ADilemmaforanyTheoryofKnowledge

TrentonMerricks

AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly(1995):279284

Eitherpresentknowledgedependsonthingsthathavenotyethappenedoronecan
haveverylittleknowledgeaboutthefuture.Fortwoworlds(WandW*)thatshare
thesameeventsuptoatimet,thesamebeliefattcanbeaccidentallytrueinW*and
thereforenotknown,butbothtrueandknowninW,dependingonwhathappensin
thefutureinWandW*.Iftruthvaluesaredeniedforfuturecontingentpropositions,
thenthisthreatenstheabilitytohaveknowledgeaboutthefuture.Otherwise,
knowledgeattdependsonwhathappensaftert,withsignificantimplicationsfor
thetheoryofknowledge.

Twoworlds"shareaninitialsegment"upto,andincluding,atimetonlyifthesame
individualsexist(atthesametimes),andthesameeventsoccurinthesameways
(atthesametimes),ineachworlduptoandincludingtimet.Worldsthatsharean
initialsegmentuptotimetcandifferinsomewaysatorbeforet,buttheycandiffer
onlywithrespectto"softfacts",not"hardfacts".1Forinstance,twoworldscould
shareaninitialsegmentuptoandincludingtimet,butdiffer,att,inthatoneand
nottheotherissuchthatitwillrainonehouraftert.Thoseworldscouldnot,
however,differwithrespecttowhetheritisrainingat(orbefore)t.Noneofthis,of
course,comesanywherenearahelpfuldefinitionof"initialsegment"or"hardfact"
or"softfact".Fortunately,nothingmorethananintuitivegraspofthesenotionsis
necessarytounderstandtheargumentsthatfollow.

Considerthefollowingprinciple:

(1)Iftwoworldsshareaninitialsegmentupto,andincludingtimet,andifattS
trulybelievesthatpinbothworlds,thenattSknowsthatpinoneworldifandonly
ifSknowsthatpintheother.2

(1)assertsthatifSknowsthatpinsomeworld,thenSknowsthatpineveryother
worldthatisjustlikethatworldupto,andincluding,thetimeatwhichStruly
believesthatp.Toputthesamepointadifferentway,(1)statesthatifS(believesp
but)failstoknowthatpinsomeworldinwhichpistrue,theninallpossibleworlds
exactlylikethatworldupto,andincluding,thetimeofS'strulybelievingthatp,S
failstoknowthatp.Inorderfor(1)toavoidtriviality,wecannotassumethatthe
worldsaresimilarattimetwithrespecttoS'sknowingthatp.

SupposethatIbelievetherewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayoutsideofmyoffice
inonesecond(Idobelievethis;indeed,Ifeelcertainofit).Letusaddthatthisbelief
istrue.Further,supposethatIamimpressedbythemaximthatoneoughtalwaysto
increasethenumberofone'struebeliefs.Ithereforeconsider,andbelieve,the
followingdisjunction:

(P)TherewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayinonesecondorBrownisinBarcelona.

LetusalsoaddthatalthoughIdonotknowthatBrownisinBarcelona(Ihaveno
ideaastowhereBrownmightbe),BrownisinBarcelona.

Itisbroadlylogicallypossible,givenallthathasoccurredintheworldsofar,thata
dinosaurappearinthehallwayinonesecond.Inotherwords,thereisapossible
worldW*whichsharesaninitialsegmentwiththisworld(W)upto,andincluding,
thepresenttime(t),butinwhichadinosaurmiraculouslyappearsinthehallwayin
onesecond.InW*,asinW,Ibelievethatp.AddthatinbothWandW*Brownis(at
t)inBarcelona,sothatpistrueinbothworlds.ButinW*mybeliefthatpis
accidentallytrue.ItisonlybecauseBrownhappens(unbeknownsttome)tobein
Barcelonathatpistrue.SinceIcannotknowwhatisonlyaccidentallytrue,Idonot
knowthatpinW*.

Nothinghereturnsoncontroversialclaimsaboutthenatureofaccidentaltruth.For
ourpurposes,S'sbeliefthatpisaccidentallytruejustincasepisbothtrueand
obviouslynotknownbyS.ThetruthofmybeliefthatpinW*isagoodexampleof
accidentaltruth.AlloftheexamplesIrelyonbelowareequallyunproblematic.

SoIdonotknowthatpinW*.ButitseemsobviousthatIknowthatnodinosaurwill
appearinthehallwayoutsideofmyofficeinonesecond;thatis,inWthisistrue,
anditseemsobviousthatIknowit.Itseems,therefore,thatIalsoknowthatpinW.
ExhypothesiWandW*shareaninitialsegmentuptoandincludingtimet;3
furthermore,inbothWandW*,att,Itrulybelievethatp.ButitseemsthatinWI
knowthatp,andinW*Idonot.(1),soitseems,isfalse.Thisisthefirsthornofthe
dilemma.

Supposethat(1)isfalse.Ifso,then(foratleastsomepropositions)ifIknowthatp
attimetinsomepossibleworld,thenthereisanotherpossibleworldexactlylike
thatoneineverywayuptotinwhichItrulybelieve,butdonotknow,thatp.Soit
couldbethatInowknowthatpalthoughinsomeotherpossibleworld,exactlylike
thisoneineverywayuptothepresenttime,Itrulybelievethatp,butdonotknow
thatp.If(1)isfalse,thenwhetheratruebeliefisknowledgeornotisnotwhollya
functionofwhathasoccurreduptoandincludingthetimeofbelief.4

Wealreadyknowthatwhetherornotabeliefistruecoulddependonwhathasyet
tohappen;fromthisitfollowsthatwhetherornotsomeofmycurrentbeliefsare
knowledgecouldturnonfuturehappenings;so,onemightwonder,whatnew
conclusionissupposedtofollowfromarejectionof(1)?Theansweristhatrejecting
(1)hasimportantconsequencesforourtheorizingaboutknowledge,consequences
thatdonotfollowfromthefactthatmybelief'struthcoulddependonfuture
occurrences.Forinstance,thedenialof(1)appearstobeinconsistentwithany
accountofwhatmakestruebeliefknowledgethatbothdependsexclusivelyon
justificationandalsounderstandsjustificationintermsofevidenceorreasonsfor
belief.Couldoneseriouslyclaimthatwhethermyevidenceorreasonsforbeliefare
anygood(whethermybeliefis,inthissense,justified)couldturnonwhathasyetto
happen?Afterall,ifInowhavegoodreasonsformybeliefthatp,thensomeonein
exactlythesameepistemicpositionasIam,nowconfrontedwithallthesame
evidence,nowhavingallthesamebeliefs,musthaveequallygoodreasonfor
believingthatp;whathappensinthefutureisirrelevant.(Notethatsuchtheoriesof
knowledgearenotsimilarlychallengedbythemerefactthatwhethermybeliefthat
pistruecoulddependonwhathasyettohappen.)

Likewise,rejecting(1)presentsaproblemforonewhothinksofknowledgeas
justifiedtruebelief,andunderstandsjustificationintermsofdeontology.Howcould
whathasyettohappendeterminewhetherornotIamnowdoingmyepistemic
dutywithrespecttobelievingthatp?Thiswouldmakethedemandsofdeontic
justificationdoublyburdensome:notonlyamIrequiredtoengageinacertainsort
ofepistemicbehavior;butwhethermybehaviorisnowappropriate,andthus
whetherInowproperlyavoidcensure,dependsonwhathasyettohappen!

Similarproblemsariseforonewhoclaimsthatwhatmakestruebeliefknowledgeis
coherence,butinacceptingthedenialof(1)addsthatcoherencemustembracenot
onlythebeliefsInowhave(andhavehad),butthebeliefsIwillhaveinthefutureas
well.Whatexactlycoherenceamountstowill,ofcourse,varyfromaccountto
account.Butitissurprisingthatacoherentistofanystripewouldclaimthat,
althoughmybeliefsarenow,andalwayshavebeen,maximallycoherent,mycurrent
truebeliefthatpmightfailtobeknowledge.Certainlytheinternalistappealof
coherencetheoriesofknowledgedisappearsoncecoherencebecomesafunctionof,
amongotherthings,beliefsIdonotyethave.

Thislastremarksuggeststhatproblemsraisedbyrejecting(1)areparticularly
acuteforanyonewithinternalistinclinations.5Rejecting(1)entailsthatwhatmakes
mytruebeliefsknowledgeisafunctionofwhathasnotyetoccurred,andnomatter
whichfactorsareincludedinwhatisinternal,presumablywhathasnotyet
occurredmustbeexcluded.

Ofcourse,itisalreadywellestablishedthatthejustifiedtruebeliefanalysisof
knowledgeisinadequate.Anditispossible,onemightadd,thatthefabled"fourth
condition"thatismeanttohandletheGettierproblemsthatplaguethisanalysis,
andispresumablyexternalistinnature,mightalsohandletheproblemsraisedbya
denialof(1).So,forinstance,maybeSknowsthatpifandonlyifS'sbeliefthatpis
justified(inamanneramenabletointernalists)andsomefurtherconditionis
satisfied;andmaybethesatisfactionofthatfurtherconditiontakescareof,among
otherthings,justthesortofproblemswithfuturebeliefsthathavebeenourfocus.
Soitmightbethatrejecting(1)isconsistentwithaccountsofknowledgeinwhich
justificationplaysanimportantrole,evenifjustificationisgivenaninternalist
analysis.

Whatthen,onemightask,followsfromthefalsityof(1)otherthanthewidely
acceptedclaimthatafourthcondition,presumablyexternalistinnature,mustbe
addedtoaninternalist'saccountofknowledge?Theansweristhatrejecting(1)
showsusthatamongalltheotherelementsthatpresumablymustgointothisfourth
conditionarefactsaboutwhathasnotyetoccurred.Thesignificanceofthisis
highlightedbynotingthatnoteveryparadigmaticallyexternalfactorwillbea
candidateforthisrole.Sincepresumablycausationrunsfromthepasttothefuture,
itseemswecannotavoidtheproblemsthatrejecting(1)raisesforinternalist
accountsbyrelyingonthefactthatone'sbeliefiscausedintherightmanner.So
evenifonealreadyacceptsanexternalist"fourthcondition"tohandleGettier
problems,rejecting(1)stillhasasurprisingresult:thatfourthconditionmust
somehowmakeroomforfutureevents,andmightnotevenbesatisfiedby
somethingasrobustlyexternalistaspropercauseofbelief(butseethediscussionof
causationbelow).

Notethatifthisisright,thenrejecting(1)shouldtroublenotonlytheinternalist,
butmanyexternalistsaswell.Forexample,considerthethesisthatSknowsthatpif
andonlyifpistrueandS'sbeliefthatpisformedbyareliablebeliefforming
mechanism.This,combinedwiththedenialof(1),leadstothefurtherclaimthat
whetherornotthemechanismthatformsone'sbeliefisnowreliablecanturnon
whathasyettohappen.Ifso,thenwhetherornotInowreliablyformbeliefsabout,
forinstance,wheredinosaurswillorwillnotbecoulddependonwhetherdinosaurs
startpoppingintoexistenceinthefuture.Iftheydo,thenperhapstherelevantbelief
formingmechanismsarenownotreliable(orarenotreliablewhendirectedatthe
future).If,ontheotherhand,nosuchmiraclesoccur,thenperhapsthemechanisms
arenowreliable.

Thisisnotawhollyimplausibleemendationtoreliabilism,butneitherisittrivial.If
oneisforcedtoconstruereliabilityintermsthatsomehowtakefutureeventsinto
consideration,thenreliabilityofamechanismcannotpossiblybeunderstoodwholly
intermsofitspast"trackrecord".So,forinstance,thefactthataparticular
mechanismhasformedallandonlytruebeliefsonathousandseparateoccasions
cannotentailthatthemechanismisreliable;whetherandhowthatmechanismwill
performinthefuture,orwouldperformregardingfuturedirectedbeliefs,mustalso
befactoredin.Regardlessofone'sviewofthemeritsof"trackrecord"accountsof
reliability,itwouldberathersurprisingiftheywereruledout,notbyreflectionon
reliabilityassuchorevenonthedetailsofatheorythatmakesheavyuseof
reliability,butratherbythefactthat,insomepossibleworld,Ifalselybelievethata
dinosaurwillnotappearinthehallwayanddisjointhiswith"Brownisin
Barcelona".

Asimilarpointappliestoatheoryofknowledgeintermsofcausationgenerally.
Supposeonethinksthatknowledgeistruebeliefcausedinsomeparticularway.
Combiningatheoryofthissortwitharejectionof(1)entailsthatwhethermybelief
wascausedinacertainwaycandependonwhathasyettohappen.Onewhothinks,
forinstance,ofcausationintermsofpast,present,andfutureregularitieswillhave
noobjectiontothisconclusion.Everyone,however,shouldbesurprisedifsucha
substantiveclaimaboutthenatureofcausationthat,roughly,whichcausallaws
arenowinplaydepends(inpart)onwhathasyettohappenshouldfollownot
fromconsiderationsaboutcausationassuch,butfromfactsaboutbeliefsIpossibly
haveaboutdinosaursorBrown'slocation.Ofcourse,accommodatingarejectionof
(1)bymakingthecurrentcausallawsdepend(inpart)onthefutureisabsolutely
unacceptabletoonewhounderstandsknowledgeintermsoftruebelief
appropriatelycaused,butthinksthatwhichcausallawscurrentlyreignisbroadly
logicallyindependentofwhathasyettooccur.Thiswouldinclude,forinstance,
anyonewhoholdsthatthereissomepossibleworld(howeverdistant)inwhichLis
atonetimealawofnature,butthat,bysomemiracle,Lisnotalawatsomelater
time.

Therearemanywaysinwhichexternalfactors,factorstowhichaknowercannot
have"directaccess",havebeeninvokedinaccountsofknowledge.Epistemologies
that,forinstance,stressthereliable,orgenerallycausal,originofbeliefimplythat
thepasthasaroleinmakingtruebeliefknowledge.Othershavearguedthatfacts
aboutone'senvironmentbarnfacadesdowntheroad,sheepoverthenexthill,
newspaperreportsonehasnotreadplayarole.Thereare,ofcourse,other
examplesthatwecouldadd.Andif(1)isfalse,then,inadditiontothepast,the
environment,andotherfamiliarexternalconditions,thereisyetanotherfactorto
whichwelackdirectaccessthatmustbeincludedinourtheoryofwhatmakestrue
beliefknowledge:thecourseofthefuture.Thisisasignificantconsequence,
especiallywhenwerealizethattheclaimisnotthatoneoranotherparticular
theoryofwhatmakestruebeliefknowledgeisforcedintoembracinganexternalism
thatincludes,atleast,thefuture,butthatalltheoriesregardlessofthepresumed
understandingsofcausation,regardlessofwhethertheyareotherwisegenerally
internalistorexternalistmustdoso.

Sothefirsthornofthedilemmaisthis:(1)isfalse;therefore,whetherornotS
knowsthatpattisafunctionof,inadditiontop'struth,whathappensintheworld
aftert.Ifweembracethishornofthedilemma,thenasignificantnewconstraintis
placedonhowweapproachorunderstandananalysisofwhatmakestruebelief
knowledge.

II

Canweavoidthefirsthornofthedilemma?Only,obviously,byembracingthe
second;thatis,onlybyholdingthat(1)istrue.This,ofcourse,commitsustothe
claimthatanypurportedcounterexampleto(1)isnotarealcounterexample.How
mightwediscreditthecounterexampleto(1)proposedabove?Recallthatthe
examplemadeuseofthefollowingclaims:twoworlds,WandW*,shareaninitial
segmentupto,andincluding,timet;inW,theactualworld,Ibelievethatp(that
therewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayinonesecondorBrownisinBarcelona);in
W,justaswewouldexpect,nodinosaurappearsinthehallwayonesecondaftert;
inW*pistrue,butonlybecauseBrownhappens,unbeknownsttome,tobein
Barcelona.Thepropositioninquestionis:(1)Iftwoworldsshareaninitialsegment
upto,andincludingtimet,andifattStrulybelievesthatpinbothworlds,thenatt
SknowsthatpinoneworldifandonlyifSknowsthatpintheother.Itisobvious
thatinW*IdonotknowthatP.Sotheonlywaytodenythatwehaveagenuine
counterexampleto(1)istoinsistthat,since(1)istrue,IdonotknowthatpinW
(theactualworld).Thismightnotseemsoimplausible:onemightholdthatIdo
knowthattherewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayinonesecond;butsince,one
mightargue,knowledgeisnotclosedunderdisjunctionintroduction,Ifailtoknow
(thedisjunctive)p.

Butnotallpurportedcounterexamplesto(1)relyondisjunctionintroduction.There
isagenuinecounterexampleto(1),andthus(1)isfalse,ifthereisapossibleworld
whereboth:Sknowsthatpatt;andallthathashappenedupto,andat,tdoesnot
entailthat,att,S'sbeliefthatpisnotaccidentallytrue.Ifthereissuchapossible
world,thenthereisanotherworldthatsharesaninitialsegmentwiththefirstupto,
andincluding,timet,butinwhich,att,S'sbeliefthatpistruebutaccidentallyso
(andthereforenotknown).Butthis,ofcourse,isjustwhat(1)assertsisnot
possible.Therefore,anyonewhowishestodefend(1)mustassertthat,necessarily,
ifSknowsthatpatt,thenallthathashappenedupto,andincluding,tentailsthat,
att,S'sbeliefthatpisnotaccidentallytrue.Thisisequivalenttotheclaimthatifitis
possible,givenallthathasoccurreduptoandincludingtimet,thatattS'sbelief
thatpbeaccidentallytrue,then,att,Sdoesnotknowthatp.Inotherwords:(2)If
twoworldsshareaninitialsegmentupto,andincluding,timet,andifinoneofthe
worlds,att,S'sbeliefthatpisaccidentallytrue,then,att,Sdoesnotknowthatpin
eitherworld.So(1)entails(2).But(2)dramaticallycurtailstheextentofour
knowledgeofthefuture.SupposeInowbelievetherewillbenodinosaurinthe
hallwayinonesecond.Thereisanotherpossibleworldthatsharesaninitial
segment(uptoandincludingthepresenttime)withthisworld,butinwhichmy
beliefisaccidentallytrue.Foritispossiblethatbysomemiracleadinosaurappears
intheroomattheendofthehallwayinhalfasecond,andthenhesitatesafull
secondbeforewalkingintothehallway.Inthatpossibleworldmybeliefthatthere
willbenodinosaurinthehallwayinonesecondistrue,butitstruthisahappy
coincidence.Inthatworld,Idonotknowthattherewillbenodinosaurinthe
hallwayinonesecond.Therefore,since(1)entails(2),thedefenderof(1)must
concludethatinthisworldIdonotknowthattherewillbenodinosaurinthe
hallwayinonesecond.

Furtherexamplesofwhat(2)entailsthatIcannotknow:thatmywifewillnotbe
abductedbyaliensthisafternoon(itisbroadlylogicallypossiblethatalienscome
intoexistencethisafternoonandattempttheabduction,but,againstallodds,they
arethwarted);thatmybodywillbewithintheMilkyWayGalaxyatlunchtime(itis
possiblethatsomehowmybodyissoonhurtledintospace,andatlunchtimeisjust
onthefringesofthegalaxy,headingout);thatIwillnotbeabraininavatby
midnight(itispossiblethatmybrainbeplacedinavatat11:50thisevening,and
thevatbreakat11:55);orthatmybestfriendwillnotmurdermetonightinmy
sleep(itispossiblethatshetry,butthatshesucceedinonlywoundingme).Further,
Iwillobviouslyfailtoknowanypropositionthatissuchthatknowingitentailsthat
Iknowoneofthepropositionsruledoutby(2);forinstance,ifitwouldtakemea
secondtosteptothedoorandlookintothehallway,then,presumably,Idon'tknow
thatifIweretolookinthehallway,Iwouldn'tseeadinosaurthere.

Furthermore,if(1)(andtherefore(2))istrue,inductioncannotbeasourceof
knowledge.Amongthethingswecannotknowaboutthefutureisthatitwillbelike
thepastincertainimportantways.Presumablyitispossiblethatthefuturewillbe
likethepastintheseways,butbecauseofthewhimofanevildemon(whocould
possiblycomeintoexistenceatanytimeaftertheinductivebeliefisformed).Insuch
acasewecouldhardlybesaidtoknowthatthefuturewillthusresemblethepast.6

Inarguingthat(1)leadsto(2)(andinmydefenseofthefirsthornofthedilemma),I
havepresupposedthatfuturecontingentpropositionspropositionsliketherewill
benodinosaurinthehallwayhavetruthvalues.Onemightdenythis.However,the
claimthatallfuturecontingentslacktruthvaluesentailsthatnoneofthemistrue,
andtherefore,sinceabeliefisknownonlyifitistrue,entailsthatnoneofthemis
known.Todenythatfuturecontingentshavetruthvaluesistoembracethesecond
hornofthedilemma;wecannotknowmanythingsaboutthefuturethatwe
intuitivelythinkwedoknow.7

Inconclusion,anytheoryofknowledgefacesthefollowingdilemma:either(1)is
false,inwhichcasewhetherornotwhatonetrulybelievesnowisknowledgeisa
functionof,amongotherthings,whathasyettohappen;or(1)istrue,inwhichcase
onecanhavesurprisinglylittleknowledgeofthefuture.8

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chisholm,Roderick(1975),TheProblemoftheCriterion(Milwaukee:Marquette
UniversityPress).

Dretske,Fred(1971),"ConclusiveReasons,"AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,vol.
491971):122.

Nozick,Robert(1981),PhilosophicalExplanations(Oxford:ClarendonPress).

NOTES

(1.)IfGodexists,andifGod'sbeliefsaboutthefutureare"hardfacts",thenweneed
toexcludeGod'sfuturedirectedbeliefs(andintentions)fromwhatissharedinan
initialsegment.

(2.)(1)is,ofcourse,implicitlyuniversallyquantified:itismeanttoholdforany
world,person,timeandbelief.Becausethetruthofapropositionaboutthefutureis
asoftfactindeed,aparadigmofasoftfactS'strulybelievingthatpmustbeadded
to,andisnotincludedin,theclaimthatthetwoworldsshareaninitialsegmentup
to,andincluding,timet.AlthoughS'sbelievingthatpattisahardfact,andthus
sharedbytheworldsinvirtueofsharinganinitialsegmentwhichincludest,the
truthofp,ifpisaboutwhatwillhappenaftert,isnot.

(3.)Theydiffer,ofcourse,inthatbeforetinWIhavethetruebeliefthattherewill
benodinosaurinthehallway,andinW*thisbeliefisfalse.Butmybeliefaboutthe
dinosaurisabeliefaboutwhattheworldwillbelikeaftertitstruth,therefore,isa
paradigmaticsoftfactandnotincludedinthesharedinitialsegmentupto,and
including,t(mybelievingthattherewillbenodinosaurisahardfactandincluded
inthesharedsegment).

(4.)Merelycounterfactualfactsaboutaworldbefore,orat,timetwillnot
necessarilybeincludedinitsinitialsegmentupto,andincluding,timet.Imagine
thatSbelievesattsomefuturedirectedpropositionp(suchas:itwillrain
tomorrow).Thecounterfactualifpwerefalse,Swouldnotbelievethatp,combined
withthehardfactthat,att,Sbelievesthatp,entailsthatpistrue.Such
counterfactuals(whencombinedwithwhatisclearlyahardfact)entailwhatis
clearlynotpartoftheinitialsegmentuptoandincludingtimet;therefore,these
sortsofcounterfactualsregardingbeliefsabouttheworldaftertarethemselvesnot
includedintheinitialsegmentuptoandincludingtimet.Counterfactualanalysesof
knowledgeareendorsedbyFredDretskein"ConclusiveReasons"andRobert
NozickinPhilosophicalExplanations(p.172).

(5.)Imakeuseofafamiliar,butrathervague,distinctionbetweeninternalistand
extemalisttheoriesofknowledge.Roughly,thedistinctionisthataccordingto
internalists,whateverplaysthecentralroleinmakingtruebeliefknowledgeis
somethingtowhicheachpersonhas,inhisorherowncase,animmediateand
perhapsinfallibleaccess.Theexternalistdeniesthis.Aswillbeacknowledgedinthe
discussionbelow,thedisagreementbetweenthetwocampsisreallyamatterof
degree;mostintemalistsagreethatthereissomeexternalistcomponenttowhat
epistemizestruebelief.

(6.)Noneofthisistodenythat,evenif(1)istrue,wecanhavejustifiedbeliefsabout
thefuture,ortodenythatitisrationaltoactonbeliefsaboutthefuture.Butif(1)is
true,thenwegetthequitesurprisingresultthatwecannotknowfactsaboutthe
futuresuchasthattherewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayinonesecond.This
shouldbeespeciallytroublingtoanyonewhofavorsa"particularist"(asopposedto
a"methodist")approachtoepistemology.Accordingtotheparticularist,in
formulatingourtheoryofknowledge,westartoutwithcertainparadigmcasesof
whatweknow,andtrytoworkoutatheorythatsavestheseparadigms.Iwould
havethought,however,thatclaimslike"therewillbenodinosaurinthehallwayin
onesecond"or"ifIturnaround,Iwon'tseeadinosaur"areparadigmaticexamples
ofknowledge.RoderickChisholmintroducesparticularismandmethodisminThe
ProblemoftheCriterion(p.15).

(7.)Therearesomeputativecasesofknowledgeaboutthefuturethat(2)doesnot
seemtoruleout.Someexamples:one'sbeliefthat2+2willequal4intheyear2001;
one'sbeliefthattomorrowwillbesuchthatitwasrainingtoday;one'sbeliefsabout
thefutureifoneessentiallyhastruebeliefsaboutthefuture;andone'sbeliefsabout
thefutureifonecomestoholdthosebeliefsbecauseonewastoldbyanessentially
omniscient,essentiallyhonestbeingthattheyweretrue.(8.)ThankstoMarian
David,DavidLewis,EugeneMills,MarkC.Murphy,AlvinPlantinga,PhilipQuinn,
LeopoldStubenberg,DeanZimmerman,andananonymousrefereeforhelpful
comments.