You are on page 1of 16

J Bus Ethics (2017) 142:169183

DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2800-4

Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement


on Negotiator Attitudes and Deceptive Behavior
Kevin Tasa1 Chris M. Bell1

Received: 26 February 2015 / Accepted: 30 July 2015 / Published online: 5 August 2015
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract In three studies, we examined the relationship (Ekman 2001). Scholarly explanations about the mecha-
between implicit negotiation beliefs, moral disengagement, nisms influencing the use of deceptive tactics include the
and a negotiators ethical attitudes and behavior. Study 1 presence of incentives for economic gain (Tenbrunsel
found correlations between an entity theory that negotia- 1998), the perception that alternatives are framed as a loss
tion skills are fixed rather than malleable, moral disen- rather than a gain (Kern and Chugh 2009), and high cog-
gagement, and appropriateness of marginally ethical nitive trust within a negotiation dyad (Olekalns and Smith
negotiation tactics. Mediation analysis supported a model 2009). Although negotiators can be influenced by features
in which moral disengagement facilitated the relationship of the situation (Olekalns et al. 2014), they are also
between entity theory and support for unethical tactics. deliberate agents whose thoughts about their own skills and
Study 2 provided additional support for the mediation the ethics of negotiation are crucial determinants of their
model in a sample of MBA students, whereby predisposi- behavior. Relying on theories of cognitive factors in
tions to morally disengage mediated the effect of disposi- achievement motivation (e.g., Dweck and Leggett 1988;
tional entity beliefs on unethical behavior in a negotiation Elliott and Dweck 1988) and moral disengagement (Ban-
exercise. In study 3, we manipulated implicit beliefs prior dura 1990, 1999, 2002), we argue that an individuals
to a negotiation simulation and found that entity beliefs implicit theory of whether negotiation skills are innate or
predict deception through two sequential mediators, can be learned, and his or her ability to morally disengage
extreme opening bids and state moral disengagement. from the consequences of actions, increases the likelihood
of unethical behavior at the negotiation table. Using three
Keywords Implicit negotiation beliefs  Moral studies, we propose and test a model in which a negotia-
disengagement  Deception  Negotiator attitudes  Ethics in tors implicit negotiation beliefs and moral disengagement
negotiation each play an important role in determining whether or not
unethical tactics are deemed to be appropriate and also
Negotiators are faced with many choices as they consider whether or not the negotiator uses deceptive tactics.
their tactical and strategic options. Due to the risk it entails, Our model states that these individual differences will
one of the most important choices a negotiator can make is influence a negotiators behavior in a two-stage process.
whether or not to deceive a counterpart by either providing First, we will show that implicit beliefs about negotiation
false information or concealing relevant information skills serve to frame the negotiators choice in terms of the
behavioral responses available when faced with negotiation
obstacles and challenges. Negotiators who view their
& Kevin Tasa negotiation skills as relatively fixed are more likely to
ktasa@schulich.yorku.ca
choose deceptive responses. Next, we will show that
Chris M. Bell although implicit beliefs set the stage for deception, that
cbell@schulich.yorku.ca
behavior is facilitated by the negotiators ability to disen-
1
Schulich School of Business, York University, 4700 Keele gage from his or her unethical actions. Notably, the prin-
St., Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada ciple goal of moral disengagement is to resolve and thereby

123
170 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

avoid the self-sanctioning or condemnation that may result Given the different goals that incremental and entity
from committing unethical acts. We also show that indi- theorists tend to adopt, it is perhaps not surprising that they
vidual differences can be manipulated with contextual also have different reactions to challenges and obstacles.
primes by creating domain specific implicit beliefs. In our Incremental theorists tend to persist in the face of chal-
final study, we replicate our dispositional findings in lenges even when the perceived chances of success are
experimental conditions (Chiu et al. 1997; Dweck and small. The tendency of incremental theorists to adopt
Leggett 1988; Kray and Haselhuhn 2007) and demonstrate learning goals is associated with a mastery-oriented
the link between manipulated implicit beliefs, extreme response to challenges that involves the pursuit of chal-
opening offers, and moral disengagement. lenging tasks and persistent striving in the face of failure.
Even when it becomes apparent that one might appear less
capable in the eyes of others, mastery-oriented incremental
Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Negotiator theorists continue to persevere when the opportunity to
Perception and Behavior learn is still present. Wong et al. (2012) found that nego-
tiators with incremental beliefs were better able to discover
Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) used a series of studies to creative negotiation agreements than negotiators with
examine whether negotiators behaved differently based on entity beliefs. In particular, negotiation dyads with higher
implicit beliefs (Dweck and Leggett 1988); they hold about levels of incremental beliefs had a more cooperative,
the malleability of negotiation skills. In short, they found integrative negotiation with higher joint gains, defined as
that negotiators who believe that skills and ability tend to be the additional value created by trading off low priority
fixed suffered at the negotiation table relative to negotiators issues in exchange for high priority issues.
who believed that negotiation skills could be learned. Consistent with their preference for performance goals
Regardless of whether such beliefs were experimentally and recognition from others, entity theorists are more prone
induced or measured as a trait, negotiators who perceived to prefer easy tasks and, in the face of failure, they do not
their skills as fixed claimed less negotiation value, had lower tend to persist in their pursuit of their goals but rather
overall performance while negotiating, and had lower grades experience a decline in intrinsic motivation and an increase
in a negotiation class. They also found that holding an of negative affect (Dweck and Leggett 1988; Grant and
implicit theory of negotiation skills that was relatively more Dweck 2003; Harackiewicz et al. 1984). For instance,
fixed than malleable positively correlated with believing that Elliott and Dweck (1988) demonstrated that entity theorists
conflict always ends with a winner and a loser, that nego- will persist in the face of challenges only as long as they
tiators have conflicting beliefs and cooperation is nearly expect to achieve their goal of appearing competent.
impossible, that self-interest is the driving force behind However, entity theorists are more likely than incremental
negotiation success, and that most people lie a bit when theorists to view effort as an indicator of a lack of inherent
making deals (Kray and Haselhuhn 2007, study 1). ability (Hong et al. 1999). In sum, rather than persevere
To understand these findings, we must first explain and overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles, entity
Dweck and Leggetts (1988) social cognitive approach to theorists may look for an easy path to the goal or else they
personality and achievement motivation, and in particular may adopt a defeatist response characterized by avoidance
how implicit beliefs are associated with goal orientation. and a deterioration of performance.
According to Dweck and Legget (1988), individuals who In addition to differences in goals and responses to
believe ability is fixed (described as entity theorists) have obstacles, there is empirical evidence that individuals who
different approaches in achievement-oriented contexts than endorse an entity approach tend to be more competitive in
individuals who believe that ability is malleable (described negotiations (Kray and Haselhuhn 2007; Tasa et al. 2013),
as incremental theorists). These beliefs are defined as perceive others as a threat (Ryan and Pintrich 1997), are
implicit because although individuals can describe their less inclined to share information with exchange partners
beliefs, they are not given a great deal of thought, operating (Poortvliet et al. 2007), and, in disagreement situations,
instead at a more unconscious level. A vast amount of reject the others opinion in order to impose ones own
research shows that implicit theories affect what individ- point of view (Darnon et al. 2006). These attitudes and
uals are trying to achieve on a given task (Grant and Dweck behaviors are more closely aligned with a competitive than
2003). Believing that ability is relatively fixed, entity the- cooperative negotiation style. Notably, there is evidence
orists prefer performance goals that emphasize favorable that a competitive negotiation style is, relative to a coop-
judgments of their competence by others. On the other erative style, more strongly associated with the use of
hand, incremental theorists believe ability is changeable, unethical tactics, in particular deceit (Schweitzer et al.
and they consequently prefer goals that emphasize 2005). Indeed, as mentioned above, Kray and Haselhuhn
increasing competence and understanding. (2007, study 1) found that stronger entity beliefs were

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 171

associated not only with fixed pie and competitive atti- ethics literature have suggested that scholars should attend
tudes, but also with the idea that most negotiators lie at more carefully to the role of cognitive processes in
least a little in order to make a deal. This latter statement is unethical behavior (Crawshaw et al. 2013; De Cremer
provocative because it suggests that entity theorists believe et al. 2011; Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004).
lying to be a normative tactic, a belief that, notably, may be Bandura introduced the theory of moral disengagement
seized upon in order to disengage morally from ones own as an extension of his more general social cognitive theory
like-minded behavior. (Bandura 1986). According to social cognitive theory,
To summarize, many of the characteristics associated when self-regulatory capabilities are working properly,
with entity theorists have also been found to be associated transgressive behavior is deterred through the self-con-
with unethical behavior in the pursuit of goals in general demnation individuals anticipate they would suffer were
and in negotiation in particular. For instance, there is a they to engage in behavior that conflicts with their inter-
long-standing line of research on unethical behavior in an nalized moral standards. Moral disengagement theory
educational context that finds that cheating behaviors are explains how this self-regulatory process can fail when
often associated with factors that characterize the moral disengagement mechanisms disable the cognitive
achievement motivation of entity theorists, such as per- links between transgressive behavior and the self-sanc-
formance goals (Anderman and Danner 2008), competitive tioning that should prevent it (Bandura 1986, 2002). The
achievement orientation (Perry et al. 1990), and a moti- moral disengagement process is theorized to play an
vation to avoid failure (Smith et al. 1972). Indeed, Corrion important role in explaining how individuals are able to
et al. (2010) have demonstrated that endorsing an entity engage in human atrocities such as political and military
theory is positively related to judgments of cheating violence (Bandura 1990) or corporate wrongdoing and
acceptability, mediated by performance goal orientations. corruption (Brief et al. 2001) without apparent cognitive
On the other hand, these authors found that endorsing an distress. Bandura proposed that moral disengagement
incremental theory was negatively associated with judg- occurs through a set of eight interrelated cognitive mech-
ments of cheating acceptability, and this relationship was anisms that facilitate unethical behavior. Moral justifica-
mediated by mastery goal orientations. Despite evidence tion, euphemistic labeling, and advantageous comparison
supporting the links between implicit beliefs and attitudes serve to cognitively restructure unethical acts so that they
about unethical goal pursuit behavior, to our knowledge, no appear less harmful. Displacement and diffusion of
study has yet explored the association between implicit responsibility obscure the moral agency of the actor.
personality beliefs and an attitude structure that predis- Finally, distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and
poses the individual to unethical behaviors (studies 1, 2 and blaming the victim serve to reduce or eliminate the per-
3)and actual unethical behavior (studies 2 and 3). There- ceived injury or distress caused to the victim.
fore, we propose the following: Bandura conceptualized these eight moral disengage-
ment mechanisms as a coherent set of cognitive tendencies
H1 A negotiators relatively more entity than incremental
that influence the way individuals manage decisions with
implicit negotiation beliefs will be positively related
ethical import. For instance, we noted above that Kray and
to:(a) a set of attitudes about unethical behavior (studies 1,
Haselhuhn (2007) found that stronger support of entity than
2, and 3) and (b) the negotiators actual use of deception
incremental theories was associated with the belief that
(studies 2 & 3).
most people lie in order to succeed in negotiation. Such a
belief in the normative context of negotiation could be
capitalized on in a process of moral disengagement. Sim-
Moral Disengagement ilarly, Shu et al. (2011) found that permissive environ-
ments, which are associated with dishonest behavior (e.g.,
An important additional facilitator of unethical behavior Gino et al. 2009; Gino and Pierce 2009; Mazar et al. 2008),
is an individuals propensity to morally disengage from promoted greater moral disengagement than less permis-
his or her transgressive acts and their consequences. sive environments. Further, individuals systematically dif-
Moral disengagement is an individual difference in the fer in their propensities to use these cognitive moral
way people cognitively process decisions and behavior so disengagement mechanisms. Recently, Moore et al. (2012)
as to behave unethically without feeling distress (Bandura validated a new measure of an individuals propensity to
1990, 1999, 2002). Broadly speaking, we know that an morally disengage and examined the relationship between
individuals ethical and unethical choices are influenced scores on this measure and a number of unethical behav-
by how the individual processes, frames, or understands iors. They found that moral disengagement predicted self-
relevant information (Kern and Chugh 2009; Tenbrunsel reported unethical behavior, a decision to commit fraud, a
and Messick 1999), and recent reviews of the behavioral self-serving decision in the workplace, and supervisor and

123
172 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

coworker reported unethical work behaviors. Similarly, we Study 1


expect moral disengagement to be associated with judg-
ments of deception and actual deceptive behavior. The first step in our investigation was to determine whether
there was a correlational relationship between implicit
H2 Moral disengagement will be positively related to (a) a
negotiation beliefs, moral disengagement, and perceptions
set of attitudes about unethical behavior (study 1) and (b) the
about questionably ethical negotiation tactics. In doing so,
negotiators actual use of deception (studies 2 and 3).
we sought to obtain evidence that would support further
Because implicit negotiation beliefs have been found to study in an experimental situation. While people tend to
directly relate to negotiator behavior and outcomes, we avoid intentional behaviors that violate their moral stan-
theorize that moral disengagement will play a mediating dards (Bandura 2002), individual attitudes are a precursor
role in connecting implicit beliefs to attitudes and to actual behavior (e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1972). With
behavior. Although we argue that moral disengagement several studies showing a correlation between attitudes
will be associated with distorted judgments of unethical towards ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics and
behavior and, hence, a greater propensity to engage in intentions to actually use them (e.g., Lewicki and Robinson
unethical acts, we do not theorize that moral disengage- 1998), we were, therefore, concerned with predictors of
ment is a motivating factor contributing to unethical those attitudes.
behavior. Rather, moral disengagement reduces the self-
regulatory implications of unethical behavior, thus facil-
Method
itating a pre-existing motive. In other words, a person
who is motivated to behave unethically will need to
To conduct our first study, we measured implicit negotia-
overcome self-regulatory obstacles before acting and
tion beliefs, moral disengagement, and the degree to which
may, consequently, seize on opportunities to morally
people endorse the use of ethically ambiguous tactics.
disengage (Bandura 1999). Keeping in mind that implicit
Participants were enrolled in either one of two separate
beliefs help determine a persons motivational orientation
executive workshops on negotiations or in a negotiations
in achievement situations, we propose that an individuals
course in an MBA program. The sample was 60 % male
implicit beliefs about negotiation, specifically whether
and consisted of 42 physicians, 48 managers and engineers
negotiation skills can be learned or are fixed and innate,
working in the automotive industry, and 78 MBA students
provide the basis of an initial motivation to take advan-
(n = 168). The average age of the participants (physi-
tage of unethical opportunities. As noted above, this
cians = 36.5; managers/engineers = 33.8; MBA stu-
connection between entity beliefs and unethical behaviors
dents = 29.5) and their years of full-time work experience
is not in itself novel. Although we are claiming that an
(physicians = 10.7; managers/engineers = 9.2; MBA stu-
entity theory mindset is more likely to be associated with
dents = 6.2) differed slightly across the three groups. Data
deceit than an incremental theory mindset, we do not
were collected using an online self-assessment survey
mean to imply that entity theory is sociopathic or asso-
taken prior to negotiation training. A single survey was
ciated with an inability to tell right from wrong. Rather, in
used for the physician and management/engineering
the pursuit of a performance goal and the desire to be
groups. However, two surveys were used with the MBA
recognized by others as competent, entity theorists may be
group: measures of implicit negotiation beliefs and moral
more likely to deceive to achieve and, in order to do so,
disengagement were assessed in the 1 week of classes and
will need to overcome self-regulatory obstacles by means
measures of ethically questionable tactics taken 7 weeks
of moral disengagement. Once motivated, the individual
later. We found no differences between the groups in terms
will still need to resolve self-regulatory tensions before
of mean scores on the measures and the direction and
engaging in deception. Therefore, our fundamental model
magnitude of the correlations among the measures.
can be expressed in a mediation hypothesis that the effect
Therefore, we combined the data for all three groups.
of implicit beliefs about negotiation on unethical negoti-
ation behavior, specifically deceit, will be facilitated by
Measures
moral disengagement:
H3 Moral disengagement will mediate the relationship Implicit negotiation beliefs were assessed with a seven-
between implicit negotiation beliefs and (a) normative item scale created by Kray and Haselhuhn (2007). A
attitudes about unethical negotiation tactics (study 1) and sample item is, Good negotiators are born that way, and
(b) the use of deception in a negotiation (studies 2 and 3). scale scores ranged from 1 (very strongly agree) to 7 (very

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 173

strongly disagree). The coefficient alpha for the scale was relationship between implicit beliefs and the type of ethi-
.80. Although the scale is a single factor comprised of cally questionable negotiation tactics varies across gender,
items framed to assess either the fixedness or malleability we cannot conclude that the relationship in principle
of negotiation skills, for ease of interpretability, we between implicit beliefs and unethical behavior is stronger
reverse-coded the malleability items so that higher scores for one gender over the other.
on the measure reflect a stronger belief in the fixedness of Second, Table 1 also shows that moral disengagement is
negotiation skills. In other words, we coded the items so as significantly correlated with each sub-dimension of the
to align with an entity theory perspective. Moral disen- SINS scale for both males and females. Specifically, moral
gagement was measured using the 8-item scale validated disengagement was correlated with appropriateness
by Moore et al. (2012). A sample item is, It is okay to assessments towards competitive bargaining, false pro-
spread rumors to defend those you care about, with a scale mises, misrepresentation, attacking an opponents network,
range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The and inappropriate information gathering.
coefficient alpha was .83. We used the bootstrapping technique advised by
Endorsement of ethically questionable tactics was Preacher and Hayes (2004) to explore whether moral dis-
assessed with the 16-item Self-Reported inappropriate engagement mediated the relationship between implicit
negotiation strategies (SINS) scale (Robinson et al. 2000), negotiation beliefs and attitudes about ethical tactics. We
which taps judgments of five classes of tactics: (a) tradi- report the analysis using the MBA population because
tional competitive bargaining, (b) attacking an opponents assessment of the independent variables preceded assess-
network, (c) making false promises, (d) misrepresentation, ment of the dependent variable by 7 weeks. Gender was
and (e) inappropriate information gathering. A sample included as a control variable and did not approach sta-
item, which captures misrepresentation, is, Intentionally tistical significance (p = .72). Using the overall SINS scale
misrepresent information to your opponent in order to as the dependent variable, a bootstrap analysis revealed
strengthen your negotiating arguments or position. All that the 95 % bias-corrected confidence interval for the size
items were rated on a 1 (not at all appropriate) to 7 (very of the indirect effect (MacKinnon et al. 2002; Preacher and
appropriate) scale. The coefficient alphas for each subscale Hayes 2004) excluded zero (.507, .192). This analysis
range from .78 to .85. indicates that the indirect effect is significant, supporting
the hypothesis that implicit beliefs relate to ethical attitudes
through moral disengagement. It is also noteworthy that the
Results and Discussion significance of the indirect effect remains when tested on
the physician and manager/engineer sample (456, .122).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The results are These results provide support for hypotheses 1(a) and
broken down by gender because Kray and Haselhuhn 2(a), which suggest that people are more likely to view
(2012, Study 4) found differences between male and ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics as appropriate when
female participants on the relationship between implicit they hold a more entity-based view of their negotiation skills
beliefs and attitudes towards ethically questionable tactics. and score higher on moral disengagement. Results also
In particular, they found that men were more lenient in highlight the different beliefs people hold about negotiation
their ethical standards than women and this effect was tactics depending on their level of implicit beliefs and moral
predicted by the mens entity theory beliefs. Here, we disengagement. Specifically, attitudes about ethically mar-
explore the same relationship while also adding moral ginal negotiation tactics are influenced by implicit beliefs
disengagement as a correlate. indirectly through moral disengagement, providing support
First, the correlation between implicit negotiation for hypothesis 3(a). Notably, these findings appear to be
beliefs and moral disengagement was significant for both substantiated for both men and women.
males and females. This suggests that individuals who view As these results are correlational, we could not be cer-
their negotiation abilities as fixed, rather than malleable, tain to what extent, if any, implicit beliefs and moral dis-
also have a higher propensity to morally disengage. With engagement lead to differences in the extent to which
respect to the relationship between implicit beliefs and people actually use deception and unethical tactics while
ethically questionable tactics, for males, implicit negotia- negotiating. In our model, a negotiators implicit beliefs
tion beliefs were significantly correlated with the likeli- about his or her negotiation skills will predispose the
hood that they would endorse attacking an opponents negotiator for marginally ethical behavior, the actual
network or make false promises. For females, entity-based expression of which is then facilitated by moral disen-
implicit beliefs were associated with the SINS dimensions gagement. Although attitudes, beliefs, predispositions and
of competitive bargaining, making false promises, and intentions to behave often predict behavior (Ajzen and
misrepresentation. Therefore, although in this sample the Fishbein 1972), this is not always the case (Ajzen and

123
174 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

Table 1 Descriptive statistics,


Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
correlations by gender, and
reliability coefficients for study 1 Males
1. Implicit beliefs 3.85 .61 (.80)
2. Moral disengagement 1.68 .58 .29** (.83)
3. Competitive bargaining 5.03 1.63 .10 .27** (.85)
4. Attacking network 2.01 1.23 .21* .38** .37** (.78)
5. False promises 2.20 1.07 .21* .46** .31** .70** (.80)
6. Misrepresentation 2.77 1.25 .16 .45** .51** .58** .53** (.81)
7. Inappropriate info 2.43 1.42 .16 .51** .50** .49** .41** .62** (.81)
8. Overall SINS 2.88 1.02 .18 .52** .73** .78** .72** .82** .79**
Females
1. Implicit beliefs 3.94 .62
2. Moral disengagement 1.62 .52 .46**
3. Competitive bargaining 4.89 1.38 .28* .41**
4. Attacking network 1.79 .99 .21 .63** .36**
5. False promises 1.94 .94 .30* .67** .48** .76**
6. Misrepresentation 2.63 1.18 .25* .59** .58** .64** .82**
7. Inappropriate info 2.36 1.37 .20 .63** .54** .53** .63** .60**
8. Overall SINS 2.72 .96 .30* .71** .75** .77** .87** .82** .83**
Numbers in parentheses are coefficient alphas for the whole sample
* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, n = 96 for males and 62 for females

Fishbein 2005). Therefore, we employed the following two position where an accurate understanding of the buyers
studies to explicitly test the hypothesized relationships plan for the property must be discerned during the course
between implicit negotiation beliefs, moral disengagement, of the negotiation.
and actual use of deception. Unbeknownst to the sellers, the buyers firm is a major
hotel corporation with plans to place a luxury hotel on the
property. The buyers agent is also instructed that if word
Study 2 circulates about the corporations true intentions it would
vastly increase the price of the Bullard Houses property, as
Method well as another property the corporation is considering.
Therefore, participants in the role of the buyers agent are
The purpose of study 2 was to extend the framework of explicitly instructed not to reveal the planned use of the
study 1 to a specific negotiation situation in which an property. The case is constructed to generate conflicting
opportunity to rely on deception in bargaining was present. interests between the two parties: the sellers agent must
136 MBA students participated in the experiment as part of attempt to glean how the property will be dealt with, while
an in-class exercise and they were randomly assigned to the buyers agent cannot reveal that information. Although
roles and dyads. The case, called Bullard Houses (Karp both parties are likely to feel some pressure to compromise
et al. 1998), is a widely used ethics simulation involving their respective clients interests in order to achieve a deal,
interactions between a buyer agent and seller agent over a the buyers agent is likely to face greater temptation to
piece of prime real estate. The Bullard Houses case con- deceive than the sellers agent. After all, the buyers agent
sists of two pages of general information read by everyone is instructed not to reveal the information that the seller
and another two pages of role-specific confidential infor- requires in order to make a decision. Furthermore, the
mation for each party. The sellers agents role stipulates buyers agent is under pressure to withhold or misrepresent
that a group of owners wish to sell the property to a party critical information in order to avert impasse and to secure
interested in using the property for residential purposes. a more favorable settlement price for their client, the buyer.
The sellers already have three alternate buyers who have Participants were randomly assigned to roles, received
made attractive offers, and although financial terms are their materials 1 week prior to the exercise, and were given
somewhat important, maintaining the residential nature of 45 min to conduct the negotiation. Only 3 of the 78 dyads used
the property is by far the most important factor in deter- the entire 45 min of negotiation time, indicating that time
mining who to sell to. Thus, the sellers agent is placed in a pressure was unlikely to influence either process or outcomes.

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 175

Measures factor and a two-factor CFA and assessed model fit. Results
show that the one-factor model (v2 (N = 136,
Implicit negotiation beliefs and moral disengagement were df = 27) = 300.20, p \ .001; CFI = .53, IFI = .58,
assessed using the same measures as the previous studies RMSEA = .26) fits the data less well than the hypothe-
and these measures were taken approximately 4 weeks sized two-factor model (v2 (N = 136, df = 26) = 52.44,
prior to the experiment. p \ .001; CFI = .93, IFI = .92, RMSEA = .081), thereby
Deception was assessed after the exercise by having supporting the uniqueness of the deception items.
participants rate the extent to which they used a range of
tactics and strategies. To minimize cues that we were Non-Independence Analysis
interested in deceptive behavior, we asked nine questions,
with five of them having nothing to do with deception (e.g., In addition, the partial correlation between the deception
To what extent did you ask questions about your coun- scores for members of the same dyad was not significant
terparts position?). Four items were designed to capture (r = -.13; p = .24), supporting analysis of the data at the
deception, with sample items being, Stated something that individual level. Descriptive statistics and correlations
was an intentional deception, and Withheld information between the studied variables are reported in Table 2.
that would be relevant to the outcome. These items were
rated on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (a lot) scale. Use of Deception

Examining Independence As Table 2 shows, buyers reported using more deception


than sellers, and this difference was statistically significant
With deception being the dependent variable, we examined (F(1.134) = 43.66, p \ .01). Therefore, we controlled for
whether a participants use of deception might be depen- role differences in our hypothesis tests.
dent on the amount of deception used by their partner. That
is, due to the interactions of the two members of the dyad, Test of Hypotheses
they may share something common specific to their
negotiated exchanges (termed non-independence by Kenny A path model was specified to test hypotheses 13, with role as
et al. 2006). Existence of non-independence is indicated by the control variable. The model specification and the stan-
heightened similarity or dissimilarity of scores from dyads dardized path coefficient are shown in Fig. 1. The fit indices
than scores from participants in other dyads. Kenny et al. indicate the model fits the data reasonably well (v2 = 3.055,
(2006) recommend using partial correlations to examine p = .08; CFI = .97; IFI = .87; RMSEA = .12). As can be
non-independence because it allows one to control for seen in Fig. 1, all the paths are significant at the .05 level.
variation on the independent variables. In the current study, We again used the bootstrapping technique to analyze
non-independence can be tested by the significance of the whether moral disengagement mediated the relationship
partial correlation between a buyers self-reported use of between implicit negotiation beliefs and deception. Using
deception and that of the sellers, controlling for difference deception as the dependent variable, a bootstrap analysis
in implicit beliefs and moral disengagement. A significant revealed that the 95 % bias-corrected confidence interval
correlation would suggest that more deception used by one for the size of the indirect effect (MacKinnon et al. 2002;
member is associated with more deception used by the
corresponding partner. A non-significant correlation would
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliability coeffi-
suggest that the amount of deception used by one member
cients for study 2
is not influenced by the amount of deception used by his or
her partner, and the dependent variable can be analyzed at Variables Mean SD 1 2 3
the individual member level. Buyers
1. Implicit beliefs 3.83 .66 (.82)
2. Moral disengagement 1.95 .55 .38** (.81)
Results: Study 2 3. Use of deception 3.34 .90 .31* .46** (.85)
Sellers
CFA Analysis of the Deception Scale 1. Implicit beliefs 3.81 .67
2. Moral disengagement 1.83 .48 .52**
We hypothesized that of the nine questions about tactics
3. Use of deception 2.36 .83 .22 .19
and strategies, the four items written to capture deception
would load onto one factor, while the other five items Numbers in parentheses are coefficient alphas
would load on a separate factor. Therefore, we ran a one- * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, n = 68 per role

123
176 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

Fig. 1 Path analysis: standardized path coefficient (study 2)

Preacher and Hayes 2004) excluded zero (.258, .040). This negotiation behavior. In study 2, we were able to assess the
analysis indicates that the indirect effect is significant, role of moral disengagement as a mediator of implicit
supporting the hypothesis that implicit beliefs relate to beliefs on actual unethical negotiation behavior. However,
deceptive behavior through moral disengagement. in both studies 1 and 2, the focal variables of our model
As confirmed above, Fig. 1 also shows that negotiator were assessed prior to the negotiation as dispositional
role was a significant predictor of deception. Although the variables. Past research has found that implicit beliefs can
partial correlation for within-dyad deception indicated that be manipulated (Bergen 1992) and, in particular, Kray and
deception levels were independent by role, sellers and Haselhuhn (2007) designed a manipulation to prime entity
buyers nevertheless experienced differing propensities to and incremental theories of negotiation skills. Manipulat-
deceive. In particular, with the sellers being motivated to ing implicit beliefs would enable us to demonstrate that our
learn the buyers intention for the property, buyers were effects are due to the specified variables and not a spurious
likely to be pushed harder to answer tough questions. Thus, relationship between traits or dispositions. Study 3 was
in the face of tough questions, a buyer would appear more designed to address the above concerns and to test our
likely to feel both the temptation to lie and the awareness model using a manipulation of implicit beliefs rather than
that they were considering deceit, increasing the need to chronic attitudes. Specifically, we manipulated implicit
reduce the self-regulatory self-sanctioning that would pre- beliefs to create conditional entity and incremental theory
vent their own use of deception. Therefore, we tested the effects. We also measured moral disengagement as a dis-
mediation model by role. For buyers, the confidence position, prior to the negotiation, and as an effect of con-
interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero dition, after the negotiation, to allow us to control for pre-
(.413, .081), but for sellers it did not (.329, -.160). negotiation propensity to morally disengage on moral dis-
engagement following the experimental manipulation.
Finally, we hypothesized that a mechanism by which
Discussion: Study 2 implicit beliefs relate to moral disengagement is through
the extreme opening offers of entity theorists. Research
The current experiment makes two contributions. First, it shows that entity theorists tend to approach negotiation
confirms that implicit negotiation beliefs and moral dis- more competitively whereas incremental theorists tend to
engagement are both related to the use of deceptive tactics be more cooperative (Kray and Haselhuhn 2007; Tasa et al.
in negotiation (Hypotheses 1(b) and 2(b)). Second, the 2013). For instance, Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) found a
experiment demonstrates that moral disengagement medi- stronger association between entity theory beliefs and a
ates the relationship between implicit negotiation beliefs win-lose framing of negotiation in which negotiators are
and use of deception when the lie is more salient (Hy- considered to be self-interested and in conflict with coop-
pothesis 3(b)). By demonstrating a link between implicit eration nearly impossible. We therefore expected entity
negotiation beliefs and deception through moral disen- theorists to be more competitive or forceful in the negoti-
gagement, we have gained a better understanding of the ation process than incremental theorists and, specifically, to
process by which entity and incremental theorists are likely use more extreme opening offers.
to formulate deceptive strategies at the bargaining table.
H4 Entity theorists, relative to incremental theorists, will
In studies 1 and 2, we found evidence for a mediation
be more likely to open with extreme offers.
model in which moral disengagement facilitates unethical
behavior that is motivated by entity theory beliefs about As reviewed above, entity theorists are motivated by the
negotiation skills. In study 1, we explored chronic attitudes goal of proving their performance capabilities and having
and tested a mediation model in which moral disengage- those capabilities recognized by others. A high or low ball
ment mediated the effect of implicit beliefs on unethical opening offer is a public statement of an aspiration or target

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 177

point, even if the tactic is intended to anchor the other party Negotiation Ability is Changeable and Can Be Devel-
on an unreasonably extreme point in order to force con- oped, while the entity theory article was called, Nego-
cessions from them. Ironically, extreme opening bids can tiation Ability, Like Plaster, Is Pretty Stable Over Time.
create something of a dilemma for entity theorists because Each article cited several fictitious studies that purported to
they are sensitive to perceived failure, and settling too far support the argument that negotiation ability is either
from the extreme opening bid would indicate a tactical changeable or fixed. After reading the article, each par-
letdown. In order to prove capabilities, the entity theorist ticipant completed the implicit negotiation beliefs scale,
should be committed to the opening bid and motivated to which served as a manipulation check, and then responded
settle as close to that point as possible. Therefore, we to a question about their goal for the upcoming negotiation.
expect extreme opening offers, emblematic of the com- Second, we sought to maximize the likelihood that a
petitive motives of entity theorists, to also promote moral sellers agent would ask the buyers agent to elaborate on
disengagement in order to facilitate unethical behavior in their intended use of the property, thereby increasing the
pursuit of performance proofs. In short, we expected that potential for deception. To do so, prior to the negotiation
entity theorists would open with relatively higher and more we asked sellers to identify their plan for ascertaining the
aggressive bids, which would in turn promote moral dis- potential buyers intended use of the property.
engagement and, finally, the use of deception. We explored Finally, each participant completed a post-negotiation
this multiple mediation hypothesis in study 3, while also survey including a description of the negotiation outcome,
manipulating implicit beliefs. the moral disengagement scale, and questions about whe-
ther they used various negotiation tactics.
H5 Extreme opening bids will mediate the relationship
between entity beliefs and moral disengagement, and moral
Measures
disengagement will in turn mediate the effects of implicit
beliefs and extreme opening bids on the use of deception.
Measures of implicit negotiation beliefs, moral disen-
In summary, our third study has three main goals. First, gagement, and deception were identical to those used in the
we aimed to manipulate implicit negotiation beliefs in prior study. Moral disengagement was assessed twice, first
order to better identify and specify the causal mechanism as a dispositional variable in an online self-assessment
underlying our framework. Second, we assessed moral 4 weeks prior to the experiment, and again as a state
disengagement twice, both before (disposition) and after variable in the post-negotiation survey. In the post-nego-
(state) a negotiation simulation, in order to track change in tiation survey, we also asked participants the extent to
ones propensity to morally disengage. And finally, we which they disagreed or agreed with the statement I made
hypothesized and tested the extended path mediation model an opening demand far greater than I hoped to settle for
of competitive behavior; specifically, extreme opening bids (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
as a mediator of the implicit beliefs to moral disengage-
ment relationship.
Results and Discussion

Study 3 Implicit Negotiation Beliefs

Method Consistent with our expectations, participants in the


incremental theory condition (M = 4.06, SD = .32)
76 MBA students participated in the Bullard Houses sim- endorsed more of an incremental viewpoint than those
ulation and were randomly distributed into roles and participants in the entity theory (M = 3.09, SD = .65)
experimental conditions. Movie passes served as an condition (F(1.36) = 32.99, p \ .001). This confirms that
incentive for each participant to provide anonymous data, the experimental manipulation was successful.
which were linked using code numbers. Although this
study also uses the Bullard Houses simulation, there are Use of Deception
several important differences between this study and the
previous one. Similar to the findings of study 2, buyers (M = 4.57,
First, prior to the negotiation, each person in the buyers SD = 1.68) reported using more deception than sellers
agent role read one of two fictitious news articles intended (M = 2.68, SD = 1.24), and this difference was statisti-
to manipulate theories of negotiations. These news articles cally significant (F (1.74) = 30.97, p \ .01). To test
were identical to those used by Kray and Haselhuhn whether deception levels were independent within dyads,
(2007), with the incremental theory article called, we computed the partial correlation between the deception

123
178 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

scores for members of the same dyad while controlling for moral disengagement scores than negotiators in the incre-
levels of implicit negotiation beliefs and moral disen- mental theory condition.
gagement. Once again, this correlation was not significant
(r = .03; p = .74), supporting the conclusion that a Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Extreme Opening
negotiators use of deception was not associated with a Bids
counterparts use of deception.
Next, we tested the relationship between manipulated Hypothesis 4 states that entity theorists are more likely than
implicit negotiation beliefs and deception for the buyers incremental theorists to make extreme opening bids. The
only, because they received the experimental manipulation hypothesis was supported, as the mean scores for entity
and also because their rates of deception were independent theorists (M = 6.16, SD = 1.25) were significantly higher
of the sellers. As expected, entity theorists (M = 5.15, than incremental theorists (M = 4.74, SD = 1.72)
SD = 1.39) reported using more deception than incre- (F(1,36) = 8.40, p \ .01). Extreme opening bids were also
mental theorists (M = 3.99, SD = 1.77), and this differ- significantly correlated with state moral disengagement
ence was statistically significant (F(1.36) = 4.87, p \ .05). (r = .51; p \ .01),
Dispositional moral disengagement was also correlated
with a negotiators use of deception. Across both experi- Implicit Negotiation Beliefs, Extreme Opening Bids,
mental conditions, the correlation between moral disen- Moral Disengagement, and Deception
gagement measured four weeks prior to the experiment and
use of deception was moderately significant (r = .27; Finally, we tested a model predicting the use of deception
p = .09). by agents for the buyer. Having already established that
implicit negotiation beliefs influenced extreme opening
Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral bids and state moral disengagement, and that extreme
Disengagement opening bids also influenced state moral disengagement,
we integrated these relationships into an extended multiple
In this study, we hypothesized that state moral disen- mediation model including a path to our dependent vari-
gagement would differ from dispositional moral disen- able, the use of deception. These models can be tested
gagement, depending on the manipulation of implicit using Hayes (2013) Process macro. The full model is
negotiation beliefs of the negotiator. First, we examined the tested in three steps, with the first step including the
correlations between time 1 and time 2 moral disengage- experimental condition as a predictor of extreme opening
ment by role. For sellers agents, the correlation was stable bids; the second step including the experimental manipu-
over time (r = .86; p \ .01), but for buyers agents, it was lation and extreme opening bids as predictors of state moral
much less so (r = .31; p = .06). In addition, prior to the disengagement; and finally all three as predictors of
negotiation, the mean scores for moral disengagement deception. Table 3 shows the results of each step, with
between those in the buyer role (M = 1.78, SD = .50) and dispositional moral disengagement serving as a control
the seller role (M = 1.81, SD = .55) were not statistically variable and using Hayes recommendation to present
different (F(1.74) = .09, p = .91). However, after the unstandardized coefficients. The full model is illustrated in
negotiation, the mean scores for those in the buyer role Fig. 2, which shows that implicit beliefs influence decep-
(M = 2.12, SD = .61) and the seller role (M = 1.88, tion via a path through, first, extreme opening bids and,
SD = .67) were significantly different (F(1.74) = 3.98, second, state moral disengagement. The confidence inter-
p \ .05). These results suggest that buyers agents were val for the indirect effect of implicit beliefs on deception
more likely to experience change in moral disengagement through extreme opening bids and state moral disengage-
than sellers agents. ment excludes zero (.697, .057).
We used regression to test the hypothesis that the
implicit beliefs manipulation caused the change in moral
disengagement for buyers agents. We entered disposi- General Discussion
tionalmoral disengagement as a control variable and
regressed implicit beliefs on state moral disengagement, The set of studies reported here demonstrates the important
assessed after the negotiation. As expected, a significant role of individual differences that underlie negotiator atti-
effect for implicit beliefs occurred (B = .76, SE = .17, tudes about marginally ethical negotiation behavior and
t = 4.35, p \ .000) as well as an attenuated effect for the their use of deceptive tactics. While our study comple-
control variable, dispositional moral disengagement ments prior research by showing that it is possible to pre-
(B = .30, SE = .18, t = 1.71, p = .09). This shows that dict deceptive behavior, it breaks new ground in several
negotiators in the entity theory condition had higher state ways. First, these studies reveal that peoples behavioral

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 179

Table 3 Results of regression analyses for multiple mediation (study 3)


Variable models Extreme opening bids Moral disengagement (state) Use of deception

Step 1a
Experimental conditionb 1.42*
Moral disengagement (disposition) -.41
c
Step 2
Experimental condition .61**
Moral disengagement (disposition) .37*
Extreme opening bids .14*
Step 3d
Experimental condition .15
Moral disengagement (disposition) .46
Extreme opening bids .15
Moral disengagement (state) 1.33**
Unstandardized beta weights are reported
a
Model summary: R2 = .19, F = 8.40, p = .01
b
Dummy variable: 0 = incremental condition, 1 = entity condition
c
Model summary: R2 = .46, F = 15.14, p = .001
d
Model summary: R2 = .36, F = 6.41, p = .001
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01; n = 38

Fig. 2 Multiple mediation


model predicting negotiator use
of deception (study 3)

style and choice to use deceptive tactics are affected by turn influenced moral disengagement. Importantly, the effect
their underlying beliefs about the malleability of their of implicit beliefs on deception was through this extended
negotiation skills, as well as their capacity to morally mediation path. These findings are consistent with our theo-
disengage from the transgressive nature of their actions. retical argument that although moral disengagement makes it
In addition, although implicit beliefs and moral disen- easier for someone to remove themselves from the conse-
gagement may be dispositional, they may also be influenced quences of morally questionable acts, implicit beliefs provide
by immediate experiences, as we showed in study 3. Studies 1 the impetus for making these choices or actions more likely.
and 2 showed that trait implicit beliefs and propensity to These findings would appear to provide new insight into the
morally disengage are related to the extent to which margin- potential role of implicit beliefs in negotiation. Typically,
ally ethical negotiation tactics are viewed as appropriate (study implicit negotiation beliefs are seen to affect negotiation
1) and indeed are resorted to during the negotiation process outcomes directly (e.g., Kray and Haselhuhn 2007; Tasa et al.
(study 2). More particularly, we found evidence for a model 2013). The present findings illustrate a role for implicit beliefs
whereby a predisposition to morally disengage mediated the in negotiation that is different from, but complementary to,
effect of dispositional entity beliefs on ethical attitudes (study current conceptions.
1) and actual use of deception as a negotiation tactic (study 2). This research also provides new insights about the fac-
We replicated this model in a study that looked at contextual tors shaping a persons decision to use or not use deceptive
effects on implicit beliefs, demonstrating that manipulated tactics while negotiating. Although most individuals care
beliefs promoted aggressively competitive tactics, which in about their moral and ethical behaviors (Aquino and Reed

123
180 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

2002), these self-perceptions are often tested in negotiation competitive behaviors, state moral disengagement, and
situations, where the opportunity to use deception to gain actual use of deception. These findings suggest that
an advantage arises and in which there are widely held although implicit beliefs and moral disengagement may be
domain specific beliefs condoning or at least normalizing stable individual difference variables, they may also be
unethical behavior. Our results are, in general, consistent manipulated and, possibly, could evolve within domains
with ethical decision making scholars (e.g., Trevino 1986; through experience and adaptation to context. We note that
Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008) who argue that moral further research examining the stability, or malleability, of
and ethical choices arise out of a complex interplay among moral disengagement is clearly warranted (e.g., Shu et al.
situational and individual characteristics. While there is a 2011).
great deal of situational variance inherent in negotiations,
such as variance in timing, reward systems, and so on Limitations
(Olekalns et al. 2014), we have also shown that when it
comes to deceptive and competitive behavior, individual We recognize that each of the three studies was conducted
differences matter. This is because, despite the strong in the context of negotiation classes and exercises, which
situation (Mischel 1977) faced by a negotiator, there still may raise concerns about external validity. It is important
remains plenty of room for variance in individual behavior, to note, however, that the participants in this research were
such as how to respond to a counterparts offer, how to all working professionals or graduate business students
substantiate ones own claims, and whether or not to do so with several years of work experience. In each case, par-
truthfully. Thus, based on our results, we concur with ticipants were instructed to enact their negotiation roles
Elfenbein et al. (2008) that the death knell for the effect of exactly as they would if the situation were real. Prior
individual differences on negotiation outcomes may be research also supports the predictive power of moral dis-
premature (p. 1464). engagement using field and cross-cultural samples (e.g.,
This study also strongly supports the argument that Baron et al. 2015; Christian and Ellis 2014). Although
moral disengagement is a precursor to ethically ambiguous implicit negotiation beliefs have been explored primarily
acts. Chronically accessible attitudes, in particular implicit using experimental methods, the social cognitive approach
beliefs and moral disengagement, may prepare an indi- to achievement motivation has proven to be a robust pre-
vidual to engage in unethical behavior. In study 1, we dictor of behavior in a wide range of task domains (Dweck
found that individuals with higher scores on implicit beliefs 2000). Further, implicit beliefs operate in a fast, automatic,
and moral disengagement were much more likely to sup- and subconscious manner consistent with Kahenmans
port negotiation tactics such as attacking an opponents System 1 (Kahneman 2013) and other dual process models
network, making false promises, and misrepresenting of cognition (Chaiken and Trope 1999); decades of
information, and that moral disengagement mediated the experimental and field research across a wide range of
relationship between implicit beliefs and tolerance of domains have provided clear support that these processes
unethical tactics. Further, trait moral disengagement exert a powerful influence on decision making and social
mediated the relationship between dispositional implicit behavior (Sherman et al. 2014). Therefore, we expect our
beliefs and attitudes about unethical negotiation behavior. findings to be consistent in the field with actual workplace
Study 2 replicated these findings with actual unethical negotiations and encourage researchers to examine this
negotiation behavior. Detert et al. (2008) similarly found possibility.
that moral disengagement was an antecedent to unethical
decision making. The fact that two of our samples in study Future Directions
1 were highly trained professionals also suggests that
cognitive and self-regulatory processes occur and stabilize Our results present important implications for research on
over time through a history of behavior and feedback. This negotiator reputations (e.g., Tinsley et al. 2002) and the
potential for a configuration of chronically accessible possibility of an unvirtuous cycle. Recall that in study 3,
attitudes is consistent with the literature on inter-attitudinal manipulated entity beliefs were related to both moral dis-
structure or attitude system (Fabrigar et al. 2005; Judd et al. engagement and deception, and also to extreme opening
1991; Judd and Krosnick 1989; Lavine et al. 1997; Wyer bids. Prior research has similarly found a link between
and Albarraacin 2005). entity beliefs and competitive negotiation behavior (Kray
In study 3, we gained insight into how these predispo- and Haselhuhn 2007; Tasa et al. 2013). Negotiators with
sitions and their relationships may develop through expe- distributive reputations are perceived to have less favorable
rience by manipulating implicit beliefs and measuring intentions towards their counterparts, and in response their
moral disengagement after the negotiation. In this study, partners are less likely to divulge information that might
we found that manipulated entity beliefs predicted help create value (Tinsley et al. 2002). Negotiators who

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 181

practice deceit also run the risk of being found out, vio- because of potential material and legal consequences, but
lating trust and gaining a reputation for unethical tactics. also because of reputational effects when an employees
On the one hand, deceitful negotiators may be provided behavior reflects on his or her manager, work group, or
with feedback that they can use to positively correct their organization. The fundamental primary impetus in our
behavior in attempts to repair their reputation and regain model is an individuals implicit beliefs about his or her
trust. However, it is also possible that deceitful negotiators negotiation skills. We have argued that the belief that
will persist in their tactics and, once a reputation of negotiation skills are fixed is associated with a limited view
untrustworthiness is established, future negotiation partners of opportunities, less creativity in the discovery or creation
will respond in perceived kind, greeting offers with sus- of opportunity, greater sensitivity to potential failure, and
picion and withholding or misrepresenting information in higher frustration in the face of looming impasse. It is
return. The behavior of negotiation partners may be inter- possible that specialized negotiation training for entity
preted in such a way as to support preconceived suspicions, theorists will help them recognize and overcome their own
and then seized upon to legitimize unethical tactics. Recall, attitudinal and perceptual traps, develop techniques to
for instance, that Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) found that discover and create value in negotiations, manage the
entity beliefs predicted normative attitudes about negotia- threat of failure or impasse, and avoid resorting to uneth-
tion tactics, most notably that most people lie in order to ical behavior in negotiation.
succeed in negotiation. We speculate that, without even
Compliance with Ethical Standards
knowing it is happening, a person with entity beliefs about
negotiation, who thus finds it easier to morally disengage Conflict of interest The data collection procedures reported in this
and behave unethically, could find themselves losing out on manuscript were approved by the York University Ethics Review
opportunities to create value when they negotiate. Committee. Informed consent was obtained by all human subjects, in
For negotiators with an entity theory implicit belief, this accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Decla-
ration of Helsinki.
could provide confirming evidence of the obstacles to
negotiation outcomes that frustrate entity theorists and
motivate them to adopt potentially unethical tactics to
avoid impasse. Further research should explore this issue of
References
reputation effects on negotiation processes. Also, and as Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1972). Attitudes and normative beliefs as
mentioned above in the discussion of moral disengagement factors influencing behavioral intentions. Journal of Personality
as a chronically accessible attitude, future research should and Social Psychology, 21, 19.
also examine the role of information processing on framing Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The influence of attitudes on
behavior. In A. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.),
of opportunity and threat in the negotiation. Implicit beliefs The handbook of attitudes (pp. 173221). Mahwah, NJ:
and the tendency to morally disengage may influence the Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
salience, selection, and interpretation of information in Anderman, E. M., & Danner, F. (2008). Achievement goals and
such a way as to promote the likelihood of engaging in academic cheating. International Review of Social Psychology,
21, 155180.
unethical behavior. Aquino, K., & Reed, A, I. I. (2002). The self-importance of moral
Banduras theory of moral disengagement (1990, 1999, identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
2002) is based on the idea that moral self-regulatory failure 14231440.
brings with it self-condemnation. This threat of condem- Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A
social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc.
nation is reduced through disengagement processes of Bandura, A. (1990). Selective activation and disengagement of moral
moral justification, euphemistic labeling, advantageous control. Journal of Social Issues, 46, 2746.
comparisons, displacement and diffusion of responsibility, Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetuation of
distortion of consequences, dehumanization, and blaming inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3,
193209.
the victim. Moral self-condemnation is likely to be asso- Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of
ciated with an individuals moral identity (Aquino and moral agency. Journal of Moral Education, 31(2), 101119.
Reed 2002), in that the more an individual values his or her Baron, R. A., Zhao, H., & Miao, Q. (2015). Personal motives, moral
moral identity, the greater the threat of self-condemnation disengagement, and unethical decisions by entrepreneurs: Cog-
nitive mechanisms on the slippery slope. Journal of Business
should he or she behave unethically. This would be an Ethics, 128, 107118.
interesting possibility to explore in future research. Bergen, R. (1992). Beliefs about intelligence and achievement-related
behaviors. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Managerial Implications Illinois atUrbanaChampaign.
Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., & Dukerich, J. M. (2001). Collective
corruption in the corporate world: Toward a process model. In
Finally, managers and organizations should be concerned M. E. Turner (Ed.), Groups at work: theory and research (pp.
about the ethicality of their agents and employees, not just 477499). Marwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

123
182 K. Tasa, C. M. Bell

Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual-process theories in Judd, C. M., Drake, R. S., Downing, J. W., & Krosnick, J. A. (1991).
social psychology. New York: Guilford Press. Some dynamic properties of attitude structures: Context-induced
Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Tong, J. Y., & Fu, J. H. (1997). Implicit response facilitation and polarization. Journal of Personality and
theories and conceptions of morality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 193202.
Social Psychology, 73, 923940. Judd, C. M., & Krosnick, J. A. (1989). The structural basis of
Christian, J. S., & Ellis, A. P. J. (2014). The crucial role of turnover consistency among political attitudes: Effects of political exper-
intentions in transforming moral disengagement into deviant tise and attitude importance. In A. R. Pratkanis, S. J. Breckler, &
behavior at work. Journal of Business Ethics, 119, 193208. A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function (pp.
Corrion, K., DArripe-Longueville, F., Chalabaev, A., Schiano- 99128). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lomoriello, S., Roussel, P., & Cury, F. (2010). Effect of implicit Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking fast and thinking slow. New York:
theories on judgment of cheating acceptability in physical Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
education: The mediating role of achievement goals. Journal of Karp, R., Gold, D., & Tan, M. (1998). Bullard Houses. In J. M. Brett
Sports Sciences, 28, 909919. (Ed.), Teaching materials for negotiation and decision making,
Crawshaw, J. R., Bell, C. M., Cropanzano, R., & Nadisic, T. (2013). 2008. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolu-
Organisational justice: New insights from behavioural ethics. tion Research Center.
Human Relations, 66(7), 120. Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D., & Cook, W. L. (2006). Dyadic data
Darnon, C., Muller, D., Schrager, S. M., Pannuzzo, N., & Butera, F. analysis. New York: Guilford Press.
(2006). Mastery and performance goals predict epistemic and Kern, M. C., & Chugh, D. (2009). Bounded ethicality the perils of
relational conflict regulation. Journal of Educational Psychol- loss framing. PsychologicalScience, 20, 378384.
ogy, 98, 766776. Kray, L. J., & Haselhuhn, M. P. (2007). Implicit negotiation beliefs
De Cremer, D., van Dick, R., Tenbrunsel, A., Pillutla, M., & and performance: Experimental and longitudinal evidence.
Murnighan, J. K. (2011). Understanding ethical behavior and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(1), 4964.
decision making in management: A behavioural business ethics Kray, L. J., & Haselhuhn, M. P. (2012). Male pragmatism in
approach. British Journal of Management, 22, S1S4. negotiators ethical reasoning. Journal of Experimental Social
Detert, J. R., Trevino, L. K., & Sweitzer, V. L. (2008). Moral Psychology, 48, 11241131.
disengagement in ethical decision making: A study of ante- Lavine, H., Thomsen, C. J., & Gonzales, M. H. (1997). The
cedents and outcomes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, development of inter-attitudinal consistency: The shared-conse-
374391. quences model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
Dweck, C. S. (2000). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, 72, 735749.
personality, and development. New York: Psychology Press. Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. J. (1998). Ethical and unethical
Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to bargaining tactics: An empirical study. Journal of Business
motivation and personality. Psychological Review, 95, 256273. Ethics, 17(6), 665682.
Ekman, P. (2001). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., &
politics, and marriage. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Sheets, V. (2002). A comparison of methods to test mediation
Inc. and other intervening variable effects. Psychological Methods, 7,
Elfenbein, H. A., Curhan, J. R., Eisenkraft, N., Shirako, A., & 83.
Baccaro, L. (2008). Are some negotiators better than others? Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest
Individual differences in bargaining outcomes. Journal of people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Journal of
Research in Personality, 42, 14631475. Marketing Research, 45, 633644.
Elliott, E. S., & Dweck, C. S. (1988). Goals: An approach to Mischel, W. (1977). The interaction of person and situation. In D.
motivation and achievement. Journal of Personality and Social Magnusson & N. S. Endler (Eds.), Personality at the crossroads:
Psychology, 54, 512. Current issues in interactional psychology (pp. 333352).
Fabrigar, L. R., MacDonald, T. K., & Wegener, D. T. (2005). The Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Structure of attitudes. In A. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. Moore, C., Detert, J. R., Trevino, L. K., Baker, V. L., & Mayer, D. M.
P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 79124). (2012). Why employees do bad things: Moral disengagement
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. and unethical organizational behavior. Personnel Psychology,
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation 65, 148.
in unethical behavior: The effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Olekalns, M., Horan, C. J., & Smith, P. L. (2014a). Maybe its right,
Psychological Science, 20, 393398. maybe its wrong: Structural and social determinants of decep-
Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2009). The abundance effect: Unethical tion in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 122(1), 89102.
behavior in the presence of wealth. Organizational Behavior and Olekalns, M., Kulik, C. T., & Chew, L. (2014b). Sweet little lies:
Human Decision Processes, 109, 142155. Social context and the use of deception in negotiation. Journal of
Grant, H., & Dweck, C. S. (2003). Clarifying achievement goals and Business Ethics, 120(1), 1326.
their impact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2009). Mutually dependent: Power,
541553. trust, affect and the use of deception in negotiation. Journal of
Harackiewicz, J. M., Manderlink, G., & Sansone, C. (1984). Business Ethics, 85, 347365.
Rewarding pinball wizardry: Effects of evaluation and cue value Perry, A. R., Kane, K. M., Bernesser, K. J., & Spicker, P. T. (1990).
on intrinsic interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- Type a behavior, competitive achievement-striving, and cheating
ogy, 47, 287300. among college students. Psychological Reports, 66, 459465.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation and Poortvliet, P. M., Janssen, O., Van Yperen, N. W., & Van de Vliert, E.
conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. (2007). Achievement goals and interpersonal behavior: How
New York: Guilford Press. mastery and performance goals shape information exchange.
Hong, Y. Y., Chiu, C. Y., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D. M. S., & Wan, W. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 14351447.
(1999). Implicit theories, attributions, and coping: A meaning Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for
system approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior
77, 588599. Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 717731.

123
Effects of Implicit Negotiation Beliefs and Moral Disengagement on Negotiator Attitudes and 183

Robinson, R. J., Lewicki, R. J., & Donahue, E. M. (2000). Extending Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems,
and testing a five factor model of ethical and unethical decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quar-
bargaining tactics: Introducing the SINS scale. Journal of terly, 44, 684707.
Organizational Behavior, 21, 649664. Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (2004). Ethical fading: The role
Ryan, A. M., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). Should I ask for help? The of self-deception in unethical behavior. Social Justice Research,
role of motivation and attitudes in adolescents help seeking in 17, 223236.
math class. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 329341. Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Smith-Crowe, K. (2008). Ethical decision
Schweitzer, M., DeChurch, L. A., & Gibson, D. E. (2005). Conflict making: Where weve been and where were going. The
frames and the use of deception: Are competitive negotiators less Academy of Management Annals, 2, 545607.
ethical? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35, 21232149. Tinsley, C. H., OConnor, K. M., & Sullivan, B. A. (2002). Tough
Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (2014). Dual- guys finish last: The perils of a distributive reputation. Organi-
process theories of the social mind. New York: Guilford Press. zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88, 621642.
Shu, L. L., Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011). Dishonest deed, clear Trevino, L. K. (1986). Ethical decision making in organizations: A
conscience: When cheating leads to moral disengagement and person-situation interactionist model. Academy of Management
motivated forgetting. Personality and Social Psychology Bul- Review, 11, 601617.
letin, 37, 330349. Wong, E. M., Haselhuhn, M. P., & Kray, L. J. (2012). Improving the
Smith, C. P., Ryan, E. R., & Diggins, D. R. (1972). Moral decision future by considering the past: The impact of upward counter-
making: Cheating on examinations. Journal of Personality, 40, factual reflection and implicit beliefs on negotiation perfor-
640660. mance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48,
Tasa, K., Celani, A., & Bell, C. M. (2013). Goals in negotiation 403406.
revisited: The impact of goal setting and implicit negotiation Wyer, R. S., & Albarraacin, D. (2005). Belief formation, organization
beliefs. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 6, and change: Cognitive and motivational influences. In A.
102120. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The Handbook
Tenbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of of Attitudes (pp. 273322). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of incentives Associates.
and temptation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 330339.

123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

You might also like