J.
Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
#1
Re: Good Shepherd
596 SCRA 401
Facts:
The administrator of Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc. (GSFI) sent a letter to the
Supreme Court asking that GSFI be exempted
from paying docket fees and legal fees. GSFI
stated that since they are catering helping
indigent persons, they should also be exempted
from paying the legal fees.
Issue:
Whether or not GSFI should be
exempted.
Held:
No. The Constitution premised the
free access clause on persons suffering
poverty, a condition that may only be
experienced by a natural person.
Furthermore, the Rules of Court (Sec 21,
Rule 3 and Sec 19, Rule 141) is clear and
precise on its intent that only natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant.
x---------------------x
#2
Duco vs Comelec
596 SCRA 572
Facts:
Duco won as a barangay chairman in the
barangay elections. His victory was challenged
by his opponent before the MCTC who ruled
against Duco.
Duco filed a notice of appeal and paid
P1400 for the appeal fee. However, the First
Division of COMELEC resolved to dismiss the
appeal due to non-perfection of the same as the
appeal fee was short of that prescribed the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Duco filed an MR before the same body
but was denied due to his failure to pay the
necessary motion fees as required the
COMELEC ROP.
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Hence, this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction in the dismissal of the
appeal and denial of the motion.
Held:
No. The SC held in previous cases that
any claim of good faith, excusable negligence
or mistake in any failure to pay the
amount of filing fees in ELECTION CASES
which may be filed after the promulgation of its
decisions is barred from being asserted.
Procedural rules are not to be
belittled simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in the
prejudice to a partys substantive rights.
The payment of the full amount of docket
fees within the period to appeal is a sine qua
non requirement for the perfection of an
appeal.
The court may relax on its procedural
rules only for the most persuasive reasons
when the negligence is not commensurate to
the injustice suffered by the litigant.
NB:
Motions for Reconsideration can only be
acted upon by the COMELEC while sitting en
banc, not on its Divisions.
Consequently, the en banc cannot decide
on matters brought before the commission. It
should be on its divisions.
x--------------------------- x
#3
Suhuri vs Comelec
602 SCRA 633
Facts:
Petitioner was the losing mayoralty
candidate in the election in Patikul, Sulu. He
filed before the Municipal Board of Canvassers
an election protest, praying for the exclusion of
25 election returns asserting that the returns
were:
(1) obviously manufactured;
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
(2) tampered with or falsified;
(3) prepared under duress; and
(4) characterized by statistical
improbability.
The MBC, however, ruled to dismiss the
petition and declared petitioners opponent as
the winning candidate.
Petitioner filed a petition-appeal before
the Comelec, praying that the proclamation of
the winning candidate be declared null and
void due to existence of a pre-proclamation
controversy. The petition was assigned to 2nd
Division who ruled in his favor, and overturned
the decision of the MBC.
His opponent moved to reconsider the
decision, but since the required majority vote
was not attained, it was forwarded to the
Comelec en banc. The latter resolved to
overturn the decision of the 2nd Division and
reinstated the earlier pronouncement of the
MBC.
Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec committed
GAD for holding that there exists no pre-
proclamation controversy.
Held:
No. A pre-proclamation controversy
according to Sec 1, Art XX of the Omnibus
Election Code, refers to:
xxx any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board
of canvassers with may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of parties
before the board or directly with the
Commission [on elections], or any
matter raised under Secs 233 236 in
relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.
The defects cited by the petitioner were
mere irregularities or formal defects that did
not warrant the exclusion of the affected
election returns. The court, citing Baterina vs
Comelec, held that the grounds for exclusion of
election returns from the canvassing as raised
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by the petitioner therein did not necessarily
affect the authenticity and genuineness of the
subject election returns as to warrant their
exclusion from the canvassing, being but
defects in form insufficient to support the
conclusion that these had been tampered with
or spurious.
The Doctrine of Statistical
Improbability exists when the results
showing the election returns are
contrary to all statistical probabilities
and is applied only where the unique
uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor
of all the candidates belonging to one party
and the systematic blanking of all the
candidates of all the opposing parties appear
in the election returns.
x------------------------------------------x
#4
Apo Fruits vs CA
607 SCRA 200
Facts:
Petitioners are registered owners of 5
parcels of land which they voluntarily offered
to sell to the government. After initial
processing at the Department of Agrarian
Reform, it was referred to Land Bank for
initial valuation.
The petitioners considered the
valuation, as per notice received from the DAR
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), to
be unreasonably low and inadequate as just
compensation for the properties. However, the
DAR requested LBP to deposit the amount of
their valuation in the names of the petitioners.
Thereafter, the petitioners withdrew parts of
the deposits in cash. Subsequently, the DAR
PARO directed the Register of Deeds to cancel
the titles of the properties and issue a new one
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The petitioners filed separate
complaints before the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for the determination of just
compensation. However, due to inaction of the
DARAB for more than three years, the
petitioners elevated the matters to the RTC
sitting as Special Agrarian Court, which were
then consolidated.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
The trial court appointed, as
Commissioners, persons it considered fit for
the proper valuation of the properties. After
the Commissioners conducted ocular
inspection on the properties, the RTC rendered
its decision. LBP moved to reconsider which
was given due course.
Unsatisfied with the modifications on
the judgment of the RTC after the MR, LBP
filed before the CA a petition for review on
certiorari. The CA ruled to nullify and set
aside the decision of the RTC.
Prior to the petition, however, DAR filed
its own separate appeal before the CA but was
dismissed on the ground that it was not the
proper mode of appeal. Furthermore, the
material dates were not included in the appeal
and so with the material portions of the record
which would support the allegations in the
petition. This decision reached its finality and
entry of judgment was entered.
In this petition for certiorari, the
petitioners assail the decision of the CA in the
petition filed by the LBP, to wit:
1. That LBP is bound by the decision of
the CA in the appeal filed by the
DAR;
2. That the LBP is barred by res
judicata after the decision of the CA
reached its finality
Issues:
Whether or not the LBP is barred by res
judicata
Whether or not the petitioners were
afforded just compensation
Held:
1. Res Judicata
No. For the doctrine of res judicata to
apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. The court which rendered the
judgment must have jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject
matter;
3. It must be a judgment based on
merits.
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4. There must be between the first and
second action identity of the parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.
The appeal filed by DAR was dismissed,
not on the merits but, due to technicalities as it
is not the proper mode of appeal. It must be by
way of petition for review, not by way of
ordinary appeal.
2. Just Compensation
No. The concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,
but also the payment of the land within
reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the
property owner is being made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of
his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.
Just compensation is defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by the Court that the
measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample.
x-------------------------------------------x
#5
De Castro vs JBC
615 SCRA 666
Facts:
CJ Puno will reach the compulsory age of
retirement on May 17, 2010. As a result, the
JBC opened the position of CJ for application or
recommendation, and published for that
purpose its announcement dated January 20,
2010.
The petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the shortlisting as it runs
counter to the constitutional prohibition on
midnight appointments (Sec 15 of Art VII).
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
The JBC in their comment said that they
have yet to submit the shortlist to the President
in light of the provisions of Art VIII, Sec 4 (1),
which provides that vacancies in the Supreme
Court shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof and the provision on
midnight appointments earlier mentioned.
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next CJ, because the
prohibition under Art VII, Sec 15 does not apply
to appointments in the Supreme Court.
Some intervenors further contend that
the petitions do not have justiciable
controversy.
Hence, the consolidated petitions.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus
standi.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable
controversy.
3. Whether or not the prohibition on midnight
appointments covers appointments in the
Supreme Court or other appointments to
the Judiciary.
Held:
1. Locus Standi
Yes. Locus Standi is defined as a
right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question. A person who would assail
the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.
The Court has held, however, that the
requirement of locus standi, being a mere
procedural technicality, can be waived the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. The
Court may liberalize the approach on
when the cases had transcendental
importance.
2. Justiciability
Yes. There is no need to wait for the
occurrence of the vacancy in order for the
principal issue to ripe for judicial
determination by the Court. A reasonable
certainty of occurrence of the perceived
threat to a constitutional interest is
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sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a
challenge, provided that the Court has
sufficient facts before it to enable it to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.
3. Prohibition on midnight
appointments.
No. The prohibition against presidential
appointments under Sec 15, Article VII does not
extend to appointments in the judiciary.
Had the framers (of the Constitution)
intended to include the members of the
judiciary in the prohibition, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
Additional doctrine:
Mandamus Mandamus shall issue
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.
Requisites: (MNLDR)
1. The plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded;
2. It must be the duty of the
defendant to perform the act,
because it is mandated by the law;
3. The defendant unlawfully
neglects the performance of the
duty enjoined by law;
4. The act to be performed is
ministerial, not discretionary;
and
5. There is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of
the law.
x------------------------------------------------x
#7
DE CASTRO vs JBC
618 SCRA 639
Facts:
This is a Motion for
Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010
decision of the Court. The said decision
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
directs the Judicial and Bar Council to next presidential elections and up to the
resume its proceedings for the end of the term of the outgoing president
nomination of candidates to fill the does not apply to vacancies in the
vacancy created by the compulsory Supreme Court.
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare x----------------------------------------x
#9
the short list of nominees and submit it
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec
to the incumbent President. Movants
621 SCRA 499
argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII,
The Rules of Court does not define
Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on
jurisdictional boundaries of the courts.
midnight appointments to cover the
In promulgating the Rules of Court, the
members of the Judiciary, and they
Supreme Court is circumscribed by the
contended that the principle of stare
zone properly denominated as the
decisis is controlling, and insisted that
promulgation of rules concerning
the Court erred in disobeying or
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
courts; consequently, the Rules of Court
can only determine the means, ways or
ISSUE:
manner in which said jurisdiction, as
Did the Constitutional
fixed by the Constitution and acts of
Commission extend to the Judiciary the
Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules
ban on presidential appointments
of Court yields to the substantive law in
during the period stated in Sec. 15,
determining jurisdiction. The
Article VII?
jurisdiction over election contests
involving elective municipal officials has
RULING:
been vested in the RTC by Section 251,
The Constitutional Commission
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
did not extend to the Judiciary the ban
Election Code). On the other hand, A.M.
on presidential appointments during the
No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper
period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The
venue where such cases may be filed and
deliberations that the dissent of Justice
heard, only spelled out the manner by
Carpio Morales quoted from the records
which an RTC with jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Commission did
exercises such jurisdiction. Like other
not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or
rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was
Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art.
designed to ensure a just and orderly
VII, a provision on nepotism.
administration of justice, and is
Election ban on appointments does
permissive, because it was enacted to
not extend to the Supreme Court. The
ensure the exclusive and speedy
Court upheld its March 17, 2010
disposition of election protests and
decision ruling that the prohibition
petitions for quo warranto involving
under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
elective municipal officials.
Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the
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J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Castillos filing her protest in the
RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to
a wrong choice of venue. Hence, the
dismissal of the protest by Branch 19
constituted plain error, considering that
her wrong choice did not affect the
jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19
should have done under the
circumstances was to transfer the
protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus,
Cavite, which was the proper venue.
Such transfer was proper, whether she
as the protestant sought it or not, given
that the determination of the will of the
electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to
the process set forth by law was of the
highest concern of our institutions,
particularly of the courts.
x------------------------------------------------x
#10
Maniebo vs CA
627 SCRA 569
FACTS:
Justina M. Maniebo was issued a
promotional appointment as Cashier III in the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality
of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she
appeared to possess the qualifications for the
position. But when the CSC Regional Office No.
IV verified her name against the Master list
Eligibles, she was found out to have actually
failed in the examination for obtaining a rating
of only 60%. She was then charged with
possessing of spurious report of rating,
falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty
after having indicated in her Personal Data
Sheet that she had passed the CSC
(professional) examination with a rating of
74.01%.
ISSUES:
Was the CSC correct in imposing the
penalty of dismissal in view of the
circumstances obtaining in the case
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Did the court of appeals err in dismissing
the petition based on alleged technicality?
RULING:
YES. A permanent appointment
implies the holding of a civil service
eligibility on the part of the appointee,
unless the position involved requires no
such eligibility. Where the appointee does
not possess a civil service eligibility, the
appointment is considered temporary. The
subsequent acquisition of the required
eligibility will not make the temporary
appointment regular or permanent; a new
appointment is needed. Accordingly, any
temporary employee who has served for the
required duration of seven years must first be
found by the CSC to continuously possess the
minimum qualifications for holding the
position, except the required eligibility, before
he or she may be granted civil service
eligibility. Among the minimum qualifications
is the continuous observance of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees
The petitioner failed to comply with this
necessary minimum qualification. She thrived
on her having misled the Government into
believing that she had possessed the requisite
civil service eligibility for the various positions
she had successively held in her 20 years of
service. In the first place, she would not have
been appointed in a permanent or temporary
capacity, had the CSC sooner discovered her
dishonesty. R.A. No. 6850 was never meant to
cure an appointment void from the very
beginning for being based on a false
representation of eligibility, like that of the
petitioner. A contrary construction of the
statute will, in effect, reward dishonesty.
2. NO. The CA did not commit any error,
least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was
founded on the correct application of the
applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court clearly requires the petition
for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting
papers. The requirement is intended to
immediately enable the CA to determine
whether to give due course to the appeal or not
by having all the material necessary to make
such determination before it. This is because an
appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of
appeal, which the
CA may either dismiss if it finds the
petition to be patently without merit, or
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial
to require consideration; or may process by
requiring the respondent to file a comment on
the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within
10days from notice.
The petitioner was not entitled to a
liberal construction of the rules of procedure.
The petitioner repeatedly disregarded the rules
too many times to merit any tolerance by the
Court, thereby exhibiting a deplorable
tendency to trivialize the rules of procedure.
Yet, such rules were not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance
might have resulted in prejudicing a partys
substantive rights. The bare invocation of
substantial justice was not a magic wand that
would compel the suspension of the rules of
procedure. Of necessity, the reviewing court
had also to assess whether the appeal was
substantially meritorious on its face, or not, for
only after such finding could the review court
ease the often stringent rules of procedure.
Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be
reduced to mere trifles.
x--------------------------------------x
#11
Jamsani - Rodriguez vs Ong
628 SCRA 626
Facts:
Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an
Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman initiated this administrative
matter by filing an affidavit-complaint to
charge Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong
(Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice
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Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division
of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with
Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material
to the complaint, with (1) grave misconduct,
conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service;
(2) falsification of public documents; (3)
improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4)
manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the
law.[1]
This decision is limited to the
determination of the administrative culpability
of the respondent Justices, and does not extend
to the ascertainment of whatever might be the
effects of any irregularity they committed as
members of the Fourth Division on the trial
proceedings. This clarification stresses that the
proceedings, if procedurally infirm, resulted
from the acts of the Sandiganbayan as a
collegial body, not from their acts as individual
Justices. The remedy against any procedural
infirmity is not administrative but judicial.
Details of the Charges
A. Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service, and
Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases
originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao
shall be heard in the region of origin, except
only when the greater convenience of the
parties and of the witnesses or other compelling
considerations require the contrary.[2] Thus,
for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006,
the Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the
trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice in
Davao City.
Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on
April 17, 2006, the complainant sent a
memorandum to Special Prosecutor Dennis M.
Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio)
to invite his attention to the irregular
arrangement being adopted by the Fourth
Division in conducting its provincial hearings.
The Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial
body. Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by
himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada heard the other cases together.
Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Ignacios instructions, the complainant objected
to the arrangement, but her objections were
brushed aside.[5]
B. Improprieties During Hearings
Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial
Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez made the following intemperate
and discriminatory utterances during hearings.
C. Justices Ong, Hernandez, and
Ponferradas Gross Ignorance of the Law
Amounting to Manifest Partiality for
Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801, Entitled
People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to
respondent Justices, the complainant cited the
Fourth Divisions resolution granting accused
Ronaldo V. Punos demurrer to evidence in
Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the
case upon a finding that the assailed contracts
had never been perfected,[14] which finding
was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.
The complainant insisted that the
conclusion that the assailed contracts had
never been perfected was based on a National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution,
which the Fourth Division appreciated in the
guise of taking judicial notice. She contended
that taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM
resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was
highly erroneous, and constituted gross
ignorance of the law.
The Court partly adopts the findings and
recommendations of the Court Administrator.
A. Respondents Violation of the provisions
of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan
Respondent Justices contend that they
preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division
despite their having separately conducted
hearings, considering that the three of them
were in the same venue and were acting within
hearing and communicating distance of one
another.
The contention is not well-taken.
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Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing
the Sandiganbayan, provides:
Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The
Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of
three Justices each. The three divisions may sit
at the same time.
Implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,
viz:
Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The
Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) Divisions of
three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding
Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit
separately at the same time. Each of the five (5)
most senior Associate Justices including the
Presiding Justice, shall be the Chairman of a
Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices
next in rank shall be the Senior Member of a
Division; and each of the last five (5) Associate
Justices shall be the Junior Member of a
Division.
B. Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez
no evidence supported the complainants charge
that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had
uttered the improper and intemperate
statements attributed to them.
A review of the transcripts of the stenographic
notes for the hearings in which the offensive
statements were supposedly uttered by them
has failed to substantiate the complainants
charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the
contrary, the Court must accept such
transcripts as the faithful and true record of the
proceedings, because they bear the certification
of correctness executed by the stenographers
who had prepared them.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject
to their influence, direction or control.
C. Respondent Justices Not Guilty of
Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the
resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court
upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006
in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing
such dismissal to have failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment
to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge
will be held administratively liable for
rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts
with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other
similar motive.[32]
D. Penalties
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, classifies the
offense of simple misconduct as a less serious
charge, viz:
Section 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious
charges include:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges
and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as
follows:
Section 11. Sanctions. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
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B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious
charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P 20,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a
light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, thus:
Section 10. Light Charges. Light charges
include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
xxx xxx xxx
and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not less
than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00;
and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with
warning.
x------------------------------x
#12
People vs Bunay
630 SCRA 445,
Facts:
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
26, in Luna, Apayao tried and found the
accused guilty of qualified rape. the accused
was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa City. The conviction was brought
for automatic review, but the Court transferred
the case to the CA for intermediate review.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction of the accused for qualified rape in
Following the CAs denial of his motion for
reconsideration, the accused now appeals to the
Court. The Court received the letter advising
that the accused had died on March 25, 2010 at
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa
City.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused
extinguishes his criminal liability.
Held:
Under the foregoing circumstances, the
death of the accused during the pendency of his
appeal in this Court totally extinguished his
criminal liability. Such extinction is based on
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which
pertinently provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment. xxx
The death of the accused likewise
extinguished the civil liability that was based
exclusively on the crime for which the accused
was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final
judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the
time of his death. Only civil liability predicated
on a source of obligation other than the delict
survived the death of the accused, which the
offended party can recover by means of a
separate civil action.
x--------------------------------------x
#13
LCP vs. COMELEC,
643 SCRA 150
FACTS:
These cases were initiated by the
consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by
the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP),
City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P.
Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the
sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component
city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject
laws.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
In the Decision dated November 18,
2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted
the petitions and struck down the Cityhood
Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections
10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection
clause.
In another Decision dated December 21,
2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,
declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc,
through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved
the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Annul the Decision of December
21, 2009.
ISSUE/s:
1 Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate
Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
2 Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate
Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws
First issue:
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is
an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their
original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has
vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress
through its law-making powers. Congress has
the power to alter or modify it as it did when it
enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of
amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When
Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided
for quantifiable indicators of economic viability
for the creation of local government units
income, population, and land area.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to
exempt respondent municipalities from such a
belatedly imposed modified income
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
requirement in order to uphold its higher
calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is
countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities
as engines for economic growth in their
respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But
the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein.
Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted
the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws
are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself.
Second Issue:
Substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. Congress, by
enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this
capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in
accelerating economic growth and development
in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency
of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to
the present.
X-----------------------------------------X
#14
RE: HABITUAL TARDINESS
645 SCRA 309
Facts:
This administrative matter emanated
from the reports dated June 16, 2010 and June
17, 2010 made by the Leave Division under the
Office of Administrative Services (OAS) to the
Complaints and Investigation Division, also
under the OAS, to the effect that the concerned
employees had been habitually tardy in the
second semester of 2009,
Issue:
Whether or not the concerned employees
had incurred habitual tardiness and that their
justifications were unacceptable.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
Held:
It is a canon under the Constitution that
a public office is a public trust. This canon
includes the mandate for the observance of
prescribed office hours and the efficient use of
every moment of such hours for the public
service, because only thereby may the public
servants recompense the Government and the
people for shouldering the costs of maintaining
the Judiciary. Accordingly, court officials and
employees must at all times strictly observe
official hours to inspire the publics respect for
the justice system.
The exacting standards of ethics and
morality imposed upon court officials and
employees reflect the premium placed on the
image of the courts of justice. That image is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work in
the Judiciary. It thus becomes the imperative
duty of everyone involved in the dispensation of
justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to
maintain the courts good name and standing as
true temples of justice.
Worthy of stress is that the nature and
functions of the employment of the officials and
employees of the Judiciary require them to be
role models in the faithful observance of the
constitutional canon that public office is a
public trust. They are always accountable to the
people, whom they must serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.
They can surely inspire public respect for the
justice system by strictly observing official
time, among others. Absenteeism and tardiness
are, therefore, impermissible.
x--------------------------------------------------x
#15
Jamsani - Rodriguez vs Ong
648 SCRA 1
FACTS:
The complainant, filed a complaint
charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez and
Justice Ponferrada with; (a) grave misconduct,
conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service
(grounded on their failing to hear cases as a
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
collegial body during the scheduled hearing of
the Fourth Division, with Justice Ong hearing
cases by himself and Justice Hernandez and
Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases
together); (b) falsification of public documents
(grounded on their issuance of orders relative to
the hearings, signed by all three of them, that
made it appear as if all of them had been
present during the particular hearing acting as
a collegial body, when in truth they were not);
(c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that
amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority
and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice
Ong and Justice Hernandezs making
intemperate and discriminatory utterances
during the hearing); (d) manifest partiality and
gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact
that Criminal Case No. 25801, was dismissed
upon a demurrer to evidence upon a finding
that the assailed contracts subject of the
criminal case had never been perfected
contrary to the evidence of the prosecution, the
dismissal order being signed by all three
respondents)
ISSUE:
1. w/n respondent Justices violated the
Provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan?
2. w/n Justice Ong and Hernandez were
guilty of unbecoming conduct provided in the
New Code of Judicial Conduct?
3. w/n Respondent Justices guilty of
manifest partiality?
RULING:
1. The Supreme Court finds the procedure
adopted by respondent Justices for their
provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of
PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and
the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
The ability of the Fourth Division to
function as a collegial body became impossible
when not all of the members sat together
during the trial proceedings. Section 2, Rule VII
of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings
on oral motions made or objections raised in the
course of the trial proceedings or hearings are
be made by the Chairman of the Division.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with
because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit
in the hearing of the cases heard by the other
respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute
to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings
before him.
Relevantly, the Court do not consider the
respondent Justices signing of the orders
during the flawed proceedings as a form of
falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby
made it appear that they had all been
physically present when the truth was
different. Such act merely ensued from the
flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a
separate offense.
2. The Court approves that no evidence
supported the complainants charge that
respondent Justices uttered the improper and
intemperate statements attributed.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez admitted randomly asking the
counsels appearing before them from which law
schools they had graduated, and their engaging
during the hearings in casual conversation
about their respective law schools. They
thereby publicized their professional
qualifications and manifested a lack of the
requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. The Court view their act as
bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament
and decorum. Judicial decorum demand that
they behave with dignity and act with courtesy
towards all who appear before their court.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
states that:
Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official
capacity, Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.
Consequently, Section 3, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges
avoid situations that they may reasonably give
rise suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partially in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their courts.
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were
guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined
as improper performance.
3. The charge of manifest partiality for
issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No.
25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this
Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5,
2006 in G.R. No. 171116 by declaring the
petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
assailing such dismissal to have failed to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had
committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by
this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO PUNO).
xx xx On the basis thereof, the Court resolves
to DENY the petition for review on certiorari
dated 2 March 2006 assailing the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan for petitioners failure to
submit a valid affidavit of service of copies of
the petition on respondent and the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with Sections 3
and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in
relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules,
there being no jurat and signature of the affiant
in the attached affidavit of service of the
petition.
X-----------------------------------------------------X
#16
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
648 SCRA 47
Facts:
Allegedly, Cojuangco purchased a block
of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through the
14 holding companies owned by the CIIF Oil
Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266
Law Students Help Group Philippines
shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the
CIIF block of shares.
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
served as a public officer during the Marcos
administration. During the period of his
incumbency as a public officer, he acquired
assets, funds, and other property grossly and
manifestly disproportionate to his salaries,
lawful income and income from legitimately
acquired property.
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
taking undue advantage of his association,
influence and connection, acting in unlawful
concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, and the individual
defendants, embarked upon devices, schemes
and stratagems, including the use of defendant
corporations as fronts, to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the
Filipino people.
Defendant Corporations are but "shell"
corporations owned by interlocking
shareholders who have previously admitted
that they are just "nominee stockholders" who
do not have any proprietary interest over the
shares in their names.
The other respondent Corporations are
owned by interlocking shareholders who are
likewise lawyers in the ACCRA Law Offices
and had admitted their status as "nominee
stockholders" only.
These companies, which ACCRA Law
Offices organized for Defendant Cojuangco to
be able to control more than 60% of SMC
shares, were funded by institutions which
depended upon the coconut levy.
The acts of Defendants, singly or
collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one
another, constitute gross abuse of official
position and authority, flagrant breach of
public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen
abuse of right and power, unjust enrichment,
violation of the constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and
irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the block of shares in San
Miguel Corporation in the names of the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
respondents should be reconveyed to the
Republic of the Philippines.
Held:
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Court declares that the block of
shares in San Miguel Corporation in the names
of respondents Cojuangco, et al. subject of Civil
Case No. 0033F is the exclusive property of
Cojuangco, et al. as registered owners.
The Concept and Genesis of Ill Gotten
Wealth in the Philippine Setting
Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 288 further
required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten, must
be:
"acquired by them through or as a result
of improper or illegal use of or the
conversion of funds belonging to the
Government of the Philippines or any of
its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial
institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of their official position,
authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich themselves
at the expense and to the grave damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines."
Although E.O. No. 1 and the other
issuances dealing with ill-gotten wealth (i.e.,
E.O. No. 2, E.O. No. 14, and E.O. No. 14A) only
identified the subject matter of ill-gotten
wealth and the persons who could amass ill-
gotten wealth and did not include an explicit
definition of ill-gotten wealth, we can still
discern the meaning and concept of ill-gotten
wealth from the WHEREAS Clauses
themselves of E.O. No. 1, in that ill-gotten
wealth consisted of the "vast resources of the
government" amassed by "former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates both here and
abroad." It is clear, therefore, that ill-gotten
wealth would not include all the properties of
President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates but only the part
that originated from the "vast resources of the
government."
"Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired
through or as a result of improper or illegal use
Law Students Help Group Philippines
of or the conversion of funds belonging to the
Government or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or
financial institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence, resulting
in unjust enrichment of the ostensible owner
and grave damage and prejudice to the State."
All these judicial pronouncements
demand two concurring elements to be present
before assets or properties were considered as
ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have
"originated from the government itself," and (b)
they must have been taken by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates by illegal means.
It does not suffice, as in this case, that
the respondent is or was a government official
or employee during the administration of
former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima
facie showing that the respondent unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because
otherwise the respondents case will fall under
existing general laws and procedures on the
matter. Xxx
The Republic should have adduced
evidence to substantiate its allegations against
the Respondents.
It is basic in remedial law that a
defendant in a civil case must apprise the trial
court and the adverse party of the facts alleged
by the complaint that he admits and of the facts
alleged by the complaint that he wishes to place
into contention. The defendant does the former
either by stating in his answer that they are
true or by failing to properly deny them. There
are two ways of denying alleged facts: one is by
general denial, and the other, by specific denial.
In this jurisdiction, only a specific denial
shall be sufficient to place into contention an
alleged fact. Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation
of the complaint may be made in any of three
ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, sets
forth the substance of the matters upon which
he relies to support his denial (b) a defendant
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
who desires to deny only a part of an averment
specifies so much of it as is true and material
and denies only the remainder and (c) a
defendant who is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the
complaint states so, which has the effect of a
denial.
When taken in its totality, the Amended
Answer to the Amended Petition, or even the
Answer to the Amended Petition alone, clearly
raises an issue as to the legal personality of
petitioner to file the complaint. Every alleged
admission is taken as an entirety of the fact
which makes for the one side with the
qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its
effect on the other side. The reason for this is,
where part of a statement of a party is used
against him as an admission, the court should
weigh any other portion connected with the
statement, which tends to neutralize or explain
the portion which is against interest.
In other words, while the admission is
admissible in evidence, its probative value is to
be determined from the whole statement and
others intimately related or connected
therewith as an integrated unit. Although acts
or facts admitted do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted, however, evidence
aliunde can be presented to show that the
admission was made through palpable mistake.
The rule is always in favor of liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real
matter in dispute may be submitted to the
judgment of the court.
Based on the complaint and the answer,
the acquisition of the San Miguel shares by, and
their registration in the names of, the
companies listed in Annexes "A" and "B" may
be deemed undisputed.
All other allegations in the complaint are
disputed.
The burden of proof, according to Section
1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, is "the duty of
a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law." Here,
the Republic, being the plaintiff, was the party
that carried the burden of proof.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
With the Republic nonetheless choosing
not to adduce evidence proving the factual
allegations, particularly the aforementioned
matters, and instead opting to pursue its claims
by Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Sandiganbayan became completely deprived of
the means to know the necessary but crucial
details of the transactions on the acquisition of
the contested block of shares. The Republics
failure to adduce evidence shifted no burden to
the respondents to establish anything, for it
was basic that the party who asserts, not the
party who denies, must prove. Indeed, in a civil
action, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading
every essential fact and element of the cause of
action and proving them by preponderance of
evidence. This means that if the defendant
merely denies each of the plaintiffs allegations
and neither side produces evidence on any such
element, the plaintiff must necessarily fail in
the action. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly
dismissed Civil Case No. 0033F for failure of
the Republic to prove its case by preponderant
evidence.
A summary judgment under Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court is a procedural technique
that is proper only when there is no genuine
issue as to the existence of a material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. It is a method intended to
expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on record. Upon a motion for
summary judgment the courts sole function is
to determine whether there is an issue of fact to
be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an
issue of fact must be resolved against the
moving party. In other words, a party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden
of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, and any doubt as to the
existence of such an issue is resolved against
the movant. Thus, in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, the court should take that
view of the evidence most favorable to the party
against whom it is directed, giving that party
the benefit of all favorable inferences.
The term genuine issue has been defined
as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
of evidence as distinguished from an issue that
is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad
faith, and patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court
can determine this on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits,
and counter-affidavits submitted by the parties
to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place
of a trial. Well settled is the rule that a party
who moves for summary judgment has the
burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of
any genuine issue of fact. Upon that partys
shoulders rests the burden to prove the cause of
action, and to show that the defense is
interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After
the burden has been discharged, the defendant
has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle
him to defend. Any doubt as to the propriety of
a summary judgment shall be resolved against
the moving party.
We need not stress that the trial courts
have limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only in cases where
no genuine issue as to any material fact clearly
exists between the parties. The rule on
summary judgment does not invest the trial
courts with jurisdiction to try summarily the
factual issues upon affidavits, but authorizes
summary judgment only when it appears clear
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.
x------------------------------------x
#17
LCP vs. COMELEC
648 SCRA 344
FACTS:
The petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial
ground that the Court could no longer modify,
alter, or amend its judgment declaring the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such
judgment having long become final and
executory.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
The petitioners posit that the controversy on
the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28,
2009 Resolution denying the respondents
second motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the
November 18, 2008 Decision for being a
prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance
of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009.
ISSUES:
w/n the Court violated rules of procedure, and
the principles of res judicata and immutability
of final judgment?
RULING:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration
is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that: No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be
entertained. Thus, a decision becomes final and
executory after 15 days from receipt of the
denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and
admit a second motion for reconsideration is
granted by the Court, the Court therefore
allows the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. In such a case, the second
motion for reconsideration is no longer a
prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the
second motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed
the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for
reconsideration was no longer a prohibited
pleading. However, for lack of the required
number of votes to overturn the 18 November
2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution,
the Court denied the second motion for
reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.
On whether the principle of immutability of
judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein,
suffice it to state that the succession of the
events recounted herein indicates that the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has
not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the
operation of the principle of immutability of
judgments did not yet come into play. For the
same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of
res judicata not yet warranted, especially
considering that the precedential ruling for this
case needed to be revisited and set with
certainty and finality.
x------------------------------------------------------x
#18
LCP vc COMELEC
652 SCRA 798
The Court has firmly held that a
second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading, and only for
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and
only after an express leave has been first
obtained may a second motion for
reconsideration be entertained. The
restrictive policy against a second motion for
reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the
recently promulgated Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15
states:
"Section 3. Second motion for
reconsideration. The Court shall not
entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to
this rule can only be granted in the
higher interest of justice by the Court en
banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of
its actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of
justice" when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable
of causing unwarranted and
irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained
before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation
of law or by the Courts declaration."
x--------------------------------------x
#19
Bayonla vs Reyes
660 SCRA 490
1.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
The canons are appropriate considering
that the relationship between a lawyer and her
client is highly fiduciary, and prescribes on a
lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.
There is no question that the money or property
received by a lawyer for her client properly
belongs to the latter. Conformably with these
canons of professional responsibility, we have
held that a lawyer is obliged to render an
accounting of all the property and money she
has collected for her client. This obligation
includes the prompt reporting and accounting
of the money collected by the lawyer by reason
of a favorable judgment to his client.
2.
It is indisputable that the pendency of
any criminal charges between the lawyer and
her client does not negate the administrative
proceedings against the lawyer. xxx
"The settled rule is that criminal and
civil cases are different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first
two will not inevitably govern the third and vice
versa. xxx"
"Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proven
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney."
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
"xxx a finding of guilt in the criminal
case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal does not necessarily
exculpate him administratively. In the same
vein, the trial courts finding of civil liability
against the respondent will not inexorably lead
to a similar finding in the administrative action
before this Court. Neither will a favorable
disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer."
It serves well to mention, lastly, that the
simultaneous pendency of an administrative
case and a judicial proceeding related to the
cause of the administrative case, even if the
charges and the evidence to be adduced in such
cases are similar, does not result into or
occasion any unfairness, or prejudice, or
deprivation of due process to the parties in
either of the cases.
3.
Due process in an administrative
context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of
justice. Where opportunity to be heard
either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as
long as fairness is not ignored. In other words,
it is not legally objectionable for being violative
of due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted
by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may
take the place of their direct testimony.
We have consistently held that the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. And any seeming defect in its
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observance is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked by a party who has had
the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
x--------------------------------------x
#20
Concepcion v. Minex Import Corp
663 SCRA 497
LABOR
Case Doctrine:
The employer may validly dismiss
for loss of trust and confidence an
employee who commits an act of fraud
prejudicial to the interest of the employer.
Neither a criminal prosecution nor a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime is a requisite for the validity of
the dismissal. Nonetheless, the dismissal
for a just or lawful cause must still be
made upon compliance with the
requirements of due process under the
Labor Code; otherwise, the employer is
liable to pay nominal damages as
indemnity to the dismissed employee.
Facts:
Respondent Minex Import-Export
Corporation (Minex) employed the petitioner
initially as a salesgirl, rotating her assignment
among nearly all its outlets. She was assigned
at SM Harrison Plaza kiosk with the
instruction to hold the keys of the kiosk. On
November 9, 1997, the petitioner and her
salesgirls had sales of crystal items totaling
P39,194.50. At the close of business that day,
they conducted a cash-count of their sales
proceeds, including those from the preceding
Friday and Saturday, and determined their
total for the three days to be P50,912.00. The
petitioner wrapped the amount in a plastic bag
and deposited it in the drawer of the locked
wooden cabinet of the kiosk. At about 9:30 am
of November 10, 1997, the petitioner phoned
Vina Mariano to report that the P50,912.00 was
missing, explaining how she and her salesgirls
had placed the wrapped amount at the bottom
of the cabinet the night before, and how she had
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
found upon reporting to work that morning that
the contents of the cabinet were in disarray and
the money already missing.
Later, while the petitioner was giving a
detailed statement on the theft to the security
investigator of Harrison Plaza, Vina and Sylvia
Mariano, her superiors, arrived with a
policeman who immediately placed the
petitioner under arrest and brought her to
Precinct 9 of the Malate Police Station. There,
the police investigated her. She was detained
for a day, from 11:30 am of November 10, 1997
until 11:30 am of November 11, 1997, being
released only because the inquest prosecutor
instructed so. On November 12, 1997, the
petitioner complained against the respondents
for illegal dismissal in the Department of Labor
and Employment. On November 14, 1997,
Minex, through Vina, filed a complaint for
qualified theft against the petitioner in the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the employer denied the
employee dismissed with due process and thus
liable for damages?
Ruling:
Yes. To dismiss an employee, the law
requires the existence of a just and valid cause.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the
just causes for termination by the employer:
a. serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or the
latters representative in connection
with the employees work
b. gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties;
c. fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or his duly
authorized representative;
d. commission of a crime or offense by
the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and
e. other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
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Indeed, the employer is not expected to
be as strict and rigorous as a judge in a criminal
trial in weighing all the probabilities of guilt
before terminating the employee. Unlike a
criminal case, which necessitates a moral
certainty of guilt due to the loss of the personal
liberty of the accused being the issue, a case
concerning an employee suspected of
wrongdoing leads only to his termination as a
consequence. The quantum of proof required for
convicting an accused is thus higher proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt than the
quantum prescribed for dismissing an
employee substantial evidence. In so stating,
we are not diminishing the value of
employment, but only noting that the loss of
employment occasions a consequence lesser
than the loss of personal liberty, and may thus
call for a lower degree of proof.
Yet, even as we now say that the
respondents had a just or valid cause for
terminating the petitioner, it becomes
unavoidable to ask whether or not they
complied with the requirements of due process.
The petitioner plainly demonstrated how
quickly and summarily her dismissal was
carried out without first requiring her to
explain anything in her defense as demanded
under Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor
Code. Instead, the respondents forthwith had
her arrested and investigated by the police
authorities for qualified theft. This, we think,
was a denial of her right to due process of law,
consisting in the opportunity to be heard and to
defend herself. In fact, their decision to dismiss
her was already final even before the police
authority commenced an investigation of the
theft, the finality being confirmed by no less
than Sylvia Mariano herself telling the
petitioner during their phone conversation
following the latters release from police
custody on November 11, 1997 that she (Sylvia)
no longer wanted to see her.
The fair and reasonable opportunity
required to be given to the employee before
dismissal encompassed not only the giving to
the employee of notice of the cause and the
ability of the employee to explain, but also the
chance to defend against the accusation. This
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
was our- thrust in Philippine Pizza, Inc. v.
Bungabong, where we held that the employee
was not afforded due process despite the
dismissal being upon a just cause, considering
that he was not given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to confront his accusers and to
defend himself against the charge of theft
notwithstanding his having submitted his
explanation denying that he had stolen beer
from the company dispenser. The termination
letter was issued a day before the employee
could go to the HRD Office for the investigation,
which made it clear to him that the decision to
terminate was already final even before he
could submit his side and refute the charges
against him. Nothing that he could say or do at
that point would have changed the decision to
dismiss him. Such omission to give the
employee the benefit of a hearing and
investigation before his termination
constituted an infringement of his
constitutional right to due process by the
employer.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause,
as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in
Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission.
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss
now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the
Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the
nature of indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking into
special consideration the gravity of the due
process violation of the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to
statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form
of nominal damages. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, taking into account the relevant
circumstances. Considering the prevailing
circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it
proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this
form of damages would serve to deter
employers from future violations of the
statutory due process rights of employees. At
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the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted
to the latter under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules.
x------------------------------------------x
#21
Cagas vs. COMELEC
663 SCRA 645
(political law)
FACTS:
The petitioner and respondent Claude P.
Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in
the May 10, 2010 automated national and local
elections. Results led to the completion by May
14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner
was proclaimed the winner.
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities,
vote-buying and violations of election laws,
rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an
electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No.
2010-42).
In his answer submitted on June 22,
2010, the petitioner averred as his special
affirmative defenses that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and
that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions
complained of. COMELEC First Division issued
the first assailed order denying the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner.
The petitioner moved to reconsider on
the ground that the order did not discuss
whether the protest specified the alleged
irregularities in the conduct of the elections. He
prayed that the matter be certified to the
COMELEC en banc. Bautista countered that
the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory,
could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc
pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v.
COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division issued its
second assailed order, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for failing to show
that the first order was contrary to law. Not
satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special
civil action directly in this Court.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the
protest for insufficiency in form and content?
HELD:
No. Petition Denied.
SC cannot review a decision of a
COMELEC Division
The governing provision is Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall
decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date
of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of
the Commission or by the Commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the
Court the power to review any decision, order
or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power
to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no
power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC.
The mode by which a decision, order or
ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated
to the Supreme Court is by the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided
in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, requires that there be
no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
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for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a
ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or
resolution of a division of the Comelec must be
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion
for reconsideration before the final en banc
decision may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
There is no question, therefore, that the
Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petition for certiorari assailing the denial
by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The
proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for
the COMELEC First Division to first decide the
protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc
along with the other errors committed by the
Division upon the merits.
Political Law- no final decision,
resolution or order has yet been made which
will necessitate the elevation of the case and its
records to the Commission en banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear
that the subject controversy is one of the cases
specifically provided under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure in which the Commission
may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the
present controversy a case where a division is
not authorized to act nor a situation wherein
the members of the First Division unanimously
voted to refer the subject case to the
Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission
en banc, under the circumstances shown above,
cannot be the proper forum which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory orders
can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the
Commission in division committed grave abuse
of discretion or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders
relative to an action pending before it and the
controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is not to refer the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
controversy to the Commission en banc as this the facts and the law on which it is
is not permissible under its present rules but to based.
elevate it to this Court via a petition for No petition for review or motion
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or
PETITION DENIED.
denied without starting the legal basis
therefor."
x----------------------------------------------x
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded.
#22
The essential purpose of the constitutional
RE: Verified Complaint of Ongioco
provision is to require that a judicial decision be
664 SCRA 465
clear on why a party has prevailed under the
law as applied to the facts as proved; the
Facts:
provision nowhere demands that a point-by-
Ongjoco is the CEO of FH-GYMN, who
point consideration and resolution of the issues
requested an amendment to a municipal
raised by the parties are necessary.
ordinance. The request was denied by the
This constitutional provision deals with
Sangguniang Panlungsod, acting upon the
the disposition of petitions for review and of
recommendation of the proper committee.
motions for reconsideration. In appellate
Allegedly, the SP members uttered statements
courts, the rule does not require any
exibiting bias against Ongjoco. For this reason,
comprehensive statement of facts or mention of
Ongjoco filed a complaint before the Office of
the applicable law, but merely a statement of
the Deputy Ombudsman against the SP
the legal basis for denying due course.
members and 2 private indiviuals. Eventually,
Thus, there is sufficient compliance
the complaint was dismissed. A subsequent MR
with the constitutional requirement when
was denied.
a collegiate appellate court, after
FH-GYMN filed a petition for review
deliberation, decides to deny a motion;
before the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the
states that the questions raised are factual
petition for review. FH-GYMN, through Onjoco,
or have already been passed upon; or cites
moved to reconsider for the denial of the
some other legal basis. There is no need to
petition, with prayer for inhibition, but the CA
explain fully the courts denial, since the
denied the motion.
facts and the law have already been laid
Hence, this present administrative case
out in the assailed Decision.
against the members of the CA's sixth division.
Its decision shows that the CAs Sixth
The complainant contends that the CA violated
Division complied with the requirements of the
Sec. 14, Art VIII of the Constitution by not
constitutional provision.
specifically stating the facts and the law on
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of
which the denial of the petition was based.
the CAs Sixth Division that the Deputy
Ombudsman found no substantial evidence to
Issue:
prove that there was interference in the
1. Whether or not the member justices of
internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a
the CA violated the Constitution.
violation of the law by the respondents met the
2. Whether or not an administrative case is
constitutional demand for a clear and distinct
proper.
statement of the facts and the law on which the
decision was based. The CAs Sixth Division did
Held:
not have to point out and discuss the flaws of
1. No. Sec 14, Art VIII of the Constitution
FH-GYMNs petition considering that the
reads:
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman sufficiently
"Section 14. No decision shall be
detailed the factual and legal bases for the
rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly
denial of the petition.

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J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
2. No. It is evident to us that Ongjocos
objective in filing the administrative complaint
was to take respondent Justices to task for the
regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay
the groundwork for getting back at them for not
favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations
cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere
threat of administrative investigation and
prosecution made against a judge to influence
or intimidate him in his regular performance of
the judicial office always subverts and
undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
Disciplinary proceedings
criminal actions brought against any
judge in relation to the performance of his
official functions are
complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
substitute for such remedies. Any party who
may feel aggrieved should resort to these
remedies, and exhaust them, instead of
resorting to disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions.
x------------------------------------------------x
#23
TIDCORP vs Manalang-Demigillo
681 SCRA 27
(POLITICAL LAW)
FACTS:
The Board of Directors of Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP), a wholly owned
government corporation, formally charged
Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo
(Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in
TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the
course of official duties.
TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo
engaged in a verbal tussle with Mr. Joel Valdes
(Valdes), President and CEO of TIDCORP.
Allegedly, Demigillo also sent a memorandum
addressed to Valdes which contained
discourteous and arrogant words.
Pending the investigation, TIDCORP
placed Demigillo under preventive suspension
for 90 days.
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Demigillo assailed her preventive
suspension in the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). The CSC ruled that her suspension was
not proper because under Section 19(2), Rule II,
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil
service officer like Demigillo might be
preventively suspended by the disciplining
authority only if any of the two grounds were
present, to wit: (1) there was a possibility that
the civil service employee might unduly
influence or intimidate potential witnesses
against him; or (2) there was a possibility that
and the civil service employee might tamper the
documentary evidence on file in her office. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the CSC.
neither
ISSUE:
Whether or not Demigillos 90- day
preventive suspension is proper?
HELD:
The 90-day preventive suspension order
issued against Demigillo was valid.
Under Section 51 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the imposition of
preventive suspension by the proper
disciplining authority is authorized provided
the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the
service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies
that before a preventive suspension may issue
there must be proof that the subordinate may
unduly influence the witnesses against him or
may tamper the documentary evidence on file
in her office.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority,
the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on
August 31, 1999. Section 19 and Section 20 of
Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the
guidelines in the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension and the duration of the
suspension It is clear from Section 19, supra,
that before an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation may validly issue,
only two prerequisites need be shown, namely:
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
(1) that the proper disciplining
authority has served a formal charge to
the affected officer or employee; and
(2) that the charge involves
either dishonesty, oppression, grave
misconduct, neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe
that the respondent is guilty of the
charges which would warrant her
removal from the service.
Proof showing that the subordinate
officer or employee may unduly influence the
witnesses against her or may tamper the
documentary evidence on file in her office is not
among the prerequisites.
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated
that preventive suspension pending
investigation is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by
preventing the latter from intimidating or
in any way influencing witnesses against
him. As such, preventing the subordinate
officer or employee from intimidating the
witnesses during investigation or from
tampering the documentary evidence in her
office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing
preventive suspension, as shown in the use of
the word intended.
GRANTED.
CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
x--------------------------------------------------x
#24
Lloren vs COMELEC (Political Law)
681 SCRA 167
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua,
Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice Mayor of
the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May
10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate with
a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682
votes as against petitioners 4,930 votes.
Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation,
defective PCOS machines in all the clustered
precincts, election fraud, and other election-
related manipulations, petitioner commenced
Election Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the
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Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos, Leyte.
In his answer with special and affirmative
defenses and counterclaim, Pua alleged that
the election protest stated no cause of action,
was insufficient in form and content, and
should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to
pay the required cash deposit.
Issues:
Whether or not appeal was perfected.
Whether or not there was a valid election
contest.
Held:
Yes. The rules on the timely perfection of
an appeal in an election case requires two
different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial
court together with the filing of the notice of
appeal within five days from notice of the
decision, and the other to be paid in the
COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day
period from the filing of the notice of appeal.
In A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the Court
promulgated the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials (hereafter,
the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC), effective on
May 15, 2007, to set down the procedure for
election contests and quo warranto cases
involving municipal and barangay officials that
are commenced in the trial courts. The Rules in
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC superseded Rule 35
(Election Contests Before Courts of General
Jurisdiction) and Rule 36 (Quo Warranto
Case Before Courts of General Jurisdiction) of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules
in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, an aggrieved party
may appeal the decision of the trial court to the
COMELEC within five days after promulgation
by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court that
rendered the decision, serving a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the
adverse party if the party is not represented by
counsel. Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC prescribes for that
purpose an appeal fee of P 1,000.00 to be paid
to the trial court rendering the decision
simultaneously with the filing of the notice of
appeal.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
It should be stressed, however, that the
Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC did not supersede
the appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC
under its own rules of procedure. As a result,
the requirement of two appeal fees by two
different jurisdictions caused a confusion in the
implementation by the COMELEC of its
procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees
necessary for the perfection of appeals. To
remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24, 2008,
whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on
the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing
the appellant to pay the COMELECs appeal
fee of P 3,200.00 at the COMELECs Cash
Division through the ECAD or by postal money
order payable to the COMELEC within a period
of 15 days from the time of the filing of the
notice of appeal in the trial court.
The non-payment of the motion fee of P 300.00
at the time of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration did not warrant the outright
denial of the motion for reconsideration, but
might only justify the COMELEC to refuse to
take action on the motion for reconsideration
until the fees were paid, or to dismiss the action
or proceeding when no full payment of the fees
is ultimately made. The authority to dismiss is
discretionary and permissive, not mandatory
and exclusive, as expressly provided in Section
18, Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure.
Yes. Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in
A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as
follows: Section 10. Contents of the protest or
petition.
xxx
c. An election protest shall also state:
(i) that the protestant was a
candidate who had duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and had been
voted for the same office;
(ii) the total number of precincts in
the municipality;
(iii) the protested precincts and
votes of the parties in the protested
precincts per the Statement of Votes by
Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are
not specified, an explanation why the
votes are not specified; and
(iv) a detailed specification of the
acts or omissions complained of showing
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the electoral frauds, anomalies or
irregularities in the protested precincts.
As the findings of the RTC show,
petitioner did not indicate the total number of
precincts in the municipality in his election
protest. The omission rendered the election
protest insufficient in form and content, and
warranted its summary dismissal, in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules
in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC.
x----------------------------------------------------x
#25
TALAGA V COMELEC (Political Law)
683 SCRA 197
FACTS:
In focus are the disqualification of a
substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a
mayoralty election and the ascertainment of
who should assume the office following the
substitutes disqualification.
Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed
their certificates of candidacy (COC) for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010
elections.
Castillo filed with the COMELEC a
petition to cancel the COC of Talaga on the
ground that he has already served as mayor of
Lucena for three consecutive terms (2001, 2004,
2007) without interruption.
Talaga countered by saying that the
Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended
him from office during his second and third
terms, which he claims to have amounted to an
interruption.
Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his
candidacy. On May 4, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed
her own COC to substitute Talaga. Talagas
name remained printed on the ballots and votes
in his favor were counted for Barbara Ruby,
who won against Castillo.
But it was only on May 13, 2010 when
the Comelec gave due course to Rubys COC to
include her in the official list of candidates.
Ruby was proclaimed newly elected mayor.
ISSUES:
The core issue involves the validity of the
substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of
Ramon, her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the
determination of who among the contending
parties should assume the contested elective
position.
RULING:
1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does
not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does
not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid
CoC is not considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed a CoC
is not at all a candidate.
All told, a disqualified candidate may
only be substituted if he had a valid certificate
of candidacy in the first place because, if the
disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is
and was not a candidate at all.
2. A permanent vacancy in the office of
Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on
succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to
wit:
x x x Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in
the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the governor or mayor, the vice-governor
or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. x x x
x-------------------------------x
#26
People vs Buado
688 SCRA 82
FACTS:
Pedro Buado y Cipriano Jr. was found
guilty by the RTC of Valenzuela (May 5,
2003) of two counts of rape committed
against his two minor daughters- 10 yrs old
and 8 yrs old. He was sentenced to suffer in
each case the death penalty.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
The accused was his own sole
witness. He denied raping his two
daughters and shifted the blame on his
drug addict son. He assailed the credibility
of the two daughters testimonies were
replete with incredulous statements, and
insisting that they were motivated by anger
and revenge than by a sincere call for
justice.
He elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (April 27, 2005). The CA affirmed
the conviction, but reduced the death
penalty to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred
in convicting the accused-appelant of the
crime charged despite the fact that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt;
and
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely
erred in imposing the Death Penalty upon
the accused-appelant despite the
prosecutions failure to prove the Special
Qualifying Circumstances of Relationship
and Minority.
RULING:
The appeal has no merit.
1. The trial records entirely supported
the lower courts findings in favor of the
credibility of the two daughters
recollections. On the other hand, the
accused did not bring to the Courts
attention any facts and circumstances of
weight that, if properly considered, would
change the result into one favorable to him.
He did not even submit to the court any
argument that would lead the court to
doubt the findings of the RTC and the CA
on the credibility of the two daughters.
Moreover, long silence and delay in
reporting the crime of rape to the proper
authorities have not always been
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
considered as an indication of a false
accusation.
The Court discussed that, the essence
of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female
either against her will (through force or
intimidation) or without her consent (where
the female is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years
of age, or is demented).
Thus, the presence or absence of
injury or lacerations in the genitalia of the
victim is not decisive of whether rape has
been committed or not. Such injury or
laceration is material only if force or
intimidation is an element of the rape
charged.
The accused may then be convicted
solely on the basis of the victims credible,
natural and convincing testimony.
2. Under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if
the rape is committed with the attendance
of any aggravating/qualifying
circumstances. One of such is when the
victim is under 18 years of age and offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim. Both minority and actual
relationship must be alleged and proved.
During the trial, the Prosecution
adduced no evidence to establish the
minority of one of the raped daughters in
Crim. Case No. 912-V-99. Hence, the court
concurs with the CAs conclusion that the
accused could not be properly found guilty
of qualified rape. Accordingly, the CA
correctly prescribed Reclusion Perpetua as
the penalty.
On the other hand, in Crim. Case No.
974-V-99, it sufficiently stated the minority
of the other daughter and her being a
legitimate daughter of the accused.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
Accordingly, the CA correctly affirmed the
penalty of death.
But, with the intervening passage on
June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, the
imposition of the death penalty has become
prohibited. Thus, the retroactive
application of the prohibition against the
death penalty must be made here because
it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless,
he shall not be eligible for parole, because
Sec 3 of R.A. No. 9346 expressly provides
that persons whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act shall not be eligible for parole
under Act No. 4103, as amended.
x-------------------------------x
#27
Dacudao vs Gonzales
688 SCRA 109
FACTS:
Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao
were among the investors whom Celso G.
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the
Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy
Group buy back agreement that earned
them check payments that were
dishonored.
Thus, they filed a case of syndicated
estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates after the Spouses were
defrauded in a business venture.
The DOJ Secretary issued
Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all
cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for
appropriate action. However, in a separate
order which is Memorandum dated March
2009, it was said that cases already filed
against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the
Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Oro City need not be sent anymore to the
Secretariat of DOJ in Manila.
Because of such DOJ orders, the
complaint of the Spouses was forwarded to
the secretariat of the Special Panel of the
DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the Department Order
and the Memorandum, which according to
the Spouses violated their right to due
process, right to equal protection of the law
and right to speedy disposition of the cases.
The petitioners opined that orders
were unconstitutional or exempting from
coverage cases already filed and pending at
the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro
City. They contended that the assailed
issuances should cover only future cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those
already being investigated. They
maintained that D.O. No. 182 was issued in
violation of the prohibition against passing
laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petitioners
violated the hierarchy of courts.
2. Whether or not the questioned
Department Order and Memorandum
violate the spouses equal protection of the
laws.
3. Whether or not it violated their right
to the speedy disposition of cases.
4. Whether or not the assailed issuances
can be given retroactive effect.
RULING:
1. Yes. The petitioners have unduly
disregarded the hierarchy of courts by
coming directly to the Court with their
petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus without tendering therein any
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special, important or compelling reason to
justify the direct filing of the petition.
The court emphasized that the
concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warrant, habeas corpus and injunction did
not give petitioners the unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort
to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse.
Accordingly, every litigant must
remember that the Court is not the only
judicial forum from which to seek and
obtain effective redress of their grievances.
As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort,
not a court of the first instance. Hence,
every litigant who brings the petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be
mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of
courts, x x x x.
2. No. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction; what it requires
is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid
classification. Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, the classification stands as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.
In issuing the assailed DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the
Secretary of Justice took into account the
relative distance between Cagayan de Oro,
where many complainants against the
Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where
the preliminary investigations would be
conducted by the special panel. He also took
into account that the cases had already
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
been filed in the City Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO
No. 182. Given the considerable number of
complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro
City, the Secretary of Justice was fully
justified in excluding the cases commenced
in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO
No. 182.
3. No. The Court has clarified that
although the Constitution guarantees the
right to the speedy disposition of cases,
such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept.
The consolidation of the cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for
the parties with the least cost and vexation
to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed
involved similar or related questions to be
dealt with during the preliminary
investigation, the Secretary of Justice
rightly found the consolidation of the cases
to be the most feasible means of promoting
the efficient use of public resources and of
having a comprehensive investigation of
the cases.
4. Yes.
As a general rule, laws shall have no
retroactive effect. However, exceptions
exist, and one such exception concerns a
law that is procedural in nature. The reason
is that a remedial statute or a statute
relating to remedies or modes of procedure
does not create new rights or take away
vested rights but only operates in
furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights. A
statute or rule regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of its passage. All procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The retroactive application is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel
Law Students Help Group Philippines
adversely affected, for, verily, no vested
right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
x---------------------------------------------x
#28
Nazareth vs Villar
689 SCRA 385
FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy
of the State to provide a program for human
resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain
the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for
total science and technology mastery.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for
the payment of the Magna Carta benefits
are to be appropriated by the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year
following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
Thereafter, Brenda Nazareth, DOST
Regional Office No. IX released the Magna
Carta benefits to the covered officials and
employees commencing in CY 1998 despite
the absence of specific appropriation for the
purpose in the GAA.
Subsequently, following the post-
audit conducted by COA State Auditor
Ramon E. Vargas, several Notices of
Disallowance were issued disapproving the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits.
Provision for use of saving of GAA was
vetoed by the President.
The disallowance by the COA
prompted then DOST Secretary Dr.
Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of
the President (OP) through his
Memorandum a Request for Authority to
Use Savings for the Payment of Magna
Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439,
for the authority to utilize the DOSTs
savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
Then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, acting by authority of the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
President, approved the request of
Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
Hence, the petitioner lodged an
appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director
Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.
The appeal was referred to the
Regional Legal and Adjudication Director
(RLAD) which denied the appeal and
affirmed the NDs. Thus, the petitioner
elevated the matter to the COA Legal and
Adjudication Office.
Director Khem N. Inok of the COA
Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a
decision denying the petitioners appeal
with the modification that only the NDs
covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY
2000 were to be set aside in view of the
authorization issued by Executive
Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the
President.
Hence, the appellant filed the instant
petition for review with the main argument
that the payment of Magna Carta benefits
to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX
employees are allowed pursuant to RA No.
8439.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment of
Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999
and 2001 is valid and legal.
RULING:
No. In the funding of current
activities, projects, and programs, the
general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the
appropriations bill is the extent Congress
will determine as sufficient for the
budgetary allocation for the proponent
agency.
The only exception is found in Section
25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by
which the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of
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Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions are authorized
to transfer appropriations to augment any
item in the GAA for their respective offices
from the savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
It bears emphasizing that the
exception in favor of the high officials
named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution limiting the authority to
transfer savings only to augment another
item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive.
The prohibition to transfer an
appropriation for one item to another was
explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. The prohibition against the
transfer of appropriations is the general
rule. Consequently, the payment of the
Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without
a specific item or provision in the GAA and
without due authority from the President to
utilize the DOSTs savings in other items
for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No.
8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted
GAA for 2001.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that
the DOST officials who caused the payment
of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered
officials and employees acted in good faith
in the honest belief that there was a firm
legal basis for the payment of the benefits.
The Court declares and holds that the
disallowed benefits received in good faith
need not be reimbursed to the Government.
x-------------------------------x
#29
Funa vs Agra
691 SCRA 196
FACTS:
Agra was then the Government
Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo
designated him as the Acting Solicitor
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
General in place of former Sol Gen
Devanadera, who has been appointed as the
Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was
designated as the Acting Secretary in place
of Secretary Devanadera when the latter
resigned. Agra then relinquished his
position as Corporate Counsel and
continued to perform the duties of an Acting
Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned
his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a
temporary capacity. Even assuming that he
was holding multiple offices at the same
time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen
is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he
never received salaries and emoluments for
being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of
Justice.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Agras designation as
Acting Secretary of Justice is valid.
2. Whether or not Agra may
concurrently hold the positions by virtue of
the hold-over principle.
3. Whether or not the offices of the
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is
in an ex officio capacity in relation to the
other.
RULING:
1. No. The designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates
the constitutional prohibition under Article
VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras
designation was in an acting or temporary
capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that
the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the
Cabinet Members in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government
Law Students Help Group Philippines
or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held
by one official must be construed as to apply
to all appointments or designations,
whether permanent or temporary, because
the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.
2. No. Agras designation as the Acting
Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio
capacity, by which he would have been
validly authorized to concurrently hold the
two positions due to the holding of one office
being the consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter
prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra
cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7
(2) of the Constitution to justify his
designation as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his designation as Acting
Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not
sufficient for Agra to show that his holding
of the other office was allowed by law or
the primary functions of his position. To
claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
needed to establish that his concurrent
designation was expressly allowed by the
Constitution.
3. No. The powers and functions of the
Solicitor General are neither required by
the primary functions nor included in the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The
OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a
constituent of the latter, as in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that
the OSG is independent and autonomous.
With the enactment of RA 9417, the
Solicitor General is now vested with a
cabinet rank, and has the same
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, allowances, benefits and
privileges as those of Presiding Judges of
the Court of Appeals.
x-------------------------------x
#30
Manalang-Demigillo vs TIDCORP
G.R. No. 168613
March 5, 2013
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized
the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of
appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario
Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was
appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15)
with permanent status, and was assigned
to the Legal and Corporate Services
Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.
Thereafter, the Board of Directors
passed Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002,
on October 22, 2002 to approve a so-called
Organizational Refinement/Restructuring
Plan to implement a new organizational
structure and staffing pattern, a position
classification system, and a new set of
qualification standards.
LCSD was abolished. Ma. Rosario
Manalang- Demigillo, albeit retaining her
position as a Senior Vice President, was
assigned to head the Remedial and Credit
Management Support Sector (RCMSS). On
the same date, President Valdes issued her
appointment as head of RCMSS, such
appointment being in nature a The CA ruled that being the alter ego
reappointment under the reorganization
plan.
Demigillo challenged before the
Board of Directors the validity of Resolution
No. 1365 and of her assignment to the
RCMSS. She averred that she had been
thereby illegally removed from her position
of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to
which she had been previously assigned
Law Students Help Group Philippines
during the reorganization of July 1998. She
insisted the Board of Directors had not been
authorized to undertake the reorganization
and corporate restructuring.
Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), raising the same issues.
The CSC ruled through Resolution
No. 041092 that the 2002 Organizational
Refinements or Restructuring Plan of
TIDCORP had been valid for being
authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656; that
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 granted
a continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of
Directors to prescribe the agencys
organizational structure, staffing pattern
and compensation packages; and that such
grant continued until declared invalid by a
court of competent jurisdiction or revoked
by Congress.
The CSC held, however, that
TIDCORPs implementation of its
reorganization did not comply with Section
6 of Republic Act No. 6656, that although
there was no diminution in Demigillos
rank, salary and status, there was
nonetheless a demotion in her functions
and authority.
The CSC further held that the
dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not
comply with the mandatory requirement
under Section 2, particularly 2.2 Rule XII of
the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions
Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of
1998.
of the President of the Philippines, the
Board of Directors of the TIDCORP is
authorized by law to have a continuous
power to reorganize its agency.
It further ruled that, reorganizations
have been regarded as valid provided they
are pursued in good faith. Reorganization
Moreover, it ruled that in utter
disregard of respondent Demigillos right to
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
security of tenure, petitioner TIDCORP
demoted her in the guise of
"reorganization."
Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Board of Directors
of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the
President who had the continuing authority
to reorganize TIDCORP.
2. Whether or not the reorganization of
TIDCORP effected in 2002 was valid.
3. Whether or not Demigillo had been
legally dropped from the rolls.
RULING:
1. No. The doctrine of qualified political
agency could not be extended to the acts of
the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite
some of its members being themselves the
appointees of the President to the Cabinet.
Under Section 10 of Presidential
Decree No. 1080, as further amended by
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five
ex officio members were the Secretary of
Finance, the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General
of the National Economic and Development
Authority, and the Chairman of the
Philippine Overseas Construction Board,
while the four other members of the Board
were the three from the private sector (at
least one of whom should come from the
export community), who were elected by the
ex officio members of the Board for a term
of not more than two consecutive years, and
the President of TIDCORP who was
concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the
Board.
Such Cabinet members sat on the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or
by reason of their office or function, not
because of their direct appointment to the
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Board by the President. Evidently, it was
the law, not the President that sat them in
the Board.
When the members of the Board of
Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the
responsible members of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP constituted
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080,
as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not
as the alter egos of the President.
2. Yes. The court upholds the 2002
reorganization and declares it valid for
being done in accordance with the exclusive
and final authority expressly granted under
Republic Act No. 8494, further amending
Presidential Decree No. 1080, and the law
creating TIDCORP itself.
Section 7. The Board of Directors
shall provide for an organizational
structure and staffing pattern for officers
and employees of the Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint
and fix their remuneration, emoluments
and fringe benefits: Provided, That the
Board shall have exclusive and final
authority to appoint, promote, transfer,
assign and re-assign personnel of the
TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to
the contrary notwithstanding.
3. No. Having found the 2002
reorganization to be valid and made
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8494, we
declare that there are no legal and practical
bases for reinstating Demigillo to her
former position as Senior Vice President in
the LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization
plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place
a set-up completely different from the
previous one, including a new staffing
pattern in which Demigillo would be
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
heading the RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice
President of TIDCORP.
Hence, Demigillo was not demoted
because she did not suffer any diminution
in her rank, status and salary under the
reorganization. Her reassignment to the
RCMSS, a smaller unit compared to the
LCSD, maintained for her the same rank of
Senior Vice-President with a corresponding
increase in pay grade. The reassignment
resulted from the valid reorganization.
x---------------------------------x
#31
Maliksi vs. COMELEC & SAQUILAVAN
G.R. NO. 203302
APRIL 11, 2013
FACTS:
Due to the election protest filed by
Maliksi in RTC, Mayor Saquilavan was
removed from his office and Maliksi replaced
him. On Appeal, COMELEC Division decided
to recount the ballots using the printouts ballot
images from CF cards without notice to the
parties. CA rendered its decision nullifying the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC Division
exercising appellate jurisdiction has a right to
conduct recount of the ballots.
2. Whether or not Maliksi was denied of
due process.
HELD:
1. No. COMELEC Division should not have
conducted the recount proceedings because it
was exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rules of procedure allowed it
to conduct a recount.
Sec. 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended, provides that recount
proceedings are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Division only in the exercise of
original jurisdiction over all election
protests involving elective regional (the
Law Students Help Group Philippines
autonomous regions) provincial and city
official.
2. Yes. Due process of law does not
only require notice of the decryption
printing and record proceedings to the
parties but also demand an opportunity to
be present at such proceedings or to be
represented therein.
Rule 15, Sec. 6 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9164 require the parties
presence during the printing of images of the
ballots.
x----------------------------------x
#32
Re: Complaint of Fabiana
700 SCRA 348
FACTS:
Merlita Fabiana claimed death benefits
against Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
(MMC) and its principal Air Sea Holiday.
When the NLRC reduced the moral damages
and exemplary damages awarded by Labor
Arbiter, Fabiana appealed before CA seeking
the reinstatement of moral and exemplary
damages awarded by Labor Arbiter. On the
other hand, MMC likewise appealed before the
CA, challenging the propriety of the monetary
awards granted to heirs of Fabiana. Fabianas
appeal was partly granted and achieved
finality. In view of the decision made on the
first appeal, Fabiana moved to dismiss the
second petition as according to her the first
petition rendered the second petition moot and
academic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA Justices willfully
disobeyed the decision in the first petition.
HELD:
The complaint lacks merit. In
administrative proceedings, the burden of
substantiating the charges falls on the
complainant who must prove her allegations in
the complaint by substantial evidence. The
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
allegations of willful disobedience against
respondent CA Justices was unsubstantiated
and baseless.
The issues raised in the first petition
were limited to the NLRCs jurisdiction over
the appeal by MMC and its principal and the
reduction of amounts awarded as moral and
exemplary damages. The second petition
concerned the propriety of awarding the
monetary benefits.
Under the circumstances, the
promulgation by the Court of the resolution in
the first petition did not dives the respondent
as members of First Division of CA of the
jurisdiction to entertain and pass upon the
second petition. Something that they sought to
explain through their resolution, the
explanation whether correct or not, was issued
in the exercise of judicial discretion.
x-------------------------------x
#33
In Re: Judge Carbonell
August 9, 2013 A.M. 08-5-305
FACTS:
RTC Br. 27 San Fernando, La Union was
subjected to a judicial audit by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA). The audit report
revealed that Judge Carbonell failed to decide
63 cases and to resolve 16 pending motions or
incidents within the reglementary period.
Judge Carbonell argued that the undecided
cases were inherited by him and that said cases
had no transcript of stenographic notes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the period of deciding
cases is interrupted or suspended due to lack of
stenographic notes.
HELD:
No. Administrative Circular No. 8
provides that a case is submitted for decision
upon the admission of the evidence of the
parties at the termination of the trial. The 90-
day period for deciding the case shall
commence to run from the submission of the
case for decision without memoranda or upon
filing of the last memoranda or the expiration
Law Students Help Group Philippines
of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.
Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall
not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend
the period of deciding the case unless the case
was previously heard by another judge not the
deciding judge in which case the later shall
have the full period of 90 days from the
completion of the transcripts within which to
decide the case.
x-------------------------------x
#34
Samson vs Era
701 SCRA 241
FACTS:
Atty. Era represented Samson in a
criminal case against Sison for estafa. Samson
executed an affidavit of desistance and in
turned they received a deed of assignment
covering the land which was executed by Sison.
Samson later on found out that the title of the
land was already in the name of a bank. Atty.
Era did not appear for the group of Samson
during the hearing. Atty. Era represented
Sison in her other criminal cases involving the
same pyramiding scam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Era violated the
trust and confidence of a client by representing
conflicting interest.
HELD:
Yes. Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest
except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his
group entire devotion to their genuine interest
and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of their rights. He was expected to exert his
best efforts and ability to preserve the clients
cause for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his clients likewise served the ends of justice.
x---------------------------------------x
#35
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
CONCERNED CITIZEN VS. CARTENA
705 SCRA 255
FACTS:
Cartena was a Court Stenographer III of
RTC. She was being accused that another
person took the CSC eligibility examination in
her stead. While the investigation was still
ongoing, Cartena resigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has
jurisdiction on the administrative case against
Cartena.
HELD:
The resignation of Cartena did not cause
the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed
against her in her administrative case. Her
cessation from office by virtue of her
intervening resignation did not warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint
against her, for the act complained of had been
committed when she was still in the service.
Nor did such cessation from office render the
administrative case moot and academic.
Otherwise, exacting responsibility for
administrative liabilities incurred would be
easily avoided or evaded.
Contributor: MARICELMONTECILLO
facebook.com/miracle19maricel
Case year/s: 2013
x-------------------------------x
#36
Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic
704 SCRA 561,
FACTS:
On Feb 20, 1998 Malabanan fled an
applicaton for land registraton, covering a
parcel of land inSilang Cavite. He bought the
land from one Velasco and had been in open,
notorious, continuous and adverse and peaceful
possession for more than 30 years. He also
presented tax declaration since 1948.
ISSUE:
Whether Malabanans possession of the
land had already ripened to ownership.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
RULING:
There are two ways how Malabanan can
acquire the property:(A) Under SEC 14(1) of
PD1529, which states that those who by
themselves or through heirpredecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since June 12, 1945.
Under this, the land need not to be
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession. One can secure judicial
confirmation as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable. (B) Under SEC 14(2) of
PD1529, which pertains to prescription as a
mode of acquiring ownership over
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY of the state but
there must be an express declaration that such
property is already patrimonial. The
prescriptive period is 10 years if with just title
and 30 years if no just title. Petton was denied
because Malabanan is not qualified under he
two circumstances. In the first, there is no
evidence of possession since June 12, 1945
since his tax declaration is only since 1948.
While under the second circumstance, the
property becomes patrimonial only since 1982
and the 30-year period of prescription is not yet
met.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
#37
Embido vs Pe, Jr.
708 SCRA 1
Facts:
A complaint for disbarment against
respondent Pe was instituted by the NBI,
represented by Regional Director Embido, after
Pe allegedly falsied a court document for a
proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction.
The Clerk of Court of the RTC, received
2 letters from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Solicitor in the United Kingdom, requesting for
a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings
Case No.084 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Quioyo. They found, however, that the RTC
had no record, as Special Proceedings No. 084
was docketed as In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando
Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena
Catin Austria.
The NBI recommended that respondent
be prosecuted for falsication of public
document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act3019, as well as for the
Oce of the Court Administrator to commence
disbarment proceedings against him.
The IBP found respondent guilty of
serious misconduct and violations of the
Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one
year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pe is guilty of serious
misconduct.
RULING:
The respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for having authored the
falsification of the decision in a non-existent
court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all
lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity
and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers
are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility not to engage in
any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent
transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law.25
Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act
that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude
on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of
Law Students Help Group Philippines
the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which
was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
x---------------------------------------x
#38
DE LEON vs PEDREA
708 SCRA 13
Facts:
Atty. Tyrone Pedrea, a Public Attorney
of Paraaque City. Jocelyn De Leon is a single
mother of two minor children. Atty. Pedrea is
the counsel of Jocelyn De Leon on the case for
support for the two minor children.
Records show, as established by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, on January 30,
2006 after asking about the status of the case
Atty. Pedrea told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride
with him and he would just drop Jocelyn by the
jeepney station, she refused to ride with him
but Atty. Pedrea persistently told her to get in
the car, and so she acceded to his request so as
not to offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedrea
rubbed the Jocelyns right leg with his hand
tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed
hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it
on his crotch area; and pressed his finger
against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter
tried at all cost to unlock the cars door and told
him categorically that she was getting off the
car. Instead he accelerated a bit more but
sensing her insistence to get off, he stopped the
car, and allowed her to get off.
Jocelyn de Leon then filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint for disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone
Pedrea.
IBP Investigating Commissioner
recommended for his disbarment, the IBP
Board of Governors however modified the
penalty to three-month suspension from
practice of law. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration by Atty. Pedrea which the
Board denied, they increased the penalty to six
months. Thereafter transmitted records and
resolution to the Court for approval.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pedrea is guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Pedrea is guilty. The
Supreme Court adopted the findings and
conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner.
Yet, the Court consider the recommended
penalty of suspension for six months not
commensurate with the gravity of the offensive
acts committed.
Given the circumstances in which Atty.
Pedrea committed them, his acts were not
merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive,
disgraceful and grossly immoral. In this
regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys
sense of decency.
Therefore, the Court took into
consideration judicial precedents on gross
immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters.
The Court consider the acts committed by Atty.
Pedrea to be not of the same degree as the acts
committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub
v. Suller, among other cases whereby the
respondent lawyer was disbarred for raping his
neighbors wife. Unlike in Barrientos where
there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where
there were threats and taking advantage of a
lawyers position, Atty. Pedrea did not employ
any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he
desisted upon the first signs of the De Leons
firm refusal to give in to his advances.
In view of these considerations,
according to the Court penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two years is fitting
and just.
x-------------------------------------------x
#39
GANZON vs ARLOS
708 SCRA 115
Law Students Help Group Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando Ganzon, an employee
of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), seeks the reversal of his
dismissal from the service and the accessory
penalties on the ground of grave misconduct.
Antecedents
During the Christmas party held by the
Iloilo DILG, respondent Arlos left the said
party and went to the second floor of the
building to get some documents.
While Arlos was making his way to the
stairs, Ganzon suddenly approached and pulled
out a short firearm of unknown caliber from his
waist and with no provocation pointed the
firearm at Arlos, angrily shouting at him.
Sensing that Ganzon would shoot him then,
Arlos quickly warded off Ganzons firearm-
wielding hand. Ganzon again aimed the
firearm at Arlos, prompting the latter to run
away as fast as he could. Ganzon followed
Arlos, and when they got to the gate of the
building, Ganzon once more pushed him back
and pointed the firearm at him.
The incidents impelled Arlos to
administratively charge Ganzon with grave
misconduct.
On his part, Ganzon denied the charge
and elected to undergo a formal investigation.
During the formal investigation conducted by
CSC Regional Office, the parties agreed that in
order to dispense with the presentation of
witnesses and other evidence, they would just
adopt the evidence presented in the pending
criminal prosecution for attempted homicide
entitled People v. Ganzon.
The witnesses for the Prosecution
attested that Ganzon had threatened and
aimed a firearm at Arlos.
In his turn, Ganzon presented himself
and two others, who described a different
version of the incident.
The CSC found Ganzon guilty of grave
misconduct.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not attending a Christmas
party as required by the office is an official
function and that any untoward incident
committed during such Christmas party is
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
automatically considered service related and
that the offender could be liable for grave
misconduct?
II. Whether or not the alleged act
committed by the petitioner was intimately
related to his office in order to consider it as
grave misconduct in the contemplation of the
law.
III. Whether or not the penalty of dismissal
is unjust and excessive.15
RULING:
The appeal has no merit.
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of an established rule must be manifest.
Drawing and pointing the loaded
firearm at Arlos evinced the intent on the part
of Ganzon to cause some harm upon Arlos on
whom he vented his resentment of the poor
performance rating he received.
Nonetheless, Ganzon projects that his
acts did not constitute grave misconduct in the
contemplation of the law because they were not
committed in relation to his performance of
duty; and that the Christmas party was not an
official function as to render any untoward
incident committed on the occasion thereof a
misconduct. He posits that his offense could
exist without the office; and that the holding of
the office was not a constituent element of his
offense.
We disagree.
To begin with, he was not acting in a
private capacity when he acted menacingly
towards Arlos, it being clear that his
resentment of his poor performance rating,
surely a matter that concerned his performance
of duty, motivated his confronting the latter.
Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were
committed outside of office hours, because they
were intimately connected to the office of the
offender. An act is intimately connected to the
Law Students Help Group Philippines
office of the offender if it is committed as the
consequence of the performance of the office by
him, or if it cannot exist without the office even
if public office is not an element of the crime in
the abstract.
Considering that Ganzon resented the
poor performance rating he had received, and
his resentment caused his aggressive
confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears
that Ganzons offense could not be separated
from his performance of duty. Indeed, under
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan and its progenitor
rulings, an act that is the consequence of the
discharge of the employees official functions or
the performance of his duties, or that is
relevant to his office or to the discharge of his
official functions is justly considered as service-
related.
Even if the incident occurred outside
regular work hours, Ganzons menacing
attitude towards Arlos still had no excuse,
particularly as Arlos was his superior in the
office hierarchy. Section 4(c) of RA 6713 (Code
of Conduct Standards for Public Officials and
Employees) fittingly provides:
(c) Justness and sincerity. Public
officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness
and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect
the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
It is almost superfluous to remind all public
employees like Ganzon that the law of good
manners and proper decorum was law during
as well as outside office hours.
Finally, Ganzons insistence that the
penalty of dismissal from the service imposed
on him was unjustified and excessive is
unwarranted.
After being duly found guilty of grave
misconduct, Ganzon was rightly meted the
penalty of dismissal from the service for his
first offense conformably with the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,27 to wit:
RULE IV
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Penalties
Section 52. Classification of Offenses.
Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave or
light, depending on their gravity or depravity
and effects on the government service.
A The following are grave offenses with
their corresponding penalties:
1. Dishonesty;
xxxx
3. Grave Misconduct;
1st offense Dismissal (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, Section 56 and Section 58
of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
respectively state that the penalty of dismissal
shall result in the permanent separation of the
respondent from the service, with or without
prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and shall
carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits and the
perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in the government
x---------------------------------------x
#40
Vivo vs PAGCOR
709 SCRA 276
By petition for review on certiorari the
petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the
decision, whereby the Court of Appeals CA)
reversed and set aside the resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC)
The petitioner was employed by
respondent Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and was
PAGCORs Managing Head of its Gaming
Department at the time of his dismissal from
office.5 .He received a letter from the Senior
Managing Head of PAGCORs Human
Resources Department, advising that he was
being administratively charged with gross
misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct
prejudicial to the interest of the company, and
loss of trust and confidence;6 that he should
submit a written explanation of the charges;
and that he was at the same time being placed
under preventive suspension.7
Law Students Help Group Philippines
Petitioners counsel assailed the
propriety of the show-cause memorandum as
well as the basis for placing the petitioner
under preventive suspension.
Petitioner received the summons to
attend an administrative inquiry, requiring
him to appear before PAGCORs Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU).8 At the petitioners
request, however, the inquiry was conducted at
his residence. He was furnished the
memorandum of charges that recited the
accusations against him and indicated the acts
and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
The memorandum of charges was based on the
statements of PAGCOR personnel who had
personal knowledge of the accusations against
him. However, when his counsel requested to
be furnished copies of the statements,
PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground
that he had already been afforded the sufficient
opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the
charges against him during the administrative
inquiry.
The Adjudication Committee summoned
the petitioner to appear in order to address
questions regarding his case. His counsel
moved for the re-scheduling of the meeting
because he would not be available on said date,
but the Adjudication Committee denied the
request upon the reason that the presence of
counsel was not necessary in the proceedings.
PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the
service.11A motion for reconsideration was
filed, however, denied. Petitioner appealed his
dismissal to the CSC which ruled that
PAGCOR had violated the petitioners right to
due process, and accordingly set aside his
dismissal from the service. In fine, the
Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due
process was violated when he was ousted from
his office without the corresponding Board
Resolution that should have set out the
collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of
Directors.
PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA.
CA promulgated its decision reversing and
setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its
finding that the petitioner had been accorded
procedural due process. The CA remanded the
case to the CSC for the determination of the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
appeal of the petitioner on the merits,
specifically the issue of whether the dismissal
had been for cause.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioners right to due process
was violated.
2. WON CAs decision was contrary to the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.
HELD:
1. No. The Court ruled that the petitioner
was not denied due process of law, for he was
afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain his side. That was sufficient to meet the
requirements of due process. In Casimiro v.
Tandog, the Court pronounced:
The essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, such as in the case
at bar, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. "To be heard"
does not mean only verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
The petitioner actively participated in
the entire course of the investigation and
hearings conducted by PAGCOR. In contrast,
the petitioner could not dispute the observance
of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set
forth herein. It is settled that there is no denial
of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded.19
2. No. In administrative proceedings,
procedural due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
and to defend ones rights (3) a tribunal vested
Law Students Help Group Philippines
with competent jurisdiction and so constituted
as to afford a person charged administratively
a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing
or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible
error in holding that P AGCOR had properly
observed the requirements of due process in its
administrative proceedings against the
petitioner.
Therefore, the petition for review on
certiorari was denied.
x-----------------------x
#43
Ong vs Delos Santos
717 SCRA 663
Facts:
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin
Ong was introduced to respondent Atty.
William F. Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando
Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. After several calls and personal
interactions between them, Ong and Atty.
Delos Santos became friends.
In time, according to Ong, Atty. Delos
Santos asked him to encash his postdated
check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash.
To reassure Ong that the check would be
funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos
bragged about his lucrative practice and his
good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos
Santos financial stability, Ong handed to Atty.
Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount
of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latters
Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated
February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored
upon presentment for the reason that the
account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of
the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter
just ignored him. When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal
complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos Santos.
Ong also brought this disbarment complaint
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed
the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
Issue:
By issuing the worthless check, did Atty.
Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Ruling:
Every lawyer is an officer of the Court.
He has the duty and responsibility to maintain
his good moral character. In this regard, good
moral character is not only a condition
precedent relating to his admission into the
practice of law, but is a continuing imposition
in order for him to maintain his membership in
the Philippine Bar. The Court unwaveringly
demands of him to remain a competent,
honorable, and reliable individual in whom the
public may repose confidence. Any gross
misconduct that puts his moral character in
serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in
the practice of law.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.
Lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or in
their private capacity, if such conduct renders
them unfit to continue to be officers of the
court.
That his act involved a private dealing
with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer
invested him whether he was acting as such
or in a non-professional capacity with the
obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and
candor in his relationship with others. There is
no question that a lawyer could be disciplined
not only for a malpractice in his profession, but
Law Students Help Group Philippines
also for any misconduct committed outside of
his professional capacity. His being a lawyer
demanded that he conduct himself as a person
of the highest moral and professional integrity
and probity in his dealings with others.
x---------------x
#44
Re: Disbarment against CA Justices
718 SCRA 335
FACTS:
Usita disclosed by name the members of
the AMALI Board of Directors who had
authorized him to file the present complaint, as
follows: (a) Atty. Vicente Acsay; (b) Felizardo R.
Colambo; (c), Arnel F. Hibo; (d) Darwin V.
Dominguez; and (e) Alberto L. Buenviaje.
On September 30, 2014, the Court
directed the abovenamed officers of AMALI to
show cause in writing why they should not be
held liable for indirect contempt for degrading
the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices of the CA, and for interfering with the
due performance of their work for the Judicial.
The aforenamed members of the AMALI
Board, with the exception of Atty. Acsay who
had meanwhile passed away on March 29,
2014, uniformly manifested that only Atty.
Acsay, Hibo and Dominguez had taken part in
the meeting of the Board of Directors at which
the resolution to file the present complaint had
been adopted; that it was Atty. Acsay who had
moved for the approval of the resolution; and
that they had caused the filing of the
administrative complaint in their belief that
they were thereby raising a valid legal issue,
without any intention of offending or
disrespecting respondent Associate Justices of
the CA.It was further manifested that Colambo
and Buenviaje had been absent from the
meeting when the resolution to file the
complaint had been tackled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not members of AMALI's
Board of Directors are hereby found and
pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of court
RULING:
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
The above named members of AMALI's
Board of Directors are hereby found and
pronounced guilty of indirect contempt of court
for thereby causing the bringing of the
unfounded and unwarranted administrative
charges against respondent Associate Justices
of the CA in order to intimidate or harass them,
thereby directly or indirectly impeding,
obstructing or degrading the administration of
justice.
Any sanction, to be proper, should be
commensurate to the contumacious conduct of
Usita and the abovenamed members of
AMALI's Board of Directors. The sanction
should be meaningful and condign; otherwise,
it would be mocked and derided, rendering it
inutile for the purpose. It must also be within
the bounds of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
whose Section 7 relevantly provides:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect
contempt. - If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. Considering that
Colambo and Bucnviaje did not take
part in the meeting of the Board of
Directors of AMALI, they are absolved of
liability for indirect contempt of court.
Likewise, Garry de Vera is absolved of
any liability because he was a mere
messenger of AMALI.
x---------------------------x
45
OCA vs Larida, Jr.
718 SCRA 359
Facts:
An investigation was led by Court
Administrator Jose Portugal Perez, upon the
instruction of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in
light of the report filed by Atty. Stanlee D.C.
Calma, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch
18, Tagaytay City, about the fire which gutted
the records room of the aforementioned branch.
The investigative team discovered the
following anomalies against Presiding Judge
Edwin G. Larida (Judge Larida), to wit:
Law Students Help Group Philippines
1. Violation of Administrative Circular No.
28-2008, in authorizing the detail of locally-
funded employees to his court without
obtaining permission from the Supreme Court,
and in allowing them to take custody of court
records and to draft court orders and decisions
for him;
2. Knowingly allowing detailed employees
Jason Marticio, Larry Laggui and Napoleon
Cabanizas to demand commissions from
bonding companies in exchange for the
issuance of release orders;
3. Extorting money from detained accused
Raymund Wang, with the help of Jason
Marticio and Larry Laggui;
4. Defying the directive of the Supreme
Court in Administrative Order No. 132-2008,
dated 15 September 2008, to stop from trying
and hearing cases and to instead, decide cases
already submitted for decision;
5. Releasing the accused on bail in
Criminal Case No. TG-4382-03 for Violation of
Section 8, Article II, RA 9165 (Manufacturing
or Engaging in the Manufacture of, in a
Clandestine Laboratory, Large Quantity of
Metamphetamine Hydrochloride, Commonly
Known as Shabu) despite their positive
identification as the perpetrators of the crime;
6. Granting a motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. TG-5307-06
without a case record and without requiring a
comment from the prosecutor; and
7. Granting a petition for the issuance of
owner's duplicate copies of various titles in
LRC case No. TG-06-1183 under questionable
circumstances.
8. That the respondent judge is held liable
for the fire that occurred in the records room of
RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is
administratively liable of the anomalies, as
charged?
Held:
1. Yes. Firstly, Judge Larida committed
lapses and laxity by allowing his staff, Jayson
Marticio, to do legal research and to draft court
orders in Branch 18, which is beyond his
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
clerical functions. Thus, a violation of
Administrative Circular No. 28-2008.
Furthermore, the respondent judge
cannot entirely be at fault for having failed to
comply with the submission of an inventory of
locally-funded personnel detailed to his office,
pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 28-
2008. Such preparation is tasked to the Branch
Clerk of Court, Atty. Calma, upon his
knowledge of such Circular from the
newspaper, to be signed by the respondent
judge. The records lack any clear evidence
showing the respondents wilful refusal to sign
and submit the inventory to the Court.
Moreover, Trial judges have usually delegated
various reporting tasks to their clerks of court
or other members of their staff in order to gain
more time for their adjudications and other
important written work. The court, thus,
presumes that his non-compliance with the
Circular was not motivated with malice, and
therefore entitled to a mitigating circumstance
in his favor.
Lastly, the physical carrying of court
records to and from the court chambers and
staff room is a mere messengerial activity
which the said Circular allows.
Hence, the court finds the respondent
liable for a less serious charge under Section 11
of Rule 140, Rules of Court, as amended.
2. Yes. A Judge is imposed with the duty
to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which he would have
become aware, pursuant to Rule 3.10A of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
The respondent was not unaware of the
solicitations done by the employees from the
complaining bonding company. What he did
was a mere confrontation in the presence of the
representative of such company, telling them to
stop such solicitations. He should have
conducted a firmer action, and immediately
caused for an investigation and have the
employees be dealt with accordingly.
Therefore, Judge Larida is hereby found
guilty of unbecoming conduct, a light charge
under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
Law Students Help Group Philippines
3. No. The court rejects any imputation of
judicial misconduct.
A sole affidavit attesting that a judge
demanded bribe in exchange for the
exoneration of an accused being tried before
him is not sufficient. There must be competent
and sufficient evidence to render an
administrative complaint against a judge for
misconduct to prosper.
Hence, the charge against the respondent of
bribery shall be dismissed.
4. No. The cease and desist order was
given only as a remedial measure to ensure
that he will be able to write decisions of the
long-pending 139 undecided cases.
The judges issuance of the 2 orders 2 or
3 days after the effectivity of AO No. No. 132-
2008 lacks any intent to violate or circumvent
the aforementioned AO. There was no showing
of the exact date as to when the respondent
judge was notified as such administrative
circulars and issuances take time to reach the
lower courts.
5. No. In a petition for bail, the
determination as to whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong is a matter left to the
sound discretion of a judge. The investigating
justice finds that the respondent judge
exercised a sound and reasonable discretion by
having given a lot of thought to the petition for
bail before its grant. The respondent Judge
found that there was lack or improper
identification of the accused in the case before
him; as such, was one of the grounds for the
grant of the petition.
Atty. Calma alleged that the resolution
was released under suspicious circumstances
considering that Atty. Albert T. Villanueva,
counsel for the defense, had already gone to the
RTC ready to post cash bail of Php 200,000.00
for each of the accused prior to the release of
resolution grating their bail.
In Atty. Villanuevas testimony, he
mentioned that upon his knowledge that their
petition for bail had been granted, he then
proceeded to take care of the Order of Release
of his clients, and other court requirements for
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
the posting of the cash bail bond as he was told
by court personnel that there are no cases to be
heard that afternoon, they have a lot of time to
take care of the Order of Release. Upon his
submission of the necessary documents which
were found to be in order by the personnel in
charge, the counsel was able to secure the
Order of Release.
Anent the foregoing circumstances, Atty.
Calmas bare allegations cannot overcome Atty
Villanuevas testimony of his presence in Brach
18. The court, thus, finds for the dismissal of
the charge of improper grant of bail by the
respondent Judge.
6. No. The accused, Jayson Espiritu, in the
criminal case was a minor of 15 years and 11
months, which is proven by a copy of his birth
certificate attached to his motion to quash.
Hence he is entitled to the quashal for being
exempt from criminal liability in accordance
with Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006).
However, the public prosecutor must
have been given the opportunity to comment on
the motion. Nonetheless, in absence of any
proof of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in the
exercise of his judicial capacity, he cannot be
sanctioned therefor, albeit an erroneous one.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the
accusations of bribery against the respondent
judge in the given issue cannot be given merit
on the basis of innuendo and hearsay, hence,
dismissed.
7. No. The judicial affidavit as presented
as evidence against the respondent judge, was
bereft of any showing of irregularities in the
disposition of the case.
The administrative charges against the
respondent must be viewed with utmost care,
and must be proven beyond reasonable doubt
for being highly penal in character.
Since, no other witnesses were presented
to substantiate such charges, the court
recommended for its dismissal for lack of
evidence and substantiation.
8. No. there was no evidence directly
linking him to the arson incident since Judge
Law Students Help Group Philippines
Larida was hospitalized for kidney injury
which he sustained in October 9, 2008.
His alleged lack of interest in the
investigation of the arson incident was in fact,
due to the OCAs order that he be barred from
reporting for work; he was not summoned for
any interview, and that he leaned from the NBI
that they had been ordered to cease from
further investigating the fire incident upon the
OCAs entry in the investigation.
x-----------------------------x
#46
Heck vs Gamotin, Jr.
719 SCRA 339
Facts:
Heinz Heck, the petitioner filed a
complaint for disbarment against then City
Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin of Cagayan de
Oro City, for "faulty, highly improper,
suspicious anomalous and unlawful practice"
by the respondent, who had obstructed justice
by delaying cases and disregarding proper
court procedures, and displayed favor towards
Atty. Adaza his business partners and friends.
Petitioner claimed that when he went to
the respondents office, the respondent
furiously KICKED the chair which was holding
the door to his office open and then SLAMMED
the door. He also claimed that the respondent
was entertaining Atty. Adaza despite his
having been already suspended from the
practice of law by the Supreme Court.
Respondent claims that he has no
knowledge of the suspension of Atty Adaza
because such information had not been
disseminated to the public offices. Respondent
also asserts that he did not display any act of
violence, particularly the kicking of the chair
and slamming of the door.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent breached any
canon on professional conduct or legal ethics.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the
complaint should be dismissed for failure to
prove the charges filed. The evidence adduced
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
by the complainant insufficient to warrant the
disbarment of the respondent. The power to
disbar, being the most severe form of
disciplinary action, must be exercised with
caution. It must be exercised only for the most
imperative reasons and in cases of clear
misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the bar.
x----------------------------x
#47
Araullo vs Aquino III
728 SCRA 1
Facts:
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch
Abad came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)
which was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects and enabled
the Executive to realign funds from slow
moving projects to priority projects instead of
waiting for next years appropriation.
Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an
expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it
turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B
for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-
P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the
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Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the
principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI,
Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments
can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP
realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative
Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a
fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program
for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment
in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did
not happen). Nevertheless, theres no
impoundment in the case at bar because whats
involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP
were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred
to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers within their
respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-
existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without
legal basis.
IV. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact,
which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior
to it being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may
not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in
good faith.
x-----------------------------------------------x
#48
Vinuya vs Romulo
732 SCRA 595
Facts:
The Petitioners who are all members of
MALAYA LOLAS, an organization established
for the purpose of providing aid to the victims
of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War filed
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a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
praying that the Court reverse its decision on
April 28, 2010 and grant their petition for
certiorari. In a previous case, petitioners claim
that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment
of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. However, officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist them and took
the position that the individual claims of the
comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with
the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.
Ruling:
The Court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for the following reason:
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort
was timely under the Rules of Court
Petitioners did not show that their
bringing of the special civil action for certiorari
was timely, i.e. within the 60-day period.
Petitioners mentioned the year 1998 only as
the time when they approached DFA, DOJ and
OSG to file their claim against the responsible
Japanese officials and military officers but filed
the petition only on March 8, 2004, which was
way beyond the 60-day period.
As we have stressed, the right to file a
special civil action of certiorari is neither a
natural right nor an essential element of due
process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative
writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
and never issued except in the exercise of
judicial discretion. Hence, who seeks a writ of
certiorari must apply for it only in the manner
and strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the law and the Rules.
2. Petitioners did not show that the
assailed as was either judicial or quasi-judicial
on the part of respondents.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order, or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. However, petitioners did
not make such a showing.
3. Petitioners were no entitled to the
injunction
The Constitution has entrusted the
Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to
espouse petitioners claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with
or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or
injunction, to conduct our foreign relations
with Japan in a certain manner.
x----------------------------------x
#49
Madrid vs Dealca
734 SCRA 468
Facts:
Complainant, Presiding Judge Jose L.
Madrid is an RTC Judge in Sorsogon. He filed
an administrative case for disbarment against
Atty. Juan S. Dealca, a lawyer, who had
engaged in an unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges
and personnel of courts.
Atty. Dealca entered his appearance in
Criminal Case Criminal Case No. 2006-6795
which is pending in RTC of the complainant, to
replace Atty. Judar who filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel of the case. But aside from
entering his appearance, he also moved that his
Criminal Case be raffled to another Branch of
the RTC. Judge Madrid denied the said motion,
contending that it is the lawyers duty to
appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to
appear for a client to remove a case from the
Court.
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Several cases were filed by Atty. Dealca,
as one of the complainants and counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and
personnel.
Issue:
1. Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous
administrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation
of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
2. Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical
practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Although the Court always admires
members of the Bar who are imbued with a
high sense of vigilance to weed out from the
Judiciary the undesirable judges and
inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any
acts taken in that direction should be unsullied
by any taint of insincerity or self-interest. Atty.
Dealca should be reminded that the aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the
parties according to law, not to harass them.
The Lawyers Oath exhorts upon the members
of the Bar not to wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit.
Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his
Lawyers Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been
expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that A lawyer shall not, for any
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
2. YES. Lawyers are licensed officers of the
courts empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend the legal causes for their clients. As a
consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved upon them by law.
Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes
certain obligations upon them. In this regard,
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility pertinently state:
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.
Atty. Dealcas averment that Judge
Madrid did not hear cases being handled by
him directly insinuated that judges could
choose the cases they heard, and could refuse
to hear the cases in which hostility existed
between the judges and the litigants or their
counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should
have been substantiated by him because it put
in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all
judges in general. This he failed to do. The right
of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latters sacred duty to decide
cases without fear of repression.
x----------------------------------x
#50
Causing vs Comelec
734 SCRA 495
Facts:
Elsie Causing assumed office as the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac, Nuevo,
Iloilo. Mayor Hernan D. Biron issued a
Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010,
commanding for the detailing of the petitioner
at the Office of the City Mayor.
Petitioner filed the complaint claiming
that the issuance made by Mayor Biron, being
made within the election period and without
prior authority from the COMELEC, was
illegal which violated Section 1, Paragraph A,
No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of
COMELC Resolution No. 8737. Mayor Biron
reiterates his counter-affidavit, namely: (a)
that there was no transfer or detail involved,
and any movement of Causing, if at all, was a
purely physical transfer, that is, only a few
steps from her office to the Office of the Mayor,
without any change in the present work,
agency, position, rank and compensation; and
(b) that granting without admitting that the
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movement constituted reassignment, the same
was not covered by the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, which
expressly limited the prohibition to either
transfer or detail only.
Issue:
Whether or not relocation of Causing by
Mayor Biron during the election period from
her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to
the Office of the Mayor constitute a prohibited
act under the Omnibus Election Code and the
relevant Resolution of the COMELEC
Ruling:
No. Mayor Birons acts did not violate
the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC
Resolution. The only personnel movements
prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737
were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in
the Resolution as "any personnel movement
from one government agency to another or from
one department, division, geographical unit or
subdivision of a government agency to another
with or without the issuance of an
appointment;" while detailas defined in the
Administrative Code of 1987is the movement of
an employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an appointment.
Obviously, the movement involving Causing
did not equate to either a transfer or a detail
within the contemplation of the law if Mayor
Biron only thereby physically transferred her
office area from its old location to the Office of
the Mayor "some little steps" away.
Equally material is that Mayor Birons
act of transferring the office space of Causing
was rooted in his power of supervision and
control over the officials and employees serving
in his local government unit, in order to ensure
the faithful discharge of their duties and
functions. His explanation that he transferred
Causings work station from her original office
to his office in order to closely supervise her
after his office received complaints against her
could not be justly ignored. Verily, she
thereafter continued to perform her tasks, and
uninterruptedly received her salaries as the
Municipal Civil Registrar even after the
transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
x-----------------------------------x
#51
Alleged loss of Boxes of OAS of PJA
737 SCRA 176
Before us is the administrative matter
inquiring into the loss of 140 reams of long copy
paper, and 40 reams of short copy paper, valued
at P27,000.00, delivered to the Philippine
Judicial Academy (PHILJA). The loss was
criminal theft by all means.
Also for our consideration now is the
application for the release of his retirement
benefits due to his intervening compulsory
retirement from the service on his 65th
birthday on August 17, 2012 of one of the
employees under investigation.
Bocs Trading Co., Inc. delivered 1,300
reams of short copy paper and 1,100 reams of
long copy paper to the Supreme Court intended
for the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).
Ryan Orcullo, the Property Custodian of the
PHILJA, because Supply Officer II Isidro
Austria and Store Keeper IV Lenin Mario
Ordoez, were then not around. With the help
of Judicial Staff Employee II Elizalde S.
Carmona, Ordoez then initiated the transfer
of the copy paper to the stockroom and the
Reproduction Room (Repro Room) of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the
Supreme Court Multipurpose Building located
in the SC New Building. Orcullo informed
Administrative Officer Recio that 400 reams of
short copy paper and 40 reams of long copy
paper were missing.
OAS concluded that Ordoez had failed
to exercise the required diligence in the
performance of his task in overseeing the
delivery of the copy paper by not seeing to the
safe storage of the copy paper, and by not
properly endorsing the copy paper to his office
or to the security guard assigned in the area
where he had left the reams of copy paper. The
OAS pointed out that the loss of the copy paper
from the OCA stockroom had been Ordoezs
fault, because he was the person in charge of
the stockroom; that Ordoezs negligence had
facilitated the theft of the 50 reams by Austria
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and Glor; and that the theft had resulted in the
loss of approximately P27,000.00 by the Court.
Ruling:
There is grave misconduct when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule are present. Dishonesty is defined as a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straight forwardness. Both
gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave
offenses that are punishable by dismissal even
for the first offense. Conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service is also classified as
a grave offense under Section 22(t) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent
Civil Service laws, with the penalty for the first
offense being suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year, and for the second
offense being dismissal. The Civil Service laws
and rules contain no description of what
specific acts constitute the grave offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. However, jurisprudence has been
instructive, with the Court having considered
the following acts or omissions as constitutive
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, namely: (a) misappropriation of public
funds; (b) abandonment of office; (c) failure to
report back to work without prior notice; (d)
failure to keep public records and property safe;
(e) making false entries in public documents;
and (f) falsification of court orders.
The fact that Austria meanwhile
reached the compulsory retirement age did not
render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC moot, let alone
release him from whatever liability he had
incurred while in the active service. The
jurisdiction acquired by the Court continues
despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed, the
Court retains its jurisdiction to declare a
respondent either innocent or guilty of the
charge even in the extreme case of the
respondents supervening death. If innocent,
the respondent receives the vindication of his
name and integrity by declaring his service in
the Government to be well and faithful; if guilty
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
in anyway, he deserves the sanction just and
appropriate for his administrative sin.
Austria is now being held guilty of the grave
offenses of gross dishonesty and grave
misconduct, (either of which is punishable by
dismissal for the first offense), as well as of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but since the penalty of dismissal could
no longer be imposed on him, the Court forfeits
all benefits to which he could be entitled, except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the Government and fines him in the amount
equivalent to his salary for his last six (6)
months in the service to be deducted from
whatever accrued leave benefits remained for
him. Hence, his request in A.M. No. 2014-025-
Ret. for the release of his compulsory
retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 is
denied.
Ordoez is guilty of gross neglect of duty.
Even if he did not have a direct hand in the
theft of the copy paper, his negligence
facilitated the theft. As correctly found by the
OAS, he failed to safely store and to endorse the
copy paper to the assigned security personnel;
and that he did not also conduct an actual count
and make a record of all the reams of copy
paper delivered to his safekeeping. Had he
been diligent in performing his tasks and
responsibilities as a Storekeeper IV, Austria
and Glor would not have managed to take out
the reams of copy paper out of the stockroom,
of which he was then in charge. Indeed, he so
admitted this during the investigation.
Neglect of duty is the failure to give ones
attention to a task expected of him. Gross
neglect is such neglect that, from the gravity of
the case or the frequency of instances, becomes
so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten the public welfare. The term does not
necessarily include willful neglect or
intentional official wrongdoing. Those
responsible for such act or omission cannot
escape the disciplinary power of this Court. The
imposable penalty for gross neglect of duty is
dismissal from the service.
We emphasize that all court employees,
being public servants in the Judiciary, must
always act with a high degree of
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professionalism and responsibility. Their
conduct must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but must also be in
accordance with the law and court regulations.
To maintain the peoples respect and faith in
the Judiciary, they should be upright, fair and
honest. They should avoid any act or conduct
that tends to diminish public trust and
confidence in the courts.
x--------------x
#52
Re: Lopez and Montalvo
737 SCRA 195
We hereby resolve the anonymous
complaint denouncing the moonlighting
activities of the respondents by engaging in
onerous money lending activities targeting the
low-income workers of the Court.
An undated letter-complaint stated that
the respondents had been involved in the
money-lending activities targeting the low-
salaried employees of the Court like the drivers
and employees of the janitorial services; that
such money-lending had been going on with the
help of the personnel of the Checks
Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing
employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming
benefits at a discounted rate; and that around
300 Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards
were surrendered by the borrowers to the
respondents as collateral for the individual
borrowings.
Report & Recommendation of the OAS
OAS submitted its report and
recommendations, whereby it recommended
the dismissal of the letter complaint against
Montalvo for lack of merit; but endorsed
Lopezs suspension "for thirty (30) days for
lending money with interest to a number of
economically challenged employees and
janitors; and directed her to immediately cease
and desist from engaging in any form of
personal business and other financial
transactions, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely."
Ruling of the Court
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
An anonymous complaint is always
received with great caution, originating as it
does from a source unwilling to identify himself
or herself. It is suspect for that reason. But the
mere anonymity of the source should not call
for the outright dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of its being baseless or unfounded
provided its allegations can be reliably verified
and properly substantiated by competent
evidence, like public records of indubitable
integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by
evidence to be offered by the complainant,
whose identity and integrity could hardly be
material where the matter involved is of public
interest,"30 or the declarations by the
respondents themselves in reaction to the
allegations, where such declarations are,
properly speaking, admissions worthy of
consideration for not being self-serving.
The Code of Conduct for Court
Employees specifically Canon I, Section 5
provides that "Court personnel shall use the
resources, property and funds under their
official custody in judicious manner and solely
in accordance with the prescribed statutory
and regulatory guidelines or procedures."
The Court agrees with the observations
and findings of the OAS about Lopez having
engaged in money-lending activities. Her
various admissions entirely belied her
insistence that her activities did not constitute
money lending. Her claim that the amounts
voluntarily given to her by the recipients had
not been interests on the loans extended to
them was plainly insincere. The fact of her
parting with her money in favor of another
upon the condition that the same amount
would be paid back was exactly what
constituted a loan under the law. In a contract
of loan, according to Article 1933 of the Civil
Code, "one of the parties delivers to another,
either something not consumable so that the
latter may use the same for a certain time and
return it, in which case the contract is called a
commodatum; or money or other consumable
thing, upon the condition that the same
amount of the same kind and quality shall be
paid, in which case the contract is simply called
a loan or mutuum."
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Did Lopezs money-lending activities
render her administratively liable?
Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re:
Prohibition for All Officials and Employees of
the Judiciary to Work as Insurance Agents),
dated October 4, 1988, has prohibited all
officials and employees of the Judiciary from
engaging directly in any private business,
vocation or profession, even outside their office
hours. The prohibition has been at ensuring
that full-time officers and employees of the
courts render full-time service, for only thereby
could any undue delays in the administration
of justice and in the disposition of court cases
be avoided. The nature of the work of court
employees and officials demanded their highest
degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they
would not ably meet the demand except by
devoting their undivided time to the
government service. This explains why court
employees have been enjoined to strictly
observe official time and to devote every second
or moment of such time to serving the public.
Although many "moonlighting"
activities were themselves legal acts that
would be permitted or tolerated had the actors
not been employed in the public sector,
moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a
serious misconduct, can amount to a
malfeasance in office by the very nature of the
position held. In the case of Lopez, her being
the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division
of the FMBO, a major office of the Court itself,
surely put the integrity of the Checks
Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO
under so much undeserved suspicion. She
ought to have refrained from engaging in
money lending, particularly to the employees of
the Court. We do not need to stress that she
was expected to be circumspect about her acts
and actuations, knowing that the impression of
her having taken advantage of her position and
her having abused the confidence reposed in
her office and functions as such would thereby
become unavoidable. There is no doubt about
her onerous lending activities greatly
diminishing the reputation of her office and of
the Court itself in the esteem of the public.
Based on the foregoing, Lopez committed
simple misconduct, a less grave offense that is
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
punishable under Rule IV, Section 52 of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service by suspension from
one month and one day to six months for the
first offense, and dismissal for the second
offense. Yet, although a first-time offender, she
could not be punished with the minimum of the
imposable penalty because she clearly abused
her being a high-ranking officer in the FMBO
in conducting her private transactions within
court premises during office hours, thereby
putting the image of the Judiciary in a bad
light. Hence, her appropriate penalty is
suspension from office for three months
without pay.
x-------------------x
#53
Funa vs Duque III
742 SCRA 166
Facts:
The independence of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) is explicitly mandated
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. Additionally, Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its
Members, during their tenure, from holding
any other office or employment.
These constitutional provisions are
central to this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition brought to assail the
designation of Hon. Francisco T. Duque III,
Chairman of the CSC, as a member of the
Board of Directors or Trustees in an ex officio
capacity of the (a) Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation
(PHILHEALTH), (c) the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the
Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
On January 11, 2010, then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Duque as
Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed Duques appointment
on February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010, President Arroyo
issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864).
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B.
Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
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citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as
well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise
known as The Administrative Code of 1987,
and the designation of Duque as a member of
the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-
A of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue
Does the designation of Duque as
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF,
in an ex officio capacity, impair the
independence of the CSC and violate the
constitutional prohibition against the holding
of dual or multiple offices for the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions?
Ruling
The Court partially grants the petition.
The Court upholds the constitutionality of
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and
the designation of Duque in an ex officio
capacity as a member of the Board of Directors
or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF.
Unconstitutionality of Duques designation as
member of the governing boards of the GSIS,
PHIC, ECC and HDMF
Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its
power of judicial review in cases otherwise
rendered moot and academic by supervening
events on the basis of certain recognized
exceptions, namely: (1) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) the case
involves a situation of exceptional character
and is of paramount public interest; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide
the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The situation now obtaining definitely
falls under the requirements for the review of a
moot and academic case. For the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future, the Court
will not abstain from exercising its power of
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
judicial review, the cessation of the controversy
notwithstanding. We proceed to resolve the
substantive issue concerning the
constitutionality of Duques ex officio
designation as member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
The underlying principle for the
resolution of the present controversy rests on
the correct application of Section 1 and Section
2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which
provide:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
The Court also notes that Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
entitles him to receive per diem, a form of
additional compensation that is disallowed by
the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of
its clear contravention of the proscription set
by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. This situation goes against the
principle behind an ex officio position, and
must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition
against holding multiple offices, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
impairs the independence of the CSC. Under
Section 17,42 Article VII of the Constitution,
the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the
President is not part of the Executive Branch.
The corporate powers of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised
through their governing Boards, members of
which are all appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the
members of their respective governing Boards
are under the control of the President. As such,
the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of
the President without impairing the
independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
Constitution.
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x---------------------------x
#54.
FLICI vs COA
748 SCRA 286
Remedial Law
I. The petitioner claims that the affidavit
of service attached to the petition for certiorari
complied with the requirement on proof of
service.
The claim is unwarranted. The
petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two
types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit
and the registry receipt xxx
Section 13 thus requires that if the
service is done by registered mail, proof of
service shall consist of the affidavit of the
person effecting the mailing and the registry
receipt, both of which must be appended to the
paper being served. A compliance with the rule
is mandatory, such that there is no proof of
service if either or both are not submitted.
Here, the petition only bore, however,
the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the
registry receipt numbers of the registered
matters, not the registry receipts themselves.
The rule requires to be appended the registry
receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the
cut print-outs did not substantially comply
with the rule.
II. There is no parity between the petition
for review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule
42 governs an appeal from the judgment or
final order rendered by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a question of
fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and
law, and is given due course only upon a prima
facie showing that the Regional Trial Court
committed an error of fact or law warranting
the reversal or modification of the challenged
judgment or final order. In contrast, the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar
to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and
assails a judgment or final order of the
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the
Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is
not designed to correct only errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Questions
of fact cannot be raised except to determine
whether the COMELEC or the COA were
guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule42
and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the
petition for review from receipt of the assailed
decision or final order, or from receipt of the
denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is
filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
interrupts the period; hence, should the motion
be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which
shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.
The belated filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the
fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the
recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should
suffer the same fate for having wrongly
assumed that the fresh period rule under
Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be
relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice
that is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for
liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to
prosper.
III. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal either to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
A close look indicates that the petition
for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose how
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the COA committed grave abuse of its
discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the
petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of
discretion.
x---------------------x
#55
Araullo vs Aquino III
749 SCRA 284
The Constitution must ever remain
supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its
rectitude.
PROCEDURAL: TO DETERMINE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DAP AND
NBC NO. 541
SUBSTANTIVE: THE PRESIDENT HAS
AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER SAVINGS TO
OTHER DEPARTMENTS PURSUANT TO
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
Ruling of the Court.
The procedural challenges raised by the
respondents, being a mere rehash of their
earlier arguments herein, are dismissed for
being already passed upon in the assailed
decision.
As to the substantive challenges, the
Court discerns that the grounds are also
reiterations of the arguments that were
already thoroughly discussed and passed upon
in the assailed decision.
DECLARES the following acts and
practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation
of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of
powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated
allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings
prior to the end of the fiscal year without
complying with the statutory definition
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts; and
(b) The cross-border transfers of
the savings of the Executive to augment
the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive.
The Court further DECLARES VOID
the use of unprogrammed funds despite the
absence of a certification by the National
Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-
compliance with the conditions provided in the
relevant General Appropriations Acts.
At the outset, we allay the respondents
apprehension regarding the validity of the DAP
funded projects. It is to be emphatically
indicated that the Decision did not declare the
en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded
projects. To be sure, the Court recognized the
encouraging effects of the DAP on the countrys
economy, and acknowledged its laudable
purposes, most especially those directed
towards infrastructure development and
efficient delivery of basic social services. It
bears repeating that the DAP is a policy
instrument that the Executive, by its own
prerogative, may utilize to spur economic
growth and development.
Application of the operative fact doctrine.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has
pointed out during the deliberations, the
doctrine of operative fact does not always
apply, and is not always the consequence of
every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It
can be invoked only in situations where the
nullification of the effects of what used to be a
valid law would result in inequity and injustice;
but where no such result would ensue, the
general rule that an unconstitutional law is
totally ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has
clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can
apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good
faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot
apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by
the proper tribunals determining their
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criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities.
x--------------------x
56
TESDA vs COA
750 SCRA 247
The TESDA, an instrumentality of the
Government an attached agency of the
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). In view of the inadequate policy on
basic health and safety conditions of work
experienced by government personnel, then
DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued AO
No. 430, series of 2003, authorizing the
payment of healthcare maintenance allowance
of P5,000.00 to all officials and employees of the
DOLE, including its bureaus and attached
agencies. AO No. 430 was purportedly based on
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 33, series of 1997, and
Section 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003
General Appropriations Act.
Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV
Rosemarie A. Valenzuela issued AOM No. 04-
005 and later endorsed the matter to the COA
Director of the LAO-National for appropriate
legal action. DOLE Administrative Order No.
430, series of 2003 is clearly without legal
basis. The TESDA filed an appeal before the
COA Commission Proper, assailing the
disallowance by the LAO-National.
ISSUE:
Did the COA commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing ND No. 2006-015
pursuant to AOM No. 04-005?
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Court agrees with the COA decision
in holding that the recipients of the healthcare
maintenance allowance benefits who received
the allowance of P5,000.00 in good faith need
not refund the sum received. The recipients
accepted the benefits honestly believing that
they were receiving what they were entitled to
under the law. Similarly, the Court holds that
the TESDA officials who granted the allowance
J. Bersamin Cases 2009 -2015
to the covered personnel acted in good faith in bonuses they received but disallowed by the
the honest belief that there was lawful basis for COA.
such grant. In view of these considerations, the
Court declares that the disallowed benefits
approved and received in good faith need not be Contributors:
reimbursed to the Government. This finds Jake Bryson Dancel for cases 1-5; 22
support in the consistent pronouncements of Jay Ar Quilaton for cases 7; 9-10
the Court, such as that issued in De Jesus v. Rosanna Tamayo for cases 6; 8; 11-12
Commission on Audit, to wit: Princess Kristine Torres Lerias for cases
Nevertheless, our 13-17; 41-42
pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala Darlene Alejandro Baquing for cases 18-19;
supports petitioners position on the 54
refund of the benefits they received. Peter Daniel Bugtas for cases 20-21; 23-25
In Blaquera, the officials and
Remi Karissima Galves for cases 26-30
employees of several government
Maricel Montecillo for cases 31-35
departments and agencies were paid
incentive benefits which the COA
Cara Bello Pedreablba for cases 36-40
disallowed on the ground that Joan Pablo for cases 46-50
Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19
January 1993 prohibited payment of
these benefits. While the Court
sustained the COA on the
disallowance, it nevertheless declared
that:
Considering, however, that all
the parties here acted in good faith,
we cannot countenance the refund of
subject incentive benefits for the year
1992, which amounts the petitioners
have already received. Indeed, no
indicia of bad faith can be detected
under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and
chiefs of offices concerned disbursed
such incentive benefits in the honest
belief that the amounts given were
due to the recipients and the latter
accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve
such benefits.
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the
instant case. Petitioners here received the
additional allowances and bonuses in good
faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board
Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment.
At the time petitioners received the additional
allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet
decided Baybay Water District, Petitioners had
no knowledge that such payment was without
legal basis. Thus, being in good faith,
petitioners need not refund the allowances and

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