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Johann Georg Hamann: Metacritic of Kant

Author(s): W. M. Alexander
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1966), pp. 137-144
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708314
Accessed: 06-11-2017 21:19 UTC

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JOHANN GEORG HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT

BY W. M. ALEXANDER

Hamann's criticisms of Immanuel Kant (as the "critical" philosopher


after 1781) are contained in letters to Hamann's friends and in two short
articles on the Critique of Pure Reason. The first article, a book review,
was completed by the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason
in July 1781. Hamann had received the first pages of Kant's book in proof
from Hartknoch, both his publisher and Kant's, as early as April. The
second article Hamann called the Metacritique of the Purism of the Reason
(1784). Playing on the term "metaphysics," which was the name given to
the book in Aristotle which followed the Physics, Hamann intends to be
the critic who follows the Critique.
This criticism of Kant was born of the most serious respect on Hamann's
part. At the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason Hamann
was working on a translation of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion to which he planned to append his own critique of Hume. When
Kant's book appeared it was evident to Hamann that the opponent was no
longer Hume, and the project was never resumed. Although the "under-
ground" influence of Hamann's criticism may be considerable, an evaluation
of Hamann's critique of Kant has not yet been satisfactorily carried
through-largely because such an undertaking would depend upon a grasp
of Hamann's thought as a whole which only recent Hamann-research
promises to provide.
Kant's problem was one of escaping certain conclusions of Hume, while
observing the principle inaugurated by the empirical tradition, that genu-
ine additions to human knowledge (i.e. those embodied in synthetic judg-
ments) 1 depend upon intuitions (Anschauungen) of sensibility (Sinnlich-
keit).2 Yet reason is not to be dissolved into momentary sense impressions
(Empfindungen) and thus saved from complete fragmentation only by
"nature" or "habit." The ideal before Kant is the Cartesian ideal of cer-
tainty.3 The way to accomplish this ideal is to show how synthetic, b
a priori (i.e. necessary and universal) knowledge is possible.4
Philosophical reason must show that it stands on a sure foundatio
This can be done by restricting its claims. A body of synthetic a pri
1 Cf. Kant, 7-8. (Reference is to the Critique of Pure Reason, First Edition o
1781. Since this pagination is given in the margins of the Akademie-Ausgabe [Vol
IV and III] and in a standard English transaction such as Norman Kemp Smit
[London, 2nd edition 1933, reprinted 1953], a simple and practicable method of
reference both to the original and to translations is at hand.)
2 Kant, 15. 8 Kant, xv. 4 See Kant, 38-39.
5 Kant, 3.
137

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138 W. M. ALEXANDER

knowledge is possible if reason (1) make


(the object),6 and (2) claims to know only
obtain for the knowing subject.7
In order to achieve this certainty, all con
excised, for experience can never confer th
of sensible intuition, space and time, whic
which is derived from experience, are in
subject.8 Representations (Vorstellunge
findung)-and therefore experience (Erfah
On the other hand, all representations ar
that belongs to sensation." 9 The content
scheinung) is given to us by experience a
tion), but the form (Form) lies a priori i
of sensibility and as the concepts of the
Thus a strict dichotomy can be accom
and the pure, between experience and the
omy is not merely one of experience over
mathematics and logic), but of a knowled
(phenomena) over against a knowledge of
obtain for the knowing subject. It shou
piricism is observed that experience i
"transcendental" knowledge only the pre
must be assumed regarding a transcenden
knowledge of the Subject is the only pur
versal) knowledge which the "theoretical"
principles are available to the "practical
To Hamann all of this makes possible
Platonic and Cartesian ideal in which the
of himself than of his experience,-in theo
with himself is more sure of his own nature than he is of the acts of God's
salvation in historical experience.
To Hamann, this dichotomy-with the epistemological foundations for
it-is indefensible. The issue between Kant and Hamann is this dichotomy.
Is it possible to apprehend a reason purified of all experience? Hamann is
willing to phrase the question in Kant's words:

Nevertheless the decision as to the mere possibility or impossibility of a


metaphysics depends still and all upon the many-sided and inexhaustible
question: "What and how much can the understanding and reason know,
independent of all experience?" [Kant, xvii]. "How much ought I to hope to
accomplish with the reason, if all the material and assistance of experience
are taken away from me?" [Kant, xiv].12
Kant's answer is: the pure intuitions, pure concepts, and pure principles
-the presuppositions of all experience, that is, "the inventory of all our
possessions through pure reason" (Kant, xx).
Hamann's answer: nothing! Not only must the status given by Kant to
6 Kant, 49. 7 Kant, xx, 11-13.
8 Kant, 48-49. 9 Kant, 20. 10 Kant, 20-22.
11Kant, 106-107. 12 Johann Georg Hamann, Werke (Nadler

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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 139

the intuitional forms of space and time be challenged, b


of a knowing subject whose certainty is based upon what
duces out of itself" (Kant, xx) must be exposed and q
effect Hamann has two sets of objections to Kant:
I. Hamann takes the position that the supposed dich
experience and the pure reason invites the reason to ove
certainties and to make this kind of "knowledge" the no
all knowledge. In effect the knowing subject is given a so
II. Secondly, Hamann holds that this dichotomy is actu
or at least cannot be demonstrated.
These objections will be taken up in turn, although in the following
comment from Hamann they are mentioned in reverse order:

The possibility of human knowledge of objects of experience outside of and


before all experience, and after this, the possibility of a sensible intuition
before all perception [Empfindung] of an object, belong to the concealed
mysteries, the task of solving which-not to speak of the solution-has yet
to be given to a philosopher. The content and form of a transcendental Doc-
trine of Elements and Method are based upon this double impossibility and
upon the forced distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments; for
besides the proper distinction between reason as an object or source or also
way of knowledge, there is yet a more universal, sharper, and purer distinc-
tion, by virtue of which reason serves as the basis of all objects, sources, and
ways of knowledge, and is itself none of the three, and consequently also
has need neither of an empirical or esthetic, nor logical or discursive con-
cept, but consists merely in subjective conditions, under which can be
thought everything, something, and nothing as object, source or way of
knowledge, and as an infinite maximum or minimum, can be given or, if
need be, taken as an immediate intuition.13
I

The first objection is to the tendency in Kant to overvalue subjective


forms. Hamann's objections to Kant are philosophical objections, but they
are theologically motivated. Even so, what interest could a man of faith
have in an abstruse epistemology such as Kant's? The connection is not
immediate and obvious. Protestant Christianity not only has existed in
the same house with Kantian philosophy but has even claimed the child
as her own. Why then should Hamann think that this Critique of Pure
Reason embodies a theology which could only be a rival of the Christian
faith?
It must be remembered that Hamann asks for the foundations and im-
plications of a philosophy; he is seldom interested in surface impressions
or in minor logical flaws. What Hamann sees at stake is a concept of man
and a norm for knowledge, both of which obfuscate rather than clarify the
Christian faith. Kant's concept of man involves the revivification (although
highly qualified and restricted) of the Platonic man whose essential being
is a transcendental ego, immortal ("necessary") and beyond experience.
Kant's concept of knowledge implies such a preference for the infallibilities
of forms that historical knowledge (by which God is known in Incarnation)
13 Hamann, III, 283-284.

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140 W. M. ALEXANDER

could hardly be accorded a normative,


The ideal of absolute certainty can be
all content. This is the old Cartesian m
assigning of an inferior value to conten
did not question that Kant's formalis
any more than he questioned the concl
is the goal the reason reaches if it be
Hamann does question is the value put
problem connected with all formalism
reason is a "wax nose" which can be p
to the contemporary fashion."

Out of words and explanations one can


what one wants to put or has put in th
What Kant gives us are indeterminat
knowing subject proceeds to determine
relate of this subjectivism: the real obje
known. Hamann sees a firm connection

It seems to me first and foremost that


more to the older idealism than is appa
Berkeley Hume would hardly have beco
Critique in uniform gratitude takes hi
Both Hamann and Kant have a doct
reason. For Kant this is the problem
its simplest form the idea of the Dialec
reason with its "progress" once it ha
Kant puts it: "The charm of extendi
nothing short of encountering a direct
us in our course. .. ."16 Kant has rec
the reason runs wild when released fro

Because however formal purity, with n


generate necessarily and "faultlessly" i
cendental Dialectic" is really intended t
as incurable original bias [Erbschade
parts"] of the pure reason . . 17

What Kant has not recognized is how h


formalism of his Critique. Kant has fa
wild when released from specific conte
it can empower reason to perform trick
of this "original sin" in its more in
"illusion"-is discussed by Hamann in te
we now turn.

14 Letter of Hamann to Scheffner, 11 February 1785.


15 Hamann, III, 283.
16Kant, 4 (translated by Norman Kemp Smith).
17 Hamann, III, 278-279.

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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 141

II

Hamann has attacked Kant's formalism and scepticism. Does he think


that he can also refute Kant once for all by pointing to language? Even
if one did not know the facts, the presumption would be against this, if
it were remembered that Hamann wished to base his thought upon experi-
ence (hence his arguments would have only the force of experience) an
therefore looks askance at a priori apodictic refutations.
Nevertheless it has been thought that Hamann argued somewhat like
this: Language is the bearer (DEIPARA, "Mother of God") of our reason
(III, 239). The entire ability to think rests upon language (III, 286)
Secondly, language is the monument and witness to sense experience. There-
fore, merely by pointing to language-so the usual interpretation runs-one
disproves that Kant can obtain knowledge independent of sense experience
Hamann's interpreters frequently make the mistake of oversimplifying
Kant. The same mistake has been made regarding Hamann himself.
It is true that Hamann thought language was the key to the errors of
the Critique of Pure Reason:
If I were as eloquent as Demosthenes, I would find it necessary to do no
more than thrice repeat a single thought: Reason is language, logos. On
this marrowbone I gnaw and on it will gnaw myself to death. Yet for me
over this depth there always remains darkness; I still await an apocalyptic
angel with the key to this abyss.18
At the end of the Metacritique of the Purism of the Reason he says:

What the transcendental philosophy "meta-obscures" [metagrabolosirt], I


have signified for the weak reader by pointing to the sacrament of language:
the letters of its elements and the spirit of its employment, and left it to
each one to unfold the balled fist into a flat hand.19

Hamann gives us some assistance in unfolding his fist. Let us be sure that
the problem is fresh in mind.
Kant wished to escape the insecurities of experience and obtain a body
of knowledge which was absolutely certain. It turned out that this certainty
can be had only of the knowing subject, specifically of the forms by which
it must necessarily think. But Kant perceives that the reason has to think
within the forms of space and time. Are not these intuitions one last con-
nection with experience, which vitiates the whole project? No. Because the
forms of space and time do not depend upon experience but must be attrib-
uted to the knowing subject. Thus a "pure intuition" devoid of experience
is possible, according to Kant. The issue is not whether sensibility (Sinn-
lichkeit) and understanding (Verstand) can be separated-as Hamann in-
accurately presents the issue in several places-but Kant's claim that "sense
experience" (Empfindung) can be separated from the "sensibility" and the
"understanding" (see Kant, 19-22). That Hamann did see this as the true
issue is clear from his letter to Jacobi, 27 April 1787:
18 Letter of Hamann to Herder, 6-10 August 1784.
9 Hamann, III, 289.

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142 W. M. ALEXANDER

In human nature sense experience [Em


from the reason as the latter from sen
"No reason without sense": Kant admitted this. However, "no reason
without experience": this is what Kant denies. The issues between Kant
and Hamann can be further clarified by an examination of an illustration,
the concept of causality.
a. Kant is not satisfied with the uncertain state in which the category
of causality was left by Hume; he wanted to show that this fundamental
category of the sciences was beyond doubt.
b. If this category is taken as a description of the objective world, then
there is no way of obviating Hume's objection that what we call causality
cannot be demonstrated to be anything more than a sequence of impressions
of which a connection always occurs but is not known to be necessary, since
(a) the objective world is known through sense impressions, and (b) these
impressions are a matter of fallible experience.
c. However, if the category of causality is taken only as a condition
of the subjective reason, then the qualification of the fallible sense im-
pressions is avoided.
d. What status or foundation then would causality have? Causality is
based on a synthetic principle (Kant, 9-10); in other words, the adding of
the concept of cause to a concept of a given event (effect) involves a syn-
thetic judgment. This alone, and not inference from experience, can give
causality the rank of necessity.
e. This synthetic move (the adding of one concept to another) is based
upon the sensible intuition, with its forms of space and time (Kant, 39).
f. This sensible intuition could be empirical or pure. If empirical (if
it involves experience), then Hume's conclusions are unavoidable. If pure,
then both the principle of the empirical tradition-that knowledge is possi-
ble only on the basis of sensible intuition, (Kant 50)-which Kant did not
want to deny, and the establishment of causality independent of fallible
experience, can be observed.
g. However, it is apparent that the whole case depends upon the dis-
tinction between the empirical and the pure. If a pure sensible intuition is
impossible, then Kant's explanation fails of demonstration.
h. Can therefore a sensible intuition (that is, an intuition qualified by
the forms of space and time) be pure (that is, devoid of experience)? Is
not this the Achilles' heel of the demonstration of causality as a pure con-
cept, for are not the forms of space and time the indication of an intrusion
of fallible sense experience at this point, in the very construction of a "pure
synthesis" of this "manifold of pure intuition"?
i. No, says Kant. Space and time are forms of the knowing subject,
not indications of experience.
j. Thus, although the contents of the mind are intuitions which are
sensible (this is the element in the empirical tradition which Kant did not
want to deny), some sensible intuitions are devoid of fallible experience
(if Kant's position regarding space and time is allowed). Such is the
foundation of the concept of casuality. If a pure (non-experiertial) intui-

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J. G. HAMANN: METACRITIC OF KANT 143

tion is possible, then casuality can be given an a priori f


the knowing subject only).
Returning to Hamann's criticism, does Hamann think
this claim that a "pure intuition" is possible by pointing
he show that a non-experiential "sensible intuition"
plished?
No. Hamann does not make this claim, as scrutiny of the quotation
below will show. What he does show is that Kant's interpretation of the
phenomenon is not the only alternative: the nature of language (by which
all thought occurs) deprives it of necessity. Kant cannot demonstrate with
necessity that his so-called "pure intuition" is invulnerably "pure," be-
cause such an intuition must be accomplished with language (linguistic
symbols), where the credentials of virginity are ambiguous. Therefore
Hamann's interpretation of the phenomenon cannot have the force of
necessity either; the only force he claims for it is the force of fallible ex-
perience, which he calls "tradition" and "use."
However, Hamann's refutation through the appeal to language does
have the force of setting aside all claims to demonstrate "purity" by neces-
sity. Hamann discusses these claims in terms of a history of the Enlighten-
ment's attempts to "purify" reason:

The first philosophical purification consisted namely in the partly misun-


derstood, partly unsuccessful attempt to make reason independent of all
tradition and faith.
The second is still more transcendent and amounts to nothing less than
an independence from all experience and its commonplace induction-for
after reason sought for two thousand years for who knows what? beyond
experience, it not only once for all despairs of this progressive [!] course of
procedure, but to the impatient contemporaries and to be sure "in a short
time" [Kant, xx] promises also, even with so much defiance, that universal,
and to catholicism and despotism necessary and infallible, philosopher's
stone, to which religion will instantly subject its holiness and the law its
majesty [Kant, xi], especially in the final decline of a critical century, where
likewise empiricism, struck with blindness, makes its own emptiness more
suspicious and more ridiculous from day to day.
The third, highest, and as it were empirical purism is concerned with
language, the sole first and last organon and criterion of the reason, without
any other credentials than tradition and use.20
The first step in the purification of the reason characterized the entire
Enlightenment; the second step refers to Kant's program; the third step
seems logically demanded. Kant is not accused of taking this third step
(how could he?); however, in order to demonstrate with necessity that his
program of "purification" has been accomplished, this elimination of lan-
guage is necessary. If Kant could eliminate language (1), perhaps his posi-
tion could be proved a priori.
Why is this so? Why does language have this importance in a discussion
of the "purity" of the reason?
According to Hamann, it is language which has the power to embody
20 Hamann, III, 284.

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144 W. M. ALEXANDER

memory and universalize experience


illusion that the forms of space and t
and time may be inconceivable. The qu

The oldest language was music and wit


pulse beat and of the breath in the
measurement of time and its numeral
painting and drawing, concerning itse
space, and its boundaries and determin
concepts of time and space through th
both the noblest senses (sight and hea
versal" and "necessary" in the entire s
and air are universal and necessary for
time would appear to be not innate bu
all intuitional knowledge.21
Knowledge that these forms are a p
rest upon a necessity accessible to the
ture of language, which is characteriz
guage is the power to contain alter
meaning. Hamann takes the position n
think rests upon language" but that la
standing of reason with itself." Lan
experiments. While it is imposssible t
language itself precludes the discovery
In other words, experience is not (n
able in Kant's sense. Spatial and tem
ponents of intuition, so Kant attribut
them a priori necessity. Hamann is sa
ition of the pure ideas, which skirts
furbished even with this concession.22

St. Andrews College, North Carolina.


21 Hamann, III, 286.
22 For further reference, cf. Philip Merlan's "Parva Hamanniana: J. G. Hamann
as Spokesman of the Middle Class," JJI., IX, 3 (1948), 380-384; "Parva Ha-
manniana: Hamann and Schmohl," JIJ., X, 4 (1949), 567-574; "Parva Ha-
manniana: Hamann and Galiani," JJ.I., XI, 4 (1950), 486-489; "Hamann et les
Dialogues de Hume," Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (1954), 285-289.
For the English-speaking reader there are several items that constitute intro-
ductions of sorts to the Hamann-Kant relationship: Walter Lowrie, Johann Georg
Hamann: An Existentialist (Princeton, 1950); James C. O'Flaherty, Unity and
Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann (Univ. of N.C.,
1952); Ronald Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann, 1730-1788: A Study in Christian
Existence (Harper, 1960). See also my forthcoming book, Johann Georg Hamann:
Philosophy and Faith (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

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