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Contents
Macariola case ................................................... 1
Macariola case digest....................................... 21
Proclamation no. 1 ........................................... 23
Proclamation no. 3 ........................................... 24
Lawyers League ............................................... 28
In re: Bermudez................................................ 29
In re: Bermudez Digest..................................... 32
Letter of Assoc. Justice..................................... 33
Proclamation no. 58 ......................................... 37
De leon vs. Esguerra ......................................... 40
E.O. 200 ............................................................ 76
Macariola case
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968
Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent
Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a
judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the
report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate
Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred
on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla
Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R.
Macariola, defendant, concerning the
properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes,
the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition,
Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things
that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a
daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b)
the only legal heirs of the deceased were
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defendant Macariola, she being the only
offspring of the first marriage of Francisco
Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene
Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased
were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no
properties were acquired by the deceased
during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties
should first be partitioned into two parts, and
one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's
deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased
Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally
among his children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by
respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence,
finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes,
Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene
Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales to have been an illegitimate child of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and
1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz
and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304
and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez
in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2
of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring
the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being
the only legal and forced heir of her mother
Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-
half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892,
5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-
half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,
4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive
owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and
one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304
and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate
of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant
to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco
Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth
(1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New
Civil Code), and the remaining portion of the
estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla
Reyes and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola,
in such a way that the extent of the total share
of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary
estate shall not exceed the equivalent of two-
fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of
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the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, The parties, through their respective counsels,
New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive presented to this Court for approval the
equal shares from the hereditary estate, following project of partition:
(Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs.
Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9)
Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant
to this court, for approval a project of partition in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable
of the hereditary estate in the proportion above Court respectfully submit the following Project
indicated, and in such manner as the parties of Partition:
may, by agreement, deemed convenient and
equitable to them taking into consideration the
location, kind, quality, nature and value of the
properties involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and
Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the Reyes Macariola;
proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named
and two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and
(I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties
[pp 27-29 of Exh. C]. 2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part
of the lot shall be awarded likewise to
Bernardita R. Macariola;
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for
lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a
project of partition was submitted to Judge
Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. 3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be
Notwithstanding the fact that the project of awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel
of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
1963, which for convenience is quoted 1,834.55 square meters along the western part
hereunder in full: of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes-Bales;

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5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided
equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of
Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded
under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded
to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes
in equal shares, provided, however that the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong
exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
Project of Partition indicated above which is
made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the
Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all
the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court
that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted,
had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant
approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court
that they are given full authority to sign by
themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of
Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for
the vesting of the rights, interests and
participations which were adjudicated to the
respective parties, as outlined in the Project of
Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of
said Project of Partition, and to perform such
other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October,
1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
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EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was
amended on November 11, 1963, only for the
purpose of giving authority to the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the
corresponding transfer certificates of title to the
respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project
of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half
thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters.
This lot, which according to the decision was
the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project
of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita
Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes
in equal shares, and when the project of
partition was approved by the trial court the
adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided
into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D.
Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court
(Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which
had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2)
who was issued transfer certificate of title No.
2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of
Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his
wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of
around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and
his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
particular portion was declared by the latter for
taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and
spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries
Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the
stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan,
Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge Asuncion, and the
latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge
Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as
the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of
Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E)
[pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on
August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated
August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to
wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of
Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010
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decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated
Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking
officer while he was a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty
of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard
of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with
a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly
and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney when in truth and in fact his name
does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that
there was a culpable defiance of the law and
utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge
(pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September
24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed
on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In
Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We
referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation,
report and recommendation. After hearing, the
said Investigating Justice submitted her report
dated May 27, 1971 recommending that
respondent Judge should be reprimanded or
warned in connection with the first cause of
action alleged in the complaint, and for the
second cause of action, respondent should be
warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited
under the law to engage in business. On the
third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma
recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about
November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.),
complainant herein instituted an action before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus
Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking
the annulment of the project of partition made
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
and the two orders issued by respondent Judge
approving the same, as well as the partition of
the estate and the subsequent conveyances
with damages. It appears, however, that some
defendants were dropped from the civil case.
For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was dismissed because he was no longer a real
party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed, having already conveyed on March 6,
1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent
Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder
was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case
against defendant Victoria Asuncion was
dismissed on the ground that she was no longer
a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of
Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on
August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina
Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.,
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Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial,
Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador
Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A.
Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of
complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her
counsel.
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R.
Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D.

Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
Justice and now Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case
No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows: (c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.

ASUNCION (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
[PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the

Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the issue of the legality
and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit
"B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C-
3"] approving the partition;
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of
B. Asuncion; the deceased Gerardo Villasin;

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(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo
Villasin the cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and
Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT
BONIFACIO RAMO
(1) Dismissing the complaint against
Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant
Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the
aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of
Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on
February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention
of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under
her first cause of action, that respondent Judge
Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring
by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which
was one of those properties involved in Civil
Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
action, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys,
clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and
rights in litigation or levied upon an execution
before the court within whose jurisdiction or
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territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies
only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons
disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that
"... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving
the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa
et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de
Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646
[1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge
purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already
final because none of the parties therein filed
an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject
of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the
sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order
dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made
pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long
become final for there was no appeal from said
orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the
lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July
31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs,
namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot
1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was
adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and
Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As
aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued
TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a
portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his
wife who declared the same for taxation
purposes only. The subsequent sale on August
31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon of their respective shares and interest
in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent
was the president and his wife was the
secretary, took place long after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the
subsequent two aforesaid orders therein
approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed
on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to
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annul the project of partition and the two
orders approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent
conveyances, the same, however, is of no
moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge
purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after
the finality of the decision which he rendered
on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his
two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963
and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11,
1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter,
change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now
Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the
aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-
E to respondent Judge having taken place over
one year after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders
approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the
sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes
and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme
to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of
said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration
for the approval of the project of partition. In
this connection, We agree with the findings of
the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-
important question whether or not the
acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot
1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the
whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent
was the President and his wife the Secretary,
was intimately related to the Order of
respondent approving the project of partition,
Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
participation in the transactions between the
Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-
E, and he insists that there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had
acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in
mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of
Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
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On this point, I agree with respondent that
there is no evidence in the record showing that
Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy"
of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the
Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible
and sincere, and I believe him when he testified
that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for
valuable consideration from the Reyeses
without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391-
394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that
respondent Judge acted illegally in approving
the project of partition although it was not
signed by the parties, We quote with approval
the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
1. I agree with complainant that
respondent should have required the signature
of the parties more particularly that of Mrs.
Macariola on the project of partition submitted
to him for approval; however, whatever error
was committed by respondent in that respect
was done in good faith as according to Judge
Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio
Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit
said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p.
24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such
written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did
Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the
statement of respondent, his affidavit being the
only one that was presented as respondent's
Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola
lead this investigator to believe that she knew
the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A,
and that she gave her conformity thereto. I
refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No.
19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased
Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a).
On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and
registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of
absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes
Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to
Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the
late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this
deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the
absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the
same having been adjudicated to her as her
share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes
Diaz as per decision of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-
A). The deed of sale was duly registered and
annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
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In connection with the abovementioned
documents it is to be noted that in the project
of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was
approved by respondent on October 23, 1963,
followed by an amending Order on November
11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was
adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4
share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr.
Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after
the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view,
however, that the latter sold her one-fourth
share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in
Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project
of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd
because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that
one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the
other half of said one-fourth was the share of
complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other
words, the decision did not adjudicate the
whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the
herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire
one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs.
Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it
was for no other reason than that she was wen
aware of the distribution of the properties of
her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is
also significant at this point to state that Mrs.
Macariola admitted during the cross-
examination that she went to Tacloban City in
connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from
which we can deduce that she could not have
been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil
case 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition
because according to her the properties
adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and
the least valuable. Complainant, however, did
not present any direct and positive evidence to
prove the alleged gross inequalities in the
choice and distribution of the real properties
when she could have easily done so by
presenting evidence on the area, location, kind,
the assessed and market value of said
properties. Without such evidence there is
nothing in the record to show that there were
inequalities in the distribution of the properties
of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge
did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in
his court, it was, however, improper for him to
have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." And as aptly
observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was
unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent
to have purchased or acquired a portion of a
12
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
piece of property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his
wife were ranking officers at the time of such
transfer. One who occupies an exalted position
in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility
of maintaining the faith and trust of the
citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only
must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for
doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice. In this particular case
of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and
render his actuations open to suspicion and
distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed
that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his
court and that he was purchasing it from a third
person and not from the parties to the
litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained
from buying it for himself and transferring it to
a corporation in which he and his wife were
financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion
that his acquisition was related in one way or
another to his official actuations in civil case
3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for
the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers
practising in his court, and the public in general
to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
actuations and the integrity of our courts of
justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the
complainant alleged that respondent Judge
violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce when he associated himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking
officer, said corporation having been organized
to engage in business. Said Article provides
that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in
commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can
they hold any office or have any direct,
administrative, or financial intervention in
commercial or industrial companies within the
limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges
and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision
shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal
judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor
to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or
prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
13
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special
provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the
aforestated provision is incorporated in the
Code of Commerce which is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however,
partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of
public law which deals with the organization
and operation of the governmental organs of
the State and define the relations of the state
with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be
recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers
and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of
Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the
"Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias
de Ultramar," which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6,
1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction
on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the
new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of
territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws
which are political in their nature and pertain to
the prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired
territory not in conflict with the, laws of the
new sovereign continue in force without the
14
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's
Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such
political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not
in conflict with the constitution or institutions
of the new sovereign, may be continued in
force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief
during the war, or by Congress in time of peace.
(Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and
Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet.
[26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has
never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any
change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government
which has acquired their territory. The same act
which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the
law which may be denominated political, is
necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct
of individuals, remains in force, until altered by
the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887,
897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a
general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act
that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the
change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce has no legal and binding
effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then
Judge of the Court of First Instance, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that
respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section
3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
15
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity,
or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution
or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under
the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or
intervened in his official capacity in the business
or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar,
the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his judicial office.
The business of said corporation is not that kind
where respondent intervenes or takes part in
his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code which has a similar prohibition on public
officers against directly or indirectly becoming
interested in any contract or business in which
it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not
enough to be a public official to be subject to
this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his
office, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the official who
intervenes in contracts or transactions which
have no relation to his office cannot commit
this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.
11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C.
Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11
[1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that
the aforesaid corporation gained any undue
advantage in its business operations by reason
of respondent's financial involvement in it, or
that the corporation benefited in one way or
another in any case filed by or against it in
court. It is undisputed that there was no case
filed in the different branches of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation
was either party plaintiff or defendant except
Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et
al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to
recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November
9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970
by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer connected
with the corporation, having disposed of his
interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the
same paragraph because there is no provision
in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the
Philippines, nor is there an existing law
expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary
from engaging or having interest in any lawful
business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296,
as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of
1948, does not contain any prohibition to that
effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of
said law, municipal judges may engage in
16
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law after office hours but with the
permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
which prohibits judges from engaging in
commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed
abrogated automatically upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is
political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the
purchase by judges of a property in litigation
before the court within whose jurisdiction they
perform their duties, cannot apply to
respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in
question to him took place after the finality of
his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his
two orders approving the project of partition;
hence, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the
Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or
employee in the civil service from engaging in
any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of
department, the same, however, may not fall
within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph
speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or
law on any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere
administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in
private business without a written permission
from the Department Head may not constitute
graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that
respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil
Service Rules promulgated thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under
said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall
engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from
the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that
respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is
covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948
and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
17
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to
remove or dismiss judges was then vested in
the President of the Philippines, not in the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two
grounds, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of
the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized,
upon its own motion, or upon information of
the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to
conduct the corresponding investigation.
Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure
for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the
1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as
other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil
Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may,
for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law
and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or
in the interest of the service, remove any
subordinate officer or employee from the
service, demote him in rank, suspend him for
not more than one year without pay or fine him
in an amount not exceeding six months' salary."
Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a
ground for disciplinary action against civil
service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as
subordinate civil service officers or employees
subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the
Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial
Department to which they belong. The Revised
Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is
the department head of the Supreme Court
(Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the
1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
other or second branch of the government (Sec.
1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation
of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered
as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as
applicable to them, would be adding another
ground for the discipline of judges and, as
aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act
recognizes only two grounds for their removal,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil
Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of
Civil Service who has original and exclusive
jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred
twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers
and employees in the competitive service, and,
except as provided by law, to have final
authority to pass upon their removal,
separation, and suspension and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and
efficiency of such officers and employees; and
prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline"
(emphasis supplied). There is no question that a
18
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a
Presidential appointee and is therefore not
covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have
already ruled that "... in interpreting Section
16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized
that only permanent officers and employees
who belong to the classified service come under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA
619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in
engaging in private business by joining the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not
violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of
1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly
unquestionable because Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his
accession to the bench, he should not retain
such investments previously made, longer than
a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of
them without serious loss. It is desirable that he
should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain
from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or
bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his
judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that
respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn
on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid
corporation and sold their respective shares to
third parties, and it appears also that the
aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit
in any case filed by or against it in court as there
was no case filed in the different branches of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the
time of the drafting of the Articles of
Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,
1966, up to its incorporation on January 9,
1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said
corporation. Such disposal or sale by
respondent and his wife of their shares in the
corporation only 22 days after the incorporation
of the corporation, indicates that respondent
realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon
25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore
deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation
and before it became involved in any court
litigation
III
19
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
With respect to the third and fourth causes of
action, complainant alleged that respondent
was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in
disregard of judicial decorum, and that there
was culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with
the recommendation of the Investigating Justice
that respondent Judge be exonerated because
the aforesaid causes of action are groundless,
and WE quote the pertinent portion of her
report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action
is the claim that respondent associated and
closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when
in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan
does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified
to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that
Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and
claims that all the time he believed that the
latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see
no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant
that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself
publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of
putting up a signboard with his name and the
words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to
indicate his office, and it was but natural for
respondent and any person for that matter to
have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of
complainant that respondent is guilty of
fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the
extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother
of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1),
that fact even if true did not render respondent
guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as
long as his friendly relations with Dominador A.
Tan and family did not influence his official
actuations as a judge where said persons were
concerned. There is no tangible convincing
proof that herein respondent gave any undue
privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan
or that the latter benefitted in his practice of
law from his personal relations with
respondent, or that he used his influence, if he
had any, on the Judges of the other branches of
the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of
the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with
practising attorneys and litigants in his court so
as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business
relations or friendship constitute an element in
determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons
of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have
social relations, that in itself would not
constitute a ground for disciplinary action
unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with
bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp.
403-405, rec.).
20
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
In conclusion, while respondent Judge
Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by
purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation
in his court and in engaging in business by
joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be
more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of
the Judiciary must not only be characterized
with propriety but must always be above
suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS
PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Macariola case digest
Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31,
1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar
Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010
rendered by respondent Hon. Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte
became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an
appeal, a project of partition was submitted to
him which he later approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto
was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project
of partition was Lot 1184. This lot according to
the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was
adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal
shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of Lot
1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria
Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and
spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries
Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on
August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case No. 4234
in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with
"acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge
Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of
21
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the
New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019,
Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno
of the CFI of Leyte rendered a decision
dismissing the complaints against Judge
Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and
recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia
Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she
recommended on her decision dated March 27,
1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate
Justice of Court of Appeals violated any law in
acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E
which he previously decided in a Civil Case No.
3010 and his engagement in business by joining
a private corporation during his incumbency as
a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act
unbecoming of a judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's
actuation does not constitute of an "act
unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to
be more discreet in his private and business
activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par.
5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate,
the sale or assignment of the property during
the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. Respondent judge purchased a
portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June
8, 1963 was already final because none of the
parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question
was no longer subject to litigation.
Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the
lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the
plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the US and later on from the US
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change
of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with
22
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted
by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There
appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce,
consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce
has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to
par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the
business of the corporation in which
respondent participated had obviously no
relation or connection with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife
deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its
incorporation realizing that their interest
contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
Proclamation no. 1
PROCLAMATION NO. 1
Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from
them.
On the basis of the peoples mandate
clearly manifested last February 7, I and
Salvador H. Laurel are taking power in
the name and by the will of the Filipino
people as President and Vice President,
respectively.
The people expect a reorganization of
government. Merit will be rewarded. As
a first step to restore public confidence I
expect all appointed public officials to
submit their courtesy resignations
beginning with the members of the
Supreme Court.
I pledge to do justice to the numerous
victims of human rights violations.
Consistent with the demands of the
sovereign people, we pledge a
government dedicated to uphold truth
and justice, morality and decency in
government, freedom and democracy.
To help me run the government, I have
issued Executive Order No. 1 dated
February 25, 1986 appointing key
cabinet ministers and creating certain
task forces.
I ask our people not to relax but to be
even more vigilant in this one moment of
triumph. The Motherland cannot thank
them enough. Yet, we all realize that
more is required of each and everyone
of us to redeem our promises and prove
23
CHOCO NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

to create a truly just society for our WHEREAS, the heroic action of the
people. people was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as
This is just the beginning. The same amended;
spirit which animated our campaign, and
has led to our triumph, will once more WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the
prevail, by the power of the people and people as manifested by their
by the grace of God. extraordinary action demands the
complete reorganization of the
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th of government, restoration of democracy,
February in the year of Our Lord, protection of basic rights, rebuilding of
nineteen hundred and eighty-six. confidence in the entire government
system, eradication of graft and
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO corruption, restoration of peace and
order, maintenance of the supremacy of
President civilian authority over the military, and
the transition to government under a
New Constitution in the shortest time
Proclamation no. 3 possible;
PROCLAMATION NO. 3
WHEREAS, during the period of
DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY transition to a New Constitution it must
TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS be guaranteed that the government will
MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE respect basic human rights and
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, fundamental freedoms;
ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL
CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING WHEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO AQUINO, President of the Philippines,
A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW by virtue of the power vested in me by
CONSTITUTION the sovereign mandate of the people; do
hereby promulgate the following
WHEREAS, the new government was Constitution:
installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION
units of the New Armed Forces of the OF
Philippines; THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

24
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1. Until a legislature is
ADOPTION OF CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE
1973 CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED
SECTION 1. The provisions of ARTICLE
I (National Territory), ARTICLE III
(Citizenship), ARTICLE IV (Bill of
Rights), ARTICLE V (Duties and
Obligations of Citizens), and ARTICLE
VI (Suffrage) of the 1973 Constitution,
as amended, remain in the force and
effect and are hereby adopted in toto as
part of this Provisional Constitution.
SECTION 2. The provision of ARTICLE
II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies), ARTICLE VII (The President),
ARTICLE X (The Judiciary), ARTICLE
XI (Local Government), ARTICLE XIII
(Accountability of Public Officers),
ARTICLE XIV (The National Economy
and Patrimony of the Nation), ARTICLE
XV (General Provisions) of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, are hereby
adopted as part of this Provisional
Constitution, as amended, are hereby
adopted as part of this Provisional
Constitution, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this
Proclamation.
ARTICLE II
THE PRESIDENT,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT, AND THE
CABINET
elected and convened under a New
Constitution, the President shall
continue to exercise legislative power.
The President shall give priority to
measures to achieve the mandate of the
people to:
a) Completely reorganize the
government and eradicate unjust and
oppressive structures, and all iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime;
b) Make effective the guarantees of
civil, political, human, social, economic
and cultural rights and freedoms of the
Filipino people, and provide remedies
against violations thereof;
c) Rehabilitate the economy and
promote the nationalist aspirations of
the people;
d) Recover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters
of the previous regime and protect the
interest of the people through orders of
sequestration or freezing of assets of
accounts;
e) Eradicate graft and corruption in
government and punish those guilty
thereof; and,
25
CHOCO NOTES
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f) Restore peace and order, settle
the problem of insurgency, and pursue
national reconciliation based on justice.
SECTION 2. The President shall be
assisted by a Cabinet which shall be
composed of Ministers with or without
portfolio who shall be appointed by the
President. They shall be accountable to
and hold office at the pleasure of the
President.
SECTION 3. The President shall have
control of and exercise general
supervision over all local governments.
SECTION 4. In case of permanent
vacancy arising from death, incapacity
or resignation of the President, the Vice-
President shall become President.
In case of death, permanent incapacity,
or resignation of the Vice-President, the
Cabinet shall choose from among
themselves the Minister with portfolio
who shall act as President.
SECTION 5. The Vice-President may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet and
may perform such other functions as
may be assigned to him by the
President.
SECTION 6. The President, the Vice-
President, and the Members of the
Cabinet shall be subject to the
disabilities provided for in Section 8,
Article VII, and in Section 6 and 7 Article
IX, respectively, of the 1973
Constitution, as amended.
ARTICLE III
GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the
government, priority shall be given to
measures to promote economy,
efficiency, and the eradication of graft
and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive
officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in the office
until otherwise provided by proclamation
or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public office or
employees separated from the service
as a result of the reorganization effected
under this Proclamation shall, if entitled
under the laws then in force, receive the
retirement and other benefits accuring
thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records, equipment,
buildings, facilities and other properties
of all government offices shall be
carefully preserved. In case any office or
body is abolished or reorganized
pursuant to this Proclamation, its funds
26
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
and properties shall be transferred to
the office or body to which its powers,
functions, and responsibilities
substantially pertain.
ARTICLE IV
EXISTING LAWS
SECTION 1. All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instruction, implementing rules and
regulations, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this
Proclamation shall remain operative
until amended, modified, or repealed by
the President or the regular legislative
body to be established under a New
Constitution.
SECTION 2. The President may review
all contracts, concessions, permits, or
other forms of privileges for the
exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of natural resources
entered into, granted, issued, or
acquired before the date of this
proclamation and when the national
interest requires, amend, modify, or
revoke them.
ARTICLE V be presented by the Commission to the
ADOPTION OF A NEW
CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. Within sixty (60) days from
date of this Proclamation, a Commission
shall be appointed by the President to
draft a New Constitution. The
Commission shall be composed of not
less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty
(50) natural born citizens of the
Philippines, of recognized probity,
known for their independence,
nationalism and patriotism. They shall
be chosen by the President after
consultation with various sectors of
society.
SECTION 2. The Commission shall
complete its work within as short a
period as may be consistent with the
need both to hasten the return of normal
constitutional government to draft a
document truly reflective of the ideals
and aspirations of the Filipino people.
SECTION 3. The Commission shall
conduct public hearings to insure that
the people will have adequate
participation in the formulation of the
New Constitution.
SECTION 4. The plenary session of the
Commission shall be public and fully
recorded.
SECTION 5. The New Constitution shall
President who shall fix the date for the
holding of a plebiscite. It shall become
valid and effective upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite which shall be held within a
period of sixty (60) days following its
submission to the President.
27
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
ARTICLE
HOLDING OF ELECTIONS
SECTION 1. National elections shall be
held as may be provided by the New
Constitution.
SECTION 2. Local elections shall be
held on a date to be determined by the
President which shall be held on a date
to be determined by the President which
shall not be earlier than the date of the
plebiscite for the ratification of the New
Constitution.
ARTICLE VII
EFFECTIVE DATE
SECTION 1. This Proclamation shall
take effect upon its promulgation by the
President.
SECTION 2. Pursuant to the letter and
spirit of this Proclamation, a Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government
consolidated official text of the
Provisional Constitution shall be
promulgated by the President and
published in English and Pilipino in the
official Gazette and in newspapers of
general circulation to insure widespread
dissemination.
DONE in the City of Manila, the 25thof
March, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Eighty-Six.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
VI Lawyers League
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES
vs. PRES. AQUINO
G.R. NO. 73748, May 22, 1986
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 on February 25, 1986 announcing that she
and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating
that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon
Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter but belongs to the
28
CHOCO NOTES
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realm of politics where only the people are the
judge.
The Supreme Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino
government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in
fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.
In re: Bermudez
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no
respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the
first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in
full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and
Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as
to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to
declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among
the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and
the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being
referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of
ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...
29
CHOCO NOTES
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The petition is dismissed outright for lack of
jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality
to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that
this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief. More importantly, the
petition amounts in effect to a suit against the
incumbent President of the Republic, President
Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary
that incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of
action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or
vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public
record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no
other persons, and provides for the extension of
their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second
Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases,
the legitimacy of the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by this
court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines
are the judge. And the people have made the
judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it
is not merely a de facto government but in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of tlie present government. All the
eleven members of this Court, as reorganized,
have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of
the Republic under her government. (Joint
Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No.
73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the
Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.];
and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay
vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
30
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully
applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
mutandis, there can be no question that
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice-President of the
Republic of the Philippines.or the above-quoted
reasons, which are fully applicable to the
petition at bar,
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
FELICIANO, JJ., concurring.
The petitioner asks the Court to declare who
are "the incumbent President and Vice
President elected in the February 7, 1986
elections" as stated in Article XVIII, Section 5 of
the Draft Constitution adopted by the
Constitutional Commission of 1986.
We agree that the petition deserves outright
dismissal as this Court has no original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
As to lack of cause of action, the petitioner's
prayer for a declaration as to who were elected
President and Vice President in the February 7,
1986 elections should be addressed not to this
Court but to other departments of government
constitutionally burdened with the task of
making that declaration.
The 1935 Constitution, the 1913 Constitution as
amended, and the 1986 Draft Constitution
uniformly provide 'that boards of canvassers in
each province and city shall certified who were
elected President and Vice President in their
respective areas. The certified returns are
transmitted to the legislature which proclaims,
through the designated Presiding Head, who
were duty elected.
Copies of the certified returns from the
provincial and city boards of canvassers have
not been furnished this Court nor is there any
need to do so. In the absence of a legislature,
31
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
we cannot assume the function of stating, and
neither do we have any factual or legal capacity
to officially declare, who were elected President
and Vice President in the February 7, 1986
elections.
As to who are the incumbent President and Vice
President referred to in the 1986 Draft
Constitution, we agree that there is no doubt
the 1986 Constitutional Commission referred to
President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice President
Salvador H. Laurel.
Finally, we agree with the Resolution of the
Court in G.R. Nos. 73748, 73972, and 73990.
For the foregoing reasons, we vote to DISMISS
the instant petition.
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I vote to dismiss this petition on the ground that
the Constitution we are asked to interpret has
not yet been ratified and is therefore not yet
effective. I see here no actual conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination at
this time. (Aetna Life Insurance Co. vs. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227; PACU vs. Secretary of Education,
97 Phil. 806.)
In re: Bermudez Digest
Political Law De Jure vs De Facto
Government
Bermudez as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as
erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in
full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended
to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President
and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May,
1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is
not clear as to whom it refers, he then asks
the Court to declare and answer the question
of the construction and definiteness as to who,
among the present incumbent President
Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador
Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to under the said
Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed
1986 Constitution refers to, . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision is
ambiguous.
HELD: No. Petitioners allegation of ambiguity
or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of
32
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
public record and common public knowledge
that the Constitutional Commission refers
therein to incumbent President Aquino and
Vice-President Laurel, and to no other
persons, and provides for the extension of
their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for
purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second
Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President
under said 1986 Constitution. In previous
cases, the legitimacy of the government of
President Aquino was likewise sought to be
questioned with the claim that it was not
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
The said cases were dismissed outright by
this court which held that: Petitioners have no
personality to sue and their petitions state no
cause of action. For the legitimacy of the
Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people of the Philippines are the judge.
And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President
Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and
in law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.
Letter of Assoc. Justice
[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S.
PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14
November 1990.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a
member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter
dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court,
seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in
the Court of Appeals.
It appears from the records that petitioner was
first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of
office for said position only on 29 November
1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General
in the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.
1
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was
reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary.
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." 2 Petitioner was appointed Appellate
Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November
1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be
ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. 3
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February
1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire
government, including the Judiciary. To effect the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate
Court and other lower courts, a Screening
Committee was created, with the then Minister of
Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as
Chairman and then Solicitor General, now
Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations
Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice Chairman. President
Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers
by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive
Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned
reorganization of the Judiciary. 4
The Screening Committee recommended the
return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the
33
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank
of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate
court justices. When the appointments were
signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986,
petitioners seniority ranking changed, however,
from number eleven (11) to number twenty six
(26). 5 of Appeals, for, in his case, Executive Order No.
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his
seniority ranking could only be attributed to
inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter
to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order
No. 33, which reads:chan roble s vi rtua l
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created
a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a
Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who
shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so
designated in his appointment and the Associate
Justice shall have precedence according to the
dates of their respective appointments, or when
the appointments of two or more shall bear the
same date, according to the order in which their
appointments were issued by the President. Any
Member who is reappointed to the Court after
rendering service in any other position in the
government shall retain the precedence to which
he was entitled under his original appointment,
and his service in the Court shall, for all intents
and purpose be considered as continuous and
uninterrupted." 6 petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is
presumed to have intended to comply with her
own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the
correction of the inadvertent error would only
implement the intent of the President as well as
the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not
provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation
(between the President and the Supreme Court).
7
Petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar
Victoriano, former Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals who, according to petitioner, was
transferred from his position as Justice of the
Court of Appeals to the Ministry of Justice as
Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986
was reappointed to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner states that his (Victorianos) stint in the
Commission of Land Registration did not
adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court
33 was correctly applied. 8
In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29
November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos
request. 9 It will be noted that before the
lawl ibra ry issuance of said resolution, there was no written
opposition to, or comment on petitioners
aforesaid request. The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno for correction of his
seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is
granted. The presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is
hereby directed to correct the seniority rank of
Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number
five (5). Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Court Administrator and the Judicial and Bar
Council for their guidance and information." 10
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was
later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos,
Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate
Justices affected by the ordered correction. They
contend that the present Court of Appeals is a
new Court with fifty one (51) members and that
prior court; neither can he claim that he was
returning to his former court, for the courts where
he had previously been appointed ceased to exist
at the date of his last appointment. 11
The Court en banc in a resolution dated 17
January 1992 required the petitioner to file his
comment on the motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dated 29 November 1990.
In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue
of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P.
Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of
Appeals is now number five (5) for, though
President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a
34
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
revolution, she had pledged at the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution) that "no right provided
under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be
absent in the Freedom Constitution." 12
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the
last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg.
129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous
repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to
petitioner, the preservation and enforcement of
all rights and liabilities which had accrued under
the original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner
avers that, although the power of appointment is
executive in character and cannot be usurped by
any other branch of the Government, such power
can still be regulated by the Constitution and by
the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set
by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of
appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law.
15
Justices Javellana and Campos were required by
the Court to file their reply to Justice Punos
comment on their motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of the Court en banc dated 24
January 1991. chanro bles. com:cra law:red
In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate
Justices Javellana and Campos submit that the
appeal or request for correction filed by the
petitioner was addressed to the wrong party.
They aver that as petitioner himself had alleged
the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the
Office of the President, ergo, he should have filed
his request for correction also with said Office of
the President and not directly with the Supreme
Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that
petitioner had indeed filed with the Office of the
President a request or petition for correction of
his ranking, (seniority) but the same was not
approved such that his recourse should have been
an appropriate action before the proper court and
impleading all parties concerned. The aforesaid
non-approval by the Office of the President they
argue, should be respected by the Supreme Court
"not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also their presumed
knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws
they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the non-
approval) is a confirmation that petitioners
seniority ranking at the time of his appointment
by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate and
not an "inadvertent error" as petitioner would
have the Court believe. 18
The resolution of this controversy is not a
pleasant task for the Court since it involves not
only members of the next highest court of the
land but persons who are close to members of
this Court. But the controversy has to be
resolved. The core issue in this case is whether
the present Court of Appeals is a new court such
that it would negate any claim to precedence or
seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the
Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 or
whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a
continuation of the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said
Executive Order No. 33.
It is the holding of the Court that the present
Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and
distinct from the Court of Appeals or the
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the
wake of the massive reorganization launched by
the revolutionary government of Corazon C.
Aquino in the aftermath of the people power
(EDSA) revolution in 1986.
A resolution has been defined as "the complete
overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously
subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and
fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually effected with violence or
at least some acts of violence." 20 In Kelsens
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is
defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal
order of a community is nullified and replaced by
a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first
order itself." 21
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a
relatively peaceful one, and more popularly
known as the "people power revolution" that the
Filipino people tore themselves away from an
existing regime. This revolution also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
35
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of
revolution has been defined as "an inherent right
of a people to cast out their rulers, change their
policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional
methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be
unavailable." 22 It has been said that "the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people
of the state" and from there is derived "the right
of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter
any existing form of government without regard
to the existing constitution." 23
The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the
Provisional (Freedom) Constitution, 24 read: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph
"WHEREAS, the new government under President
Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
"WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was
done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended;
"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by the sovereign mandate of the people, do
hereby promulgate the following Provisional
Constitution."25cralaw:red
These summarize the Aquino governments
position that its mandate is taken from "a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people." 26
Discussions and opinions of legal experts also
proclaim that the Aquino government was
"revolutionary in the sense that it came into
existence in defiance of the existing legal
processes" 27 and that it was a revolutionary
government "instituted by the direct action of the
people and in opposition to the authoritarian
values and practices of the overthrown
government." 28
A question which naturally comes to mind is
whether the then existing legal order was
overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal
order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such
code consists of all the rules found in the
enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the
state operates under a written constitution, its
organs may be readily determined from a reading
of its provisions. Once such organs are
ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate
their enactments. The rules in such enactments,
along with those in the constitution, comprise the
legal order of that constitutional state." 29 It is
assumed that the legal order remains as a
"culture system" of the polity as long as the latter
endures 30 and that a point may be reached,
however, where the legal system ceases to be
operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by
the population nor enforced by the officials. 31
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the
presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986
presidential election. 32 Thus it can be said that
the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government
which was met by little resistance and her control
of the state evidenced by the appointment of the
Cabinet and other key officers of the
administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the
Military signalled the point where the legal system
then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipino.
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the
legal system abolished by the revolution and that
the Court of Appeals established under Executive
Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with
appointments thereto having no relation to earlier
appointments to the abolished courts, and that
the reference to precedence in rank contained in
the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as
amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to
prospective situations as distinguished from
retroactive ones.
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive
36
CHOCO NOTES

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Order No. 33 did not abolish the precedence or PROCLAIMING THE RATIFICATION
seniority ranking resulting from previous
appointment to the Court of Appeals or
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
1986 revolution, it is believed that President ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL
Aquino as head of then revolutionary
government, could disregard or set aside such
COMMISSION OF 1986, INCLUDING
precedence or seniority in ranking when she THE ORDINANCE APPENDED
made her appointments to the reorganized Court THERETO
of Appeals in 1986.

It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance WHEREAS, the Constitutional

of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was Commission of 1986 adopted the
still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
government, encompassing both executive and Constitution of the Republic of the
legislative powers, such that she could, if she so Philippines on October 15, 1986,
desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. together with the Ordinance appended
Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It
should also be remembered that the same thereto, which shall become valid and
situation was still in force when she issued the effective upon ratification by a majority
1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
other words, President Aquino, at the time of the
issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or the purpose;
disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended by Executive Order No. 33, on
precedence or seniority in the case of the
WHEREAS, the Commission on
petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since Elections, sitting as the national board of
the appointment extended by the President to the canvassers for the February 2, 1987
petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new
Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution,
roster of justices, was a valid appointment certified that:
anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then
revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at
this time to question or correct that exercise. (1) The Commission on Elections
canvassed the returns from 83,288
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for voting precincts throughout the country
Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of
members of the Court of Appeals, including that involving 21,785,216 votes cast; and
of the petitioner, at the time the appointments
were made by the President in 1986, are
recognized and upheld.
(2) On the basis of the canvass made by
the Commission on Elections, the
SO ORDERED. results thereof are as follows:

(a) Affirmative votes: 16,622,111

Proclamation no. 58
PROCLAMATION NO. 58

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CHOCO NOTES
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(b) Negative Votes: 4,953,375
(c) Abstentions: 209,730
A copy of the Certificate of Canvass of
the Votes Cast in the Plebiscite Held on
February 2, 1987, of the Commission on
Elections dated February 7, 1987 is
hereto attached as Annex A of this
Proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the sovereign mandate of the people, do
hereby proclaim that the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines adopted
by the Constitutional Commission of
1986, including the Ordinance
appended thereto, has been duly ratified
by the Filipino people and is therefore
effective and in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
hereunto set my hand and caused the
seal of the Republic of the Philippines to
be affixed.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 11th
day of February, in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President:
(Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO
Executive Secretary
CERTIFICATE OF VOTES CAST IN
THE FEBRUARY 2, 1987 PLEBISCITE
ON THE 1986 PROPOSED
CONSTITUTION
We, the undersigned Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on
Elections, sitting en banc at the Session
Hall of the Commission on Elections,
Intramuros, Manila, Philippines, as the
National Board of Canvassers for the
Plebiscite on the 1986 proposed
Constitution held on February 2, 1987
do hereby certify:
I PLEBISCITE QUESTION
That pursuant to Section 5, Article V of
Proclamation No. 3 and Section 14 of
Proclamation No. 9, as amended, the
following question was submitted to the
Filipino people:
QUESTION: DO YOU VOTE FOR THE
RATIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH THE
ORDINANCE APPENDED THERETO?
II CANVASS
That on the basis of the certificates of
canvass duly authenticated, certified
and submitted to the Commission on
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CHOCO NOTES
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Elections by Seventy (70) Provincial
Boards Of Canvassers, and six (6)
District Boards of Canvassers in , Metro
Manila, we publicly canvassed, with
notice to, and in the presence of the
representatives of the major political
parties and the citizens arm of the
Commission, the votes cast in the
Plebiscite starting at 10:00 oclock a.m.
on February 4, 1987 and continuing
everyday thereafter until 4:40 oclock
P.M. of February 7, 1987;
III DECLARATION OF RESULTS
That after said canvass, we hereby
declare the results thereof to be as
follows:
Affirmative Votes (YES) Percent
16,622,111 76.30%
Negative Votes (NO) Percent
4,953,375 22.74%
Abstentions Percent
209,780 0.96%
QUESTION: DO YOU VOTE FOR THE
RATIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH THE
ORDINANCE APPENDED THERETO?
That the foregoing affirmative votes
constitute a majority of the total number
of votes cast in Plebiscite;
That the above results, represent the
returns from 83,288 out of 86,505
precincts throughout the country and
87.04% percent of the total number of
registered voters nationwide;
That when the Commission adjourned,
only the certificates of canvess from the
provinces of Eastern Samar, Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur, and Pagadian City
were still unreported and unaccounted
for, representing a total of 509,173
registered voters, which can not affect
the final outcome of the Plebiscite.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We, the
Chairman and Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections, have set our
hands and caused the seal of the
Commission to be affixed hereunto in
the City of Manila, Philippines, this 7th
day of February, 1987.
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CHOCO NOTES
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De leon vs. Esguerra
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT,
MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO,
ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as
OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC
Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS,
RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V.
MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L.
TOLENTINO, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by
petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from
replacing them from their respective positions
as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen
of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents
submitted their Comment on the Petition, and
petitioner's their Reply to respondents'
Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982,
petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners
Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C.
Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M.
Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the
Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de
Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8,
1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by
the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC
Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated
December 1, 1986 designating respondents
40
CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta
Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita
L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is
evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC
Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been
appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
That as being OIC Governor of the Province of
Rizal and in the performance of my duties
thereof, I among others, have signed as I did
sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering
the replacement of all the barangay officials of
all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay,
Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated
December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally
on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further
deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following
day, February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject
Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared
null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant
to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of
1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall
be six (6) years which shall commence on June
7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors
shall have elected and shall have qualified," or
up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section
2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution,
promulgated on March 25, 1986, which
provided:
41
CHOCO NOTES
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SECTION 2. All elective and appointive
officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within
a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision,
respondents contend that the terms of office of
elective and appointive officials were abolished
and that petitioners continued in office by
virtue of the aforequoted provision and not
because their term of six years had not yet
expired; and that the provision in the Barangay
Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be
deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of
the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be
no question that petitioners, as elective officials
under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in
office but should vacate their positions upon
the occurrence of any of the events mentioned.
1 Constitutions.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional
Constitution, there has been no proclamation or
executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution
is whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended
on February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent
OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977,
should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1,1986 to
which it was ante dated, in keeping with the
dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still
within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted
provision in the Provisional Constitution must
be deemed to have been overtaken by Section
27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take
effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous
42
CHOCO NOTES
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The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the
elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired
security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a
policy of the State to guarantee and promote
the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.
2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a
part, 3 and limits the President's power to
"general supervision" over local governments. 4
Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987
Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has
been determined by law, therefore, the term of
office of six (6) years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still
govern.
Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find
nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6)
years for elective Barangay officials and the
1987 Constitution, and the same should,
therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent,
with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by
respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987
designating respondents as the Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively,
of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both
declared to be of no legal force and effect; and
(2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with
the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions
subject of this Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
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CHOCO NOTES
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Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar
is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite
for its ratification was held or whether it took
effect on February 11, 1987, the date its
ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation
No. 58 of the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of
Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of
the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in
the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution
should be deemed to "take effect on the date
its ratification shall have been ascertained and
not at the time the people cast their votes to
approve or reject it." This view was actually
proposed at the Constitutional Commission
deliberations, but was withdrawn by its
proponent in the face of the "overwhelming"
contrary view that the Constitution "will be
effective on the very day of the plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of
the Constitutional Commission fully supports
the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear,
unequivocal and express intent of the
Constitutional Conunission in unanimously
approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and
none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
was that "the act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the
44
CHOCO NOTES
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ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of
the votes] is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done
by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is
reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we
now put to a vote the original formulation of
the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless
there are other commissioners who would like
to present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following
amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and
in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT
HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after
"constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR
AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam
President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
propose an additional sentence, the committee
would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally
formulated. We are now ready to comment on
that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete
the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE
PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And
the second amendment would be: After the
word "constitutions," add the words" AND
THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed
amendment. However, we regret that we
cannot accept the second proposed
amendment after the word "constitutions"
because the committee feels that when we talk
of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it
includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
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CHOCO NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not
insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the
second amendment so the Commission would
be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we
can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read:
"THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN
FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF
THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after
conferring with our chairman, the committee
feels that the second proposed amendment in
the form of a new sentence would not be
exactly necessary and the committee feels that
it would be too much for us to impose a time
frame on the President to make the
proclamation. As we would recall, Madam
President, in the approved Article on the
Executive, there is a provision which says that
the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve
this first sentence, and it says that there will be
a proclamation by the President that the
Constitution has been ratified, the President
will naturally comply with the law in accordance
with the provisions in the Article on the
Executive which we have cited. It would be too
much to impose on the President a time frame
within which she will make that declaration. It
would be assumed that the President would
immediately do that after the results shall have
been canvassed by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot
accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the
same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the
President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding,
Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second
sentence.
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CHOCO NOTES

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FR. BERNAS. Madam President. there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is

recognized. MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman
answer a few clarificatory questions?

FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to

reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new
Constitution dependent upon the proclamation
of the President. The effectivity of the
Constitution should commence on the date of
the ratification, not on the date of the
proclamation of the President. What is
confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976
when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In
that particular case, the reason the
amendments of 1976 were effective upon the
proclamation of the President was that the
draft presented to the people said that the
amendment will be effective upon the
proclamation made by the President. I have a
suspicion that was put in there precisely to give
the President some kind of leeway on whether
to announce the ratification or not. Therefore,
we should not make this dependent on the
action of the President since this will be a
manifestation of the act of the people to be
done under the supervision of the COMELEC
and it should be the COMELEC who should
make the announcement that, in fact, the votes
show that the Constitution was ratified and
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree
that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when
the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the votes
were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the
mechanics of the whole thing, Madam
President. We present the Constitution to a
plebiscite, the people exercise their right to
vote, then the votes are canvassed by the
Commission on Elections. If we delete the
suggested amendment which says: "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT
HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear
terms, the date when the Constitution is

47
CHOCO NOTES
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supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the
case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting
of the ballots. if the President were to say that
the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on
January 19, 1987, then the date for the
effectivity of the new Constitution would be
January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would
not depend on the actual issuance of the results
by the Commission on Elections which will be
doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam
President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President,
because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes"
is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the
plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of
Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know
from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if
he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting
on the amendment because I cannot subscribe
to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the
date of the ratification is reckoned from the
date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot
be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split
the moment of casting by each of the voters.
Actually and technically speaking, it would be all
right if it would be upon the announcement of
the results of the canvass conducted by the
COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all
over the country. But it is necessary that there
be a body which will make the formal
announcement of the results of the plebiscite.
So it is either the President or the COMELEC
itself upon the completion of the canvass of the
results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
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CHOCO NOTES
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THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is
recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I
beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I
support the stand of Commissioner Bernas
because it is really the date of the casting of the
"yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of
the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification even if the results are
released two or three days after. I think it is a
fundamental principle in political law, even in
civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirmation The act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for
presidential proclamation, that proclamation
will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner
Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was
precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass
thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done
by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be
recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is
recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide
amendment because we have to fix a date for
the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the
announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and
rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite
date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide
amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Maambong is recognized.
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MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the
Commissioner, would there be a necessity for
the Commission on Elections to declare the
results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the
Commission on Elections which makes the
official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is
the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the
canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results
of the canvass as submitted by the Commission
on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no
necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President
may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or
not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation
made by the President would be immaterial
because under the law, the administration of all
election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission
on Elections which announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the
President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what
he says contradicts what the Commission on
Elections says, it would have no effect. I would
only add that when we say that the date of
effectivity is on the day of the casting of the
votes, what we mean is that the Constitution
takes effect on every single minute and every
single second of that day, because the Civil
Code says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the
votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution
is really effective from the previous midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on
citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or
anybody born on the date of effectivity of the
1973 Constitution, which is January 17, 1973,
are natural-born citizens, no matter what time
of day or night.
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MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore,
safely say that whatever date is the publication
of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC
retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the
need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas
which speaks of the date (of ratification that
would have a definite date, because there
would be no definite date if we depend upon
the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is
recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam
President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the
result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or
the President, would announce that a majority
of the votes cast on a given date was in favor of
the Constitution. And that is the date when the
Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or
amendment of the Constitution provides that a
constitution becomes effective upon ratification
by a majority of the votes cast, although I would
not say from the very beginning of the date of
election because as of that time it is impossible
to determine whether there is a majority. At the
end of the day of election or plebiscite, the
determination is made as of that time-the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on
such and such a date. So that is the time when
the new Constitution will be considered ratified
and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-
President Padilla.
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MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against
the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Davide and I support the view of Commissioner
Bernas and the others because the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the people, by
a majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of
the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a
contract, say, between an agent and a third
person and that contract is confirmed or ratified
by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the
date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as
ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor
of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once
more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on
his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and
overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I
am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the
Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now
ready to vote on the original provision as stated
by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read
again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
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THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please
raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand.
(No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none
against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its
declaration at bar that the Constitution took
effect on the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the
Provisional Constitution promulgated on March
25, 1986 must be deemed to have been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after
said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying
clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article
of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer exercise the power to replace
petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC
Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of
their successors could no longer produce any
legal force and effect. While the Provisional
Constitution provided for a one-year period
expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the
power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and
effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers
of the Constitution been otherwise, they would
have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as
indeed they provided for multifarious transitory
provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent
President until the convening of the first
Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement
in the dissent that "the appointments of some
seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial
fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by)
the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious questions," in view of the
provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution which require prior
endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar
Council created under the Constitution. It
should be stated for the record that the
reported date of the appointments, February 2,
1987, is incorrect. The official records of the
Court show that the appointments of the seven
Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to
this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were all
appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3

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(Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987,
Justice likewise show that the appointment when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield
papers of the last batch of provincial and city to that better view and agree with her ponencia
fiscals signed by the President in completion of completely.
the reorganization of the prosecution service
were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1, SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
1987.) It is also a matter of record that since
February 2, 1987, no appointments to the
Judiciary have been extended by the President,
With due respect to the majority I register this
pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar
dissent.
Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has
likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the
effective date of the Constitution, as now
expressly declared by the Court. While I agree that the one-year deadline
prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution with respect to the
tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
CRUZ, J., concurring.

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials

In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice
and employees under the 1973 Constitution
Herrera is able to prove her point with more
shall continue in office until otherwise provided
telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has
by proclamation or executive order or upon the
written another persuasive opinion, and I am
designation or appointment and qualification of
delighted to concur. I note that it in effect
their successors, if such appointment is made
affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora,
within a period of one year from February 25,
Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted
1986.
that the local OICs may no longer be summarily
replaced, having acquired security of tenure
under the new Constitution. Our difference is
that whereas I would make that right was cut short by the ratification of the 1987
commence on February 25, 1987, after the Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether
deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, or not that cut-off period began on February 2,

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1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve

the new Charter. To my mind the 1987
constitution took effect on February 11, 1987,
the date the same was proclaimed ratified
pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, and not February 2,
1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the
1987 Charter itself, thus:
I have no doubt that between February 2, and
February 11, 1987 the government performed
acts that would have been valid under the
Provisional Constitution but would otherwise
have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall,
in particular, the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals,
and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly
extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections
8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution,
as follows:

Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect

immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the
Constitution takes effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained, and not
at the time the people cast their votes to
approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically
said that Constitution was ratified during such a
plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that
time, had not, and could not have been, vet
determined.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex oficio
Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
xxx xxx xxx

Other than that, pragmatic considerations

compel me to take the view.

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Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy, Such appointments
need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious
questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably
reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as
well as the amendments thereto from the date
it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the
1973 Constitution became in force and effect
on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No.
1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the
Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was
issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date
further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became
final. And this was so notwithstanding Section
16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose and, except as herein provided, shall
supersede the Constitution of nineteen-
hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos
promulgated Proclamation no. 1595,
proclaiming the ratification of the 1976
amendments submitted in the plebiscite of
October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states,
inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I
hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied
in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino
people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct.
16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in
full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9
of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the
incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
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they have been ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive
issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the
Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of
judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for
local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said
amendment is hereby declared to take effect
immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21,
dated December 18, 1979, the proposed
amendment shall take effect on the date the
incumbent President/Prime Minister shall
proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was
issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the
Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the Amendments
to the Constitution Embodied in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them
Therefore Effective and in Full Force and
Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said
amendments duly approved, further declared
them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect
as of the date of this Proclamation," It shall be
noted, in this connection, that under
Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang
Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, which parented these
amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2,
Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122,
"An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for
Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent
Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three,
Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds
Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result of
the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to
it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board
of Canvassers of each province or city.
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CHOCO NOTES
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We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332,
"Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of
January 27, 1984, of the Amendments to the
Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and
113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and
effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as
Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9,
Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on
the date the President of the Philippines shall
proclaim that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held
for the purpose, but not later than three
months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113
provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of
the Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at
which it is submitted to the people for their
ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI
of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto
take effect upon proclamation of their
ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite
is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in
Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite
called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the
Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress)
adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted
on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution
makes no mention of a retroactive application.
Accordingly, when the incumbent President
(Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on
February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance
appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the
Filipino people and is therefore effective and in
full force and effect. 4
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CHOCO NOTES
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the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came
into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at
no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5
in which we declared, in passing, that the new
Charter was ratified on February 2, 1987, does
not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated,
the remark was said in passing-we did not
resolve the case on account of a categorical
holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life
on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I
now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with
the views expressed above, that the challenged
dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid,
the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in
force.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar
is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite
for its ratification was held or whether it took
effect on February 11, 1987, the date its
ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation
No. 58 of the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of
Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of
the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in
the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution
should be deemed to "take effect on the date
its ratification shall have been ascertained and
not at the time the people cast their votes to
approve or reject it." This view was actually
proposed at the Constitutional Commission
deliberations, but was withdrawn by its
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proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" there are other commissioners who would like
contrary view that the Constitution "will be to present amendments.
effective on the very day of the plebiscite."

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.

The record of the proceedings and debates of
the Constitutional Commission fully supports
the Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is
unequivocal and express intent of the recognized.
Constitutional Conunission in unanimously
approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and
none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
amendments.
was that "the act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of
the votes] is merely the mathematical On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and
confirmation of what was done during the date in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT
President is merely the official confirmatory HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last line, after
declaration of an act which was actually done "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR
by the Filipino people in adopting the AMENDMENTS."
Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam
President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
The record of the deliberations and the voting is propose an additional sentence, the committee
reproduced hereinbelow: 1 would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally
formulated. We are now ready to comment on
that proposed amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we
now put to a vote the original formulation of
the committee as indicated in Section 12, unless

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The proposed amendment would be to delete
the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE
PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And
the second amendment would be: After the
word "constitutions," add the words" AND
THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed
amendment. However, we regret that we
cannot accept the second proposed
amendment after the word "constitutions"
because the committee feels that when we talk
of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it
includes "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not
insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the
second amendment so the Commission would
be able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we
can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read:
"THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE WITHIN
FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF
THE CANVASS BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH
PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after
conferring with our chairman, the committee
feels that the second proposed amendment in
the form of a new sentence would not be
exactly necessary and the committee feels that
it would be too much for us to impose a time
frame on the President to make the
proclamation. As we would recall, Madam
President, in the approved Article on the
Executive, there is a provision which says that
the President shall make certain that all laws
shall be faithfully complied. When we approve
this first sentence, and it says that there will be
a proclamation by the President that the
Constitution has been ratified, the President
will naturally comply with the law in accordance
with the provisions in the Article on the
Executive which we have cited. It would be too
much to impose on the President a time frame
within which she will make that declaration. It
would be assumed that the President would
immediately do that after the results shall have
been canvassed by the COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot
accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
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MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the
same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the
President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding,
Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second
sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to
reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new
Constitution dependent upon the proclamation
of the President. The effectivity of the
Constitution should commence on the date of
the ratification, not on the date of the
proclamation of the President. What is
confusing, I think, is what happened in 1976
when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In
that particular case, the reason the
amendments of 1976 were effective upon the
proclamation of the President was that the
draft presented to the people said that the
amendment will be effective upon the
proclamation made by the President. I have a
suspicion that was put in there precisely to give
the President some kind of leeway on whether
to announce the ratification or not. Therefore,
we should not make this dependent on the
action of the President since this will be a
manifestation of the act of the people to be
done under the supervision of the COMELEC
and it should be the COMELEC who should
make the announcement that, in fact, the votes
show that the Constitution was ratified and
there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman
answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree
that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when
the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
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FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the votes
were supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the
mechanics of the whole thing, Madam
President. We present the Constitution to a
plebiscite, the people exercise their right to
vote, then the votes are canvassed by the
Commission on Elections. If we delete the
suggested amendment which says: "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT
HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what would be, in clear
terms, the date when the Constitution is
supposed to be ratified or not ratified, as the
case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting
of the ballots. if the President were to say that
the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on
January 19, 1987, then the date for the
effectivity of the new Constitution would be
January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would
not depend on the actual issuance of the results
by the Commission on Elections which will be
doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam
President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President,
because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes"
is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the
plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of
Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know
from the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if
he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting
on the amendment because I cannot subscribe
to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the
date of the ratification is reckoned from the
date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot
be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split
the moment of casting by each of the voters.
Actually and technically speaking, it would be all
right if it would be upon the announcement of
the results of the canvass conducted by the
COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all
over the country. But it is necessary that there
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be a body which will make the formal
announcement of the results of the plebiscite.
So it is either the President or the COMELEC
itself upon the completion of the canvass of the
results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is
recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I
beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I
support the stand of Commissioner Bernas
because it is really the date of the casting of the
"yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of
the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification even if the results are
released two or three days after. I think it is a
fundamental principle in political law, even in
civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirmation The act of ratification is the act of
voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for
presidential proclamation, that proclamation
will merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner
Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was
precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass
thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory
declaration of an act which was actually done
by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the
date of the plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be
recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is
recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide
amendment because we have to fix a date for
the effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the
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announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and
rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite
date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide
amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the
Commissioner, would there be a necessity for
the Commission on Elections to declare the
results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because it is the
Commission on Elections which makes the
official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is
the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the
canvass, will there be a necessity for the
President to make a proclamation of the results
of the canvass as submitted by the Commission
on Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no
necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President
may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or
not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation
made by the President would be immaterial
because under the law, the administration of all
election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission
on Elections which announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the
President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what
he says contradicts what the Commission on
Elections says, it would have no effect. I would
only add that when we say that the date of
effectivity is on the day of the casting of the
votes, what we mean is that the Constitution
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takes effect on every single minute and every
single second of that day, because the Civil
Code says a day has 24 hours.
So that even if the votes are cast in the
morning, the Constitution is really effective
from the previous midnight. So that when we
adopted the new rule on citizenship, the
children of Filipino mothers or anybody born on
the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
which is January 17, 1973, are natural-born
citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore,
safely say that whatever date is the publication
of the results of the canvass by the COMELEC
retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the
need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas
which speaks of the date (of ratification that
would have a definite date, because there
would be no definite date if we depend upon
the canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is
recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam
President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the
result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or
the President, would announce that a majority
of the votes cast on a given date was in favor of
the Constitution. And that is the date when the
Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or
amendment of the Constitution provides that a
constitution becomes effective upon ratification
by a majority of the votes cast, although I would
not say from the very beginning of the date of
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election because as of that time it is impossible
to determine whether there is a majority. At the
end of the day of election or plebiscite, the
determination is made as of that time-the
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on
such and such a date. So that is the time when
the new Constitution will be considered ratified
and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-
President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against
the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Davide and I support the view of Commissioner
Bernas and the others because the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the people, by
a majority vote, have cast their votes in favor of
the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a
contract, say, between an agent and a third
person and that contract is confirmed or ratified
by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the
date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as
ratified should retroact to the date that the
people have cast their affirmative votes in favor
of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner
Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once
more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on
his amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and
overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I
am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the
Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now
ready to vote on the original provision as stated
by the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read
again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
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This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and
shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please
raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand.
(No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none
against; Section 12 is approved. 2
The Court next holds as a consequence of its
declaration at bar that the Constitution took
effect on the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the
Provisional Constitution promulgated on March
25, 1986 must be deemed to have been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after
said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying
clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article
of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer exercise the power to replace
petitioners in their positions as Barangay
Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted
replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC
Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of
their successors could no longer produce any
legal force and effect. While the Provisional
Constitution provided for a one-year period
expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the
power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and
effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers
of the Constitution been otherwise, they would
have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as
indeed they provided for multifarious transitory
provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII,
e.g. extension of the six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent
President until the convening of the first
Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement
in the dissent that "the appointments of some
seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial
fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by)
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the President on February 2, 1987 . . . could be
open to serious questions," in view of the
provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution which require prior
endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar
Council created under the Constitution. It
should be stated for the record that the
reported date of the appointments, February 2,
1987, is incorrect. The official records of the
Court show that the appointments of the seven
Court of Appeals Justices were transmitted to
this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were all
appointed on or before January 31, 1987. 3
(Similarly, the records of the Department of
Justice likewise show that the appointment
papers of the last batch of provincial and city
fiscals signed by the President in completion of
the reorganization of the prosecution service
were made on January 31, 1987 and
transmitted to the Department on February 1,
1987.) It is also a matter of record that since
February 2, 1987, no appointments to the
Judiciary have been extended by the President,
pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar
Council, indicating that the Chief Executive has
likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the
effective date of the Constitution, as now
expressly declared by the Court.
CRUZ, J., concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice
Herrera is able to prove her point with more
telling effect than the tones of thunder. She has
written another persuasive opinion, and I am
delighted to concur. I note that it in effect
affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora,
Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted
that the local OICs may no longer be summarily
replaced, having acquired security of tenure
under the new Constitution. Our difference is
that whereas I would make that right
commence on February 25, 1987, after the
deadline set by the Freedom Constitution,
Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987,
when the new Constitution was ratified. I yield
to that better view and agree with her ponencia
completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this
dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline
prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution with respect to the
tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
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SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided
by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25,
1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether
or not that cut-off period began on February 2,
1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve
the new Charter. To my mind the 1987
constitution took effect on February 11, 1987,
the date the same was proclaimed ratified
pursuant to Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, and not February 2,
1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the
1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the
Constitution takes effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained, and not
at the time the people cast their votes to
approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically
said that Constitution was ratified during such a
plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that
time, had not, and could not have been, vet
determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations
compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and
February 11, 1987 the government performed
acts that would have been valid under the
Provisional Constitution but would otherwise
have been void under the 1987 Charter. I recall,
in particular, the appointments of some seven
Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals,
and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly
extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections
8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of the l987 Constitution,
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme
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Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex oficio
Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
xxx xxx xxx
2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy, Such appointments
need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious
questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably
reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as
well as the amendments thereto from the date
it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera, 2 we held that the
1973 Constitution became in force and effect
on January 17, 1973, the date Proclamation No.
1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the
Filipino People of the Constitution Proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was
issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date
further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 3 became
final. And this was so notwithstanding Section
16, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose and, except as herein provided, shall
supersede the Constitution of nineteen-
hundred and thirty- five and all amendments
thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos
promulgated Proclamation no. 1595,
proclaiming the ratification of the 1976
amendments submitted in the plebiscite of
October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states,
inter alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I
hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied
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in this certificate as duly ratified by the Filipino
people in the referendum plebiscite held Oct.
16-17, 1976 and are therefore effective and in
full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9
of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the
incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive
issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the
Ratification by the Filipino People of the
Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the
Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of
judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for
local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said
amendment is hereby declared to take effect
immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21,
dated December 18, 1979, the proposed
amendment shall take effect on the date the
incumbent President/Prime Minister shall
proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was
issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the
Plebiscite of April 7, 1981 of the Amendments
to the Constitution Embodied in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them
Therefore Effective and in Full Force and
Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said
amendments duly approved, further declared
them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect
as of the date of this Proclamation," It shall be
noted, in this connection, that under
Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang
Pambansa, Third Regular Session, Sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, which parented these
amendments, the same:
... shall become valid as part of the Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2,
Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122,
"An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for
Ratification or Rejection, the Amendment to the
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Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa, Sitting as a Constituent
Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three,
Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds
Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en
banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result of
the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to
it, duly authenticated and certified by the Board
of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332,
"Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of
January 27, 1984, of the Amendments to the
Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112 and
113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and
effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as
Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9,
Batas Blg. 643), which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on
the date the President of the Philippines shall
proclaim that they have been ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held
for the purpose, but not later than three
months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113
provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of
the Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at
which it is submitted to the people for their
ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI
of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto
take effect upon proclamation of their
ratification and not at the time of the plebiscite
is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in
Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite
called pursuant to Republic Act No. 73 and the
Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress)
adopted on September 18, 1946, was adopted
on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution
makes no mention of a retroactive application.
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Accordingly, when the incumbent President
(Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on
February 11, 1987, at Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance
appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the
Filipino people and is therefore effective and in
full force and effect. 4
the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came
into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at
no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga 5
in which we declared, in passing, that the new
Charter was ratified on February 2, 1987, does
not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated,
the remark was said in passing-we did not
resolve the case on account of a categorical
holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life
on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I
now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with
the views expressed above, that the challenged
dismissals done on February 8, 1987 were valid,
the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in
force.
De Leon vs. Esguerra Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra Case Digest
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31,
1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M.
De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together
with the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election
held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise
known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon
received a Memorandum antedated December
1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the
other respondents as members of Barangay
Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
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Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that
the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3
of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office shall be six years
which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and
shall continue until their successors shall have
elected and shall have qualified. It was also
their position that with the ratification of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC
Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that
the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners
continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of
the Provisional Constitution and not because
their term of six years had not yet expired; and
that the provision in the Barangay Election Act
fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to
six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art.
3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of
respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended
on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the
Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on
Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal
force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to
have superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec
2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to
the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution
further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years x x
x."
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Until the term of office of barangay officials has the Official Gazette, considering its erratic
been determined by aw, therefore, the term of release and limited readership";
office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that
"[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
E.O. 200
circulation could better perform the function of
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a
wider readership, and come out regularly"; and
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS
EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises
PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR
Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
EFFECTIVITY
amended so the laws to be effective must be
published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly
provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
otherwise provided . . .;"
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby order:

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be

effective only a publication thereof in the
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some
following the completion of their publication
problems, a point recognized by the Supreme
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R.
of general circulation in the Philippines, unless
No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it
it is otherwise provided.
observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the
view that the publication need not be made in

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Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386,

otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent
with this Executive Order are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect

immediately after its publication in the Official
Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of

June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.

77