, Florida, where John
Mitchell, Jeb Stuart Magruder, G. Gordon Liddy and LaRue discussed
! intelligence plans for the Committee to Re-Elect the President, during
f which time Jeb Magruder has stated Mitchell approved Liddy f s plan for
electronic surveillance coverage of the Democratic National Committee
as well as other illicit campaign tactics. LaRue has also admitted that
he transferred $210, 000 of the Committee to Re-Elect the President's
money to William O. Bittman, a lawyer for E. Howard Hunt, Jr. , one of
the seven original defendants. It was La Rue's understanding that Bittman
would disburse the money to various defendants in the Watergate case
and their lawyers. Bittman stated that the money was distributed according
to directions he received from John Dean.
Prosecutive Action
On June 27, 1973, LaRue plead guilty to one count of Conspiracy
to Obstruct Justice. Sentencing on this plea has been deferred.
13. GEORGE GORDON LIDDY
A former FBI agent from September 1957 to September 1962 who
was also employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New York State
and as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for Law
Enforcement Matters. He served from July to December 1971 as a
Special Assistant on the Domestic Council in the White House. Liddy
left the White House in December 1971 to go to the Committee to Re-
Elect the President in which he served as Legal Counsel and later as
Legal Counsel to the Finance Committee. Liddy was the prime mover in
the scheme to electronically monitor the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters at the Watergate. He devised the original plans and to-
gether with E. Howard Hunt assembled the team which eventually carried
out the Watergate burglary and wiretapping. Liddy personally presented
his intelligence schemes to former Attorney General John Mitchell who
is alleged by John Dean to have approved Liddy's operations including
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f
the wiretapping of the Democratic National Committee. Mitchell denies
authorizing the Liddy plan but does not deny that it was discussed with
him. Throughout the entire course of the Watergate investigations and
trials Liddy has refused to cooperate not only with the FBI but with the
Special Prosecutor, the courts, and Congressional Committees.
| Prosecutive Action
| In the Watergate burglary and wiretapping matter, Liddy was

[ indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15, 1972, on four counts
! including Interception of Communications, Conspiracy and Burglary.
Liddy was found guilty on all counts at a trial which concluded on
January 30, 1973. On March 23, 1973, he was sentenced to serve from
six years eight months to no more than twenty years and a $40,000 fine.
I In regard to the Daniel Ellsberg case, Liddy was indicted on March 7,
| 1974, on one count of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of Dr. Fielding.
| Liddy plead innocent on March 14, 1974, and is currently awaiting trial
on these charges. In addition Liddy has been charged with refusing to
! testify before a House Committee. He was convicted on this charge on
[ May 10, 1974, and given a suspended six month sentence.
I *''' 14. JEB STUART MAGRUDER

s
A former assistant to H. R. Haldeman and White House
Communications Director Herbert G. Klein from 1969 to 1971 at which
time he was appointed Acting Director of the Committee to Re-Elect the
President and later was made Deputy Director serving under John
Mitchell. Magruder, a graduate of Williams College and the University
of Chicago Business School, worked in advertising and management in
Santa Monica, California, prior to joining the Nixon administration.
He has previously worked as a volunteer in election campaigns of
President Nixon, Senator Barry Goldwater, and former Representative
Donald Rumsfeld. At the time of his indictment Magruder was employed
i as Planning Director for the Department of Commerce.
\
> Prosecutive Action
I
On August 16, 1973, Magruder plead guilty to a one count indict-
ment charging Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice. On May 21, 1974, Magruder
: was sentenced to from ten months to four years in Federal custody.
a
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15. ROBERT C. MARDIAN
Former Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division,
Department of Justice. Mardian resigned from his position as Assistant
Attorney General in April of 1972 to join the Committee for the Re-Election
of the President. His position at the Committee was that of Campaign
Coordinator and Political Consultant. Jeb Magruder has testified that
Mardian was present in a meeting in John Mitchell's apartment on June 19,
1972, during which time the destruction of illegal wiretap logs was dis-
cussed. Mardian has testified that four days after the Watergate break-
in G. Gordon Liddy briefed him and Fred LaRue about the Watergate
break-in, the Ellsberg psychiatrist break-in and other matters pertaining
'to the "Plumbers" operations. Mardian now resides in Phoenix, Arizona,
where he is President of the Mardian Construction Company. In a state-
ment to FBI agents Mardian acknowledged receiving custody of logs from
FBI wiretaps of White House aides and newspaper reporters which were
undertaken upon White House instructions in an effort to discover the
source of news leaks of highly classified information. Mardian stated
that he turned the logs of these wiretaps over to the White House where they
were located last May as a result of an FBI inquiry instituted by former
Acting Director Ruckelshaus. These logs were found in a safe belonging
to former presidential Domestic Counsel John D. Ehrlichman.
Prosecutive Action
On March 1, 1974, Mardian was indicted on one count of Conspiracy
to Obstruct Justice. On March 9, 1974, he plead not guilty to this charge.
A tentative trial date of September 9, 1974, has been set.
16. EUGENIO ROLANDO MARTINEZ
One of the five subjects apprehended in the Watergate complex on
June 17, 1972. Martinez is alleged to have come to the United States
from Cuba in 1959
trtinez received an immigrant visa to the

fates in 1959 and was naturalized in 1970. His naturalization
petition was signed by Bernard L. Barker, also one of the subjects
arrested at the Watergate. Prior to the Watergate break-in Martinez
was employed by the real estate firm of Bernard Barker in Miami,
Florida.
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Prosecutive Action
On September 15, 1972, Martinez was indicted on four counts charging

Interception of Communications, Conspiracy and Burglary. On January 15,
1973, Martinez plead guilty to the charges and on November 9, 1973, was
sentenced to from one to six years in the custody of the Attorney General.
On March 7, 1974, Martinez was indicted for conspiracy to violate the
civil rights of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg
by burglarizing his office. The Grand Jury indictment charged that the
burglary was carried out by Bernard L. Barker, Felipe DeDiego and
Eugenio Martinez, under the supervision of G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard
Hunt. Trial for this indictment was set for June 17, 1974.
17. JAMES WALTER MC CORD, JR.
A former FBI agent from October 1948 to February 1951 and

official with the CIA from 1951 to May of 1970 at which time he retired. At
the time of his retirement'
;* \^0f ^ ^ ^ H H H | ^ ^ ^ V i c C o r d was one of the five individuals who

werearrestedmsidetneTDemocratic National Committee Headquarters
in the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. At the time of his arrest
McCord was head of McCord Associates in Rockville, Maryland, a company
specializing in security work. McCord was employed at the time of his
arrest and had been so employed since January 1972 as Security Chief
for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. On March 23, 1973, Judge
John J. Sirica produced in open court a letter that McCord had written
charging that there had been a cover up in the Watergate case and that
perjury had been committed during the trial. On March 30, 1973,
Judge Sirica deferred sentencing of McCord until McCord testified before
the Federal Grand Jury and the Senate Watergate Committee. On May 18,
1973, McCord in testimony before the Watergate Committee implicated
i by hearsay information that President Nixon himself was involved in
I alleged offers of Executive Clemency in return for guilty pleas by
? McCord and the other Watergate defendants. McCord also outlined a
; series of payments he had received in a covert manner from John J.
Caulfield, a former presidential staff assistant who worked in the office
of John W. Dean III. Caulfield was at that time employed as a Special
i Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury for Law Enforcement. McCord
| has been critical of the FBI's investigation into the Watergate matter
stating that if an all out investigation had been conducted the Bureau
( would have uncovered the whole story. McCord states he believes the
- actions of L. Patrick Gray, former Acting Director of the FBI, thwarted
Bureau agents in fully discharging their investigative duties and thereby
adequately resolving the entire Watergate matter.
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:C
I Prosecutive Action
On September 15, 1972, McCord was indicted by a Federal
Grand Jury on four counts charging Interception of Communications,
Conspiracy and Burglary in connection with the Watergate burglary
incident. McCord plead not guilty and at a trial ending January 30,
1973, was found guilty on all counts. On November 9, 1973, he was
sentenced to from one to five years in the custody of the Attorney
General. McCord is presently free on bond pending appeal.
18. JOHN N. MITCHELL
Former Attorney General of the United States from 1969 to 1972,
he left the Attorney General's post on March 1, 1972, to become Director
of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President. Mitchell resigned
this post on July 1, 1972, citing personal family reasons for leaving the
campaign post. Mitchell was a partner with President Nixon in the
New York law firm of Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander and Mitchell.
He is 60 years of age having been born on September 5, 1913, in Detroit,
Michigan, and is a graduate of Fordham University Law School. Testi-
mony received in the Senate Watergate Hearings indicated that Mitchell
while still Attorney General was involved in several meetings where
plans for a broad scale campaign of espionage and illicit campaign tactics
against the Democratic Party and its nominee were discussed which
plans were said to have included the electronic surveillance of the
Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate Complex.
Jeb Stuart Magruder, former Deputy Campaign Manager under John
Mitchell, testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that Mitchell
approved the electronic surveillance project on March 30, 1972, while
in Key Biscayne, Florida.
Prosecutive Action
On March 1, 1974, Mitchell was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury
on seven counts including conspiracy to obstruct justice, two counts of
making false statements to a Federal Grand Jury, one count of perjury,
one count of making false statements to FBI agents and one count of
obstruction of justice. Mitchell plead innocent on March 9, 1974, and a
tentative trial date has been set for September 9, 1974. On April 28,
1974, Mitchell along with former Secretary of Commerce Maurice H.
Stans were acquitted on charges of obstruction of justice in connection
with the Robert Vesco case wherein it was charged that they (Mitchell
and Stans) attempted to influence the Securities and Exchange Commission
Ci to take favorable action for Vesco in litigation that the Securities and
Exchange Commission had undertaken..
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19. KENNETH W. PARKINSON
A prominent Washington attorney who has been active in civic and
legal affairs in the District of Columbia for several years. He is a
past President of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and has served as
an officer of the District of Columbia Bar Association and President
of the Legal Aid Society. Parkinson was retained by the Committee for
the Re-Election of the President immediately following the Watergate
break-in arrests. Parkinson represented the Re-Election Committee
in several suits brought by Democratic Party officials. Parkinson also
sat in on FBI interviews with Re-Election Committee employees and it
was alleged that at least on one occasion Parkinson confronted an
employee and accused her of talkhg to the FBI without his authority.
Prosecutive Action
On March 1, 1974, Parkinson was indicted by a Federal Grand
Jury on one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice and one count of
obstruction of justice. Parkinson plead not guilty on March 9, 1974.
A trial date of September 9, 1974, was set.
20. HERBERT L. PORTER
I Former Scheduling Director, Committee for the Re-Election of
the President, Porter testified before the Senate Watergate Committee
i on June 7, 1973. Porter advised the Committee that Jeb Magruder,
former Deputy Director of the Nixon campaign asked him (Porter) to
tell a fabricated story about what happened to $100,000 in cash given to
i convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy. Porter also admitted
that he had related the false account of how the funds were used to the
' FBI and to the Watergate Federal Grand Jury.
f
I Prosecutive Action
| On January 28, 1974, Porter plead guilty to a one count
\ information charging false statements to FBI agents. He was sentenced
on April 11, 1974, to serve 30 days of a five to fifteen month sentence.
Porter was released from custody on May 20, 1974.
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: 21 DONALD H. SEGRETTI
A California attorney born in San Marino, California, in 1941 and

educated at the University of Southern California. At the University of
' Southern California Segretti became acquainted with Dwight Chapin,
t former Appointments Secretary to President Nixon. Segretti served in
a legal position with the Treasury Department in Washington, D. C.,
and later joined the U. S. Army where he served as an attorney in
the Judge Advocate's General Corps. Herbert Kalmbach, former
1 personal attorney to President Nixon has advised Bureau agents that
. Segretti was brought to his attention by Dwight Chapin and that he met
j with Segretti on Chapin's instructions in August or September 1971 as
Segretti was leaving the Army. Chapin instructed Kalmbach to pay
Segretti $16, 000 per year and expenses out of campaign contributions
collected before the April 7, 1972, law requiring campaign contribution
disclosure became effective. Segretti in testimony before the Senate
Watergate Committee on October 3, 1973, confirmed that he had been
hired in the Summer of 1971 by two former University of Southern
California classmates, Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan, who were
both then employed by the White House. Segretti advised he was instructed
to perform certain political functions for the re-election of the President.
Segretti stated he considered these functions to be "similar to college
pranks which had occurred at the University of Southern California and
that there was nothing improper or illegal in such traditional activities."
He was later instructed by Chapin that his duties would consist of various
activities tending to foster a split between the various Democratic hopefuls
and to prevent the Democratic Party from uniting on one candidate.
Segretti stated he had received $45, 000 in expense money from Herbert W.
i Kalmbach during the period September 1971 to March 1972 and bi-weekly
\ salary payments of $667 during the same period.
[ Prosecutive Action
| On September 27, 1973, Segretti was indicted by a Federal Grand

j Jury in Washington, D. C., on charges of the illegal distribution of false
f campaign literature. Segretti plead guilty on October 1, 1973, was sen-
l tenced to one year on each count, suspended with six months in the custody
of the Attorney General and probation for three years. Segretti was
released from Federal custody on March 25, 1974.
I
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: 22. GORDON C. STRACHAN
i Graduate of the University of Southern California who received his
law degree from the University of California. Strachan worked for
President Nixon's former law firm in New York for two years before
j joining the White House Staff in August 1970 as an Assistant to White
j House Chief of Staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman. Strachan worked for
I Haldeman until December 1972 when he became General Counsel for
I the United States Information Agency. He assumed that position in
i January of 1973 and resigned on April 30, 1973, the same day that
j Haldeman resigned his position as White House Chief of Staff. Strachan
; served as the liaison representative between Haldeman and the Committee
t to Re-Elect the President during 1972 campaign. Jeb Stuart Magruder,
| former Deputy Director of the Nixon campaign testified that Strachan was
i kept informed of plans to develop a covert intelligence gathering operation
| involving break-ins and illegal wiretapping being carried out by the
\ Re-Election Committee. Magruder also stated that Strachan had been
I informed that the operation had been approved and that Strachan was
! furnished with copies of "Gemstone" materials for transmittal to his
[ White House superiors. Strachan has testified that Haldeman had told
him on June 20, 1972, three days after the Watergate break-in to "make
sure our files are clean". Strachan testified that he destroyed documents
| that had been received in the White House from the Re-Election Committee
| as a result of that order from Haldeman. Strachan has also stated that he
I returned to Frederick C. LaRue, an official of the Re-Election Committee,
$350,000 in cash being kept in the White House. LaRue has testified that
| this money was given to the Watergate defendants as part of the "cover up."
I
1 Prosecutive Action
On March 1, 1974, Strachan was indicted by a Federal Grand
Jury, Washington, D. C., on counts of conspiracy to obstruct justice,
obstruction of justice and making false statements to a Federal Grand
Jury. Strachan plead innocent on March 9, 1974, and a tentative trial date
has been set for September 9, 1974.
-103-
)
23. FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS

Sturgis, who was born Frank Anthony Fiorini, later changed
his name to Sturgis, was one of the five defendants arrested during the
Watergate burglary on June 17, 1972. Sturgis is a Miami resident and
the operator of the Hampton Roads Salvage Company in Miami. He is
a long time associate of fellow Watergate defendants Bernard L. Barker
and Eugenio Martinez. Sturgis lost his U. S. citizenship in 1960 when
he enlisted in the armed forces of a foreign nation (the Cuban Army).
He has been involved with the International Anti-Communist Brigade
and other anti-(
Sturgis has decline ureau agent

investigating the Watergate matters.
Prosecutive Action
Sturgis was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15,
1972, on counts of Interception of Communications, Conspiracy and
Burglary. He plead guilty on January 15, 1973, and was sentenced on
November 9, 1973, to serve to from one to four years. Sturgis was
freed pending an appeal on January 18, 1974.
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(I
APPENDIX C
EXPLANATORY NOTES AND DOCUMENTATION
1. Airtel from Acting Director FBI, to SACs Washington Field,

Atlanta, Alexandria, Baltimore, Boston, Kansas City, New York, and
Philadelphia; captioned "James Walter McCord, J r . ; Bernard L.
Barker, et a l . , Burglary of Democratic Party National Headquarters,
6/17/72, Interception of Communications - Conspiracy," Bureau file
No. 139-4089.
2. "Plumbers" is a name given the White House Special Investigations
Unit. The Unit was under the direction of Egil Krogh.
3. General Investigative Division Inspection; Inspector W. M. Mooney,
Report dated 8/10/73, Pages 69-77.
4. W. M. Felt to Walters memorandum, dated 5/22/73, captioned
"Watergate."
5. L. M. Walters to Felt memorandum, dated 5/23/73, captioned
i "Watergate."
| 6. Memorandum to Mr. Archibald Cox, Special Prosecuting Attorney,
I from Acting Director FBI, dated 6/7/73, captioned "Watergate - Events
\ at Initial Stage of Case."
r 7. Inspector James Joseph O'Connor to Mr. Jacobson memorandum,
\ dated 6/26/73, captioned "Watergate - Analysis of Possible Involvement
1
by L. Patrick Gray."
8. Letter to Special Prosecutor's Office, from Director, FBI, dated
j 4/10/74, captioned "Confirmation Hearings of L. Patrick Gray III. "
j 9. For comments and/or criticisms in this general area see Transcript
! of White House Tapes, pages 258-259, 821-822; Transcript of Silbert
' Confirmation Hearings, pages 38-39, 97-99; Report of Senate Watergate
Hearings, pages 940-941, 944-945, 3478-3482; A Piece of Tape: The
Watergate Story: Fact or Fiction by James W. McCord, pages 66, 236-237,
312-313, 324; All The President's Men by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward,
: pages 172, 232; Watergate: The Full Inside Story by Lewis Chester, Et Al,
pages 182, 186; L. Patrick Gray III, Senate Confirmation Hearings,
( pages 45-46, 57, 304, 331-332, 334-339, 345, 347, 358, 361, 375, 619,
653, 692-693.
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c
10. See Silbert Hearings, Op. cit., pages 81-82, 84, 154-161; Senate
Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3485, 3848-3849; McCord, Op. cit.,
pages 39, 43, 65-66; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 41, 67,
172; Gray Hearings, Op. cit., pages 334-336, 345.
11. See White House Transcript, Op. cit., pages 270-271; Silbert
Hearings, Op. cit., pages 37-43; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit.,
page 3467; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., page 232; Chester, Op. cit.,
page 183; Gray Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 328, 350-354,
676, 692; "The Judge Who Tried Harder" by George V. Higgins in "The
Atlantic Magazine", April 1974, page 103.
12. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , pages 185-186; Silbert
Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , page 32; Senate Watergate Hearings,
Op. cit., pages 963, 3485-3486, 3554-3555, 3582, 3790; McCord, Op.
cit., page 39.
13. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 57-58, 104,
179-183; Chester, Op. cit. , page 186; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit.,
pages 29-31, 35.
14. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 15-16, 32;
Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3521, 3848-3849; McCord,
Op. cit., pages 37-38, 40; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., page 173.
15. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., page 64; Bernstein
and Woodward, Op. cit. , page 200.
16. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., page 56-57; Silbert Con-
firmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 99-101; Senate Watergate Hearings,
Op. cit., pages 3548, 3595-3596, 3651-3652; McCord, Op. cit., pages
25-26 (McCord states that he installed two electronic devices on the
telephones in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, Watergate
Office Building, that were not detected or removed by the FBI; the first
was removed in December 1972 from the telephone of Spencer Oliver and
the second was not removed until April 1973.)
17. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , page 381; Silbert Con-
firmation Hearings, Op. cit., 109-110, 116-119, 122-124, 126-127, 132,
135-136; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3551-3552, 3620-
3621; Bernstein and Woodward, op. cit., pages 18, 29-31, 35, 107, 166;
Chester, Op. cit., pages 183-184, 188; Gray Confirmation Hearings, Op.
cit., pages 44, 57-60, 77, 144, 147-148, 177, 214-219, 224, 305-307,
347, 391, 599, 625, 664-665, 691.
-106-
c
18. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., pages 131-132, 185-186,
821-822, 865, 1218; Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 43-44,
124-125; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3450-3467 (re CIA
connection), 3467-3472 (re John Dean and Hunt files), 3624-3625; McCord,
Op. cit., pages XI, 40, 228-229, 237, 319; Bernstein and Woodward,
Op. cit., pages 107, 146, 166, 230; Chester, Op. cit., 189, 204;
Higgins, Op. cit., 102-103; also see pages listed in Footnote 17, supra,
re Gray Confirmation Hearings regarding Donald Segretti matter.
19. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., page 88; Senate Confirmation
Hearings, Op. cit., pages 124-126; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit.,
pages 66, 146, 165, 270.
20. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., pages 185-186; Silbert Con-
firmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 135-136; Senate Watergate Hearings,
Op. cit., pages 940-941, 3532; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit.,
pages 153, 157; Gray Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 227, 280.
21. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., pages 185-186; Silbert Con-
firmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 11-12, 23, 25, 29, 35-37, 51-53,
65, 73-74, 110-115, 127, 132, 171, 173, 175, 186, 188; Senate Watergate
Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3560-3567, 3620-3625; McCord, Op. cit.,
: pages XI, XV, 35, 39, 234-235, 237-238, 315-316, 319, 325-327;
; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 127; Chester, pages 166-167.
I 22. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 63-72; Senate
!
Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3403-3449, 3815, 3450-3467, 3648,
3821-3822; McCord, Op. cit., pages 49-51; Bernstein and Woodward,
\ Op. cit., pages 73, 318; Chester, Op. cit., 186-192, 214, 225, 226-227.
' 23. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., pages 128-129 (This is a
| . conversation between the President and White House Counsel John Dean in
which they are discussing the supposed political use of the FBI by the
Johnson Administration. During this conversation the President states
"How bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly
damaged?" Dean replies, "Do you mind if I take this back and kick it
around with Dick Moore? These other questions. I think it would
be damaging to the FBI, but may be it is time to shake the FBI and r e -
build it. I am not so sure that the FBI is everything it is cracked up to
be. I am convinced that the FBI isn't everything the public thinks it is. ")
Pages 185-186 (In this conversation between the President and John Dean
they are discussing the adequacy of the investigation and the performance
of Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. The President states to
-107-
i G
'- Dean "Do you honestly feel that he did an adequate job?" Dean replied,
"They ran that investigation out to the fullest extend they could follow
a lead and that was it." The President then asked "But the way point is,
where I suppose he could be criticized for not doing an adequate job.
Why didn't he call Haldeman? Why didn't he get a statement from Colson?
Oh, they did get Colson!" Dean then stated, "That's right. But as based
on their FBI interviews, there was no reason to follow up. There were
no leads there. Colson said, 'I have no knowledge of this' to the FBI.
Strachan said, 'I have no knowledge.' They didn't ask Strachan any
questions about Watergate. They asked him about Segretti. They said,
'what is your connection with Liddy?' Strachan just said, 'Well, I met
him over there.' They never really pressed him. Strachan appeared,
as a result of some coaching, to be the dumbest paper pusher in the
bowels of the White House. " Pages 270-271 (In this conversation between
the President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell
on March 22, 1973, they discussed the testimony of L. Patrick Gray HI
during his Senate confirmation hearing indicating that John Dean probably
: lied to FBI agents about whether or not Howard Hunt had an office in the
| White House. Dean states to the President that he had indicated that he
would check it out and that the agent had asked if he could see the office
and that Dean had told him that he would have to check it out. Dean is
complaining that the headlines will state "Gray says Dean lies." And
the President indicates that Mr. Gray probably misunderstood the question
and Mitchell states "Another factor those agents may not have reported
it exactly.") Pages 338, 566-567 (In this conversation between the President,
Haldeman and Ehrlichman on April 14, 1973, the adequacy of Ehrlichman's
inquiry into the Watergate cover up is being discussed. Haldeman states
"Did you review the FBI files?" Ehrlichman "No. " Haldeman, "Why not?
That's the original source you said was the most extensive investigation
in history. Why the hell didn't you look at it?" Ehrlichman, "I didn't look
at because I didn't need to look at it. I got a summary. " Later in this
conversation Ehrlichman indicates that the summary he reviewed was a
Justice Department summary and that he did not attempt to duplicate the
inquiry that had been conducted by the U. S. Attorney, the Federal Grand
Jury or the Justice Department.) Pages 1216-1220. (These pages reflect
the transcript of a conversation between the President and two attorneys
for Haldeman and Ehrlichman, a Mr. Wilson and a Mr. Strickler. During
this conversation Mr. Wilson relates to the President, Ehrlichman's
version of what happened when John Dean turned over certain materials
from Howard Hunt's White House safe to Mr. Gray in the presence of
John Ehrlichman); Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 106,
113, 125-126, 171; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 205, 216-217,
238, 272, 274, 277, 293-294, 306; Chester, Op. cit., pages 183-185, 187-
189, 191; Higgins, Op. cit. , pages 102, 105; there are also numerous
instances cited during the testimony of L. Patrick Gray; General Walters,
-108-
r
Deputy Director of the CIA, John Dean, Henry Petersen, John Ehrlichman
and H. R. Haldeman before the Senate Watergate Committee in relationship
to attempted White House interference during the initial stages of the FBI's
Watergate investigation.
24. W. W. Bradley to Mr. Conrad memorandum, dated April 12, 1973,
captioned "James W. McCord, et al, IOC - Democratic National Committee
Headquarters (DNCH)," file No. 139-4089, serial 2001.
25. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate on
Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus To Be Deputy Attorney General,
page 49.
26. Ibid. , page 61
-109-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WATERGATE
(SUMMARY)
PART 2 of 2
FILE NUMBER: 139-4089
V; t)
Si Afeoc. Dir. .
Dep.-A D-,
Dep-A I -
* Aast Dir.:
WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE Admin.
United States Department of Justice Com p. Syst Jp?
1425 K Street, N.W. Ext. A'fair_"t_
Washington, D.C. 20005 Ues A C#
Gen.
Ident
Inspection
IntelL
Lab." rs ''ry _^_
October 16, 1975 Plan. t& fU'aL _
Spec. Inv. _ _ _
Traininif ,._
Legal Conn. _____
ROUTE TO D.O. FOR SIGNATURE Telephone Rm. _,
J
j^
Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20537
Dear Clarence:
I am enclosing a copy of a Report covering

the activities of the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force from May 1973 to September 15, 19 75.
As you know, we have relied heavily on the

Bureau for investigative assistance in many extremely
important areas of our work. I want to express my
personal appreciation to you and to each of the agents
and the supervisory personnel who cooperated so well
in the mission of this Office.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
HENRY S. RUTH, JR.

Special Prosecutor
0
pi
r-;ov a-1275
&m Ad*
\
p SUI^MARY 07 OCTOBER, 1975 REPORT OF
YwATfiRGATE_SFECI,AL_lROSECUTION FORCE
The Report of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force

(WSPF) describes the work of WSPF during the 28-month period
from May 25, 1973 when Archibald Cox took office as Special
Prosecutor to September 15, 1975. The work produced more than
fifty criminal convictions of individuals and pleas of guilty
from nineteen corporations. These matters included eleven
completed or pending trials of which six were held in
Washington, D.C. and five were held or are scheduled in
various cities around the Nation.
In addition to reporting on the investigations and trials
WSPF undertook and completed, the Report describes the pro-
cess by which decisions were made as to the investigations to
be undertaken, the persons to be charged and the charges to
be brought, including decisions concerning plea negotiations.
However, the Report does not sot out facts about individual
cases or criminal charges other than those that have been
presented in court or otherwise made public, because, as ex-,
plained in the Introduction to the Report, to do so would be
inconsistent with fundamental protections which our system of
justice accords to individuals.
The Report describes in detail the Special Prosecutor's
efforts to obtain tapes, documents and other information and
SI
1
f
o
- 2-
material of the Nixon Administration starting immediately

after Cox's appointment and continuing for several months
after President Nixon's.resignation. It also describes the
deliberations and the actions of the Special Prosecutor
relating to the possibility of criminal charges against
President Nixon and the cooperation between WSPF and the
House Judiciary Committee during that Committee's investiga-
tions and deliberations about possible impeachment.
Finally, the Report states some concluding observations
and makes a series of recommendations based upon the experience
of the prosecutors during their 28-tnonths' work. Since the
Prosecution Force was not a commission or study group, the
proposed recommendations are not intended as a comprehensive
finding as to the changes needed to prevent and challenge abuses
of power. A detailed series of appendices follows the main
body of the Report.
There are summarized below those chapters of the Report
setting forth WSPF's recommendations, the policies and proce-
dures of WSPF including decisions about prosecutions to be
undertaken and about plea bargaining, descriptions of major -
investigations, efforts to obtain evidence from the White
House, and actions related to possible criminal prosecution
against President Nixon.
.r
- 3 -
WSPF Recommendations (Chapter 5)

1. Protecting the Integrity and Effectiveness of the
Prosecution Function ~~~~ ~~
Among recommendations seeking to insulate the Department
of Justice from political pressure were the following:
- Neither the campaign manager nor any other top
officials of the President's campaign should
become Attorney General.
- The Hatch Act should apply to all Justice
Department employees.
- A written record should be maintained of all
outside contacts with Justice Department
officials concerning pending matters.
- A new unit with adequate resources should be
established within the Justice Department to
investigate and prosecute corruption cases.
- An Office of Permanent Special Prosecutor
should not be established.
- The organized bar and the courts should clarify
and more actively inquire into possible
conflicting interests in one attorney's repre-
sentation of both higher-level and lower-level
employees during a federal investigation of
the leadership's conduct in hierarchial organi-
zations, such as corporations, labor unions
and government agencies.
- In order to ensure a continuous flow of informa-
tion from cooperating witnesses, the Freedom
of Information Act should be clarified to protect
absolutely information obtained confidentially
by law enforcement agencies.
2. Protecting the Integrity of Executive Branch
Functions in Law Enforcement
- Congress should exercise effective oversight of
enforcement and intelligence agencies through
b
regular review of agency policies, internal inspec-
tion procedures and other checks on how sensitive
functions are being performed.
- A constitutional amendment should clarify if and

when a President in office is subject to criminal
prosecution.
Control of Intelligence and National Security .

Functions
- All intelligence agencies should issue written

policies setting forth types of domestic intelli-
gence to be gathered and methods to be used.
These policies should be reviewed by a domestic
intelligence policy review board.
- The Administration should clarify its present

policy on warrantless searches and seizures
in connection with foreign intelligence investi-
gations.
Political Financing and Campaign Tactics
- The Department of Justice should take the initia-

tive in undertaking investigations and prosecutions
for campaign financing violations without waiting
for referral of complaints from other agencies or
individuals,
- Individual responsibility for the various reporting

requirements of a campaign committee under the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) should be
extended to include committee chairmen, rather
than just the treasurers of such committees.
- The statute of limitations on election law viola-

tions, amended retroactively in the middle of
WSPF's work to a three-year period, should be
restored to the five-year period applicable to
mn almost all other federal crimes.
' i ;
- Several amendments are needed to the FECA pro-

visions barring corporate contributions and
contributions by a government contractor in order
to clarify the extent and nature of the criminal
prohibitions and make them more consistent in
approach to the problems of campaign financing.
(See pp 149-152 of Report)
C)
- 5 -
b
- The authority of the Federal Election Commission
should be broadened with respect to "dirty
tricks" to enable it to promulgate standards
' of unaccepted campaign conduct.
WSPF Policies and Procedures for Investigation and Prosecution
Chapter 2)
A. Beginning Investigations
The Report describes the various sources of information
on the basis of which decisions were made to undertake investi-
gations. It notes that with respect to some areas of its
responsibility, WSPF began with the benefit of prior investiga-
tive work by other agencies while with respect to others, little
prior work had been done. It describes the Special Prosecutor's
decision to utilize the FBI as its principal investigating
agency, a decision that Cox reached only after satisfying him-
self that alleged improprieties by some former high FBI
officials did not involve those who v:ould be responsible for
work undertaken for the Special Prosecutor.
B. The Investigative Process
.4* JA
The Report details the various investigative techniques
used by WFPF, noting similarities and differences in comparison
with other "white-collar" crime investigations.
Among the differences were the special problems resulting
mm
from the White House's refusal to make available important evi-
dence, the intense interest of the news media, and WSPF's need
mv to maintain public support in view of the threat its work pre-
un
< 3 '(.
sented to the President and others in high positions.
- 6 -
The Report describes the various methods used for obtain-

ing information from witnesses, including FBI interviews, of-
fice interviews and bringing the witness before the grand jury
and the role each of these methods played in WSPF's investiga-
tions. It notes that only about 30 of the several hundred wit-
nesses who were interviewed were granted immunity as a means of
obtaining crucial information. An important reason for this
was WSPF's belief that most of those who were at relatively
"low" levels of the conspiracies and other wrong-doing it was
investigating held important positions of public trust and were
not entitled to complete immunity. Whenever possible in such
situations, WSPF sought to obtain the information it needed on
the basis of a plea bargain in order that a court could im-
pose an appropriate penalty.
C, Charging and Disposing of Cases
The Report analyzes the bases on which WSPF decided whether
to charge persons and what particular charges to bring.
The case involving the burglary of the office of Dr. Fielding,
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, is used as an example to
describe the factual and legal considerations that led to re-
jection of certain charges and the decision to bring others -
in that case conspiracy to violate Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amend-
ment rights to not be victimized by an illegal search and
seizure.
"S?
^ %
- 7-
The Report describes the issues the Special Prosecutor

faced in deciding whether to bring perjury charges and whether
to invoke the federal conspiracy statute in those cases where
it appeared to be applicable.
The Report also explains why instead of using the minimum
required standard of proof for a grand jury indictment, the
Special Prosecutor sought to use a higher standard and thus
sought indictments only when all the available evidence, in-
cluding the defendant's explanations, seemed likely to result
in a guilty verdict at trial.
The Report indicates the special circumstances that in
some cases led the prosecutors to believe leniency was jus-
tified in making charging decisions. Thus, in a few cases
the defendant's health was taken into account. In others, the
defendants seemed to have relied on advice of counsel as to
the legality of their actions or on prior non-enforcement de-
US cisions by government agencies.
Plea Bargaining
Without plea bargaining the Special Prosecutor would
na have been able to convict only a small number of the persons

who were shown on investigation to have committed crimes. In-
formation obtained by plea bargaining was crucially important
in many of the major prosecutions and convictions.
u
- 8-
The Report describes Special Frosecutor Cox's offer of

leniency to corporations which volunteered information about
their violations of the campaign financing laws. The reasons
for Cox's policy, which was adhered to by each succeeding
Special Prosecutor, are described in full in the Report and
include proof difficulties, prior lack of enforcement and
corporate disclosure of prior practices. The volunteer policy
resulted in guilty pleas by 12 corporations and 10 corporate
officers. These pleas, and others that followed in the campaign
eontributions area, marked the first time in many years that
corporate officers had been convicted for consenting to
illegal contributions.
The Report describes WSPF*s concern that guilty pleas
involve admission of guilt to a sufficiently serious charge
to enable the judge to impose an appropriate sentence. In
general the Special Prosecutor was willing to accept a plea
i
Ik to one felony charge. Most federal felonies permit a five-year
maximum sentence. WSPF also believed that guilty pleas should
resolve the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence of
if the underlying conduct which the evidence established. Thus,
WSPF refused to accept pleas if the defendant was asserting his
innocence in court at the time of the plea, and, with one
exception involving one of the first campaign-law violators to
come forward voluntarily, refused to accept pleas of nolo
- 9 -
contendere. In a few other situations the Special Prosecutor

was willing to accept guilty pleas that did not fully meet
these concerns, and the Report sets out the range of considera-
tions that led to the acceptance of such pleas.
The Report also notes that in considering a plea agree-
ment, WSPF was concerned that where subordinates had been
convicted and sentenced, the principle of proportionality
prevented accepting a plea to a lesser charge from a person
who had directed his criminal activities.
Major Investigations and Other Actions (Chapter 3)

The most important work of WSPF's five task forces and
the counsel's office is summarized in Chapter 3 of the Report.
Not included are large numbers of investigations which
involved a relatively minor commitment of office resources and
a lesser number of investigations, requiring more substantial
efforts, which have not been publicly disclosed in the past
and which did not result in charges. Reporting them would
publicize, for the first time and in an improper forum, allega-
tions from which the prosecutors concluded they should not
initiate court action for the various reasons cited in
Chapter 2. In the investigations included within this chapter,
allegations are cited if they have already received extensive
publicity or if they had become public through court proceedings,
legislative inquiries or other forums.
- 10 -
A section of the work of the Watergate Task Force briefly
describes its three investigations. The Watergate cover-up
investigation resulted in the prosecution and felony conviction
of eight men formerly associated with the White House or the
President's Campaign Committee. On January 15, 1974, a panel
of tapes' experts appointed by Judge Sirica concluded that
an 18 1/2 minute gap in a subpoenaed Presidential tape
recording of June 20, 1972 had been produced by at least five
separate hand operations of the stop and record buttons of a
Uher 5000 machine, the same model used by the President's
secretary, Rose Mary Woods, in transcribing the tape. Since
the experts' report made it clear that the gap had been caused
by intentional erasures, and evidence produced at earlier
hearings showed that the erasures had occurred after the tape
had been subpoenaed, Judge Sirica had referred the matter to
t the grand jury for further investigation of the possibility
of obstruction of justice. A grand jury, assisted by WSPF
and the FBI, concluded from the testimony of over 50 people
that a very small number of persons could have been responsible
for the erasures, but it was unable to obtain evidence sufficient
to prosecute any individual.
>'* Another matter which arose as part of the Watergate cover-
up investigation was an inquiry into President Nixon's sub-
mission of Presidential tape transcripts to the House Judiciary

- 11 -
Committee on April 30. 1974. Comparison of the President's
submission with transcripts in WSPF's possession showed that
the President's version contained several omissions of por-
tions of conversations. After an investigation, WSPF concluded
that there is strong circumstantial evidence that at least some
of the lengthy deletions were deliberate, but no prosecution
was possible for reasons outlined in the Report.
The Report also describes the work of WSPF's "Dirty
Tricks" task force. The "Dirty Tricks" investigation, which
resulted in convictions of Donald Segretti and Dwight Chapin,
sprung from reports that President Nixon's re-election cam-
paign had included an undercover network of agents who had
engaged in various kinds of political espionage and sabotage
against candidates for the Democratic Presidential nimination.
The reported activities included forging letters and other
literature which unfairly attacked some candidates, planting
manufactured stories in the press, copying documents from
campaign files, and recruiting people to ask embarrassing
questions at candidates* rallies or to picket such rallies on
behalf of opposing candidates. V7SPF also received and
investigated allegations about possible "dirty tricks" by
agents of Democratic candidates directed against President
Nixon's campaign.
81
- 12 -
WSPF's ITT task force investigated allegations that the
Department of Justice had settled three antitrust suits in
19.71 against International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
(ITT), one of the Nation's largest conglomerates, in return
for ITT's alleged offer to help finance the 1972 Republican
National Convention. These investigations included the
possibility that perjury had been committed in the 1972
confirmation hearings of Richard Kleindienst to become Attorney
General and an allegation that a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) inquiry had been obstructed by ITT's failure
to produce certain documents. The Report summarizes these
investigations and additional allegations that the Kleindienst
hearings had been illegally obstructed; that crimes had been
committed in connection with the transfer of documents relating
to ITT from the SEC to the Justice Department; that ITT had
been granted a favorable tax ruling by the Internal Revenue
Service as a result of improper influence or fraud; that
improper influence had been applied to the Justice Department's
handling of the antitrust suits against ITT, apart from the
1971 settlement; that improper influence had been used an
securing the agreement of another corporation to merge with
ITT; and that perjury had been conanitted by various people
before Congressional Committees, the SEC, and the grand *
jury. Richard Kleindienst and Howard Reinecke were convicted
by this Task Force.

o - 13 -
i The "Plumbers" task force investigated and prosecuted

those responsible for a break-in in September 1971 at the
Los Angeles offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, conducted to secure
the psychiatric records of Fielding's former patient, Daniel
Ellsberg. At the time of the break-in, Ellsberg was under
indictment for his role in the alleged theft of the classified
"Pentagon Papers." The report recounts that prosecution,
which resulted in the conviction of six individuals, and a
Bi number of other investigations undertaken by WSPF's "Plumbers.1
These included investigations of other break-ins, a "national
security" wiretap program, the alleged misuse of federal
agencies, the alleged mistreatment of demonstrators, and an
inquiry into President Nixon's tax returns.
The Report also details the work of the Campaign Contri-

butions task force, which systematically examined the campaign
finances of major 1972 Republican and Democratic Presidential
candidates. This examination included the investigation of
several hundred separate transactions, including corporate
and labor union contributions, recipients' non-reporting of
contributions and expenditures, and alleged quid pro quo
relationships between contributions and Government actions.
m The Report specifically describes investigations into the

alleged sales of Ambassadorships, contributions made by
b
- 14 -
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., the "Townhouse" program, the

Hughes-Rebpzo allegations and an inquiry into the National
Hispanic Finance Committee. In total, the Campaign Contribu-
tions Task Force convicted 32 individuals and 19 corporations.
Chapter 3 concludes with a summary of the work of
WSPF's legal issues task force, the Office of Counsel to the
Special Prosecutor.
Efforts to Obtain Evidence from the White House (Chap. 4,
first section)
From the first days of Special Prosecutor Cox's tenure until
many months after President Nixon's resignation, much of WSPF's
energy and concern was devoted to a continuing struggle with
the White House to obtain tapes, papers and other evidence
that were under President Nixon's control during his incum-
bency.
m The Report describes Cox's early efforts in May and June,

1973, to obtain papers and to insure that White House files con-
taining items he might need would not be tampered with. It
i
details the decision to seek tapes after their existerice be-
came known in July, 1973, including the process of identifying
for a subpoena the particular tapes which would establish
whether John Dean or the President were telling the truth about
the President's knowledge and involvement. The negotiations
0
between Cox and the White House and litigation over the grand
- 15 -
b
jury's subpoena which led in October 1973 to Cox's dismissal
are also described. The public uproar over Cox's firing led
the President to agree to comply with the subpoena, and the
Report describes the disclosure that two of the tapes were missing
and one had an 18 1/2 minute gap and the resulting investiga-
tion. It details Special Prosecutor Jaworski's continuing
efforts to obtain additional materials and the issuance in
April 1974 of a subpoena for 64 tapes needed for the Watergate
trial and the ensuing litigation resulting in the United
States Supreme Court's unanimous decision on July 24, 1974,
requiring that these tapes be turned over to the Special
Prosecutor.
After President Nixon 1 s resignation WSPF took immediate
action to prevent tapes and documents from the White House
from being shipped to California and there ensued complex
negotiations and litigation, described in the Report, resulting
in the Special Prosecutor's obtaining access to the materials

he believed he needed to complete his task.
Actions Related to President Nixon's Possible Criminal

Liability (Chap. 4, second section)
Section B of Chapter 4 describes the issues facing the
Special Prosecutor relating to the possible criminal liability
of President Nixon. The background is John Dean's testimony

- 16 -
&
ill
in June, 1973 before the Senate Select Committee implicating
the President in discussions of executive clemency for Water-
fc $ gate burglar E. Howard Hunt and the decision to pay Hunt

"hush money." Dean's version was corroborated and added to
by the March 21, 1973 tape which WSPF obtained following the
"Saturday night massacre" in late October 1973.
The Report describes the deliberations of WSPF on whether
President Nixon could and should be indicted and Special
Prosecutor Jaworski's decision not to recommend such an indict-
ment to the grand jury, but instead to transmit evidence
pertinent to the President's involvement to the House Judiciary
Committee which was then considering impeachment. The Report -
details the steps leading to this information reaching the
House Committee and describes the cooperation between the
Committee and WSPF that resulted in additional information and
assistance being made available to the House Committee. On
July 29, 1974 the Committee included in Article II of its
Articles of Impeachment a charge that the President had "know-
ingly misused the executive power by interfering with agencies
of the federal government," and included WSPF among the agencies
listed.
The Report also details the decision to name President
Nixon an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate indictment.
1
f;^lMi:- /îM;^^^ __ * *
- 17 -
After President Nixon resigned. Special Prosecutor

decided that he would defer any possible criminal action againstJ"
the former President until the Watergate cover-up jury wad
sequestered and the trial had started. His purpose was to
avoid exposing the jurors to additional pre-trial publicity
The result of this decision was that Nixon, if charged
complicity in the Watergate cover-up, would have been tried
separately from Haldeman, Mitchell, Ehrlichman and the other
alleged co-conspirators originally charged.
The Report describes Jaworski's meeting with Phillip
Buchen, Counsel to President Ford, in which the Special
Prosecutor told Buchen that the pre-trial publicity required^
a delay of at least 9 to 12 months before a jury could be
selected and at which he gave Mr. Buchen a list of ten mat- 7-'5$P^
ters pending before WSPF which "may prove to have some W
connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is personally
involved."but as to which WSPF lacked evidence of a probable
criminal violation. ''"*
' *\ * *S
.; On September 8, President Ford pardoned Mr. Nixott. On
October 12 Special Prosecutor Jaworski wrote Attorney General
Saxbe a letter accompanying his resignation in which he ex-'*4
plained his reasons, included in the Report, for not challenging
the pardon.
nwm
I . r.
0
/-^
'o
- 18 -
In addition to the 154 pages in the main body of the
I Report summarized above, the Report included 13 appendices.

They include a complete status report of all cases handled
by WSPF up to September 15, 1975, a detailed organizational
history of WSPF, a description of the relationship of the
Special Prosecutor with the Attorney General and with various
federal agencies and legislative committees, a detailed
chronology of Watergate events as they related to WSPF's
work, and a comprehensive bibliography of the extensive public
materials relating to matters investigated by WSPF.
MARK FELT
WATERGATE DEEP THROAT
FBI FILES
PRESIDENT NIXON AUDIO RECORDINGS
BACM RESEARCH
HTTP://WWW.PAPERLESSARCHIVES.COM

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MARK FELT

WATERGATE DEEP THROAT

SUBJECT: JAMES WALTER MC CORD, J R . ,

On 6-19-72 after briefing you concerning developments in

*' %':*-, '

tm ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Felt DATE: June 22, 1972 Conn4

I - Mr. Bates HanKall

SUBJECT: JAMES W. McCORD, JR. , AND OTHERS i.'

At 9:30 a. m. this date, SAC Kunkel and I had a conference

I told Mr. Gray this would be done immediately and have so

TO DATE. June 22, 1972

FROM C. W. Bates Punier

BURGLARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY Mi. rler*

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 6/17/72

^ At 4:00 p. m. on 6/21/72, Mr. Felt, SAC Kunkel of WFO and I

In answer to our question, Mr. Gray instructed as follows:

SAC Kunkel broached the theory that this was in furtherance I

While on the phone with him, I advised him of a new development:

I talked to Mr. Gray again at 5 p. m. on 6/22/72 after his return ^

At 3:15 pm on 6/23/72 Mr. Gray called me. He said he had .

Mofno to Mr, Bolz

Smith told me he merely wanted to let me know what had happened

I immediately called Mr. Gray and relayed to him Smith's conver-

Mr. Gray called me at home Saturday afternoon, 6 24 72. He said

At 5:50 p. m. on 6/24/72 Sandy Smith called me. Said he had learned

Smith said he tried to get deleted completely the Mitchell-Gray

While in Mr. Gray's office Mr. JohryJQean of th^White House called

Mr. Gray asked that I brief Mr. Felt completely on prior

At 11:40 a. m. 6/27/72, Mr. Felt called me and advised that I

We discussed with him a list of 8 leads that should be covered at

Also on 6 '28/72 Mr. Felt instructed that we discontinue a lead to

2) General Redman, White House Communications Agency, has

xician says Lnat hunt

At Hunt's request Bouman flew to Washington In January of 1972.

Mr. KurJ<el, SAC - WFO, would like to obtain photographs of l i v e Y:;.

M^nneth H. Dahlberg was again contacted at his residence the morning

(1) Who reconunended/recruited James Walter McCord, Jr Tor A

(4) Determine the Committee's knowledge of a bank account opened

(5) To whom did McCord report concerning transactions in the

(8) Determine the Committee's knowledge of and/or contacts made

"Ontoe"morning of 6 / 29/72 NTr| Felt, *a^ter l a ^ n g \I?t|b Mr. Gray

At 10:15 a. m. 6/30/72 SAC Kunkel advised me that AUSA Siibert

At 12:30 p. m. 6/30/72 Mr. Felt stated it was OK for Agents to

At 2:30 p. m. on 7/3/72 SAC Kunkel and I met with Mr. Gray.

On the morning of 7/5/72 I delivered to Mr. Felt and to Mr. Gray

At 12:05 p. m. 7/5/72 Mr. Felt called and instructed that I tell

At 2:45 p . m . 7/5/72 SAC Kunkel advised that Baldwin was thinking

At 4:30 p . m . 7/5/72 SAC Kunkel advised that Baldwin had agreed

At 11:30 A.M. this morning", WFO Agents arranged for

Contact was also made of Mr. Robert Dole to arrange

Miami office has advised that a Cuban photographer

$25,000 CASHIERS CHKCK

Miami has determined from records of RKJBIK Republican

MC CORD'S BANK ACCOUNT

Subpoena has been served on McCord's bank, Rockville,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FROM :W. M. FELT 'ft

A story in the Washington Post for Saturday, 9-9-72, quoted Justice

Please prepare a memorandum for the Acting Director outlining the

The article which appeared in the Washington 'Post M s moi'ninl

I personally contacted SAC Kunkel to point out trfal ft app^eaWS the

' %':-, '