3. Admissions and Confessions
After a brief struggle, my
Sec. 26. Admissions of a Party
[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002
DOCTRINE: An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130,
Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis
Wong y Chua.On June 11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally
shot Dennis Wong y Chua outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan
Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly
attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.
Meanwhile, recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells,
two live caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta
Sanvicente.
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police
Station 9 petitioners .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No.
5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz,
Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon
City which reads as follows:
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour
above he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust Co.,
Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank,
said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just
withdrew (sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with
Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards. Still the deceased
continued his attack and grabbed his gun.
client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person
and money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper
preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU
736) was taken by your operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova
and [is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and
depression and was advised to undergo medical treatment and
confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My
client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-
95, stating that slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one
hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners caliber .45 Mark IV
pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm.The
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased
failed to appear at the trial. In order to dispense with her testimony,
petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the medico-
legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits,which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel
to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL.
On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer
to Evidence) based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal;
(2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the
civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence.
1
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case
double jeopardy had set in.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court nullified the Order of the trial court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated
January 2, 1998.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing
the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of
Exhibit LL which, it claimed, positively identified petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime charged.
HELD:
No.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial court
subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge
against petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL
as the basis for the indictment against petitioner, however, contested
the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court prevented it
from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said
document in the manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due
execution of a piece of documentary evidence vis--vis the truth of its
contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the fundamental
distinction between an admission and a confession. The prosecution
maintains that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and
argues thus: What better evidence is there to positively identify the
perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner himself,
freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?[32] According to the
prosecution, this extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest
evidence of guilt.[33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of
Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a
person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the
accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while
there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.[35] Only
recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court distinguished confession
and admission in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statementby the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours)
[37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an
admission, not a confession, because of the unmistakable qualification
in its last paragraph that
2
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client. . .
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected
the prosecutions motion to have Exhibit LL further identified in the
manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed testimony of
petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to
testify.Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the
scope of privileged communication, it would, more importantly, be
tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with
regard to the details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to
Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business
for which petitioner retained the services of the latter.[39] More
specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in
relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain
something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice
his client or manage the litigation.[40] Hence, there is no grave abuse
on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against
petitioner. The petition is GRANTED.
[ABON] People v. Lorenzo y Corsino, G.R. No. 110107, January 26,
1995
DOCTRINE: An admissible confession or admission which has been
duly proved shifts to the accused the burden of evidence to disprove,
by strong evidence, that he made the admission, or admitting it, that he
is not guilty of the crime.
FACTS:
On March 30, 1992, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a
policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide, an information
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan.The
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo
and a fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, hack and chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own husband,
inflicting upon him several injuries on the different parts of his body
which caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty was present.
On 24 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding
the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00.
Meanwhile,at the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain
Isabelo Liban and SPO1 Jose Eclipse as its witnesses. The
prosecution evidence tells the following story: Agapito Lorenzo and
accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Looban, Barangay
12, Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Among their neighbors are
Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the Tuguegarao
PNP Station was in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan because that was
his post for the night. At about a little past 10:00 o'clock that evening, a
tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse and reported to him a
stabbing incident in said Barangay 12;
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he
met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own Station who
immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife
and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store of
Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito
sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body.
Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out of
his house. In the presence and within the hearing of said barangay
3
official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering because I
killed my husband".
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the
lifeless body of Agapito Lorenzo to a funeral parlor while he and
Policewoman Lorenzo went to the Tuguegarao PNP Station.
Policeman Eclipse turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together with the
bolo and knife to the Desk Officer, SPO3 Urbano Aquino. Eclipse then
orally made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the
Police Blotter.
While the defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo
Racheta. It painted another picture of the incident. It's theory is that it
was not Policewoman Lorenzo but a certain Robert Santos who killed
Agapito.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It found nothing on record which showed that
their impartiality had been vitiated or compromised or that they had
any motive to falsely impute upon the appellant the commission of the
crime. It further declared that when the appellant surrendered the knife
and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she
killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing
more was needed to prove her culpability. The trial court held that the
confession was admissible for it was not made in violation of
paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The appellant
was neither under police custody nor under investigation in connection
with the killing of her husband.However, the trial court rejected the
story of the defense and characterized it as "palpably a put-up
scenario . . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality
controverts logic and assails common sense."
ISSUE: WON the appellants declaration that she killed her husband is
an extrajudicial confession.
HELD:
No.
The Court does not agree with the trial court's characterization of the
appellant's declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an
admission and a confession. These sections reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or admission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged. 24
Wharton 25 defines confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Underhill 26 distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime
charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is an
admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an
inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
While Wigmore 27 says:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused
in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some
essential part of it. 28
4
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was
admissible against the appellant and, having been duly proved,
together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the
evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence,
that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not
guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court
characterized her story as "palpably a put-up scenario.
. . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality,
controverts logic and assails common sense." The five reasons
enumerated by it to support this conclusion are founded on or are
inferred from facts duly established by the prosecution or are otherwise
solidly based on common experience, logic, and common sense.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed
to Eclipse that she killed her husband, she should have protested
when Eclipse reported to the desk officer that she had confessed to
the killing of her husband or she should have attempted to correct the
entry in the police blotter containing this inculpatory report. The
appellant demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to
refute this statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing in the
record clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the report and that
she read the entry in the police blotter. She conveniently forgot that on
cross-examination she admitted having heard Eclipse making the
report but claiming that she did not protest because she was not in her
right senses and was in a state of shock at the time.
The Court has held that the testimony of the accused is not credible
where he has adopted an attitude of indifference relative to the crime
he is accused of and where he failed to inform the police authorities
and the fiscal during the investigation that it was not he but somebody
else who committed the murder.APPEALED DECISION IS
AFFIRMED.
[ABON] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738
(Resolution), April 3, 2001
For resolution are petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos.
146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Courts
Decision of March 2, 2001.
On Evidentiary Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE ANGARA DIARY IS INADMISSIBLE FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE RULES ON EVIDENCE SPECIFICALLY,
ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ACTA RULE.
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged
improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the use
of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on
the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of
hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of
court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases
at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the
Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the
said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their
pleadings.[3] The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from
February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of
the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T. Capulong, et al.,
dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of the Diary were
earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private
respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact,
petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum
both the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,[4]
and the third part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It was also
extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use
of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Meanwhile, the Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner
which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a
snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his
5
statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if
the second envelope would be opened by Monday and Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this
its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue). I
just want to clear my name, then I will go. We noted that days before,
petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not resign despite the
growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is
obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the
doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys
reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones explains that the basis
for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the
ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other
person had made.[14] To use the blunt language of Mueller and
Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common
sense.[15] In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to
dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as
President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary Angara
had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider
the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to
the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country.
Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken
as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him
violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in
section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule
has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule
130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner.
He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the
petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he
abandoned Malacanang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary,
the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli,
ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the
only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.)[17] This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary
Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to
this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would
already leave Malacanang after taking their final lunch on January 20,
2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I
have to leave now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.
Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of
the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was
always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner
in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary
Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones very well
explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is done
by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So,
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his
principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act
within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected
with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which
he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet
6
opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence
against such principal.[20]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and his
Omnibus Motion in G.R. No. 146738 are DENIED for lack of merit.
[ABON] Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 26, 2002
DOCTRINE: An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130,
Section 33 is the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis
Wong y Chua.On June 11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally
shot Dennis Wong y Chua outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan
Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter allegedly
attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash which he had just
withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.
Meanwhile, recovered at the scene were five empty caliber .45 shells,
two live caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta
Sanvicente.
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioners car in Barrio
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioners counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police
Station 9 petitioners .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No.
5504095. He also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz,
Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon
City which reads as follows:
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour
above he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust Co.,
Katipunan branch a large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank,
said victim immediately attacked him to grab the money he has just
withdrew (sic). My said client pulled out his gun (duly licensed with
Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot upwards. Still the deceased
continued his attack and grabbed his gun.After a brief struggle, my
client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his person
and money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper
preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my clients car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU
736) was taken by your operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova
and [is] now in your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and
depression and was advised to undergo medical treatment and
confinement at the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My
client would have no objection if you assigned police escort/guard
under your supervision pending his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client.
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-
95, stating that slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one
hand, and cartridge cases fired from petitioners caliber .45 Mark IV
pistol, on the other hand, were fired from the same firearm.The
Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy on the deceased
failed to appear at the trial. In order to dispense with her testimony,
petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the medico-
legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Exhibits,which included the above-quoted letter of petitioners counsel
to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL.
On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer
to Evidence) based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal;
(2) prosecutions evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent, hence,
inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was not proven by positive
evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
7
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the case together with the
civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
on the ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case
double jeopardy had set in.
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court nullified the Order of the trial court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated
January 2, 1998.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in preventing
the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of
Exhibit LL which, it claimed, positively identified petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime charged.
HELD:
No.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial court
subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence
presented by the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge
against petitioner. The prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL
as the basis for the indictment against petitioner, however, contested
the dismissal of the case allegedly because the trial court prevented it
from further identifying the genuineness and due execution of said
document in the manner that it wanted.[31]
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due
execution of a piece of documentary evidence vis--vis the truth of its
contents. Likewise at the core of the dilemma is the fundamental
distinction between an admission and a confession. The prosecution
maintains that the letter, Exhibit LL, constituted a confession and
argues thus: What better evidence is there to positively identify the
perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the petitioner himself,
freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?[32] According to the
prosecution, this extrajudicial confession constitutes the strongest
evidence of guilt.[33]
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of
Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged or any offense necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession is a declaration made at any time by a
person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is
usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the
accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged.[34]
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while
there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.[35] Only
recently in People v. Licayan,[36] the Court distinguished confession
and admission in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statementby the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours)
[37]
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an
admission, not a confession, because of the unmistakable qualification
in its last paragraph that
8
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary
surrender, without admission of guilt on the part of my client. . .
(Emphasis and italics supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected
the prosecutions motion to have Exhibit LL further identified in the
manner that it wanted,[38] i.e., through the proposed testimony of
petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who incidentally refused to
testify.Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within the
scope of privileged communication, it would, more importantly, be
tantamount to converting the admission into a confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with
regard to the details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to
Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business
for which petitioner retained the services of the latter.[39] More
specifically, said communication was relayed by petitioner to Atty.
Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or assistance in
relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain
something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice
his client or manage the litigation.[40] Hence, there is no grave abuse
on the part of the trial court in dismissing the charges against
petitioner. The petition is GRANTED.
[ANACTA] People v. Caritativo, G.R. Nos. 145452-53, June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Larry Caritativo, was charged of the crime of murder for stabbing one
Expidito "Freddie" Mariano and Marlon Trambulo.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Catalino Gonzales,
Expedito Prado, Dr. Michael Jimenez and Rosalinda Mariano
(Here are two most important Testimonies related to our topic J )
Catalino Gonzales (Catalino) testified that around 3:30 a.m. on
April 28, 1995, while he was attending a dance on the occasion of the
wedding of Minesa Dalida and a certain Zamora in Sitio Bulangcog,
Barangay Iriron, Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, the appellant, Larry
Caritativo, whispered to him that he was going to stab somebody.
Catalino had known the appellant for a long time because they were
neighbors. Appellant's father, Peping Caritativo, and Catalino were
friends.
Catalino asked the appellant who he was going to stab. The appellant
pointed to a certain person Catalino did not know, saying that that
person was the one who ran over and killed his mother ("siya ang
nakasagasa sa nanay ko"). The appellant then showed Catalino a
knife tucked in his waist. The knife was a double-bladed instrument
about 8 inches long.
Catalino did not know the person singled out by the appellant.
Nevertheless, he advised the intended victim to leave the dance hall.
About five minutes later, a commotion arose. People inside the dance
hall were running in different directions. Most of them ran towards the
jeep parked some ten meters away from the dance hall. Two
personshad been stabbed. One was bleeding inside the jeep while the
other was sprawled on the ground, dying. One of the victims was
Freddie Mariano (the victim in this case). Catalino knew Mariano but
did not know the other victim.
At around 4:00 a.m., Catalino left the dance hall to go home. He met
the appellant on the highway, about 150 meters from the dance hall.
They went home together. While walking, the appellant put his arm on
Catalino's shoulder and told him that he was the one who stabbed the
victims. Pointing to his stomach, the appellant said, "Dito pare, sinagad
ko hanggang lumagitik sa jeep."
Catalino did not believe the appellant at first but when a vehicle
passed by and its lights focused on the appellant's white shirt, Catalino
noticed blood on it. The appellant started to run away but Catalino held
his arm. Catalino told him not to run lest the people suspect him. They
then proceeded to their respective homes. Catalino's house was only
one kilometer away from the dance hall. Before they parted, the
appellant told Catalino not to tell anybody about his revelation.17
At around 7:00 a.m. of the same day (April 28, 1995), the father of the
appellant, Peping Caritativo (Peping), went to Catalino's house. Peping
and Catalino were neighbors. Peping told Catalino, "Pare, ikaw lang
ang nakakaalam na nakasaksak ang aking anak." Catalino replied,
"Pare, pag nalaman ng batas 'yan delikado ka." Peping then
threatened him, "Pare, ikaw lang ang nakakaalam nito kaya delikado
ka!"
9
 The second prosecution witness was Expedito Prado (Expedito).
He testified that he had known the appellant for six years.20 At around
3:30 a.m. on April 28, 1995, while a dance was going on during the
wedding reception of his niece, Minesa Dalida, in Sitio Bulangcog,
Iriron, Occidental Mindoro, he was seated on a chair outside a parked
passenger jeep, waiting for a ride home to Calintaan. The parked
passenger jeep was about four arms length away from the dance hall.
Without noticing Expedito, the appellant entered the jeep and
immediately stabbed the two sleeping persons inside ("pag-akyat sa
jeep bigla na lang sinaksak 'yung dalawang natutulog").
When the appellant alighted, he noticed Expedito. The appellant
chased him but Expedito was able to escape. The appellant ran
towards the mango tree, about 20 meters from the parked jeep, while
Expedito ran home to Poblacion, Calintaan which was about three
kilometers away.
For its part, the defense presented four witnesses: Monchito Angeles,
Minesa Zamora, Santiago Caritativo and appellant himself, Larry
Caritativo.
Monchito Angeles (Monchito) testified that he arrived at the
wedding party at around 7:00 p.m. on April 27, 1995. He helped in
serving the food. He noticed the presence of the appellant at around
9:00 p.m. He, his brother-in-law Herbert Montenegro, Obet Tanglaw
and the appellant held a drinking spree. After the drinking session (he
could not remember the exact time it ended), he joined the dancing in
the dance hall. At around 3:30 a.m., he was dancing the cha-cha with
the appellant beside him. They suddenly heard shouting coming from
where the "Jet-Ric" passenger jeep was parked. The jeep was about
30 meters away from the dance hall.33
People ran towards the jeep. Monchito did the same. There, he saw
Freddie Mariano dead inside the jeep and Marlon Trambulo bleeding
on the ground. He helped Marlon board the jeep with the help of
Herbert Montenegro and one of Montenegros conductors.
The fourth and last defense witness was the appellant himself,
Larry Caritativo
He testified that he went to the wedding party at around 7:00 p.m. on
April 27, 1995. At around 3:00 a.m., he helped out in the kitchen. At
4:00 a.m., he joined the dancing at the hall. He could not remember
the names of the persons on the dance floor, except Monching
(Monchito) Angeles. Although he joined the drinking spree, he was not
drunk. He did not know the victims, Freddie Mariano and Marlon
Trambulo. He was not aware of any commotion in the early morning of
April 28, 1995.
He left the dance hall at 6:00 a.m. and went home by foot. His house
was two kilometers away from the hall. He did not meet anybody on
the way. He proceeded to his father's house instead and rested there
from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. His father and mother were at home. His
parents' house was two kilometers away from his. His father told him
that Freddie Mariano and Marlon Trambulo were killed but he had no
reaction to the said information. After resting, he went to the place
where the wedding was held and helped in the dismantling of the
"damara." 44
He went to Manila on May 8, 1995 to look for a job. He landed a
stevedoring job at Pier 2 with the North Star Company. He worked
there for two years (from May 1995 to the latter part of 1997) but lost
his ID and other documents issued by North Star. He, however, had an
ID of Bantay Bayan, Manila. He was arrested on May 27, 1998 in
Tondo, Manila while working as a vendor in Divisoria at that time. From
the time he left Bulangcog, he communicated with his wife and parents
through letters.
In weighing the testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court gave more
credence to the prosecution witnesses and ruled that the defense of
alibi by herein appellant must fail in the light of the following:
1. Expedito Prado could not have been mistaken in identifying the
accused as the assailant of the victim. He was seated on a chair with
its back leaning at (sic) the parked passenger jeep, more or less four
(4) arms length from the place where the dancing was taking place. He
saw the accused entered (sic) the jeep and stabbed Freddie Mariano
and Marlon Trambulo. "Pag-akyat sa jeep bigla na lang sinaksak 'yung
dalawang (2) natutulog." When the accused alighted from the jeep he
chased the witness but he was able to escape. (t.s.n. December 1,
1998, pages 4-6).
2. When the crime happened, the light coming from the dance hall
reached the parked jeep and you can reached (sic) the jeep within four
to five seconds by running (t.s.n. March 1, 1995, page 15). The
10
conditions for visibility were favorable, the ability of Prado as witness to
recognize the accused should be upheld.
3. The possibility of mistaken identity was also ruled out by the fact
that Prado had known the accused even before the incident (t.s.n.
December 1, 1998, page 3).
4. No ill motive was imputed by accused to Prado for having testified
against him, thus Prado's testimony was no less than the untarnished
truth. Prado's positive testimony that the accused was the perpetrator
of the crime remained unchallenged (t.s.n. April 23, 1999, page 24).48
The trial court also ruled that the culpability of herein appellant was
further established by the fact that he fled Calintaan, Occidental
Mindoro after the commission of the crime. The trial court did not
believe his explanation that he left Calintaan to look for a job in Manila.
Finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime, the trial
court convicted herein appellant of the crime of murder and sentenced
him to suffer the death penalty.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Catalino Gonzales of the
admission of appellant Carrativo to him of the commission of the crime,
can be admitted as evidence against Carrativo.
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the
supreme penalty of death.
HELD:
1. YES. We find no basis to doubt the testimony of Catalino
Gonzales. Catalino testified categorically and candidly that appellant
confessed to him that he killed Freddie Mariano. And nowhere in the
records of the case did appellant ever categorically deny his admission
of guilt to Catalino Gonzales. Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
And in People vs. Maqueda,57 we ruled that:
"Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private
party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, this Court held
that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person,
otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession,
is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard
and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral
confession; it suffices if he gives its substance." (emphasis ours)
Clearly therefore, under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the admission by the appellant expressly acknowledging his guilt to
Catalino Gonzales, a private party, can very well be taken in evidence
against him.
Moreover, the appellant failed to show any improper motive why
Catalino Gonzales would testify falsely against him. The testimony of
appellant's father that the reason why Catalino testified falsely against
the appellant was because he (appellant's father) hacked Catalino's
dog was unworthy of belief, being uncorroborated and self-serving.
The allegation was hollow as nothing was offered to support it. When
there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive
why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.
Thus, the trial court correctly admitted in evidence the testimony of
Catalino Gonzales regarding the admission of guilt by the appellant.
But appellant's admission, standing alone, is not sufficient to convict
him. Being merely an inference, appellant's admission must be
supported by some other proof which shows his culpability for the
crime charged.
2. YES. In the present case, we can no longer consider treachery
as an aggravating circumstance again, this time for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty, because it was already used to qualify the
killing to murder. Other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
no proof of any other aggravating circumstance was presented during
the trial or alleged before the court to justify the imposition of the death
penalty. Thus, the proper penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.
11

[ANACTA] Estrella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44902, April 20,
1989
FACTS:
An old woman was killed twenty-two years ago. Her killing has so far
gone unpunished, her heirs' plea for redress so far unanswered. It is
time that justice is done.
The victim was Mauricia Baraceros. On January 21,1967, in Barrio San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, she was run over by a power wagon
being then driven by Rodolfo Arcalas. She suffered injuries resulting in
cerebral hemorrhage and died almost instantly.
The police conducted an investigation of the incident shortly after its
occurrence in the course of which Arcalas declared in a sworn
statement that it was the power wagon he was operating which, while
backing up, had run over Mauricia Baraceros; that the wagon belonged
to the spouses Conrado Estrella and Sergia Bautista Estrella; and that
he was said spouses' driver.
A criminal case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
against Rodolfo Arcalas, but was dismissed provisionally due to the
failure of the prosecution to present witnesses.
Mauricia's heirs engaged the services of counsel who, on June 27,
1967 made a written demand on the Estrella Spouses and their driver
for settlement of their claim for damages. The demand was ignored. It
appears that an offer of the Estrellas of P500.00 as settlement had
earlier been spurned by the heirs.
Two months afterwards, the heirs of Mauricia Baraceros (the private
respondents herein named) brought suit in the Court of First Instance
of Manila against the Estrellas and Rodolfo Arcalas. In their complaint
they alleged that Arcalas had driven the power wagon in a "wanton,
reckless and imprudent manner and without regard to the safety of life
and property" and thus caused their mother's death; that the Estrellas
had "failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, defendant driver having been reckless and careless;"
and that consequently the defendants should pay P15,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, P15,000.00 as moral damages,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
The Estrellas and Arcalas, for their part, alleged in their answer that
they had no sufficient knowledge of facts and circumstances that might
have caused the death of the victim, a nonagenarian deaf and/or
physically incapacitated; Arcalas had never been a careless or
reckless driver; and the defendant spouses had "always exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, and
would never allow an employee to drive if he was reckless and
careless."
In due time, and on the plaintiffs heirs' motion, the case was set for
pre-trial on February 8,1968. Now began a long series of dilatory
maneuvers on the part of counsel for the Estrellas and Arcalas.
The Estrellas' counsel moved for postponement of the pre-trial for
several times. The pre-trial was finally held on May 16, 1968. The
parties tried but failed to come to an amicable settlement. The case
was set for trial on the merits on June 27, 1968. On June 27, 1968,
neither the Estrellas or Arcalas nor their counsel appeared for the trial.
On February 4, 1970, judgment was finally handed down. The Trial
Court's verdict was in the heirs' favor.
The Estrellas and Arcalas moved for reconsideration. The Court
denied the motion. The Estrellas and Arcalas appealed to the Court of
Appeals. But it was denied.
The petitioners submit that it was error for the Appellate Court to have
sanctioned the use of Arcalas' sworn statement (Exh. B) before the
police as evidence, it being hearsay in character; to have adjudged
the Estrella Spouses liable despite absence of proof of their ownership
of the vehicle and the employment relation between them and Arcalas;
and to have held that they had not been denied due process when
they "were not allowed continuance to present their defense nor to
present a motion to dismiss."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statement of Arcalas be admitted as
evidence in order hold Estrella Spouses liable.
HELD:
YES.
Arcalas' statement to the police(Exh.B),in which he declared that while
he was driving a vehicle owned by the spouses Estrella, he had "run
12
over an old woman," constitutes competent proof it is an extra-judicial
admission, admissible pursuant to the well-known rule that the act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be received
in evidence against him.
It is properly receivable as proof against the declarant, it being contrary
to the position taken by him in the action. In the answer filed in behalf
of the declarant, Arcalas and his co-defendants specifically denied, for
lack of "sufficient knowledge," the allegation in the complaint that "on
January 21, 1967, at about 11:00 o'clock a.m., in Barrio San
Bartolome, Resales, Pangasinan, the said motor vehicle, while being
driven by defendant Arcalas, ran over one Mauricia Baraceros
resulting in the latter's untimely death." That denial is obviously
inconsistent with Arcalas' sworn written declaration that he had indeed
been operating the wagon in question on that date and time and had
on that occasion "run over an old woman." It is precisely the factor of
inconsistency between that declaration and the allegations in the
pleading subsequently filed by him, concerning relevant facts, that
makes the former admissible in evidence against the declarant.
The hearsay rule has no application to the situation. The extra-judicial
declaration is not excludible on the ground of hearsay- which
proscribes evidence as to which opportunity to cross-examine is not
provided to the party against whom it is adduced at the time of
presentation -since the declarant can hardly complain of not having the
opportunity to cross-examine himself at the time that his prior
statement is submitted as proof against him.
The petitioners' last submittal that they should have been accorded a
postponement to present evidence in their behalf after the plaintiffs
had rested, or to file a demurrer to evidence, is also undeserving of
credit. It conveniently ignores the fact that they had already delayed
the disposition of the case by many motions for cancellation of, if not
indeed by failure to appear at hearings despite notice. It conveniently
ignores the fact that they were granted by the Court a period of one
month after the case had been declared submitted for decision, within
which to make one last attempt to settle the case amicably- their
constant representation to the Court being precisely that they were
negotiating for such a settlement, but the month passed with nothing at
all being heard from petitioners.
[ANACTA] Cuison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88539, October 26,
1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Kue Cuison is a sole proprietorship engaged in the purchase
and sale of newsprint, bond paper and scrap, with places of business
at Baesa, Quezon City, and Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. Private
respondent Valiant Investment Associates, on the other hand, is a
partnership duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines with business address at Kalookan City.
From December 4, 1979 to February 15, 1980, private respondent
delivered various kinds of paper products amounting to P297,487.30 to
a certain Lilian Tan of LT Trading. The deliveries were made by
respondent pursuant to orders allegedly placed by Tiu Huy Tiac who
was then employed in the Binondo office of petitioner. It was likewise
pursuant to Tiac's instructions that the merchandise was delivered to
Lilian Tan. Upon delivery, Lilian Tan paid for the merchandise by
issuing several checks payable to cash at the specific request of Tiu
Huy Tiac. In turn, Tiac issued nine (9) postdated checks to private
respondent as payment for the paper products. Unfortunately, sad
checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank.
Thereafter, private respondent made several demands upon petitioner
to pay for the merchandise in question, claiming that Tiu Huy Tiac was
duly authorized by petitioner as the manager of his Binondo office, to
enter into the questioned transactions with private respondent and
Lilian Tan. Petitioner denied any involvement in the transaction
entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac and refused to pay private respondent the
amount corresponding to the selling price of the subject merchandise.
Left with no recourse, private respondent filed an action against
petitioner for the collection of P297,487.30 representing the price of
the merchandise. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the
complaint against petitioner for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the
decision of the trial court was modified, but was in effect reversed by
the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.
It is evident from the records that by his own acts and admission,
petitioner held out Tiu Huy Tiac to the public as the manager of his
13
store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, Manila. More particularly, petitioner
explicitly introduced Tiu Huy Tiac to Bernardino Villanueva,
respondent's manager, as his (petitioner's) branch manager as testified
to by Bernardino Villanueva.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiu Huy Tiac possessed the required authority from
petitioner sufficient to hold the latter liable for the disputed transaction
HELD:
YES. It is a well-established rule that one who clothes another with
apparent authority as his agent and holds him out to the public as such
cannot be permitted to deny the authority of such person to act as his
agent, to the prejudice of innocent third parties dealing with such
person in good faith and in the honest belief that he is what he appears
to be . From the facts and the evidence on record, there is no doubt
that this rule obtains. The petition must therefore fail.
(Based on the Petitioners Testimony)
But of even greater weight than any of these testimonies, is petitioner's
categorical admission on the witness stand that Tiu Huy Tiac was the
manager of his store in Sto. Cristo, Binondo, to wit:
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And who was managing the store in Sto. Cristo?
A: At first it was Mr. Ang, then later Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac but I cannot
remember the exact year.
Q: So, Mr. Tiu Huy Tiac took over the management,.
A: Not that was because every afternoon, I was there, sir.
Q: But in the morning, who takes charge?
A: Tiu Huy Tiac takes charge of management and if there (sic) orders
for newsprint or bond papers they are always referred to the
compound in Baesa, sir. (t.s.n., p. 16, Session of January 20, 1981,
CA decision, Rollo, p. 50, emphasis supplied).
Such admission, spontaneous no doubt, and standing alone, is
sufficient to negate all the denials made by petitioner regarding the
capacity of Tiu Huy Tiac to enter into the transaction in question.
Furthermore, consistent with and as an obvious indication of the fact
that Tiu Huy Tiac was the manager of the Sto. Cristo branch, three (3)
months after Tiu Huy Tiac left petitioner's employ, petitioner even sent,
communications to its customers notifying them that Tiu Huy Tiac is no
longer connected with petitioner's business. Such undertaking spoke
unmistakenly of Tiu Huy Tiac's valuable position as petitioner's
manager than any uttered disclaimer.
More than anything else, this act taken together with the declaration of
petitioner in open court amount to admissions under Rule 130 Section
22 of the Rules of Court, to wit :
"The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him."
For well-settled is the rule that "a man's acts, conduct, and declaration,
wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason
that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his
fault if they do not. If a man's extrajudicial admissions are admissible
against him, there seems to be no reason why his admissions made in
open court, under oath, should not be accepted against him."
Moreover, petitioner's unexplained delay in disowning the transactions
entered into by Tiu Huy Tiac despite several attempts made by
respondent to collect the amount from him, proved all the more that
petitioner was aware of the questioned commission was tantamount to
an admission by silence under Rule 130 Section 23 of the Rules of
Court, thus: "Any act or declaration made in the presence of and within
the observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
may be given in evidence against him."
All of these point to the fact that at the time of the transaction Tiu Huy
Tiac was admittedly the manager of petitioner's store in Sto. Cristo,
Binondo. Consequently, the transaction in question as well as the
concomitant obligation is valid and binding upon petitioner.
By his representations, petitioner is now estopped from disclaiming
liability for the transaction entered by Tiu Huy Tiac on his behalf.
More in point, we find that by the principle of estoppel, Manila
Remnant is deemed to have allowed its agent to act as though it had
plenary powers. Article 1911 of the Civil Code provides:
14
"Even when the agent has exceeded his authority, the principal
issolidarily liable with the agent if the former allowed the latter to act as
though he had full powers." (Emphasis supplied)
Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court
at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in
court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that
is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party,
and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to
fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On theother hand, a party's
testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity
for cross-examination.
[ANACTA] People v. Licayan y Sucano, G.R. No. 144422, February
28, 2002
FACTS:
Appellant Aldrin Licayan and Bernard Agcopra were friends from way
back. On June 25, 1999, after years of absence, appellant went to
Agcopra who had a machine shop in Barangay Inobulan, Salay,
Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. On
this occasion, they drank rum to celebrate their reunion. Romeo
Bangcong, who was also Agcopras friend, joined them later in their
drinking bout. They finished drinking in Agcropas shop at 5:00 p.m.
The group continued drinking in the house of Wenny Rajal also in
Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental. After consuming two
bottles of Beer Grande, they bought a case of the same drink, which
they brought to the house of Romeo. When they arrived, Romeos wife
Rosalinda and his children, Rey Oriente, Raymundo and five-year old
Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer
anymore. He went with Romeo to the barangay captain leaving
appellant in Romeos house. When Romeo returned to his house,
appellant was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying
that he missed his daughter.
Appellant kept on embracing Rowena. At 6:00 p.m., more or less,
Rowena asked that she be allowed to watch television at neighbor
Dorbits house fifteen meters away. An hour later, Romeo told Rey
Oriente to fetch Rowena. Thereafter, appellant also left, saying that he
would look for Agcopra. When the boy reached Dorbits house, he saw
appellant there with Rowena. Appellant told Rowena: "Day, come here
because your father asked you to go home so you can eat your
supper." Appellant then held the hand of Rowena and dragged her into
a dark area. Rey Oriente, however, did not go with appellant and his
sister, thinking that they were heading for the Bangcong house.
When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit
house to inquire about her. Rey Oriente told him what happened,
which caused him to cry. Neighbors were alerted and immediately
formed a posse to look for the girl. While searching for Rowena, they
spotted appellant when they trained a flashlight to him. Appellant ran
towards the ricefield. The posse chased him, but failed to catch him
when he jumped into the deep Inobulan River. When appellant passed
by a group of men who offered him a drink, his clothes were wet and
his body was muddy. He had no slippers. That same night, appellant
was arrested by the police.
The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was
found at the swamps, where appellant told Rogelio Dahilan, Jr., one of
the searchers, she would be. Photographs were taken of the girl. A
postmortem examination of the girl revealed that she had hematomas,
lacerations, abrasions all over her body, as well as a deep incomplete
hymenal laceration at the 6:00 oclock position. The cause of death
was asphyxia by submersion in water. Rowena died a painful death.
As stated earlier, after the prosecution had rested its case and formally
offered its evidence, accused-appellant escaped detention and has
remained at large despite efforts to apprehend him. Accused-
appellants escape should be considered a waiver of his right to be
present at the trial and the inability of the court to notify him of the
subsequent hearings will not prevent the court from continuing with the
trial because the escapee is deemed to have received notice.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances
are insufficient to prove his guilt. He argues that:
15
1.] the first three (3) circumstances do not point to accused-appellants
guilt;
2.] prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among those
who organized the search party, is not credible because he did not
shout upon finding accused-appellant;
3.] the witnesses could not have seen accused-appellant in the
darkness;
4.] the witnesses could have seen somebody else;
5.] assuming that accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse,
he was not committing any wrong by running away;
6.] the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them
where Rowenas body could be found based on accused-appellants
admission is hearsay;
7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowenas lifeless
body could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her;
8.] the admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is
inadmissible; 9.] the circumstance that accused-appellant was seen
with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers lacks probative value;
and 10.] there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was
dragging Rowena to the swamp.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence against the accused-
appellant is sufficient enough to warrant his conviction.
HELD:
YES.
The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but together. Like strands which create a pattern
when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the
accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece
of evidence. It is more like weaving a tapestry of events that will
culminate in a clear picture that will reveal a convincing scenario
pointing towards the accused as the author of the crime.
The credibility of prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano cannot be
impeached by the mere fact that he failed to rouse other members of
the search party when he found the accused-appellant. Suffice it to
state that different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of
situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified
from a distance of about twenty (20) meters in the dark is untenable,
considering that illumination produced by a flashlight or kerosene lamp
is sufficient to allow the identification of persons.
Accused-appellants argument that he did not commit any wrong in
running away upon being espied by the search party likewise deserves
scant consideration. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the wicked
flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a
lion."Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily explained why he fled
upon being spotted by the posse.
In People v. Templo, we held that "the act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. One
type of act that can be given in evidence against him is flight. In
criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained
flight of the accused person may as a general rule be taken as
evidence having tendency to establish his guilt." In short, flight is an
indication of guilt. What makes flight particularly damaging for
accused-appellant is that he fled twice, i.e. first, upon being spotted by
the search party and second, by scaling the perimeter fence of the
Provincial Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing
trial.
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by
Rogelio "Jun-jun" Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the victims body is
hearsay. Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never
presented on the witness stand, because it is the opportunity to cross-
16
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay. In the instant case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified
that accused-appellant indeed told him where the victims body can be
found. What is more, the victims body was actually recovered at the
location pointed by accused-appellant.
Accused-appellants objection to the admissibility of his statement as
to where he dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of
an extra-judicial confession, is just as tenuous. The foregoing is not an
extra-judicial confession, but merely an extra-judicial admission.
**(Confession vs Admission)**
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue,
and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.
In other words, an admission is something less than a confession and
is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself
is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Contrary to accused-appellants claim, he was in fact seen grabbing
and dragging the struggling victim from the house where she was
watching television by Rey Oriente, the victims elder brother.
While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he raped
and killed Rowena, the prevailing circumstances overwhelmingly point
to his guilt. As stated earlier, direct evidence is not always necessary
to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. A witness may
not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, hut he
may nevertheless identify the accused as the assailant as when the
latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime, as in this case.
In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are
as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence
of the accused-appellant. In other words, the circumstantial evidence
against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony committed.
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four basic
guidelines must be observed:
1) it should be acted upon with caution;
2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and
4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to
convince the judgment beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
the one who committed the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from
scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a
puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture pointing
towards the conclusion the accused is the author of the crime.
[ANG] People v. Zuela y Morandarte, G.R. No. 112177, January 28,
2000
FACTS: The case involved the conviction of the three accused TITO
ZUELA y MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES,
and NELSON GARCIA y TEMPORAS of the crime of robbery with
homicide. In the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually aiding each other, with intent
to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
violence and intimidation against persons, that is by shooting and
stabbing one Hegino Hernandez, Sr., Maria S. Abendao and John-
John Abendao, thereby inflicting upon them mortal injuries that
caused their instantaneous death, take, rob and carry away the
following personal properties belonging to the said Maria Abendao.
Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how
the crime was committed with the testimony of Romualda Algarin,
which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission given by
Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the
Camaligan municipal jail. The three accused were arrested without an
arrest warrant and underwent custodial investigation without
17
assistance of counsel. They signed a statement of confession
allegedly under duress by the police. Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed
their individual statements before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur on three (3)
different dates. She followed the same procedure and line of
questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the voluntariness of
the three (3) accused's confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his
companions to leave her and the accused inside the chamber.
Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights and that they
voluntarily executed their statements, she had them sign their
individual extrajudicial statements.
Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and
(2) that they were tortured and forced to make a confession. In
addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they were not assisted by counsel
when their confessions were taken.
Thereafter, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three
(3) accused of robbery with homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid confession (NO)
Wheter or not Romualda Algarins testimony regarding the accuseds
extrajudicia confession may be given weight (YES)
HELD: Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the
confessions of Tito and Nelson was not cured by their signing the
extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn statements did
not leave a void in the prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo
repeated the contents of his sworn statement to Romualda Algarin
who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private
person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the
"act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly
gave evidentiary value to Romualda's testimony.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of
Romualda for testifying on accused-appellant Maximo's admission and
therefore the presumption that in so testifying, she was impelled by no
other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact that she is related to
two of the victims did not render her testimony incredible. Relationship
per se is not proof of prejudice. She might have been mistaken as to
the date when she talked with accused-appellant Maximo while he was
detained considering the more than three-year gap between June
1985 and September to October 1988 when Romualda testified.
However, it is not necessary that the witness should be able to fix
accurately the date of the conversation in which the admission was
made. What is important is that the witness is able to state the
substance of the conversation or declaration.
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission
sealed not only the latter's fate but also that of appellants Tito and
Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon
the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because
the latter has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and
therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay, is not applicable
here. What is involved here is an admission, not a confession. A
confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine witness Romualda on accused-appellant Maximo's
declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by presenting
evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could
put to test Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's
testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as credible, stands
unscathed.
[ANG] People v. Omictin y Singco, G.R. No. 188130, July 26, 2010
FACTS:
Mary Lou Omictin was engaged in illegal recruitment and was
able to take 40k php from 3 unsuspecting victims (Guevara,
Caponpon, and Mago) and 16k php from another (Ambrosio). An
entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked
money, Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents.
Omictin was found guilty of violating Section 6, in relation to Sec. 7(b),
18
of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995. Specifically, accused-appellant was charged with
and adjudged guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3)
counts of Estafa.
Aggrieved, Omictin appealed to the CA, raising in her Brief for
the Accused-Appellant, the following issues:
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa
Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of
Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was
not presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is
unsubstantiated and hearsay; and
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt
presented to show payment to accused-appellant, rendering his
testimony uncorroborated and self-serving.
CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not without the supporting testimony of Dotenes
who was not presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is
unsubstantiated and hearsay.
HELD: No. The common objection known as "self-serving" is not
correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper
basis for objection is "hearsay". Petitioner fails to take into account the
distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in
court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court
advocating his own interest; they do not include a partys testimony as
a witness in court. Self-serving statements are inadmissible because
the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination,
and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This
cannot be said of a partys testimony in court made under oath, with
full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.
Even assuming that the testimonies are selfserving, Omictin
admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the
amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000
through her testimony.
[ANG] Heirs of Clemea y Zurbano v. Heirs of Bien, G.R. No. 155508,
September 11, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case before the RTC which they claim
ownership over a land. Defendants was long before been terminated
as administrator to the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde who
deliberately continued to occupy and usurp possession and use of the
disputed land and refused to relinquish possession of the same to the
lawful owner thereof. But defendants claim that they are In exclusive
possession over the disputed land and his claim of ownership was
based on sale by estate of late Pedro Clemea y Conde to his
predecessor-in-interest. RTC ruled declaring petitioners absolute
owners of the land and directing respondents to respect petitioners
possession but later the RTC reconsidered its decision and found that
contending parties failed to prove their respective claims of ownership
and therefore the land in question still belongs to the original owner,
the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde. Respondents appealed
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTCs resolution of the
issue relating to the two (2) parcel of land but reversed the ruling on
ownership of land and proceeded to award respondents P118,000 as
compensatory damages of their deprived shares of possession in the
harvest based on the testimony of Gregorio Clemea hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Is the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals to
determine award of damages self-serving and not proper basis for
such award?
RULING:
Petitioners proposition that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was
self-serving and not proper basis for the award of damages is just
unworthy of the Courts consideration. Self-serving evidence is not a
weapon to devalue and discredit a partys testimony favorable to his
cause. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any
evidence that serves it proponents interest, the term refers only to acts
or declarations made by party in his own interest at some place and
time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a
witness in court, also refers to the lack of opportunity for cross-
examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that it
admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. At any rate,
for all their protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemeas
testimony, petitioner never once alleged, much less tried to show, that
19
his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Petitioners objection is
founded solely on the mere fact the he, being a plaintiff, was a witness
interested in the outcome of the case. The partys interest may to
some extent affect his credibility as witness. The court cannot
subscribe to the view, implicit to petitioners argument, that a partys
testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account solely
of his interest in the case. As held in National Development Company
v. Workmens Compensation Commission, that interest alone is not a
ground for disregarding a partys testimony, the interest of witness
cannot ipso facto deprive his testimony probative force or require it to
be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of
the witness testimony as he finds credible the reject the rest. The
award of damages stands.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible
[ANG] People v. Magdadaro y Gerona, G.R. Nos. 89370-72, May 15,
1991
FACTS:The Complainant, Beverlinda Abrasado, is a 16-year old
country girl, a Grade VI student, daughter of Leonardo Abrasado. The
latter is a tenant of accused-appellant Magdadaro at the latter's farm at
Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City. Beverlinda helps her father till the farm.
Appellant is a farmer, 54 years of age, married residing at Tin-ao,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Beverlinda was raped three times by the accused, with each time
boxing her in the stomach, and thereafter threatened the victim not to
tell anyone at risk of her life and her family. During the last rape,
Leonardo Abrasado, Beverlinda's father, heard the shouts and
proceeded towards the direction where they came from. Leonardo
testified that upon reaching there, he could hardly believe his eyes
when he saw Appellant, his own landlord, abusing his own daughter.
Engaged, he called "Gaw" and unsheathed his bolo. But Appellant was
quick on his feet, stood up, naked from waist down, and ran away,
leaving his pants', his underwear and his hat in his haste. The father
chased Appellant but lost the latter lost in the bushes.
Appellant was found about two hours later by some members of the
Bantay Bayan and the military, approximately 300 meters away from
the place of the incident, still hiding in the bushes (Tsn., 29 September
1988, p. 18). He was "wearing his coat, but no pants, he just wrapped
himself in the lower portion of his body with a long sleeved sweater."
The witness asked him if he was Paulino Magdadaro and "why did you
do it?" but the latter did not answer (ibid., pp. 10-11). Appellant was
then taken to the checkpoint of the PC detachment by Sgts. Lustre and
Viras.
When the search party arrived at the scene of the incident, they found
the corn plants toppled down, a pair of long pants, a pair of briefs, a
hat and the underwear of a woman. Beverlinda was also still there,
seated, crying. The accused was convicted of three counts of rape and
sentenced with three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. Appellant's offers to settle the case in exchange for
money or land, which were all rejected by Beverlinda's father, were
correctly appreciated by the Trial Court as evidential of his culpability.
An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.
Discrepancies there may be in Beverlinda's testimony and her affidavit
where she did not mention that Appellant had boxed her but instead
said that she had been pushed. Be it one or the other, however, the
inconsistency will not affect the crucial fact that Beverlinda had
suffered disgrace at Appellant's hands. Moreover, as we have
consistently held, an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion,
sometimes for want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of
which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his
memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the
subject
Civil Cases
[BERNARDO] Smith Bell and Co. (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 56294, May 20, 1991
FACTS: In the early morning of 3 May 1970at exactly 0350 hours,
on the approaches to the port of Manila near Caballo Island, a collision
took place between the M/V "Don Carlos," an inter-island vessel
20
owned and operated by private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and
Company ("Go Thong"), and the M/S "Yotai Maru," a merchant vessel
of Japanese registry. The "Don Carlos" was then sailing south bound
leaving the port of Manila for Cebu, while the "Yotai Maru" was
approaching the port of Manila, coming in from Kobe, Japan. The bow
of the "Don Carlos" rammed the portside (left side) of the "Yotai Maru"
inflicting a three (3) cm. gaping hole on her portside near Hatch No. 3,
through which seawater rushed in and flooded that hatch and her
bottom tanks, damaging all the cargo stowed therein.
The consignees of the damaged cargo got paid by their insurance
companies. The insurance companies in turn, having been subrogated
to the interests of the consignees of the damaged cargo, commenced
actions against private respondent Go Thong for damages sustained
by the various shipments in the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
The Court of First Instance of Manila held that the he officers and crew
of the "Don Carlos" had been negligent that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision and accordingly held respondent Go
Thong liable for damages to the plaintiff insurance companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in
evidence against the person making the offer.
HELD: NO. Private respondent Go Thong also argues that a
compromise agreement entered into between Sanyo Shipping
Company as owner of the "Yotai Maru" and Go Thong as owner of the
"Don Carlos," under which the former paid P268,000.00 to the latter,
effectively settled that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault. This
argument is wanting in both factual basis and legal substance. True it
is that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the owner of the "Yotai
Maru" paid a sum of money to the owner of the "Don Carlos."
Nowhere, however, in the compromise agreement did the owner of the
"Yotai Maru " admit or concede that the "Yotai Maru" had been at fault
in the collision. The familiar rule is that "an offer of compromise is not
an admission that anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence
against the person making the offer." 11 A compromise is an
agreement between two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall
or put an end to a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent,
an adjustment which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining
more, balanced by the danger of losing more. 12 An offer to
compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on
the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor on the part of a
plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful, since
the compromise is arrived at precisely with a view to avoiding further
controversy and saving the expenses of litigation. 13 It is of the very
nature of an offer of compromise that it is made tentatively,
hypothetically and in contemplation of mutual concessions. 14 The
above rule on compromises is anchored on public policy of the most
insistent and basic kind; that the incidence of litigation should be
reduced and its duration shortened to the maximum extent feasible.
[BERNARDO] Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 109172,
August 19, 1994
FACTS: Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted
several financial accommodations amounting to P1,300,000.00 by
respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and secured
by four (4) promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three
parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over petitioner's stock and
inventories. Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested
for, and was granted by respondent bank, a restructuring of the
remaining indebtedness which then amounted to P1,057,500.00, as all
the previous payments made were applied to penalties and interests.
To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new
promissory notes were executed by Trans-Pacific. The mortgaged
parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two
other parcels of land and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock
inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and the
proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were
turned over to the bank and applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured
loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate original
copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word
"PAID" stamped thereon. Despite the return of the notes, or on
December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific
21
payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest.
According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously
released. Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the
amount demanded by respondent bank. Later, it had a change of heart
and instead initiated an action before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati for specific performance and damages. There it prayed that the
mortgage over the two parcels of land be released and its stock
inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as
having been fully paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible in
evidence against the person making the offer.
HELD: Petitioner claims that the above offer of settlement or
compromise is not an admission that anything is due and is
inadmissible against the party making the offer (Sec. 24, Rule 130,
Rules of Court). Unfortunately, this is not an iron-clad rule. To
determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to
compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits
the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle
the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233
[1980 ed.); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing
McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of
settlement is an effective admission of a borrower's loan balance (L.M.
Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640
[1990]). Exactly, this is what petitioner did in the case before us for
review.
[BERNARDO] Tan v. Rodil Enterprises, G.R. No. 168071, December
18, 2006
FACTS: Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the subject premises, the Ides
ORacca Building since 1959. The Ides ORacca Building, located at
the corner of M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila,
is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. On 18 May 1992, Rodil
Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), entered into a Renewal of a Contract
of Lease over the Ides ORacca Building. A space thereof, known as
Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan. In
Rodil Enterprises Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against
Luciano Tan, the former alleged that Luciano Tan bound himself to pay
under a Contract of Sublease. In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that
he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the Ides
ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. According to the MeTC,
notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank
representations by Luciano Tans counsel of the formers liability in the
form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The foregoing
gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a
fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan,
and was thus, admissible. The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had
explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic consideration for
the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the
rentals in arrears. Tan posits that the aforesaid admission, made in
open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,36 which states, inter alia,
that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of
liability.
ISSUE:
HELD: The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not
an admission of liability. It is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror. The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated
by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,37 to wit:
22
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to
compromise, the circumstances of the case and the intent of the party
making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is
inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits
the existence of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle
the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233
[1980 ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing
McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer
of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance. In
the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly
appreciated petitioners admission as an exception to the general rule
of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations
anent the formers liability in the form of rentals. This expressed
admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an
explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the subleased
premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the
existence of the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not
denied by petitioner. The contracts that were assailed by petitioner are
the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has
been upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No.
129609 and G.R. No. 135537.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not
only as to his liability, but also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the
form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was
clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of
P440,000.00, representing petitioners unpaid rentals from September
1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals
computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after
30 June 2000. The petitioners judicial admission in open court, as
found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds
particular significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that the rentals
due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the
present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion.
Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An admission
made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted
by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored
whether objection is interposed by a party or not. A judicial admission
is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact, which
said party cannot thereafter disprove.
[BERNARDO] Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 117728, June 26, 1996
FACTS: Servicewide Specialists, Inc. (Servicewide) filed a complaint
for replevin and/or sum of money with damages before the then Court
of First Instance Manila, Branch V against private respondents
Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa (Tolosa spouses) and one John Doe.
Servicewide alleged that on January 15, 1981, the Tolosa spouses
purchased from Amante Motor Works one (1) Isuzu passenger-type
jeepney and the spouses failed to pay the installments due on the
purchase price despite several demands. They claimed that they
purchased one jeepney unit from Binan Motor Sales Corporation
(Binan Motors), not Amante Motor Works; that in January 1981, they
ordered another unit from the same corporation through the proddings
of its President and General Manager, Eduardo Garcia; that Garcia
informed the spouses that the additional unit shall be "house financed"
by Binan Motors; that Eduardo Tolosa noticed that the vendor
indicated in the deed of sale was not Binan Motors but Amante Motor
Works; that Garcia explained to Tolosa that he (Garcia) was to make
full payment on the jeepney to Amante Motor Works and that he
(Tolosa) was to pay Garcia the monthly installments thereon; that
Tolosa never received any notice from Binan Motors about the jeepney
unit he ordered. On June 10, 1982, Servicewide amended its
complaint by adding Eduardo Garcia as the defendant in place of John
Doe. Servicewide alleged that the Tolosa spouses, without
Servicewide's knowledge and consent, executed and delivered to
Eduardo Garcia a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage" over
23
the jeepney sought to be recovered. Petitioner insists that there is
enough evidence to prove Garcia's liability, viz.: (1) the pleadings filed
by Garcia and Binan Motors, specifically, the "Answer" to the complaint
and the "Answer to Complaint in Intervention" where Garcia admitted
selling the mortgaged vehicle to the Tolosas which also show that he
sold the same vehicle to Bartina during the effectivity of the mortgage;
(2) the testimony of Lourdes Bartina where she declared that the same
mortgaged vehicle was indeed sold to her by Garcia and Binan Motors;
(3) Garcia's subsequent compromise with Bartina which proves his
liability for the obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the offer of compromise between Bartina and
Garcia and Binan Motors can be taken as admission of Garcias
liability.
HELD: NO. The compromise between Bartina and Garcia and Binan
Motors cannot be taken as an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability. 39
With more reason, a compromise agreement should not be treated as
an admission of liability on the part of the parties vis-a-vis a third
person. The compromise settlement of a claim or cause of action is not
an admission that the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is a
dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of the controversy, 40 nor
is a compromise with one person an admission of any liability to
someone else. 41 The policy of the law should be, and is, to
encourage compromises. When they are made, the rights of third
parties are not in any way affected thereby.
[BULLECER] El Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. L-
21911, September 15, 1924
FACTS:
INSULAR LUMBER had a lighter (a flat-bottomed barge used for
transporting cargo, esp in loading or unloading a ship) called Tatlo
which was to be repaired by EL VARADERO de Manila. The work was
performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could
be, secured from any other company. When repairs were completed
and EL VARADERO gave INSULAR LUMBER the bill, the latter
(INSULAR LUMBER) refused to pay because it was of the opinion that
the price was grossly exorbitant. INSULAR LUMBER, hence, offered a
compromise, but they disagreed. Hence, they went to court. In the CFI,
they entered a compromise again. Ultimately, they never settled on an
agreed figure, because CFI merely adopted INSULAR LUMBERs
proposal (CFI was so impressed with their testimony). Dissatisfied, EL
VARADERO appealed to SC (no appeal to CA was mentioned).
ISSUE:
Whether the compromise must be excluded in arriving at a correct
figure of liability?
HELD:
NO. The general rule is that an offer of compromise is inadmissible.
Where, however, the amount named in the offer to accept a certain
sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of
value, it is relevant. The rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations
does not apply where there is no denial expressed or implied of
liability, and the only questions discussed relate to the amount to be
paid (as in this case).
SC considered 3 points which assisted them in rendering judgment:
1st point GR: Compromise is inadmissible. Where, however, the
amount named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement
appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, it is
relevant. Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question
discussed was the amount to be paid which EL VARADERO insisted
should not be less than P10,241.37, and which INSULAR LUMBER
insisted should not be more than P8,070.12. 2nd point testimony of
one Mariano Yengko, a disinterested witness and is an inspector of
vessels, assessed the fair value of the repairs at P5,134.20, but which,
on cross examination, he raised to between 7K and 8K. 3rd point the
tacit understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs
should be approximately the same as what other companies would
charge. INSULAR LUMBER admits that El Varadero de Navotas
(another branch of El Varadero) would have done the work for about
P8,000. Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing
considerations, we are of the opinion that the reasonable value of the
24
repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by
INSULAR LUMBER Company, was something less than P8,000. We
fix the sum definitely at P7,700.
[BULLECER]Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PAL Employees Savings &
Loan Association, Inc., G.R. No. 201073, February 10, 2016
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (PESALA) is a private non-stock corporation, the
principal purposes of which are "(t)o promote and cultivate the habit of
thrift and saving among its members; and to that end, to receive
moneys on deposits from said members; (t)o loan said deposits to
members when in need." With the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3779 (Savings and Loan Association Law), PESALA submitted the
necessary requirements to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) so
that PESALA will be authorized to operate as a savings and loan
association to which the BSP issued to PESALA Certificate of
Authority No. C-062. Since then and until the filing of the present case
before the trial court, PAL religiously complied with its arrangement
with PESALA to carry-out the payroll deductions of the loan
repayments, capital contributions, and deposits of PESALA members.
The controversy began on July 11, 1997, when PESALA received from
PAL, a Letter informing it that PAL shall implement a maximum 40%
salary deduction on all its Philippine-based employees effective August
1, 1997. The Letter stated that, as all present Philippine-based
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) contain this maximum 40%
salary deduction provision and to prevent "zero net pay" situations,
PAL was going to strictly enforce said provision.
Foreseeing difficulties, PESALA estimated that if the 40% ceiling will
be implemented, "then only around 8% (P19,200,000.00) of the total
monthly payroll of P240,000,000.00 due to PESALA will be collected
by PAL. The balance of around P48,000,000.00 will have to be
collected directly by plaintiff PESALA from its members who number
around 13,000 and who have different offices nationwide." PESALA
claimed that this scenario is highly impossible as PESALA was only
ninth in the priority order of payroll deductions. In the obtaining
circumstances, PESALA's computation showed that "(t)here will
remain an uncollected amount of P38,400,000.00 monthly for which
plaintiff will suffer loss of interest income of around P3,840,000.00
monthly."
PESALA filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Damages or
Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Injunction before the RTC of Pasay City, and which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-1026.
After a finding that the alleged CBA provision on the maximum 40%
deduction was applicable only to union dues, and as the PESALA
deductions were duly authorized by the member-employees, the RTC
granted the injunctive writ prayed for by PESALA, enjoining PAL,
Blanco, and all other persons or officials acting under them from
implementing the maximum 40% limitation on salary deductions, and
ordering PAL to strictly enforce the payroll deductions in favor of
PESALA until further orders from the court.
In an Order dated March 11, 1998, the RTC ordered PAL to remit to
PESALA the amount of P44,488,716.41.
Despite said assurances, PAL still failed to make good its word. On
January 17, 2000, PESALA filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt
against Blanco, Mr. Avelino L. Zapanta (then PAL President), and Mr.
Andrew L. Huang (then PAL Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief
Financial Officer) before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-0016, and consolidated with Civil Case
No. 97-1026.
In the Decision dated November 6, 2002, the RTC made the writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued as permanent, thus ordering PAL
and its officials to strictly comply with and implement the arrangement
between the parties whereby PAL deducts from the salaries of
PESALA members through payroll deductions the loan repayments,
capital contributions and deposits of said members, and to remit the
same to PESALA.
It is also worth mentioning that PAL, through its then counsel Atty.
Emmanuel Pena and then Labor Affairs OIC Atty. Jose C. Blanco,
acknowledged its liability to PESALA in the amount of P44,488,716.41.
In open court, during the hearing held on December 4, 1998, Atty.
Pena and Atty. Blanco assured that: (1) PAL will regularly remit to
PESALA the full amount per pay period that is due to the latter; and (2)
25
PAL will likewise pay PESALA the balance of the previously
undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41 by January 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PALs admission falls under one of the exceptions
to the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
HELD:
Yes. Even if viewed as an offer of compromise, which is generally
inadmissible in evidence against the offeror in civil cases, PAL's
acknowledgment of its liability to PESALA in the amount of
P44,488,716.41 falls under one of the exceptions to the rule of
exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In Tan v. Rodil, 41 the Court, citing the case of Varadero de Manila v.
Insular Lumber Co., held that if there is neither an expressed nor
implied denial of liability, but during the course of negotiations the
defendant expressed a willingness to pay the plaintiff, then such offer
of the defendant can be taken in evidence against him.
In the case at bar, PAL admitted the amount of P44,488,716.41
without an expressed nor implied denial of liability. This admission,
coupled with an assurance of payment, binds PAL.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED. Petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) is ordered to REMIT
to PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) the
principal amount of P44,488,716.41, with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 11, 1998 until fully remitted, without
prejudice to the right of PAL to be reimbursed the principal amount by
the concerned PESALA members.
|||
Criminal Cases
[BULLECER]People v. De Joya y Cruz, G.R. No. 75028, November 8,
1991
FACTS:
In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y
Cruz was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. At
arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court
a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986 convicting De Joya of
the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior
strength, old age, disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old,
the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The accused
being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as
provided in Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.The Court therefore,
sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in
the amount of P550.00.
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into
account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of robbery with
homicide may be listed as follows:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson
Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: Si Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the
deceased victim, took place two weeks before the robbery and
homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a
bicycle which appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house
without the consent of the victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which
according to Herminia, she found near a cabinet in their house one (1)
meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified
as one of the pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the
previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the
afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of the Valencias, standing
and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during
the four-day wake.
In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the
circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt on the
part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the
case amicably".
ISSUE:
26
Whether or not the testimony given by the son-in-law of the deceased
as to the supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to settle
the criminal charge amicably is conclusive.
HELD:
No. We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so
far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to offer a
compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the
provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides that:
"SECTION 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of
compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is not
admissible in evidence against the person making the offer. However,
in criminal cases which are not allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt." (Emphasis supplied)
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above
testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the deceased
victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused"
nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the part of the appellant may
be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made
no mention of any attempt on the part of appellant to settle the criminal
case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the
trial court either did not believe that appellant had tried to compromise
the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be
deemed to have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and
killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific
detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had
impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with
homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus
consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of
circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise
to a compelling inference that appellant had indeed robbed and slain
Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum
total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce that
moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and unsettled
after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence
supporting the judgment of conviction.
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's
guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond
reasonable. The decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
appellant Pioquinto de Joya is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
[BULLECER]People v. Mejia y Villafania, G.R. Nos. 118940-41 &
119407, July 7, 1997
FACTS:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay
Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a
passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and
a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple
stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on
the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the
jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the
road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a
consequence of the injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito,
Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis,
Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person.
Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the
incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after.
Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in question,
while the others have remained at large.|||
Three (3) separate criminal complaints for murder, frustrated murder
and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended) were filed against the accused. The first two cases were
assigned to the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, presided by Judge
Crispin Laron, while the third case was assigned to Judge Silverio
Castillo of Branch 43 of the same court.
At the arraignment, the four accused entered a plea of innocence in
each case.
After trial, the Laron court convicted the accused of murder and
frustrated murder, while the Castillo court convicted them of violation of
the Anti-Carnapping Act.
27
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and
relied heavily on the identification of the accused by Catugas, the
absence of ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the
parents of the accused to compromise the cases.|||
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court properly applied Section 27 of Rule 130
of the ROC.
HELD:
No. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants
authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of
payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation
of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he
incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to
reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.|||Catugas
had ulterior motive in implicating the appellants. He demanded
P80,000.00 from the parents of the appellants in consideration of his
exculpatory testimony. But the parents could not deliver the money as
they cannot afford it. There is no evidence that any of the appellants
authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of the
payment of the P80,000.00.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the prosecution evidence has
established beyond doubt the carnapping of the passenger jeepney, it
is not convinced with moral certainty that the appellants committed the
crimes charged. The nine persons happened to be passengers of the
jeepney by accident, not by design. Witness Catugas admitted that he
recognized only three of the nine persons. In the Castillo court,
Catugas declared that he was stabbed by the nine persons, but on
cross-examination he candidly admitted that only one person stabbed
him but he could not remember anymore the person. He also admitted
that none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of the jeepney
driver.
Decision reversed and appellants are acquitted.
| statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of
[CANA] San Miguel Corp. v775. Kalalo, G.R. No. 185522, June 13,
2012
FACTS: As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo
had been a dealer of beer products since 1998. She had a credit
overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the
delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to
petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount
corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of
the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual
amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty
beer bottles and cases from the gross value of the goods delivered.
Once they succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC,
that amount would be written on the blank check, and respondent
would fund her account accordingly.
In time, respondent's business grew and the number of beer products
delivered to her by SMC increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week.
Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it became very difficult
for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she
requested regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to
comply.
In 2000, SMC's agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated
checks to cope with the probable increase in orders during the busy
Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the
balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash
payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases,
she noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She
then insisted that it provide her with a detailed statement of account,
but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC
to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the
last seven checks she had issued to petitioner. On 19 October 2000,
instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC
sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks.
AHDaET
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the
agents of SMC, respondent's counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of
Compromise") wherein Kalalo "acknowledge[d] the receipt of the
P816,689.00" and "submitt[ed] a proposal by way of 'Compromise
Agreement' to settle the said obligation."
28
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9
March 2001, it filed a Complaint against respondent for violating the
Bouncing Checks Law.
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update
her account. During trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and funded
checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the
Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed
to petitioner was P71,009. Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of
Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared,
she was being threatened by SMC agents with imprisonment, and that
she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.
ISSUE: whether or not the offer of compromise by the petitioner is an
admission of his liability.
HELD: NO. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the aforequoted letter
does not contain an express acknowledgment of liability. At most, what
respondent acknowledged was thereceipt of the statement of account,
not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to
petitioner SMC cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In
Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we examined the
reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence
against the offeror: CHDAaS
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court,
a person is entitled to "buy his or her peace" without danger of being
prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication
made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every
offer to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who
presents it, many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or
entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be
exploited as a confession of weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not
intended as admissions by the parties making them. A true offer of
compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an admission on
the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of
a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it
is made with a view to avoid controversy and save the expense of
litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it
is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual
concessions. (citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondent's Offer of Compromise may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. It quotes Rule
130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which states:
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer
of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of
Compromise dated 5 December 2000 was made prior to the filing of
the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of Compromise was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. SHCaEA
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the
Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted the contents of the
Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the letter
prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of
imprisonment from petitioner's agents. The trial courts and the CA
gave weight to her justification, and we find no cogent reason to
disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise
may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor
can it be the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of
P921,215.
[CANA] People v. Manuel, G.R. No. 92503, July 8, 1991
29
FACTS: At the early dawn of November 28, 1987, complainant Dolores
Biag, a 15-year old and single college student, along with seven (7)
other persons, were hiking home to Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino. They
came from sitio Dalemdem, Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino where they
attended a birthday party of one of their friends.
"After their other companions were already in their respective houses,
appellant Camilo Manuel, who was behind the complainant and Benita
Cabigat, suddenly grabbed complainant's hand, twisted it at her back,
covered her mouth with his hand and dragged her to a waiting shed. At
this juncture, Benita Cabigat ran away.
"At the waiting shed, appellant made his sexual advances. Initially,
complainant resisted. But appellant boxed her twice which rendered
her unconscious. Thus, appellant succeeded in ravishing and
deflowering her.
"After she regained consciousness, appellant was no longer there and
she was writhing in pain. Her clothes were torn. Then she cried.
"Hearing her cries, Benita Cabigat came to her succor. Cabigat
brought complainant to the house of Cabigat's sister. When asked why
complainant was crying, she did not answer. Cabigat then
accompanied her home.
"Upon reaching their house, complainant revealed everything to her
parents, that her honor and reputation could no longer be redeemed.
Her mother immediately reported the incident to their Barangay
Captain who happens to be the uncle of appellant. Appellant's parents,
their daughter-in-law and brother went to complainant's house to settle
amicably the case. Appellant would marry complainant.
"Complainant, however, refused to marry appellant. On November 30,
1989, she together with her mother and brother went to the Integrated
National Police of Aglipay, Quirino and formally filed her complaint
against appellant
ISSUE: won the offer of compromise here is an admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. It pointed out that the offer of the appellant's family to
simply settle the case constitutes an implied admission of guilt, the rule
being that "(i)n criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as
an implied admission of guilt." As it also aptly observed, the
propositions or insinuations of marriage were all rejected by
complainant, which acts reinforce her credibility and resolute desire to
bring to the bar of justice the man who had ruined her life and
shattered her future. In People vs. Manzano, we held that the attempt
of the parents of the accused to settle the case with the complainant
was considered an implied admission of guilt. We have further ruled
that an offer of marriage by the accused, during the investigation of the
rape case, is also an admission of guilt.
On the other hand, while appellant claims that he and the complainant
were sweethearts, he miserably failed to substantiate this allegation.
He had never even actually visited the victim in her home prior to the
rape, nor could he come up with any other proof of his alleged past
romantic relations with the complainant. In People vs. Valdez, supra,
the Court definitely found a similar story of the appellant therein to be
untrue on the ground that if the said appellant and complainant were
really sweethearts, the latter would have readily accepted the former's
proposal of marriage. Had there been love between the two, the girl
would not have jeopardized their relationship by exposing everything to
her mother and to the authorities, much less by filing a complaint for
rape against him and publicly testifying therein. On the foregoing
premises and our own calibration of the evidence, we are convinced
that the pretensions of appellant must be rejected and the case of the
people should be sustained.
[CANA] People v. Mangat y Palomata, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999
FACTS: Thirteen-year-old Kristal F. Manasan lived with her family in
Barangay Lusong, San Agustin, Tablas Island, Romblon. On July 10,
1995, Kristal went out of their house to go to the shore, about 2 1/2
kilometers away. To reach it, she has to pass by Saguilpit creek.
Kristal failed to return home and could not be found for three days.
Alarmed, Herminio Manasan, father of Kristal, reported the matter to
their barangay council.
At four in the afternoon of July 13, 1995, SPO1 Fajutag received
information from Brgy. Kagawad Ronnie Manao of Brgy. Lusong that a
decomposing body was found along Lusong River. SPO1 Fajutag
proceeded to Brgy. Lusong to verify the report. Upon reaching the
30
place, he saw the dead body of a girl lying on her belly. The victim was
nude and the upper part of her body was placed inside an opening of a
stone hole. The panties and shorts of the victim were also found on the
riverside, along with a plastic bag containing a pitcher and a
headband. The place where the body was found was a cave-like
structure on top of which was a foot-trail used by local residents, and
underneath water flowed to the lowlands. da
The body was later identified to be that of Kristal F. Manasan. Dr.
Cynthia Baradon-Mayor examined the cadaver and certified that Kristal
died of multiple hemorrhage due to multiple fracture on the head. The
victim also suffered multiple hymenal and anal lacerations. Her bladder
went out of the vaginal canal and her intestines went out of the rectal
vault. From all indications, Dr. Mayor concluded that the victim was
brutally raped and murdered.
Pacifico Magramo, a farmer and resident of Brgy. Lusong, was
presented as prosecution witness. He testified that at 2:30 p.m. of July
10, 1995, he was walking downhill along Saguilpit creek in Brgy.
Lusong, carrying a sack of copra which he was bringing to the shore.
He chanced upon accused Dominador Mangat pushing the naked and
lifeless body of thirteen-year-old Kristal into a rock hole. Seeing him
too, accused warned him not to divulge to anyone what he saw or he
would be next. Scared, Magramo continued downhill while accused
walked away followed by his dog. He also testified that the accused
was wearing a gray sando and white pair of shorts, and was carrying a
bolo in a sheath hanging on his left shoulder by a string.
Jaime Magramo and his wife traversed the same pathway at two
o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1995. They were going downhill
with Jaime carrying a sack of copra on his shoulder. While passing
along Saguilpit creek, Jaime saw the accused conversing with his
father Benedicto Mangat. Jaime though could not hear what they were
talking about. On July 14, 1995, Jaime was informed by his son who
was in Grade V that the dead body of Kristal was found along Lusong
River. It was found exactly in the same spot where the accused was
seen talking with his father in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.
With the recovery of the body of Kristal on July 14, 1995, there was
widespread speculation that the accused was the culprit. On July 15,
1995, the police authorities arrested the accused. Bothered by his
conscience, Pacifico Magramo eventually came out in the open and
reported to the police what he had witnessed in the afternoon of July
10, 1995.
While at the police station, the accused and his father offered to settle
the case amicably. SPO1 Fajutag executed an affidavit.
The accused offered an alibi. He claimed that on July 10, 1995, he was
working with his wife at a farm located in the mountain of Lusong from
morning until lunch time, after which they went home to their house,
located just 50 meters away, to eat lunch and rest. At 1:00 p.m., they
returned to the farm and continued their weeding until 4:30 p.m. This
was corroborated by his wife, Alice Mangat. The accused admitted,
though, that he had a dog which fit the description given by
prosecution witness Pacifico Magramo. Corollarily, the accused
asserted that the prosecution witnesses have an ill-motive in testifying
against him as he did not vote for their candidate in the last May 8,
1995 elections.
ISSUE: WON the offer of the accused to settle amicably is an
admission of guilt.
HELD: YES. The most damaging piece of evidence which points to the
appellant's culpability is the affidavit executed by SPO1 Fajutag to the
effect that the appellant and his father, Benedicto Mangat, offered to
settle the case amicably. It is most telling for the defense not to have
made any effort whatsoever to dispute this. Said gesture can only be
taken to mean an admission of guilt. In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law
to be amicably settled or compromised, an offer of compromise by the
accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.|
It is true, as contended by the defense, that there is no direct evidence
linking the accused to the crime charged. There is to Our mind,
however, ample circumstantial evidence which tend to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused was the author of the offense.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial
than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be
31
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that
the accused committed the crime. In this case, not only was the
accused-appellant's presence at the crime scene established, there is
also clear and convincing testimony that he was seen pushing the
body of the victim into a cave-like hole in the rock.
[CANA] Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20, 2006
FACTS: At around 10:00 p.m. on March 12, 1992, Renato Concepcion,
Marcelo Ringor, Marino Servidad, Danny Singson and their supervisor,
Engr. Roy Rivera left the Baguio Colleges Foundation after overtime
work. Rivera requested Marino Servidad to buy two bottles of gin and
invited his companions to the Heike Jade Restaurant where they had a
drinking spree. They ordered two bottles of beer each. After two
bottles, Concepcion noticed that Rivera appeared dizzy, so he
instructed Singson to help bring Rivera home. Singson went out to hail
a taxicab along Session Road. He was followed at a distance by
Ringor, Servidad, Concepcion and Rivera. As Rivera could hardly
walk, Concepcion braced Rivera's arms around him. They were by the
Jaime's Fastfood Restaurant when suddenly, Rivera lost his balance
and accidentally bumped petitioner Bricenio. Concepcion immediately
apologized, "Boss, please bear with us because our engineer is tipsy."
Petitioner suddenly pulled Rivera inside the restaurant, picked a
wooden stool, and hit Rivera's head twice. As a result, Rivera fell on
the floor. Ringor and Servidad quickly ran away. CDAHIT
Singson, while waiting for a taxicab noticed the commotion inside the
restaurant. He saw Concepcion by the entrance of the restaurant
hurling empty bottles into the restaurant. He rushed to help his
companions. Singson saw Rivera lying on the floor. Singson tried to
get Rivera out but petitioner's companions who were throwing empty
bottles right back at them stopped Singson. Singson also started to
throw bottles at the petitioner. Concepcion was hit on the face when he
tried to get Rivera. After about fifteen minutes of bottle-throwing, two
men arrived at the scene. Thinking that these men were petitioner's
companions, Singson told Concepcion to flee. They ran but the two
men, who turned out to be police officers, caught up with them. They
were arrested and brought to the Baguio City Police Station. At the
police station, Singson asked the police officers to go back and get
Rivera at the Jaime's Fastfood Restaurant. But they were later
informed that Rivera had died.
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on March 13, 1992, Singson, Concepcion,
Servidad, petitioner and Noe Sapguian, an employee of Jaime's
Fastfood Restaurant, were questioned by the police. Concepcion
identified petitioner as the person who killed Rivera. Petitioner was
arrested and indicted for homicide.
ISSUE: won the petitioner admitted his guilt.
HELD: YES. The records show that the petitioner offered the
prosecution witnesses a compromise involving a separate case that he
filed against them. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-
offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
Petitioner's claim that an indication of his innocence was his bringing
the victim to the hospital. We reiterate one pronouncement in People v.
Loto, where we held that the accused, in helping bring the victim to the
hospital, does not by itself prove his innocence, for it could have been
motivated by feelings other than a genuine desire for the victim to
recover.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. De Guzman y Sico, G.R. No. 117217,
December 2, 1996
FACTS: Gilda Ambray filed a case of rape against Gener De Guzman
Y Sico. Homeward bound from her work as a sales clerk, complainant
Gilda Ambray was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision, waiting
for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten
minutes. When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants,
sitting at the guardhouse, she approached him and asked him some
questions. The complainant recognized the accused very well because
it was summertime and the gate of the subdivision was well-lit.
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed
her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. While on board the
tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different route. She got
scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while
stop the tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When
they reached Phase II of the same subdivision near an unfinished
house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle. She
32
alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept.
Gilda then walked away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the
accused embraced her from behind, covered her mouth and held her
neck tightly.
(rape followed) (2 attempts were made prior to the act that
consummated the rape. The accused did not succeed on the first 2
attempts because of the complainants resistance)
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband,
Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she was raped by the accused. They then
went to report the incident to the owner of the homeowners
association and NBI. Complainant also submitted to physical
examinations, the results of which affirmed that there was a sexual
intercourse with force.
Then, Bebey and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked
the help of Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accuseds kumadre, to
beg for Gildas forgiveness for the accuseds sake. The following day,
Resurreccion accompanied the accuseds parents, wife, children and
sister-in-law to Gildas house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for
forgiveness, she told them that should not be tolerated.
ISSUE: w/n the plea of forgiveness done by the relatives of the
accused amounts to an implied admission of his guilt?
RULING: YES.
The Court said, . . . any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification
of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his
parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness
from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified
to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He
chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the unequivocal
pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was strongly established
by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the
house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise,
the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error
and his Appellants Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably
then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness,
or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to
pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children
and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by
law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would
ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to
forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment
against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from
or retribution upon (an offender). In People vs. Calimquim, we stated:
The fact that appellants mother sought forgiveness for her son from
Corazons father is an indication of guilt.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Abadies y Claveria, G.R. Nos. 139346-50,
July 11, 2002
FACTS: Accused-appellant stands charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
Accused JOSE ABADIES y CLAVERIA commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of his 17-year old daughter ROSALIE ABADIES Y
MANUNGHAYA by kissing, mashing her breast and touching her
private parts against her will and consent.
The facts show that accused-appellant has been living for the past
twenty years with his common-law wife, Catalina Manunghaya,
together with their two children, Jonathan and complainant Rosalie.
The family sleeps together in one room and usually Catalina wakes up
early in the morning to buy bread. It was during these short periods of
time while Catalina was out of the house that the abuses took place.
On the dates material to these cases, complainant was 17 years old.
Accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi. He denies
having committed acts of lasciviousness against complainant. He
testified that on the dates of the alleged incidents, he woke up between
7:00 to 7:30 a.m.; that complainant and her mother were already
preparing breakfast; and after eating breakfast, he would leave for
work. He also testified on the reason why the charges at bar were filed
against him. Allegedly, on July 26, 1997, he asked complainant what
was happening to their lives as his children were aloof with him.
Complainant threatened to end her life because she felt she was to be
blamed for their problems. Accused-appellant also declared he was
33
too strict with his children, and even inflicts physical harm on them
when they disobey him.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant asserts that the court a quo
erred in finding the prosecution's version more credible and in
convicting him despite the implied pardon given by complainant.
Accused-appellant likewise contends that there exists no factual basis
for the trial court to consider his plea of forgiveness in his letter to
complainant as an implied admission of guilt.
ISSUE: w/n the plea of forgiveness may be admitted as an implied
admission of guilt
RULING:
YES.
A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily show
that accused-appellant was indeed seeking pardon for his misdeeds.
Some of the pertinent portions read as follows: "I made this letter to
ask your 'forgiveness. x x x Alam mo bang sobra-sobra na ang
pagsisisi ko sa ginawa kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na
hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong puso ko ng pinagsisisihan.
Patawarin mo na ako anak. x x x." There is no iota of doubt that
accused-appellant was asking forgiveness for having committed the
acts with which he now stands charged. Settled is the rule that in
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed
by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness
unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may
be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. Under the
circumstances, accused-appellants plea of forgiveness should be
received as an implied admission of guilt.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998
FACTS: Private complainant Emmie R. Rosales was seventeen years
old when the dastardly outrage befell her. She testified that she and
her younger sister, Melissa, were asleep in a room in their house and
were then the only persons at home because their grandfather, who
lived with them, was in the hospital at that time.
At around midnight, complainant suddenly awoke as she felt a heavy
weight pressing down upon her. She thereupon realized that a man,
clad only in his underwear, lay on top of her. She was about to shout
when he poked a gun at her neck and warned her not to create any
noise or he would kill her.
Although the house lights were off, moonlight streamed through the
sawali door of the room, enabling complainant to see the intruder. She
recognized him as appellant Senen Prades, her barriomate. It appears
that he gained entry into the house through a passageway in the
kitchen.
Then the accused succeeded in raping the victim.
Several days later, complainant received two letters from appellant.
She saw appellant hand the first letter to her grandmother who later
gave it to her. The other letter was given by appellant to complainant
through the latters sister. Aggrieved by all these circumstances,
complainant decided to disclose to her grandfather the sexual assault.
appellant escaped from confinement before the prosecution had
completed the presentation of its evidence. A general warrant of arrest
was issued for his apprehension and it was ordered that he be
included in the list of wanted criminals. Appellant, however, has not
been recaptured up to now
ISSUE: w/n the letters sent by the accused to the victim served as an
admission of his guilt
RULING:
YES.
it is conceded that after the rape, he sent complainant two letters in
which he implored her forgiveness and offered to leave his wife so that
he could be with her. In fine, appellant sealed his own fate by admitting
his crime under the seal of a virtual confession in fact, if not in law.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those
allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. For this rule to apply, it is not necessary that
a complaint be first filed by the victim because all that is required is
that after committing the crime, appellant or his representative makes
an offer to compromise and such offer is proved
Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed
some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as
34
analogous to an attempt to compromise. The letters of appellant
containing an appeal for condonation of his acts cannot but be
construed as an implied admission of his guilt.
The Court is persuaded that appellant sent complainant the letters
introduced in evidence by the prosecution and that said letters
contained an admission of his guilt, thus confirming his culpability. If
appellant did not forcibly rape complainant on the night of March 24,
1994, complainant may possibly have accepted appellants offer to live
with her. At the very least, she would not have revealed her misfortune
so as not to expose the despoliation of her virtue. That complainant
chose to divulge the incident and subject herself to the disgrace of
public scrutiny and scandal buttresses the charge that she had been
criminally ravished by appellant.
Further, because no evidence was presented by the defense to
discredit this affirmation of guilt derived from the contents of the letters,
the authenticity of said letters is no longer open to question. The letters
thus bolster and corroborate complainants testimony on the identity
and guilty of appellant.
Another factor supporting appellants conviction is his flight. By
escaping from confinement during trial and failing to turn himself in
despite his subsequent conviction by the trial court, and despite the
standing warrant of arrest, appellant has become a fugitive from
justice.
[CASTILLEJO] People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26,
2008
FACTS:
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly
grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to
hurt her if she would make a noise.
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind
tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed his maong
pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he
removed her short pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and
inserted his penis into her private parts and made push and pull
movements. He likewise raised AAAs sandoand mashed her breast.
AAA felt pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt
something sticky in her private part after Larry made the push and pull
movements.
Victim got pregnant.
CCC (AAA's father), testified that the family of accused-appellant went
to their house and initially offered P50,000 and later P150,000; that in
January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house for the wedding
reception. Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
Defense however claimed that accused could never be on the crime
scene since he was with his wife while giving birth and that he never
left her side.
This was corroborated by the hilot and the victims friend who testified
that she never left the victim when her shorts got hooked; that they
went together to the store of Auntie Beth where they parted.
Family of the accused also claimed that it was because the other sister
of the rape victim was supposed to marry their other son, brother of
accused, but they had an altercation regarding the bills for the
wedding. So the victims family tries to falsely accuse his other son of
the rape for revenge.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution
and the defense conflict on certain points, more notably the claim by
BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the case.
This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and
CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the
case at bar in light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of
compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
The accused testified that he had not asked his parents to plead the
victims family for compromise, instead they went there on their own.
ISSUE: w/n the act of the parents of the accused to compromise on
their own will amounts to an implied admission of guilt
RULING:
NO.
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot
be used against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified
35
that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant
was not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to
an admission of the party himself. Although the Court has held in some
cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case
is an implied admission of guilt, we believe that the better rule is that
for a compromise to amount to an implied admission of guilt, the
accused should have been present or at least authorized the proposed
compromise. Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was
not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made,
such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give
less weight to the testimonies of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB
and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the
victim, respectively. Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement
simply contradict each other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts
did not consider the alleged offer of settlement in resolving the case.
ACCUSED WAS ACQUITTED.
The friend of the victim, Joy, testified against the family of the victim
and claimed that the victims mother insist that she change her
statement to further impugn the accused.
[DLC] People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894, October 3, 1996
FACTS:
On or about June 28, 1992, in the City of Laoag, the said
accused, Moreno Bayani, by means of force and intimidation with the
point of a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant Maria Elena Nieto, against
her will.
The complainant's testimony was faithfully summarized below:
In 1992, Maria Elena Nieto was a fourth-year high school student of St.
Lawrence Academy, a Catholic School of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She
was then 15 years old. At that time both her parents were abroad as
overseas contract workers. On July 19, 1989, Maria Elena together
with her siblings moved to Barangay Manayon, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to
live with her paternal grandmother Rosalina B. Nieto, her uncle
Eugenio Nieto and his family. There, she met appellant. Appellant was
a neighbor. He was close to her paternal uncles, Eugenio and Rudy
Nieto. Appellant often went to her grandmother's house. She was
considered a relative. At about 6:00 in the morning of June 28, 1992,
appellant went to their residence. He asked her if she could
accompany him to visit a friend in Laoag City. She told appellant to ask
permission from her grandmother who consented. At 9:30 of that same
morning, appellant fetched her. At about 11:30 a.m., they reached
Laoag City. They proceeded to a boarding house near the Northern
Christian College. There appellant visited a woman. After about 30
minutes, appellant called for her and they left. Appellant brought her to
a restaurant. At that time, Maria Elena did not know the name of the
restaurant. Neither did she know then that the second floor of the
restaurant was a hotel. It was her first time to be in such place.
Appellant invited her for lunch there. She declined as she was still full
and suggested that they go home. Appellant, however, called for a
tricycle and told her "[w]e will first go to a friend of mine before going
home. He brought her to the "third floor of a certain building". While
there, Maria Elena was made to wait outside and "he went to talk with
somebody". Upon returning, appellant told her that "it was in the
second floor where the person he wanted to talk with was". They
proceeded to the second floor. Upon reaching the door of a room at
the second floor of the building, appellant took hold of her wrist. She
tried to free herself, but all the more appellant took hold of her wrist
and he "opened the door" with a key.
After opening the door, appellant pushed Maria Elena inside. She
wanted to run away but was prevented by appellant, who pulled her
hair. Appellant then locked the door. Appellant pushed her hard
making her kneel down on the floor beside the bed. All that time,
appellant was holding her hair, pressing her head against the bed.
Maria Elena struggled to free herself. This prompted appellant to
tighten his hold on her hair and he poked a gun against her right
temple. Appellant then told her "[y]ou remove your pants, otherwise, I
will shoot you." Out of fear, she complied with appellant's order. While
Maria Elena was removing her pants, appellant removed his pants,
36
too. Thereafter, appellant pushed Maria Elena to the bed and forced
her to lie down. He ordered her to open her thighs and then he went on
top of her. She struggled but felt weak. Appellant successfully had
sexual intercourse with her. While doing this, appellant was holding his
gun in his right hand. Thereafter, Maria Elena wanted to leave.
However, appellant pointed his gun at her and threatened to kill her if
she revealed the rape incident to anybody. After a while, appellant
repeated the sexual intercourse for two more times. All the while,
appellant was uttering indecent words at her, among them, "This is
something very delicious. You will be longing for this". Appellant
repeated his threat to kill her as well as members of her family, if she
related the rape incident to anybody. They left the room at about 3:00
in the afternoon. She went home alone.
In view of the threats of appellant, Maria Elena did not immediately
relate the incident to her family. She was forced to divulge the rape
committed by appellant against her, when her family noticed her
tummy was bloating. At that time, Maria Elena and Ambrosio Malapit,
Jr., were sweethearts. The incident was reported by Ambrosio to the
principal of St. Lawrence Academy, who went to Maria Elena's house
in order to verify. She related to the principal what appellant did to her
including his threats to kill her and her family. The school took the
initiative of hiding her. She stayed for 1 week in the house of a teacher.
Thereafter, she was transferred to Madre Nazarena in Laoag City, an
institution run by nuns.
The rape incident was reported to the NBI. The defense presented the
accused and Bernard Javier, the information officer of the Dragon Inn.
The accused not only admitted having sexual intercourse with the
complainant; he asserted, in the main, that the complainant was his
mistress and that the further acts of sexual intercourse after the said
date were with her consent. Defense witness Bernard Javier
corroborated the accused's testimony as to the couple's checking-in at
the Dragon Inn and further declared that upon checking-out he noticed
that the complainant "was happy and even laughing."
The prosecution presented as rebuttal witnesses Romeo Nieto and
Rosario Nieto, the complainant's uncle and father, respectively. Romeo
testified that the accused came to his house where the complainant
resided bringing gifts (powder, soap, cotton, and milk) for the
complainant and offered to amicably settle the case. In all, the accused
came thrice for the purpose.
The Court is convinced that the accused tried to amicably settle the
case with the private complainants mother as testified to by Romeo
Nieto. It is inconceivable that Romeo Nieto, an ordinary citizen could
have the courage to drop the names of highly-placed and influential
officials in the province Despite the protestations of the accused and
Major Alio the Court has no doubt that the accused was present in all
the three (3) occasions related by Romeo Nieto wherein they were
looking for the private complainants mother.
At any rate, his non-presence during these occasions cannot erase the
fact that the highly-placed and influential provincial officials went there
on his behalf -- that was to ask for a compromise deal. It would be
absurd to assume that these highly-placed and influential officials went
to the residence of Romeo Nieto on their own without the knowledge of
the accused.
Verily, the attempt of the accused to amicably settle the case is an
admission of guilt of the crime charged against him
After the parties submitted their memoranda, the trial court
promulgated the decision appealed from. It gave full faith and credit to
the evidence of the prosecution. The accused seasonably appealed
from the decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding that the appellant offered to
compromise the case
HELD:
NO. Oddly, the accused takes inconsistent positions on this
matter. On one hand, he claims that he sought forgiveness, but on the
other hand, while testifying as regards a meeting with the
complainant's mother during the conduct of the trial, the accused
claimed that he "did not ask for forgiveness because what they
charged against him is not true." At any rate, the accused's attempt to
split hairs between forgiveness and compromise is unavailing. While
compromise "is an agreement made between two or more parties as a
37
settlement of matters in dispute," the term "forgiveness" necessarily
implies a consciousness of wrongdoing or guilt.
The weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which
admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to
show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt,
but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some
other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer
to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensure
therefrom.
As such, we adopt the pertinent portions of the lower court's ruling on
this subject and declare that no reversible error was committed in
appreciating the accused's plea for forgiveness as an implied
admission of guilt, in accordance with Section 27(2), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This can only be buttressed by the persistence of the
accused's intercessors in attempting to see the complainant at least
thrice.
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party/ Res inter alios acta, Part One
[DLC] People v. Raquel, G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996
FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito attended to the person knocking at
the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men
emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her
husband lifeless while a man took her husband's gun and left hurriedly.
She shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their
water pump while 2 other men ran away.
George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for help. He reported the
incident to the police. The police came and found one of the
perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from
the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce was first treated at a clinic before he was brought to the
police station.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants
Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and
that they may be found in their residence. However, the police failed to
find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting
incident. Appellants were later on apprehended on different
occasions. Appellants relied on alibi as their defense.
Accused Valeriano Raquel testified that on July 2, 1986 he left Paatan,
Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao.
He stayed in the house of his sister-in-law. Together with Boy
Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4.
On July 5, while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied
by his father arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of
Kabacan, Cotabato. He already heard the name of accused Amado
Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of land in Paatan.
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old, testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at
home when his son Valeriano Raquel told him that he was going to
Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay. On (the) same
date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to leave
since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at
Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house,
looking for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and
even accompanied them to Tungol where they arrested his son
Valeriano.
The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced them
accordingly. Herein appellants filed a notice of appeal wherein they
manifested that they were appealing the decision to the CA .In view of
the penalty imposed, the CA properly forwarded the same to us.
ISSUE:
W/N trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and
Valeriano Raquel despite absence of evidence positively implicating
them as the perpetrators of the crime
HELD;
YES. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
38
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the
assailants of her husband. Even the corroborating witness, George
Jovillano, in his testimony made no mention of who shot Agapito
Gambalan.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the
identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on
the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them
as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused
escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at
large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused
may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in
open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine
his co-accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary
that the same are hearsay as against said accused.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the
confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A
distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and
judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his
confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential
exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the present
case.
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered
in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be
waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.
These rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and
foundation, were never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt. Without the positive identification of appellants, the
evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to them.
While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the
evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and
evidentiarily barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness
of the defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its
own evidence. In fact, alibi need not be inquired into where the
prosecution's evidence is weak.
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every reasonable
doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty
of guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met
nor were the standards therefor fulfilled.
[DLC] Tamargo v. Awingan, G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail
Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003
along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police
had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003.
He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty.
Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and
that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of
Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution
finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does.On
February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed
against them in the RTC of Manila. Columna was arrested in the
39
province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for
detention and trial
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.)
executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as look out
during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias
Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent
Lloyd Antiporda.The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor
of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio
Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty.
Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother
of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by
Columna. On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the
investigating prosecutor who subjected him to clarificatory questions.
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They
alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan
during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his
political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas
admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty
post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and
once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case
against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against
Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as
Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted
by the Sandiganbayan.
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio
presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent
Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna
disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how
he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He
stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.
Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May
25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his
handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna
to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During
the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted
the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed
the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been
employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor. Meanwhile,
in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon
Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced
to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the October
22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside
the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention
center.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to
the DOJ. DOJ reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the
Informations for murder. Accordingly, the Informations were filed and
the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC. However, on
August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion
for reconsideration and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations.This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of
Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was
admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the
trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. RTC
granted the motion to withdraw the Informations. Petitioner filed an MR
but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same.
The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge Zenaida R.
Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner. She denied the
MR of the Antipordas. Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the CA. The
Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case.
CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion
because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account
in concluding that there was no probable cause against all the
accused. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted
confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to
establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession
40
was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the
conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
The CA denied reconsideration, CA likewise granted the
petition for certiorari of respondents Antiporda. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna had committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations
for murder against respondents
HELD:
NO. The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of
resolving the motion to withdraw the informations effectively
sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus
impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead, she should
have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made
available to her at that point of the cases. No less than that was
expected and required of her as a judicial officer. According to Santos
v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment of
the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits,
documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of
the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce
before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the court by
the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial
confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as
evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against
his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.The
reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts
are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his
conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by
the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an
admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
(b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the
witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on
recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
[GUTIERREZ] FGU Insurance Corp. v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corp.,
G.R. No. 141910,
August 6, 2002
FACTS:
41
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver
thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its
Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles (Respondent Driver Eroles),
from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South
Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon
Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north
diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban,
Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a
deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid
to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the
sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights
and interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of
the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS.
Since the GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for
damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and
Respondent Driver Eroles with the Regional Trial Court,.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Driver Eroles can be held liable even if it was not
party to the contract of carriage?
RULING:
No, Respondent Driver Eroles without concrete proof of his negligence
or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not
being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal
and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract
can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors
who have assumed their personality or their juridical position.
Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet
prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person.
Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa
aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant
for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant.
[EVIDENTE]
Reyes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212593-94, 213163-78, 213540-41,
213542-43,
215880-94 & 213475-76, March 15, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their
respective participations in the PDAF scam, involving, as reported by
whistleblowers Benhur Luy et al., the illegal utilization and pillaging of
public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Enrile for the years
2004 to 2010, in the total amount of P172,834,500.00.16 Tersely put,
petitioners were charged for the following acts:
(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material
to this case, for fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's
illegal PDAF disbursements
(b) Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF
scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement
of Senator Enrile's PDAF
(c) the Napoles siblings, as high ranking officers of the JLN
Corporation, for continuously diverting the sums sourced from Senator
Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control
(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger, for
assisting in the fraudulent releases of the PDAF funds to the JLN-
controlled NGOs and eventually remitting the funds to Janet Napoles's
control
As alleged, the systemic pillaging of Senator Enrile's PDAF
commences with Janet Napoles meeting with Senator Enrile himself or
through his Chief of Staff, Reyes, or Ruby Tuason - with the former
rendering an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a
"kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.
In her defense, Reyes filed her Consolidated Counter-Affidavit,
contending that the letters and documents which she purportedly
signed in connection with the allocation of the PDAF of Senator Enrile
were all forged, and that none of the three (3) witnesses - Luy, Suas,
and Nova Kay B. Macalintal - who mentioned her name in their
respective affidavits, directly and positively declared that she received
money from the PDAF in question. For their part, the Napoles siblings
42
filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit opposing their inclusion as
respondents in the complaint. They argued that the affidavits and
statements of the whistleblowers contain nothing more than mere
hearsay and self-serving declarations, which are, therefore,
inadmissible evidence unworthy of credence. On the other hand, while
De Asis admitted that he was an employee of the JLN Corporation
from 2006-2010 in various capacities as driver, bodyguard or
messenger; that he had no knowledge in setting up or managing the
corporations which he supposedly helped incorporate; and that he did
not personally benefit from the alleged misuse of the PDAF.
Meanwhile, despite due notice, Janet Napoles failed to file her counter-
affidavits to the foregoing Complaints. Thus, the Ombudsman
considered her to have waived her right to file the same.
While preliminary investigation proceedings were ongoing before the
Ombudsman, Tuason, who was likewise charged under OMB-C-C-13-
0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396, surfaced as an additional witness and
offered her affidavit implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam. The
Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution dated
March 28, 2014 finding probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes,
Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of Plunder, and against
Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen
(15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly,
separate motions for reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet
Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis.
Consequently, a total of sixteen (16) Informations were filed by the the
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan, charging, inter alia, Reyes,
Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1) count of Plunder, docketed as
Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238; and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the
Napoles siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM-0241 to 0255, which were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's Third
Division.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238,
"along with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the filing of a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the
resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it
determines the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused.
On September 29, 2014, the Special Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution126 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-
CRM- 0241 to 0255, finding the existence of probable cause against
them, and several others, and consequently, setting their arraignment.
The Napoles siblings urgently moved for the reconsideration of the
judicial finding of probable cause against them and requested that their
arraignment be held in abeyance pending the resolution of their
motion. However, the Napoles siblings alleged that the Sandiganbayan
acted on their motion for reconsideration through the latter's Resolution
dated November 14, 2014, declaring that the presence of probable
cause against them had already been settled in its previous
resolutions. Hence, the Napoles siblings caused the filing of the
petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 215880-94, assailing the September
29, 2014 and November 14, 2014 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan
committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
resolutions ultimately finding probable cause against petitioners for the
charges against them.
HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit. At the outset, it must be
stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with
the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be
filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary
or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
43
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of
discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling - that, is:
preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, "a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction." In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr., "[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information,
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does riot require an
inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged."
Thus, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support
a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute
certainty." In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of
Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Napoles siblings cannot discount the testimonies of the
whistleblowers based on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule
under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which states
that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under
the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the
foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should
not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be
inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary
investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties."
Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies
substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers
herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the
evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case
law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the
fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation," as in this case.
[EVIDENTE] Salapuddin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 184681
(Resolution), February 25,
2013
FACTS: The instant petition assails the Decision and Resolution dated
August 6, 2008 and October 16, 2008, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, which affirmed the inclusion
of petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin in the amended information for
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case
No. Q-07-149982 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), -Branch 83 in
Quezon City.
The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly
after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb
exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of
Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The
blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar (Congressman
Akbar) et al. and the inflicting of serious injuries on other victims.
Based on the affidavits of arrested suspects Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal,
Police Superintendent Asher Dolina indorsed a letter to then Chief
State Prosecutor Zuo requesting the inclusion of Salapuddin,
Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Bayan Judda in the complaints for murder and multiple frustrated
murder. After conducting preliminary investigation, the Chief State
44
Prosecutor approved a Resolution dated December 6, 2007 where he:
(1) found probable cause to indict Aunal, Ikram, and Kusain for
multiple murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2)
recommended the conduct of further investigation for their indictment
for multiple frustrated murder; and (3) recommended the conduct of
preliminary investigation as to the other respondents who were not
under detention.
On February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuo approved the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Investigating Panels Supplemental Resolution
recommending the amendment of the Information in Criminal Case No.
Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to include
respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang
Hataman and Salapuddin. Referring to Salapuddin in particular, the
DOJ Investigating Panel stated the observation that: "Salapuddins
participation in the [crime] cannot be downplayed just because he did
not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has his
hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place
used are all, [in] one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be
mere coincidence." On the other hand, the resolution dismissed the
charge as against Julham Kunam, Congressman Hataman, and Jim
Hataman. So the DOJ Investigating Panel found, "their participation as
conspirators in the grand scheme is unstable x x x apart from the
statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman
Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently
establish their involvement in the crime."
On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the
Supplemental Resolution with the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
The Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued, refused to give probative
weight to the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the
Hataman brothers, but relied on the very same statements in finding
probable cause to indict him. Moreover, he maintained that there is no
evidence independent of Ikrams statements that will support the
finding of probable cause to indict him for murder and multiple
frustrated murder.
On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution
excluding Salapuddin from the Information for the complex crime of
murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the Supplemental
Resolution of the Investigating Panel. The Secretary of Justice
predicated his modificatory action on the interplay of the following
premises: the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the
statements of Ikram. However, Ikrams statements are laden with
irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that they cannot be
considered worthy of belief. What is more, the Secretary added, "there
is nothing on record that will indicate that x x x Salapuddin performed
the overt acts of the offense charged." The Secretary of Justice
observed that the statements of the other accused cannot be given
weight as they were obtained through force and intimidation contrary to
the Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents
Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan questioned the Secretary of
Justices Resolution before the CA, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating to the
admissibility of evidence and credibility of witnesses are best
determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of
determining probable cause. There is, so respondents claimed,
overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to kill
Congressman Akbar.
The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. As held, the totality of the
evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent
moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the
commission of the crime," the CA adding in this regard that "the
absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is
evidentiary in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits." And to the
CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal, and Kusain and their claim
of torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were
"unsupported by competent proof."
Salapuddin moved for, but was denied, reconsideration per the CAs
Resolution dated October 16, 2008.
45

In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi,
Pagwalang Bisa ng Naunang Mga Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo dated
October 6, 2008 with the Quezon City RTC-Branch 83 claiming that he
was forced to sign the affidavits he previously executed and was
merely forced to implicate Salapuddin and the Hataman brothers in the
alleged conspiracy by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several mayors
from Basilan because of their political rivalry in the province.On
November 11, 2008, Ikram submitted another affidavit of recantation
supplying details of his ordeal while under custodial investigation and
alleging that he was physically and mentally tortured so that he was
forced to write and sign statements regarding the Batasan bombing
that were in fact supplied by the police officers themselves.
On November 24, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before
this Court, ascribing on the appellate court the commission of grave
error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions of Jamiri, Kusain, and
Aunal obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse,
without the effective assistance of a competent independent counsel of
their choice, and were in fact recanted. The appellate court also
grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in according full probative
value to Ikrams extrajudicial confession implicating Salapuddin even if
it was riddled with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition on September
29, 2010. Hence, on December 1, 2010, Salapuddin filed a Motion for
Reconsideration106 specifically inviting attention to the prosecutions
admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking him to
the crime charged except Ikrams testimony.107 Since, as urged,
Ikram has recanted his testimony on account of the violations of his
constitutionally protected rights, there is no longer any reason or
probable cause to maintain the criminal case filed against Salapuddin.
To the motion, respondents interposed an Opposition dated December
17, 2010108 stating that Salapuddin has not provided this Court any
new and substantial matter that would show the serious error attributed
to the CA; that the allegations of torture and recantation have already
been denied by the investigating prosecutors and should not sway this
Court to reverse the Decision of the appellate court; and that
Salapuddins evasion from arrest is evidence of his guilt.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to indict Salapuddin in
this criminal case.
HELD: The discrepancies in Ikrams affidavits and the variations in the
statements of the other accused do not persuade this Court to find
probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted primarily because
of Ikrams confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to the
Batasan bombing. Instead, while We are not pre-empting the findings
of the trial court with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain, the
variations and the inconsistencies contained in their affidavits lend
credence to their allegations of torture and coercion, especially as
these allegations are supported by medical reports prepared by an
independent medical practitioner who was assisted by the personnel of
the Human Rights Commission.
It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and
full respect of the rights of the accused are essential in the pursuit of
justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence, and all
rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary
investigation. It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to
indict a person for the commission of a felony, only those matters
which are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and
material are considered. No such evidence was presented to
sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the
non-bailable offenses he is accused of. It, thus, behooves this Court to
relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety, and expenses
of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the
government's resources.
Extrajudicial confession; binding only on the confessant; exceptions. A
review of the records show that the only direct material evidence
against Salapuddin is the confession made by Ikram. While the
confession is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to
establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission
of the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of
46
Justice, this cannot be considered against Salapuddin on account of
the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Clearly
thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It
cannot be admitted against his or her co-accused and is considered as
hearsay against them. The exception provided under section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission of a
conspirator requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by
evidence other than the confession. In this case, there is a dearth of
proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to
set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman
Akbar. Not one of the other persons arrested and subjected to
custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was involved in the
plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the
investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddins
association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant in
the conspiracy. The Supreme Court, however, has previously stressed
that mere association with the principals by direct participation, without
more, does not suffice. Relationship, association and companionship
do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddins complicity to the crime, if this be
the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the
arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly
stayed while in Manila. It must be shown that the person concerned
has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act, without the cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient
to prove conspiracy.
[EVIDENTE] Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128517,
September 10, 1998
Doctrine: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE; RULE ON ADMISSIONS BY
THIRD PARTY; CASE AT BAR. Declarations, that are extrajudicial
are inadmissible in evidence. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
may be allowed by the Rules of Court. The admission of such
declarations will violate the right of the petitioner to due process,
specifically his right to confront and cross-examine his co-accused. A
different rule applies with respect to testimonies given during the trial.
In a number of instances, we have held that the testimonies of
particeps criminis may be admissible against the person incriminated.
But such rule is not without qualification. We always advise caution in
according probative value to the testimony of an alleged co-
conspirator, as the latter is deemed a polluted source. His or her
declaration must scrutinized with care and subjected to grave
suspicion. True, such testimony, even if uncorroborated, may be
sufficient to convict a co-accused, provided it is shown to be sincere,
unhesitating, straightforward and detailed that it could not have been
the result of deliberate afterthought. Otherwise, his testimony would
require corroborative evidence which, if strong and convincing, may be
given its due weight and force. Being of human nature, culprits are
likely to pin the blame on others rather than on themselves. There is
therefore no guarantee that petitioner's co-accused had testified
truthfully. There are no other pieces of evidence that support their
testimonies and that tend to show or establish the guilt of the
petitioner.
FACTS: The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction for
cattle rustling. According to the prosecution, on the early morning of
March 18, 1991, police officers Pfc. Felizardo and Pfc. dela Cruz with
Pat. Victoriano were on foot patrol inside the town proper of Sapian,
Capiz, because of rampant cattle rustling in the area. They tried to flag
down a suspected passenger jeepney owned by Waquez, but instead
of stopping, the driver stepped on the gas pedal where Pfc. dela Cruz
was almost hit. At the Ivisan Police Station, the passenger jeepney
was intercepted and Lozada, the driver, was apprehended. The
jeepney was transporting one male carabao which was found out later
to be stolen. When investigated, Lozada told the police that his
companions were Waquez, Dagohoy and Santiago. Later that same
morning, Veloria reported to the Sapian Police Station that his male
carabao was stolen. He identified his male carabao and showed his
proof of ownership. On the other hand, Lozada and Waquez both
claimed that on the early morning of March 18, 1991, while on board
the subject jeepney, they were stopped by Santiago, who, together
47
with Ledonio offered P1,500.00 for them to transport a carabao to
Roxas City. Santiago however testified that at around 8:00 o'clock in
the morning of March 17, 1991 while he was at Poblacion, Sapian,
Capiz, Ledonio approached him and asked him if he was going to
Roxas City and requested him to tell Lozada that he (Ledonio) would
load something in the latter's jeepney. He did as requested and
thereafter, he went home to Sapian and had an accounting with his
employer because he was going to Mindanao to work there.
Afterwards, he went home, packed his clothes, then played domino.
Thereafter petitioner went to sleep. His wife woke him up at about 4:00
a.m. the following morning, March 18, 1991, and thereafter rode a
vehicle going to Sitio Talaba, Sapian, Capiz, and eventually rode a bus
to Iloilo City. They arrived in Iloilo City at about 7:30 a.m., and then
proceeded to Marbel, South Cotabato.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict Santiago
of cattle rustling
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence is insufficient to
convict petitioner Santiago of cattle rustling. The identification of the
petitioner as the malefactor was not sufficiently established. There is
no clear, convincing and corroborative evidence that shows the
complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the offense.
First, the trial court did not find the testimonies of said witnesses
"frank, candid and straightforward," or their testimonies worthy of any
credit. And our own reading of the transcripts does not lead us to
conclude otherwise. In fact, the solicitor general himself submits that
"the testimonies of co-accused Lozada and Waquez are insufficient to
justify petitioner's conviction."
Second, both Lozada and Waquez deny any participation in cattle
rustling. In fact, they claim to have no knowledge that the carabao was
indeed stolen. Being of human nature, culprits are likely to pin the
blame on others rather than on themselves. There is therefore no
guarantee that petitioner's co-accused had testified truthfully.
Third, the identification of the petitioner as the malefactor was not
sufficiently established. Lozada did not identify the petitioner in open
court, but merely mentioned his name. True, Waquez pointed to
Santiago, but the probative weight of his identification of the latter as
the culprit is attenuated by his admission that, on the night of the
incident, he "could not really determine that he is Joebert" and that he
"did not recognize him."
Lastly, the testimonies of Waquez and Lozada were not corroborated.
There are no other pieces of evidence that support their testimonies
and that tend to show or establish the guilt of the petitioner. Of the four
original accused, only Waquez was positively identified by Prosecution
Witness Felizardo as the one who was "hanging at the back of the
jeep." Urdelas, who apprehended Lozada, did not see anybody except
the latter. Only Lozada and Waquez testified that Santiago rented the
jeep they were plying and was with them while they were transporting
the carabao.
We agree with the solicitor general's recommendation to acquit
Santiago:
". . . the facts obtaining in the case engender reasonable doubt on
petitioner's complicity which, should, therefore, tilt the scale of justice
in his favor. . . . 'where the people's evidence fails to meet the quantum
required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence, the
accused is entitled to acquittal regardless of the weakness of his
defense of denial and uncorroborated alibi."'
For insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this
Court is constrained to acquit the petitioner. It is axiomatic that the
accused is entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own merit; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
To summarize, the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to convict
Santiago. First, the testimonies of the policemen, being hearsay, are
inadmissible in evidence. Second, the declarations of Lozada and
Waquez during the investigation are inadmissible under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and for being violative of petitioner's
right to due process. Third, the testimonies of Lozada and Waquez, as
48
borne out by the stenographic notes, are not worthy of credence.
Lastly, there is no other clear, convincing and corroborative evidence
that shows the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the
offense.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent
[GUTIERREZ] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738
(Resolution), April 3, 2001
FACTS:
On February 5, President Joseph Estrada (President Estrada) filed
with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in
any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.
Thru another counsel, President Estrada, on February 6, filed GR No.
146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming
President Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and
to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE: WON allowing the Angara Diary into the evidence violates the
res inter alia doctrine?
HELD:
No. Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against
him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in
section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
except as hereinafter provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has
several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130
with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner.
He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by the
petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he
abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary,
the petitioner told Secretary Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng
kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli,
ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the
only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still are.) This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary
Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to
this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would
already leave Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20,
2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I
have to leave now?)[18] Secretary Angara told him to go and he did.
Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of
negotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss
the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of
the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was
always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their
negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner
in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary
Angara) are binding on the principal (President Estrada). Jones very
well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is done, by agent, is
done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So,
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his
principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act
within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected
with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which
he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet
opus is, in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence
against such principal.
49

[GUTIERREZ] Learning Child, Inc. v. Ayala Alabang Village
Association, G.R. No. 134269, 134440, 144518, July 7, 2010
FACTS:
Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a
parcel of land to the spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the
spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne
Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No. 149166
issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed
of Restrictions indicated that the property shall be used exclusively for
the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery
and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an
office for school administration, playground and garage for school
vehicles.
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the
properties in the Ayala Alabang Village, including the above
restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of homeowners
therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning
Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially
consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was
expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy
Cross, which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially
enrolled advanced.
AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso,
essentially (1) protesting the TLCs and the spouses Alfonsos violation
of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the
same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school
and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of
the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance.
On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses
Alfonso.
On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by TLC and
the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being
proscribed by Section 2, Rule 19[10] of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the
other, filed separate Petitions for Review with this Court challenging
the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
TLC and the spouses Alfonsos main argument against the
enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on their property is the AAVA
had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the
spouses Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a
setting aside of said restrictions:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court
that AAVA had previously approved the proposed construction of a
school building with 24 classrooms, which approval is further
evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site Development Plan
with the signature of Frank Roa himself.[44]
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of
Appeals, AAVA, through its president Jesus M. Taedo, authorized
through a letter the construction of a new school building
extension.[45]
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as
institutional, as allegedly proven by the testimony of then Municipal
Planning and Development Officer Engineer Hector S. Baltazar, who
said:
Engineer Baltazar:
There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala
Alabang Village, in fact, was the one who submitted this map of theirs.
In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the developer of the
Ayala Alabang Village whom we know na maayos naman ang kanilang
zoning, we just adopted what they submitted to us. Whereas, the other
areas are talagang pinag-aralan pa namin.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was
considered institutional in the Official Zoning Map, thereby implying
that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent to have the
subject property reclassified as institutional.
50
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to
institutional, as shown by its letter dated July 24, 1991, wherein it
stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales
concerning the proposed expansion of the school curriculum to grade
school of the Learning Child Pre-school owned by Mrs. Mary Anne
Alfonso.
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is
concerned, we believe that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely
benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
ISSUE: WON the actions of ALI in Nos. 3 and 4 bind AAVA and if so
are these actions damaging to AAVAs cause?
HELD:
Yes, ALIs statements if damaging to AAVA would be binding on the
latter but the acts of ALI are not damaging to AAVA.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims
that these acts cannot be considered in the case at bar under the res
inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, if damaging to AAVA, would
be binding on the latter. The general Ayala Alabang Village Deed
Restrictions, which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the
title of the subject property, expressly state that: 2. Compliance with
the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe
enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and
assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association.
As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with
AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore
covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and
during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies
to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of
AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns the alleged assent of ALI to the
reclassification of the subject property as institutional which, as we
have already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of
Restrictions. As regards the act in number 2, the statement in ALIs July
24, 1991 letter that it believes the expansion of TLC is a worthy
undertaking, it should be pointed out that ALIs purported assent came
with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is
concerned, we believe that it is a worthy undertaking that will definitely
benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
It is true that the AAVA Board does not have the authority on its own to
alter the Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the
approval of Ayala is an indispensable condition precedent to any
change in the restrictions. However, we feel that any change in the
restrictions for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to by the AAVA
Board on the premise that any change in the restrictions affects the
general welfare of the community which is the primary concern of the
AAVA Board. On this same premise, we have imposed as an
additional condition to our approval of the change in restrictions, that
such change should be approved by the residents of the Village or by
the residents of the particular district where the school is situated, at
the option of the Board. We feel that the concurrence of not only the
AAVA Board but also of the residents of the Village or of the affected
district (as the case may be) is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances.
As previously stated, a majority of AAVAs members, on April 5, 1992,
voted to ratify the Board of Governors resolutions that the Deed of
Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore, the conditions for ALIs
51
approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namely the
concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected
residents of the village, were clearly not met.
[FULLANTE] Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corp. v. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580, April 21, 2014
Facts: Redmont, after inquiring with DENR, it learned that the areas
where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where
already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. Petitioner
McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc.
(SMMI), filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP)
with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Office of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). SMMI
was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 and EPA-IVB-44. The MPSA and EP
were then transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation (MMC) and
assigned to petitioner McArthur.
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and
Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & Development
Corporation (PLMDC) which previously filed an application for an
MPSA with the MGB. Another MPSA application of SMMI was filed
with the DENR. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and
assigned its rights and interest over the said MPSA application to
Tesoro. Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the
DENR three (3) separate petitions for the denial of petitioners
applications for MPSA. In their Answers, petitioners averred that they
were qualified persons under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. (RA)
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. POA issued a Resolution
disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs.
Aggrieved by the Resolution and Order of the POA, McArthur and
Tesoro filed a joint Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with
the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) while Narra separately filed its
Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal. Redmont filed before
the (RTC) a Complaint for injunction with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Belatedly, the RTC issued an Order granting Redmonts application for
a TRO and setting the case for hearing the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Redmont filed a Motion for
Reconsideration Order of the MAB. Subsequently, it filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
RTC issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MAB from finally disposing of the appeals of
petitioners and from resolving Redmonts Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MABs Resolution.
However, the MAB issued a second Order denying Redmonts Motion
for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and
resolving the appeals filed by petitioners. Hence, the petition for review
filed by Redmont before the CA. CA rendered a Decision. With respect
to the applications of respondents McArthur, Tesoro and Narra for
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of
their MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for its rejection or
approval is left for determination by the Secretary of the DENR and the
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners. CA
upheld the findings of the POA in its Resolution which considered
petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra as foreign corporations. While
pending with the CA, Redmont filed with the Office of the President
(OP) a petition seeking the cancellation of petitioners FTAAs. The OP
rendered a Decision, wherein it canceled and revoked petitioners
FTAAs. The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was further
denied. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
OPs Decision and Resolution with the CA. In the CA Decision, the CA
affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the OP. Thereafter, petitioners
appealed the same CA decision to this Court which is now pending
with a different division.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in the use of the exception of the res
inter alios acta or the "admission by co-partner or agent" rule and
"admission by privies" by pointing out that statements made by MBMI
52
should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party to the case
and that it is not a "partner" of petitioners.
Held: NO.
Application of the res inter alios acta rule
Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or declaration of
a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and
during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other
person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies.- Where one derives title to property
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former.
Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied
to a case, "the partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of
the fact must be made by evidence other than the admission itself."
Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership
relationship exists between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such
partnership exists.
Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements
A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves
to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves. On the other hand,
joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can
be assumed that the relationships entered between and among
petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a
rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership
agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture
agreements with other corporations or partnerships for certain
transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and
among petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal
prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the
relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws
on partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement
between and among corporations may be seen as similar to
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI
are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying
Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint
venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator
[FULLANTE] People v. Bokingo, G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011
Facts: For review is the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Bokingo and Col guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. An Information was filed against Michael Bokingo and
Reynante Col, charging them of the crime of murder wherein they
conspired together armed with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and
nighttime, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and maul Noli Pasion, by hitting and beating his head and
other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said
Noli Pasion fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his
death. During the preliminary investigation. Bokingco admitted that he
conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the killing
several days before because they got "fed up" with Pasion. On
arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not
53
guilty. During the pre-trial, Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.
The trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, there being the two aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered
against both accused and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea
of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, sentencing them to Death.
The Court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court however
lowering the penalty to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 7659.
Issue: Whether Reynante Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a
co-conspirator based on Michael Bakingos admission that Col is a co-
consiprator?
Held: NO. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in
the case before us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and
Bokingco be proved. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with
the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as
clearly as the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial
confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the commencement of the
attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being
attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas house and allegedly
ordering her to open the pawnshop vault.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion.
Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their
moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the
pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically where
he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration or omission of another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is
considered as hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such
act or declaration. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be
received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that first,
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission
itself; second, the admission relates to the common object; and third, it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and is inadmissible
in evidence against Col.
[FULLANTE] People v. Palijon, G.R. No. 123545, October 18, 2000
Facts: Rodelo Palijon, Carlos Decena, and Jim Mercene, both were
elderly returnees (balikbayans), recently arrived from the United
States. Entered the yard of the residence in San Pablo City of the
spouses Gonzalo and Mellorequina Reyes. Entered the house and
positioned themselves near the couples bedroom door and waited for
someone to open it so they could take cash and jewelry from the
bedroom. Palijon remained outside the house, as look-out.
Mrs. Reyes came out the bedroom to go to the bathroom. Decena then
followed her to the toilet where he kicked and boxed her. Mrs. Reyes
managed to shout for help before she fainted. Mr. Reyes rushed to
assist his wife. Decena met him, with a steel-edged stool and struck
him hard several times. Mr. Reyes fell prostrate on the floor. The
robbers ransacked the house then escaped.
Prosecution witness Merly Reyes Alvero, a daughter of the Reyes
couple, who lived some distance away, was roused from her sleep by
a phone call from her cousin, Edith Bicomong. A hysterical Bicomong
told Alvero that the latters parents were hospitalized and in critical
condition. Alvero then proceeded to the house of her parents. An
54
inspection of the bedroom of the spouses Reyes revealed that cash
amounting to P17,000.00 and various pieces of jewelry belonging to
her mother, worth P100,000.00 were missing.
Mr. Gonzales died from his injuries. The immediate cause of death was
cardio-respiratory failure caused by severe contusion hematoma of
head.
In an Information, the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City
charged Rodelo Palijon, Jim Mercene, Carlos Decena, Myra Pria, and
several John Does, with robbery and homicide.
The accused were arraigned before the RTC of San Pablo City and
pleaded Not Guilty to the offense in the charge sheet. Both parties
waived pre-trial. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Counsel for accused Decena and Mercene moved that the two be
allowed to withdraw their earlier plea of Not Guilty and be re-arraigned
to allow them to enter a plea of Guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide. The prosecution raised no opposition and the motion was
granted. Decena and Mercene were then re-indicted for homicide and,
with assistance of counsel, pleaded Guilty to the charge. Both were
then sentenced as guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Trial then proceeded against the remaining co-accused Rodelo Palijon
and Myra Pria. The prosecutions case was propelled in the main by
the testimony of Mercene, who gave evidence against said co-
accused. The trial court found the prosecutions evidence convincing.
Palijon filed his notice of appeal to this Court, while Pria moved for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision. The court denied Prias
motion for reconsideration. Pria filed her notice of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Palijon on the
basis of the testimonies of his alleged conspirators?
Held: NO. In the instant case, both prosecution witness Mercene and
defense witness Decena admitted the existence of a conspiracy to rob
the victims. However, their versions as to the participation of appellant
Pria differ. Mercene testified that he and his co-accused agreed to
enter and rob the house of the Reyes couple. According to Mercene it
was appellant Pria who: (1) informed them of the arrival of the Reyes
spouses from abroad; (2) told them that the balikbayans had a lot of
money being; and (3) told them how to enter the house.
Decena, admits that Pria was present when they plotted the robbery,
but vehemently insists that she had no participation in its planning.
Decena claims that Pria was there only to attend to their child, and she
was sleeping when he and Mercene broke into the house of the
victims. To buttress Decenas testimony, the defense presented three
of his letters to Pria, written in prison, clearing her of any knowledge or
participation in the crime.
In our view, notwithstanding her absence from the actual crime scene,
Pria, as a conspirator, is as liable for robbery with homicide just as if
she had participated in the actual robbing and killing. At the instant that
the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and
pursue it, each and every member of the conspiracy is criminally liable
for the felony committed by anyone of them.
Appellant Palijon denies he conspired with the others. He says the trial
court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimonies of his
alleged conspirators. Their testimonies could not be taken against him
under the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet as
formulated in Sections 28 and 30, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.
Palijon and Pria submit that the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of a conspiracy and, did not overcome the presumption of
innocence in their favor.
There is conspiracy to commit a crime, where at the time the
malefactors of the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of
purpose to attain their illicit ends. One who joins a criminal conspiracy
adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and can no
longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.
In ruling upon Palijons arguments, we must make a distinction
between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the
declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to
cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at
55
trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.
Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the
witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon.
Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is
competent evidence against the latter. Nor can we give credence to
Palijons defense of alibi. Mercenes identification of Palijon as one of
the conspirators and participants in the crime was positive and
categorical. His alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
made by the prosecutions eyewitness.
[FULLANTE] People v. Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013
Facts: Ibaez went to Weapons System Corporation (WSC), and told
Henessy Auron that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the
companys gun show in SM Megamall. Henessy arrived at WSC and
rang the doorbell, but no one opened the door. She went to the back of
the office and called Zaldy Gabao. Zaldy answered from inside the
store but Henessy did not understand what he said. Henessy called
Raymundo Sian, and informed him that Zaldys hands had been tied.
After one hour, the police arrived. When Henessy and the police
entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had been handcuffed to the
vault. Zaldy informed the police that the companys gunsmith, Rex
Dorimon, was inside the firing range. The police entered the firing
range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex.
(NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela
was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its
employees. The NBI formed an entrapment team. Upon their arrival,
Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent
by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The police
introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC.
Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the other
persons involved in the crime.
Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the
buyers, and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. NBI
Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the
asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them,
and brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them
several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the
firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting
was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could
make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms from
Cachuelas house.
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibaez whom the asset
also contacted. The NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibaez
whom they saw inside a Nissan California car. Lino, Abiera and the
asset entered the car, and asked Ibaez where the firearms were.
Ibaez brought out two (2) firearms, and showed them to the agents.
The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation; they
then arrested Ibaez when they sensed that he was already becoming
suspicious. The agents recovered two guns from Ibaez.
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police
line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the
killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession
implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.
The prosecution filed an Information for robbery with homicide before
the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and Zaldy.
RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Excepted from the
conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt.
The appellants filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence
showed that the appellants robbed WSC and killed Rex during the
course of this robbery:
(1) Ibaez visited WSC two days before the robbery and asked several
questions from Henessy;
(2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several
ammunitions worth P1,563,300.00 had been stolen;
56
(3) among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial
number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML
245;
(4) Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing
range;
(5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body;
(6) Cachuela and Ibaez were caught trying to sell the .9 mm
Bernardelli, with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock
30, with serial number FML 245, respectively, in separate entrapment
operations; and
(7) Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came into
possession of the stolen firearms.
The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the
appellants as the perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants
argument that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in
evidence, pointing out that the seizures were the result of lawful
entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to
impute any ill or improper motive against the police officers who
conducted the entrapment operations.
Issue(1): Whether or not the out of court identification by Zaldy was
admissible?
Held(1): NO. In People v. Algarme, explains the procedure for out-of-
court identification and the test to determine its admissibility, as
follows: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1)
the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure.
Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a
glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt
identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used
in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by
Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of
Linos testimony.
Issue(2): Whether or not Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence?
Held(2): NO. Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.
This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay
against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This
provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence
against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of
a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other
than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common
object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since
there was no other piece of evidence presented, aside from the
extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the
appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be
presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively as the
crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to
insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
[GO] People v. Constancio y Bacungay, G.R. No. 206226, April 4,
2016
Facts:
57
"AAA" went to Alabang Town Center with her friends Dacanay and
Golez. After parting ways with them, "AAA" was about to board her car
when she found herself confronted by Berry then armed with a knife,
who was then in the company of Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Darden
and alias "Burog." These five forcibly seized "AAA's" car and drove her
to Constancio' house where she was raped and killed.
In the course of an interview with ABS-CBN Reporter Amparo, Berry
revealed that while "AAA's" car was parked in Constancio' garage, the
said car was moving and shaking with "AAA" inside. 6 This led him to
suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of
the car was opened, he (Berry) saw that "AAA" was without her
underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, "wala na,"
indicating that "AAA" was already dead. 7
"AAA's" body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a
tricycle driver, saw Berry, Constancio, and their other companions,
throw something over a bridge which turned out to be "AAA's" body
upon investigation by the authorities.
On the evening of March 12, 2001, Bales almost became the next
victim when Berry and his companions who were still using "AAA's"
car, attempted to abduct her. Fortunately for Bales, a barangay tanod
was present at the scene and was able to foil the abduction when he
shouted at the malefactors and startled them. Nonetheless, Bales' bag
was taken during this incident.
Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant
surfaced and identified them as "AAA's" assailants. The informant
came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for information leading
to the identity of persons responsible for "AAA's" rape-slay.
During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of
his constitutional rights and the consequences of his statements, Berry
executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in a
Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo during an
interview that he did take part in the execution of the crime.
At the trial, however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as
false, and claimed that he was coerced into signing the same.
For his part, Constancio contended that he was in Baguio at the time
of the commission of the crime. Both appellants denied the charges
against them. These two also asserted that Berry's extrajudicial
confession was inadmissible in evidence.
RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape with Homicide
CA affirmed the RTC decision
Also, the CA gave credence to Berry's extrajudicial confession as
contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay which he executed with the
assistance of Atty. Suarez. Berry's extrajudicial confession was
admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused and cousin, Constancio as shown
by the circumstantial evidence extant in the records
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in declaring Berry's extrajudicial confession
admissible in evidence and in considering it against his co-accused
Constancio
Ruling:
On the other hand, Constancio argues that Berry's confession is
inadmissible in evidence against him under the principle of res inter
alios acta found in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Our ruling in Tamargo v. Awingan
21 pertinently explains the reason for this rule:
[O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own
acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are
his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct
be used as evidence against him.
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on
the confessant and is inadmissible in evidence against his co-accused
since it is considered hearsay against them. 22 However, as an
exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial
confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said
co-accused in the crime. 23
In People v. Aquino, 24 this Court held that in order that an extra-
judicial confession may be used against a co-accused of the
58
confessant, "there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence
which when taken together with the confession would establish the
guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt." Applying the rule to
Constancio's case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to
show circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime.
Significantly, Constancio was positively identified as among those who
threw the body of "AAA" over a bridge. It is significant to note that
eyewitness Adarna also attests that Constancio was riding in the very
same car where "AAA" was raped and killed. This fact leaves this
Court without a doubt that Constancio is guilty of the crime charged as
the same qualifies as circumstantial evidence showing his participation
in the execution of the crime.
[GO] People v. Comiling, G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004
Facts:
Accused including certain JOE, REY and PAUL, whose family names
have not yet been known, armed with firearms and handgrenade,
aboard an owner-type stainless jeep and motorized tricycle enter the
Masterline Grocery pretending to be customers and once inside, poked
their guns and intimidated the owner of said grocery, MR. INCIONG
CO, and his worker carried away P81,000.00 and three (3) pieces of
Chinese gold necklace and afterwhich the above-named accused on
their way out to escape with their loot, shot and hit a responding Tayug
Policeman, PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR, mortally wounding him on his
face that subsequently led to his untimely death, and when said
accused were cornered by other responding policemen, ran and
passed to an adjacent store (Good Taste Bakery) and used it as their
exit and while there also shot, hit and mortally wounded MRS.
CONCHING CO, the owner of said bakery causing her injuries.
The remaining accused (Comiling, Galingan, Mendoza, Salagubang
and Clotario) pleaded not guilty during their arraignment. Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution
witness Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what
she knew about the case. During the trial, she testified that she was
present in all the four meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline
Grocery was hatched.
On the basis of the evidence the prosecution has adduced, which in
the Courts perception satisfies the requisite proof beyond reasonable
doubt as mandated by Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, the
Court hereby renders a judgment, as to the accused MAJ. EMILIO
COMILING, GERALDO GALINGAN and RICKY MENDOZA finding
them GUILTY of the special complex crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Naty Panimbaan a co-conspirator is
admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, Appellant Comiling contends that Natys testimony was
inadmissible against him to prove conspiracy because of the res inter
alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration
This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not
against his co-conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by
other independent evidence.
According to Comiling, Natys testimony showed that she was also a
conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy must be shown by
evidence other than Natys admission. As there was no independent
proof of conspiracy except the testimony of Naty, the latters testimony
concerning appellants participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible
against him. This contention is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule
refers only to extrajudicial declarations or admissions and not to
testimony given on the witness stand where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.[8] In the
present case, Natys admission implicating appellant Comiling was
made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence against
him
59
[GO] People v. Baydo y Arcamo, G.R. No. 113799, June 17, 1997
Facts:
Accused, conspiring with GEORGE NAVARRO Y PADILLA @ BOY
HAPON shot Leonardo Punongbayan, Jr. y Concepcion on the chest
and left thigh with a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the said Leonardo
Punongbayan, Jr. y Concepcion gunshot wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Upon arraignment, Appellant Baydo, assisted by counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty.
The evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of
Rosito Punongbayan, nephew and Evelyn Punongbayan, wife of the
victim who saw Leonardo Punongbayan get shot.
As a defense, Bienvenido Baydo interposed the defense of alibi stating
that he was resting inside their house at Onyx Avenue about 15 to 20
meters from the crime scene when he heard shots and went out to
know what happened; he came to know that Leonardo Punongbayan
was shot and later he learned in the neighborhood that he is being
accused of shooting Leonardo Punongbayan. Out of fear, he fled to
Laguna
Furthermore, George Navarro testified that he conspired with a certain
Lino Saladanan to murder Leonardo Punongbayan
RTC found appellant guilty of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the
Information despite the apparent failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Ruling:
Yes, For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof,
as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements
thereof, viz.: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; 2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and 3) sufficient lapse of time between determination
and execution to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his
act. These, however, were not established. True, one can deduce from
the narration of George Navarro that the commission of the offense
was planned and that, until its consummation, there was an inexorable
resolve to kill Leonardo Punongbayan. It cannot be ignored, however,
that Navarro was referring to Lino Salandanan as his accomplice.
Nowhere was the name of appellant mentioned as a member of the
group which planned the death of Leonardo. Although the evidence
revealed that it was really appellant who cooperated with Navarro in
the killing, the admission of Navarro regarding evident premeditation
cannot be taken against appellant in the absence of proof of
conspiracy. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another except as otherwise provided in
Sections 29 to 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Besides, it does
not follow that appellant was the one referred to as Lino Salandanan
just because he actually cooperated with Navarro in the commission of
the crime. No proof whatsoever was adduced by the prosecution that
appellant was ever called Lino Salandanan or known by that name.
[GO] People v. Baharan, G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011
Facts:
An RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas
bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via EDSA, when
accused Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu
Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky entered the
vehicle.
Bus Conductor, Elmer Andales grew suspicious that the two were up
to know good. Although they entered the bus together they sat apart.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala
Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus.
According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off
the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere
except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus driver gave in and
allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the
bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the
bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the
60
bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or
looking traumatized.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of
Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson
of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station
DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio
and warned of more bomb attacks.
In an exclusive interview with ABS CBN, accused Baharan likewise
admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a
television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor
identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they
were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of
14 February.
After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that
while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu
Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs
and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles
against the government in the city, and that their first mission was to
plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts
of Metro Manila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the
Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to
secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester,
and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a
bomb. He then recalled that sometime in November to December
2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on
two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The
TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004,
but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing,
Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in
the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The
latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the
TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad had already been exploded in
Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the
warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call
from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission. According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag
success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Asali is admissible as evidence.
Ruling:
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant
to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy.
However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant
repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession
is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or
admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party adversely
affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes
admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand.
It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where
several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony
of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter
Sec. 31. Admission by privies
[GO] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Facts: Petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, represented by the
OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled
61
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by
his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount
of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million
inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten
wealth. The funds five account groups, using various foreign
foundations in certain Swiss banks
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and
US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples
salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of
the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the
freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District
Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate
transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request
was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the
District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the
funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be
placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was
allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in
its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another
motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the
US$356 million, based on the following grounds: THE ESSENTIAL
FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS
SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE
ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING
The Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary judgment:
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow
at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration
Respondents posits the defense of lack of knowledge for lack of privity
or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago or, on the
part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioners
motion for summary judgment:
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not
prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos
spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the
ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss
Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be
deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce,
must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is
reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being set for further
proceedings.[12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to establish that the
Marcoses owns the swiss accounts.
Ruling: There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses
admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be
ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or
not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
62
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.[105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents
judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely
binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of
them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of
a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and
during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies
to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former.[107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever
a privity of estate exists between the declarant and the party, the term
privity of estate generally denoting a succession in rights.[108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record
is competent.[109] Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents
in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly
interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of
one is competent against all.[110]
Sec. 32. Admission by silence
[JULARBAL] People v. Roa, G.R. Nos. 138195-96, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
On May 25, 1997, around 12:30 a.m., then 15-year old Ma. Nina de la
Cruz (Nina) was sleeping in her room located at the third floor of the
residence of her adopting parents, Maxima and Melencio de la Cruz, in
Ilang-Ilang St., Balubaran, Valenzuela City. Sleeping in the same room
but on a separate bed was Ninas 23-year old mentally deranged
brother.
Nina was awakened when appellant, who had resided with the de la
Cruzes since 1976, he being one of the workers in the family metal
craft business, armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered her
room. Appellant then covered her mouth, held her hand and removed
her shorts and panty after which he removed his pants and brief, went
on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his
carnal desire, appellant warned her not tell anyone about what
happened and left the room.
More than two months after the May 25, 1997 incident or on July 29,
1997, around 1:25 a.m., Nina was, like her brother with whom she
shared her bedroom, sleeping. She was once again awakened when
appellant, also again armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered
her room. Just like the May 25, 1997 incident, appellant removed her
shorts and panty, after which he too removed his pants and brief and
threatened Nina that hell kill her if she shouted. Appellant thereafter
went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. His carnal
desire satisfied, appellant left the room.
In late July 1997, Ninas mother, after confirming from Nina herself that
she was pregnant, confronted appellant about the incidents but he
remained silent. Appellant was thereupon asked to leave as he did, he
proceeding to Melencio de la Cruzs fathers house at Iba, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. On physical examination on August 2, 1997, Nina was found
to have at least two lacerations on the genital area, and fifteen to
sixteen weeks pregnant.
On the other hand, appellant, who was 55 when he testified on
November 16, 1998, denied that he raped Nina on May 25, 1997 or on
July 29, 1997. He claimed that on May 25, 1997, around 12:30 a.m.,
he was at work in the glass factory of Melencio de la Cruzs niece Dory
de la Cruz at Hagonoy; that on July 29, 1997, he was back at the
house of the de la Cruzes at Balubaran after Melencio de la Cruz
rehired him; and on July 23, 1997, he was confronted about the
alleged rape and cursed by Maxima but [he] did not retaliate [and] just
remained silent, and on even date he left and went to the house of
Melencio de la Cruzs father at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Melencio de la
Cruz, together with his bodyguard later maltreated him and haled him
63
into the Hagonoy jail where he was detained. He did not complain,
however.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court found accused Nicanor Roa
y Rabino Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of Nina, a close
scrutiny of which he claims readily exhibits inconsistencies which go to
the very core of her credibility.
Appellant argues that the fact that she was already sleeping would
make it impossible for [him] to lay her down again because these
circumstances do not appear to be in consonance with the normal
course of human nature; and that while Nina attributed her pregnancy
to appellant, she nevertheless admitted that she was already pregnant
before May 25, 1997 when the alleged rape subject of the first case
occurred. As for Ninas attribution of her pregnancy to appellant, albeit
she admitted that she was already pregnant before the first rape
incident, the same does not infirm her credibility. While, given her
youth, she may erred in attributing her pregnancy to appellant on
account of the May 25, 1997 incident, what matters is that she was
positive in her claim about the occurrence of the sexual assault on her,
as shown in her following verbatim testimony which the trial court did
find, as does this Court, to be candid and bereft of any indication that it
was fabricated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the silence of accussed-appelant is deemed an
admission of the charges against him.
HELD:
The prosecution having by its evidence prima facie established
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence
shifted on him. Appellants evidence, however, is weak and fails to
controvert the positive declaration of Nina who was not shown to have
any reason to falsely charge him. His admitted silence when Ninas
mother confronted and even cursed him by his claim, betrays his guilt
just as his passivity does when he was allegedly maltreated and haled
into jail by Ninas father on account of the incidents. For an innocent
man would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and
do something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did not.
Following Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
which provides:
SECTION 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing observation of a party who does or
says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to
do so, may be given in evidence against him.
he is, by his silence, deemed to have admitted the charges.
[JULARBAL] People v. Magdadaro y Gerona, G.R. Nos. 89370-72,
May 15, 1991
FACTS:
The Complainant, Beverlinda Abrasado, is a 16-year old country girl, a
Grade VI student, daughter of Leonardo Abrasado. The latter is a
tenant of accused-appellant Magdadaro at the latter's farm at Balubal,
Cagayan de Oro City. Beverlinda helps her father till the farm.
Appellant is a farmer, 54 years of age, married residing at Tin-ao,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Beverlinda's narration of the three (3) happenings follows:
The 10 July 1988 incident:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, when Beverlinda was gathering
"guyabano" near Appellant's house at Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City,
the latter suddenly appeared, held Beverlinda by the hand and pulled
her towards the cornfield nearby. She tried her best to extricate herself
but was no match for Appellant's strength. The latter then held her
hand again and boxed her in the stomach, making her fall to the
ground. She lost consciousness. When she regained her senses,
Appellant was already on top of her, taking advantage of her
womanhood.
The event over, Beverlinda was ordered to go home by Appellant with
the threat not to reveal the occurrence to any one at the risk of her life
and that of her family.
The 15 July 1988 incident.
On this date, while Beverlinda was fetching water from the well near
Appellant's house, the latter appeared, held her by the hand, and
pulled her towards the cornfield, despite her resistance and attempts to
free herself. She was again boxed, fell to the ground, and when she
64
came to, Appellant was on top of her "making the push and pull
movements."
As in the first incident, Beverlinda did not reveal the episode for fear of
her life.
The 21 August 1988 incident.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of this date, Beverlinda was
tethering a carabao in a grassy area adjoining Appellant's house at
Balubal. From out of the bushes, Appellant appeared and chased her.
She was able to run but Appellant caught up with her and held her
hand tightly. She shouted for help. Appellant boxed her in the stomach.
She lost consciousness and fell to the, ground. Regaining her senses,
she found Appellant already astride her, having carnal knowledge of
her.
Unknown to Beverlinda and Appellant, Leonardo Abrasado,
Beverlinda's father, heard the shouts and proceeded towards the
direction where they came from. Leonardo testified that upon reaching
there, he could hardly believe his eyes when he saw Appellant, his
own landlord, abusing his own daughter. Engaged, he called "Gaw"
and unsheathed his bolo. But Appellant was quick on his feet, stood
up, naked from waist down, and ran away, leaving his pants', his
underwear and his hat in his haste. The father chased Appellant but
lost the latter lost in the bushes.
Appellant was found about two hours later by some members of the
Bantay Bayan and the military, approximately 300 meters away from
the place of the incident, still hiding in the bushes. He was "wearing his
coat, but no pants, he just wrapped himself in the lower portion of his
body with a long sleeved sweater." The witness asked him if he was
Paulino Magdadaro and "why did you do it?" but the latter did not
answer. Appellant was then taken to the checkpoint of the PC
detachment by Sgts. Lustre and Viras.
When the search party arrived at the scene of the incident, they found
the corn plants toppled down, a pair of long pants, a pair of briefs, a
hat and the underwear of a woman. Beverlinda was also still there,
seated, crying.
The genital examination of Beverlinda, on 22 August 1988, at the
Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City,
disclosed "incomplete hymenal laceration at 1:00, 3:00, 7:00 and 9:00
o'clock position," "suggestive of sexual intercourse," but "negative of
spermatozoa".
Beverlinda's father declared that on his way to the City Hall on 22
August 1988 in the company of Sgt. Romero, his wife, a Bantay
Bayan, and Appellant, the latter asked for forgiveness twice and
offered to pay damages but that he refused because the matter was
already before the authorities. Again, during the investigation at the
Fiscal's Office, Appellant asked for settlement of the case but he gave
the same answer.
So much for the prosecution evidence. Now, for Appellant's own
account:
He states that he knows Beverlinda because she is the daughter of his
tenant, Leonardo Abrasado. He admits having had carnal knowledge
of her on 10 July, 15 July and 21 August 1988 but maintains that the
act was consummated upon mutual agreement.
On 10 July 1988, he had sex with Complainant at his own house,
adding that she was no longer a virgin as he was able to penetrate
immediately and without obstacle. The act consummated, Beverlinda
asked him for money so she could buy a birthday dress. He replied
that he had to go home first to get the money. On 14 July 1988, he
went to Beverlinda's house at Balubal, bringing with him fish and
P200.00.
The following day, 15 July 1988, Beverlinda went to his house and he
handed her the money. One thing led to another and they made love.
Beverlinda invited him for her birthday but he begged off because of
another appointment in Zamboanga, but promised that he would try
and be back.
In the morning of 21 August 1988, Appellant went fishing. Later, with
his two children, he went to Balubal and gave his catch to Leonardo,
his tenant. After having lunch at the latter's house, both went out to
gather fruits and cassava. An hour later, or at 2:30 P.M., they placed
what they had gathered in sacks and Appellant instructed his children
to hurry so they could catch the bus headed for home. Appellant
accepted Leonardo's offer to help the children carry the sacks. After
Leonardo and the two children had left, Beverlinda went to his house.
After a brief conversation, Appellant discovered that he had not
brought the house keys. Beverlinda suggested that they go instead to
the cornfield near the house and repeat what they had engaged in on
65
two other occasions. Upon reaching the cornfield, he took off his pants
and brief. After spreading his pants and brief on the ground, Beverlinda
removed her panty. They made love afterwards. Minutes later,
Appellant heard Leonardo calling him "Gaw." Upon seeing him, he took
off immediately, leaving behind his pants and brief.
In the course of his testimony, Appellant stoutly denied having forced
Beverlinda to have sex with him; or having boxed her and rendering
her unconscious to satisfy his desire; or having threatened her and her
family if ever she reported the incidents to the authorities. In a nutshell,
Appellant's version is that he and Beverlinda were sweethearts.
The Trial Court disbelieved Appellant, found him guilty in all three
criminal cases.
ISSUE:
IV. In holding that a) the flight of the accused from the scene of the
crime is evidence of guilt; b) the alleged repeated request for
settlement of the case by the accused is an implied admission of guilt;
and c) the failure of the accused to answer the question of Francisco
Bagtong when the accused was asked "are you the one who
committed the crime?", which would have naturally called for comment
if not true, is admission of guilt;
HELD:
From the evidence before us, it is difficult to see how Appellant can
profess innocence. Even if we were to discount Beverlinda's testimony,
her father's declarations point to Appellant's clear culpability, He had
heard his daughter's shouts (not knowing then that it was she) while
she was being pulled by Appellant. He had actually seen him
consummating his dastardly act. Infuriated, the father chased him with
a bolo but he was fast on his feet and successfully eluded pursuit. That
immediate flight is strongly indicative of his consciousness of guilt.
"The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold
as the lion."
When found, still hiding behind the bushes, Appellant was still without
his brief and pants, was uncovered from the waist down, his private
part exposed. He was caught literally with his pants down. The pieces
of clothing needed to cover him up were all found at the very site of the
incident. What more physical evidence is necessary? They eloquently
confirm Beverlinda's testimony that after having undressed himself
Appellant had violated her on 21 August 1988.
Appellant's flight upon discovery by Beverlinda's father of his shameful
act, belies consent by Beverlinda for if that had been so, she would not
have been found crying her heart out, nor would he have fled in fear.
His silence when asked by the Barangay Captain "why he had done
it?" is likewise significant. His claim that there was no admission by
silence on his part since he was not given the opportunity to make a
reply besides the fact that whoever asked the question was not known
to him, hardly deserves consideration.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and
specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some
circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will at once
naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of
self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is
persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
[JULARBAL] People v. Paragsa, G.R. No. L-44060, July 20, 1978
FACTS:
In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol, who was then a little over
twelve and a half (12) years old, was alone in her parents' house in
Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu,
cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at the time her father was
in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental
while the rest of the family were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio
Codia; also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade student of
the Bunacan Elementary School. Upon instruction of her mother, she
did not go to school that afternoon so that she could look after the pigs
and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground floor of their
house cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa,
armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door
after him. Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around
Mirasol's neck, encircled her abdomen with his right arm, at the same
time pointing the hunting knife with s right hand at her breast, and
threatened her not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter,
66
the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby, rolled up her dress
and, with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused then
placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the
zipper of his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's thighs,
picked up the hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol,
inserted his erect penis into her sexual organ and then made four push
and pull movement until he ejaculated. In the process, Mirasol's dress
and panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the
accused to roll up her dress and pull her panties without any
resistance whatsoever. During the intercourse, the accused was not
holding the hunting knife. After the accused had discharged, he ran to
the storeroom of the house upstairs because he heard Mrs. Lita
Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from
outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol
did not answer because she was then in the act of putting on her
panties. After she had put on her panties, she opened the gate and
saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she
did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside
the house. She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had
sexual intercourse with her under threats and against her will. Her aunt
Lita then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if
she would tell her aunt Lita what he did, he would kill her. After the
incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of the
same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did
not reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the
accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same
day; but Mirasol did not also reveal the incident to him because she
was afraid her father might punish her. Her mother returned home on
July 16, 1971 from Sagay, Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also
tell her mother about what happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac It
was her aunt Lita who revealed the matter to Mirasol's mother, who
thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the incident
of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked her about it;
because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the
accused. Three days after her return from Sagay, Negros Occidental
on July 19, 1971 Mirasol's mother brought her to the Bantayan
Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by
Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
Abrasion of inguinal region
Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but
negative for spermatozoa
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the
wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50)
meters away from the house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto
Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13, 1971, she went to the house
of her brother-in-law in Tabagac Arriving there, she saw, through the
gate which was made of split bamboos, the accused running away
when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her
panties, to open the gate. Mirasol opened the gate after she had put
on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked Mirasol what
the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and
from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding
place and run away, passing through the gate of the fence. Thereupon,
she told Mirasol to go home to barrio Codia because she was also
going there.
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same
afternoon but she did not talk to him about what she saw earlier in
Tabagak However, she revealed the incident to her husband.
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs.
Parochel had a conversation with her regarding the person of the
accused and thereafter Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding
complaint against the accused.
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five
errors as having been committed by the trial court. These errors may,
however, be boiled down to the issue of credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the
complaining witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by employing
force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were
sweethearts; that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited
him to the latter's house where they had sexual intercourse after
kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that afternoon
was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse.
67
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated
by two witnesses for the defense, Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo
Ducay.
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence
is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the
crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse
between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary.
Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any
resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault.
She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's
advances without endangering her life. But she did not.
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her
parents that she was raped. It was only after her mother arrived from
Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and
confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through
her aunt Lita that she eventually revealed to her mother what the
accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, 1971.
Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to
rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that
the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had
had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of
which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where
Mirasol and the accused slept together in the evening of the same day
after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from the
town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the silence of Marisol may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of the assertion by the accused.
HELD:
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be
taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard
and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a
denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting
his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for
an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that
the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would
be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all
obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts
asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed
as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the
truthfulness of Mirasol is the testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did
not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's vagina.
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual
experience, she must have been a virgin when she was allegedly
raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain as
the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did
she state that she was bleeding during and after the alleged forced
coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused made
four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated
indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to
the fact that her aunt discovered her having sexual intercourse at so
young an age and that she feared that her aunt would report the same
to her parents.
[JULARBAL] Solas v. Power Telephone Supply Phils., Inc., G.R. No.
162332, August 28, 2008
FACTS:
On 16 August 1997, Herbert Solas entered into a contract of
employment with Power and Telephone /Supply Philippines, Inc., to be
the Assistant Sales Manager of the company with a monthly salary of
P21,600.00, excluding bonuses and commission.
On 06 November 1998, private respondent company granted petitioner
Herbert Solas and Franklin D. Quiachon an amount of P85,418.00
each, corresponding to their sales commission from the month of
January to June of 1998. From that time up to the present, no other
sales commission was ever again given to them.
Thus, on 04 February 2000, petitioner requested for the release of his
alleged commission which had already accumulated since July of
68
1998. However, in an inter-office memorandum, said request was
denied, and instead, petitioner was even mandated to settle his
outstanding obligation with the company.
On 07 February 2000, petitioner likewise received another
memorandum requiring him to return the issued cellular phone, car
and key to his office, which he allegedly all complied. Petitioner
averred that these were all forms of harassment including the non-
payment of his salary for the month of February 2000, and onwards.
Hence, on 15 February 2000, he instituted a case for illegal
constructive dismissal, recovery of 10% sales commission on gross
sales, and attorney's fees.
In response, private respondents maintained that there was no
agreement, written or oral, which talked of the grant of 10%
commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was there a CBA on the
matter. There was even no CBA to speak of, since the company had
no union, with its employees numbering only to less than 10, all being
fixed-salaried employees. The company gave bonuses when there
was an income, but these were purely on the liberality of the company,
subject to the availability of funds and profits. Besides, petitioner has
actually no client of his own from whom he could close sales, thus the
claim for commission was utterly baseless.
Private respondents maintained also that the claim of petitioner that he
was constructively dismissed, was without basis. Beginning 02
February 2000, petitioner's attendance was already irregular. On 11
February 2000, he was on absence without leave. He was sick and
had a growing lump on his left shoulder. It was this absence without
leave which prompted private respondents to write several memoranda
to petitioner, one advising him to return to work immediately, as his
continued absence was inimical to the company; the other, directing
him to explain his continued unauthorized absences within 24 hours
from receipt of the memo.
Private respondents asserted further that neither the order directing
petitioner to return the company car, the issued cellular phone and
keys, nor the deductions made on his salary, could constitute as basis
for his alleged constructive dismissal, all allegations being baseless
and without merit. Thus, private respondents prayed for an order
directing petitioner to pay the latter's debt with the company, and an
award amounting to P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the
dismissal of petitioner from employment.
The parties submitted their position papers. On 31 August 2000, the
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding for the petitioner Herbert
Solas.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the LA. The NLRC ruled that that there was no constructive
dismissal in this case, because petitioner never resigned but merely
filed an indefinite sick leave, even admitting during the preliminary
hearings that he was still an employee of respondents, and his
principal claim was for payment of his sales commission. Furthermore,
the NLRC saw no badge of constructive dismissal in respondents'
action of applying petitioner's salary for the month of February 2000 as
payment for his debts to the company amounting to P95,000.00. It was
also held that petitioner failed to establish that there was an agreement
between him and respondent employer for a 10% sales commission,
and that he failed to establish the origin and authenticity of the specific
amount of the commission being claimed by him.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but
the same was denied.
From such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari. On September 12, 2003, the CA
promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the NLRC ruling,
ISSUE:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC FINDING THAT
THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
HELD:
In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents committed acts of
harassment, i.e., the withholding of his salary for the month of
February and directing him to return the company car, cellphone and
office keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently explained by private
respondent company in its Position Paper. Respondents were able to
69
show that its acts were not intended to harass or discriminate against
petitioner.
There was valid reason for respondents' withholding of petitioner's
salary for the month of February 2000. Petitioner does not deny that he
is indebted to his employer in the amount of aroundP95,000.00.
Respondents explained that petitioner's salary for the period of
February 1-15, 2000 was applied as partial payment for his debt and
for withholding taxes on his income; while for the period of February
15-28, 2000, petitioner was already on absence without leave, hence,
was not entitled to any pay.15
With regard to the company car, respondents explained that the
company car was actually issued to Franklin D. Quiachon although
petitioner and another employee, Nelson Gatbunton, may borrow the
car for company operations with the consent of Quiachon as stated in
an office memorandum dated March 10, 1999. Since Nelson
Gatbunton had to attend to official business in Clark, said employee
was then given use of the company car.16
The taking of the office key from petitioner was also justified, as
respondents stated that the company's office consisted only of one big
room without separate or individual offices, so it was only the main
door that required a key. The key to the office door could be borrowed
by any employee from a co-employee in possession thereof in case of
overtime or weekend work, but not a single employee had the
exclusive use of the key to the office. Thus, when another employee,
Myrna Dumlao, had to work overtime, she borrowed the key from
petitioner on February 4, 2000. Thereafter, on February 18, 2000,
respondents moved to another unit in the same condominium building
housing its office, so it was already useless to return the key to the
door of the former office to petitioner.17
As to the cellphone, respondents maintain that said phone remained
the property of the company, and it became company policy for its
employees to pay for personal calls. When petitioner's debts and
advances accumulated, and he showed no intention of paying for them
despite receipt of bonuses, the company had to take measures to
regulate the use of the company cellphones.18
Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations for
withholding his salary and the reasons why he was required to return
the company car, key and cellphone. This constitutes admission by
silence under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or
says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to
do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that respondents'
explanations are truthful and, based thereon, the NLRC and the CA
committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was no
constructive dismissal in this case.
Lastly, as to petitioner's claim for commissions, the NLRC and the CA
were correct in not sustaining the award thereof by the LA. It must be
borne in mind that there is no law which requires employers to pay
commissions;19 thus, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that that
there is indeed an agreement between him and his employer for
payment of the same.
The only evidence presented by petitioner to prove that he is entitled to
sales commissions are the employment certificate, stating that he is an
employee of respondents receiving P21,600.00 per month as salary,
exclusive of bonuses and sales commissions, and the undisputed fact
that private respondent company gave him and its other employees
the amount of P85,418.00 sometime in 1998. However, the CA was
correct in ruling that the employment certificate was insufficient to
prove that petitioner was indeed entitled to his claim for sales
commissions, as said document does not give the details as to the
conditions for payment of the same or the agreed percentage, if any.
Here, the NLRC and the CA found that the computations for
commissions were determined and prepared unilaterally by petitioner.
Thus, it was correctly ruled that said computation, with its uncertain
origin and authenticity, is self-serving and cannot prove petitioner's
claim for commissions in the amount of P892,780.37.
[LINGAHAN] People v. Ranario, G.R. No. 25083, August 17, 1926
FACTS:
The CFI of Bohol found Fulgencio Ranario guilty of the crime of murder
against Agustin Galanida The antecedent facts are as follows:
70

According to the confession made by the accused Leon Caday, at
about 8 oclock on the night of October 16, 1925, while Agustin
Galanida was seated on a bench, he was stabbed, through the said
wall, with a bolo in the left lumbar region, causing a wound which
passed through his body as a result of which he died in about twenty-
four hours.
The only evidence there is against the accused appellant Fulgencio
Ranario is that furnished by Leon Caday in the confession. The latter
confessed that he killed Agustin Ganida, claiming, however, that he
was induced to do so by Fulgencio Ranario, who promised to give him
P10, and gave him a bolo, which he returned to him after he had
committed the crime.
According to Caday, Fulgencio Ranario suspected that the deceased
was the cause of the illness of his son Moises Ranario. In view of
these statements, Leon Caday was taken to Fulgencio Ranarios
house, who was not there, having gone to the river. The Constabulary
lieutenant who accompanied him, sent the chief of police to find him.
Before Fulgencio Ranario reached his house he was disarmed by the
chief of police who accompanied him. Upon seeing the bolo, Leon
Caday said that it was the one which Fulgencio Ranario had given him.
Fulgencio Ranario protested saying it was not so and that Leon Caday
had not been in his house.
On the night of October 16, 1926, Agustin Galanida, finding himself in
a serious condition and knowing that he was about to die, made a
declaration before the justice of the peace in which he said that he
suspected that Moises Ranario was the aggressor because he was the
only one with whom he had trouble in 1925.
On October 22, 1925, Leon Caday made another confession in which
he explained the manner in which he committed the crime, again
implicating Fulgencio Ranario.
Fulgencio Ranario being confined in jail with Leon Caday, asked him
why he had stated that he had ordered him to kill Agustin Galanida and
censured him for his conduct. Leon Caday told him that he would
plead guilty provided he would give him P100. Fulgencio Ranario
replied that he would not give him that sum as he hadnt done
anything, although at the beginning he was inclined to, but was afraid
that Leon Caday would betray him and say something else.
During the trial, Fulgencio Ranario testified as a witness in his own
defense and denied everything that Leon Caday had said against him
outside of the court. He trial court found Ranario guilty. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made by the accused
implicating his co-accused admissible and be used against the latter.
Held:
No.
Jurisprudence has already established that an extrajudicial confession
made by an accused implicating his coaccused is not admissible
against him. (People v. Durante, 47 Phil., 654.) It is true that when
Leon Caday made his confession contained in Exhibit B, in which he
implicates Fulgencio Ranario, the latter was present and said nothing,
according to justice of the peace Castor del Bando, but it does not
appear that Fulgencio Ranario heard the confession of Leon Caday
nor had the opportunity to deny it.
On the other hand, however, it does appear that when Leon Caday, in
the presence of the Constabulary soldiers, was shown the bolo that
Fulgencio Ranario carried and said it was the one that had been given
him by the appellant, a discussion took place between them in which
the said Fulgencio Ranario denied having given the said Leon Caday
his bolo and having been in his house. Neither is the presumption of
innocence sufficiently rebutted by the fact that before the commission
of the crime Fulgencio had a dispute with the deceased on the
question of boundaries, which was amicably settled aside from the fact
that Agustin Galanida did not suspect him but his son Moises Ranario.
71
The guilt of the accused-appellant has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt and that he has the right to the benefit of the doubt.
Sec. 33. Confession
[LINGAHAN] People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. L-35598, May 29,
1987
FACTS:
Appellant Leonardo de los Santos and Alfredo Lacastesantos were
charged with the crime of Murder for conspiring together and for
assisting one another in assaulting Gregorio Dotado, thereby inflicting
hack wounds upon the body of the latter, which caused his death. The
trial court dismissed the case against Lacastesantos for the reason
that although appellant Leonardo de los Santos was convicted, his
conviction was due to his extrajudicial confession and that
Lacastesantos was merely implicated by the appellant as one of the
participants of the crime.
The pertinent facts that gave rise to the instant prosecution are as
follows:
Sometime in 1971, a certain Gregorio Dotado was found dead by his
sister at the junction of a trail leading to his house at Tairan, Isabela,
Basilan City. Francisco Dotado, the father of the deceased, reported
the matter to the manager of Tairan Plantation who notified the police
authorities. There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime.
The police authorities immediately began the investigation of the case.
Patrolman Conrado D. Francisco of the Basilan Police Department
learned that prior to his death, the victim Gregorio Dotado was courting
a certain Herminia Garcia and he had a rival by the name of Leonardo
de los Santos, appellant herein. On December 6, 1971, at around 5:30
p.m., appellant was picked up for questioning by the police authorities
of Basilan City. The following day, appellant voluntarily executed an
affidavit wherein he confessed to his participation in the killing of the
deceased. . Appellant narrated in his confession that at about 7:00
p.m. on November 29, 1971, the victim was then drinking tuba at the
house of Manuel Martinez together with Sebastian Ambrosio, Romeo
Martinez, Pablito Santos and Alberto Meneng; that when the victim left
the house of Martinez, he and Alfredo Lacastesantos followed the
former; that before the victim reached his house, they overtook him;
whereupon appellant hacked him with a bolo, first on the throat and
when the victim fell on the ground, he again hacked him on the
forehead and realizing that the victim was already dead, they ran
away.
On December 9, 1971, appellant executed an affidavit repudiating his
extrajudicial confession. The lower court, however, ruled that the
extrajudicial confession of appellant was freely and voluntarily
executed and appellant was found guilty of the crime
charged.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law li
In seeking the reversal of the decision rendered against him, appellant
herein raised the sole issue that:
"The lower court erred in having convicted defendant-appellant solely
on the strength of Exhibit D, the alleged confession when the same
was obtained thru violence, threat and intimidation . That in the
evening of December 6, 1971, after Pat. Conrado Francisco had
brought him to the police station for questioning, two men from the
Detective Department investigated him; that when he denied any
participation in the killing of the deceased, the two men boxed him,
hitting him in the left eyebrow and in the mouth and they also kicked
the left side of his body while he was in a squatting position.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Leonardo DeLos Santos extrajudicial confession
is freely and voluntary executed.
2. Whether or not the declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in
evidence against him.
RULING:
1. Yes. A confession is deemed to have been made voluntarily if
the accused did not complain to the proper authorities regarding the
alleged maltreatment despite the opportunity to do so (People v. Page,
77 SCRA 348). If appellants confession as contained in Exhibit "D"
was voluntary, we have to conclude that Dotado was slain in the
manner and for the reason set out in that document. It is needless to
say that no one in his right mind would convict himself without
72
compulsion by fabricating a highly self-damaging story and
suppressing the truth which would absolve him (People v. Carillo, 77
Phil. 572).chanrobles.c
a. It is significant to consider that Exhibit "D" was taken on
December 7, 1971 by Pat. Conrado Francisco while the alleged
maltreatment was done in the evening of December 6, 1971.
It is unbelievable that the alleged maltreatment made by the two
policemen was what induced appellant to admit the crime the following
day. Ordinarily, confessions executed through intimidation or
maltreatment are obtained during or immediately after the supposed
maltreatment. In the instant case, appellant alleges that in spite of the
alleged manhandling, he never admitted anything that evening and the
two policemen desisted from further harming him. However, when
investigated the following day (December 7, 1971) by police detective
Conrado Francisco, appellant readily confessed his participation in the
killing of Gregorio Dotado.
b. Another factor that militates against the claim of appellant of
involuntariness in the execution of Exhibit "D" is the fact that the
confession is replete with details that only the confessant could have
known. The post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased
conducted by Sanitary Inspector Hilario Guerrero showed that the
wounds sustained by the victim were located exactly in the places
where appellant in his affidavit stated that he inflicted them upon the
victim.
Indeed, the confession at bar being complete with details that only the
appellant could have known, therefore, show that the confession was
executed voluntarily (People v. Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721).
c. It is significant to note that the extrajudicial confession, Exhibit
"D," was obtained and offered in evidence before the 1973 Constitution
took effect. In fact, the decision appealed from was rendered by the
trial court on May 24,1972. Consequently, appellants extrajudicial
confession, Exhibit "D," is admissible in evidence although the
requisites in Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under
investigation for an offense who has not been informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel were not observed, since that portion of
the 1973 constitutional mandate should be given prospective and not
retrospective effect and no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution (Magtoto v.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4).
2. Yes. Furthermore, the declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, may be given in
evidence against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130). It has been held that a
confession constitutes evidence of high order and the presumption is
that no sane person would deliberately confess the commission of a
crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. (U.S. v. De
los Santos, 24 Phil. 329).
[LINGAHAN] People v. Satorre, G.R. No. 133858, August 12, 2003
FACTS:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with
Murder for attacking Romero Pantilgan with the use of .38 paltik
revolver hitting the latter at the head which caused his instantaneous
death.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then
ensued.
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at
2:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, her husband, Romero, went out to attend a
fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot.
Gliceria got up and went out to the porch, where she found her dead
husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on
his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m.
of May 25, 1997 appellants father, Abraham Satorre, informed them
that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. They looked for appellant in
the house of his brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but
were told that he already left. Nevertheless, appellants brothers,
Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufinos house and surrendered
the gun which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father,
Abraham, to the Barangay Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu
73
where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was
detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of
Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle
brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having killed
Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan
because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. That same
evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where
she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily
narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun which he
wrestled from his possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu
certified that the cause of Pantilgans death was gunshot wound.
Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken
from Pantilgans head wound was fired from the gun surrendered by
appellants brothers to the Carcar Police.
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was
asleep inside his house at the time of the incident. He alleged that
Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when
he tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He
denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed
ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not
even remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having
accompanied appellant to Castaares house to surrender him.
Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never
accompanied appellant to Castaares house to surrender. His other
brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm to
anybody.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution's evidence
and rendered a decision convicting appellant of Murder. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the confession of the accused is admissible in
evidence despite the fact that it was not reduced in writing and was
made out of court.
Whether or not the alleged confession or admission is voluntary and
freely made
RULING:
1. Yes There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants
alleged oral extrajudicial confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is
concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes no
distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A
confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein. Both may be
given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the
whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had
committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before
the Barangay Captain was a confession. Since the declaration was not
put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial
confession.
2. No. Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is
was it voluntarily and freely made. The term voluntary means that the
accused speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any
kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and
consequences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free
from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the
confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against
74
him. Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its
voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting
spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. The
problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is
an oral extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness
cannot be inferred from the testimony of a witness who allegedly heard
the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was
voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court
since, precisely, it was made outside the judicial proceeding. The
problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not only
the admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such
confession was indeed made, but more significantly whether it was
made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age,
character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must
be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings of
the accused. This is the position taken by the courts, whatever the
theory of exclusion of incriminating statements may be. The
intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into
account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his
act.
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not
even finish first grade. Granting that he made the confession in the
presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized
the full import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to
say that he is not capable of making the confession out of a desire to
tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that
due to the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the
voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not be definitively
appraised and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case
against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not
conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they
were uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at
best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords but a
precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict
cannot be permitted to rest.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It
may be oral or written, formal or informal in character. It may be
recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. However,
while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is
advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video tape or other means, to
reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession
and helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If
possible the confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read
to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have
it attested by witnesses.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with
the physical evidence. According to Barangay Captain Castaares,
appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the
deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with
a piece of wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva
found that the entrance wound on the deceased was located at the top
of the head or the crown, indicating that the victim was probably lying
down when he was shot.
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where
it is uncorroborated. There must be such corroboration that, when
considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not necessary that the
supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the
extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the
defendants identity or criminal agency. All facts and circumstances
attending the particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate
extrajudicial confession.
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Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans
brain can not be considered as corroborative evidence. While the slug
embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the prosecution
was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other
than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellants
brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was denied by appellant
and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
[LINGAHAN] People v. Cavite, G.R. No. 86784, November 8, 1991
Facts:
Pedro Nacional, Jr. was found lifeless in front of his house, his hands
bound, wounded in several parts of the body. The police investigation
team found at the scene, and took possession of, the rope with which
Nacional had been bound; a bamboo pole and a piece of wood (which
appeared to have been used as weapons); and a telescope. Acting on
leads apparently obtained through preliminary inquiries at the scene of
the crime, the police officers brought in and investigated Eduardo
Cavite y Taduran (53 years of age) and Augusto San Juan y Cavite
(25 years old).. Another suspect, Ernesto Villar y Benavente (18 years
old), was questioned, at the police station.
It appears that Eduardo Cavite and Augusto San Juan (and their
families) used to occupy a portion of land owned in common by Pedro
Nacional, Jr. and his brother, Municipal Trial Court Judge Jose
Nacional. Cavite and San Juan however had to vacate the premises
sometime on January 11, 1986 on request of Judge Nacional on
account of suspicions by Pedro Nacional, Jr. that Augusto San Juan
had stolen his goat and had been stoning his house.
It is noteworthy that in their affidavits, which was executed by Cavite,
San Juan and Villar, all three (3) suspects attempted to exculpate
themselves. Eduardo Cavite claims that he "was just standing near the
house and . . was surprised because . . (he had) no knowledge that . .
. (his companions) intention was to kill Pedro Nacional, Jr." Augusto
San Juan asserts that he and Cavite "were only made to guide . . . (the
killers and robbers to) the house of Pedro Nacional, wherein what . .
(they) did is only to watch them while they were in the course of killing
the victim . . ." And Ernesto Villar alleges that he "was just standing (at)
the door of the bedroom because . . (he) was amazed that . . (his
companions) intention was to kill Pedro Nacional, Jr., and . . (he) was
also threatened that if . . . (he) will not go with them something will
happen to . . (him), and because they are also . . (his) friends . . (he)
went with them."
Trial commenced after the accused all entered a plea of not guilty on
arraignment. No eyewitness was presented by the prosecution. The
victims "common-law wife," Edna San Juan, never took the witness
stand.
Nevertheless, the Trial Court found that the guilt of the accused as co-
conspirators in the crime charged had been established beyond
reasonable doubt by "the totality of the contents of Exh. A, B, C, 38
together with the recovered evidence, Exh. E 39 and F, 40 (and) the
flight of the accused Pedro San Jose and Eduardo Privaldos . . "
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was an admission of guilt based on the
affidavits executed.
2. Whether or not the admission that all of them are in the scene when
the crime was perpetrated is sufficient for them to be convicted as
authors of the crime.
Ruling:
1. No. It is apparent that the three sworn statements are not
confessions. The Rules of Court define a confession as the
"declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged." None of the three (3) affidavits contains any
acknowledgment of "guilt of the offense charged" on the part of the
affiants. Not one of them acknowledged having laid a hand on the
victim or assisted in inflicting any injury on him, or having taken, or
assisted in the taking of any property for him. On the contrary, they all
76
disclaimed any participation in the offense or even knowledge of any
intention or plan to kill or rob Pedro Nacional, Jr.
2. No. The affidavits are not sufficient to warrant the conviction of the
appellants. The most that perhaps may be said about the affidavits, as
evidence against the affiants, is that they are admissions that the latter
were in fact at the scene as the crime was being perpetrated. This is of
no help to the prosecution's cause in so far as concerns implication
of the affiants themselves in the killing of Pedro Nacional, Jr. for the
affidavits fasten responsibility therefor directly and exclusively on
persons other than he affiants who, as repeatedly stated, explicitly
deny any participation therein, or even prior awareness that the crime
would be committed. Worse, those affidavits are categorically rejected
and repudiated by their supposed authors who variously asserted, also
under oath, that the declarations attributed to them were false and
extracted under duress.
Moreover, it is impermissible to pick the affidavits apart, lending
credence only to the portions seen as incriminatory, while disregarding
as false and unacceptable those supportive of innocence, absent, as
here, any circumstance which would logically justify such
dismemberment. But this, it would appear, is what the Trial Court did;
with no further explanation than an advertence to the "totality" of the
contents of said affidavits and the recovered physical evidence it in
effect hung a finding of conspiracy against appellants Cavite, San Juan
and Villar on those portions of the affidavits that would lend
themselves to an inference of such circumstance and ignored their
exculpatory parts. This is manifest error because said statements each
considered in complete context, or "in totality" as it were, recount
nothing more culpable than that the affiants were unwilling, or
unwitting, witnesses to a crime in the planning and commission of
which they had no conscious involvement. Such finding of conspiracy
thus lacking any clear or sufficient basis where those affiants are
concerned, a verdict of guilt against them, as to whom here is no other
evidence to contradict their claim of never having laid a hand on the
victim, cannot be allowed to stand.
Accused-appellants are all acquitted.
[MACAVINTA] United States v. Corrales, G.R. No. 9230, November
10, 1914
Fact:
The appellant in this instant case was convicted for the crime of
misappropriation of public funds, and sentenced to 9 months
imprisonment plus costs of trial
On or about june 6, 1913 the appellant was the clerk of court of first
instance of misamis, he received a sum of P321.88 from a chinaman
named Melliza, which was the fine imposed upon the latter, and that
instead of giving Melliza the proper official receipt, the accused handed
him a copy of judgement of conviction stating fine and costs paid.
However upon audit and inspection it was later discovered that the
funds were not found, hence the accused was charged with
misappropriation of funds; however a few hours later the accused went
to the house of the auditor and informed him that the amount in
question is now safe in the drawer which he kept in his personal funds.
The accused admitted the fact that he received the money from melliza
but he was busy and had no time to render a receipt for melliza, and
put the money in a safe which he kept in his personal funds, and
making the proper deposit on a later date in his convenience. Which
he ultimately forgot until the auditor saw the discrepancy in the funds.
Accused states that he never used the funds kept in his personal safe
and that upon audit, he went straight to the auditors house to explain
what had happened.
This court however does not agree with the accused alleged alibi and
agrees with the trial judge stating that the evidence of record
conclusively establishes the falsity of the account of what occurred as
given by the accused.
77
The auditor testified that the accused admitted that he put the money
in the safe AFTER the inspection had been completed.
Counsel for appellant contends that such admission should be
disregarded, on ground that it was incompetent and inadmissible.
Counsel for accused further contends that such admission was not
freely and voluntarily made, without compulsion or inducement and
that it was not made under oath.
Issue:
Whether or not admission is admissible when not freely given
Whether or not admission is admissible when not made under oath
Held:
The court held that the admission is admissible.
The court herein points out the difference between a confession and
an admission. Confession, is a declaration made at any time by a
person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating that
he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
While admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statement of
facts made by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgement or a criminal intent to commit the offense.
As to the first issue, The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to
confessions unless it is first made to appear that they are made
voluntarily does not apply in cases of admissions, although, of course,
evidence of the fact that a particular statement was made under
duress would tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value. It is
very clear from all the evidence, and from the circumstances under
which the statement was made by the accused to the auditor, that it
was not made under duress, and we are of opinion that the trial judge
properly took it under consideration as evidence against the accused.
As to the second issue the law does NOT prescribe either confession
or admissions to be competent to be made under oath. It is the fact
that they are made by the accused and against his own interest which
gives to them their evidentiary value, and provided that the fact is
established it does not matter whether they are made under oath or
not.
[MACAVINTA] People v. Artellero, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000
Facts:
On october 11, 1991, at the Far East Bank and Trust Company branch
in manila, a messenger found the lifeless body of Matias, inside the
bank premises and bore a total of 32 stab wounds. This sprung an
investigation led by SPO3 Mendoza and two other officers of the
western police district. Upon investigation, they interviewed the bank
janitor, Mr cawagdan, and the other security guard Dionisio Vargas.
They also found a bloodstained scissors made inside a podium located
near the main entrance of the bank. Head of security also reported that
.38 cal revolvers and five 12 gauge shotguns were missing from the
guard rostrum.
Upon follow-up investigation, they learned that there was an ongoing
construction on the upper floors of the bank, and that the appellant
(Artillero) and his co-accused (Rodriguez) had access to the bank
after office hours. This prompted SPO3 Jamoralin to go to the barracks
of the construction workers, wherein they saw the accused and co-
accused, rodriguez, packing his personal belongings.
When asked why he was packing, he replied that he had nothing else
to do at the site. The police however saw some reddish stains on the
accused shirts and pants. Again probbed on the reasoning behind
such stain the accused explained that he had a wound on his back.
Upon inspection of his back no wound was found. Hence this
prompted SPO3 Jamoralin to arrest appellant and bring him to the
police station for further interrogation together with the t-shirt and
maong pants found with the reddish stain
On october 15, 1991, accused rodriguez executed a sworn statement
confessing that he and appellant together with one Mendoza, and two
other names he did not know, killed Matias.
78

They were then charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
Upon arraignment they entered their plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1)
SPO3 MENDOZA (2) SPO3 JAMORALIN (3) Atty Lao III (4) Carolyn
Custodio the supervisor of the chemistry district of the NBI
Custodio testified that the reddish stains on rodriguez pants and shirt
were positive of type O blood, which was also the blood type of
rodriguez.
After the prosecution presented evidence, the appellant filed Demurrer
to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish
accused beyond reasonable doubt and that testimonies presented
were hearsay.
Such demurrer was however denied.
On the stand, both rodriguez and appellant Artillero admitted that they
were province mates from masbate and worked in the construction
site. Rodriguez claims that he was mauled by the policemen to make a
confession while appellant was placed outside the room where
rodriguez was being interrogated and was not asked for any
statement, further stating that he did not own any maong pants.
After due trial, the court rendered a decision finding appellant and
rodriguez guilty of murder, instead of robbery with homicide.
This prompted an appeal only by Artillero and contends that the court
erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of rodriguez in
proving conspiracy as circumstantial evidence to show probability of
his participation.
Issue:
Whether or not extrajudicial confession made by Co-accused
Rordriguez is admissible for establishing conspiracy with appellant
Artellero
Held:
The court states the four fundamental requisites for admissibility of a
confession
Confession must be voluntary
Confession must be made with competent counsel
Confession must be express
Confession must be in writing
We find the second requisite lacking. The records show that both
accused were detained for 4 days, and that Atty Lao from PAO was
only called on the 4th day of detention when accused was about to put
his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment
accused and appellant were arrested they were already under
Custodial Investigation.
The records who that rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their
arrest was informed of their miranda rights. WORSE, they were not
provided with competent and independent counsel during the custodial
investigation prior to the execution of the EJ confession.
Assuming further, that granting arguendo that the EJ confession was
admissible, section 33 of rule 130 of the ROC provides that such
confession is only admissible against the CONFESSANT. And that
there is a requirement that independent evidence is required aside
from the EJ confession to prove conspiracy. In this case however no
independent evidence was presented.
Hence both appellant and rodriguez are ACQUITTED.
[MACAVINTA] People v. Urro, G.R. No. L-28405, April 27, 1972
79
Facts:
That on or before january 26, 1962 the four accused in the municipality
of zambuanga del sur, acting with treachery and premeditation, struck
several times the victim Reconalla inflicting mortal injuries that caused
his death.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on the night of January 25,
1962, Reconalla left the conjugal home to catch fish and thereafter did
not return. After search by his wife was in vain, she reported the
disappearance to the police authorities. After search with the
authorities, they found his lifeless body along the beach near his
sailboat.
Upon investigation, it was then found out by the chief of police that the
4 herein accused are the enemies of the deceased. The chief of police
investigated the four suspects (herein defendants). They voluntarily
executed their confessions and signed them and acknowledged them
to be true before the mayor.
The four confessions, were in complete harmony with one another,
and stated that Urro asked his co-defendants to meet him and that he
offered the amount of P300.00 for the death of Reconalla. Which the
defendants accepted.
It was here that the three defendants went into shore on january 26,
1962 to find Reconalla fishing. They approached him pretending to be
buyers of fish, but when the latter declined their offer, they began
clubbing him to death with a piece of bamboo and paddle.
The confession was corroborated by pedro calago, who declared that
while returning to the shore, he heard the cries of a Reconalla and saw
the co-defendants carrying the lifeless body of the deceased and
dumped the same into the shore.
The defense consisted mainly of denials. After weighing the evidence
for the prosecution and defense, the court believes that the crime of
murder was committed by the four herein. This is attended with the
aggravating circumstances of premeditation and promise of reward
without any mitigating circumstance.
The court rendered decision against the defendants, which prompted
an appeal.
On appeal, the accused-appellants assail that the lower court erred in
basing their conviction on the alleged extra judicial confessions,
notwithstanding their strong and convincing evidence that the
confessions were prefabricated and take from them by force and
coercion.
Issue:
Whether or not the extra judicial confession made is admissible as
evidence
Held:
Two telling earmarks of prefabrication of appellants alleged
confessions were presented, that (1) it is impossible to tell from the
record just who actually reduced the statements in writing and that the
(2) intrinsic evidence of diction and style unerringly shows that the
confessions are products of one mind and not of four different minds.
Hence there is there is reason to believe that the alleged confessions
were prefabricated by persons other than the accused, who were
thereafter compelled to sign them.
(medjo mahaba and malabo na ung testimonies pero in short sinasabi
lang that the 4 extrajudicial confessions were too good to be true,
because they were all in sync hence meron nang doubt that opens up
the possibility of fabrication)
The court held that it is an established doctrine that the confession or
declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged may be given in evidence against him, where it is
VOLUNTARY. Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by the
force or intimidation are null and void and are abhorred by the law,
which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to
80
secure confession. A coerced confession stands discredited in the
eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed
Hence ACQUITTED
[MACAVINTA] People v. Bascugin y Agquiz, G.R. No. 184704, June
30, 2009
Facts:
In an information dated June 21, 1999 herein accused-appellant,
Bascugin was charged with rape with homicide.
With his the assistance of counsel de oficio, Bascugin pleaded guilty
upon arraignment on august 5, 1999.
Since this was a capital offence, the trial court asked him if his plea
was voluntarily given and whether he understood the consequences of
his plea.
The prosecution presented testimonial, object, and documentary
evidence, while the defense offered no contest. The trial court then
and there adjudged him guilty of the charge beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to death
In automatic review by the SC, the OSG and bascugin challenged the
proceedings in trial court, specially the invalid arrangement of
bascugin, they contended that consultation made by the counsel de
oficio was hasty; and bascugin was not sufficiently apprised of the
nature of his case and consequences of his plea.
SC found merit and remanded the case back to court a quo for
appropriate proceedings.
Bascugin was once again arraigned on may 6, 2002. And this time with
assistance from counsel de oficio, he pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution asked the court to adopt the past testimonies given in
the first witness. The defense did not object to said motion, thus, it was
granted.
according to the prosecution, AAA was on board the tricycle driven by
accused. De mesa, saw bascugin going towards Balayan town proper,
but did not notice if he had a passenger on board. On the same night,
liwanag, was on his way home from work via his motorcycle when he
passed bascugins tricycle parked near a waiting shed. Liwanag
testified that he heard a girl shout but he ignored the same because
the area was allegedly haunted.
When AAA was reported missing, the police conducted an
investigation. PO3 de castro received information that a patient was
being treated at Don Manuel Lopez Memorial District Hospital for
tongue injury. As they rushed to the hospital they found the patient to
be Bascugin.
Bascugin told the police that AAA was his passenger that night and
that a man and a woman also boarded his tricycle. He was then hit
behind the neck and fell unconscious, and when he awoke, his tongue
was injured and the passengers were gone.
Further investigation ensued and the police went to the scene of the
crime, where they found in a muddled portion of a sugarcane
plantation the lifeless body of AAA naked with 13 stab wounds inside a
canal along national road. They also recovered a pair of maong pants
and two panties belonging to the victim.
Before prosecution can rest its case, the defense manifested that
Bascugin wanted to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, hence on
sep 29, 2003 he was arraigned one more time, and pleaded guilty to
the charge.
Upon motion of the prosecution, Bascugin was placed on the wtiness
stand, where he affirmed that he understood the consequences of his
voluntary plea, and admitted that AAA rode his tricycle on june 4, 1999
and that he raped and killed her.
81

HOWEVER, on november 12, 20013 he moved to withdraw his plea of
guilty and when Re-arraigned again he pled not guilty.
Bacugin testified that AAA rode his tricycle and that due to heavy rain,
they stopped at a waiting shed in a barangay for a long time. He then
further stated that something happened which he could not tell but
after that incident, he started the engine of his tricycle to bring AAA
home but she ran away, and that he can only remember driving her
lifeless body to bagong daan and assumed responsibility for his
passenger. Thereafter, he went home and was brought to the hospital
by his father to treat his injured tongue soon after that he voluntarily
went with the investigators, and on cross-examination, admitted he
raped and killed AAA.
The RTC found bascugin GUILTY.
Hence forwarded to the CA for review
In the CA, bascugin argued that his confession when he pleaded guilty
should be expunged from the records since he withdrew the said plea
and substituted it with a plea of not guilty.
The CA upheld the conviction, stating that he admitted in open court
that he raped and killed AAA. this judicial admission constitutes
evidence of high order, not only because it is presumed that a
deliberate confession to a crime is prohibited by truth, but also
because such admission was supported by medical findings of sexual
intercourse between him and AAA.
Hence appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not confession during arraignment was admissible
Held:
The court held that the confession of Bascugins, wsa freely,
intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession constitutes
evidence of a high order.
Rule 130 sec 33 states that Confession is a declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given evidence against him.
The court stated that the presumption is that no sane person would
deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to
do so by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt constitutes evidence
against him.
[SANTOS] People v. Muit, G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
FACTS:
Muit, Pancho, Jr.,Dequillo, Romeo,Hermano, Ferraer were charged
with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping in two
separate informations. All appellants pleaded not guilty during their
arraignments. In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Julaton, a
relative of Ferraer, arrived at the latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu,
Batangas with Pancho, Sr., Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and four other men
on board a gray Mitsubishi car. Pancho, Sr. told Ferraer that they
wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their visitor. Hermano told
Ferraer not to worry because they are not killers; their line of work is
kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get
would be shared equally among them. After the assailants carried
their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to their agreed meeting
place
The prosecution presented the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr.
and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of Atty. Mallare
admitting that they did the crime.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to
December 1997 he was working as a mason at Villanueva
Construction in BF Homes. He stated that on 8 December 1997, he
82
was arrested by the CIDG at his house and allegedly tortured when he
denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a
statement without being allowed to read it. Atty. Mallare only came in
after he had already signed the statement. He denied any participation
in the crimes charged against him.
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in
Calbayog, Samar. He alleged that the police tortured him and forced
him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He
denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged
against him.
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in
Lipa City, near the place of the shootout. He had just attended a
gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his uncle Bonifacio
when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the
crime. He denied knowing the people whose name appeared in his two
extra judicial confessions. He claimed that the names were supplied by
the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation.
The RTC found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail
over the positive declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. The RTC
did not give credence to the claims of appellants that their extra judicial
confessions were procured through torture as these were belied by the
testimony of Atty. Mallare and appellants medical certificates which
were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their
statements. The CA affirmed the decision. The prosecution was able to
prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one another in
the planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover,
appellants executed extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their
counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, and to the sworn statement
and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.
HELD:
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were
established by the direct testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez.
During the investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the
assistance of their counsels and family members, executed extra
judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and
execution of the crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in
the actual abduction of the victim, they should still be held liable, as the
courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy. The degree
of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit
strengthened the case against them. There is nothing on record to
support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of
voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is
that each contains many details and facts which the investigating
officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the
knowledge and information given by appellants. Moreover, the
appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements.
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates
from the physical examinations done on them. These claims of torture
were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for the first time during
trial.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also
strengthened the prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an
extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it
recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several
extra judicial statements had been made by several persons charged
with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference
to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all
material respects identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.
They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the
person implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual
participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as
corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances
83
that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime
charged and proved. These are known as interlocking confessions.
Ra 7438, An Act Defining Certain Rights Of Person Arrested, Detained
Or Under Custodial Investigation As Well As The Duties Of The
Arresting, Detaining And Investigating Officers, And Providing
Penalties For Violations Thereof
[SANTOS] People v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No. 206296, August 12,
2015
Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice stocks unaccounted
for in the bodega of the NFA. The stocks were under the account of
Matas. Estur suspended accused Matas. Upon disembarking from the
Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo, was stabbed and shot in front of his
rented apartment. Upon hearing her husband shout, If you want to kill
me, dont include my wife, quickly followed by two gunshots, Vicenta
hid inside their apartment. After a few minutes, she went out of the
house and saw Betonio, barely alive, slumped on the ground with a
knife, with a handle like that of an eagle and a carving like that of a
dragon, still pierced through his chest. Before Betonio was brought to
the hospital, where he was later pronounced dead on arrival, he
whispered to his wife the names, Delfin and Matas.
During the investigation, accused-appellant Peaflor admitted killing
Betonio and that he was hired by accused Ondo, the brother-in-law of
Matas, for the amount of P15,000.00, to kill Betonio. At 3:00 p.m. of
that same day, the police brought accused-appellant Peaflor to the
Office of the City Prosecutor to obtain his admission.
The RTC acquitted accused Matas, Omilig, and Ondo, while it
convicted accused-appellant Peaflor for the crime of murder for killing
Betonio. The RTC admitted accused-appellant Peaflors extrajudicial
confessions because they were not taken under duress or intimidation
as the extrajudicial confessions were conducted at the Prosecutors
Office and not in a police station, and in the presence of his relatives.
The CA affirmed the decision. The CA ruled that accused-appellant
Peaflors two extrajudicial confessions were admissible in evidence
as he was not under custodial investigation when the said extrajudicial
confessions were executed; they were conducted before an Assistant
City Prosecutor and a City Prosecutor.
In detail, accused-appellant Peaflors first extrajudicial confession
was taken before Assistant City Prosecutor Albulario, during which
accused-appellant Peaflor was assisted by Atty. Cristobal. On the
other hand, his second extrajudicial confession was taken before City
Prosecutor Lagcao with Atty. Cavales assisting accused-appellant
Peaflor, and while in the presence of accused-appellant Peaflors
father, mother, and other relatives. The Court of Appeals rejected the
defenses claim of inadmissibility of accused-appellant Peaflors
extrajudicial confessions, which is anchored on the sole ground that
they were not made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. According to the
Court of Appeals, the right to competent and independent counsel
applies only to a person under custodial investigation. In the case at
bar, as accused-appellant Peaflor was not under custodial
investigation, but under a preliminary investigation before a public
prosecutor, during which his right to a competent and independent
counsel does not apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions are admissible?
HELD:
YES.
As correctly found by the lower courts, accused-appellant Peaflor
executed his extrajudicial confession not during custodial investigation,
but during the preliminary investigation. In Ladiana v. People, the
Court defined the difference between custodial investigation and
preliminary investigation: Custodial Interrogation/Investigation is the
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way; on the other hand, Preliminary Investigation is
an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
84
should be held for trial. In Ladiana, this Court has unequivocally
declared that a person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. The import of the
distinction between custodial interrogation and preliminary
investigation relates to the inherently coercive nature of a custodial
interrogation which is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the
interrogatory procedures employed by police authorities, which are
conducive to physical and psychological coercion, the law affords
arrested persons constitutional rights to guarantee the voluntariness of
their confessions and admissions, and to act as deterrent from
coercion by police authorities. These safeguards are found in Article
III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438.
Sans proper safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means to
obtain confessions and admissions in duress. Resultingly, as
pronounced in Ladiana, the claim by the accused of inadmissibility of
his extrajudicial confession is unavailing because his confessions were
obtained during a preliminary investigation. And even if accused-
appellant Peaflors extrajudicial confessions were obtained under
custodial investigation, these are admissible. To be admissible, a
confession must comply with the following requirements: it must be (a)
voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.31 In the case at
bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of
these requirements.
[OFALSA] People v. Deniega y Macoy, G.R. No. 103499, December
29, 1995
FACTS
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in
an ill-frequented back corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church
in New Manila, Quezon City. Her hands were tied behind her back by a
shoestring and pieces of her own clothing. The body bore 39 stab
wounds. There was evidence that she had been brutally assaulted,
physically and sexually, before she was murdered. Police authorities
arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that the victim was last
seen with Daniega. Friends of Canoy volunteered the information that
the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega.
Appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators for
questioning. A second sworn statement, substantially similar and
corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was
later extracted from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz admitted his
participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he had something to
do with the victim's death. Armed with the said extra-judicial
confessions, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with
Homicide. At trial, the confessions obtained by law enforcement
authorities during their (separate) custodial investigations formed the
centerpiece of the prosecution's case for Rape with Homicide against
both accused. In their defense, appellants, during the course of the
trial, vehemently denied the claim that they had voluntarily executed
the said confessions. Appellants Daniega and Diaz went to the extent
of seeking the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
there executed a sworn statement to the effect that their respective
confessions were coerced and obtained through torture. Both testified
that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment. They
contended that they were arrested without warrants of arrest and that
the confessions obtained from them immediately thereafter were made
without the assistance of counsel.
ISSUE
WON the confessions made are admissible.
HELD
The legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the documents in
question are so glaring, even from a cursory examination of the
confessions. The statements evidencing the interrogation, including
those portions in which the appellants purportedly were informed of
their constitutional rights, were in typewritten form. However, within the
body of these documents, blank spaces were conspicuously left at
strategic areas (spaces) where the accused were supposed to sign
and acknowledge that they were appraised of their rights and that they
gave their statements voluntarily. These were spaces obviously
provided for the accused to fill in the blank with the word "yes" ("opo")
followed by another blank space for their respective signatures. Apart
from the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists
85
evidence indicating that the actual custodial investigation was
conducted at the police headquarters in the absence of counsel, as
contended by appellants. These facts lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that the confessions of both defendants were obtained in
the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution and that the same may have been acquired
under conditions negating voluntariness, as alleged by the accused.
[OFALSA] People v. Felixminia y Camacho, G.R. No. 125333, March
20, 2002
FACTS
Rolando Felixminia was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape
with homicide and the extreme penalty of death was imposed upon
him. The conviction was based on the circumstantial evidence that
Felixminia abducted the six-year old Maria Lourdes Galinato who was
later found to have been raped, killed and buried near the Macalong
River in San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. In this appeal, Felixminia
claimed that the trial court erred in convicting him based purely on
circumstantial evidence and in not applying the doctrine of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree."
The Court found the extra-judicial confession of the accused as invalid
since he was deprived of his right to counsel during said custodial
investigation. Consequently, the exclusionary rule applies and the
extra-judicial confession should be struck down as inadmissible.
However, it bears stressing that in crimes of rape with homicide, it is
seldom, if not ever, that there is an eyewitness to the act itself.
Consequently, the courts must rely on the circumstantial evidence,
which led to the obvious conclusion that accused is the perpetrator of
the crime, more so when there is corroborative evidence pointing to
the guilt of the accused. Here, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in court and the findings made in the autopsy report of Dr.
Ramon Gonzales, Jr., the autopsy report of the Philippine National
Police, the joint affidavit of police officers Reyes and Rubianes, and
the affidavit of witness Mangunay, showed that the accused-appellant
is guilty of the crime charged.
ISSUE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
PURELY ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
DO NOT HOWEVER MEET THE REQUISITES PROVIDED FOR BY
LAW FOR CONVICTION BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
HELD
In the instant case, the admission made by accused-appellant was not
in the form of a written extra-judicial confession; the admission was
made verbally to PO3 Roberto Reyes, a member of the Philippine
National Police stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. PO3 Reyes
testified that after accused-appellant was taken into custody, he
"interviewed and interrogated" the latter and in the course of their
"conversation," accused-appellant said that he "raped, killed and
buried" Maria Lourdes. There is no doubt, therefore, that accused-
appellant was taken into custody for investigation of his possible
participation in the commission of the crime. Hence, the constitutional
mantle of protection clearly covers the instant situation. While said
officer testified that he apprised the accused-appellant of his right to
remain silent and to have a counsel of his own choice, accused-
appellant's alleged admission was made without the presence of a
counsel. It does not appear either that accused-appellant manifested
that he could not afford the services of a counsel nor waived his right
to one in writing and in the presence of a counsel as no such written
and counseled waiver of these rights was presented in evidence.
Therefore, the Court finds the extra-judicial confession of accused-
appellant invalid since he was deprived of his right to counsel during
said custodial investigation. Consequently, the exclusionary rule
applies and the extra-judicial confession should be struck down as
inadmissible. Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial
confession executed by the accused-appellant, he was properly
convicted by the trial court because (a) compromising circumstances
were duly proven which were consistent with each other and which
lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that he was guilty of the
crime charged and (b) the totality of such circumstances eliminated
beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of his innocence.
The circumstances are consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused-appellant is guilty, and at the same time
86
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Moreover, Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules provides that an accused can still be convicted even if
no eyewitness is available, provided that enough circumstantial
evidence has been established by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony
would result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community. Circumstantial evidence is not a "weaker form of evidence
vis-a-vis direct evidence," and cases have recognized that
circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass
direct evidence in its effect upon the Court.
[PATAWARAN] People v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 82604, December 10,
1991
FACTS: The police officers of Cebu station received a report that one
Pelagio Jimenez had been found dead below the cliff near the Balite
tree. They went to the scene and found the lifeless body of Pelagio
which sustained stab wounds to the head and leg and was apparently
already rotting.
Upon further investigation, the police officers drew their suspicion to
the sons of Pelagio, Marcos and Robert. Also, there was a trail of dried
blood stains from the deceaseds porch leading to the cliff where he
was found dead. It was also alleged by witnesses that the brothers
were seen by their neighbors bathing in the artesian well as if washing
away blood stains and that there were occasions where the brothers
would violently box their father who had been accused of
surreptitiously selling their uncles copra, a Dr. Jimenez.
The police invited the brothers and Pelagios widow, Albina for
questioning where MARCOS CONFESSED that it was who hacked
their father on the right leg and thereafter, the carried their father and
left him near the Balite tree. Lt. Bancog TOOK DOWN THE
CONFESSION ON A PIECE OF PAPER and gave it to Pat. Cavalida,
who was to type up the confession and continue the investigation.
Pat. Cavalida continued the investigation in the presence of Ex-judge
Jabagat who acted as counsel for Marcos. Cavalida typed the
confession but was unsigned by Marcos because Jusge Calderon,
before whom the confession was supposed to be sworn and signed
had earlier left. Marcos agreed to return the next day to sign but did
not return.
Subsequently, an information was filed against Albina, Marcos, Pelagio
and added Wilkins, another brother for Parricide. During arraignment,
they all pled not guilty.
Marcos testimony included the following:
Marcos admitted having been investigated by Lt. Bancog on August
16. They were only two in the room. He likewise admitted that Judge
Jabagat arrived but only after his statement had been typed by Pat.
Cavalida. He admitted that Lt. Bancog wrote down what he stated, and
this handwritten statement was handed to Pat. Cavalida . . . (He also)
admitted the existence of blood near the house and plenty of it in the
bushes . . .; the existence of blood in the plowed area . . . (and) it was
he and Robert who plowed the same. In the matter of his confession
(Exh. 'B'), he claims that what is stated there is in accordance with
what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, wanted him to tell, that he was
pressured to admit the crime under threat of punishment."
The RTC acquitted Albina and Wilkins and were ordered to be
released. However, the brothers Marcos and Robert were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for parricide.
The RTC based the brothers conviction from the confession made by
Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction based on Marcos confession is
valid.
HELD: No, the RTC is reversed. Marcos and Roberto are
ACQUITTED.
The Constitution explicitly declares that a person being investigated by
the police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among others, 'to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
87
choice. In this case, former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of
Marcos ,Jimenez' own choice; she was the police officers' choice; she
did not ask Marcos if he was willing to have her represent him; she just
told him: "I am here because I was summon(ed) to assist you and I am
going to assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal
assistance contemplated by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Judge Jabagat was not
present at the critical time that interrogation of Marcos Jimenez by the
police was actually taking place. She came only after the questioning
had been completed, and the handwritten record of Marcos Jimenez'
answers already typewritten- and all she did was to show the
typewritten document to Marcos and ask him if he had voluntarily given
the statements therein contained.
It follows that neither the handwritten summary of Marcos Jimenez'
answers made by two investigating officers for the typewritten
statement based thereon is admissible.
The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the
handwritten notes from which the former was derived. The confession
was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos Jimenez as not reflective of
his own perceptions and recollection, but as containing only what his
uncle, Marcos Jimenez, had instructed him to tell the police "under
threat of punishment." Hence, the supposed waiver made therein of his
constitutional right to counsel of his own choice is void.
Equally obvious is that any confession or admission ascribed to
Marcos Jimenez in the premises is inadmissible against his brother, his
co-accused, Robert Jimenez, not only because obtained in violation of
the Constitution and therefore void, but also because of the familiar
principle of res inter alios acta. "The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another;" the
confession of an accused is admissible only against him, but not
against his co-defendants.
[PATAWARAN] People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21,
2015
FACTS: SPO2 Paglicawan and SPO3 Yuzon received a radio
message from the barangay captain Torreliza that a suspicious looking
boat was seen in the vicinity of the island of Looc, Mindoro. The police
officers proceeded to the island and they saw a fishing boat and a
speed boat anchored side by side with people transferring cargo from
the fishing boat to the speed boat. As the police officers boat
approached, the fishing boat sped away leaving the speed boat which
seemed to be having engine problems. The police officers were not
able to apprehend the fishing boat due to the strong waves.
The officers found Chi Chan Liu and Leofe Senglao with several plastic
bags containing a crystalline substance which they immediately
suspected as shabu. Unable to produce their identification papers
upon the police officers demand, they were brought to the police
officers where they repeatedly tried to bribe the officers with big, big
amount of money. In the police station and in the presence of the
appellants and the municipal mayor Telebrico, they conducted an
inventory of the 45 bags. The bags were subsequently confirmed to
contain shabu.
The accused were then transported to Laguna by General Acop and
during the CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, both the accused still
refused to say anything but big money, call China. General Acop
then allowed them to make a call but was unable to understand the
situation because they spoke in their native tongue. Due to this, they
sought the assistance of an interpreter. Upon arrival of the interpreter,
he was tasked to inform both the accused of their constitutional rights
but they only kept repeating big money, call China.
The RTC found them GUILTY for violating the RA 7659 (Dangerous
Drugs Act). On appeal the CA AFFIRMED in toto the RTC decision.
Senglao and Liu now questions the validity of their arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not they were afforded their Constitutiolnal rights
during custodial investigation?
88
HELD: YES, the CA decision is AFFIRMED.
Appellants also assail the legality of their detention for being formally
charged in an Information on December 8, 1998 or five (5) days after
their arrest on December 3, 1998, beyond the thirty-six (36)-hour
period in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. But while the law
subjects such public officers who detain persons beyond the legal
period to criminal liability, it must be remembered that the proceeding
taken against the detained persons for the act the committed remains
unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate. This Court is
nevertheless mindful of the difficult circumstances faced by the police
officers in this case, such as the language barrier, the
unresponsiveness of the appellants, the fact that one of the days fell
on a Sunday, as well as the disparity in the distances between the
different offices. But even assuming that the police officers intentionally
delayed the filing of the Information, appellants should have taken
steps to report or file charges against the officers. Unfortunately, they
cannot now rely on administrative shortcomings of police officers to get
a judgment of acquittal for these do not diminish the fact that illegal
drugs were found in appellants' possession.
Anent appellants' claim that their constitutional rights were further
violated for during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of
their choice nor were they provided with one, this deserves scant
consideration since the same is relevant and material only when an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an accused
becomes the basis of his conviction. In this case, neither one of the
appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the
records clearly show, appellants barely even spoke and merely kept
repeating the phrase "call China, big money." The trial court convicted
them not on the basis of anything they said during custodial
investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of
appellants' constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation.
In this relation, appellants further criticize the legality of the
proceedings in saying that during their arraignment, they were not
represented by a counsel of their choice but were merely represented
by a court-appointed government lawyer. The facts borne by the
records of the case, however, militate against the contention of the
appellants. This Court does not find a violation of appellants' right to
counsel for even in their own narration of facts, appellants stated that
when they appeared without counsel when the case was called for
arraignment on January 19, 1999, the trial court gave appellants time
to secure the services of counsel of their choice. It was only when
appellants again appeared for the second time without counsel on
February 23, 1999 that the court appointed a counsel from the Public
Attorney's Office. It is clear, therefore, that appellants had ample
opportunity to secure the services of a counsel of their own choice.
They cannot now assign error in the proceedings conducted by the trial
court for the fact remains that they were appointed with counsel in full
compliance with the law.
[PATAWARAN] Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008
FACTS: Aquino, Garganta and another woman identified as Adeling
went to the house of respondent Paiste to convince the latter to buy a
gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. Aquino and company
showed Paiste a sample of the gold bar then proceeded to a
pawnshop to test its authenticity which was shown to be genuine.
However, Paiste informed them that she did not have money.
Regardless, Aquino repeatedly convinced her and agreed to meet
Arnold who showed Paiste the gold bar and informed her that it was
worth P60,000. Aquino and company then repeatedly tried to convince
Paiste to buy the gold bar for P50,000 to which she agreed.
Paiste subsequently had the gold bar tested and was informed that it
was fake. Paista went to Aquinos house to inform the latter that the
gold was fake. Aquino replied that she had nothing to do with it and
that they needed to see Garganta.
Paiste brought Aquino to the NBI and in the presence of a certain Atty.
Tolentino, Aquino promised amicably compromised with Paiste that
they would locate Garganta and the document they both signed would
be disregarded should they locate Garganta. The amicable settlement
reads:
89
(1) In view of the acceptance of fault by MRS. JUANITA ASIO-
AQUINO of the case/complaint filed by MRS. TERESITA PAISTE
before the NBI-National Capital Region for Swindling, Mrs. J. Aquino
agreed to pay the complainant half the amount swindled from the
latter. Said P25,000.00 offered by Mrs. J. Aquino as settlement for the
case of Estafa will be paid by her through installment scheme in the
amount of P1,000.00 per month beginning from the month of March,
1991 until fully paid
(2) The undersigned accused/respondent hereby waives her right to
counsel despite the recital of her constitutional rights made by NBI
agent Ely Tolentino in the presence of a lawyer Gordon S. Uy.
Petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In the
presence of Barangay Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer,
respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold the fake gold
bar. Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a
demand against Garganta alone. Subsequently, respondent filed a
criminal complaint from which an Information against Garganta,
petitioner, and three others for the crime of estafa
Garganta and the others remained at large and only the petitioner was
arraigned who pled not guilty.
The RTC found that petitioner conspired with Garganta, Adeling, and
Arnold in committing the crime of estafa. The trial court likewise gave
credence to the amicable settlement as additional proof of petitioners
guilt as an amicable settlement in criminal cases is an implied
admission of guilt. The CA AFFIRMED the RTC.
Aquinos claim that the documents cannot be given weight as she
executed the documents under threat and not freely and voluntarily
which was a violation of her Constitutional rights under the Miranda
Rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amicable settlement and the waiver of the
right to counsel are valid.
HELD: Yes, the amicable settlement and the waiver of the right to
counsel are valid.
Republic Act No. (RA) 7438 has extended this constitutional guarantee
to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but
has merely been "invited" for questioning. Specifically, Sec. 2 of RA
7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed x x x."
Petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uys
appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when
she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in People
v. Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection against the
lawyers appointment during the course of the investigation and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before
the swearing officer" the accused is deemed to have engaged such
lawyer. Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have
engaged Atty. Uy when she conferred with him and thereafter signed
the amicable settlement with waiver of right to counsel in his presence.
We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon
cross-examination about the petitioners counsel in the NBI, could be
evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent
counsel, Atty. Uy, was provided petitioner.
When petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly
executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an
independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth."15 An amicable settlement is not
and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or
admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters
of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus,
the presence of Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioners rights even if the
custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat
of violence, coercion, or intimidation.
90
Even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of
an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible
since none of her constitutional rights were violated. Petitioners
allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but bare
allegations. Allegations are not proof.
[PATAWARAN] Mesina v. People, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015
FACTS: Bernardo Mesina, then Local Treasurer of the Local
government of Caloocan City collected from Rosalinda Baclit the
weeks collection of market fees, miscellaneous fees, real property
taxes, community tax receipts and the patubig collection all
amounting to P468,394. The cash were bundled and placed inside
separate envelopes containing their respective liquidation statements
which were signed by both Mesina and Baclit.
Later that day, Baclit received several phone calls confirming the
collection of the patubig collections by Mesina. 30 minutes later,
Baclit received a call informing her that the supposed patubig
collection amounting to P167,870 was not remitted. Mesina then called
Baclit to inform her that he allegedly DID NOT RECEIVE the patubig
collection.
Carolo Santos, City Treasurer then summoned both Mesina and Baclit
for an inquiry relative to the missing collection. Baclit and Mesina
insisted on their respective versions. The City treasurer then ordered
the Sealing of Mesinas vault pending investigation.
The following morning, Mayor Malonzo called an immediate probe on
the matter. Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same
while Baclit positively asserted that Mesina indeed received the
collections.
The following day, the statement of collections supposedly signed by
Mesina which had been previously lost was recovered. A criminal case
for Malversation was then filed Mesina.
During trial, Mesina then ADMITTED collecting the patubig collection
but denied misappropriating or embezzling the fund maintaining that
the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during the
inspection. He alleged that he kept the funds in his safe believing that
he did not yet need to remit the amount because it was to be re-
counted and because his wife suffered a heart attack and was rushed
to the emergency room.
RTC gave no credence to his defense and found him GUILTY of
MALVERSATION. The CA AFFIRMED the RTC.
On appeal with the Supreme Court, Mesina raises that he was not
informed of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel during the
investigation. He argues that a custodial investigation was what really
transpired and insists that the failure to inform him of his Miranda rights
rendered the whole investigation null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation conducted was equivalent to a
custodial investigation.
HELD: NO, The CA is AFFIRMED.
According to People Vs. Marra, custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation
begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then focused
on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom
the police would then direct interrogatory questions that tend to elicit
incriminating statements.
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those
being investigated did not by itself define the nature of the investigation
as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to
ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its
nature, the inquiry had to involve persons who had direct supervision
over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the
representative from different concerned offices, and even the City
91
Mayor. What was conducted was not an investigation that already
focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry
into the missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the
custody of the police or other law enforcement office.
[PERENA] People v. Guting y Tomas, G.R. No. 205412, September 9,
2015
FACTS:
In an Information dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-93, accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with
Parricide. When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial
on the merits ensued.
Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy
afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis
Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling Police Station
when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed
weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he
had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-appellant's statement, PO1
Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and
turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.5
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi
narrated that accused-appellant suddenly appeared before them at the
Police Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant
proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1
Macusi asked who killed accused-appellant's father. Accused-
appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na
po!" PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it
to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet
in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe
(Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose), accused-
appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police
officers informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-
appellant's mother), who was still in the market with Emerlito Guting
(Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-appellant's brother),
who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and
Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired
from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did.
When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw
Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds.
Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where he
was pronounced dead on arrival.
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was
given to him by PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-
appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither did
accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he
used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak
ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also admitted
that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it was
clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed away
by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why
he did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed
his father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he
was still new at the job then and he was carried away by the fast flow
of events.7
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that accused-appellants extrajudicial
confession is admissible in evidence.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and
PO1 Macusi, without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in
evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his constitutional
right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
92
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertains to "custodial investigation." Custodial
investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission.
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under
custodial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of
counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father to
death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously
and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the
police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-
appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response
to accused-appellant's initial declaration that his father was already
dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually
committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the
suspect in his father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely
standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of the Camiling
Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
[PERENA] People v. Sison, G.R. No. 70906, May 30, 1986
FACTS: Petitioner, represented by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Antique, in this special action for certiorari, assails the Order dated
March 26, 1985 issued by the respondent Judge Luis V. Sison of
Branch X, Regional Trial Court of Antique, rejecting the extrajudicial
confession of private respondent Jocelyn de Asis for having been
taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution.
It appears that in an amended information dated January 4, 1984, the
Provincial Fiscal of Antique, Ramon M. Salvani, Jr., charged Jocelyn
de Asis, 20, single, a resident of Barangay Agcarupi, Januiay, Iloilo,
and an elementary school graduate, with subversion for having
become a member of the New People's Army (Criminal Case No.
2670). Jocelyn pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Fiscal Recaredo P. Barte offered in evidence the aforecited
extrajudicial confession (Exhibit Q) dated May 19, 1983 of Jocelyn.
This was vehemently objected to by her counsel. Respondent judge
sustained the objection on the ground that Jocelyn's waiver of her right
to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel, consonant
with the ruling of this Court in the twin cases of Morales vs. Enrile, et
al., G.R. No. L-61016, Moncupa vs. Enrile, et al., G.R. No. L-61107,
April 26, 1983 (121 SCRA 538).
In her confession, which was taken at a hospital in San Jose, Antique,
Jocelyn was led to admit through a leading question that she became
a member of the New People's Army on May 8, 1983. She further
stated that in an encounter with the Philippine Constabulary and
Civilian Home Defense Forces a week later, or on May 17, 1983, she
was wounded and her brother David was killed.
Fiscal Barte contends that the ruling in the aforecited cases has no
doctrinal value since the said ruling was contained in an obiter dictum
and was concurred in by only three Justices instead of the required
number of eight Justices.
Counsel for private respondent, in his comment, contends that the
doctrine in the Morales and Moncupa case was reiterated in the
93
decision in People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51170 promulgated on March
20, 1985.
The former Solicitor General, in his comment, submits that said
confession is admissible.
After deliberating on the petition and comments, the Court resolved to
dismiss the petition. In the case of People of the Philippines vs.
Francisco Galit (135 SCRA 465), which was decided en banc and
concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court
had occasion to put at rest all doubts regarding the ruling in the
Morales vs. Enrile and Moncupa vs. Enrile cases. The Court, in setting
aside the judgment appealed from and acquitting the accused
Francisco Galit, reiterated the ruling laid down in the aforecited cases,
which we quote below:
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down
the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which we
reiterate:
7. At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must
show the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative
or any one who chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if
possible-or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his behalf,
or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The fight to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (People vs. Galit, supra., p. 472) (Emphasis
supplied).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
[PERENA] Manuel v. N.C. Construction Supply, G.R. No. 127553,
November 28, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioners Eddie Manuel, Romeo Bana, Rogelio Pagtama, Jr. and
Joel Rea were employed as drivers at N.C. Construction Supply
owned by private respondents Johnny Lim (a.k.a. Lao Ching Eng) and
Anita Sy.
On June 3, 1995, the security guards of respondent company caught
Aurelio Guevara, a company driver, and Jay Calso, his helper
("pahinante"), taking out from the company premises two rolls of
electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to
the Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso
named seven other employees who were allegedly involved in a series
of thefts at respondent company, among them petitioners Manuel,
Bana, Pagtama, Jr. and Rea.
On June 5, 1995, petitioners received separate notices from
respondent company informing them
that they were positively identified by their co-worker, Jay Calso, as
perpetrators of the series of thefts committed at respondent company.
They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for investigation
regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.
Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their
behalf an investigation regarding petitioners' involvement in the theft.
Atty. Reyes interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in
the series of thefts committed at respondent company. Petitioners
initially denied the charge. However, after being positively identified by
94
Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in
exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal charge against them.
On July 17, 1995, petitioners filed a complaint against private
respondents for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not
informed of the charge against them nor were they given an
opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their admission
made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the
theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained
by private respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.
Issue: Whether or not the admission of the petitioners is admissible in
evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that petitioners extrajudicial admission is
admissible in evidence.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that such admission
was obtained by means of threat or intimidation as such allegation is
couched in general terms and is unsupported by evidence.
We also reject petitioners' argument that said admission is
inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill
of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been
taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions
are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
such investigation.Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(3) Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in
a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the
course of the investigation conducted by private respondents' counsel
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their
employment. Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they
were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime. The
investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by
the employer, not a criminal investigation. The questions were
propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact
that the investigation was conducted at the police station did not
necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation as the venue
of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions
made by petitioners during such investigation may be used as
evidence to justify their dismissal.
[PERENA] People v. Marra y Zarate, G.R. No. 108494, September 20,
1994
FACTS:
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe
and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal
shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992.
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified
appellant as the triggerman in the killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din
recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front of
Lucky Hotel located at M.H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan City, which was
owned by the witness' father and of which he was the administrator.
He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man
made a dirty sign with his finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The
man repeated his offensive act and called them by waving his hands.
Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter stopped in front of the
Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets.
They demanded an explanation from the man but they were not given
any.
95

At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was
going on. Tandoc informed him that they were just demanding an
explanation from the man. Din was surprised when Tandoc
unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with
Tandoc clashing with the two men while Din exchanged blows with the
man who made the dirty finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three
opponents ran away in a westward direction.
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they
were about to enter the place, they noticed that the men with whom
they just had a fight were running towards them. Sensing danger, they
ran inside the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the
lock of the sliding outer door. They entered a room and waited until
they felt that the situation had normalized. After ten to fifteen minutes,
thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity, they left the room.
Having decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a
sudden, Din saw Appellant, who at that time was wearing a security
guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. There was a fluorescent
bulb installed at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to identify the
assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of the chest and he fell down.
Then, Din saw four to five men scamper away from the scene.
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried
to chase appellant and his companions but he failed to catch up with
them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor Hospital.
The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour
later.
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the
Dagupan City Police Station received a report about a shooting
incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He proceeded to the
crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores
and SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon their arrival about five minutes later,
they were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din that the victim had been
brought to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the hospital where
Din informed them that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc
and that the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo shirt of a security
guard's uniform.
They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw."
Seeing the security guard of a nearby bus company, they inquired from
him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened in the vicinity.
The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together
with some companions, chasing two persons running towards M. H.
del Pilar Street. He further added that the man was wearing a polo
shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular guard
might be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The
man eating was not in a security guard's uniform.
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security
guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter answered in the
affirmative. After a series of questions, they learned that he was
Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding
day to 6:00 A.M. the following day, that he was still on duty at around
2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and that the firearm issued to
him was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they
proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street.
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an
aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets
and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun,
De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied
ever having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he
shot Tandoc. Marra at first denied the accusation but when informed
that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in self-defense,
firing at the victim only once.
Issue: Whether or not Marras confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that Marras confession is not admissible in
evidence.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
96
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is
only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect,the suspect
is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule begins to operate.
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation
when he made the admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to
compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could have refused
to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested
that they all go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached
a level wherein they considered him as a particular suspect. They were
just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely
informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security
guard's uniform.
[RAMOS] People v. Suarez, G.R. No. 111193, January 28, 1997
Facts:
On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of
Pasig, Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife, Marivic Suarez,
also the victims adopted daughter, could get at once any property that
Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's death. In exchange
for the job, Suarez would allow the other accused to steal what they
wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after
one month from the killing of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn statement
detailing what transpired from the planning until the execution of the
crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court
found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.
Issue:
Whether the extrajudicial confessions of each of the accused are
binding against each other and admissible in evidence
Ruling:
YES. If it is made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no sane person or one of a normal mind will
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost
identical with each other in their essential details which could have
been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other
evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the
probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the
crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in their
execution
The court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking
confessions sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each
accused's own incriminating statements. This doctrine of interlocking
confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions
of this Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the
hearsay rule. Reyes' confession is thus admissible against Lara to
show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the
crime. Where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to
show the probability of participation by an accused co-conspirator, that
confession is receivable as evidence against him.
[RAMOS] People v. Buluran y Ramirez, G.R. No. 113940, February 15,
2000
97
Facts: The Meyer family was celebrating the birthday of their mother at
their residence in Area 4, Barangay Amaparo, Capri, Novaliches,
Quezon City. It appears that Dominador Meyer, Jr., had an altercation
with a cousin. The victim, Edilberto Meyer, Sr., tried to pacify them,
and brought Dominador outside the house to cool-off. However, while
the victim and Dominador, were talking outside their residence,
Reynaldo Danao approached them and warned them not to make any
trouble because the community was celebrating its fiesta. The victim
denied making any trouble and said that the matter was a family
problem. Suddenly, Reynaldo boxed the victim who also retaliated with
a fistblow. The two exchanged blows and grappled with each other.
Reynaldo managed to run away but returned after about two minutes.
Now, accompanied by his barkadas or gangmates (Cielito Buluran,
Leonardo Valenzuela and Jaime Danao), Reynaldo was armed with a
12-inch stainless knife. Cielito had also a knife. Leonardo and Jaime
each carried slingshots, with sharp-pointed arrows made of five-inch
nails with abaca tails. Without warning, Reynaldo stabbed the victim at
the left side of his lower back. All the while, his three companions were
pointing and brandishing their weapons at the Meyer brothers and the
other people present in order to prevent them from interfering. Cielito
poked his knife at the Meyer brothers and stood guard to prevent other
people from rendering help to the victim. Leonardo likewise held his
slingshot against the Meyer brothers and prevented people from going
near the victim by pointing his loaded slingshot at them. Thereafter, the
four barkadas fled. The victim died that same night
During trial, the prosecution presented three eyewitnesses all were
neighbors of the victim. The prosecution likewise presented PO1
Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan, Novaliches,
Quezon City, who "invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct,[6] and
Chief Inspector Florante F. Baltazar, the Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy on the victim. Baltazar testified that the cause
of death was the "penetrating stab wound at the posterior left lumbar
region."[7] The victims widow, Mrs. Erlinda C. Meyer, testified as to the
actual damages sustained as a result of the death of her husband.[8]
All were neighbors of the victim. The prosecution likewise presented
PO1 Roberto C. San Miguel of Station 2, Sangang Daan, Novaliches,
Quezon City, who "invited" appellant Buluran to the precinct,[6] and
Chief Inspector Florante F. Baltazar, the Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy on the victim. Baltazar testified that the cause
of death was the "penetrating stab wound at the posterior left lumbar
region."[7] The victims widow, Mrs. Erlinda C. Meyer, testified as to
the actual damages sustained as a result of the death of her
husband.[8] Hence, the present appeal.
Issues: here involve the alleged irregularity of appellants arrest; the
alleged violation of their constitutional rights during custodial
investigation for lack of counsel; and the alleged invalidity of the
proceedings in the trial court sans preliminary investigation.
Considering these issues,
Held:
First. Appellants are estopped from questioning the validity of their
respective arrests since they never raised this issue before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.[15]
Second. There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
during custodial investigation since neither one executed an
extrajudicial confession or admission. In fact, the records[16] show that
appellant Cielito Buluran opted to remain silent during the custodial
investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction.[17] In this case, the basis of the
conviction by the trial court was the testimonies of the three
eyewitnesses, Artemio Avendao, Jacinto Castillo, and Gloria Castillo. It
is noteworthy that appellants never attempted to impeach their
testimonies during trial. Neither do they assail the credibility of said
witnesses on appeal.
Third. The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary
investigation did not impair the validity of the information nor affect the
98
jurisdiction of the trial court.[20] While the right to preliminary
investigation is a substantive right and not a mere formal or technical
right of the accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation
is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment.[21] It appearing that appellants
only raised the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal,
their right to a preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they
entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
Pursuant to the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review (including penalty, indemnity and damages),[22]
we shall now consider whether appellants were correctly found guilty
of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
Unquestionably, and appellants do not allege otherwise, conspiracy
attended the killing of the victim. Conspiracy to exist does not require
an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.[23]
From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.[24] In this case, the presence of
appellants, both armed with deadly weapons, at the locus criminis
indubitably shows their complicity in the criminal design of Reynaldo
Danao to kill the victim.
However, we find that no treachery attended the killing. On numerous
occasions, we have held that where a killing was preceded by an
argument or quarrel, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery can
no longer be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been
forewarned and could anticipate aggression from the assailants.[25]
The previous boxing incident between the victim and Reynaldo Danao
must have already put the victim on guard for further aggression or
retaliation by Reynaldo Danao. Hence, treachery could not be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in this case.
[RAMOS] People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, January 20,
2004
People v. Guillermo y Garcia, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004
Facts: For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal
Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. Apellant is
accused of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. Appellant
contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He
points out that there is no clear showing that he was not informed of
his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by
the police investigators.
Issue: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME
PENALTY OF DEATH.
Held: Appellant contends that his conviction was based on
inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing
that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to
understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he
was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at
the police precinct. He was not provided with the services of counsel
during the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view
of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights,
appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his
alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by
SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP
Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the
Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution,[43] a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession
must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession
must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.[44] In the
instant case, the testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination
clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police of said constitutional
guarantees.
99

Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants
confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence
does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards
on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do
not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through
questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the
offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section
12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive
power as would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not
intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth
outside the sphere of such power.
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility
of appellants alleged confession to the police, the prosecution has
amply proven the appellants guilt in the killing of Victor F. Keyser. The
bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to
the spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security
guard Campos and the two media reporters, Abelgas and David. The
positive evidence, including the instruments of the crime, together with
the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution
witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor
Francisco Keyser, in the gruesome manner vividly described before
the trial court.
[RAMOS] People v. Galgarin, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16
October 1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused
Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend Clara Agagas
who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to
Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free
himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown
Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward
Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety,
the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the
Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for
breath and near death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him
to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive
medical attention.
An Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against
Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants
were issued for their arrest.
Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the
Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio,
Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by
the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was
fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi
and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to
Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television
station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video
footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his
guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman
Testimonies of different persons present in the crime scene were
adduced pointing out Galgarin as the accused. For his part, accused-
appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to
help his common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born.
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting
police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule
provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.[8]
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The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of
the testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was
exerted on accused-appellant. The alibi of Galgarin was likewise
rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support his
allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16
October 1991. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was
convicted of murder qualified by treachery. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in rejecting his alibi and admitting his
videotaped confession as evidence against him.
Held: With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial
proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leongs identification of
accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous
manner. Her confidence as to the attackers identity was clearly shown
by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his nose, which is
correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to
implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was
no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of accused-
appellant as her boyfriends assailant was not done out of spite, but
was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped
confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was
recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his
guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not
given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed
been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from
the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with
him. As the trial court stated in its Decision[13]-
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this
phenomenon in several cases,[14] it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to
legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on
television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media
men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of
police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and
invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw,
particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp
judgments in determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the
question that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly
denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless,the
crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was
stabbed while he was simply standing on the pavement with his
girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's criminal
design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim,
without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to
parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.[15]
[TAN] Gutang v. People, G.R. No. 135406, July 11, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner along with 2 others were charged with illegal possession and
use of prohibited drugs in the RTC of Pasig City. During their arrest,
several items were seized by the police in the bedroom they were in
during the arrest and their cars. These items included weed, shabu
and several paraphernalia used in the consumption and storage of the
said drugs. The police issued receipts for property seized to the
accused w/c he was required to sign and they were subjected to
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chemical test and thereafter used as evidence in the criminal case.
Accused and company were also subjected to drug tests.
Petitioner contends that the items seized should be inadmissible as
evidence since they were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer,
said evidence are tantamount to having been derived from an
uncounseled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in
evidence for being fruits of the poisonous tree. The chemical tests
done on the items should therefore be inadmissible following this train
of thought.
Absence of counsel should also render the drug test inadmissible
since the same violated his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: WON the items seized, chemical tests performed on them and
the drug tests should be considered as being fruits of the poisonous
tree.
HELD:
W/ regard to the items seized, it has been held in a long line of cases
that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is
inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of
counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime
charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the
signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same being
tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
However, as to the chemical tests performed and the drug tests, the
SC held that the fact that the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I
and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render inadmissable the
Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the Chemistry Report
(Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined materials were legally seized or
taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search
warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said materials were validly seized or
taken from the bedroom of the petitioner in his presence, the
laboratory tests conducted thereon were legally and validly done.
Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the laboratory
examinations, aside from the testimonial and other real evidence of the
prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the
petitioner used and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in
his possession. In other words, even without the Receipts of Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the
crimes charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into
custody and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime,
i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confession or admissions from the accused. Such
right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. However, what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion. The situation in the case at bar falls within the
exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what
was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. This
was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give
samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when
they were requested to undergo a drug test.
[TAN] People v. Paynor, G.R. No. 116222, September 9, 1996
FACTS:
Accused was charged by the RTC of Roxas, Isabela with the murder of
Carmelita Aguinaldo based the testimony of a single witness,
Fresnaida Magaway who saw how the crime was perpetrated.
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The accused provided an alibi in his defense, asserts that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights when his clothes were seized
during his custodial investigation to be later used as evidence in his
trial and contends that the court erred in convicting him on the basis of
the testimony of a single underaged witness.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of Magaway should prove that the
accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. The contention of appellant that the expected reaction of the
witness should have been to identify him by name is an obvious non
sequitur. What should be considered as a general or common rule is
that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. In the instant case,
the youthful witness was unable to immediately reveal the name of
appellant to the police as she was evidently scared or confused and,
as she explained, she also failed to name appellant at that time since
her concern and thoughts were of her teacher whom she followed to
the hospital. Surely, we cannot fault the young girl for her confusion
and fear, it being her first time to witness such a crime of violence.
The important thing is that when she testified at the trial, she was firm,
spontaneous and categorical in her declaration that it was appellant
whom she saw that afternoon, and that it was he who entered the
classroom of her teacher and stabbed the latter with a pointed bladed
weapon. The witness stood by her declaration, unshaken throughout
the entire trial, and never showed any hesitation in her testimony.
Another fact worth stressing is that the witness had no motive
whatsoever to fabricate a serious charge against appellant. When
there is no showing that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by an improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated, and his testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.
As to his clothes, this constitutional right applies only against
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be
compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against
testimonial compulsion.
[TAN] People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, February 25, 1991
FACTS:
The accused in the case was convicted of murdering Rene Impas in
the RTC of Cebu. The accused allegedly went to the house of the
deceased, kicked open his bedroom door and fired 2 rounds with a
shotgun at Impas and ran away. Several witnesses saw the
occurrence and testified in court against the accused. An extrajudicial
confession was also obtained by the investigating police as was the
murder weapon. A paraffin test also came back positive w/c
established that the accused had recently fired a gun.
Gamboa claims that the testimonies of the witnesses had
inconsistencies and that the confession, murder weapon and paraffin
test were all obtained in violation of his constitutional rights because of
the absence of counsel.
ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in convicting the accused.
HELD:
No. The SC held that the appellant's claim of contradictions and
inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into
serious doubt their credibility, Different persons who witnessed an
incident from different angles and situations could not be expected to
give uniform details of what they saw and heard. Such minor
discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected because of the
human differences in perception. Such contradicting statements are on
minor details, as hereinabove discussed, and rather than affect the
credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of candor.
The paraffin test is not a violation of his right against self-incrimination
as this constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and
not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in
this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he just
recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of
the prosecution.
As to his extrajudicial confession, the SC found merit as to his
contention as he was maltreated during his interrogation.
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As to the murder weapon, the Court is not persuaded that the police
investigators in this case would willingly allow themselves to be
instruments to frame the appellant for so serious a crime as murder. It
appears that the three empty shells were actually recovered from the
vicinity of the scene of the crime. The ballistics examination shows that
it was fired from the very shotgun of the appellant. This evidence
corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very strongly, that the
appellant was the assailant of the victim.
However, the Court did not have to take into account the
inconsistencies regarding the confession and the weapon in order to
prove the accused as guilty since there was already a multitude of
evidence that corroborated this fact as provided by the prosecution.
[TAN] People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-2154, April 26, 1950
FACTS:
Accused and one Otadora were charged with the crime of murdering
Leon Castro and Apolonia Carreon. Otadora plead guilty to the charge
and claimed that the accused had induced him in committing the crime
by promising money as a reward. The accused denied the same and
asked for a separate trial.
This was granted by the court and so Otadora was presented as one
of the witnesses along with several others who testified that the
accused had provided Otadora with the murder weapon and promised
money in order to commit the murder.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in finding the accused guilty.
HELD:
No, of course it is founded mainly upon the declarations of Antonio
Otadora that necessarily are persuasive inasmuch as he himself
admits his direct participation and his assertions are fully corroborated
by a series of circumstances competently established.
Hilaria denied connection with the assassination. And naturally the
defense exerted effort to discredit Otadora's version, by submitting the
following theory:
Antonio Otadora planned a revenge upon Castro because the latter as
a spy caused the death of his father Sergio Otadora at the hands of
the Japanese. He, however, found himself in the necessity of
eliminating Apolonia Carreon because the latter was a witness to his
deed. On the other hand, Antonio Otadora (and the other witnesses
who are his relatives) also desire to take revenge upon Hilaria Carreon
because the latter, during the Japanese occupation, saved Leon
Castro from death at the hands of the guerrillas. The defense says that
to those who had been prejudiced by the espionage activities of Leon
Castro, Hilaria Carreon appears to be just as responsible as Leon
Castro.
The theory can not be lawfully accepted. Firstly, Otadora denies that
his father died at the hands of the Japanese. Secondly, the alleged
"saving" of Leon Castro was not sufficiently established. Loreto
Micabel, the superior officer of the guerrillas, who ordered the release
of Leon Castro, did not mention Hilaria as one of those who interceded
for the prisoner (p. 286, stenographic notes). Thirdly, nobody in his
right senses holds Pedro criminally responsible for the crime of Juan
simply because a few days before the crime Pedro saved Juan from
drowning.
[UY] People v. Omilig y Mancia, G.R. No. 206296 , August 12, 2015
Facts: An information was filed against accused Omilig for the killing of
Eduard Betonio. The same was amended imploding accused Matas
and Peaflor. It was further amended imploding Ondo. During
arraignment, all plead not guilty. The prosecution presented 10
witnesses and the defense presented 5 witnesses while Peaflor
presented 3 witnesses.
Estur, COA auditor, discovered the unaccounted rice stocks in the
bodega of the NFA, who Betonio was the Provincial Manager. Betonio
who was stabbed and shot in front of his rented apartment. Before
Metonio was brought to the hospital, he whispered to his wife the
names Delfin and Matas. Based on the necropsy, Betonio died of
cardio-respiratory arrest hypopolemic shock due to a gunshot and
deep stab wounds. However thru the complete sketch, they found out
104
that it was Peaflor who was actually the killer. Peaflor admitted in
killing Betonio however he reiterated that he was hired by Ondo.
Padilla was the counsel of Peaflor thru Praquilles. However Padilla
was only hired 3 days after Peaflors first extra judicial admission.
Padilla was dismissed when the 2nd extra judicial confession was
made but this was conducted by the City Prosecutor Lagcao with the
assurance of Atty. Cavales as counsel de officio.
RTC admitted the extra judicial confession and charged Peaflor for
the crime of murder. On appeal, defense claimed that the extra judicial
confession should be inadmissible for obtaining it in violation of his
constitutional right. CA affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the court erred in admitting the extrajudicial confessions
made by the accused?
Held: No! it was discussed in the case of Ladiana that a Custodial
investigation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that resident is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
Also it said that a person undergoing prelim investigation cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. Even if that those
were obtained in custodial investigation to be admissible, it must be
made a.) voluntary b.) express c.) writing d.) with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. However in the case at bar, the
prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of these
requirements. Furthermore there is a presumption of regularity
therefore it means that a confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Prosecution failed
to adduce evidence to prove the presence of any of the circumstance
that would negate the admissibility of the submission of evidence to
convert the accused-appellant herein provided.
[UY] Ladiana v. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
Facts: Petitioner was originally charged with murder however the anti-
graft court issued an order noting that beside the allegation of the
crime committed, it was done while he was taking advantage of his
official position. Prosecution presented 5 witnesses and their
testimonies:
a. Caridad M. San Juan declared that she is the wife of
Francisco San Juan (victim herein.) Caridad testified that Francisco
was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who
happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent. Caridad
received the news that her husband was shot and was killed. The
lifeless body was being examined by Gabinete. Caridad maintained
that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana
because this was what the woman actually told her. Moreover,
accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified
that he was eventually buried at the Lumban Cemetery. Caridad
narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds - one on the
upper right temple and the other on the left cheek. However,
Caridad stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and
the exit points. She also told the Court that her husband was wearing
short pants at the time of his death and that she found some bruises
on his knees.
b. PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda JR, declared that he is a policeman
assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He even
continued that a certain person reported to him about an existing
trouble along Jacinto Street, he was also accompanied by Alberto
Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Cacalda saw the lifeless body of
Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the
body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2]
Percival A. Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived. He
gathered news from the people that it was Ladiana who killed the
deceased and therefore started to search for him but to be surprised
that the accused had already surrendered to the authorities. On cross-
examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and
105
 not an investigator of the police station. He also testified that he
did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar.
c. Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, he is the physician and the Municipal
Health Officer in Laguna. Javan recounted that he was the one who
performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he had
prepared the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto.
Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of
the body of Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the
gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The marking Gunshot
wound A is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter
and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking Gunshot
wound B is the point of exit of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2)
centimeters in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and one
(1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another
gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as Gunshot
wound C and Gunshot wound D, respectively. Gunshot wound D is
one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left
cheek, three and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while
Gunshot wound C is one (1) centimeter in diameter and found at the
right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the adams apple.
the assailant must be behind the victim when he
inflictedGunshot wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C, the assailant
likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than
twenty-four (24) inches away. Javan testified that Gunshot
wound A could have been fired first because the trajectory is on
the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim
could have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot wound C
could have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down.
Javan then stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
d.SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, The testimony of Gabinete wa
subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that
he was part of the group of policemen who proceeded to the place of
the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying
along the road.
e. Maria T. Cortez. retired assistant prosecutor. the defense
counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused
Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said
counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the
fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly
did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking
accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on
the arm of accused Ladiana. Cortez emphasized that he was
not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the
complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally,
Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the
face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that
there was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue
Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit. The
prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Court issued a resolution for the admission of all documentary
evidence. Accused however filed for a motion for leave to file a
demurrer of evidence. Court denied the motion for being improper.
Sandiganbayan ordered that the prosecution was able to establish the
guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. It convicted him of the
same hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the issue of self defense may be given weight as
admission?
Held: Yes! The declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are
admissions that may be used as evidence against him. The
Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the
theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid
out in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because
the admission was clear and unequivocal.
106
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his
Counter-Affidavit are utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of
proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that
self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be
entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent
evidence, and it is also doubtful. The question whether the accused
acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact properly
evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites
of self-defense enumerated in the law. Had petitioner been more
vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and
cogent evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a
quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to
present any evidence at all. So, we do not see how the
Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his
Counter-Affidavit.
4. Previous Conduct as Evidence
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence/ Res inter alios acta, Part 2
[UY] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126713, July 27, 1998
Facts: Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their
children were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and Gerry Cruz. Upon the death
of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and children executed on
August 22, 1977 a notarized Deed of Partial Partition by virtue of which
each one of them was given a share of several parcels of registered
lands all situated in Taytay, Rizal. The next day the same mother &
children executeed MOA that provided: 1. That the parties hereto are
common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following
registered real properties, all situated at Taytay, Rizal, Philippines 2.
Deed of Partial Partition was executed among us before Atty. Virgilio J.
Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the Province of Rizal 3. That as a
result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually
partitioned and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to
him/her. However That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial
Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their respective shares,
the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among
themselves and by these presents do hereby bind themselves to one
another that they shall share alike and received equal shares from the
proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in
their individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition.
Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable. The MOA was
registered and annotated. Deeds were issued in their names.
Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil Case
No. 31231 against the spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson
Tamayo for a sum of money. RTC ruled in favor of Eliseo & Virginia.
Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the lands in
question. It was sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the
spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to
exercise her right of redemption within the statutory period and so the
final deed of sale was executed by the sheriff conveying the lands in
question to spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos. The Malolos couple
asked Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the owners duplicate copy of
the seven (7) titles of the lands in question but she refused. The couple
moved the court to compel her to surrender said titles to the Register
of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. This was granted on September 7,
1984. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of
the court and so the Malolos couple asked the court to declare said
titles as null and void. Adoracion Cruz, Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and
Arnel Cruz entered the picture by filing is said lower court a motion for
leave to intervene and oppose Maloloses motion. The Cruzes alleged
that they were co-owners of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo over the lands in
question. Said order was modify by the court. directing the surrender of
the owners duplicate copies of the titles of the lands in question to the
Register of Deeds not for cancellation but for the annotation of the
rights, interest acquired by the Maloloses over said lands. Adoracion,
Thelma, Gerry and Arnel Cruz filed Civil Case No. 961-A for Partition
of Real Estate against spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos over the
lands in question. As already stated in the first paragraph of this
107
Decision, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs
from which the defendants appealed to this court. CA reversed the
judgement of the RTC hence this petition.
Issue: WON the court violated the Res Inter Alios *Acta Rule
Held: No. Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibits the
admission of evidence that tends to show that what a person has done
at one time is probative of the contention that he has done a similar as
act at another time. Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels
the dependant to meet allegations that are not mentioned in the
complaint, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of irrelevant
issues, and diverts the attention of the court from the issues
immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against the
practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the
trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.
However The rule is not without exception. While inadmissible in
general, collateral facts may be received as evidence under
exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and
the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.[26]
Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state
of mind or knowledge of a persons; it provides insight into such
persons motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it
reveals a mistake.
In the case herein, Evidence of such transactions falls under the
exception to the rule on the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is
admissible because it is relevant to an issue in the case and
corroborative of evidence already received.[28] The relevancy of such
transactions is readily apparent. The nature of ownership of said
property should be the same as that of the lots on question since they
are all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and
disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute
owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as
absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses. Unmistakably,
the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners common purpose and
design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely
owned and not subject to co-ownership.
[UY] Tanzo v. Drilon, G.R. No. 106671, March 30, 2000
Facts: Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the
business of forwarding and transporting from Cali to Manila. Manuel
operates MANSAL forwarders, Mario on the other hand handles the
forwarding business in the USA. Mario convinced petitioner to invest
money in the said business. Mario had allegedly represented that
petitioner's money will be held in trust and administered by both him
and his brother for the exclusive use of their forwarding and
transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario promised
him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum for one
month, at the end of which, his money plus interest earned ned shall
be returned to him. When petitioner got home to the PH, it was Manuel
who tried to convince him and in the end an investment total of US
$34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt, Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who
was residing in the U.S.A. Several checks were issued and the same
were acquired by their aunt. After the expiration of the 30 days,
petitioner demanded for his financial investment and Mario gave
excuses to forestall payment of which and instead said that there were
problems encountered in the BOC. When petitioner tried to acquired
the balikbayan boxes, smuggled goods were inside the balikbayan
boxes. Private responden continued to neglect his obligation to
petitioner which resulted to a complaint filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor which the latter dismissed for being lack of jurisdiction. MR
was also denied. A crime of estafa was filed against private
respondent with then Sec of Justice Drilon which the same was
dismissed for lack of merit. MR was the same was also denied. Hence
this petition.
Issue: WON the evidentiary loan contract of Manuel the same with
those of Liwayway & if the res inter *alios *acta rule applies?
Held: Yes! These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary
value in support of Manuel's claim that the agreement with petitioner
108
was no different from the loan contracts with Liwayway Dee Tanzo.
Under the rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but it may be
received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
As held in the case of Cruz v. CA Collateral facts may be received as
evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational
similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact
offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be
proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light
on the state of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides insight into
such person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan,
or it reveals a mistake.
[MANIQUIS] People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 126351, February 18, 2000
FACTS: Accused was a friend of Elmer Montesclaros, grandson of
complainant Filomena Marigomen. Elmer lived in the house of
Filomena. A few hours before the fire (set by accused?), Elmer,
thinking accused harboured his live-in partner, stormed the house of
the accused and burned clothes, furniture and appliances. Afternoon of
the same day, accused was seen carrying a stove and a kitchen knife
going to the house of Filomena. He told one Mona that he will burn the
house of Filomena. There, accused poured kerosene on the bed and lit
it but the fire was easily put off by accused's wife. Next day, neighbour
Lina, who was roused from sleep, saw Filomenas house burning and
noticed accused standing in front of the burning house. The accused
was charged with arson. RTC for convicted him. Accused bewails
conviction based on several circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Was it proper to convict accused based on circumstantial
evidence of previous act?
HELD: YES. Circumstantial evidence can support conviction. Here,
there were several circumstances which support conviction: 1) he has
motive; 2) his presence at the locus criminis during the fire; 3) his
nonchalance and threats subsequent to the burning and; 4) accuseds
previous conduct. Accuseds intent to commit the arson was
established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed inside the
house of Filomena which was burned later in the night. Prosecution
witness Mona xxx testified that xxx in the afternoon of the same day,
she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked
him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was
going to burn the house of (Filomena). Later, she heard the sound of
somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she
peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of
(Filomena) and started pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then
lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and
extinguished the fire with a broomstick. xxx
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like." Pp. v. Dadles: "In the early case of US
v. Evangelista, accused was convicted of arson after the trial court
admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same
premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said
that: ". . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does
not by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it
was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire
which was charged in the information." xxx xxx xxx 'Where a person is
charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be
received of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the
purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.'"
[MANIQUIS] People v. Magpayo, G.R. Nos. 92961-64, September 1,
1993
109
FACTS: Appellant was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with
Hold-up and Forcible Abduction in four separate informations
allegedly.
Criminal Cases (For RAPE) and (For ROBBERY)
Ten-year old Lilibeth was given P26 by her parents for her to buy milk.
On the way, she was approached by appellant, accusing her of
involvement in a theft of coffee. Lilibeth denied but appellant told her
that the thief had a tattoo on the back. Appellant demanded that she
come with him. "They proceeded to the Church and then entered the
cemetery beside the church. Upon the prodding of appellant, Lilibeth
raised her blouse to show that she had no tattoo. But appellant said:
"Ano ang gusto mo, kakantutin ka o makakauwi ka ng buhay." Lilibeth
pleaded for her life. Appellant inserted his organ into her mouth. He
also inserted his organ into hers. "After his coitus with her, appellant
took the P26.00 of Lilibeth and warned her to keep quiet. Lilibeth went
back to her mother and told her she was raped.
Criminal Case (For Robbery Hold-Up)
Jacquiline, then eight, was accosted by appellant who accused her of
stealing a cart. Appellant insisted that they go to the police station, and
Jacquiline consented. Instead, she was brought to the cemetery
beside the church where she was divested of her gold earrings and a
ring with red stone, valued at P1,000.00, given by her father as a
birthday gift.
Criminal Case (For Forcible Abduction with Rape)
Then 11-year old Mara was with her younger brother Daniel in the
Market upon instruction of their mother to buy "sago". They were
approached by appellant, who asked her if she was involved in a theft
of Nescafe coffee, and to which she answered in the negative.
Appellant asked her if she knew Neneng, and when she said yes,
appellant suddenly poked a sharp instrument at her neck and forced
her and Daniel to go with him. They boarded a pedicab and alighted
somewhere and they walked to a grassy portion where Daniel was told
by appellant to stay at a corner, while appellant brought Mara to
another portion, about four meters away. Appellant inserted his organ
into hers. Appellant left the place.
Mara and Daniel told a mortorshop owner that they were lost. The
owner asked a jeepney driver to take them back to the market, from
where they were able to get home.
ISSUE: Was it proper to admit and consider evidence of similar acts
against the accused?
HELD: YES. Appellant assails the application of res inter alios acta
(S34, R130) allegedly because the similarity of the acts involved (i.e.,
molestation) was not sufficiently established.
The trial court committed no error in applying the exception to the
doctrine. As a rule, evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to
show, that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime
wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial. It is not
competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like nature for
the purpose of showing that he committed the crime charged in the
complaint or information.
An exception to this rule is when such evidence tends directly to
establish the particular crime, and it is usually competent to prove the
motive, the intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or
the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on
trial.
Here, evidence was introduced in Case (Forcible Abduction with Rape)
committed by appellant against Mara on November 20, 1987, not as
evidence of similar acts to prove that on April 10, 1988, appellant also
committed a similar act of rape (and robbery) against Lilibeth. These
offenses are separate crimes and are the subject of separate
complaints and proofs though jointly tried. Hence, the evidence in one
was not offered and admitted to prove the other but only to show the
plan, scheme or modus operandi of the offender.
It is to be observed that in all the cases, the modus operandi of the
offender is that of approaching young girls of not more than twelve
years of age, and taking advantage of their innocence, imputed to
them the commission of a crime and brought them to an isolated place
where the offenses charged were committed. These young girls
narrated in detail in a clear and convincing manner what the offender
did to them and likewise positively identified said offender as herein
accused during the investigation as well as during the trial. Thus, S34,
R130 provides that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
110
at one time may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.
[MANIQUIS] People v. Dadles, G.R. Nos. 118620-21, September 1,
1997
FACTS: This case involved the alleged kidnapping of farmer Alipio
Tehidor and son Dionisio, and farmer Salvador Alipan and son
Antonio, for which appellant along with several other accused were
accused charged in two separate informations. Of the several
accused, only appellant was arraigned as the other accused remained
at large.
Accused et al. were allowed entry at the Tehidors residence. There,
they tied the hands of Alipio and Dionisio. Accused et al. told the wife
that the captives would be freed for the firearms of two other Tehidor
sons who were CAFGU. Unable to surrender the firearms which were
not in possession of the spouses, accused et al. took the victims and
since then, were not heard from.
Same night, about 30 minutes later, accused et al. showed up at the
Alipans. Accused told the wife that they will borrow Salvador and
Antonio and will be returned tomorrow. They never came back.
ISSUE: Was it error to convict accused of kidnapping the Alipans
absent testimony to the effect that the latter were coerced?
HELD: NO. As regards the Alipans, appellant points out that the
testimony of wife who witnessed the alleged kidnapping demonstrates
that the victims were not deprived of their liberty because they went
with the appellant and his companions peacefully without being
subjected to threats and coercion. The court is not convinced. That the
victims' hands were not tied nor guns poked at their sides when they
were taken do not conclusively preclude the deprivation of their liberty.
The circumstances that appellant et al.s previous conduct in
kidnapping the Tehidors, plainly demonstrate their intent to likewise
deprive the Alipans of their liberty.
True, (res inter alios acta is the rule)." However, (exception applies
here). Thus we have held that: "The general rule is that evidence is not
admissible which shows or tends to show, that the accused in a
criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense
for which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed
other crimes of a like nature for the purpose of showing that he would
be likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment. A man may be
a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a jury
in passing upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the particular
offense for which he is on trial. A man may have committed many
crimes and still be innocent of the crime charged in the case on trial.
To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds
of the jurors against the defendant. One who commits one crime may
be more likely to commit another; yet logically, one crime does not
prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless there is such a
relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the other." (Pp.
v. Asinas)
In US v. Evangelista, the accused was convicted of arson after the trial
court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the
same premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we
said that: "While it was not the fire charged in the information, and
does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the
accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting
the fire which was charged in the information. xxx xxx xxx 'Where a
person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony
may be received of other similar acts committed about the same time,
for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.'"
Here, there is such a relation between both incidents of kidnapping
charged in the two informations that "proof of one tends to prove the
other", and evidence of similar acts committed about the same time
establishes the criminal intent of the appellant to deprive Salvador and
Antonio of their liberty. First of all, both incidents happened almost
simultaneously. The kidnapping of Alipio and Dionisio occurred only
some thirty (30) minutes before Salvador and Antonio were taken from
their home. The appellant and his companions were apparently well
acquainted with the Tehidors and the Alipans who readily allowed
them entrance. Alipio and Dionisio were taken by appellant's group on
the pretext that they wanted to talk to Alipio. Similarly, the appellant
111
claims that they took Salvador and Antonio only because they wanted
to talk to the former. Alipio's wife was warned not to tell the authorities
about the incident. The same warning was given to Salvador's wife.
OSG: circumstances exist to conclude that it was the appellant's
criminal intent to deprive the victims of liberty: "First. If appellant's
group merely wanted to talk to Salvador Alipan, they could just have
talked to him then and there at the house of the latter without
necessarily taking him together with his son. Second. Appellant's
group could have elicited the required information from Salvador in just
a matter of hours. Hence, they should have returned Salvador and his
son the following day as promised. To this date, however, no trace of
the two (2) can be found. Third. If they did not have any ill-motive
against the duo, why did they warn the family of the victims not to
report the incident to anybody or they will be killed? Clearly, this
behavior betrays the falsity of their alleged intention."
[MANIQUIS] Tanzo v. Drilon, G.R. No. 106671, March 30, 2000
FACTS: Respondents Salazars are brothers engaged in forwarding
and transporting "balikbayan" boxes from California to Metro Manila.
Manuel managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a
business in his name. Mario handled the U.S. side as GM of M.J.S.
International, Inc.
Petitioner alleged that while in the US, Mario tried to convince him to
invest. Mario represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust
and administered by both him and his brother for the business. Mario
promised him a return on his investment equivalent to 10% for one
month, at the end of which his money plus interest earned shall be
returned to him. Manuel also tried to persuade him to invest. Petitioner
agreed to invest $34K which he entrusted to his aunt Liwayway Dee
Tanzo who was in the US. Thus, Tanzo issued several personal
checks payable to aunt LDT, or to Calfed, or to Cash.
Upon the expirations of the 30 day investment period, petitioner
demanded accounting and/or the return of capital plus interest earned.
Manuel admitted that their shipments encountered some problems with
the Customs. When petitioner attempted to secure the release of the
"balikbayan" boxes from the Customs, he discovered that the same
had actually contained smuggled goods and were accordingly seized
and forfeited.
When respondents continued to ignore petitioner's demand, the latter
filed a complaint for estafa before the Prosecutor. Prosecutor
dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction over the offense as it was
committed not in QC. Petitioner elevated it to the Secretary of Justice.
Acting SOJ dismissed the petition. Reconsideration was also denied,
saying lack of jurisdiction and lack of evidence for estafa (apparently
believing respondents evidence [consisting of loan contracts between
respondent and petitioners aunt LDT] and averment that the
transaction was merely of loan, not trust).
ISSUE: Was it proper to consider the loan contracts between LDT and
respondents as evidence of the real transaction between petitioner and
respondents?
HELD: YES. Petitioner failed to present evidence other than his bare
assertion that he had invested money on the basis of a trust
agreement. The checks allegedly subject of the trust agreement did
more damage than good to petitioner's proposition. None of these
checks were issued to either Mario or Manuel and were in fact payable
to "LDT," "Calfed" or "Cash." Moreover, only one of these checks was
actually encashed by Mario, the rest by LDT. On the basis of the
foregoing alone, respondents could have completely denied the
existence of their liability to petitioner as neither proof in writing nor
witnesses exist to substantiate petitioner's claim of a trust agreement
between himself and the respondents. On the contrary, Manuel does
not deny that Mario had indeed received money from the petitioner,
albeit claiming that the latter's liability thereunder is purely civil in
nature for being rooted in a simple loan contract. Manuel offered in
evidence copies of the contracts of loan between M.J.S. International
and LDT. True, these loan contracts do not by themselves prove that
his agreement with respondents was also a loan.
However, these loan contracts may, be given evidentiary value in
support of Manuel's claim that the agreement with petitioner was no
different from the loan contracts with LDT. Under the rule of res inter
alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one
112
time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or
similar thing at another time, but it may be received to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. [C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence
under exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity
or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered
and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.
Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially in
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state
of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides insight into such person's
motive or intent, it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it reveals a
mistake. (Cruz v. CA)
The series of transactions between M.J.S. and LDT were entered into
under similar circumstances as those surrounding the contract
between petitioner and Mario. Just like the alleged trust agreement
between petitioner and Mario, the loan between M.J.S. and LDT
provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for
use by the latter in its business operations. Petitioner also admits that
he entrusted the checks to Liwayway Dee Tanzo for investment in
private respondents' business. This shows that private respondents
were transacting directly with LDT in the usual manner that they
conduct business, that is, the loan of money for stipulated interest.
Hence, respondents' modus operandi, if there ever was one, in raising
additional capital for M.J.S. was to borrow money from willing
investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that
respondents would all of a sudden deviate from an established
business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner.
[MELCHOR] People v. Magtuloy y Montaray, G.R. No. 105671, June
30, 1993
Facts:
Accused was charged with murder of 1 year old Arturo, Jr. before RTC
Caloocan. According to the victims mother, Betty, she, Arturo, and her
live-in partner, the accused, are residents of Caloocan and that she
always leaves the child with the accused when she works, selling
siopao. On that fateful day, she quarreled with the accused when she
informed the latter of her intention to go back to the province with her
son. She also averred that she does not get along so well with the
accused and quarelling between them is frequent. At midday the same
morning, the accused sought assistance from his neighbor carrying the
seemingly dead child bleeding from the mouth saying that he is to be
blamed if Arturo dies. He brings the latter to the hospital to no avail,
while constantly asking Betty for forgiveness and even went on vigil
during the wake. An autopsy confirmed that the victim died due to
hematoma in the chest area which may be caused by a blunt
instrument/weapon such as a punch. Accused admitted that he only
slapped the victim causing him to hit the door and fall down the stairs.
Accused was arrested and pled not-guilty during arraignment, hence
trial on the merits ensued. As there is no eye-witness to the crime, a
resort to circumstantial evidence was necessary. RTC convicted the
accused. At his appeal, accused averred that prosecution has not
satisfactorily proved appellants guilt by circumstantial evidence as it
was he who initially sought assistance with his neighbor and then
subsequently with the hospital and that he stood vigil during the wake.
Issue:
WON court erred in finding the accused guilty by circumstantial
evidence.
Held:
No. The ff. circumstantial evidence are crucial in the determination of
the guilty verdict.
1. Victim was not the son of accused.
2. He maltreats both mother and child on occasions.
3. On that fateful morning, he quarreled with the mother.
4. He was left alone on the house with the victim on the said date.
5. He constantly asks for forgiveness.
Also important to note that the expert testimony of P/Capt. Baltazar of
PNP Crime Lab, stating that a fall of 1 meter, even upon a hard
pavement will not resort to a hematoma and the suspects testimony
on cross examination stating that there are no stairs in their house
were appreciated by the court.
The proven facts of the case yield the inescapable conclusion that the
prosecutions evidence albeit circumstantial, was of a sufficient
quantum to establish the guilt of the accused. There is more than one
113
circumstance, and the combination of all is enough to produce guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
[MELCHOR] Malig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 71712, April 15, 1988
Facts:
On 10/29/1982, after public bidding, the Province of Bulacan
contracted Halrey Const. for the construction of a road for Php
963,850, to be completed in 120 days from the date of award, 10%
retention fee and liquidated damages of no less than 20% of contract
price in case of failure to comply with the stipulations, with work
beginning in 11/02/1982. On 11/24, Provincial Engineer wrote Halrey
Const. changing the station limits in the contract where the last 200m
is to be transferred to the start point and that there is no actual change
in the length of the road. However, petitioners say that they knew
nothing of the changes, as it was not documented. On 03/07/1983,
Pres. Halili of Halrey Const. informed the provincial govt that project
was completed and asked for payment, the process of which was
initiated. Pres. Halili avers (through prosecution witnesses Francisco
and Gerona) that petitioner appeared in his office on the 15th,
demanding Php 20,000 for a favorable post-inspection report. They
were said to also have appeared on said office on the 21st, still
demanding payment but coming home empty-handed. On the 22nd,
petitioners contended via a Contract Review Report and Contract
Review Work Sheet that only 820m of the contracted 1,020m was
completed, recommending payment of only Php 691,619 and a penalty
of Php 92,770 for the delay, leaving only Php 498,849 due the
complainant contractor out of a total contract price of Php 963,850.
Hence Pres. Halili filed an anti-graft case against petitioners with
Sandiganbayan, which found petitioner guilty of violating the anti-graft
law. Petitioner denies knowing the witnesses and contends that the
witness testimony presented by respondent is insufficient as such is
self-serving and purely hearsay.
Issue:
WON witness testimonies by Francisco and Gerona is sufficient to
convict petitioners.
Held:
Yes. According to the particulars of this case, both witnesses know of
petitioner Malig by virtue of previous construction contracts which
Halrey Const. has bid on. This is evinced by the fact that no further
introductions were required when the petitioner appeared at the office
of Halrey Const. on the two above-mentioned dates, demanding Php
20,000 for a favorable post-inspection review. While Rule 130, Sec. 35
of the Rules of Court states that evidence that one did or omitted to a
thing at one time is inadmissible to prove that he did one thing/omitted
to do one thing at another time, it may be received to prove a specific
intent, knowledge, identity, plan, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and
the like. Also, through participation on previous construction projects,
respondent knows of the petitioners habit of demanding money for
favors. Also, the post-inspection report is erroneous as it reported a
delay in the project even if it was finished on time, and that there is no
shortage in the finished road as what occurred was an authorized
change of station limits, evinced by an authorization letter from the
provl. engineer.
[MELCHOR] People v. Saguban, G.R. No. 96287, April 25, 1994
Facts:
An information for Rape was filed with RTC Dumaguete by Casido
alleging that accused raped her Accused pled not guilty and trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution presented the ff.witnesses: Dra.
Fuentes, Brgy. Capt. Lacpao, Atty. Icao and Casido herself. They set
out to prove that on 1pm, while bathing after washing clothes on a
creek in Brgy. Alangilan, accused jumped her and held both her hands
while prodding her with a knife, compelling her to stop screaming and
enabling the accused to have carnal knowledge of her. Eventually, she
was able to extricate herself from him and escaped. She, along with
her hubby then reported the matter to Capt. Lacpao, who was unable
to locate the accused as he had already left. Also, prosecution offered
the suspects previous rape conviction to prove his penchant for
committing such crimes. Defense on the other hand called the ff.
witnesses: Tinaa, Sienes and accused himself, seeking to establish
that he was nowhere near the crime scene as he was plowing his field
in Brgy. Jantianon, and that he doesnt know the complainant and has
never set foot in the brgy. of the crime scene. RTC Dumaguete found
accused guilty of the crime of rape against Casido and sentenced him
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pay damages of Php 12,000 and
costs, stating that the defense stood on an alibi which is easy to
114
contrive and therefore weak. Accused appealed, especially bemoaning
the inclusion of his former conviction for rape as evidence, hence the
petition at bench.
Issue:
WON court erred in disregarding the defense of alibi of the accused.
WON inclusion of former conviction as evidence of a crime is proper.
Held:
1. No. For the defense of alibi to prosper, two things must concur: 1.
Accused was not at the crime scene when it was committed and 2.
That it is physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene
at the time of the crimes commission. Witness testimonies of the
prosecution, especially of Capt. Lacpao and the victim herself belies
the suspects claim that he has never set foot in Alangilan as they have
positively identified him as resident of Alangilan. Accused himself
mooted his own defense when in claiming he did not know the victim,
failed to provide a reason why the victim instituted an action against
him and why the former can positively identify him. The other defense
witnesses were informed that they will testify for the accused, but did
not know that it was for rape.
2. Yes. Rule 130, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Court states that evidence
that one did or omitted to a thing at one time is inadmissible to prove
that he did one thing/omitted to do one thing at another time, it may be
received to prove a specific intent, knowledge, identity, plan, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. In the case at bench, this piece of
evidence was not the sole basis of conviction, rather, it was the
concurrence of established facts as well as weak alibi, which coupled
with the previous conviction formed the basis of the suspects present
conviction.
RA 8505, Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998
RA 10364, Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012
Child Witness, A.M. No. 004-07-SC, December 15, 2000
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer
[MELCHOR] Mclaughlin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57552,
[October 10, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner and Respondent Flores entered into a contract for the
conditional sale of real property, with purchase price fixed at Php
140,000 divided as Php 26,000 upon the execution of the deed and the
balance of Php 113,000 to be paid not later than May 77. Parties also
agreed that the balance shall bear an interest of 1% per month
commencing on December 76 until payment of full purchase price. In
79, petitioner filed a complaint for the rescission of the deed of
conditional sale due to the failure of the private respondent to pay the
balance due on May 31 77. Later the parties submitted a compromise
agreement where the private respondent acknowledged indebtedness
to the petitioner under the deed of conditional sale in the amount of
Php 119,000 and parties agreed that said amount would be payable as
follows: 1. Php 50,000 upon signing of the agreement and the 2.
Balance of Php 69,000 in 2 equal installments on June & December
80. As agreed upon, private respondent paid the Php 50,000 as well
as an escalation cost of Php 25,000. In Par. 3 of the compromise
agreement, private respondent agreed to pay Php 1,000 monthly rental
from December 79 until obligation is fully paid, for the use of the
property subject matter of the deed of conditional sale, while Pars. 6 &
7 states that in the event the defendant fails to comply with his
obligation herein provided, plaintiff will be entitled to the issuance of a
writ of execution rescinding the deed of conditional sale. Defendant
hereby waives the right to appeal from the order of rescission and the
writ of execution which the court shall render in accordance to the
stipulations herein provided for. In the event of execution, all payments
made by defendant will be forfeited in favor of plaintiff as liquidated
damages. In October 80, petitioner demanded payment of the
remaining balance of Php 69,000, which includes the installments for
both June and December 80. Private respondent signified his intent to
pay the full balance while demanding to see the Certificate of Title and
tax payment receipts. Private respondent then tendered payment, but
was not accepted by petitioner, who then filed a motion for writ of
execution alleging that private respondent failed to pay installment due
on June 80 and that he has not been paying the monthly rentals. RTC
granted the motion for writ of execution, issuing the writ in November
80. RTC also granted petitioners ex-parte motion for clarification of
the order of execution rescinding the deed of conditional sale of real
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property. MR was denied. Upon appeal to CA, it nullified and set aside
the orders of the RTC, hence this petition.
Issue:
WON tender of payment by respondent, which was not accepted by
petitioner, made him not liable to pay his obligations and rentals in the
arrear.
Held:
No. Rule 130, Sec 35 of the Rules of Court provide that an offer in
writing to pay a particular sum of money or deliver a written instrument
or specific property is, if rejected, is equivalent to actual production and
tender of the money, instrument or property, further emphasized by
Art. 1256 of the New Civil Code stating that if the creditor to whom
tender of payment was made refuses without just cause to accept it,
debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the
sum due, and that consignation alone shall produce the same effect in
the cases enumerated therein (refer to Art. 1256, NCC); Art. 1257
provides that in order that consignation of the sum due may release
the obligor, it must first be announced to the person interested in the
fulfillment of the obligation and Art. 1258 provides that consignation
shall be made by depositing sum due at the disposal of the judicial
authority and that interested parties shall be notified thereof. Tender of
payment must be distinguished from consignation. Tender is the
antecedent of consignation; a preparatory act to the consignation, from
which are derived the immediate consequences which the debtor
desires. Tender of payment may be extrajudicial while consignation is
necessarily judicial, and priority of tender is attempt to make a private
settlement before proceeding with the solemnities of consignation. In
this case, although private respondent has preserved his rights as a
vendee by timely tender of payment of the balance of his obligation
which was unjustly refused by petitioner, he remains liable for the
payment of his obligation because of his failure to deposit such amount
with the court. Due to private respondents failure to deposit the
amount, his obligation remains unpaid along with the monthly rentals,
to which he is liable. Upon full payment of the amount of Php 76,059
and the rentals, respondent shall be entitled to a deed of absolute sale
in his favor of the real property in contention.

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