Chapter 2.

HUMAN RELATIONS:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, ACTS CONTRARY TO

LAW, AND AGAINST MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS AND PUBLIC
POLICY. Article 19 provides a rule of conduct that is consistent with an orderly
and harmonious relationship between and among men and women. It codifies the
concept of what is justice and fair play so that the abuse of right by a person
will be prevented.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights, sets certain standards which
may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become a source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:

1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. which is exercised in bad faith;
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

x x x
(Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16).
On the other hand, the 1947 Code Committee in explaining Article 20 stated that the
said rule enunciated in the said article pervades the entire legal system, and
renders it impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has violated
some legal provision, should ?nd himself without relief (Report of the Code
Commission, page 39).
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 445 SCRA 500, the
Supreme Court said:
Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision. Good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the
state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjusti?able harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

According to Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16, Article
20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or
negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another,
shall indemnify his or her victim for injuries suffered thereby. Insofar as Article
21 is concerned, the same 1947 Code Committee stated that it was designed to fill
in the countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury
(Report of the Code Commission, page 39, Manuel v. People, 476 SCRA 461). The 1947
Code Commission continued, thus:
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: A seduces the
nineteen year-old daughter of X. A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage be ?led. Therefore, though a
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action. Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for speci?cally in the
statutes.

But, it may be asked, would not this proposed article obliterate the boundary line
between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis every good law
draws its breadth of life from morals, from those principles which are written with
words of ?re in the conscience of man. If this premise is admitted, then the
proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of
enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damage. When it is re?ected that
while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man
has remained ?xed to its ancient moorings, one cannot feel that it is safe and
salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus
imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its
superlative attributes.

Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequences upon the social order
than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellowmen so long as he
does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred
postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the
government to afford him protection or relief. (Report of the Code Commission,
pages 40-41).
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements:
1. There is an act which is legal;
2. but which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy;
3. and it is done with intent to injure

(Albenson Enterprises Corp.v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16).

It presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a
result of such violation (Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association v. Court of
Appeals, 207 SCRA 343).
Articles 19, 20, and 21 are related to each other and, under these articles, an act
which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages
(Albenson Enterprises Corp.v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16). There is a common
element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either willfully,
or negligently (Ibid.).In a case where a particular government employee was
singled out by the deputy administrator and strictly subjected to the rules for
obtaining benefits after retirement while employees similarly situated were
liberally granted their benefits for as long as the rules were substantially
complied with by them, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court
awarding damages in favor of the government employee on the basis of Article 19 of
the Civil Code by observing and stating, thus:

As we said, the acts of petitioner were legal (that is, pursuant to procedure), as
he insists in this petition, yet it does not follow, as we said, that his acts were
done in good faith. For emphasis, he had no valid reason to go legal all of a
sudden with respect to Mr. Curio, since he had cleared three employees who, as the
Sandiganbayan found, were all similarly circumstanced in that they all had pending
obligations when, their clearances were fi led for consideration, warranting
similar official action.
The Court is convinced that the petitioner had unjustly discriminated against Mr.
Curio. It is no defense that the petitioner was motivated by no ill will (a grudge,
according to the Sandiganbayan), since the facts speak for themselves. It is no
defense either that he was, after all, complying merely with legal procedures
since, as we indicated, he was not as strict with respect to the three retiring
other employees. There can be no other logical conclusion that he was acting
unfairly, no more, no less, to Mr. Curio. It is the essence of Article 19 of the
Civil Code, under which the petitioner was made to pay damages, together with
Article 27, that the performance of duty be done with justice and good faith. In
the case of Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Philippines,120 Phil. 187, we held the
defendant liable under Article 19 for disposing of its property a perfectly legal
act in order to escape the reach of a creditor. In two fairly recent cases,
Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 171 and Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 1, we held that a principal is liable under Article 19 in terminating the
agency again, a legal act when terminating the agency would deprive the agent
of his legitimate business (Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 309).

Following the same principle, though a person may not have acted criminally, he or
she can nevertheless undertake acts which injure another. In Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237, where a sugar quota was mortgaged to the PNB
and a lease of such sugar quota allotment made by the debtor to a third person
required the consent of the PNB and where the responsible officers of the same told
the lessor and the lessee that PNB will approve the lease if the amount thereof was
increased from P2.50 to P2.80 per picul and whereupon, the lessor and the lessee
agreed to the increase which prompted even the vice-president of the bank to
recommend to the PNB Board of Directors the approval of the lease but which,
consequently, was twice turned down by the said Board because it wanted to raise
the consideration to P3.00 per picul, resulting to the loss by the lessee of the
amount of P2,800, the Supreme Court, after deliberating on the other important
circumstances surrounding the case, observed and ruled, to wit:

There is no question that Tapnios failure to utilize her sugar quota for the crop
year 1956-1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of
the petitioner. The issue, therefore, is whether or not petitioner is liable for
the damage caused.

As observed by the trial court, time is of the essence in the approval of the lease
of sugar quota allotments, since the same must be utilized during the milling
season, because any allotment which is not filled during such milling season may be
reallocated by the Sugar Quota Administration to other holders of allotments. There
was no proof that there was any other person at that time willing to lease the
sugar quota allotment of private respondents for a price higher than P2.80 per
picul. The fact that there were isolated transactions wherein the consideration
for the lease was P3.00 a picul, according to the trial court, does not
necessarily mean that there are always ready takers of said price. The
unreasonableness of the position adopted by the petitioners Board of Directors is
shown by the fact that the difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered
by Tuazon and the P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total
sum of P200.00. Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the
Bank were secured by the chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of
leasehold rights and interests on her properties, and surety bonds and that she had
apparently the means to pay her obligation to the Bank, as shown by the fact that
she has been granted several sugar crop loans of the total value of almost P80,000
for the agricultural year 1952 to 1956, there was no reasonable basis for the
Board of Directors of petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a
measly sum of P200.00. While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or
disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the
latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection
of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the
lease of said sugar quota. The law makes it imperative that every person must in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19 of the Civil
Code). This petitioner failed to do. Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year
was about to expire, that by its disapproval of the lease private respondents would
be unable to utilize the sugar quota in question. In failing to observe the
reasonable degree of care and vigilance which the surrounding circumstances
reasonably impose, petitioner is consequently liable for damages caused on private
respondents.

Under Article 21 of the New Civil Code, any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The aforecited provisions on
human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to speci?cally provide in the statutes.

Also, in a case where a person sold a parcel of land to another; thereby

transferring title to such other person and subsequently the same transferor
claimed and misrepresented that the title to the said land was lost during the
Second World War, which enabled him to procure another title which he used to have
the same property sold to another person with the active participation of the
register of deeds and the lawyer-son of the said register of deeds, who both knew
of the ?rst sale, the Supreme Court held that the register of deeds and his lawyer
son are likewise civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in
the performance of their duties as public of?cer and as member of the Bar (Art. 19,
New Civil Code) or for willfully or negligently causing damage to another (Art. 20,
New Civil Code), or for willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Art. 21, New Civil
Code). (Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals, 82 SCRA 294).
In the same vein, where the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm
lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings, it was held that the
defendants violated the plaintiffs rights and caused prejudice to the latter by
the unjustified diversion of the water for which the award of damages under Article
21 can be made (Magbanua v. IAC, 137 SCRA 329). Also, creditors are protected in
cases of contracts intended to defraud them. Further, any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party also under Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Peoples Bank v.
Dahican Lumber Company, 20 SCRA 84).

Similarly, in a case where a drivers group, claiming to protect the interest of

all drivers of a particular transportation company and in protest of certain
policies of the said company, decided to take over the operation of the jeepney
service in the Cogeo-Cubao route without authorization from the Public Service
Commission and in violation of the right of the transportation company to operate
its services in the said route under its certificate of public convenience, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision awarding damages in favor of the
transportation company by observing and ruling, to wit:
x x x
Although there is no question that petitioner can exercise their constitutional
right to redress their grievances with respondent Lungsod Corp., the manner by
which this constitutional right is to be exercised should not undermine public
peace and order nor should it violate the legal rights of other person. Article 21
of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages. The provision covers a situation where a person
has a legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. It presupposes loss or injury, material or
otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such violation. It is clear from the
facts of this case that petitioner formed a barricade and forcibly took over the
motor units and personnel of the respondent corporation. This paralyzed the usual
activities and earnings of the latter during the period of ten days and violated
the right of respondent Lungsod Corp. to conduct its operations thru its authorized
officers.

Significantly, while a breach of promise to marry is not actionable (Gashem Shookat

Baksh v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115), it has been held that to formally set a
wedding and go through and spend for all the wedding preparations and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony was about to be solemnized, is a
different matter. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which the defendant must be held answerable for damages in accordance with Article
21 of the Civil Code (Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 649). In the same vein, it has been
held that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim which entitled her to
compensation under Article 21 of the Civil Code (Quimiguing v. Icao, 34 SCRA 133).
Similarly, in Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115, the Supreme
Court ruled:

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to ful?ll that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioners
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on appellants part that made plaintiffs parents agree
to their daughters living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In
short, private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of
every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction, the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.

x x x x x x x x x
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about
the entire episode for as soon as she found out that petitioner was not going to
marry her after all she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault. At most, it could be conceded that she is merely
in delicto. Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests,
or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.

However, no damages can be recovered under Articles 19 and 21 where the sexual
intercourse is a product of voluntariness and mutual desire (Hermosisima v. Court
of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629). Thus, in Constantino v. Mendez, 209 SCRA 18, where it
was shown that where a man invited the woman to go to a hotel after meeting in a
restaurant and that the woman was 28 years old then and admitted that she was
attracted to the man and that sexual intercourse transpired between the two even
after the man confessed that he was married, the Supreme Court, in disregarding the
claim of the woman that she was deceived by the man in his representation that he
would have his marriage with his present wife annulled and thereafter he would
marry her, accordingly held that no damages under Articles 19 and 21 can be awarded
to the woman because the attraction to the man was the reason why she surrendered
her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage,
she could have immediately severed her sexual relation with the man when she was
informed after their first sexual intercourse that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the following three months, they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicated that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was
the moving force that made her submit herself to the man.