UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT
DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT

REBECCA L. JOHNSON, 3:17CV1429 (MPS)

JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER
Plaintiffs

V. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

KARYL CARRASQUILLA (I CAPACITY),

MICHAEL BOWLER (I CAPACITY)
Defendants

AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 U. S. C.

1331, 1343 (a) (3) and (a) (4), 2201. Jurisdiction of this court is further invoked

pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. 1983, 1981 and 1988.

II. VENUE
Venue is proper in this court inasmuch as the acts alleged herein occurred

within the State of Connecticut.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Plaintiff Rebecca L. Johnson (hereafter referred to as Johnson), is a

citizen of the State of Connecticut. Johnson is African-American.

2. Plaintiff is Josephine Smalls Miller (hereafter referred to as Miller), a

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 citizen of the State of Connecticut, with an office and place of business at 152

Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302, Danbury, CT 06810. Miller is African-American.

3. Karyl Carrasquilla, sued in her individual capacity, is Chief Disciplinary

Counsel, State of Connecticut, Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (hereafter

referred to as Carrasquilla). At all times material herein, Carrasquilla was acting

under color of law.

(a) The Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel (hereafter referred to as

OCDC), is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut, which is

charged with, inter alia, enforcing the state statutes regarding attorneys practice

of law, including investigating and monitoring attorney conduct. It has an office

and principal place of business located at 100 Washington Street, Hartford, CT

06103.

4. Michael Bowler, sued in his individual capacity, is employed as Bar

Counsel for the Statewide Grievance Committee. At all times material herein,

Bowler was responsible for managing the process of attorney discipline

procedures. At all times material herein, Bowler was acting under color of law.

(a) The Statewide Grievance Committee (hereafter referred to as SGC)

is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut that is charged with, inter

alia, enforcing the state statutes regarding attorney practice of law, investigating

and monitoring attorney conduct. It has an office and place of business located at

287 Main Street, East Hartford.

5. 5. Plaintiff, Rebecca Johnson, (hereinafter referred to as Johnson) is an

African American woman, licensed to practice law in the State of Connecticut,

commencing in January of 1994 and subsequently in the Second Circuit.

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6. 6. Johnson practiced law in Connecticuts state courts from January of 1994,

through September of 2002, and in the Second Circuit until January of 2003, with

a focus on civil rights related claims.

7. 7. On or about July 9, 2002, the superior court, Skolnick J., issued an order in

the Statewide Grievance Committee (hereinafter referred to as SGC) disciplinary

matter, relating to docket number CV01-378603, suspending Johnson from the

practice of law, for a period of one year beginning September 1, 2002. The

underlying allegations of misconduct on the part of Johnson, were related in part to

a wrongful termination lawsuit that had been filed by Johnson on behalf of a former

client, Gail Dunn. The allegations of misconduct, on the part of Johnson, related to

the dismissal of Dunns complaint, by the superior court after Dunns complaint was

placed on the dormancy calendar. The final dismissal of Dunns complaint

occurred after Johnson was no longer representing Dunn. The dismissal occurred

at a time when a second attorney, with whom Johnson had previously practiced

law, was retained by Dunn, pursuant to a written retainer agreement she executed

with this second attorney, and after the second attorney filed appearances twice

in the case demonstrating his representation of Dunn. It was in fact substantial

misconduct on the part of the second attorney/law firm that lead directly to the final

dismissal of Dunns lawsuit, yet Johnson was inexplicably, and solely singled out

for investigation, and eventually disciplined. Both Bar counsel and Judge Skolnick

were aware of the second attorneys involvement, yet both would not require the

second attorney to account for his misconduct.

8. 8. This first period of suspension, commencing on September 1, 2002, is

hereafter referred to as Suspension I.

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9. 9. On or about November 1, 2004, the superior court, Robaina J., issued an

order in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05-4012328S,

suspending Johnson from the practice of law, for a period of two years, beginning

on or about November 1, 2004. The client who filed the underlying grievance,

William Hazel, had been represented by Johnson and another attorney, in a

wrongful termination claim. On the eve of settlement of his claim, Hazel decided

that he would not honor the retainer agreement that had been negotiated in his

case between himself, Johnson and the second attorney. The retainer agreement

had been forwarded to Hazel following a lengthy discussion of the details of the

underlying retainer agreement, however, neither Johnson nor the second attorney

noted that Hazel had failed to execute and return his copy to them. Hazel

complained when Johnson and the second attorney retained 25% of the settlement

proceeds as attorneys fees. The 25% fee was divided between Johnson and the

second attorney. Johnson was held responsible to reimburse the client security

fund for the entire amount, notwithstanding that legal services had actually been

performed and despite the fact that the second attorney had been permitted to

retain his portion of the settlement proceeds. The allegations of misconduct on the

part of Johnson, involved the exact misconduct on the part of a second attorney/law

firm, yet Johnson was inexplicably, and solely, singled out for investigation, and

eventually disciplined. Both Bar counsel and Judge Robaina were aware of the

second attorneys involvement, yet both failed to require the second attorney to

account for his alleged misconduct.

10. This second period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2004, is

hereafter referred to as Suspension II.

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11. On or about November 1, 2006, the superior court, Lagar J., issued an order

in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05- 40123285,

suspending Johnson from the practice of law, for a period of eighteen months,

beginning on or about November 1, 2006.

12. This third period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2006, is

hereafter referred to as Suspension III. In the underlying grievance, Anthony

Amabile, was represented by Johnson (prior to being suspended) in a wrongful

termination matter which was being investigated by the EEOC. A second attorney,

had resumed representation of Amabile after Johnson was suspended. Amabile

was not satisfied with the progress of the EEOC complaint procedure and requested

that his complaint be released. Subsequently, Amabile had a disagreement with the

second attorney because Amabile desired the second attorney to file a complaint in

federal court, on a contingency basis. The second attorney would not agree to a

contingency arrangement. Amabile allowed the statute of limitations to toll and

subsequently filed a complaint with the SGC falsely claiming that Johnson had not

made him aware that her license was under suspension and further claimed that

she allowed the statute of limitations to toll. The allegation of misconduct on the part

of Johnson, involved the exact same alleged misconduct on the part of the second

attorney/law firm, yet Johnson was inexplicably, and solely, singled out for

investigation and eventually disciplined. The second attorney involved in the

Amabile grievance was also the attorney involved in the Hazel grievance. Both Bar

counsel and Judge Lagar were aware of the second attorneys involvement, yet both

failed to require the second attorney to account for his misconduct.

13. During the trial immediately preceding Suspension III, Johnson attempted to
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offer testimony regarding factual allegations of racially discriminatory treatment of

her leading the SGC to pursue charges of misconduct against her in the three (3)

disciplinary matters.

14. Johnson was repeatedly interrupted by the judge at the presentment hearing

when she tried to introduce evidence of racial disparity in attorney discipline.

Johnson was repeatedly questioned about the relevance of the testimony or

instructed to move along.

15. In support of Johnsons claim that Suspensions I, II and III were racially

motivated, she offered testimony concerning the racially discriminatory manner in

which complaints against Caucasian attorneys are handled (much more to their

favor) who had committed offenses that were serious violations of state law as

compared to Johnson.

16. Johnson testified, for example, about a grievance complaint that had been

filed in the fall of 2002 against Attorney Anthony Lucci, a Caucasian attorney

licensed to practice law in Connecticut. Johnsons sister, an African American

woman, wanted to purchase a home in West Haven. Lucci, representing the seller,

received the complainants down payment, which pursuant to state law, was

supposed to be deposited in Luccis escrow account. The transaction did not take

place due to the fact that the sellers property was found by the insurance carrier to

be uninsurable. There was extensive damage to the roof, along with other problems

with the house in question. When the complainant made a timely demand for the

return of her down payment, Lucci did not do so, having purloined the money. When

a grievance complaint was filed, the SGC sent a letter to the complainant informing

her that the complaint would be set aside so that Lucci would have time to find a
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way to repay her the money. These facts were actually stated in the written

response to the complainants complaint. The complainant likewise filed a complaint

with the State of Connecticuts Real Estate Commission. The Real Estate

Commission followed suit, refused to process the complaint and refused to respond

to inquiries regarding why the complaint was not being processed or addressed.

Johnsons sister filed suit in superior court (Docket no.CV 030473174) in January of

2003. After five months of litigation, Johnsons sisters money was returned to her

in May of 2003. Lucci notified the SGC when he returned the money and the SGC

immediately dismissed the complaint, without taking disciplinary action against

Lucci. Upon information and belief, Lucci was never referred by the SGC for criminal

charges.

17. Johnson was disciplined for the same offenses committed by other

attorneys who worked side-by-side with her and had appearances in the cases in

question. However, these other attorneys were never questioned by the SGC, Bar

Counsel or the trial court judges and were not disciplined. Although the SGC staff

and the courts acknowledged the necessity of the presence of these other attorneys

during court proceedings, they were never required to answer for their portion of

responsibility for the underlying complaints.

(a) Johnson specifically claimed she was subjected to a racially

discriminatory pattern of investigation and subsequent disciplinary process,

reserved for African American attorneys by the SGC and Bar Counsel, in her

brief submitted to the trial court following the presentment hearing that

resulted in Suspension III.

(b) The SGC never responded to Johnsons claims of racial discrimination

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during the presentment hearing or in its brief.

(c) In the memorandum of decision issued following the presentment

hearing, the trial court, Lagar J., refused to acknowledge or respond to

Johnsons claims of racial

discrimination.

(d) In a subsequent appeal taken to the Connecticut Appellate Court,

Johnson briefed her claims of race discrimination.

(e) As at the trial level, neither opposing counsel in its brief, nor the

Appellate Court in its memorandum of decision, acknowledged or addressed

Johnsons claims of race discrimination.

18. Johnson applied for reinstatement on or about February 19, 2004; however

the application was denied due to the pendency of the underlying complaint relating

to Docket number CV04-4000920S.

18. Johnson again applied for reinstatement on or about March 27, 2009, and a

three (3) judge panel denied said application.

19. The conditions for reinstatement that Johnson had been made aware of was

that she (1) complete a CLE course on professional responsibility, (2) take and pass

the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and (3) pay back a fine of

approximately $14,900.00.

20. Johnson had complied with the first two orders. As to payment of the

$14,900.00 fine, as of the date the filing of her second petition, Johnson had repaid

$9,000.00. The $14,900.00 fine that Johnson was required to re-pay included the

portion of the attorneys fees that went to her as well as the portion of the fees that

went to the second attorney. Johnson had been unable to pay the balance prior to
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filing her application due to an inability to maintain full time, gainful permanent

employment since August of 2009. Johnson, through, her counsel had reached an

agreement with the Client Security Fund to make installment payments upon her

return to work.

21. In its decision, the three judge panel accused Johnson of being unfit to return

to practice without specifying why she was unfit and found that she had intentionally

failed to meet to requirements for reinstatement.

22. The panels judgment even chastised Johnson for choosing Attorney

Josephine Miller, a well qualified, African-American female attorney, as her counsel

and/or mentor. Without a factual basis, the panel questioned Millers ability to act as

mentor for Johnson even though Miller had absolutely no disciplinary history at the

time.

23. Upon information and belief, the decision to continue its discipline of Johnson

after seven (7) years of suspension was due to Johnsons race and color, and

because both Johnson and her Attorney were aggressive litigators who have chosen

to focus their respective practices on civil rights litigation.

24. After refiling her petition in December of 2013, Johnson was introduced by

former Chief Disciplinary Counsel Mark DuBois, to Attorney Beth Griffin of Lawyers

Concerned for Other Lawyers, in April of 2014. Johnson, at Dubois advising, sought

advice from Griffin on how to approach her reinstatement efforts.

25. Griffin offered to seek out information regarding the judicial climate that

Johnson would face by speaking to members of the judiciary.

26. Upon meeting with Griffin in April 2014, she told Johnson that (1) she should

not wear her power to the people t- shirt while in court presenting to the judges;
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(2) upon being reinstated, Johnson should make it clear she would avoid practicing

civil rights litigation (forever) as that choice would not be received well by certain

judges and would instead engage in a safer area of practice such as bankruptcy

or real estate practice; and (3) Griffin stated that Johnson should definitely not have

Attorney Miller represent her because Miller was seen by certain judges to be highly

offensive and too aggressive. When Johnson commented that Miller has an

impressive and successful track record of litigating civil rights cases and that she

preferred having Attorney Millers services, Griffin continued to strongly urge

Johnson to seek someone else to represent her.

27. Upon information and belief Johnson and Miller have been targeted by the

attorney discipline authorities in a racially discriminatory manner, and in part

because of their joint emphasis on civil rights litigation practice.

28. Johnson remains under suspension despite the passage of fourteen (14)

years.

29. At all times material herein, Miller has been a practicing attorney, licensed to

practice in the State of Connecticut and subject to state statutes regarding attorney

conduct.

30. Miller has at various times over the past thirty-five years been admitted to

practice in the States of Michigan, Georgia and Connecticut. She has been admitted

to practice in Connecticut since 2004. Miller is admitted to practice before the

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Northern District of

Georgia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,

and the United States Supreme Court.

31. During most of her thirty-seven years of practice Miller has specialized in
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employment discrimination/civil rights law. However Miller has practiced in areas

such as family and criminal law and various other types of civil litigation.

32. Miller has filed complaints in U. S. District Court for the District of Connecticut

against the Bridgeport Police Department, the Bridgeport Board of Education, and

others, alleging inter alia, race discrimination, conspiracy, and tortious interference

with contract. [Miller v. Bridgeport Police Department; 3:14-cv-00689-JAM; Miller v.

Bridgeport Board of Education, 3:12-cv-1287 (JAM)]; Miller v. Chief Disciplinary

Counsel, 3:15cv1111; and in various state court cases alleging racial discrimination

against her as an African-American attorney and civil rights practitioner. [Miller v.

Bridgeport Police Department, FBT CV10-6010380; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of

Education, FBT CV10-6011406; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of Education, DBD CV15-

6017320; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of Education, DBD CV12-6010257; and in state

administrative agency cases [Miller v. Commission on Human Rights &

Opportunities, HHB-CV16- 6035626; Miller v. Commission on Human Rights &

Opportunities, HHB-CV17-6036669]

33. The intent of each of these lawsuits has been to highlight the racially

discriminatory practices on the part of the municipality, the City of Bridgeport, in

terms of contracting practices with her as an African American attorney, in its

repeated refusal to pay attorney fees lawfully due her, especially in light of the fact

that Caucasian attorneys are not treated in such an illegal manner, after Miller shed

light on such civil rights violations.

34. Miller has presented evidence of racially discriminatory treatment including:

(a) Refusal to pay attorney fees to her for legal services performed while

paying such fees to Caucasian attorneys.

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1. Caucasian male attorney, Matthew Hirsch, was paid by the City

of Bridgeports Board of Education, for three years, for his

representation of Bridgeport School Principal Andrew Cimmino, during

the time period 2007 through 2009. When Cimmino retained Miller, to

continue representing him in the same matter, in lieu of Hirsch, the

City of Bridgeport refused to pay Millers attorney fees. The City of

Bridgeports refusal to pay the attorneys fees due Miller, was at issue

in the civil matter filed in Connecticut superior court docket nos. FBT-

CV10-6011406; DBD-CV12-6010257; DBD-CV15-6017320; and U S

District Court docket no. 3:12-cv-01287 (JAM). It was through Millers

provision of legal services, including the granting of her clients motion

for summary judgement, that the complaint against Cimmino was

finally dismissed. (See docket no. FBT-CV13-6035941.)

2. The City of Bridgeports Police Department has likewise, as if

in concert with the Bridgeport Board of Education, refused to

compensate Miller for legal services provided on behalf of two

Bridgeport police officers (Docket nos. FBT-CV09-6005032S; UWY-

CV10-6006798). As the result of Millers provision of legal services,

the complaint against one of her clients, named as a defendant, in

Docket no. FBT-CV09-6005032S, was voluntarily withdrawn by the

plaintiff. Notwithstanding the successful outcome for Millers client, the

City of Bridgeport has refused to pay her. Under similar circumstances,

however, the City of Bridgeport paid the legal fees for a Caucasian

attorney, Matthew Hirsch.

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3. On or about October 22, 2013, Miller was informed by Assistant

City Attorney Errol Skyers regarding a civil action scheduled to be tried

in the judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, in the matter of Powell

v. Bridgeport Board of Education (Docket no. FBT-CV-09-5021654S)

that Millers name was on a no pay list as regards the Bridgeport

Office of the City Attorney. Attorney Skyers stated that this no pay

list meant that Miller was an attorney with whom the Office of the City

Attorney would not settle any case.

4. On or about October 7, 2013, Miller instructed a (then) current

client, to contact the City of Bridgeports Assistant City Attorney

Russell Liskov. Miller was representing this client, in a federal civil

rights claim, as a result of the client being terminated by the City of

Bridgeport, after the client was falsely accused of subjecting a

subordinate coworker to sexual harassment. While the sexual

harassment litigation was pending, a lawsuit was filed against the City

of Bridgeport in Connecticuts superior court, relating to a different civil

matter where Millers client was also named as a co-defendant along

with the City. In the Connecticut superior court matter, Millers client

was being represented by the Bridgeport City Attorneys office. The

clients sole purpose in contacting Liskov, was to simply advise Liskov

of the possible conflict of interest. However, Attorney Liskov went well

beyond the bounds of the conversation, instructing Millers client that

he should reconsider utilizing Millers services. Attorney Liskov told

Millers client that while Miller won big verdicts at the trial level, she
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was likely to be reversed at the appellate level. Attorney Liskov then

attempted to steer Millers client, instructing him to utilize the services

of Attorney Thomas Bucci (Caucasian male) to handle the federal

lawsuit. Attorney Liskov further reiterated to Millers client that there

were some attorneys with whom the city did not settle cases, and that

Miller was one of those attorneys.

5. In the matter of Cimmino v. Marcoccia, et al. (Docket no. FBT-

CV09-5023251-S), Miller obtained a jury verdict in favor of her client,

Cimmino, for $125,000 with additional punitive damages. Under the

statutory claim of C.G.S. 31-51q, the punitive damages were to have

been awarded based upon Millers reasonable attorneys fees. Miller

made a claim for attorney fees in the amount of $350,000 (as against

the two defendants). The trial judge refused to award Miller any

attorney fees. In its final disposition of the case, on July 29, 2013, after

taking eight months to carefully consider the issue, the trial court

denied defendants motion to set aside the verdict. However, just nine

(9) days after Miller took an appeal of the trial courts decision to deny

an award of attorneys fees, the trial court took the unprecedented

measure to reverse its decision to deny defendants motion to set

aside verdict, sua sponte. The Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed

the appeal in the Cimmino matter on December 9, 2014 and thereafter,

upon information and belief, Attorney Thomas Cotter (Caucasian

male) was then able to recover attorney fees to be paid to him on

behalf of his clients (the losing parties).

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6. In the matter of Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport Board of

Education, SC 18401, the Connecticut Supreme Court set aside a $2

million jury verdict that had been obtained in favor of Millers client,

after four (4) years of appellate litigation, based upon an alleged lack

of sufficient evidence for the jury to have reached a verdict on the claim

of racial discrimination, retaliation under C.G.S. 31-51q and

Intentional infliction of emotional distress, all claims that the jury had

found in favor of Millers client.

7. In the matter of Miller v. Maurer, Docket no. DBD-CV17-

6021872, an interpleader action, Miller sought judicial intervention as

it related a dispute regarding the division of attorneys fees with

another Caucasian attorney, Elizabeth Maurer (hereinafter referred to

as Maurer) and the client. Maurer had initiated a civil rights claim

(employment discrimination) on behalf of her former client, Ms. Lori

Rodriguez. After years of mishandling Rodriguez claim, Rodriguez

terminated Maurers services and hired Miller to replace Maurer and

her firm. Miller successfully settled the claim on behalf of Rodriguez

for $128,000.00. Maurer subsequently provided invoices to Rodriguez

claiming that her firm was owed $165,000.00. The trial court found

that Maurer had diligently and professionally represented Rodriguez

in her claims against all defendants in that action, that Maurers law

firm added good value to Rodriguez claims, and found no evidence

of misconduct or professional negligence by anyone in the Maurer law

firm in its initial handling of the initial action. For the following reasons,
15
the trial courts findings were neither based on fact nor law.

(i) The trauma Rodriguez claimed to have suffered at the

hands of her employer was so serious that Rodriguez suffered

a stroke. However, Maurers and her firms inaction relating to

compliance with standard discovery requests led to the federal

court decision to sanction Rodriguez by precluding the

introduction of all evidence pertaining to Rodriguez emotional

distress claims.

(ii) During the evidentiary hearing in the interpleader action,

Miller presented evidence that in response to defendants

Motion to Dismiss the underlying federal action, Maurer made

brutally honest admissions as to her culpability for the damage

done to Rodriguez claims, stating:

these inadequacies are not completely due to the fault

of counsel or fault of the Plaintiff herself; instead, they
are shared. Embarrassingly, counsel concedes that
it is to blame for much of the late disclosures and
production of documents in this case. . . It is shameful
and contrary to Plaintiff's practice to have necessitated
the Court's intervention on so many occasions and to
now be in the position of pleading for its forgiveness. . .
Plaintiff's counsel and Ms. Rodriguez which has caused
numerous oversights by counsel and ultimately
resulted in the unprofessional and sloppy piecemeal
production which lands us here today. . . The Court has
already issued an extreme sanction in ruling to preclude
all evidence of emotional distress. Additionally,
Plaintiff's issues for trial have been seriously limited to
whether Plaintiff was sexually harassed and whether
that harassment led to a medical event in January 2007,
effectively dismissing the Plaintiff's alternate causes of
action . . . Plaintiff cannot, in good faith, make a straight-
faced argument to this Court that any of the delays were
substantially justified. . . [C]ounsel has heard the
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 Court's wake-up call as is evidenced by this objection
which forces counsel to put its tail between its legs
and cower toward the tribunal in embarrassment,
The Court has indeed warned Plaintiff on numerous
occasions of dismissal of her case for discovery non-
compliance . . . Plaintiff's counsel does not need a
deterrent to behaving in a disrespectful manner towards
the Court; counsel has already been deterred by the
sheer embarrassment and tenor of this objection.
(Emphasis added.)

(iii) During the evidentiary hearing in the interpleader action,

Miller presented evidence that Maurer also admitted in

subsequent email correspondence to Rodriguez that:

this [courts sanction precluding introduction of

evidence of Rodriguez emotional distress claims] is a
major blow to your case which will take most of the
value out of the case . . .after I get the judges rulings
on discovery and the sanctions Ill be better able to tell if
there is anything left worth pursuing. . . I am having a
very hard time seeing any way to present a case with a
chance of succeeding, . . . I am not optimistic that your
case will survive with the number of sanctions and
inconsistencies in the case. Notwithstanding Maurers
and her firms grave failures, after assuming the
representation of Rodriguez, Miller was able to obtain a
$128,000.00 settlement. (Emphasis added.)

(iv) Rodriguez also testified at the evidentiary hearing in the

interpleader action that she had been instructed by a principal

in the Maurer law firm to destroy a personal notebook that had

been requested by the defendant during discovery in the

underlying federal court action.

(v) Rodriguez testified at the evidentiary hearing in the

interpleader action that no attorney from the Maurer law firm

was present at the deposition of her principle treating mental

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health witness because the attorney from Maurers firm who

had been sent was not admitted to practice before the federal

district court. This same attorney was present at the evidentiary

hearing in the interpleader action and did admit that he was

initially present for the aforementioned deposition, but was not

permitted to remain because he had not been admitted to

practice before the federal court at the time of the deposition.

No continuance of the deposition occurred and the deposition

took place without the presence of any attorney on Rodriguez

behalf.

(vi) The federal court complaint in the underlying Rodriguez

matter had been originally filed on February 8, 2007. As of the

time of a ruling on a motion to compel was issued on October

7, 2011, the federal court noted that after over twenty-seven

months of waiting, the [defendants] have not received a single

document related to treatment by [plaintiffs treating physicians]

Drs. Graham, Khalid, Mahajan or Astoria Park. Moreover, the

court noted that medical records from Rodriguezs primary care

doctor and primary mental health treater were not provided until

after Defendants filed their motion to compel production of

documents on July 29, 2011 in response to Requests for

Production dated May 20, 2009.

(vii) Upon information and belief, no sanctions were ever

issued against Maurer or any member of her firm, by any

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 federal or state judge. Nor was any referral made for

investigation by any federal or state judge, to the SGC, or

OCDC as a result of Maurers or her firms misconduct by any

state or federal court judge.

(viii) Attorney Maurer was awarded full attorney fees and

costs at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing in interpleader action.

(b) Pursuit of investigatory or disciplinary action, against African-

American attorneys, when such measures are not pursued against

Caucasian attorneys in similar situations

(1) On September 1, 2015, Miller presented substantial evidence

to Attorney Carrasquilla regarding multiple instances of Caucasian attorneys

who engaged in the same or substantially similar misconduct (and at times

much more serious misconduct) as compared to that which has been alleged

against Miller, but with no pursuit of investigatory or disciplinary action against

them. By further example, on August 17, 2015, Miller filed a complaint with

Attorney Michael Bowler of the SGC regarding multiple false statements of

material fact by an Assistant Attorney General in written pleadings in a matter

pending in Connecticut superior court (i.e. Gilbert v. Department of

Correction). Neither Carrasquilla nor Bowler took any action to pursue

investigatory or disciplinary actions based on the professional misconduct

engaged in by Caucasian attorneys.

(c) Investigation of African-American lawyers for possible professional

misconduct when Caucasian lawyers are not. Carrasquilla and Bowler caused an

investigation to be made of at least two of Millers race discrimination/civil rights

19
cases while refusing to perform investigations of the cases of Caucasian attorneys.

(d) In Grievance No. 14-0803 Carrasquilla determined at the end of the

probable cause hearing that she would recommend Miller for a presentment

because she deemed Millers attitude to be improper; Miller had stated

throughout the hearing her belief that the grievance authorities were engaged in a

witch hunt against her; upon information and belief other attorneys who

protest their belief that the grievance process was being used as a witch hunt or was

otherwise improper were not recommended for discipline on that basis.

(e) Carrasquilla and one of her subordinate counsel in the OCDC sought

Millers agreement to a voluntary suspension of her right to practice law,

based upon the sole claim of a pleading violation brought to the attention of

the SCG, by Judge Meyer. At that time, Miller had no prior history of being

disciplined by the SGC. They compared Miller to a Caucasian attorney who

had been reprimanded, gone to presentment five times, and suspended three

times.

(f). On November 3, 2015, the SGC, acting through its bar counsel,

Bowler, filed a complaint against Miller based upon a referral by the Danbury

Local panel, finding probable cause for, inter alia, the alleged filing of false,

unmeritorious, frivolous complaints or allegations of racial discrimination that

could not be supported, in the matters of Igidi v. Connecticut Department of

Correction (a civil rights matter pending in federal district court) and Eaddy

v. Connecticut Department of Children & Families (a civil rights matter

pending in Connecticut superior court). Both the Igidi and Eaddy complaints

alleged racial discrimination claims on behalf of two of Millers clients.

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 (g) On September 11, 2017 the Danbury Local Panel found, without

hearing, probable cause for alleged improper communication by Miller with a

client and further claimed that Miller had engaged in a crime. The grievance

in question was filed by a client who paid $2,000 retainer to Miller. who

proceeded to review her termination of parental rights appeal including the

review of a fifty-seven page memorandum of decision, the drafting of a motion

for permission to file a late appeal after another attorney was found to have

allegedly filed the appeal late. Miller refused to refund the initial retainer, as

requested by the client because of the time spent on the appeal despite its

ultimate lack of success. The conclusion that Miller had engaged in a crime

under these circumstances, is in stark contrast to the failure or refusal of the

SGC or OCDC to conclude that there was criminal conduct as regards

Caucasian attorneys Anthony Lucci (paragraph 16 above); Thomas Rome

(paragraph 55 below); Laurence Parnoff who removed from his IOLTA

account some $380,000 in disputed attorney fees [Disciplinary Counsel v.

Parnoff, Docket No. FBT-CV12-6031943, SC19535; or Kathleen Nastri and

Michael Koskoff who were alleged to have taken $7,000,000 in disputed

attorney fees from their client.

35. Upon information and belief, Bowler acted in concert with Carrasquilla, other

staff members of the OCDC, and employees of the Connecticut Judicial Branch, to

interfere with Millers pursuit of racial discrimination complaints on behalf of her

clients.

36. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC singled out for investigation

only racial discrimination complaints out of all the other types of civil matters being
21
pursued by Plaintiff on behalf of clients.

37. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC singled out racial

discrimination complaints filed against agencies of the State of Connecticut for

investigation in an unlawful attempt to subvert legitimate causes of actions based

on violations of civil rights based statutory schemes

38. On August 17, 2015, Miller filed a grievance alleging that Attorney Betsy

Ingraham had orally made multiple false statements on the record before federal

court Judge Jeffrey Meyer at a June 30, 2015 oral argument.

39. Upon information and belief, Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, in its investigation sought to foreclose

Miller from responding to the answer filed on behalf of Attorney Ingraham by stating

that no response could be filed by any party.

40. Upon information and belief, Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, in their investigation sought to

inappropriately insulate Attorney Ingraham from any consequence for her false

statements.

41. Upon information and belief, Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, in their investigation sought to insulate

Attorney Ingraham from any consequence for her misconduct because she is

Caucasian.

42. On October 29, 2015, Bowler and the SGC, through its Fairfield Judicial

District Grievance Panel, found no probable cause to proceed on Millers complaint

of misconduct against Attorney Betsy Ingraham. This finding was not properly

based on the evidence presented by Miller and as such represents a part of a pattern
22
of racially discriminatory bias in favor of Caucasian attorneys who engage in

misconduct.

43. On August 17, 2015, Miller filed a grievance with Bowler and the SGC,

alleging that Assistant Attorney General Nancy Brouilett had made multiple false

statements in written pleadings in the matter of Gilbert v. Connecticut Department

of Correction.

44. On September 2, 2015, Bowler and the SGC unjustifiably refused to even

process or investigate the grievance filed by Miller against Attorney Brouilett.

45. On September 2, 2015, Miller insisted that the grievance complaint and all

supporting documents be processed.

46. On December 16, 2015, Bowler and the SGC, through its Hartford Judicial

Grievance Panel, unjustifiably found no probable cause to proceed on Millers

complaint of misconduct against Attorney Brouilett. This finding was not properly

based on the evidence presented by Miller and as such represents a part of a pattern

of racially discriminatory bias in favor of Caucasian attorneys who engage in

misconduct.

47. Upon information and belief, Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, in their investigation sought to insulate

Attorney Brouilett from any consequence for her false and misleading pleadings.

48. Upon information and belief, Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, in their investigation sought to insulate

Attorney Brouilett from any consequence for her misconduct because she is

Caucasian.

49. Bowler and the SGC have engaged in a pattern of applying Connecticuts
23
attorney discipline rules and regulations during their investigations in a manner that

discriminates against African-American attorneys, who are held to a very high

standard of adhering to the rules and regulation, while unjustifiably insulating

Caucasian attorneys from adhering to the same high standard, particularly when the

source of the grievance is an African-American person, such as Miller.

(a) Bowler and Carrasquilla refused to consider the claims of misconduct

that Miller has made, when the misconduct is on the part of Caucasian attorneys.

By way of example:

1. Attorney Joseph Jordano is a Caucasian, male, Assistant

Attorney General, who at the time was, inter alia, assigned to provide

advice and counsel to the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights

& Opportunities (hereafter referred to as CHRO). Jordano was

assigned to defend a civil rights (employment related) lawsuit filed by

Femi Bogle-Assegai, against her former employer, CHRO in federal

district court (Docket no. 3:08CV564 (VLB). Jordano made false

claims, at the district court level, that the work-sharing agreement

between CHRO and EEOC had expired at the time Bogle-Assegai

dual filed her employment discrimination complaint with the CHRO

and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

(Without a work sharing agreement in place, any complainant filing a

complaint, cannot rely upon CHRO to automatically file the complaint

with the EEOC or prosecute the complaint based on federal law. The

complainant would have to take separate, affirmative steps on her

own, to preserve her federal claims with the EEOC.) Based on

24
Jordanos claim, Bogle-Assegais case was dismissed on statute of

limitations grounds. By virtue of a subsequent Freedom of Information

request, Miller discovered that Jordanos claims were false (i.e. that

during the time period when it had been alleged that the work sharing

agreement had expired, CHRO continued to accept and process

complaints and forward them to the EEOC with the specific notation

that they were doing so pursuant to the work sharing agreement.)

Miller unsuccessfully attempted to alert the court of Jordanos false

statements. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals would not allow the

record to be perfected and Jordano was never held accountable.

Jordano continued to rely on his false statements, when he offered

them again in response to Bogle-Assegais petition for writ of certiorari

before the United States Supreme Court (which was ultimately

unsuccessful.) Following the denial of her petition for certiorari to the

Supreme Court, Bogle-Assegai filed a second lawsuit in federal district

court. The court dismissed the matter, less than sixty (60) after the

complaint was filed and before any responsive pleading was filed.

This second time around, the trial court was not concerned or

impressed by Bogle-Assegais claims (now pled in her complaint) that

Jordano had repeatedly submitted false information and summarily

dismissed the matter, immediately following a telephone status

conference. The district courts decision to dismiss was appealed to

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which was likewise unimpressed

with the record which now clearly established Jordanos clearly false
25
statements. Countless other discrimination complaints, filed by other

complainants during the same period of time when Jordano claimed

there was no work sharing agreement were not similarly targeted for

dismissal. When it was brought to their attention, neither the federal

trial or appellate court judges had any concern that Jordano knowingly

made false statements. No sanctions were ordered by any of the

various judges against Jordano when irrefutable documentary

evidence was offered that Jordano repeatedly made false statements,

neither were any referrals made of him to the SGC or the OCDC.

2. On or about February 15, 2011, during the trial of a personal

injury matter, Dos Santos v. Janos in Connecticut superior court,

(Docket no. FBT-CV09-5028019), defense attorney Frederick Trotta,

(Caucasian male) introduced a computer-generated document into

evidence, which purportedly claimed that Plaintiff had been present at

a local gym on a specific date and time. Trottas purpose for the

evidence was to challenge Plaintiffs claims concerning the veracity

and/or extent of his injuries. The evidence was clearly false because

at the exact date and time of the alleged trip to the gym occurred when

Miller and her client/Plaintiff, as well as Trotta and his client/Defendant,

were all present in the courthouse for jury selection. Notwithstanding

being confronted in open court, defense counsel never retracted the

false document or the testimonial evidence given in support of it. A

Plaintiffs verdict was entered. The trial court did not issue sanctions

against Trotta for this clearly false presentation of evidence, and no

26
referral was made to the SGC or OCDC.

3. On or about December 2013, during the course of an

educational neglect case pending in the superior court for juvenile

matters in , In Re Hodge, it was learned that Frank Johnson,

(Caucasian male), defense counsel for Respondent/Mother, Tiara

Harrison, never notified Harrison that a default judgment had entered

against her. Harrison had been defaulted for failing to make a

scheduled court appearance even though Harrison was actually

present on the day and time in question. Harrison was waiting in the

court hallway, but Harrisons counsel had not informed her to come

into the courtroom. It was only after Miller assumed representation of

Harrison in lieu of the prior attorney that Harrison became aware of the

default. A motion was then filed seeking to vacate the default on the

ground that Harrison had not been properly represented by her prior

counsel. The Assistant Attorney General assigned to the case

approached Miller, to try to convince Miller to drop the claim that

Harrisons rights had been violated by her prior attorney. While the

court vacated the default, there was no sanction issued against Frank

Johnson, nor did the court make a referral to the SGC, or OCDC for

investigation or subsequent discipline.

4. On or about October 2012, Thomas Cotter, (Caucasian male)

made multiple false representations, both in open court and in

chambers in the matter of Cimmino v. Marcoccia, et al., a Connecticut

superior court matter, with Docket no. FBT-CV09-5022351, that his

27
client/Defendant, Maria Marcoccia had previously pled guilty to certain

criminal charges pursuant to the Alford doctrine. These prior criminal

charges and the disposition of the criminal matter impacted the (then)

current civil action (Cimmino v. Marcoccia). Cotter persisted in this

claim for approximately eight (8) days. Miller insisted that Cotter

produce written proof of his claim because Miller had possession of

copies of court records that contradicted Cotters claims. Attorney

Cotter knew that his assertion was false and ultimately was required

to abandon his claim, notwithstanding the fact that he repeatedly made

false representations to the court over a period of eight (8) days. The

trial never issued sanctions against Cotter, nor was Cotter ever

referred to the SCG or OCDC Counsel for investigation or subsequent

discipline.

5. Attorney Maureen Duggan, (Caucasian female) formerly

employed by the State Ethics Commission, admitted to constructing a

false claim of sexual harassment against Alan Plofsky, the (former)

Executive Director of the Office of State Ethics, for the purpose of

subjecting Plofsky to investigation. Duggan labelled the 2004

complaint letter as being drafted by an anonimus (an intentional

misspelling) person employed as a parking lot attendant. The

Executive Director was terminated from his employment and it cost the

State of Connecticut tens of thousands of dollars to investigate the

matter, before the falsity of Duggans complaint and Duggans identity

as the complainant were discovered. This costs of the investigation

28
were in addition to the back wages and/or other costs required to settle

Plofskys wrongful termination claim, as the decision to terminate him

was eventually overturned. Duggans discipline merely consisted of a

$1,000 fine to the agency, a reprimand, and the requirement that she

take a nine (9) hour ethics course over a three (3) year period.

Duggans status as a state employee remained unscathed as she was

eventually transferred from the State Ethics Commission to the

Department of Children and Families where she remains employed to

this day.

6. While Miller was under investigation, as the result of a

grievance complaint where Miller was charged with making a false

statement in a federal pleading (a complaint.) Miller made a direct

inquiry to First Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel Suzanne Sutton,

(Caucasian female) on May 31, 2015, for any documentation being

relied upon to support the complaint. In response to Millers inquiry,

Sutton told Miller that there was no other documentation, which the

OCDC had possession of, which was relied upon in pursuing the

grievance. Millers request was specific, as she sought access to any

communications in which she, (Miller), was discussed. This request

was broader discovery than simply asking for copies of what was in

the OCDCs file. Sutton categorically denied having any other

documentation. However, on June 22, 2015, Sutton forwarded a

memo to Bowler, containing some six (6) inches of documents, which

consisted of an alleged disciplinary referral, made on April 9, 2015, by

29
Connecticut superior court Judge Barbara Bellis. This six (6) inch

stack of documents was purportedly produced for the purpose of

determining whether Miller should be referred to a local grievance

panel for investigation. Either Sutton falsely notified Miller, regarding

Millers May 31st documentary request, that there were no documents

or the allegation that Judge Bellis made a referral on April 9 th is false.

Either way, there were false representations, made during the course

of an OCDC investigation matter, which were deliberately misleading

to Miller. The request for discovery regarding a disciplinary matter,

which is proceeding to the hearing stage, is vitally important to

preparing a defense of the charges. Sutton knowingly made a false

statement of fact, no less serious than the alleged false statement

claimed to have been made by Miller. Upon information and belief,

Sutton was never investigated sanctioned for her misconduct.

7. In the federal civil rights matter, Bryant v. Meriden, Docket no.

3:13CV449 (SRU), Attorney James Tallberg (Caucasian male), who

represented the Defendant, disclosed two expert witnesses and an

expert report on the last day discovery was due, August 29, 2014.

Miller filed a response on behalf of her client/Plaintiff by way of a

motion to preclude the experts testimony. Tallberg initially contended

that he had discovered the expert reports within the week preceding

his filing Defendants disclosure. However, upon further discovery, it

was learned that the expert report, containing the two experts names,

had been in his clients possession since June 19, 2013, more than
30
year earlier. Tallberg, was on notice of Plaintiffs discovery requests

regarding any such expert reports since a December 16, 2013

discovery request. The information was in the possession of

Tallbergs clients for more than a year prior to their disclosure on the

last day of discovery. On January 28, 2015 Attorney Tallberg

admitted that they had the expert report since a month prior to the

disclosure. Even this belated admission was belied by the evidence

that the document was in defendants possession for a year prior to its

disclosure. Miller filed a motion to preclude expert testimony and

report and for sanctions. Miller was required to file a second motion,

(after a two month delay) regarding the late disclosure before receiving

any response from the court. Attorney Tallberg was never sanctioned,

never reprimanded and never referred to the OCDC or SGC for

investigation or discipline.

8. In the matter of Coble v. City of Bridgeport (Civil Action No.

3:13cv1538 (MPS) Attorney John Bohannon (Caucasian male) made

repeated representations to Miller, and to the court regarding his ability

to secure documents responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests. He

represented that the discovery responses were voluminous, had to be

sent out for copying, and that the documents would need to be

delivered to Millers office. However email communications showed

that as early as February 2015 Attorney Bohannon had represented

that the documents had already been copied so that there should have

been no reason to delay their production to Plaintiff. Attorney

31
 Bohannon was never sanctioned, never referred for investigation by

OCDC or SGC.

(b) Connecticut Practice Book Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional

Misconduct states that (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has

committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a

substantial question as to that lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as

a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

(c) By failing and refusing to investigate the matters of Caucasian

attorneys misconduct made known to them by Miller, Bowler and Carrasquilla have

repeatedly violated the very rules of attorney discipline they are employed to uphold.

50. On November 3, 2015 Bowler and the SGC filed a complaint against Miller

based, inter alia, upon a referral by Judge Barbara Bellis which claimed that she had

engaged in misconduct.

(a) Connecticut Practice Book Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional

Misconduct states that (b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a

violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial

question as to the judges fitness for office shall inform the appropriate

authority.

(b) By failing and refusing to investigate referrals made by judicial

authorities when they knew or should have known that such referrals were

biased, harassing or otherwise brought for improper purposes, Bowler and

Carrasquilla violated the spirit if not the letter of Rule 8.3 which contemplates

that judicial conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

. (c) The referral by Judge Bellis included a claim that Miller had refused to
32
make a client available for a deposition and misuse of a case flow request in

the matter of Mazzo v. Town of Fairfield (Connecticut Superior Court) (Docket

No. CV12-6031781)

(d) The referral by Judge Bellis contended that Miller had waited until day

119 before filing a motion to open judgment in a case when the Practice Book

rules permitted 120 days to file. Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have

known that the referred conduct was not a violation of any ethical rule yet

they permitted the matter to proceed to a local grievance panel, permitted a

probable cause hearing to be held on this claim, inter alia, before being

dismissed by a reviewing panel.

(e) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that Judge Bellis

referral of Miller came only after Miller had alleged racial disparity by the

judge in her brief before the Connecticut Supreme Court in the Writ of Error

on June 5, 2015.

(f) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that the judicial

referral came after Judge Bellis had forced Miller to leave a court-ordered

deposition of her client, that was then in progress, in a federal case (Perez-

Dickson v. Bridgeport Board of Education) in order to appear at a Superior

Court hearing on January 25, 2015; they knew or should have known that

Miller was instructed by the judge that she should report herself to the

grievance committee, presumably because she could not be in two places at

the same time; they knew or should have known that there was no ethical or

professional basis for a suggestion that Miller self-report to the grievance

committee.
33
51. Bowler, the SGC, and Carrasquilla had irrefutable documentary evidence that

the attorney implicated in the documents used in support of Judge Bellis referral for

the matters stated in paragraph 50 above was not Miller, but rather another attorney

(Caucasian male) involved in the same matter.

52. Despite Bowler and Carrasquillas knowledge that the referral on these

matters was based upon false evidence (i.e. implicated another Caucasian male),

they nevertheless continued with the investigation of the matter against Miller and

the local grievance panel found probable cause to discipline Miller.

53. Upon information and belief, Bowler nor Carrasquilla have taken any action

to discipline the Caucasian attorney who was perpetrator of the misconduct referred

to by Judge Bellis.

54. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC, acting through its Hartford

Judicial District Grievance Panel, refused to find probable cause when a grievance

was filed against Attorney Thomas Rome, a Caucasian male attorney who engaged

in serious misconduct of a financial nature.

55. A grievance was filed against Attorney Rome by one of Millers clients,

Isabella Mensah, after Rome removed $29,000.00 from a joint account owned by

Mensah and her ex-husband. The Appellate Court ordered Rome to hold the

$29,000.00 in his (Romes) escrow account were misappropriated. Rome

represented Mensahs husband in a dissolution matter. The Appellate Court had

further ordered that Rome maintain the $29,000.00 with interest for the benefit of

Mensah and her husband. Upon demand, Rome refused to provide an accounting

for the funds despite the Appellate Court order to return such funds with interest to

the Mensahs account

34
56. Upon information and belief, Attorney Rome was not required by Bowler, the

SGC or its agent or Carrasquilla, the Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel to

provide the client with any evidence that the funds were held by Attorney Rome.

57. Upon information and belief Bowler and members of the SGC, through its

Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Rome from

any consequence for his misconduct because he is Caucasian.

58. Carrasquilla, and Bowler have refused to investigate complaints of

misconduct by multiple other Caucasian attorneys who Miller has brought to their

attention in complance with Practice Book Rule 8.3.

59. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC, acting in concert with the

OCDC and others within the Connecticut Judicial Branch, have found probable

cause and pursued disciplinary proceedings against Miller when Caucasian

attorneys have not been disciplined or referred for discipline when they engaged in

very serious misconduct. By doing so they have engaged in racial discrimination.

60. By finding probable cause, and pursuing disciplinary proceedings against

Miller when Caucasian attorneys have not been so disciplined, Bowler and

Carrasquilla have interfered with Millers right to make a claim of racial

discrimination, utilizing the federal district courts, and 42 U. S. C. 1983.

61. On December 1, 2016, Carrasquilla and Bowler caused a hearing to be held

regarding allegations of professional misconduct that had been raised by members

of the Connecticut Judicial Branch.

62. On June 23, 2017, the reviewing panel issued a decision that ordered a

presentment be commenced against Miller.

63. The memorandum of decision made specific reference to evidence that had
35
never been made a part of the record during the probable cause hearing.

64. Specifically, the reviewing panel had access to, and considered a purported

transcript of a court hearing that was claimed to have taken place on April 10, 2015

in which a superior court judge purported to reprimand Plaintiff and advise the

conditions under which the case would be dismissed.

65. Connecticut Practice Book 2-35 (i). The reviewing committees record in

the case shall consist of a copy of all evidence it received or considered, including

a transcript of any evidence heard by it, and its decision.

66. The reviewing panel violated Practice Book 2-35 (i) when it examined,

reviewed, considered and relied upon evidence outside the record.

67. The transcript relied upon the by the reviewing panel has never been made

a part of the official record of the underlying superior court matter, Stone v.

Bridgeport BOE, Docket no. CV13-6032345.

68. Miller was never advised at any time by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that

the transcript was existent, or that it would be reviewed or considered by the

reviewing panel.

69. Miller was never advised at any time by the SGCs Bar Counsel that the

transcript was existent, or that it would be reviewed or considered by the reviewing

panel.

70. Miller was never advised in pre-hearing Rule 7 Disclosures of any transcript.

71. Miller had specifically obtained access to all files maintained on the SGC prior

to the December 1, 2016, probable cause hearing. Access had been obtained by a

review of the files at the offices of SGC in East Hartford.

72. In its decision, the reviewing panel specifically referred to aggravating

36
factors which included the fact that [Plaintiff} has been suspended before the

Appellate Court and has failed to complete the ordered conditions and apply for

reinstatement.

73. One basis for the probable cause hearing was a referral on December 9,

2014, by the Connecticut Appellate Court.

74. Part of the December 9, 2014 Order of the Appellate Court was that, after a

six (6) month period of suspension, Miller would be required to seek re-admission

to the Appellate Court and set forth conditions for such re-admission.

75. The reviewing panel found in its decision that Millers refusal to apply for re-

admission to practice before the Appellate Court was misconduct.

76. However, any information regarding whether Miller has applied for

reinstatement of practice before the Appellate Court is nowhere to be found in the

record of the December 1, 2016 hearing.

77. An examination of the judicial website, with regard to the cases that resulted

in the Appellate Court referral, will demonstrate that there is no evidence of the

alleged refusal of Miller to seek reinstatement.

78. On or about June 19, 2017, Miller had a discussion with Chief Disciplinary

Counsel regarding her choice not to seek reinstatement at this time to practice

before the Connecticut Appellate Court.

79. Miller specifically stated her belief that the Connecticut Appellate Court was

not amenable to her reinstatement because they wished to see her come in with her

head bowed and feet shuffling.

80. Carrasquilla is the only person with contact with the SGC with whom Miller

has communicated regarding her beliefs about reinstatement to practice before the
37
Appellate Court.

81. Upon information and belief, Millers refusal to seek reinstatement was

communicated to the reviewing panel by Carrasquilla.

82. As the prosecuting authority in the attorney discipline process, there should

be no ex parte communications with members of the reviewing panel.

83. Any evidence obtained by the reviewing committee regarding whether Miller

has failed to apply for reinstatement was extra-judicial, outside the record, and

should not have been considered by the panel.

84. Miller was not required to apply for reinstatement if she chose not to; many

lawyers who are licensed to practice in Connecticut do not perform any appellate

work.

85. If it was prejudicial to the administration of justice for Miller to have conducted

herself in a manner that caused the Connecticut Appellate Court to suspend her, it

should be likewise prejudicial to the administration of justice for Miller to seek

reinstatement.

86. Upon information and belief, the reviewing panel has engaged, along with

other disciplinary authorities, in efforts to find any basis, no matter how spurious, to

reach unjustifiably negative conclusions regarding Miller.

87. Although attorney disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, there are

elements of criminal and civil law in such proceedings.

89. A criminal defendant cannot be compelled to testify against herself. If a

criminal defendant does choose to testify, she cannot be compelled to admit guilt.

Likewise, an attorney may not be required to admit guilt.

90. By its conclusion in the memorandum of decision that Miller did not
38
acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, the reviewing panel has imposed

an unconstitutional requirement upon her.

91. In its memorandum of decision, the reviewing panel refused to address

Millers claim of racial discrimination and retaliation.

92. Miller specifically sought to introduce evidence of racial disparity in the

attorney discipline process at the time of the December 1, 2016, probable cause

hearing.

93. Miller had subpoenaed two staff counsel for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel

who were involved in the investigation of claims against her and other attorneys who

were similarly situated to her.

94. The reviewing panel vacated the subpoenas and instructed the two attorneys

that they could leave the hearing without allowing Miller to examine the witnesses

to establish her race discrimination claim on the record.

95. Miller was not permitted by the reviewing panel to elicit testimony that would

have established the racial disparity in attorney discipline.

96. Miller was not permitted to call client witnesses that were prepared to testify

in support of her.

97. On or about January 2017, one of Millers clients contacted the Hartford

superior court for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the status of her

case.

98. The client did not ask for any information regarding the status of Millers

license to practice law.

99. However, the superior court clerk who assisted Millers client, instructed her

(the client) that she should file a grievance against Miller because Miller was
39
suspended and about to be disbarred.

100. The superior court clerk then instructed Millers client that she should file a

grievance against Miller, and provided her with the telephone number for the SGC.

101. Millers client then communicated by telephone with the SGC, advising them

as she had been instructed by the superior court clerk. A staff member of the SGC

likewise informed Millers client that Miller was suspended and that she was about

to be disbarred.

102. A staff member of the grievance committee also informed Millers client that

she could file a complaint with the Client Security Fund and that she could definitely

receive a repayment of the $2,000 retainer that had been paid to Miller.

103. The staff member of the SGC with whom Millers client spoke repeatedly

stated that she should hurry up and file a grievance before Miller was disbarred so

that she would more likely receive a repayment of her money. Millers client was

urged to move quickly to file the grievance and seek return of her retainer payment,

even though there was not one shred of evidence of wrongdoing on Millers part in

handling her clients legal matter, nor was there any reason to believe that Miller had

not earned the money paid by the client to Miller.

104. The following day, Millers client went to the SGC office and met with two (2)

staff members. To the client, they appeared to be very welcoming and very happy

to see that she had come in to file a grievance against Miller. They supplied her

with forms and assisted her with completing and copying the grievance complaint

and client security fund complaint against Miller.

105. Although no probable cause was found as regards the essence of the clients

complaint, Miller was found not to have executed a retainer agreement in a timely
40
manner with the client.

106. On or about December 1, 2014, Miller raised the claim that she was subjected

to racial discrimination in the attorney discipline process during a hearing on an

Order to Show Cause held before an en banc Connecticut Appellate Court.

107. The Connecticut Appellate Court did not address in any way the claim of

racial discrimination in their decision and order dated December 9, 2014.

108. Miller filed a timely writ of error with the Connecticut Supreme Court

concerning the unjustifiable and racial discriminatory discipline that had been meted

out to her by the Connecticut Appellate Court.

109. On or about November 13, 2015, Miller again raised the issue of racial

discrimination in the context of her writ of error to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

110. On April 5, 2016, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued a decision in the

matter of Millers writ of error.

111. While the decision acknowledged that Miller had alleged race discrimination,

the Supreme Court refused to make any finding one way or the other, with regard to

the claim of race discrimination.

112. In its decision regarding the writ of error, the Supreme Court sought to provide

justification for the acts of discriminatory investigation by disciplinary authorities of

Miller at the request of the Connecticut Appellate Court.

113. The Order of the Connecticut Appellate Court that referred Miller for further

investigation by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel made no mention of investigation

of any of Millers cases other than the four cases that were then on appeal.

(a) The decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court to issue an Order to

Show Cause Hearing appears to have been unprecedented in that no other

41
 instance was found of an en banc hearing on an attorney discipline matter

particularly where the alleged misconduct involved

(1) a claim that Miller had failed to file a hearing transcript when the

transcript had in fact been filed five months earlier but under a different docket

number of the same case;

(2) a claim that Miller had not properly filed an electronic notice of

certification in a matter in a newly installed e-filing system;

(3) a claim that an appellants brief was not timely filed (after Miller

learned that the multi-day trial transcript was incomplete ); and

(4) a claim that Miller filed a frivolous appeal (when the underlying

issue involved a dismissal of her clients case when a trial court judge

had dismissed a case during the pendency of a hearing in the matter

before the assigned judge.[The case has now been removed from the

judicial website]

(b) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that these

matters did not rise to the level of misconduct or a violation of any ethical

rules, notwithstanding the referral by judicial authorities; they knew or should

have known that Caucasian attorneys were not being referred for

investigation and or discipline for even more egregious litigation related

conduct at the appellate court level; they knew or should have known that a

referral on such bases was for the purpose of creating a paper trail of alleged

misconduct by Miller.

(c ) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known of cases such as

Jackson v. Jackson [AC 38858] where appellant was (1) permitted to continue
42
his appeal even though he was almost five months late in filing in the appellate

court, (2) did not file the appropriate pleadings even after filing in the appellate

court, (3) failed to ever order the trial transcript despite the fact that there was a

full day evidentiary hearing, (4) was given an extension of time within which to

file his brief, (5) issued a rule nisi to file his brief but still failed to file; (6) the

case was not dismissed until some two months after the passage of the rule nisi

order date.

(d) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that the Appellate

Court records are replete with examples of Caucasian attorneys who

engaged in far more serious procedural missteps than those alleged against

Miller but who were not suspended from practice before the court.

114. The Connecticut Supreme Court added language to the Order that gave post

hoc justification for the investigation by Sutton and Carrasquilla of any and all of

Millers cases.

115. The Connecticut Supreme Court violated its own rules of construction

regarding the Appellate Court order, broadening the scope of what the order

permitted and allowing a sweeping and wholesale investigation of Millers cases,

when the original order had referred only to the four matters on appeal before the

Appellate Court.

116. At the December 1, 2016, probable cause hearing, Carrasquilla and the

reviewing panel permitted evidence of the SGC investigation of Millers federal court

cases despite the fact that no federal court cases were inquired about at the

December 6, 2014 Show Cause hearing before the Appellate Court, and despite the

fact that the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in the writ of error never
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mentioned federal court cases.

(a) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that the Connecticut

Supreme Court, according to one of the justices, in LaPointe v. Commissioner

of Correction (Conn 2016) has said the majority begins with the conviction that

the petitioner is innocent, and only constructs its analysis after it has arrived at that

conclusion, ; if a finding is problematic, simply pretend it is not there.;

the majority should not even try to convince itself that the reader will be

fooled by its shell game.; decision could be viewed as illustrating

precisely the type of subtle [distortion] of prejudice and bias of which Rawls

warned, thus giving rise to a risk of the appearance of impropriety.

117. Joseph Elder is an African-American attorney who has been licensed to

practice in Connecticut for thirty-three (33) years.

118. On July 4, 2016 Miller filed a motion for permission to file an amicus curiae

brief in the matter of Disciplinary Counsel v. Joseph Elder, SC 19698, in which Miller

addressed the disparity in attorney discipline based upon race and other prohibited

factors. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the motion to appear as an amicus

however, the full brief and the assertions therein were filed with the court attached

to the motion so that the court was fully aware of its content.

119. Elder was referred for presentment regarding a grievance matter with

underlying events that were some eleven (11) years old, despite the fact that the

attorney discipline rules contain a six (6) year statute of limitations for filing grievance

complaints. The SGCs decision to discipline Elder was based on an unusually

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harsh standard and interpretation of law which was uniquely applied to Elder.

120. At the conclusion of the underlying presentment hearing, Elder was ordered

to be suspended from practice for a one year period of time.

122. Elder sought, but was denied, a stay of execution of the one year suspension

while he appealed the disciplinary order to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

123. Elder was suspended for a period from September 1, 2015 through May 2,

2017 by the time the Supreme Court reversed the decision below, during which time

he had been effectively been unable to practice his profession.

124. Caucasian attorneys have been permitted a stay of execution of their

suspensions while the discipline was being appealed.

125. Caucasian attorney Kristen Peters-Hamlin, who has engaged in particularly

egregious misconduct, was ordered to be suspended for seven (7) years by the New

York State and Federal Court, and was disbarred in the State of Maryland. However,

the State of Connecticut has withheld prohibiting her from practicing law in both state

and federal court, instead opting to impose a retroactive suspension. Even when

reciprocal discipline was sought by the OCDC,

126. The misconduct that led to Peters-Hamlins suspension included the fact that

she:

while serving as lead counsel for a plaintiff in a trade secrets infringement

suit in New York, instructed a first-year associate to mark-up deposition
transcripts and claim them as attorney work product; knowingly made false
statements to mislead the court as to these events; and made copies and
ordered additional copies of deposition transcripts for use in another matter,
in contravention of court confidentiality orders. engaged in conduct
involving repeated intentional dishonesty, misrepresentations, and deceit.
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Misc.
Docket AG No. 30, September Term, 2015. Opinion by Hotten, M.

127. Peters-Hamlin has never been suspended by the Connecticut courts, nor has
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she ever been reprimanded, nor lost a single day of legal practice. Unlike Elder,

she has never been required by the Connecticut disciplinary authorities to serve an

actual suspension of her ability to practice law in Connecticut during the time period

that her seven years of appeal was being pursued.

128. Caucasian attorney Robert Serafinowicz was suspended from the practice of

law for four months because he gave an interview to the media on the steps of the

Derby courthouse in which he made false statements disparaging a judge by

questioning his abilities, competency and impartiality in violation of Rules 8.2(a) and

8.4(4). (Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafinowicz,, Docket no. UWY-CV-13-6018974,

Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury, aff'd, 160 Conn. App. 92 (2015).

129. Serafinowicz was permitted a stay of execution of the four (4) month

suspension during the time of his appeal.

130. Like Plaintiffs Johnson and Miller, Elder raised the issue of racial disparity of

treatment in his defense of the suspension meted out against him.

131. The Connecticut Supreme Court refused to acknowledge or respond to

Elders complaint of racial discrimination when it issued the decision in his case on

May 2, 2017.

COUNT ONE: PURSUANT TO THE U. S. CONSITUTION, FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (As to Carrasquilla, Bowler)

1. 131. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 131 are incorporated herein b y

reference and made paragraphs 1 through 132 of this Count One.

132. The acts of defendants alleged in paragraphs 5 131 violate Johnson and

Millers rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U. S. Constitution, in one or more of the following ways;

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 (a) Refusing to allow the calling of witnesses chosen by them in support

of their defenses at the time of probable cause hearings;

(b) Vacating subpoenas lawfully issued to witnesses that would have

supported the defense at probable cause hearings

(c ) Refusing to permit access to all records, documents or other materials

to which the reviewing panel has access at the time of probable cause hearings;

(d) Claiming attorney client privilege, work product privilege or other

privileges in avoidance of providing full access to records, documents or

other material to which the reviewing panel has access at the

time of probable cause hearings;

(e) Bringing multiple prosecutions of probable cause hearings instead of

consolidation of complaint;

(f) Refusal to require the presence of witnesses for purposes of cross-

examination.

133. Application of the state statutes regarding attorney regulation, as applied to

Johnson and Miller under the circumstances alleged herein, is unconstitutional.

134. Johnson and Miller have been and will be damaged thereby.

COUNT TWO: PURSUANT TO THE U. S. CONSITUTION, FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (As to Carrasquilla, Bowler)

1. 131. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 131 are incorporated herein by

reference and made paragraphs 1 through 131 of this Count Two.

132. The acts of defendants alleged in paragraphs 5 131 violate Johnson

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and Millers rights under the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U. S. Constitution to be free of racial discrimination, in one or

more of the following ways:

(a) Investigation of African-American attorneys under circumstances

where similarly situated Caucasian attorneys were not investigated;

(b) Investigating African-American attorneys at the insistence of judicial

authorities under circumstances when they knew or should have known that

those judicial complaints were made for the purpose of subject the African

American attorneys to adverse racial bias, harassment, interference with

African American practitioners who are dedicated to advancing the progress

of civil rights litigation and other legally and ethically unwarranted and

undesirable reasons.

(c) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known of the propensity

of Connecticut court system authorities to engage in a shadow process such

as that found disturbing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia v.

Hebert, 352 F.Appx 602, 603 (2d Cir, 2009). ln this Connecticut case, the

Defendant was arraigned at the Connecticut superior court in Bantam,

Connecticut. A not guilty plea was entered on his behalf even though neither

the Defendant or his attorney were present in court. It was discovered that

court records were generated, falsely indicating that the Defendant had

personally appeared on the day in question and was instructed to appear at

a subsequent hearing, The Connecticut Attorney General was ordered to

provide the court with a detailed report discussing what steps had been taken

to ensure that constitutionally sound practices would be adhered to in the

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 future..

133. Application of the state statutes regarding attorney regulation, as applied to

Johnson and Miller under the circumstances alleged herein, is unconstitutional.

134. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the conduct of which

Johnson and Miller complain.

135. Johnson and Miller have been and will continue to be damaged thereby.

COUNT THREE: PURSUANT TO 42 U. S. C. 1983. (As Carrasquilla and

Bowler)

1. 131. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 131 are incorporated herein by

reference and made paragraphs 1 through 131 of this Count Three.

132. By, inter alia, finding professional misconduct in the circumstances as

alleged herein, Carrasquilla and Bowler have interfered with Johnson and Millers

rights under 42 U. S. C. 1983, to make a claim of racial discrimination, utilizing

the federal district courts.

133. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the constitutional and

statutory violations against Johnson and Miller and are not entitled to qualified

immunity.

134. Johnson and Millers rights under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U. S.

C. 1983 are well established.

135. Johnson and Miller have been and will continue to be damaged thereby.

COUNT FOUR: PURSUANT TO 42 U. S. C. 1983. (As to Bowler and

Carrasquilla)

1. 131. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through131 are incorporated herein by

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reference and made paragraphs 1 through 131 of this Count Four.

132. Upon information and belief, Carrasquilla and Bowler have acted in concert

with each other in the investigation of and presentation of grievances against Miller

and Johnson that will result in further grievance hearings.

133. By, inter alia, finding professional misconduct in the bringing of claims of

racial discrimination against Johnson and Miller, Carrasquilla and Bowler have

maintained a policy and practice of interfering with the rights of African-American

attorneys under 42 U. S. C. 1983, to make claims of racial discrimination.

134. By the acts and conduct alleged in paragraphs 5 through 131 the defendants

have engaged in a continuous practice and policy of racially discriminatory

enforcement of its attorney discipline processes, beginning at least since January

2002 and continuing through the present.

135. The discriminatory acts and conduct alleged in paragraphs 5 through 131

against African-American attorneys such as Johnson and Miller, have remained un-

remedied for so long as to amount to a racially discriminatory policy and practice.

136. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the constitutional and

statutory violations against Plaintiffs and are not entitled to qualified immunity.

135. Johnson and Millers rights under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U. S.

C. 1983 are well established.

136. Johnson and Miller have been and will continue to be damaged thereby.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendants and each of

them, as follows:

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1. Declaratory relief;

2. Compensatory damages;

3. Costs of suit herein incurred;

4. Attorneys Fees; and

5. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

THE PLAINTIFFS
BY: _/s/Josephine S. Miller
Josephine S. Miller, # ct27039
152 Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302
Danbury, CT 06810
Tel: (203) 512-2795
Fax: (203) 702-5188
Email: jmillerlaw@sbcglobal.net

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