THIRD DIVISION

SPS. GUILLERMO MALISON G.R. No. 147776

and AMELITA MALISON,
Petitioners, Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

SPS. MELCHOR MARANAN, Promulgated:
JR. and VIRGINIA MARANAN,
Respondents. July 10, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

a complaint[5] for ejectment was filed by the private respondents

Spouses Melchor Maranan, Jr. and Virginia Maranan against the petitioners,
Spouses Guillermo and Amelita Malison. They alleged that they are the
owners/lessors of the subject property which they acquired from its former owner
Belen Eser-Pascual, through her attorney-in fact, Luz Eser-Tabing, in a Deed of
Sale . Petitioners assail the Deed of Sale in favor of the private respondents
asserting that any purported sale of the subject property was spurious and in excess
of the authority of Luz, Belens attorney-in-fact, who was directed to sell the
subject property for the specific amount of P400,000.00 and to particular
individuals, namely, petitioner Spouses Malison.

The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.

Petitioners appealed to the RTC and rendered a decision affirming MeTC. Case
was elevated before the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. A Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 29 March 2001.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC that the jurisdictional
requirements have been sufficiently complied with by the private respondents and
the evidence on hand show their entitlement to the relief sought in their complaint
for ejectment.

Hence, this petition moored on the following issues:

1) Is the purchase of subject property by respondents Sps. Maranan from

a person other than the registered owner of a residential house and lot
valid?

2) Is ejectment the proper remedy

of Sps. Maranan assuming arguendo validity of title?[15]

The first issue brings to the fore the validity of the purchase of the property made
by the private respondents. The second issue seeks to determine whether or
not ejectment is the proper remedy for the private respondents.

At the threshold, there is a need to stress that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review before this Court
should only raise questions of law. Factual matters cannot be raised before this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This Court, at this stage is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. We are
restrained from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial
courts. Otherwise, we would convert this Court into a trier of facts.[16] In the
absence of a showing that the case falls under one of the exceptions, [17] factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and
not reviewable by this Court. And they carry even more weight when the Court of
Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. After a perusal of the
records, this Court can only conclude that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, affirming those of the RTC, are amply supported by evidence and are,
resultantly, conclusive on this Court.[18] As such, this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.[19] Where factual matters are involved, it is well-settled that a
question of fact is to be determined by the evidence to support the particular
contention. As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence adduced on this score
are in private respondents favor. Whether such conclusion of the Court of Appeals
was supported by the evidence presented before it, is also factual in nature.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141986. July 11, 2002]

NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Within what period may private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a
judgment acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt? Is the 15-day period to be
counted from the promulgation of the decision to the accused or from the time a copy
thereof is served on the offended party? Our short answer is: from the time the offended
party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its
promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

the trial court promulgated its judgment (the Judgment) in Criminal Case No.
96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private
prosecutors were present during such promulgation.

the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the
Judgment.

petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment.

Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion
for Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday.

petitioner received its copy of the Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of
merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day,
petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of
Appeal.

The RTC refused to give due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and Amended
[6]

Notice of Appeal. Hence, this Petition.

[8]

The Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for our consideration:

Whether the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or
move for a reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a
judgment in a criminal action should be reckoned from the date of
promulgation or from the date of such partys actual receipt of a copy of such
judgment considering that any party appealing or challenging such judgment
would necessarily need a copy thereof, which is in writing and which clearly
express the factual and legal bases thereof to be able to file an intelligent
appeal or other challenge. [9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

to do: to appeal the civil liability arising from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.

Period for Perfecting an Appeal

Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure declares:

Section 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen

(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from
the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

This provision is similar, though not identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985
Rules invoked by petitioner. The difference is that the former makes clear
that promulgation refers to judgment, and notice refers to final order appealed from.
Taken on its face, the provision seems to suggest that the period for any appeal,
whether by the accused or by the private offended party, must be counted from and
understood in conjunction with the provision on the promulgation of the judgment. This
provision mentions the presence of the accused, the judge or the clerk of court in
certain instances, and/or the counsel or representative of the accused. Petitioner is
correct in observing that the private offended party is not required to be present during
the promulgation; in fact, the said party is not even mentioned in the provision.

Appeal of the Accused Different from That of the Offended Party

Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of judgment refers to the accused, not to the
private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the
proceedings. Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will
be inequitable to count from that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but
logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the notice of judgment upon the
offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. It is only through notice to
the former that an appeal can reasonably be made, for it is only from that date that the
complainant will have knowledge of the need to elevate the case. Till then, the remedy
of appeal would not be an option in the event of an adverse judgment.
We clarify also that the situations covered by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are
limited to appeals of judgments rendered by regional trial and inferior courts. In higher
courts, there is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6 Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. In the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a decision is
promulgated when the signed copy thereof is filed with the clerk of court, who then
causes copies to be served upon the parties or their counsels. Hence, the presence of
[33]

either party during promulgation is not required.

The period to appeal, embodied in Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, cannot be applied equally to both accused-appellant and private offended
party. Further bolstering this argument is the second sentence of this provision which
mandates as follows:

x x x. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motions has been served upon the accused or his counsel at
which time the balance of the period begins to run. (Italics supplied)
[34]

The above-quoted portion provides for the procedure for suspending and resuming
the reglementary period of appeal specifically mentioned in the preceding
sentence. However, it is clear that the procedure operates only in relation to the
accused. This conclusion can be deduced from the fact that after being interrupted, the
period to appeal begins to run again only after the accused or the counsel of the
accused is given notice of the order overruling the motion for reconsideration or for new
trial. Verily, the assumption behind this provision is that the appeal was taken by the
accused, not by the private offended party.
Indeed, the rules governing the period of appeal in a purely civil action should be
the same as those covering the civil aspects of criminal judgments. If these rules are not
completely identical, the former may be suppletory to the latter. As correctly pointed out
by petitioner, [t]he appeal from the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is, for
all intents and purposes, an appeal from a judgment in a civil action as such appeal
cannot affect the criminal aspect thereof. Being akin to a civil action, the present
[35]

appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil Procedure.

Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves
proceedings brought to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise
of the latters original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of
appeal. An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of
[37]

the judgment or final order appealed from. For the private offended party, this rule then
[38]

forecloses the counting of the period to appeal from the promulgation of the judgment to
the accused.
In sum, we hold that an offended partys appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a
judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or the
final order appealed from. To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby directed to
cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended
parties or their duly appointed counsels -- the private prosecutors. This step will enable
them to appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate circumstances.

General Rule Not Applicable to the Present Case

Having laid down the general rule on the appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now
determine its application to the present controversy. In short, was petitioners appeal
timely filed?
If we were to follow the reasoning of petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on January
31, 2000 was on time, considering that (1) the Judgment had been received by its
counsel only on November 12, 1999; and (2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed on
November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of the reglementary period.
However, a peculiar circumstance in this case militates against this
conclusion. Here, the private prosecutor himself was present during the promulgation of
the Judgment. This fact is undeniable, as petitioner itself admits his presence in its
Memorandum as follows:

2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial Court promulgated its judgment (the
Judgment) in Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the accused of the crime of
estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as
the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation.
(Italics supplied)
[39]

Further, private prosecutor even signed a copy of the Judgment dated October 29,
[40]

1999, a signature which in unequivocal terms signifies notification of the party he

represents -- herein petitioner.
Having been present during the promulgation and having been furnished a copy of
the judgment at the time, private offended party was in effect actually notified of the
Judgment, and from that time already had knowledge of the need to appeal it. Thus, the
very raison d'tre of this Decision is already satisfied: the filing of an appeal by the said
party, only after being notified of the Judgment. As argued by respondent, did not the
public and private prosecutors acquire notice of Judgment at its promulgation because
of their presence? Notice of the judgment may not be defined in any other way x x x. [41]

Petitioner stresses the need for service of the Judgment on the offended party. It
harps on the fact that -- based on constitutional, statutory and even jurisprudential
edicts -- judgments must be in writing and with the factual and legal bases thereof
clearly expressed.
Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the
Judgment, for the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof
which] they can review or refer to from time to time. To rule otherwise would
[42]

supposedly deny them due process.

We clarify. If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then
the period for appeal would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to
attend the promulgation, much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. But
fiction must yield to reality. By mere presence, the offended party was
already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and should have taken the
necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed.
Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial courts Decision to the CA. There was no
reason why it could not have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse
Judgment during the promulgation. Parties and their counsels are presumed to be
[43]

vigilant in protecting their interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay
and without resort to technicalities.

Appeal Not Part of Due Process

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. Hence,
[44]

its requirements must be strictly complied with. The failure of petitioner to file a timely
[45]

notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus rendering the Judgment final and executory, is
not a denial of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied
its day in court.
 It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal
as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed, deviations
[46]

from the rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
[47]

appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed
cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be
followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims
and caprices of appellants. [48]

Neither has petitioner justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Anyone
seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal
has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances
warranting such deviation. [49]

A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be
strictly observed, for they are indispensable interdictions against needless delay and for
an orderly discharge of judicial business. After judgment has become final, vested
[50]

rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. This principle becomes even
[51]

more essential in view of the fact that the criminal aspect has already been adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172505 October 1, 2014

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a
deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock. The deed was for the sale and purchase of
shares of stock from various corporations. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio
Garcia. The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at
5

public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia. 6

the information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was filed against Antonio Garcia
before the Regional Trial Court. He was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the
12

Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of
the contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances.

In the decision RTC, Antonio Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 14

II. Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted to
forum shopping

III. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability ex delicto
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping

The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicatain another.
Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties asrepresent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicatain the action under consideration; said requisites are also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens. (Citation omitted)
56

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court
decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was
entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)." The 57

"civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation before the trial court to institute the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.

There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are
both parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari before this
court.

There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it may
appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals is
purely on the civil aspect of the trial courts decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is
allegedly only onthe criminal aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of civil
liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case. Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminalaspect of the case.
58
1wphi1

THIRD DIVISION

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 151973

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING,* J.,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., and
PERALTA, JJ.
SPOUSES LORENZO L. LAOHOO and Promulgated:
VISITACION LIM-LAOHOO; and LUZ
LOMUNTAD-MIEL, July 23, 2009
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

(NAPOCOR) is a GOCC created under Republic Act (RA) No. 6395, decided to
acquire an easement of right-of-way over respondents' properties located
at Barangay San Andres and Poblacion, Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar for its
proposed 350 KV LEYTE-LUZON HVDC POWER TL PROJECT.

petitioner filed two complaints before the (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, seeking to
acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of respondents' properties.
Petitioner then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession[5]

The RTC issued two Orders directing the Sheriff of the RTC to place petitioner in
possession of the premises upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
provisional value fixed by the trial court in Civil Case No. 6890.

On September 15, 1997, the trial court issued two Orders [15] requiring the petitioner
to pay the amount fixed as just compensation.

On October 2, 1997, petitioner filed Motions for Reconsideration [16] in both cases,
which the RTC denied in an Order[17] dated October 14, 1997.

Petitioner filed Notices of Appeal,[18] which were dismissed by the trial court in an
Order[19] dated December 10, 1997, for being filed out of time.

the trial court issued two Orders[20] directing petitioner to deposit with PNB the
balance of the just compensation for the properties of the Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[21] of the Orders dated December 10, 1997 and March 13,
1998, praying that its notices of appeal be admitted. The said Motion was denied in
a Resolution[22] dated July 2, 1998.

the trial court issued two separate Orders[23] reiterating its previous orders for
petitioner to deposit with PNB the amounts adjudged as just compensation

Hence, the instant petition assigning the following errors:

 CERTIORARI ON A MERE TECHNICALITY IS CONTRARY TO THE TIME
HONORED DOCTRINE THAT LITIGATION IS NOT A GAME OF
TECHNICALITIES AND THERE IS NO VESTED RIGHT IN IT BECAUSE
THE GENERAL AIM OF PROCEDURAL LAW IS TO FACILITATE THE
APPLICATION OF JUSTICE TO THE PARTY- LITIGANTS.

The petition is not meritorious.

Although the dismissal of the petition by the CA was based on the failure to timely
file the petition, such dismissal was not merely based on technicality, but on
petitioner's failure to perfect its appeal on time with the RTC.

Records show that, on September 15, 1997, the RTC, in both civil cases, issued
orders directing the petitioner to pay the amount fixed as just
compensation. Petitioner, through its counsel, received the said Orders
on September 25, 1997. On October 2, 1997, petitioner filed by registered mail, a
Motion for Reconsideration of the said Orders which the RTC denied in an Order
dated October 14, 1997.

On October 30, 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal by registered mail for the
two civil cases. Respondent Spouses Laohoo filed their Comment and Opposition
to the notice of appeal, contending that the said appeal was filed six days late.

This Court finds that the petitioners appeal before the RTC was filed out of time.

Since the appeal was not filed within the reglementary period of 15 days as
provided by the Rules,[31] the appeal is dismissible[32] for having been filed out of
time. The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the lower
court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If the notice of appeal is, however, filed
beyond the reglementary period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or
disallow the same in accordance with Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules. [33] Let it
not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not
even this Court can trifle with.[34] Consequently, the trial court committed no error
in dismissing the appeal.

The failure of the petitioner to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law
renders final the decision sought to be appealed. As a result, no court could
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision.[35] It is settled that a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it
or by the highest court of the land.[36]Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation
and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.[37]

Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties
are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the
decision which is a matter of right.[38] The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of
execution, the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty.[39]

In addition to the non-perfection of the appeal on time, records show that the notice
of appeal failed to indicate the date when the petitioner received the Order denying
its motion for reconsideration. The rules require that the notice of appeal shall state
the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. [40] The indication of date is
important in order for the trial court to determine the timeliness of the petitioners
appeal.

Likewise, petitioner did not pay the appellate courts docket and other lawful fees
on time. Respondents pointed out that the payment of the fees, as reflected by the
official receipts,[41] was made only after five months from the filing of the notice of
appeal.

It is a rule that within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay the
full amount of the appellate courts docket and other lawful fees. [42] In the absence
of such payment, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the
appeal for non-payment of the docket fees and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period.[43]