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511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
David Nelson STANDEFER, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appel-
lant.
No. 73-1001.
April 14, 1975.
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1975.
Action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act based on Veterans Administration hospital's al-
leged negligent treatment of patient who was
rendered quadriplegic. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, at Hous-
ton, John V. Singleton, Jr., J., rendered judgment
for plaintiff, and the United States appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held that
evidence as to neurosurgeon's failure to warn X-ray
technician or to be present to make sure that pa-
tient's head and neck were carefully handled, in
light of suspected injury to cervical spine, was suf-
ficient to support finding of negligence which prox-
imately caused sudden onset of quadriplegia during
X-ray procedure; that trial court's active participa-
tion in trial did not result in prejudice requiring re-
versal; that there was no error in using standard
mortality tables without adjustment to take account
of impact of disability on plaintiff's life-span; but
that trial court erred in allowing an inflationary
factor to be used in computing damages for future
medical expenses and loss of future earnings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Federal Courts 170B 759.1
170B Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
170BVIII(K)1 In General
170Bk759 Theory and Grounds of De-
cision of Lower Court
170Bk759.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk759, 106k406.1(8))
Even if the only claim of negligence which was
properly before the trial court in action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act was conduct referred to in
administrative claim before the Veterans Adminis-
tration, with respect to alleged negligence at VA
hospital, judgment of trial court which took into
consideration all claims of liability could be af-
firmed on basis that liability was explicitly imposed
for negligent acts “independently and in combina-
tion,” and that the allegedly negligent treatment re-
ferred to in the VA claim was sufficient in itself to
support judgment. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671 et seq.,
2675(a).
[2] Federal Courts 170B 759.1
170B Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
170BVIII(K)1 In General
170Bk759 Theory and Grounds of De-
cision of Lower Court
170Bk759.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 170Bk759, 106k406.1(8))
Decision of trial court finding liability on part of
defendant must be affirmed if there is any theory on
which liability can properly be predicated.
[3] Federal Courts 170B 761
170B Federal Courts
170BVIII Courts of Appeals
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
170BVIII(K)1 In General
170Bk759 Theory and Grounds of De-
cision of Lower Court
170Bk761 k. Reasons for Decision.
 Page 2
511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)

Most Cited Cases and neck were carefully handled was sufficient to
If a decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, support finding of negligence which was proximate
though the lower court relied on a wrong ground or cause of sudden onset of quadriplegia during X-ray
gave a wrong reason. procedure. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 et seq.

[4] United States 393 78(3) [6] Federal Courts 170B 850.1

393 United States 170B Federal Courts

393V Liabilities 170BVIII Courts of Appeals
393k78 Torts 170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
393k78(3) k. Private Person's Liability as 170BVIII(K)5 Questions of Fact, Verdicts
Measure. Most Cited Cases and Findings
170Bk850 Clearly Erroneous Findings
United States 393 78(14) of Court or Jury in General
170Bk850.1 k. In General. Most
393 United States
Cited Cases
393V Liabilities
(Formerly 170Bk850, 106k406.3(9))
393k78 Torts
Task of Court of Appeals is not to choose between
393k78(14) k. Place of Injury and Law
conflicting theories, but to make certain that the
Governing. Most Cited Cases
theory accepted by the district court has sufficient
Liability of the United States for alleged negligent
evidentiary support and that acceptance of prevail-
treatment of patient at Veterans Administration
ing party's factual assertions was not clearly erro-
hospital turns on whether a private individual
neous. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 52, 28 U.S.C.A.
would be liable under state law. 28 U.S.C.A. §
2674. [7] Federal Civil Procedure 170A 2251

[5] Health 198H 823(12) 170A Federal Civil Procedure

170AXV Trial
198H Health
170AXV(K) Trial by Court
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of
170AXV(K)1 In General
Duty
170Ak2251 k. In General. Most Cited
198HV(G) Actions and Proceedings
Cases
198Hk815 Evidence
Where action is tried without jury, district court is
198Hk823 Weight and Sufficiency,
accorded great discretion in its role in the trial.
Particular Cases
198Hk823(12) k. Radiology, Ultra- [8] Federal Courts 170B 906
sound, and Other Medical Imaging. Most Cited
Cases 170B Federal Courts
(Formerly 204k8 Hospitals) 170BVIII Courts of Appeals
Under Texas law, evidence in Federal Tort Claims 170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent
action with respect to failure of neurosurgeon at 170BVIII(K)6 Harmless Error
Veterans Administration hospital to warn X-ray 170Bk906 k. Remarks and Conduct of
technician of need for special precautions with re- Trial Judge. Most Cited Cases
spect to patient suspected to be suffering from in- (Formerly 106k406.6(6))
jury to the cervical spine or to be present during X- In Federal Tort Claims action tried without a jury,
ray procedures to make certain that patient's head active participation of the court in the trial, primar-

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.


511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
ily with respect to in-court investigation of what ap-
peared to be an attempt to tamper with hospital re-
cords pertaining to Veterans Administration's treat-
ment of plaintiff, did not indicate prejudice requir-
ing reversal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2402.
[9] Damages 115 96
115 Damages
115VI Measure of Damages
115VI(A) Injuries to the Person
115k96 k. Discretion as to Amount of
Damages. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not abuse discretion in computing
damages based on standard mortality table without
adjustment to take into account impact of plaintiff's
disability on his life-span, in light of other variables
such as possibility that daily expense used in com-
puting cost of future medical care might be too con-
servative.
[10] United States 393 142
393 United States
393IX Actions
393k142 k. Damages. Most Cited Cases
In action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, based
on alleged negligence in the treatment of plaintiff at
Veterans Administration hospital, plaintiff was en-
titled to recover amount equal to his past medical
expenses incurred at the VA facility prior to trial,
unless the Government agreed to waive its lien pur-
suant to the Medical Care Recovery Act. 28
U.S.C.A. § 2671 et seq.; Medical Care Recovery
Act, § 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2651 et seq.
[11] Damages 115 226
115 Damages
115XI Computation and Amount
115k226 k. Computation of Amount. Most
Cited Cases
District court erred in allowing an inflationary
factor to be used in computing damages for future
medical expenses and for loss of future earnings.
*102 Anthony J. P. Farris, U.S. Atty., William L.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 3
Bowers, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for de-
fendant-appellant.
Joseph D. Jamail, John Gano, Gus Kolius, Houston,
Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.
*103 Before TUTTLE, DYER and MORGAN, Cir-
cuit Judges.
DYER, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals from an adverse judg-
ment rendered under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C.A. s 2671 et seq., based upon a Veterans
Administration Hospital's negligent treatment of a
patient, David Standefer, who was rendered quadri-
plegic. The Government raises a number of issues
concerning both the imposition of liability and the
award of damages. Although we determine that the
judgment was proper as to liability, the inclusion of
an inflationary factor in the computation of dam-
ages for future medical expenses and loss of earn-
ings necessitates a partial reversal and a remand for
recomputation of that portion of the award.
During the early morning of January 27, 1969,
Standefer was injured in an automobile accident
near Brenham, Texas, and was admitted to St.
Jude's Hospital in Brenham. The attending physi-
cians concluded that Standefer had a neurological
problem beyond their expertise, and about noon the
next day arranged to have the patient transferred to
the VA Hospital in Houston. The senior neurologic-
al resident on duty at the VA facility, Dr. Patrick,
was advised that Standefer was expected to arrive
sometime during the afternoon, so the physician left
orders with the admissions office that Standefer
was to be brought to neurosurgery upon his arrival.
Standefer arrived at the Houston hospital at approx-
imately 4:30 p.m., but he was not sent to Dr.
Patrick for examination until sometime between
7:00 and 7:30 p.m.

511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
The physical examination conducted by Dr. Patrick
indicated a neurological deficit, evidenced by a
flaccid condition of the left leg, substantial weak-
ness in the left arm, and some weakness on the right
side of the body. There is some dispute whether
Standefer was undergoing progressive paralysis
from the time of the accident, but it appears that
even during his wait in the admissions area of the
VA hospital he was able to light and smoke cigar-
ettes without assistance, drink water and carry on
normal body functions. After the examination, Dr.
Patrick was optimistic and indicated, according to
one member of Standefer's family, that the patient
would be up and around in a few weeks.
Although the attending physicians at St. Jude's in
Brenham had suspected a subdural hematoma, a
type of head injury, Dr. Patrick's examination led
him to conclude that the injury was in the cervical
spine. Upon being informed that x-rays had been
taken at St. Jude's and that the films were in the
family's possession, Dr. Patrick asked that the films
be brought to him. The trip to obtain the films took
considerably longer than Dr. Patrick anticipated,
and he was further disappointed to discover that the
x-rays contained no views of the cervical spine.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Standefer was taken
to the x-ray department. Because Standefer is a
large man, standing over six feet tall and weighing
over 200 pounds, the x-ray technician, Reeves,
asked Standefer's son-in-law, Glasgow, to assist in
the x-ray procedures. The first four films were
taken with no difficulty, except that the x-rays were
inadequate to reveal the exact location of the injury.
It is undisputed that while the first four x-rays were
being taken, Standefer was kept lying on his back,
and that his head and neck remained virtually im-
mobile. During the last two films, one arm was po-
sitioned above his body to obtain a view known as
a ‘swimmer's lateral.’ According to Reeves and Dr.
Patrick, Standefer was again so positioned for the
fifth film, but both Standefer and Glasgow main-
tained that for the last film, Reeves pulled
Standefer's right arm across his body, possibly in an
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 4
attempt, according to expert testimony, to obtain an
‘oblique’ view. Standefer felt a jerking motion ‘as
though he was going to flip me over,’ and cried out
that he was unable to move. Regardless of which
version of the events actually occurred, the out-
come was the same: Standefer left the x-ray room a
permanent quadriplegic.
*104 In November 1970, Standefer filed an admin-
istrative claim with the Veterans Administration.
The incident giving rise to the claim was described
by Standefer as follows: ‘Claimant sent to have x-
rays taken. Veterans Administration Hospital em-
ployee twisted his neck and/or body causing onset
of quadriplegia.’ After six months had passed with
no final disposition of the claim,[FN1] Standefer
filed this action alleging essentially the same basis
for the lawsuit. In August 1972, approximately
three weeks before trial, the complaint was
amended to further charge negligence in admitting
the patient to the VA hospital, in delaying the be-
ginning of treatment, and for inadequately staffing
the x-ray department. The district court, sitting
without a jury, [FN2] accepted these contentions
and determined that ‘(a)ll such acts of negligence,
independently and in combination, on the part of
the defendant, its agents and employees, proxim-
ately caused the paralysis suffered by the plaintiff.’
Based upon mortality tables showing that at the
time of trial Standefer had a life expectancy of 20.0
years, the court awarded damages for: (1) loss of
earnings, including an inflationary factor of 5.5%,
in the amount of $130,439.09; (2) future medical
expenses, based on a figure of $120 per day and in-
cluding an inflationary factor of 4.5%,
$929,238.20; (3) past medical expenses,
$47,597.90; and (4) pain and suffering, $400,000.
FN1. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2675(a).
FN2. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2402.
[1][2][3] The Government argues that no issue with
respect to liability was properly before the court
other than mistreatment vel non in the x-ray room,
since Standefer's administrative claim before the

511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
Veterans Administration referred only to the occur-
rences in the x-ray department. Even if we were to
accept this position, the judgment of the lower
court could still be affirmed on the basis that liabil-
ity was explicitly imposed on the VA for negligent
acts ‘independently and in combination.’ In fact, by
isolating the original basis of the claim, we need
not address other issues such as negligent delay in
admission and treatment, for we must affirm the de-
cision of the court below if there is any theory on
which liability can properly be predicated. As the
Ninth Circuit held when presented with a similar
situation: ‘In view of the fact that the judgment is
based on two grounds . . . the judgment must be af-
firmed if supportable on either ground.’ Hayden v.
Chalfant Press, Inc., 9 Cir. 1960, 281 F.2d 543,
547. By limiting out examination of the judgment
to the original charge of negligence-which is essen-
tially unchallenged in the appeal by the United
States-it is unnecessary for us to consider the al-
ternative theories of liability which the Government
attacks.[FN3] Thus we now focus our inquiry on
whether liability can be premised solely on the al-
legedly negligent treatment in the x-ray room.
FN3. For our disposition of the Govern-
ment's contention that the United States
cannot be held liable for the manner in
which it staffs a VA hospital see note 5, in-
fra. As for the other acts of alleged negli-
gence on which the district court relied, it
is sufficient to say that: ‘In the review of
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that
if the decision below is correct, it must be
affirmed, although the lower court relied
upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong
reason.’ Helvering v. Gowran, 1937, 302
U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed.
224. In our determination of this appeal,
we need not and do not reach the merits of
the Government's arguments that Standefer
failed either to make a prima facie case or
to introduce sufficient evidence to support
the alleged acts of negligence by the VA
prior to the incident in the x-ray room.
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5
Even if the VA was negligent in failing to
render prompt treatment to Standefer, the
determination that the x-ray room mis-
handling proximately caused the onset of
quadriplegia renders the earlier negligence
irrelevant.
[4][5][6] In examining the legal basis of the judg-
ment below we must determine whether a private
individual would be liable under state law, in this
case the law of Texas.[FN4] The requisites for es-
tablishing medical negligence were enunciated*105
by the Supreme Court of Texas as follows:
FN4. 28 U.S.C.A. s 2674. United States
v. Muniz, 1963, 374 U.S. 150, 153, 83
S.Ct. 1850, 10 L.Ed.2d 805.
It is definitely settled with us that a patient has no
cause of action against his doctor for malpractice,
either in diagnosis or recognized treatment, unless
he proves by a doctor of the same school of practice
as the defendant: (1) that the diagnosis or treatment
complained of was such as to constitute negligence
and (2) that it was a proximate cause of the patient's
injuries.
Bowles v. Bourdon, 1949, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d
779, 782. While this action is not against Dr.
Patrick personally, the underlying theory of the
lawsuit is that once the neurosurgeon was aware of
the probability of injury to the cervical spine, he
was under a duty either to warn the x-ray technician
of the need for special precautions or to be present
during the x-ray procedures to make certain that the
patient's head and neck were carefully handled.
After reviewing the expert evidence adduced by
Standefer, we are satisfied that Dr. Patrick was on
notice of the need to safeguard Standefer from any
twisting or turning which might aggravate the in-
jury. The plaintiff's expert witness further estab-
lished that an attempt to pull Standefer's arm across
his body to obtain an oblique view could have res-
ulted in the jerking motion that Standefer recalled.
If the x-ray technician did so position the patient,
and if neither he nor the neurosurgeon had taken the
required steps to immobilize the patient's neck be-

511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
fore the maneuver was attempted, the result could
have been a ‘new insult’ which proximately caused
the sudden onset of quadriplegia. [FN5] We con-
clude that Standefer carried the legal burden estab-
lished by Texas law. Although the Government,
too, presented expert evidence in support of its the-
ory that Standefer was undergoing a progressive
paralysis which suddenly culminated in quadriple-
gia during a properly conducted x-ray procedure,
our task is not to choose between conflicting theor-
ies, but to make certain that the theory accepted by
the district court has sufficient evidentiary support.
FN5. The Government's contention that the
district court erred in holding that a prox-
imate cause of Standefer's injury was inad-
equate staffing of the x-ray department
gives us little pause. The argument that
staffing is a discretionary function for
which the United States cannot be held re-
sponsible under the Federal Tort Claims
Act presents a legal issue that is undercut
by the facts of this case. The expert wit-
nesses for both sides agreed that because
of Standefer's size, a single x-ray techni-
cian would require additional help.
However, it was made clear that any
‘semiintelligent layman’ could, with prop-
er direction, provide the needed assistance.
As noted before, Standefer's son-in-law
was asked to aid in positioning the patient,
but the record leaves no doubt that Glas-
gow was called upon only to hold
Standefer in the position in which the x-ray
technician placed him, hence the question
remains whether the x-ray technician and
the neurosurgeon took the necessary steps
to protect Standefer's head and neck.
As we view this case, the outcome depends entirely
on the district court's factual resolution of what oc-
curred in the x-ray room. Because the version of
the events related by Standefer and Glasgow was
totally opposed to the version given by the x-ray
technician and the physician, the applicable stand-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 6
ard is whether the district court was clearly erro-
neous in accepting the plaintiff's factual asser-
tions. McAllister v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S.
19, 75 S.Ct. 6, 99 L.Ed. 20.
[7][8] At this juncture, it is appropriate to address
another point of alleged error raised by the Govern-
ment since it is inextricably connected with the
soundness of the district court's findings of
fact. The United States asserts that the court below
abused its discretion in the conduct of the trial by
summoning its own witnesses, launching collateral
inquiries and otherwise departing from its judicial
role by becoming an advocate for the
plaintiff. Since the action was tried without a jury,
the district court is accorded great discretion in its
role in the trial. Bowles v. Lentin, 7 Cir. 1945, 151
F.2d 615, 620, relied on by the Government to but-
tress its position, suggests *106 only that it is
‘conceivable’ that the conduct of a judge might be
so unfair as to evidence prejudice warranting re-
versal. Even this less than compelling language is
prefaced by the observation that in the absence of a
jury, a court has ‘wide latitude’ in commenting
upon the occurrences at trial, and by the caveat that
appellate courts must guard against magnification
of instances which are of little importance in their
setting. In this case, the Government complains
primarily of the in-court investigation into what ap-
peared to be an attempt to tamper with hospital re-
cords pertaining to the VA's treatment of Standefer.
Because there was so little non-testimonial evid-
ence of what actually happened in the x-ray room,
we certainly cannot fault the district court for trying
to ascertain the reliability of records which might
lend credence to one of the versions being urged by
the litigants. While the record does show that the
court actively participated in the trial, we are unper-
suaded that its expressions indicate prejudice re-
quiring reversal.
Finding no basis for the contention that the court
exceeded the bounds of judicial propriety in its con-
duct of the trial, our review is limited to determin-
ing whether the court's factual resolution of the

511 F.2d 101
(Cite as: 511 F.2d 101)
controversy fails to meet the clearly erroneous
standard. Where, as here, the outcome depends so
greatly on the evaluation of highly conflicting evid-
ence, we must give ‘due regard . . . to the opportun-
ity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.’ Rule 52, Fed.R.Civ.P. We are satisfied
that the district court was not clearly erroneous in
the resolution of the disputed facts. United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 1949, 338 U.S. 338, 70 S.Ct.
177, 94 L.Ed. 150. We affirm the district court's
imposition of liability on the United States.
[9] Turning now to the damages awarded Standefer,
we address the three specifications of error argued
by the Government. The first contention is that the
district court erred by using mortality tables with no
adjustment to take account of the impact of
Standefer's disability on his life-span. The Govern-
ment's expert evidence was to the effect that quadri-
plegia might decrease Standefer's life expectancy
by ten to fifteen percent. Although no challenge
could be made to the admissibility of mortality
tables in this case, Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 5
Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1009, 1012, the Government
argues that reliance by the district court on unadjus-
ted mortality tables was contrary to the weight of
the evidence. Tabor v. Miller, 3 Cir. 1968, 389
F.2d 645, cert. denied 391 U.S. 915, 88 S.Ct. 1810,
20 L.Ed.2d 654. In Tabor, life expectancy tables
were excluded but the court concluded that even
without them, the jury had adequate evidence to re-
solve the ‘necessarily speculative question’ of the
plaintiff's probable life-span. Id. at 647. In the case
sub judice, a judge, not a jury, was called upon to
answer this ‘necessarily speculative question,’ and
while there was evidence that Standefer's life-span
might be diminished by being a quadriplegic, the
court also had other factors to consider. For ex-
ample, the parties seemed to agree that the figure of
$120 per day for medical care was a reasonable ap-
proximation of costs which would have to be borne
over a number of years, subject, however, to the
contingency that if Standefer encountered any seri-
ous medical complications, the estimate might be
too conservative. Balancing such factors in within
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 7
the province of the district court, and we are unwill-
ing to hold that the court abused its discretion in
computing damages based on standard mortality
tables considered in conjunction with the other
variables existent in this case.
[10] The Government's second attack on the dam-
ages awarded is directed at the amount found due
for past medical expenses incurred at the VA facil-
ity prior to the time of trial. We find no basis for
overturning the decision of the district court that
unless the Government agreed to waive its lien pur-
suant to the Medical Care Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C.A. s 2651 et seq., Standefer was entitled to
recover an amount equal to his past *107 medical
expenses from the United States in this action.
[11] Finally, we reach the contention of the Gov-
ernment that the district court erred in allowing an
inflationary factor to be used in computing damages
for future medical expenses and for the loss of fu-
ture earnings. Our en banc decision in Johnson v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 5 Cir. 1974, 510 F.2d 234
(Nos. 72-2243, 71-2245, March 21, 1974, p. 4581)
establishes the correctness of the position taken by
the United States, and thus necessitates a reversal
of the judgment on these items. The district court
did not have the benefit of our final holding in Pen-
rod at the time of trial, hence we remand this case
to the court below for a recomputation of damages
for future medical expenses and loss of earnings.
Finding no other meritorious points in the appeal,
we affirm the judgment in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
C.A.Tex. 1975.
Standefer v. U.S.
511 F.2d 101
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Citing References

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

Cited
1 Martinez v. U.S., 780 F.2d 525, 528+, 54 USLW 2389, 2389+ (5th Cir.(Tex.) Jan 16, 1986) (NO.
85-2087) HN: 5 (F.2d)
2 Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 290, 1983 A.M.C. 2251, 2251 (5th Cir.(La.) Sep 22,
1982) (NO. 79-3985) HN: 11 (F.2d)
3 Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir.(Ind.) Jul 06, 1984) (NO. 83-1666, 83-1951) HN:
10 (F.2d)
4 Chernock v. U.S., 718 F.Supp. 900, 904 (N.D.Fla. Jun 14, 1989) (NO. 87-50009-RV) HN: 4
(F.2d)
5 Graci v. U.S., 435 F.Supp. 189, 195 (E.D.La. Jul 22, 1977) (NO. CIV 15962, CIV 15976, CIV
16091, CIV 66-306, CIV 67-1280) HN: 4 (F.2d)
6 Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F.Supp. 1126, 1137, 58 A.F.T.R.2d 86-5950, 86-5950, 86-2 USTC P
9677, 9677 (S.D.Tex. Aug 04, 1986) (NO. H-83-2173) HN: 10 (F.2d)

Mentioned
7 Dickens v. U.S., 545 F.2d 886, 890 (5th Cir.(Tex.) Jan 20, 1977) (NO. 74-3084) HN: 6 (F.2d)
8 Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F.Supp. 202, 212 (N.D.Cal. Dec 05, 1977) (NO. C-76-1018-CBR) HN: 4
(F.2d)
9 Simon v. U. S., 438 F.Supp. 759, 761 (S.D.Fla. Sep 14, 1977) (NO. 77-102-CIV-CA) HN: 4
(F.2d)
10 Bohn v. U.S., 724 F.Supp. 443, 446 (N.D.Tex. Oct 16, 1989) (NO. CIV A 4-87-507-E) HN: 4
(F.2d)
11 Rojas v. U.S., 660 F.Supp. 652, 656, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 17,658, 17658 (D.Puerto Rico
Apr 30, 1987) (NO. CIV. 86-149866) HN: 4 (F.2d)

Secondary Sources (U.S.A.)

12 Claims Arising from Conduct of Governmental Employee in Administering or Failing to Admin-
ister Medical Care as Within Discretionary Function Exception of Federal Tort Claims Act (28
U.S.C.A. s2680(a)), 172 A.L.R. Fed. 407 (2001) HN: 5 (F.2d)
13 Propriety of considering effect of inflation in awarding damages under Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 U.S.C.A. secs. 1346, 2671 et seq.), 38 A.L.R. Fed. 201 (1978) HN: 1,5,9,10,11 (F.2d)

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 14 Validity and construction of Medical Care Recovery Act (42 USC secs. 2651-2653), dealing with
third-party liability for hospital and medical care furnished by United States, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 289
(1971)
15 Federal Tort Claims Act: Medical malpractice cases, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 16 (1971)
16 Effect of anticipated inflation on damages for future losses--modern cases, 21 A.L.R.4th 21
(1983)
17 Federal Tort Claims s 10:1, Government medical malpractice (2010) HN: 5 (F.2d)
18 Federal Tort Claims s 2:14, Particular negligent or wrongful acts (2010)
19 Federal Tort Claims s 4:7, Inflation (2010) HN: 11 (F.2d)
20 Hospital Liability s 2.03, FEDERAL IMMUNITY (2008)
21 8 Am. Jur. Trials 635, Federal Tort Claims Act Proceedings (2010)
22 CJS Damages s 380, Computation of amount (2010)
23 INFLATION AND THE PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE ECONOMIC DAMAGES, 37 U.
Miami L. Rev. 93, 122 (1982) HN: 11 (F.2d)
24 TORTS: TAKING THE "I" OUT OF SUICIDE: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
ALARMING EXTENSION OF DUTY IN "EXCEPTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS"-SANDBORG
V. BLUE EARTH COUNTY, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1307, 1324 (2002) HN: 5 (F.2d)
25 163 BNA Daily Report for Executives H-10, 1986, TAXPAYER PRIVACY-PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES NOT ABAILABLE AGAINST U.S. IN DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER INFORMA-
TION (1986) HN: 10 (F.2d)
26 163 BNA Daily Tax Report H-14, 1986, TAXPAYER PRIVACY - PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT
AVAILABLE AGAINST U.S. IN DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION: Court re-
cognizes IRS violation of disclosure rules, denies punitive damages against United States.
(USDC STex.; Single (1986) HN: 10 (F.2d)

Court Documents

Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Appellate Briefs
27 Naomi MORGAN, Administratrix of The Estate of Clarence Moriston Morgan, Jr., Appellant, v.
George L HANBURY, Jr., W.W. Davis and Douglas W. Nicholson, Appellees., 1978 WL
221016, *221016+ (Appellate Brief) (4th Cir. Sep 15, 1978) Brief of Appellees (NO. 78-1315)
HN: 11 (F.2d)
28 ICE EMBASSY, INC. et al., Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Defendant -
Appellee., 2007 WL 4559388, *4559388+ (Appellate Brief) (5th Cir. Jul 27, 2007) Appellee's
Brief (NO. 07-20329) HN: 6 (F.2d)
29 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario ROQUE-VILLANUEVA, De-
fendant-Appellant., 1998 WL 34078342, *34078342+ (Appellate Brief) (5th Cir. Dec 28, 1998)
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee (NO. 98-40115) HN: 1,3 (F.2d)
30 Lloyd Edwin HUMPEREYS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; Bureau

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 of Prisons; Patricia Shingles, Community Corrections Manager; Doncella Milton, Director of
Community Corrections Center, Respondents-Appellees., 1997 WL 33575330, *33575330+
(Appellate Brief) (5th Cir. Nov 03, 1997) Brief for the Appellees (NO. 97-10853) HN: 3
(F.2d)
31 GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY and POTOMAC INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellants/Cross-Appellee, v. EMPLOYERS NATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Ap-
pellee/Cross-Appellant., 1994 WL 16067272, *16067272+ (Appellate Brief) (5th Cir. Feb 05,
1994) Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant (NO. 94-20608) HN: 6 (F.2d)
32 GETTY OIL COMPANY, Succeeded By and A Division of Texaco, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, et al., Defendants-Appellees., 1987 WL
882396, *882396+ (Appellate Brief) (5th Cir. May 13, 1987) Brief of Appellees (NO. 87-2074)
HN: 6 (F.2d)
33 FOLKSTONE MARITIME, LTD., a Cyprus corporation, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
v. CSX CORPORATION, a corporation, and CSX Transportation, Inc., a corporation, Defend-
ants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appel lants, v. The M/V Pontokratis, a vessel, her
engines, tackle, furniture, etc., in rem, Counter-Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee, CSX Cor-
poration, a corporation, and CSX Transportation,, 1994 WL 16179644, *16179644+ (Appellate
Brief) (7th Cir. Nov 18, 1994) Brief and Argument of Defendant-Appellee/Third Party De-
fendant-Appellee, Captain Carl B. Turner (NO. 94-2306, 94-2402) HN: 6 (F.2d)
34 Ferial K. ARDALAN, pro se, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Louis CALDERA, Secretary, Department of
the Army, Defendant, Appellee., 2001 WL 34097602, *34097602+ (Appellate Brief) (9th Cir.
Feb 12, 2001) Appellant's Brief (NO. 00-16955) " HN: 6 (F.2d)
35 Alfred D. DAISE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALENTI SOUTHEAST, INC., a Florida corporation;
Valenti Management, Inc., a Florida corporation; and Edward B. Smith III, a/k/a Brad Smith, De-
fendants-Appellees., 1993 WL 13138596, *13138596 (Appellate Brief) (11th Cir. Apr 27, 1993)
Answer Brief of Defendants-Appellees (NO. 92-4445) HN: 6 (F.2d)

Trial Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Trial Pleadings
36 Alvin Lavon MOORE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, State of Georgia, Ms.
Manns, Southeast Regional Staff for the Bureau of Prisons, Chantel Kent, Community Correc-
tional Administrator for the Bannum Place of Savannah Georgia, et al Defendants., 2007 WL
2982161, *2982161 (Trial Pleading) (S.D.Ga. Aug 21, 2007) Complaint-Personal Injury-
Negligent administration or Lack of care or supervision of community placement center-
Losses of liberty interest, wages from employment, future earnings, reputation, ... (NO.
CV407-123)

Trial Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits

37 Lynne LAPENSEE and Roland Lapensee, Plaintiffs, v. WHITEHALL-ROBINS, a Division of
Wyeth f/k/a American Home Products Corporation; and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Defendant., 2006
WL 1643515, *1643515 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Conn. Apr 11, 2006)
Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Wyeth's Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of the

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 Opinions of Jack Bopp and Allan Mccausland (NO. 303CV1739, CFD)
38 Janice PARDO as Personal Representative of the Estate of Napoleon Pardo and on behalf of
Janice Pardo, Linda Pardo, Kathy Watkins, Alisha Pardo, Maria Andruszka, and Elena Schneider,
as surviving daughters of Napoleon Pardo, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant., 2003 WL 23679062, *23679062 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit)
(S.D.Fla. 2003) Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dis-
miss Counts II and III (NO. 03-21429-CIV-HIGHSMI)
39 Louis FERRER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant., 2001 WL 34629439,
*34629439+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (S.D.Fla. Oct 29, 2001) Defendant
United States' Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff's Memoranda Filed October
15, 2001 (NO. 00-1535-CIV-SEITZ/GA)
40 In Re: KATRINA CANAL BREACHES CONSOLIDATED LITIGATION. Pertains to: Robin-
son., 2009 WL 2492727, *2492727+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (E.D.La. Jun
19, 2009) Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief (NO. 05-4182, 06-2268) HN: 4 (F.2d)

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