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Author(s): W. M. Alexander
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1966), pp. 137-144
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708314
Accessed: 06-11-2017 21:19 UTC
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JOHANN GEORG HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT
BY W. M. ALEXANDER
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138 W. M. ALEXANDER
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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 139
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140 W. M. ALEXANDER
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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 141
II
Hamann gives us some assistance in unfolding his fist. Let us be sure that
the problem is fresh in mind.
Kant wished to escape the insecurities of experience and obtain a body
of knowledge which was absolutely certain. It turned out that this certainty
can be had only of the knowing subject, specifically of the forms by which
it must necessarily think. But Kant perceives that the reason has to think
within the forms of space and time. Are not these intuitions one last con-
nection with experience, which vitiates the whole project? No. Because the
forms of space and time do not depend upon experience but must be attrib-
uted to the knowing subject. Thus a "pure intuition" devoid of experience
is possible, according to Kant. The issue is not whether sensibility (Sinn-
lichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) can be separated-as Hamann in-
accurately presents the issue in several places-but Kant's claim that "sense
experience" (Empfindung) can be separated from the "sensibility" and the
"understanding" (see Kant, 19-22). That Hamann did see this as the true
issue is clear from his letter to Jacobi, 27 April 1787:
18 Letter of Hamann to Herder, 6-10 August 1784.
9 Hamann, III, 289.
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142 W. M. ALEXANDER
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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 143
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144 W. M. ALEXANDER
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