Compiled Consti 2 Digests

SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
COLLEGE OF LAW ATTY. BRUCE RIVERA
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GR 160261 November 10, 2003 Anton
Malamug
FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

resolution which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide
of the Judiciary Development Fund. On June 2, 2003, President
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The House Committee on Justice
ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, a second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House. This was founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution regarding the
Judiciary Development Fund. Hence this petition contending that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Sec. 3 Par. 5 of Article 11 of the Constitution
that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year." The Respondents
assert that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Any question, issue or incident arising at any stage
of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is barred

under Section 3 Paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Constitution
RULING: Respondents contention that the one year bar prohibiting

the initiation of impeachment proceedings could not have been
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives has yet to act on it cannot be upheld. An
impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It consists of a beginning,
middle and end. The end is the transmission of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice. The impeachment proceeding is
initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. According to Sec. 3 Par. 5 of Art. 11
of the Constitution, once an impeachment complaint has been
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initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period. Section 16 and 17 of Rule 5 of
the House Impeachment Rules contravene Sec. 3 Par. 5 of Art. 11
since the rules give the term initiate a meaning different from filing
and referral. Congress may determine its own rules and proceedings
but it may not ignore Constitutional restraints. Since the firstt
impeachment was filed on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM
GR 122156 February 3, 1997
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant

to the privatization program of the government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51 % of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, only two
bidders participated. Petitioner Manila Prince, a Filipino Corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian Firm, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the
winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
by Renong Berhad. Subsequently, petitioner sent a manager's check
as bid security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent
GSIS refuse to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
which Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be preferred over Malaysian

firm under Section 10, second paragraph of Article 12 of the 1987
Constitution
RULING: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the

governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. Since the constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. Article 12, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution
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provides that "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions

covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos." It means just that qualified Filipinos
shall be preferred. When the Constitution speaks of "national
patrimony", it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Hotel has become a landmark- a living testimonial of Philippine
Heritage. While it was restrictively an American Hotel when it first
opened, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Verily, Manila
Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
Respondents argue that the Constitutional provision is addressed to
the State, not to GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a
person distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages is a public
function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action;
and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
Without doubt, the transaction entered into by the GSIS is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command. Therefore, the GSIS is directed to accept the matching bid
of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
PEOPLE VS. JULIO POMAR

GR 22008 November 3, 1924
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: On October 26, 1923, the prosecuting attorney of the City of

Manila presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance, accusing
the defendant of a violation of section 13 in connection with section
15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature. The complaint
alleged that the said accused, being the manager and person in
charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La
Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, and having, during the
year 1923, in his employ and service as cigar-maker in said factory, a
woman by the name of Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation
leave which began on July 16, 1923, by reason of her pregnancy, failed
and refused to pay to said woman the sum of eighty pesos, to which
she was entitled as her regular wages corresponding to thirty days
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before and thirty days after her delivery and confinement which took
place on August 12, 1923, despite and over the demands made by her,
the said Macaria Fajardo, upon said accused, to do so.
The defendant answered and admitted at the trial all of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the
provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon which the complaint was based,
were illegal, unconstitutional and void. Judge Imperial found the
defendant guilty of the alleged offense described in the complaint.
From that sentence the defendant now appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of sections 13 and 15 of Act No.

3071 are a reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the
state
RULING: Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature in the

exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose
of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory,
shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to
a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one
month after their delivery.
The statute at bar is required in the interest of social justice for
whose end freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint.
The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent
matters, is not absolute. That liberty must frequently yield to the
common good and the line beyond which the power of interference
may not be pressed is neither definite nor unalterable, but may be
made to move, within limits not well defined, with changing needs and
circumstances.
Said section creates a term or condition in every contract made
by every person, firm, or corporation with any woman who may,
during the course of her employment, become pregnant, and a failure
to include in said contract the terms fixed by the law, makes the
employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and imprisonment.
Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person, firm, or
corporation or place of labor of any description within the Philippines,
of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as
he and the employee may agree upon. The law creates a term in every
such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are,
therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract. For such, it has been
held that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the
Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void, in that they
violate the peoples freedom to contract.
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LAMBINO, ET AL. VS. COMELEC

GR 174153 October 25, 2006 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: The group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino

Group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. The
proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
The Lambino Group claims that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its
registered voters; and that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The COMELEC, however,
denied due course to the petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to
the Supreme Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the initiative petition complies with Section 2,

Art XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the people
RULING: No. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the

governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must
sign on a petition containing such full text.
The essence of amendments is that it be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of
the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
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fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the

several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before - not after - signing. Moreover, an
initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive
and misleading which renders the initiative void.
In the case at bar, there was no single word, phrase, or sentence
of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does
the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is
fatal.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
GR 127325 March 19, 1997 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public

respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked
the COMELEC for an order fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, causing the necessary publications of
said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation, and
instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
Movement for Peoples Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail
of the system intended to institutionalize people power. He and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted
under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. He further alleged
that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. He also
maintained that signature stations shall be established all over the
country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall
verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories, and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which
the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general
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and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the

COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction
RULING: Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by
at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does
not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the
purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to
gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before
the filing of such petition are to prescribe the form of the petition, to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on
the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;, to
assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits,
and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition does not fall under any
of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC. COMELEC acted
arbitrarily in giving due course to the scrap of paper which is the
petition.
GONZALEZ VS. COMELEC
GR L-28196 November 9, 1967
Francis Villanueva
FACTS: Petitioners are challenging the validity of two new sections in

the Revised Election Code, Republic Act 4880. The provisions
prohibited too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period
of election campaign and partisan political activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the limitations prejudice the peoples freedom

of speech, assembly, and to form associations not contrary to law
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RULING: The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom is

undeniable. However, the court notes that the legislative declaration
was in response to as serious substantive evil affecting the electoral
process. Furthermore, the laws themselves state that simple
expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election are not
included in the prohibition. Therefore, there is no curtailment to the
freedom of speech.
With regard to association, the parties only have less time to
nominate candidates but this does not directly curtail their freedom to
associate. Furthermore, they are not prevented from assembly. They
may still assemble, just not for the purpose of partisan political
activity.
Justices vote that the law be declared valid there having no
constitutional infringement. Although this only constitutes a minority,
the number of justices is insufficient to declare the law as
unconstitutional. Therefore, the laws constitutionality is affirmed.
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SANIDAD VS. COE

GR L-44040 October 12, 1976 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: The National Assembly was not called to form itself into a
constituent assembly. The incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted them thru PD 1033 to the
people through a referendum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction

over the subject matter
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the amending process, as to

proposal and ratification are judicial questions which falls within their
jurisdiction. Hence, they can validly intervene.
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BONDOC VS. PINEDA

GR 97710 September 26, 1991
Jeffrey Santos
FACTS: In the local and congressional elections, Marciano M. Pineda

of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time,
Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman
Camasura revealed to his Chief, Congressman Jose S. Cojuanco, Jr.,
LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but
also that he voted for Bondoc consistent with truth and justice and
self-respect, and to honor a gentlemens agreement among the
members of the HRET that they would abide by the result of the
appreciation of the contested ballot. Congressman Camasura was
expelled by the LDP for voting in favor of a NP. The resolution of the
House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his
vote in favor of the Nacionalista Partys candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of Congressman Camasura is

unconstitutional
RULING: Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the

House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for
a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunals
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of
the Tribunals decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec.
17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral
Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc. The resolution of the House of Representative in
withdrawing the nomination of Congressman Camasura as a member
of the House Electoral Tribunal was declared null and void ab initio
for being violative of the Constitution.
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MIRASOL VS. CA
GR 128448 February 1, 2001 Ria
Castro
FACTS: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. In 1973-

1974, they produced 70,501.08 piculs of sugar, 25,662.36 of which
were assigned for export. The following crop year, their acreage
planted to the same crop was lower, with 23,696.40 piculs marked for
export. Private respondent Philippine National Bank financed the
Mirasols sugar production venture for crop years, 1973-1974 and
1974-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme,
the Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in PNBs favor. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB as the petitioners attorney-in-fact
to negotiate and to sell the latters sugar in both domestic and export
markets and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations
to it. President Marcos later issued Presidential Decree No. 579 which
authorized private respondent Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. to
purchase sugar allocated for export to other foreign markets. The
Sugar Quota Administration, PNB, the Department of Trade and
Industry, and the Office of the President determined the price and
quantity. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEXs
purchases and directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize
from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the
national government, after deduction of expenses. The government
offices and entities tasked by existing laws and administrative
regulations to oversee the sugar export pegged the purchase price of
export sugar in crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 at P180.00 per
picul.
The crop loans and similar obligations were secured by real
estate mortgages over the Mirasols properties and chattel mortgages
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over standing crops. Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales
to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay their
obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds
of the sale of their export sugar, which the PNB ignored. Due to these
demands for payment, petitioners conveyed to PNB real properties
valued at P1, 410,466.00 by way of dacion en pago, leaving an unpaid
overdrawn account of P1, 513,347.78. Petitioners continued to ask
PNB to account for the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar for
crop years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations with the
bank. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings from
the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and
were subject to the disposition of the President of the Philippines for
public purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are

unconstitutional
RULING: PNBs obligation to render an accounting is an issue which

can be determined without having to rule on the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 579, since there is nothing in the said law which is applicable
to PNBs intransigence in refusing to give an accounting. The
requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very
lis mota of the case is absent.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

GR L-52245 January 22, 1980 Jeffrey
Santos
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 52 was enacted in connection with the

January 30, 1980 Local Elections. The petitioners question Section 4
of the said law on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence. The first
paragraph of section 4 reads, any retired elective provincial city,
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been
65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office, to which
he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective office from which he retired. On the other hand, paragraph.
2 of Section 4 provides:
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Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the

State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection
rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be
candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein and the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be prima facie evidence of such facts.
ISSUE: Whether or not aforecited provisions of Section 4 and BP 52

are violative of the constitutional principles of equal protection and
presumption of innocence
RULING: Paragraph 1, Section 4 of BP 52 does not transgress the

constitutional guarantee mentioned. As adverted to in many decisions,
the equal protection clause does not prohibit classification, provided it
complies with the requisites since what is prohibited is classification
which is arbitrary and unreasonable. The distinction here is
substantial. The second paragraph of Section 4, however, violates the
constitutional guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so, since
a candidate is disqualified from running for a public office on the
ground alone those charges have been filed against him. In this wise,
it is as if he is placed in the same category as a person who has
already been convicted of a crime whose penalty carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.
LACSON VS. PEREZ

GR 147780 May 10, 2001
Ria Castro
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FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an

angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and
attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital
Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless
arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion
were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a
state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to
the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the
Court:
(1) G.R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and
habeas corpus (with an urgent application for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
filed by Panfilo M. Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O.
Mancao;
(2) G.R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis
for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-
Santiago;
(3) G.R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed by
Rolando A. Lumbao; and
(4) G.R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political
party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of
rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in
fact an in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyos declaration of a state of

rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly affected by virtue
thereof have basis in both fact and in law
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the authorities may only
resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
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SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR 159085 February 3, 2004 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: Some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. They
complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation
of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the state of rebellion.
Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.
435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
Petitioners contend that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution
does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
Furthermore, petitioners argue that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress
within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4 are constitutional
RULING: Yes. The Court rendered that both Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President
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in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the

Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President
has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the
Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.
JOYA VS. PCGG

GR 96541 August 24, 1993 Cheryl
Banaria
FACTS: During the Aquino administration, PCGG chairman wrote to

the President requesting her for authority to sign the proposed
Consignment Agreement between the State through PCGG and
Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New
York, or CHRISTIE'S) concerning the sale of eighty-two Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. His
request was granted.
The Chairman of the Commission on Audit submitted audit and
findings on the consignment agreement. The findings averred the
doubtful authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into
the Consignment Agreement and, that the assets subject of auction
were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their
disposal was prohibited by law, among other things. PCGG, through its
new chairman, refuted the allegations. The Director of the National
Museum issued a certification that the items subject of the
Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of
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protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of

the Filipino cultural heritage. Thus, this petition preventing the selling
of the said artifacts.
ISSUE: Do the petitioners herein have the legal standing to raise the
issue
RULING: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if
the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to
raise the constitutional question. "Legal standing" means a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Such
interest must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
An exception to this rule is when a taxpayer questions the
validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public
funds. Petitioners argue that as taxpayers, they are deeply concerned
in the protection of the countrys artistic wealth and they therefore
have the legal standing to raise the issue and bring the same in the
Court.
The paintings in questions were donated by private persons
from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts. The ownership of these
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members thereof,
although the public has been given the opportunity to view these
paintings when they were placed on exhibit. The pieces of antique
silverware were given to the Marcoses as gifts from friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding anniversary.
If the government already acquired these properties, only the proper
parties --the true owners thereof -- must raise any constitutional
defect in their acquisition and disposition whose authority to recover
emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by
statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the
legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
GR 101083 July 30, 1983 Vanessa
Bugayong
17
FACTS: Petitioners are minors who are duly represented and joined
by their parents in the filing of the present suit. The petition bears
upon the right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin
concept of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational
justice. The said petition was filed to the Secretary of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the defendant herein, which
issued timber licenses for logging companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action for filing a

petition regarding the protection of the rainforests
RULING: The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal

right, which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology. This
right, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. This right has
mandated to a state first, a solemn obligation to preserve the
environment and second, an obligation to protect and advance the
environment. The day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. A denial or violation of that right by the
other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. In addition licenses, are not
form of contract, therefore susceptible of impairment without
violating the Constitution. In short, the non-impairment clause must
yield to the police power of the state.
18
AGAN JR. VS. PIATCO

GR 155001 May 5, 2003 Kenneth
Buncayo
FACTS: Asians Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC), a group formed by

influential business leaders, ventured the opportunity of investing in
the new NAIA airport terminal. They gave their proposals to the
government for the development of NAIA International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III
project. Bidders were invited, and among the bids, Peoples Air
Cargos (Paircargo) was preferred and given the bid. AEDC protested
alleging that first choice was given to Paircargo, but still the project
was awarded to the latter. Such event led to the incorporation of Phil.
International Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO
entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate
the said terminal for 21years. The concession agreement in 1997 was
amended in the matters of pertaining to the description of the
obligations specified to the concessionaire, advancement of facilities
and earnings, fees and charges, and the termination of contract. Since
MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA
terminals I and II, it has a contract with numerous service providers.
The employees filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they
would lose their job, and the service providers coupled them, as they
filed a motion for intervention. Likewise, a number of employees of
MIAA filed an appeal assailing the legality of arrangements. A group
of congressmen filed similar petitions. Then Senator Gloria Macapagal
- Arroyo stated in her speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts
which the Executive Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1997 Concession Agreement is null and

void
RULING: The 1997 Concession Agreement is null and void as it is

said to be divergent to public policy. The modifications have the effect
of changing it into an entirely different accord from the contract that
was first agreed upon. The revision offered new terms and conditions
which offer pecuniary benefit to PIATCO. Such changes altered the
technical and financial parameters of other bidders had they known
that such terms were available. The Supreme Court ruled that the
1997 Concession Agreement, its amendments and supplements is to
be set aside for being null and void.
19
OSMUNDO UMALI VS. TEOFISTO GUINGONA

GR 131124 March 29, 1999 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau

of Internal Revenue by the then President Fidel Ramos. Ten months
later, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum
regarding petitioners alleged violations of internal revenue laws.
Petitioner was then held under preventive suspension while his case
was investigated by the Presidential Commission on Anti Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC).
He was duly informed of the charges against him. He also was
able to file his answer to such accusations. During the hearing,
neither petitioner nor his counsel questioned the authenticity of the
evidences against him. After evaluating the evidences, PCAGC held
the existence of prima facie evidence to support six of the twelve
charges against petitioner, mostly involving falsification of official
documents and gross disobedience.
Pursuant to PCAGCs findings, President Ramos issued
Administrative Order 152, dismissing petitioner from service, with his
retirement and other benefits forfeited. Upon being denied of
reconsideration from the Office of the President, petitioner moved for
injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, alleging that his
dismissal from service constituted denial of due process of law. He
claimed that he was a career executive service officer with tenurial
protection, and loss of confidence is not among the legal grounds for
removal.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law.

Whether or not his dismissal was violative of tenurial protection
RULING: As to the first issue, such claim by the petitioner of denial of

due process of law is untenable. Records show that petitioner filed his
answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation. He
also attended the hearings before the investigating body.
20
As to the second issue, petitioner failed in proving through

evidence that he is a career executive service officer eligible. Such
failure is critical to his claim.
However, the Supreme Court lifted the order of dismissal
against petitioner, because the Ombudsman, after investigating the
criminal aspect of the case, dismissed the charges against the
petitioner. The Bureaus Commissioner also sent a letter withdrawing
the charges against petitioner. Hence there is now a lack of basis to
support such order.
IN RE: ALBINO CUNANAN

Resolution March 18, 1954 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, for
a candidate to be deemed to have passed his Bar examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent
in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.
Considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, the Court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per
cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per
cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent, pursuant to Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953.
Unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which,
among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of Supreme Court on the bill. Seven justices
submitted adverse comments, and shortly thereafter the President
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
21
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the

vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic
Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Thirty
three who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions
for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions,
which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this
tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act Number 972 is constitutional
RULING: Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
The law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by the Court in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals
to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. The statement that there was an insufficiency of
legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. However, for lack of
unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to
the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from
1953 to 1955 inclusive, is held valid and candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or
more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for
admission or not.
AGUSTIN VS. EDU
GR L-49112 February 2, 1979 Shelumiel
Espaldon
FACTS: President Ferdinand Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction

which reads in the interest of safety on all streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1.
That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all
22
times in their motor vehicles at least one pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and
yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides.
3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized
Triangular Early Warning Devices to be prepared and issued to
registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers,
charging for each piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He
shall also promulgate such rules appropriate to implement this order.
"
Thus, Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular
No. 32. It is in pursuance of Letter of Instructions No. 716, providing
that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have
substantially complied with the EWD specifications contained in
Section 2 of said administrative order, and that to insure that every
motor vehicle, except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair
of serially numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this
Commission, shall be attached to each EWD.
Leovillo Agustins Volkswagen Beetle is properly equipped with
blinking lights, which could very well serve as an early warning device
in case of the emergencies. He alleges that said LOI clearly violates
the provisions and delegation of police power. He contended that the
LOI is infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public. The LOI will make
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning
device at the rate of P56.00 to P72.00 per set. They are unlawful and
unconstitutional as being compulsory and confiscatory on the
motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road
safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary

as to violate the provisions and delegation of police power
RULING: No. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the

exercise of the police power. Police power is the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. It is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people
Nothing in the questioned LOI or AO No. 1 requires motor
vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed
thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned to
equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in
question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source.
23
Motor vehicle owners can even personally make this early warning
device so long as the same substantially conforms to the specifications
laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. The
early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and
dealers of said devices instant millionaires at the expense of car
owner's as petitioner so sweepingly concludes.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

GR L-7995 May 31, 1957 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: The government passed Republic Act 1180, otherwise known

as An Act to Regulate Retail Business. The effect of this law
nationalizes the retail trade business. It prohibits non-Filipino citizens
and corporations from engaging in retail trade.
ISSUES: Is the Act unconstitutional because it denies the equal

protection of the laws. Is this a valid exercise of Police Power. Does
the act violate international treaties
RULING: The test or standard for proper exercise of police power is

that it must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between purpose and means. In this
case the importance of retail trade gives rise to the need for the
exercise of police power. According to the statistical trends, the gross
sales of aliens and their participation in the industry have steadily
increased during the years. Although they are not yet a majority, most
of the alien retail trade businessmen are engaged in the major retail
enterprises. The Filipinos only engaged in minor enterprises. The
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit and
supply.
Even the constitutional convention realized the needs to
nationalize retail trade because there was a general feeling of
dominance by alien investors. This dominance endangers national
interest, because alien retailers and merchants can act in complete
unison, increasing prices, manipulating the market, etc. The National
producers and consumers will be at the mercy of these merchants.
There are also fears of smuggling, evading tax laws, bribing officials.
These circumstances create well-founded fears. Therefore the court is
satisfied that the law is not founded on discrimination or racial
hostility. It is the desire of the people to free the nation from their
disadvantageous economic situation.
With regard to equal protection, the practices resorted to by
aliens in the control, of distribution, and their utter disregard for the
24
welfare of their customers show the existence of real, actual and

fundamental differences between alien and national. These
differences are a valid reason for the state to prefer national over
retail trade. Therefore as long as there are substantial distinctions,
the state validly exercised police power.
LUTZ VS. ARANETA

GR L-7859 December 22, 1955
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator

of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by
the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years
1948-1949 and 1949-1950, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional
and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for
which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the
case.
The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that
the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise
of the taxing power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said imposition of special tax is

constitutional.
RULING: The Supreme Court sustained as a legitimated exercise of

the police power the imposition of a special tax on sugar producers for
25
the purpose of creating a special fund to be used for the rehabilitation

of the sugar industry.
The tax levied by the challenged statute shows that the tax is
levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power of the
state and taxation was merely used to implement the states power.
TIO VS. VRB

GR 75697 June 18, 1987 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of

other videogram operators adversely assail the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD).
Section 134 of the said Presidential Decree states, There shall be
collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That
locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax."
26
Petitioners find that this Presidential Decree to be oppressive

and therefore violative of their constitutional right to life and
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Decree is unconstitutional
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the Presidential Decree is

constitutional. The creation of the Board was an exercise of police
power where the supervision and regulation by the board is necessary
to ensure that public morals and public welfare are protected. The
underlying objective of the Decree is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought
about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent
sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in
theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of
video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in
business.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. DAR
27
GR 78742 July 14, 1989 Genevive

Gutierrez
FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the
validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the
provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President
in the lawful exercise of legislative power. The adoption of the concept
of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State
embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the
recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not
only for national economic development, but also for its security and
national defense, ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy
of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources.
President Corazon C. Aquino, promulgated Executive Order No. 211
prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the
continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the
development of mineral resources. President Aquino likewise
promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for
such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. The petitioner
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that
respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos.
57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 279.
ISSUES: Whether or not the DENR Secretary acted in grave abuse of

discretion. Whether or not Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are
constitutional
RULING: The court reiterate the principle that the power of

administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into
effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. There is no clear
showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the
bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his
rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Section
6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to
28
promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be

necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Therefore,
rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed
to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they
were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of
the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be
sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

GR L-63419 December 18, 1986
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,

the Bouncing Checks Law. BP22 incarcerates a person who makes or
draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing that at
the time of the issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioners challenge the validity of BP22 on the grounds that it
contravened the impairment clause and violates the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa 22 contravenes the

impairment clause and violates the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt
RULING: The Court held that Batas Pambansa 22, or the Bouncing
Checks Law, is a valid exercise of the police power as such offense
contravenes public policy. Flooding the system with worthless checks
is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nations economy.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. Also, checks cannot be categorized as
mere contracts as it is a commercial instrument which is now a
convenient substitute for money. It forms a part of the banking system
29
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the State.
Thus, it cannot be held to contravene the impairment clause.
More importantly, Batas Pambansa 22 did not transgress the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt as the
challenged statute does not punish the person for non-payment of a
debt but because of the malicious act of issuing a worthless check.
The law does not intend to force a person to pay a debt but aims to
prohibit the issuance of a worthless check and putting them in
circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against the
property, but an offense against public order.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA

GR L-15972 October 11, 1920 Marielle
Magrata
FACTS: Ordinance No.532 of the City of Manila requires receipt in

duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and
number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments.
The petitioner prays to prohibit the City of Manila from
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 and to declare it null and void.
Petitioners who were Chinese laundrymen claims that the ordinance
savors class legislation; that it unjustly discriminates between persons
in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes arbitrary
infringement of property rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 532 is valid and justifiable

under the police power
RULING: The ordinance invades no fundamental rights and impairs

no personal privilege. It is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in
its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction,
30
whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other

nationality.
Its purpose is to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their
patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. It objective is to
promote peace and order and prevent cheating, fraud and deceit.
The very foundation of police power is the control of private
interest for the public welfare. The oppressiveness of the ordinance
may have been somewhat exaggerated. The printing of the laundry
receipts need not be expensive. The printing of the several kinds of
clothing is printed in English and Spanish with equivalent in Chinese
below. No great difficulty shall be experienced in the implementation
of the said ordinance since it is certain that at least one person in
every Chinese laundry knows how to read and write Arabic numbers.
Hence, Ordinance No. 532 is valid.
TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

GR L-78164 July 31, 1987
Anton Malamug
FACTS: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of

medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education,
one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
31
with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and
the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After
hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial
court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted
and administered as previously scheduled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement of passing NMAT exam

before admission to a medical school is constitutional
RULING: The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its

branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. The legislative power of
the State is validly delegated to the Board of Medical Education to
realize its duty to regulate the practice of medicine. By requiring a
certain exam measuring the scholastic aptitude of a future medical
student, the State is validly exercising its police power to protect the
publics health and safety. That the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. The government is
entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of upgrading the selection of applicants
into our medical schools and of improving the quality of medical
education in the country. What is sought by the State is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
32
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA

GR L-34915 June 24, 1983
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: The Quezon City Council passed a resolution, pursuant to

Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, Section 9 "requiring memorial park
operators to set aside at least 6% of their cemetery for charity burial
of deceased persons", requesting the City Engineer to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City. Hence, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. that said Ordinance would be enforced. Himlayang
Pilipino filed a petition before the CFI seeking to annul Section 9 of
said Ordinance in question being contrary to the Constitution, as it
constitutes taking of property without just compensation. Respondent
court declared Section 9 of the ordinance null and void. Hence,
petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 of

Quezon City is null and void
RULING: The ordinance is invalid, as it is not a valid exercise of

police power, and one that constitutes taking of property without just
compensation. The ordinance is actually taking without just
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, BP 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
Panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and
in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance", it simply
authorizes the City to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. Police
power is defined as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of
property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police
power being the most active power of the government and the due
process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of government and the due process clause
of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. But it does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
33
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to

destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of
his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation. Therefore, the decision of the lower court was
affirmed.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY VS.
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
GR 135962 March 27, 2000
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the

delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent BAVA, is a
non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in
Bel-Air Subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered
owner of Neptune Street, a road beside Bel-Air Village.
On Dec. 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular
traffic starting Jan. 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a decision on
the merits of the case finding that MMDA has no authority to order
the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause
the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA has the authority to open Neptune

Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers
RULING: The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in Republic Act No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the
Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no
34
provision in Republic Act 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila

Development Authority or its council to enact ordinances, resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature and these
are actually summed up in the charter itself. Thus, MMDA may not
order the opening of Neptune Street in the Bel-Air Subdivision to
public traffic, as it does not possess the delegated police power.
TATEL VS. VIRAC

GR 40243 March 11, 1992
Francis Villanueva
FACTS: The Petitioners questioned the validity of two ordinances

(ordinance 5 and 6 of 1965) in the Municipality of Virac. The effect of
these ordinances would be to increase taxes by more than 50%
without the approval of the Secretary of Finance. This is in violation of
Commonwealth Act 472.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances are null and void for violating
Commonwealth Act 472 and are unjust, excessive and confiscatory
RULING: To begin with, the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 472

requiring the prior approval of the Secretary of Finance, when an
ordinance increases by more than 50% municipal taxes prescribed in
previous ordinances, has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2264. This vests municipal, city and municipal district councils ample
discretion to impose taxes. Furthermore, the ordinances in question
do not tax specific goods. They impose license taxes, or regulate and
tax those engaging in the businesses or occupations, or exercising the
privileges.
The license tax prescribed in each category is graduated, the
amount thereof being dependent upon the "capital investment or
35
purchases for the previous year, whichever is higher." Therefore the

value is relative to the capacity of each investment. It cannot be
considered as unjust by the sheer amount of cash one has to pay. If it
is relative to the reasonable paying capacity of a taxpayer, then it
cannot be declared as void.
The power to impose such license taxes is explicitly authorized
in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264. Under this new law, the power
of the Secretary of Finance is limited to suspending ordinances
imposing taxes that he considers "unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory," and that the only qualification of that power is that it be
exercised within 120 days after the passage of the ordinance
Therefore, under the new statute, the Secretary of Finance does
not need to review the law before it becomes valid. If the Secretary
does not declare the tax as "unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory," within 120 days, then such law is valid.
REPUBLIC VS. TAGLE

GR 129079 December 2, 1998 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner

of two parcels of land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias,
Cavite.
Philippine Human Resources Development Center and private
respondent Benitez signed a Memorandum of Agreement which
provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to lease within the
period of twenty years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is
no less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees
to lease within a period of twenty years and/or buy said property
site.
The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a
permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and to
undertake land development, electrical and road network installations
and other related works necessary to attain its objectives.
36
Accordingly, PWU entered into a purported contract of lease with

PHRDC on a ten -hectare piece of land which stipulated, among other
things, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for an initial term of four
years.
PWU entered into the aforesaid lease contract, purporting to be
the donee of the property involved in a deed of donation executed by
Benitez in its favor.
After the expiration of the lease contract, negotiations began on
the purchase of the property in question on a plain offer of Benitez to
sell the same. In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in
question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale with Benitez, as
vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF, as vendees, duly represented by then
Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez.
However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did not sign
the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell
the lot in question.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated
sale, petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, to
which CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain,
pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge may quash a writ of

possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is
already occupying the property sought to be expropriated
RULING: Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need

not be granted even by the fundamental law. Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, in mandating that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation, merely imposes a
limit on the governments exercise of this power and provides a
measure of protection to the individuals right to property. Clearly, an
ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the States power of
eminent domain.
Petitioner has deposited not just the 10 percent required, but
the whole amount of the just compensation that private respondent is
entitled to. Thus, there is no legal impediment for the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner. The purpose of instituting
expropriation proceedings is to prevent petitioner from being ejected
from the subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd
and circuitous rulings would arise.
It is clear that, in quashing the writ of possession, respondent
judge violated Executive Order 1035 on the quaint and whimsical
ground that petitioner was already in actual possession of the
property.
37
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF

MANILA
GR L-14355 October 31, 1919 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: The City of Manila requested that certain lands be

expropriated for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue, Manila. The
Chinese Community questioned this petition alleging that there was
no need to expropriate part of the land because they would be
disturbing the resting place of the dead. Furthermore, the community
argued that there are other routes available for the petitioner to fulfill
its purpose. Part of the land the petitioner was expropriating was a
cemetery used by the Chinese community and is alleged to be a public
improvement.
ISSUE: Is there a valid exercise of Eminent Domain
RULING: The right of expropriation is not an inherent power of

municipal corporations such as the City of Manila. Before they can
expropriate, some law must exist conferring the power upon it. The
courts must determine that: (a) there is a law providing for the
expropriation and (b) the right or authority is being exercised
according to law. In this case, two conditions are imposed on the City
of Manila. First the land must be private and second, the purpose
must be public.
38
REPUBLIC VS. PLDT

GR L-18841 January 27, 1969 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: The Bureau of Telecom, acting for the government filed for a
petition for injunction for PLDT to stop its threats of severing
telephone connections with other countries. PLDT and RCA Comm.,
Inc. entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages coming
from the US would automatically be transmitted to PLDT lines. The
Government rented the trunk lines of PLDT to enable them to call
private parties. PLDT now threatens to severe the telephone lines of
the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Government can order PLDT to provide

for the telephone lines
RULING: The Government may, through the exercise of Eminent

Domain, require telephone companies to permit interconnection of he
government telephone system and that of PLDT, as the needs of the
government would require subject to just compensation.
39
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO

GR L-12172 August 29, 1958 Jeffrey
Santos
FACTS: During the incumbency of the appellant Juan R. Fajardo as

mayor of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal
council passed Ordinance No. 7 which pertinently provides: That any
persons who will construct or repair a building should before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipality Mayor, that if said building destroys the view of the
Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at
the expense of the owner of the building or house.
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had
expired, and his son-in-law co-appellant, Pedro Babilonia, filed a
written request with the municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardos name, located along the National Highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. Such request was twice
denied. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon
and that they had been living on leased property. Appellants were
charged and convicted for violation of the said Ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
RULING: Ordinance No. 7 is invalid; being an undefined and

unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity which is
per se lawful. In this case the refusal of the mayor of Baao to issue a
building permit was predicated on the ground that the proposed
building would destroy the view of the public plaza by preventing its
being seen from the public highway. The ordinance is unreasonable
and oppressive; in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants
of the right to use his own property: Hence, it oversteps the bounds of
40
the police power and amounts to a taking of the appellants property

without just compensation.
CITY OF BAGUIO VS. NAWASA

GR L-12032 August 31, 1959 Ria
Castro
FACTS: Plaintiff, a municipal corporation filed a complaint for

declaratory relief in the Court of First Instance of Baguio against
defendant, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383,
creating and authorizing the transfer to it of all government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities, and
municipal districts. Notwithstanding Executive Order No. 127,
outlining the procedure to effect the transfer, no actual physical turn-
over of the Baguio Waterworks System has so for been made.
The Court of First Instance of Baguio rendered its decision and
held that the waterworks system of the City of Baguio falls within the
category of private property, thus may not be expropriated without
just compensation.
ISSUES: Whether or not plaintiffs action for declaratory relief is

improper because there has already been a breach by plaintiff of
Republic Act. No. 1383. Whether or not the transfer of Waterworks
Systems to the NAWASA was a valid exercise of the Police Power.
Whether or not Republic Act No. 1383 does not violate our
Constitution even if it involves the power of eminent domain
41
RULING: As to the first issue, there has been no breach of law

because no actual transfer of the Waterworks System has been
effected, and since all the other necessary elements for the action are
present an action for declaratory relief is proper.
With regard to the second issue, Republic Act No. 1383 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the Police Power of the State. The Act
does not confiscate, destroy, or appropriate the property belonging to
a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all waterworks
belonging to cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the
Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of placing
them under the control and supervision of one agency with a view to
promoting their efficient management, but in so doing it does not
confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with an equal
value of the assets of the NAWASA.
The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any other public
property that is held in trust by a municipal corporation for the
benefit of the public but is a property owned by the city in its
proprietary character. Being patrimonial property of a municipal
corporation, waterworks cannot be taken away except by just
compensation.
NPC VS. GUTIERREZ

GR 60077 January 18, 1991 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: NPCs line has to pass the land belonging to the spouses
Gutierrez for the construction of its 230KV Mexico - Limay
transmission lines. Defendant spouses were authorized to take the
fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P937 from the
Provincial Treasurer. The controversy between the parties arises from
the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation
fee of the expropriated properties.
The court appointed three commissioners for the determination
of the fair and just compensation to be paid to defendants, a
representative of the plaintiff, of the defendant and of the court.
42
Pursuant to the recommendation of defendants representative,

the lower court ordered plaintiff to pay the sum of P10 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable compensation with a total sum of
P7,600. Plaintiff questions such compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not NPC should be made to pay the full

compensation for the land traversed by its transmission line
RULING: Yes. While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right of
way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendant of their
proprietary rights. Furthermore, because of the high tension current
conveyed through said transmission lines danger to lives that may be
caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted. Moreover,
plaintiff shall only pay the fees to the defendants once while the latter
shall continually pay the taxes due on the property.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI

GR L-20620 August 15, 1974 Cheryl
Banaria
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines had begun renting a property

owned by Castellvi during 1947. The property was being rented
specifically for the use of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
In the agreement entered into by the Republic and Castellvi, the
43
Republic was to return the said property to Castellvi in substantially

the same condition as the time the property was first occupied by the
AFP. The lease contract was for a year but was renewable from year to
year. The AFP was also to pay Castellvi the agreed rentals to Castellvi
on a monthly basis. During the occupancy of the AFP in the said
property, the latter constructed some installations of a permanent
nature.
On June 26, 1959, the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed the
complaint for eminent domain for the said property.
ISSUE: Did eminent domain take place from the moment the property
was rented by the AFP in 1947
RULING: For taking to take place, the circumstances which must be

present are: the entering of the expropriator into the private property;
the entrance must be for more than a momentary period; the entry
should be under warrant of color or legal authority; the property
being entered must be for public use and the utilization of the
property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the present case, the first circumstance is present for the
AFP entered Castellvis property which is a private property. Taking
must not be momentary. When applied to possession or occupancy of a
real property, momentary should be construed to mean a limited
period, not permanent. The agreement was for the AFP to lease the
said property for a duration of a year, renewable from year to year;
making the entry of the property temporary and is considered
transitory. Therefore, the second element is not present for the
agreement in 1947 was a lease of the property for a duration of one
year which is renewable from year to year. Such agreement indicates
that the entry was for a momentary period only.
The third element was present for the entry of the AFP in the
said property was of legal color for the latter entered Castellvis
property as lessee. The property was entered for pubic use for it was
used by the Armed Forces of the Philippines making the fourth
element present. As to the last element, Castellvi remained as the
owner of the property and was neither denied of any beneficial
enjoyment he can receive from the property. He remained as the
owner of the property and was a party in the lease agreement with the
AFP. AFP was bound to pay, and had been paying Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals from 1947 until the complaint for eminent domain
was filed in June, 1959.
With the premises considered, the occupancy of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines of Castellvis property from 1947 to 1959
cannot be considered as that of taking under eminent domain. The
AFP did not take the property permanently and Castellvi was not
44
ousted as the owner of the said property and neither was he denied of
any beneficial enjoyment he could have received from the property.
Therefore, the taking of the property of Castellvi for the
purpose of determining the just compensation to be paid must start
from June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
EPZA VS. DULAY
GR L-59603 April 4, 1987
Vanessa Bugayong
FACTS: Proclamation No. 1811 was issued by the President reserving

a parcel of land in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for
the establishment of an export processing zone by the Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), the petitioners herein. However,
four parcels of land were not considered public domain but were
owned and registered in the name of the private respondents.
Petitioner offered to purchase the parcels of land with the value set
forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree No. 464. Thus, the parties
failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale due to the value
equivalent for the parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value of the parcels of land under Section
5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed by
Presidential Decree No. 1533 on basis of just compensation
RULING: Various factors can come into play in the valuation of

specific properties singled out for expropriation. Tax declarations
presented by the petitioner as a basis for just compensation were
made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal. The values given by provincial
assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several
barrios or even the entire town with the exception of the poblacion.
Tax values can serve as guide but cannot be absolute substitutes for
just compensation. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that
Presidential Decree No. 1533, which eliminates the courts discretion
to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is
unconstitutional and void. The guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, provides that no statute, decree, or executive order
shall prevail over the Courts findings.
45
VICTORIA AMIGABLE VS. NICOLAS CUENCA

GR L-26400 February 29, 1972
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is a registered lot owner. She has a

Transfer Certificate of Title and it has no annotation at the back in
favor of the government of any right or interest in the property.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the petitioners lot for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921
although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide
and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said
roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925."
Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting
payment of the portion of the said lot appropriated by the
government. The Auditor General in its 9th Indorsement prohibited
the claim of the Plaintiff. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a
complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
the latter as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the
complaint filed was premature since it must first be filed at the Office
of the Auditor General. Defendants alleged that the right of action for
the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the
Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff
had no cause of action against them.
The complaint of the Plaintiff was dismissed which led to the
appeal of this case from the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: Can appellant sue the government, given the circumstances

in the case at bar
46
RULING: According to the doctrine in Ministerio v. Court of First

Instance of Cebu, when the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
In the abovementioned case, given that there was no
annotation at the back of the certificate of title in favour of the
government, Plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of the lot to the government. This makes the Plaintiff the
owner of the lot. She could then bring an action anytime to recover
possession of the land, because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. On the other hand, given that such action is not
practicable at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes,
the only relief left is for the government to give due compensation to
price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

GR L-119694 May 22, 1995 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: On March 2, 1995, the Commission on Elections promulgated

Resolution No. 2772, which provides that it shall procure free print
space of not less than one half page in at least one newspaper of
general circulation in every province or city for use as Comelec Space,
which shall be allocated among all candidates free of charge. The
Commission shall also use it for dissemination of vital election
information. Petitioner seeks to declare said Resolution
unconstitutional for it violates prohibition upon the government
against taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is taking of private property
47
RULING: Yes. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec

space amounts to taking of private personal property for public use.
The extent of taking is substantial, not a temporary restraint upon use
of private property.
Comelec has not shown the necessity for taking. There is no
suggestion that petitioner is unwilling to sell print space at their
normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. There is also lack of
proof that show that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain
Of course newspapers and magazine publishers may voluntarily
give free print space to Comelec for purposes contemplated in the
Resolution. However, the Resolution bears no constitutional basis for
compelling publishers against their will to provide free print space for
Comelec. The Resolution does not constitute valid exercise of power
of eminent domain. Furthermore, it neither can be taken under police
power because there is no proof the Resolution complied with the
requisites of lawful taking under police power.
REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

GR 147511 January 20, 2003 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed

separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands of the
cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the petitioners,
48
before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite. The stated public
purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of
just compensation. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a
decision rendered on October 29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs.
Zaballero and which became final on November 26, 1987.
On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an order to transfer the
title in the name of NHA, for NHA to pay petitioners the amount of
P322,123.05.
NHA failed to pay the petitioners the amount, hence they filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon dismissed the case. Hence, this petion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have the right to reclaim the

property for non-payment and breach of contract, when the
government exproriated their land
RULING: Petitioners contend that NHA violated the stated public

purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project
when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area,
as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court
which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain
unoccupied. Petitioners also question the public nature of the use by
NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost
housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public
purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that
respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the
expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now
be returned to herein petitioners.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract
for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. The
concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. At
present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for
the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be
sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as
a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking.
Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the
developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials
firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private
49
concerns. Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the

private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots.
However, the refusal of respondent NHA to pay just compensation,
allegedly for failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax and
surrender the owners' duplicate certificates of title, was held to be
unfounded and unjustified.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE VS. V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION
GR 127820 July 20, 1998
Shelumiel Espaldon
FACTS: Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95 of the Municipality

of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of
land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque. Allegedly, the
complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living
conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project. Parenthetically, it was also for
this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter
into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which
the latter did not accept.
ISSUE: Whether or not local government units may expropriate

private land through a resolution
RULING: The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative

branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
local government units, other public entities and public utilities. A
local government unit may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and
subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before a local

government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
50
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under

Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a

law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a
third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
If Congress intended to allow local government units to exercise

eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. DAR

(SUPRA)
Gutierrez
FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the
validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the
provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President
in the lawful exercise of legislative power. The adoption of the concept
of jura regalia that all natural resources are owned by the State
embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the
recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not
only for national economic development, but also for its security and
national defense, ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy
of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources.
President Corazon C. Aquino, promulgated Executive Order No. 211
prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the
continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the
51
development of mineral resources. President Aquino likewise

promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR
Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for
such agreements and those agreements involving technical or
financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.The petitioner
Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that
respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos.
57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 279.
ISSUES: Whether or not the DENR Secretary acted in grave abuse of

discretion. Whether or not Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are
constitutional
RULING: The court reiterate the principle that the power of

administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into
effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. There is no clear
showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the
bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his
rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Section
6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to
promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Therefore,
rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed
to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they
were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of
the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be
sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
ESLABAN VS. DE ONORIO

GR 146062 June 28, 2001
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in

South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. On October 6,
52
1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the
construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. Respondents
husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that
they be paid by the government for the area taken after the
processing of documents by the Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed
between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid respondent the
amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees
whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and
improvements, which she suffered as a result of the construction of a
right-of-way on her property. The same year, petitioner offered
respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property,
but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on
December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of
P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in
the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation
expenses, and the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be

determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality
of the decision
RULING: The value of the property must be determined either as of

the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first. Even before the new rule, however, it was
already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the
price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage
of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation.
The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that
compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., just not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but to the public, which is to pay
for it. In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question
is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the
appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the
provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato)
constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the
expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.
53
KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 108015 May 20, 1998
Jay Gernale
FACTS: Petitioner sought to recover compensation from the

government alleging that the government demolished his house for
purposes of extending EDSA road. However, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because the said ownership of
the property had already been transferred to SALEM, thus, making
the petitioner an undue party to claim for compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can claim compensation over the

property that was demolished during the time of his occupancy of the
said land
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of

Appeals. It contended that indeed petitioner had lost his right to claim
for compensation because the government had already appropriated a
certain amount to the legal owner of the property, which in this case is
SALEM. It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of
eminent domain under Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 that expropriation
proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to
be expropriated. Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down
the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the
specific properties expropriated and declared that just compensation
was to be determined by the court. Therefore it is said that the
governments action to compensate the legal owner of the property
which is SALEM is valid. Petition is dismissed.
54
REPUBLIC VS. KER

Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcel of land owned by
respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of
the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City.
The provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated was
fixed at the aggregate sum of P2,221,000.00 or 1,000 per square
meter. Respondent claimed that the value of the properties subject for
expropriation is more than P4,000 per square meter
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation is excessive
RULING: The appellate court did not err in upholding petitioners

claim that the valuation for the lot in Site I is excessive and
unreasonable since the tax declaration of the property indicated a
much lower market value.
In computing the just compensation for expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at
the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition
of judgment which should be taken into consideration. Section 4, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the
filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter the court
is correct in disregarding petitioner claim.
55
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 106440 January 29, 1996
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of land, which was ascertained

by the National Historical Institute to be the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The said parcel of land was
then declared as a national historical landmark. Subsequent to the
declaration, the Republic instituted a complaint for expropriation of
the said parcel of land as such national historical landmark is for
public purpose. The Republic was then authorized to expropriate the
said property upon payment of its provisional market and assessed
values.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the contention
that the intended expropriation was not for public use as it would only
redound to the benefit of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. Also, the
petitioners questioned the act as it would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of a
specific religious entity, which is contrary to the constitutional
provision of Separation of Church and State.
ISSUES: Whether or not a property declared as a religious national

historical landmark can be the subject of expropriation. Whether or
not the expropriation of a religious national historical landmark
56
violates the Constitutional provision of Separation of Church and

State
RULING: The Court ruled against the petitioners holding that the
term public use is not confined to actual use by public. As long as
the subject of expropriation would give the public the right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public
advantage or public benefit would be sufficient to a constitute a
public use.
The Court also explained that the purpose of the expropriation
of the birthplace of the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo is to recognize the
significant contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate the founding and leadership
of a particular religious entity. Even if such act would in fact redound
to a greater benefit to the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than most
others, such advantage is only incidental to the main purpose of the
expropriation.
PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

COMMUNICATIONS
GR L-10121 December 29, 1960
Marielle Magrata
FACTS: Private respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who was a member of the

Senate, offered to donate his private properties as projected feeder
roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal. The offer was accepted but
no deed of donation was executed. The respondent called the
attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum of
P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected
feeder roads in question. The Petitioner instituted an action against
57
the application of Republic Act No. 920 on the ground that said
projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time
of the passage and approval of the said act. The appropriation of
P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal
and, therefore, void ab initio. It was made to believe that the
projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private
streets of a private subdivision".
That the alleged deed of donation was subject to an onerous
condition and violated the provision of our fundamental law
prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the Government, and,
hence, is unconstitutional for the construction of the projected feeder
roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase
the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta.
ISSUE: Should Republic Act No. 920 be declared void
RULING: The legislature limits its power to appropriate public

revenues for anything but a public purpose. The test of the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although
each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected
feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether
said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter
on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said
bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum
became effective. In as much as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose,
and hence, was null and void.
The donation to the Government, over five months after the
approval and effectivity of said Act the appropriation in question, did
not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Hence, the Court sufficiently
justifies petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and
donation in question.
58
PUNSALAN VS. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA

GR L-5682 May 26, 1954
Anton Malamug
FACTS: The petitioners are professionals currently practicing their

profession in the city of Manila. The object of the suit is the
annulment of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila together with
the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of
taxes collected under the ordinance but paid under protest by the
petitioners. The ordinance in question imposes a municipal occupation
tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes
non-payment of the tax. Having already paid their occupation tax
under Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiffs,
upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the
ordinance, paid the same under protest. The petitioners challenged
the second tax as double taxation and asked that it be annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3398 amounts to double

taxation
RULING: The Supreme Court held against the petitioners. The two
taxes being imposed on the petitioners come from two different
jurisdictions. Ordinance No. 3398 is imposed the city government of
Manila while the Occupation tax exacted by the national government.
For double taxation to exist, there must be additional taxes laid on the
same subject by the same taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing
period and for the same purpose. Double taxation will not be allowed
if it results in a violation of the equal protection clause. The
petitioners contention that they are being discriminated against
because other professionals practicing elsewhere were not subjected
to the tax is unfounded. There is a substantial distinction between the
Petitioners and the other professionals not practicing in Manila.
59
OSMENA VS. ORBOS

GR 99886 March 31, 1993
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: President Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account

in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from
exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market
prices of crude oil. President Corazon C. Aquino expanded the
grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery
incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount
being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. Petitioner alleges that
the status of the OPSF showed a Terminal Fund Balance deficit that to
abate the worsening deficit. Notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar
Orbos, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and others are poised to
accept, process and pay claims not authorized under P.D. 1956. He
further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates Section 29(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, "All money collected on any tax levied
for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government". He also
contends that the delegation of legislative authority to the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) violates Section 28 (2). Article VI of the
Constitution, "the Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix,
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues and inasmuch as the delegation relates to the
exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits, limitations and
restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must also impose a
specific limit on how much to tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not the powers granted to the ERB under P.D.
1956 partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State
60
RULING: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established to

minimize the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate
changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products. It was established to protect local consumers from the
adverse consequences that such frequent oil price adjustments may
have upon the economy. Its character as a special kind of fund is
emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine
National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which
may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by the
Constitution. Hence, while the funds collected may be referred to as
taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the
State. OPSF is segregated from the general fund; and while it is
placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the
provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional
amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by
which the authority must be exercised. However, P.D. 1956 does not
authorize the reimbursement of financing charges, for the reason that
they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices
of petroleum products. Under the same provision, however, the
payment of inventory losses is upheld as valid, being clearly a result
of domestic price reduction, when oil companies incur a cost under
recovery for yet unsold stocks of oil in inventory acquired at a higher
price.
REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
GR L-19201 June 16, 1965
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: In 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated

P10,000 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for
the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total
amount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On March 3,
1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. On
April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish
of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest.
The tax amounted to P1,370 including surcharges, interests of 1%
monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for
the late filing of the return.
In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed,
among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish
priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person
61
known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he

should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that
the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic
Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the
provisions of the Constitution.
After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, affirming the
decision of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the
petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc was ordered to pay to the
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed

donee's gift tax on the P10,000 donated for the construction of the
Victorias Parish Church
RULING: Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution exempts from

taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents,
appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the
present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the
assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon
general ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of
which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the
learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as
employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. There being no clear, positive or
express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.
In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated, the
assessment at bar had been properly made and the imposition of the
tax is not a violation of the constitutional provision exempting
churches, parsonages or convents, etc. The Head of the Diocese, to
which the parish Victorias pertains, is liable for the payment thereof.
The decision appealed regarding tax liability is affirmed; it is
modified, in the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable for
the said gift tax, but the Head of the Diocese instead.
CASANOVA VS. HORD
GR 3473 March 22, 1907 Eliza
Yamamoto
62
FACTS: In January 1897, the Spanish Government, in accordance with

the provisions of the royal decree, granted to the plaintiff certain
mines in the province of Camarines, of which mines he is now the
owner. These were valid perfected mining concessions which were
considered as under the classification of the Internal Revenue Act.
Section 134 of the Internal Revenue Act provides that they should pay
taxes. The government grants the ownership of the said mines for an
unlimited period of time so long as they shall comply with the terms
and conditions to the effect that they may develop the same, and make
free use and disposition of the output thereof, with the right to
alienate the said mine subject to existing laws. This deed constituted a
contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Section 134 of the Internal

Revenue Act is a law which impaired the contract between the
government and that of Casanovas
RULING: Section 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void

because it impairs the obligation of the contracts contained in the
concessions of mines by the Spanish Government.
63
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION VS. CITY OF MANILA
GR L-24693 July 31, 1967 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: It was alleged that Section 1 of Ordinance No. 4760 of City of

Manila is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels. It
was also alleged hat Section 2 of the ordinance prohibits a person less
than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to
lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every twenty four
hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty and
for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process

clause
RULING: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels,

motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to
safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers
extending as it does to all great public needs.
Mush discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue.
The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be
deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a
living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must
exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter,
from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront
to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What
64
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an

abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals.
The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common
inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than
twice every twenty four hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence
between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ (SUPRA)

GR L-7995 May 31, 1957 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: The government passed Republic Act 1180, otherwise known

as An act to Regulate Retail Business. The effect of this law
nationalizes the retail trade business. It prohibits non-Filipino citizens
and corporations from engaging in retail trade.
ISSUES: Is the Act unconstitutional because it denies the equal

protection of the laws. Is this a valid exercise of Police Power. Does
the act violate international treaties
RULING: The test or standard for proper exercise of police power is

that it must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a
reasonable relation must exist between purpose and means. In this
case the importance of retail trade gives rise to the need for the
exercise of police power. According to the statistical trends, the gross
sales of aliens and their participation in the industry have steadily
increased during the years. Although they are not yet a majority, most
of the alien retail trade businessmen are engaged in the major retail
enterprises. The Filipinos only engaged in minor enterprises. The
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit and
supply.
Even the constitutional convention realized the needs to
nationalize retail trade because there was a general feeling of
dominance by alien investors. This dominance endangers national
interest, because alien retailers and merchants can act in complete
unison, increasing prices, manipulating the market, etc. The National
producers and consumers will be at the mercy of these merchants.
65
There are also fears of smuggling, evading tax laws, bribing officials.
These circumstances create well-founded fears. Therefore the court is
satisfied that the law is not founded on discrimination or racial
hostility. It is the desire of the people to free the nation from their
disadvantageous economic situation.
With regard to equal protection, the practices resorted to by
aliens in the control, of distribution, and their utter disregard for the
welfare of their customers show the existence of real, actual and
fundamental differences between alien and national. These
differences are a valid reason for the state to prefer national over
retail trade. Therefore as long as there are substantial distinctions,
the state validly exercised police power.
VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG

GR L-29646 November 10, 1978
Yves Dalisay
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance no. 6537

which prohibits aliens from procuring employment, whether
permanent or casual, within the Philippines without securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila. A permit
fee of P50 was also to be paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is constitutional
RULING: No. The fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive

but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences among
individual aliens. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences. The
66
same amount of P50 is being collected from every employed alien,

regardless of the nature of his tenure.
The Ordinance is null also because it fails to provide standards
to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. This violates the
due process of law and equal protection enshrined in the Constitution.
While it is true that the State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law, which includes means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protections
clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
PHILIPPINE PHOSPATE VS. TORRES

GR 98050 March 17, 1994 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Philphos Movement for Progress Inc. (PMPI) filed with the
DOLE a petition for certification election among the supervisory
employees of the company, PHILPOS. The latter did not oppose the
petition. Later, PMPI filed an amended petition with the mediator-
arbiter to represent its professional/technical and confidential
employees in addition to the supervisory employees. The parties
agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the
amended petition submitted for decision. The Mediator-Arbiter issued
67
an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a

certification election. PHILPHOS appealed the decision to the Labor
Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not PHILPHOS was denied due process
RULING: No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to

be heard. In this case, PHILPOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision
on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process. It could
have requested for a hearing which it did not request but proceeded
instead with the submission of its position papers.
RUBI VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

GR 14078 February 28, 1919
Isabel Oliver
68
FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and

other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said
to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against
their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
directed the Manguianes to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site
on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected
by provincial governor.- With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners constitutional right to

freedom of abode is violated
RULING: One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has
not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and
which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section
2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards
the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we
are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Tennessee writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a
ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the
courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of
cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In
balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its
probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code
69
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy
of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA (SUPRA)

GR L-15972 October 11, 1920 Ria
Castro
FACTS: The petitioner challenged a municipal ordinance requiring all

laundry establishments to issue their receipts in English and Spanish
on the ground that it was oppressive. His claim was that he did not
know any of the prescribed languages and would have to employ more
help, at added expense to him, to be able to comply with said
requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional
RULING: The Supreme Court sustained the measure, noting that it

was intended to protect the public from deceptions and
misunderstandings that might arise from their accepting receipts in
Chinese characters that they did not understand.
70
YU ENG CONG VS. TRINIDAD

GR L-20479 February 26, 1925
Sarah Abraham
FACTS: A statute was passed which prohibited the use of any other
language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect by
merchants to keep its account books. Petitioner Yung Cong Eng claims
that it is difficult for Chinese merchants to keep books of account in a
language which they barely understand. It is necessary for them to
maintain a set of books in a language that they understand since such
material informs them of the status of their business. Thus, he assails
the validity of such law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute is a valid exercise of police power
RULING: No. The statute is oppressive and arbitrary since it

prohibits Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the
Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters and thus prevents
them from keeping advised of the status of their business and
directing its conduct. If the law would prohibit them from keeping
their books in the language which they understand, such merchants
would be prey to all kinds of fraud and without possibility of adopting
any safe policy. It would greatly and disastrously curtail their liberty
of action and be oppressive and damaging in the preservation or their
property.
71
AIAG VS. COMELEC

GR 104961 October 7, 1994 Cheryl
Banaria
FACTS: Due to the 1992 elections and pursuant to the election Gun
Ban, the Sgt.-at-Arms of the House of Representatives wrote a notice
to herein Petitioner requesting the latter to return the two firearms
issued to him by the House. Petitioner then asked his driver, Ernesto
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from Petitioners house and return
them to Congress.
In the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) set up a checkpoint few meters away from the entrance of the
Batasan Complex. Arellano, approaching the checkpoint, was flagged
down by the police officers manning the checkpoint. They searched
the car and found firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and
placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained.
ISSUE: Was the search and seizure legal
RULING: One of the exceptions to the rule of an authorized search

and seizure by a valid warrant is the warrantless search in cases of
72
moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view. In the

present case, Petitioner argues that the guns were not in plain view.
He contends that the guns were not in his drivers waist nor placed
within his reach and was in fact neatly packed in gun cases and
placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
There was also nothing in the report showing Arellano to have
acted, in any way, of any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction.
The Supreme Court held that an extensive search without warrant
could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either
the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in
the vehicle to be searched.
With the premises considered, the Supreme Court held that the
police officers intruded into the Petitioners privacy and the security
of his property. Also, it was declared that the guns or evidence
obtained from the search cannot be admitted as evidence.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC

GRs L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
Vanessa Bugayong
FACTS: This case has been moot and academic due to supervening
events. However, when lives has been lost in connection to this case,
including the petitioner herein, justice demands that action must be
made for the vindication of the outraged right but also for the
guidance and restraint upon the future. Events happened when
petitioner and respondent are contending for the position of Batasang
Pambansa of Antique in May 1984 elections. Petitioner seemed to be
in advantage for popular support and the latter being part in the
ruling party of the administration of Marcos. The bitter contest came
73
when the followers of the petitioners were ambushed. Subsequently,

respondent was announced victorious to the election and declared
only by the second division of Commission of Elections. Petitioner
contested that proclamation must be made by the COMELEC en banc
but while the case still considered the petitioner was gunned down.
ISSUE: Was the Second Division of the Commission of Elections

authorized to promulgate its decision of 1984 Elections, proclaiming
the private respondent the winner in the election
RULING: Article XII-C Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution states that

the Commission on Election may sit en banc in contests involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa Jurisdiction for the
Commission en banc would begin only after the proclamation was
made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter
before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power. As
correctly observed, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided
by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases.
Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human
lives. In tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in vigor of his
youth because he dared to speak against tyranny, the citizens come to
this court in quest of law but we must also give him justice. If it were
not for the supervening events, the petition filed would have been
granted and the decision of Commission of Elections of 1984 Elections
are set as violative of the Constitution.
74
RESTITUTO YNOT VS. IAC

GR 74457 March 20, 1987
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: The Petitioner had transported 6 carabaos in a pumpboat

from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984 when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac, Nuevo, Iloilo
for violation of Executive Power No. 626-A issued by then President
Marcos. The Petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas
bond for P12, 000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and since they could
no longer be produced by the Petitioner when ordered by the court,
the court ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the Executive Order for lack of
authority and for its presumed validity. On appeal, the lower court's
decision was sustained hence this petition for review of EO 626-A
which provides in Section 1 thereof, "The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat Inspection may see fit, in the case of the
carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director
of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos".
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 626-A is constitutional
RULING: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police

power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees
but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like
expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
75
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if
they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to
assert them.
Executive Order No. 626-A was declared unconstitutional. The
decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the supersedeas
bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

GR 84818 December 18, 1989 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Philcomsat was granted a franchise to establish, construct,

maintain and operate in the Philippines, station/s and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications. It
used to be exempt from the National Telecommunication
Commissions jurisdiction however Executive Order 196 placed them
under such jurisdictiom.
Pursuant to the Executive Order, NTC required Philcomsat to
apply for requisite certificate of public convenience covering its
facilities and services, as well as the authority to charge rates.
Philcomsat heeded such requirement and applied for provisional
authority to operate. NTC granted such provisional authority and
even extended it upon expiration.
The NTC order in question is the second extension of the
provisional authority, with the direction to change modified reduced
rates of 15%, on present authorized rates. Philcomsat asserts it
violated procedural due process because such order was without prior
notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Order denies Philcomsat of due process
RULING: Generally, notice and hearing are not essential to the

validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in
the exercise of executive, administrative or legislative functions, but
where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial
matter, its acts particular and immediate rather than general and
prospective, notice and hearing are warranted.
76
Alcuaz order in question is undoubtedly stemming from quasi-

judicial adjudication. Said order pertains exclusively to petitioner.
While respondent may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of petitioners application, it is not exempt from notice
and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. NTC has
no power to fix unreasonable rates or arbitrarily regulate them.
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION VS. HON.

JOSE P. DANS, JR.
GR L-59329 July 19, 1985 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the
reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed
on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it
was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to
incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a
bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure.
The petitioner was not informed beforehand why an administrative
action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action
was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the
reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the
issue of freedom of speech. Respondents' general charge of "inciting
people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift
towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the
airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
77
However later, petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G.

Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Respondent National Telecommunications Commission agreed to
grant to the new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and
franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of
the radio transmitter of said station DYRE. Petitioner has no longer
any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is
likewise not interested in pursuing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State has the right to regulate broadcast
communications
RULING: The cardinal primary requirements in administrative

proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed
or its operations curtailed.
All forms of media are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on
freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger
rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent,
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions
which apply the test. The clear and present danger test, however,
does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot
simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others. Necessarily, however, the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the
start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a
right to be informed. Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom
of expression clauses of the Constitution. This petition is denied for
being moot.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

GR 46496 February 27, 1940 Shelumiel
Espaldon
78
FACTS: Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was shortage of leather

soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off
the members of the National Labor Union Inc. NLUI said the claim is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. The
supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the
NLUI from work. The employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of National Labor Union Inc.

were given due process
RULING: There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected

even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at

the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore,

must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
79
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial

questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. JUDGE

CAPULONG
GR 99327 May 27, 1993 Aretha
Eugenio
FACTS: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner

University , died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General
Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez
was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal
failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him
on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which
was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding Villas death. Said notice also required
respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-
four hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime,
they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a
prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of
the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students
were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge.
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges
against respondent students. The Board found respondent students
guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However,
in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on
the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to
the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students
filed with RTC Makati a Temporary Restraining Order since they are
currently enrolled, which was granted. A day after the expiration of
the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special
Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
80
students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by

the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due
process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was
ordered.
ISSUE: Was there denial of due process against the respondent

students
RULING: There was no denial of due process, more particularly

procedural due process. The Dean notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of
filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel,
copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were
adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a
position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court,
thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted
legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case,
where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been
afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
Petitioner University .
U.S. VS. HON. PURUGANAN
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: The Government of the United States requested for the

extradition of Mark Jimenez by virtue of an indictment of a grand jury
and the warrant of arrest issued by the United States District Court.
In a previous decision involving the same subject, the Supreme Court
held that an extradition proceeding is not a criminal proceeding,
which will call into operation all the rights of the accused as
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not
include the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
guilt or innocence of the accused will be adjudicated in the State
where he will be extradited.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to bail during

extradition
81
RULING: The Court of the requesting State in determining as to

whether an individual requested should be arrested has the discretion
on whether said individual may be granted bail. The Constitutional
provision that persons are entitled to bail except those charged with
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when the evidence
of guilt is strong is applicable in criminal case. However, in the case at
bar, the Philippine Supreme Court exercised its discretion and denied
the application for bail.
82
NAMIL, ET AL. VS. COMELEC

GR 150540 October 28, 2003 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan

Kudarat issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation No. 8031108, which contained the names of the
petitioners as the winning candidates for the Sangguniang
Bayan. The petitioiners took oath and assumed offices. The
following day, the same Board issued another Certificate
proclaiming the private respondents as winners for the
petitioners position.
Joenime Kapina, one of the private respondents, requested to
the respondent Commission that she and the other private
respondents be declared the winning candidates. The Commissioner-
in-charge for the region conducted an investigation, which showed
that the private respondents should be declared winners. Acting on
such investigation, respondent Commission declared the private
respondents as the winners.
Petitioners now contend that the declaration of the respondent
is null and void because they were deprived of due process, as they
were not afforded due notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents declaration is null
RULING: Yes. While it is true that Comelec is vested with broad

power to enforce all election laws, the same is subject to the right of
the parties to due process. The petitioners had been proclaimed
winning candidates and had assumed their office. Their proclamation
enjoys the presumption of regularity since no contest or protest was
ever filed assailing the same. The Comelec has no power to totally or
partially annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing. In nullifying the
proclamation of the petitioners, ousting them from office based solely
on the recommendations by the Commissioner-in-charge, and not
according the petitioners the chance to be heard on the said
recommendations, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in proclaiming the private respondents as the valid winners.
83
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

GR 45987 May 6, 1939 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Prosecuted for violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639,

the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province,
was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine
of five pesos or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Section 2 of Act No. 1639 states, it shall be unlawful for any native of
the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within
the meaning of Act 1639, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make
prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one
hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or
township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors
found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian
tribe. Accused was found guilty by the trial court of Baguio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Act is violative of the constitutional right

of the equal protection of law
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower

court. The Supreme Court held that it is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
84
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally
to all members of the same class. The Supreme Court found that all
these requisites are present in the said Act, thus rendering it
constitutional. The justification still exists in the all-comprehending
principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or
the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a
certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed
from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience
which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of
such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. In
the case at bar, the court considered that the above principle to be the
determinant factor in its finding that indeed the said Act was
constitutional.
PASEI VS. DRILON

GR 81958 June 30, 1988 Genevive
Gutierrez
FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters,

Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the
constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment. In their petition for
certiorari and prohibition, they assailed that "discrimination against
males or females does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills", and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid
exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not Department Order is valid under the

Constitution
85
RULING: The concept of police power is well established in this

jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory
reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that
(1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to
existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC (SUPRA)

GR L-52245 January 22, 1980
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao is a retired Governor of Nueva

Vizcaya who has filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position
in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. However, he was
86
disqualified to run for the said office under the disqualification

provided in Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which provides that
any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office for which
he has retired. Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality the
said provision claiming that it is discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process and that the classification provided
therein is based on purely arbitrary grounds.
On the other hand, Petitioners Romeo Igot and Alfredo
Salapanatan, both taxpayers an qualified voters, question the validity
of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which disqualified from
running for local elective office any person who has committed any
act of disloyalty to the State provided that the filing of charges for
the commission of such crimes before a civil court or tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
ISSUES: Whether or not a provision disqualifying a 65-year old,

retired local official from running for the same position which he has
retired from is a valid classification. Whether or not a provision
disqualifying a person charged with an offense of disloyalty to the
State, without a judgment of conviction, is a valid classification
RULING: The Court held that there is reason for disqualifying a 65-
year old elective official who has retired from a provincial, city, or
municipal office from running from the same office from which he has
already retired from. The rationale of this disqualification is that in
the retirees decision to retire, he manifested that he is already tired
and unavailable for the office that he retired from. In this case, there
is a need for new blood. Thus, the challenged disqualification is
reasonable as it is based on substantial distinctions.
On the other hand, the Court struck down the validity of the
second disqualification. Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel The Court explained that
an accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
disqualification contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Such disqualification was virtually placed in the same
category as person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of
arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of
the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
87
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST

ATTORNEY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GME
NETWORK, INC. VS. COMELEC
GR 132922 April 21, 1998
Marielle Magrata
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6646 was passed which prohibits the sale
and donations of print space or airtime for political ads, except to the
COMELEC under Section 92 of Batas Pambansa No. 881. It requires
radio and television stations to give free airtime to respondent to be
used as the COMELEC hour for broadcasting information regarding
the candidates in the 1998 elections.
Petitioner TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies suing as citizens, taxpayers and
voters of the Philippines.
ISSUES: Whether or not TELEBAP has the locus standi in the case.
Whether or not Section 92 of Batas Pambansa No. 881 violates due
process of law and equal protection clauses
RULING: A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question

only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of allegedly illegal conduct of the
government. TELEBAP failed to show that they have suffered from the
operation of Section 92 of Batas Pambansa No.881. Nor do the
petitioners have an interest as registered voters since the case does
not concern their rights. Much less do they have an interest as
taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of
its taxing or spending power.
Radio and television broadcasting companies which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequency which they
transmit broadcast and images. They are merely given temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the
exercise of the privilege may be reasonably burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
In addition, the government can control broadcast media to
ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the
system of free expression. COMELEC does not take over the
operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of the
88
airtime to the candidates for the purposes of answering, among other

things, equal opportunity, time and right to reply as mandated by the
Constitution. Hence, the Court affirmed the validity of Section 92 of
Batas Pambansa 881.
LACSON VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

GR 128096 January 20, 1999 Anton
Malamug
FACTS: Panfilo Lacson was charged before the Sandiganbayan as an

accessory for the murder of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the case transferred to the Regional Trial
Court pursuant to Section 2 Paragraphs a and c of Republic Act No.
7975. The said law limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
case where one or more of the "principal accused" are government
officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank
of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank
of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the salaray grade of at least
27. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution,
and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of
the amended informations on March 1, 1996, Republic Act 8249 was
approved into law expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said law sought, among others, to amend the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal"
from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of Republic Act No. 7975. Because of Republic Act 8249, the
Sandiganbayan regained jurisdiction over the Petitioner. Petitioner
now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8249; including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law
"shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as to the approval thereof.
89
ISSUES: Whether or not Republic Act 8249 is unconstitutional and an

ex post facto law. Whether or not the offense of multiple murder was
committed in relation to the office of the Petitioner
RULING: Every law is to be presumed as constitutional. To justify its

nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with
those who challenge it. That burden was not convincingly discharged
in the present case. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. All
the elements for a reasonable classification are present in this case.
The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval
of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences.
An ex post facto law generally prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
Republic Act 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of Republic Act 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional. An offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his
official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged
and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the information.
The amended information for murder against the petitioner is wanting
of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
information that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
VS. QUISUMBING
GR 128845 June 1, 2000
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Described as discrimination, Filipino teachers locally hired of

private respondent School receive salaries less than their
counterparts hired abroad. Private respondent International School,
Inc., pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to
continue carrying out its educational program and improve its
90
standard of instruction, the same Decree authorizes the School to

employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it
either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities. Thus,
the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: foreign-hires and local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local-
hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
significant economic disadvantages foreign-hires have to endure- the
dislocation factor and limited tenure. The Department of Labor and
Employment issued an Order resolving the parity and representation
issues in favor of the School. DOLE contends that the Union cannot
invoke the equal protection clause since it is not violated by
legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied the equal protection

clause
RULING: The Constitution, in Article XIII, Section 3 thereof, provides

"to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities" hence entitling the labor to
"humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees. The Constitution also directs the
State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." These relations
are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must
yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations
that are contrary to public policy, courts will strike down these
stipulations. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its international
character notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has
not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of
foreign-hires. The Court found this argument devoid of merit. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. The School
cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile
to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay. The dislocation factor and
limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by
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certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,

such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC. VS. THE TREASURER

OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
ORMOC CITY
GR L-23794 February 17, 1968
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City

passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the
Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of
uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from
being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was
within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act
and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda,
the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of
defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to
include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its
charter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said ordinance is violative of the equal

protection clause
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the equal protection clause
applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar
a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present
92
conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially

identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set
up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
PHILIPPINE JUDGES VS. PRADO

GR 105371 November 11, 1993
Jeffrey Santos
FACTS: The Philippine Postal Corporation, through its Circular Nos.

92-28, implemented Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354. These
measures withdrew the franking privileges from the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their
official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-mentioned
measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending
of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings.
On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354
on the grounds that its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes, it did not pass the required readings in both
Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its passage, and it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 is

unconstitutional
93
RULING: Republic Act No. 7354 was held to be unconstitutional in

that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Also, Section 35 of the
law was annulled because it was violative of Article 3, Section 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall be deprived of the
equal protection of the laws.
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

GR 81561 January 18, 1991 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: Accused went to a forwarding agency to send four packages

to a friend in Zurich. The proprietress of the agency asked the
accused if she could examine the packages but the accused refused.
Right before the packages were to be delivered to the Bureau of
Posts, the husband of the proprietress, observing standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. He discovered that
the package contained what appeared to be marijuana. He took a few
samples of it and brought it to the NBI. Three agents of the NBI went
back to him in his office where he totally opened the four wrapped
packages. Upon examination of the substance by the forensic chemist,
they confirmed that the samples that were submitted were marijuana
flowering tops.
94
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of accused against unreasonable

searches and seizures was violated
RULING: No. The constitutional protection against unreasonable

searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person from
interference by the government. Such constitutional protection cannot
extend to acts committed by private individuals.
In the case at bar, the arresting officers merely identified the
contraband articles without trespass. The Supreme Court held that to
merely observe and look at the articles in plain sight is not a search
contemplated by the Constitution.
WATEROUS DRUG CORP. VS. NLRC

GR 113271 October 16, 1997
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: Herein respondent, Catolico, received a memorandum from

Waterous Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her
not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. Co issued
another memorandum, on the same date, to Catolico warning her not
95
to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the

Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of
purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with
the suppliers. Another memorandunm was given to Catolico warning
her against "rush delivery of medicines without the proper
documents."
One of the clerks of the petitioner informed the vice president
that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The irregularity is a medicine purchased from
the latter company. The medicine purchased is ten bottles of Voren
tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews purchase orders issued to YSP,
Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while the purchase
order involving Catolico shows that the medicines were priced at
P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00).
WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00. Upon verifying the same from
YSP it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP,
Inc. Accounting Department confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets which was paid
to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no. 892068. The
undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she
denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice.
However, upon conversation with another WDRC employee in
their Espana branch the latter confirmed that the check amounting to
P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. Ms. Catolico even
asked the said employee if she opened the envelope containing the
check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas." After
placing Catolico in a suspension, she was later terminated by herein
petitioner.
ISSUE: Was Catolicos right against illegal searches and seizures

violated
RULING: Catolicos right against unlawful searches and seizures was

not violated when the envelope containing the check was opened. In
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti, the Bill of Rights does not
protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated
by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims,
that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to
both criminal and civil liabilities.
As said by the Solicitor General, Waterous Drugs Corporation
could have thought that the envelope was for them knowing that YSP
is their supplier.
96
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

GR 19550 June 19, 1967 Vanessa
Bugayong
FACTS: Respondent Judges issued on different dates, a total of forty-

two warrants against petitioners to search the latters offices,
warehouses and residences, and to seize and take possession of their
personal property as the subject of their offense. These things were
described as violation of the Central Bank Laws, Tariffs and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners contend that the search warrants are null and void,
as contravening in the Constitution and Rules of Court due to three
reasons: they do not describe particularity of the documents, books
and things to be seized, the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the petitioners, and the searches and seizures were made in
illegal manner.
ISSUES: Whether or not the search and seizure warrants in question

are valid. Whether or not the evidence such as documents, books and
other things may be used against the petitioners considering the
legality of the search and seizure warrants
RULING: The warrants are issued upon committing a violation of

Central Bank Laws, Tariffs and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code), and the Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause. Under the Revised Rules of Court, a
search warrants shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with specific offense. The Court also added a paragraph directing
that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
The warrants for the search of the residences of the petitioners
are null and void. That the searches and seizures therein are made
illegal and the seized documents, papers and other effects is hereby
permanent. The writs prayed for are granted insofar as the
documents, papers, and others effects seized in the residences are
concerned.
97
BURGOS, SR., ET. AL. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP

GR L-65334 December 26, 1984
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: The Respondent judge issued two search warrants, in the

address of Metropolitan Mail Newspapers and We Forum
Newspapers. The suspected properties of Petitioner Burgos, Jr. who is
the publisher and editor of the We Forum Newspaper were seized. To
name some of those that were seized were office and printing
machines, equipments, paraphernalias, printing publication and
distribution articles, motor vehicles, documents, papers and books.
The Petitioner assailed the legitimacy of the search warrant and prays
for the return of the seized articles. In addition, Petitioner prays that
Respondent be enjoined from using the articles seized as evidence
against petitioner Burgos, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is void
RULING: In the determination of whether a search warrant describes

the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially
true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the
warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, and it has
also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in
the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the
place to be searched.
98
Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the

fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani
Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to
be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership,
therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person
against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the
property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged
to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the
warrants.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. When the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
The Supreme Court held that the search warrants were null and
void due to its failure to specify in distinctiveness the so-called
subversive materials. It is, as a result, a general warrant.
LEON TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE

GR 89103 July 14, 1995 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt Flumar Natuel applied for the
issuance of a search warrant, alleging that he received information
that petitioner had in his possession in his residence guns, grenades
and subversive documents. A search warrant was issued on the same
day.
On September 9, 1988, a police team searched petitioners
house, and seized, among other things, two envelopes containing cash
amounting to P14, 000.00. The Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC),
acting on petitioners urgent motion to return the seized articles,
granted said motion and ruled that the seizure should have been
limited to that specifically stated in the search warrant. However, the
Solicitor General moved to annul MTCCs order, contending that
pending the determination of legality of seizure of the articles, such
should remain in custodia legis. Regional Trial Court Branch 44
99
ordered the return of the money pending resolution on the criminal

complaint against the petitioner. Later on, all the charges against
petitioner were dismissed.
ISSUE: Did the Regional Trial Court Branch 44 gravely abuse its
discretion in ordering the retention of the money
RULING: Yes. From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the even
the search warrant was illegally issued, since the warrant mentioned
more than one specific offense i.e., illegal possession of firearms and
Anti Subversion Law. The warrant is scatter-shot and is therefore
null and void.
The police team acted beyond their authority when they seized
things not found in the warrant. The requirement of particularity in
Section 2, Article 3 of the Constitution is aimed to prevent
unreasonable seizure of things and to the end that abuses may not be
committed.
Also, assuming legality of search warrant and seizure, the fact
that all charges against petitioner were dismissed precludes the
argument that the money must stay in custodia legis.
NESTORIO M. PLACER VS. JUDGE NAPOLEON D.

VILLANUEVA
GR L-60349-62 December 29, 1983 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: Petitioners, the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants
filed in the City Court of Butuan fourteen informations all certifying
that preliminary examinations have been conducted by the respective
100
Fiscals, from which examinations there is reasonable ground to

believe that the crime charged has been commited and that accused is
probably guilty thereof. Following receipt of said informations,
respondent judge issued an order setting the hearing of said criminal
cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent
issued the questioned orders requiring petitioners to submit to the
court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the
exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable
cause by petitioners.
Petitioners in their prayer for reconsideration contended that
under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the
existence of a probable cause in a preliminary
examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence
thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of
arrest by the court. The respondent judge denied said motions and
reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits
and other documents within five days from notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certification of the investigating fiscal in

the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates
respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
RULING: Petitioners filed a motion with this Court to restrain

respondent from enforcing the orders subject of the main petition and
to compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations
filed in his court. They contend that the fiscal's certification in the
information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient
justification for the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that such
certification binds the judge, it being supported by the presumption
that the investigating fiscal had performed his duties regularly and
completely.
The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is the existence of probable cause. P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal
or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause.
There is no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's
certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, but the judge is not bound to issue a
warrant based on the certification. The issuance of a warrant is not a
mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion
on the part of the issuing magistrate.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing , a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of
the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
101
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a

probable cause.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

GR 8287 November 14, 1988 Shelumiel
Espaldon
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

GR 8287 November 14, 1988 Shelumiel
Espaldon
FACTS: Reporter Luis Beltran wrote an article claiming that

President Corazon Aquino hid under her bed at the height of the 1988
coup d etat attempt. President Aquino filed a libel case against
Beltran. Judge Ramon Makasiar issued a warrant for Beltrans arrest.
Beltran questions the manner of Judge Makasiars examination of the
probable cause prior to issuing the warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were

violated when Judge Makasiar issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause
RULING: No.
According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
102
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure. Otherwise, judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from
the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS D.

ACHACOSO
GR 81510 March 14, 1990
Aretha Eugenio
FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), charged petitioner with
illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding
the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner.
The Order stated that there will a seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the
New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team
was then tasked to implement the said Order.
The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a
certain Mrs. Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted
103
costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return
of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and
hearing therefore depriving her of due process. She also alleged that
it violated Section 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were
confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force
and intimidation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the POEA (or the Secretary of Labor) can
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article
38 of the Labor Code
RULING: Under the new Constitution, ...no search warrant or

warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue
warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was
based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We
reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and
effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests)
cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under
the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore,
the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant.
The Court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must
identify specifically the things to be seized.
MORANO VS. VIVO

GR L-22196 June 30, 1967 Nhorrie
Franco
FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor
son Fu Yu Yan arrived in the Philippines as tourists. They were
permitted to stay in the Philippines for two months and posted a bond.
In January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano where a
baby was born out of the union. To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, they obtained several extensions and the last extension
expired on September 10, 1962. About a month prior to expiration,
104
the Commission on Immigration notified them to leave the country on

or before the said date, in case of failure to do so, a warrant of arrest
will be issued and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Instead of
leaving the country, Chan Sau Wah together with her husband Morano
and Fu Yan Fun filed a petition at the Court of First Instance of Manila
to compel the CID commissioner to cancel petitioners Alien
Certificates of Registration, prohibition to stop issuing warrant for
their arrest, and preliminary injunction to restrain the Commissioner
from confiscating their cash bond.
ISSUES: Can Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution requiring

that a judge determine the issue of probable cause, be extended to
deportation proceedings. Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued
by the Commissioner is unconstitutional
RULING: No. Section 1(3), Art. III of the Constitution does not
require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of
deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional
limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a
measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent
official, such as legal order of deportation, issued by the CID
commissioner, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
In the case directly in point, the Commissioner did nothing but to
enforce such condition whereby temporary visitors are subject to
contractual stipulations as contained in bond, which is necessary for
him to prepare the ground for his deportation in case of breach.
Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary
visitors visa. She is non-immigrant. Under Section 13 of Immigration
Act, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and
desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of
Section 9. The Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently
too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or
her status without first departing from the country and complying
with the requirements of Sec. 9 of the Immigration Act.
105
HARVEY VS. SANTIAGO

GR L-35603 June 28, 1988 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72

years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna, while Adriaa Van Den Elshout, 58 years old, is a
Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. The case stems from
the apprehension of petitioners on February 27, 1988 from their
respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by
respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two suspected alien pedophiles
who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by
CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two days after apprehension, or on
February 29, 1988, seventeen of the twenty-two arrested aliens opted
for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for
lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but
for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty
two, only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was lawful
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the arrest of the petitioners
without a warrant of arrest was based on probable cause determined
after close surveillance for three months during which period their
activities were monitored. Seized during petitioners apprehension
were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child
prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged
in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes. These constitute probable cause. The
Supreme Court held that every sovereign power has the inherent
power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may
deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority
of the sovereign. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to
the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in
instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the
interests of the State. Therefore the arrest was valid basing upon the
probable cause and the act of the Immigration for the interest of the
State.
106
SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 143802 November 16, 2001
Genevive Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor of Pagudpud, Ilocos

Norte, fatally shot the former mayor and his political rival, Atty. Rafel
Benemerito, in an alleged shoot out in Barangay Caparispisan after a
heated altercation between them. After the shooting incident,
petitioner surrendered and placed himself under the custody of the
municipal police then asked that he be brought to the PNP
headquartered in Laog City.
The next day, Police Chief inspector and private respondent
Thelma Benemerito, wife of the victim, filed a complaint for murder
against petitioner. Judge Calvan conducted the preliminary
examination of the witnesses
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners constitutional rights were

safeguarded during the preliminary investigation conducted before
the filing of an information for murder against him and the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest by respondent Sandiganbayan
RULING: In this case, the undue haste in filing of the information

against petitioner cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence
until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that
the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and to secure
a warrant of arrest of petitioner without bail and his consequent
detention.
The Ombudsman for all practical purposes did an even worse
job than Judge Calvan for, by adopting in its entirety the findings of
the investigating officer despite its obvious flaws, he actually did
nothing at all and, in effect, threw everything to the Sandiganbayan
for evaluation. The charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a non-
bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to mention the
107
fact that the principal accused is an incumbent mayor whose

imprisonment during the pendency of the case would deprive his
constituents of their duly-elected municipal executive, should have
merited a deeper; and more thorough preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman, however, did nothing of the sort and instead swallowed
hook, line and sinker the resolution.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE

GR 81756 October 21, 1991
Laida Isidro
FACTS: M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., chief of the PC Narcom

Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an Application
for Search Warrant with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII,
Dumaguete City (RTC), against the petitioners Nicomedes Silva and
Marlon Silva. The application was accompanied by a Deposition of
Witness executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo.
On the same day, Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then the presiding
judge of the RTC, pursuant to the said application and deposition,
issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to
search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva
for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act (RA 6425). The search
warrant authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried
leaves, cigarettes and joint.
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized
money belonging to petitioner Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40. The latter filed a motion for return of the said amount on
the grounds that the search warrant did not authorize the seizure of
money, and that the refusal to return the said search warrant is
violative of the Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Acting on
108
the said motion, the court held that said amount shall remain in
disposition of the court while filing of the appropriate charges in
connection with the search warrant is still pending.
Petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the
grounds that: 1) it was issued on the sole basis of the mimeographed
application and deposition which were merely answered by filling in
the blanks, and 2) the judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers,
which is violative of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who replaced retired Judge
Ontal, denied the said motion, holding that the challenged search
warrant was validly issued. Respondent judge likewise denied the
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Search Warrant No. 1 was validly issued
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners holding that the
challenged search warrant was violative of the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as provided in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on the said provision of the Bill of Rights, the judge must,
before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable
cause by personally examining the complainant and witnesses through
searching questions and seizures.
In the case at bar, respondent judge determined the existence of
probable cause and issued the challenged search warrant by simply
basing it on the submitted deposition which contained suggestive and
leading questions answerable by merely placing a yes or no in the
blanks provided. The questions provided were not probing but merely
routinary. Such failure to comply with the constitutional requirement
that a judge must personally examine the applicant and witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion.
VEROY VS. LAYAGUE

GR L-95630 June 18, 1992 Marielle
Magrata
FACTS: Captain Reynaldo Obrero raided the house of herein

petitioner in Davao City on information that said residence was being
used as safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard
with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the
owner was not present and that they did not have a search warrant.
109
Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City

residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house. The
former responded that the search must be conducted in the presence
of Major Ernesto Macasaet, a long time friend of Veroys.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the
house of herein petitioner to conduct the search operation. Capt.
Obrero recovered a .45 cal. Hand gun, 3 half-full jute sacks, traveling
bags containing a telescope, road map, a book entitled Islamic
Revolution Future Path of Nation, etc, in the childrens room.
An information was filed against herein petitioners for Violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion).
Petitioner spouses aver that while they conceded Capt. Obrero
had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break upon the door of their
residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence
of alleged rebel soldiers. The permision did not include any
authority to conduct room-to-room search. Hence the items taken are
products of illegal search and are inadmissible in evidence against
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences obtained are inadmissible for

being violative of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizure
RULING: The rule that searches and seizure must be supported by

valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions are (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a
moving vehicle; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view. None of these
exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The act of Capt. Obrero of not
entering the house shows that he himself recognized the need for a
search warrant. Hence, he asked for the permission from the Veroys.
Permission was granted only to ascertain the presence of rebel
soldiers. Under the circumstances, it is undeniable that the police
officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
The objects seized, being products of illegal search are
inadmissible in the evidence in the criminal actions subsequently
instituted against the accused-appellants.
110
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO

GR 109633 July 20, 1994 Anton
Malamug
FACTS: Private respondent was charged and convicted of the Illegal

Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions and illegal sale of regulated
Drugs in two separate criminal cases filed against him with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite. There appears to be certain
irregularities in the procedure of the buy-bust operations and in the
implementation of the search warrant. As to the buy-bust operations,
the alleged poseur-buyer had to return to the police station and
inform the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from
the accused to implement the search warrant. Thereupon, the raiding
team proceeded to the house of the accused to implement the search
warrant. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police
officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands
over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. As to the
implementation of the search warrant, the search warrant specifically
authorized only the search and seizure of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia but
the raiding team also seized certain firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the firearm seized though not specifically

included in the search warrant is admissible as evidence against the
accused
RULING: A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a

raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate
any and all kinds of evidence articles relating to the crime. The
Constitution itself (Section 2, Article 3) and the Rules of Court
(Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant
must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search
warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm
which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in
the search warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the gun was
seized in the course of the arrest, for as earlier observed, accuseds
arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been
illegally seized is not admissible in evidence.
111
PEOPLE VS. GESMUNDO

GR 89373 March 9, 1993
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court for

violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for the alleged selling of
marijuana. The prosecution's version of the story is that police officer
Jose Luciano instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from
the accused. He saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian
informer. On the same day, a raiding police team armed with Search
Warrant went to the residence of the accused. The accused led the
team into her kitchen and she pointed to a metal basin on top of a
table as the hiding place of the dried marijuana flowering tops
contained in a plastic bag. The police also recovered from an uway
cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped separately in paper.
After the discovery, the accused was photographed together with the
confiscated items. Accused was made to acknowledge in writing that
the dried marijuana flowering tops were taken from her possession
and control inside her residence. Accused-appellant' s version, on the
other hand, is that she invited Sgt. Yte to enter the house. While
seated at the sala, Sgt. Yte was showing to accused-appellant a search
warrant when someone uttered the words, "ito na" coming from the
direction of the kitchen of the house. She, together with Sgt. Yte
proceeded to the kitchen and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag
with four other companions who entered the house through the back
door. Luciano handed the bag to Sgt. Yte who, after examining the
contents, confronted her and insisted that the plastic bag came from
her, which she denied. She was made to sign a prepared document
with her name already printed on it. Sgt. Yte asked help from
accused-appellant to testify against one Warner Marquez, son of her
former landlord, for drug pushing. Accused refused but Sgt. Yte was
forcing her to testify against Marquez. Sgt. Yte left word that accused,
should be careful as she might be the next to be charged with drug
pushing.
112
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence against accused are validly

seized
RULING: The Investigation Report states that the raiding team

discovered a hole at the backyard of the house of the suspect with a
can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed
wherein the marijuana were confiscated. According to Luciano and
Sgt. Yte, there was no mention of any marijuana obtained from a
flower pot as stated in the investigation report. This shows
inconsistencies as to where the marijuana was found. Irreconcilable
and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses cast doubt on the guilt of appellant. The search of the
accused-appellant' s house was conducted in violation of Section 7,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that no search of a
house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. While the
police were able to get an admission from her, that marijuana was
found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document
entitled "PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police, is
inadmissible in evidence against her for having been obtained in
violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation. She
was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was
she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the fact that
the document may be used as evidence against her. Therefore,
accused-appellant was acquitted.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS

CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL AND
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL AND
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE VS. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE
GR 81567 October 3, 1991
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: In GR 81567, military agents were dispatched to the St.

Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a
confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed
113
that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five male
"sparrows" who murdered two Capcom mobile patrols the day before,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name
was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-
two years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed decision disregards the fact that
such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested
RULING: The arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as

it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5(a), Rule 113,
he was committing an offense, when arrested, because Dural was
arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership is penalized, and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a
continuing offense.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be
said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls
under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: first, that
the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second,
that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted,
refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of
facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first, the day
before, two CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City by five "sparrows" including Dural; second, a wounded
person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually
then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third,
as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his
address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the
wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural. The records show that the
arresting officers did not appear to have been ill motivated in
arresting Dural.It is, therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant,
of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
The Court reiterated that mere suspicion of being a Communist
Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest
without warrant of the suspect.
114
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SUCRO

GR 93239 March 18, 1991
Genevive Gutierrez
FACTS: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio was instructed to

monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered that Sucro was selling marijuana.
As Pat. Fulgencio reported the buying and selling of marijuana
activity going on, P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue
monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat Fulgencio again
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as
Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
The accused- appellant contends that his arrest was illegal,
being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for
the police officers to apply for a search and warrant considering that
Fulgencio informed his Station commander of the activities of the
accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is

lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from
such arrest is admissible
RULING: An offense is committed in the presence or within the view

of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without the warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof.
The records show that Fulgencio went to Ariel Regalados house
at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was
earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two meters away
from Regalados house.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when
intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick
and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from
the accused- appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the
marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers has personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored Sucros nefarious activity.
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual
findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground
to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and
transport it within the country.
115
PEOPLE VS. RODRIGUEZA

GR 95902 February 4, 1992 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: At around 5 oclock in the afternoon, a confidential informer

arrived and told the authorities that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major Zeidem
informed the team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The P 200 bills
were treated with ultraviolet powder and were given to Sgt. Molinawe
who acted as a poseur buyer. He went to Tagas alone and met
Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where he
could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he returned,
he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as
Don, herein complainant.
After agreeing on the price of P 200 for 100 grams of marijuana,
Don left for a while. When he came back, Don gave Taduran a certain
object wrapped in a plastic which was later identified as marijuana,
and received payment thereof.
Based on the information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to
conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. The two officers
proceeded to Regidor St., Daraga, Albay and arrested appellant,
Lonceras and Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with
a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command conducted a raid
in the house of Rodrigueza, father of appellant. During the raid, they
were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe,
among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants right against unreasonable search

and seizure was violated
RULING: In the case at bar, the raid conducted by the NARCOM

agents in the house of Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search
warrant. Hence, appellants right against unreasonable search and
116
seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal
that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some
time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should,
because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during
that time.
PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA

GRs 136066-67 February 4, 2003
Francis Villanueva
FACTS: On September 21, 1996, Emmeraldo Nunag received a report

that the accused was about to deliver drugs in Thunder Inn Hotel. On
this basis, PNP Chief Gutierrez formed a team of operatives. At 11:45,
the informer pointed to a car driven by the accused. Accused alighted
from a car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, and SPO2 Nulud
immediately arrested within the accuseds wallet and Zest-O box were
packs of shabu. He was thereafter arrested. The Regional Trial Court
found him guilty of Illegal possession of shabu.
ISSUES: Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search made by

the operatives was lawful. Whether the shabu may be taken as
evidence against him
RULING: Normally, the decisions with regard to facts of a trial court

are given the utmost respect, if not final because the trial court judge
has the prerogative to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. In this
case, the Regional Trial Court may have overlooked some facts which
casts doubt on the guilt of the accused.
First, the accused was first searched and found in possession of
shabu before he was arrested. Since there was no warrant of arrest,
for the accused to have been lawfully searched, he must be in the act
117
of committing the crime (in flagrante delicto) or during a stop-and-

frisk. In the case of in flagrante delicto, a warrantless search may
only be valid if the search must be incidental to a valid arrest. To
validly arrest without a warrant, 2 elements must exist: (1) the person
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed or is
about to commit a crime, and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of an arresting officer.
With regard to stop-and-frisk, the police officer must observe
unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot and/or that persons he is dealing with are
dangerous. Mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate stop-and-
frisk. A genuine reason must exist to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed.
The accused did not act in a suspicious manner. The
apprehending policemen even had prior knowledge of the accuseds
activities. The police should have obtained a warrant. While the
government needs to support the drive against illegal drugs, it should
not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen enshrined in
the constitution.
Because the drugs were confiscated against the rights of the
person, it may not be used as evidence against the accused.
118
GO VS. CA
GR 101837 February 1, 1992 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Maguan was driving his car along Wilson Street in San Juan
when Go came from the opposite direction. It was a one-way street.
Go shot Maguan, then left. A guard was able to get Go's plate number.
LTO was able to trace it to his wife. He presented himself before the
police station accompanied by two lawyers. He was detained. He was
told that he has a right to preliminary investigation but he should first
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. He refused to sign. Gos counsel said the arrest was warrantless
and that there was no preliminary investigation. He was released on
bail. The Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was valid because the
crime was just "freshly committed", identity was established and there
was a manhunt for him. Accused contends that he went to the station
six days after the crime was committed so it was not "freshly
committed".
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the officers who arrested him
had no personal knowledge. They merely relied on the statements of
witnesses, the crime was not freshly committed, and that he was not
arrested but that Go placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. Go was then entitled to be released on bail subject only to
appearing to a preliminary investigation.
119
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA

GR L24674 June 20, 1977
Sarah Abraham
FACTS: Respondent judge Villanueva issued warrants of arrest based

on two complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioners. The
latter assailed the validity of such warrant on the ground that the
fiscal and not the respondent judge should have conducted the
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, the petitioners have posted
the required bail bonds after the issuance of the warrants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants issued are valid
RULING: Yes. The posting of the bail bond constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity attending the arrest of a person. From the moment the
petitioners posted the required bail bond, they are already estopped
from questioning the validity of the warrants issued.
120
POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 89139 August 2, 1990
Cheryl Banaria
POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 89139 August 2, 1990
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: Urisicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) pf the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted Petitioner carrying a buri
bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
Petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two
notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the buri bag of Petitioner where they found
one caliber .38 revolver, a smoke grenade and two live ammunitions
for a .22 caliber gun. All that Petitioner was carrying were all
unlicensed. He was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE: Was the right of the accused against unlawful searches and
seizures violated
RULING: At the time the peace officers in this case identified

themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee,
they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They
just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many
instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest foremost of which is the stop
and frisk without a warrant at military checkpoints. Not all searches
and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
121
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed

formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Between the inherent right of the State to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless
search is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at
military or police checkpoints and the search threat in the case at bar,
there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police officer to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in
the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be
useless, futile and much too late.
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE

Bugayong
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE

Bugayong
FACTS: On August 8, 1987, Western Police District received a

telephone call from their informer that there were three suspicious
looking people at the corner of San Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. Patrolmen conducted surveillance in the
said place. They saw two men looking from side to side and holding
their abdomen. The patrolmen approached these persons and
identified themselves as policemen. After which, the two men tried to
escaped but was halted by the lawmen. The suspects were then
searched. The accused-appellant was found with .38 caliber Smith and
Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. Appellant and his
companion were turned over to police headquarters for investigation
and their weapons are taken from them.
122
Accused-appellant was convicted of illegal possession of

firearms. He appeals that the weapon was not admissible as evidence
against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit
of the poisonous tree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant less arrest and search by the
patrolmen was valid and lawful
RULING: The Court reads that warrantless arrest and search would
be lawful if it is under the Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
These requisites have not been established in the case at bar. There
was nothing to support the arresting officers suspicion other than the
accuseds darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. These acts could
have been inferred to different acts. The Court feels that if the
arresting officers were not impulsive and mindful of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, the accused could have been convicted. Wherefore
accused-appellant is acquitted and ordered be released immediately
unless he is validly detained for other purposes.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN

GR L-63630 April 6, 1990
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: Patrolmen Quenedo and Punzalan were conducting

surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal aimed not only
against persons who may commit misdemeanor at said place but also
on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs
based on informations supplied by informers. At 9:30 pm, they noticed
a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously
123
and they confronted him. The person was requested to open the bag
but he refused only to accede later on when the petitioner identified
himself. Found inside the bag were marijuana leaves. The accused
was then taken to the police headquarters for further investigation.
ISSUE: Was the marijuana inadmissible in evidence on the ground

that it was the product of an unlawful search without a warrant
RULING: No. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a

search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. (Section 12
Rule 126). Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying
marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely
within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful
arrest and is consequently valid.
This case also presented urgency. The transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused
was carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the
police officer had to act quickly. There was no enough time to secure a
search warrant.
124
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT

GR 91107 June 19, 1991 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, went on a bus trip

from Sagada to Baguio City. Several NARCOM officers stopped the
bus where accused was riding. It appears that a checkpoint was
established pursuant to numerous reports that vehicles from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. There was
also information that a Caucasian man coming from Sagada has in his
possession prohibited drugs.
After introducing themselves, the NARCOM officers started
their inspection. The officers noticed a bulge on the waist of the
accused. Suspecting it to be a gun, the officers asked for accuseds
passport and other identification documents. When he failed to
present such, the officers made him reveal what was in the bulge. It
turned out to be a pouch bag, and upon opening of such by the
accused, the officer opened one of four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped objects turned out to be
hashish, a derivative of marijuana. He was invited to alight the bus
but before doing so, he took out two bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon alighting, the officers opened the bags, which had a teddy bear
inside. It was only after the officers opened the bags that the accused
presented his passport. During the investigation, it was found out that
the teddy bear also contained hashish.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Dangerous Drugs
Act. He now contends that there was violation of his constitutional
freedom, as the search of his personal effects was illegal since it was
made without a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was illegal
RULING: No. When a search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,

there is no need to obtain a search warrant.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs. He was actually committing a crime during that
time and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made
upon his personal effects falls within the rule that allows a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
There was no time for the officers to procure a search warrant.
The reports of a Caucasian coming from Sagada carrying prohibited
drugs reached the officers a few hours before the apprehension of the
accused.
Probable cause also existed. The officers were merely carrying a
routine inspection. They only ordered the accused to present his
125
passport after noticing the bulge on his waist. The receipt of

information about a Caucasian man carrying prohibited drugs, taken
with the failure of the accused to present his passport led the officers
to believe that accused must have been hiding something, from which
probable cause arose.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IDEL AMINNUDIN

Y AHNI
GR L-74869 July 6, 1988 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in
Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified
as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him
that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted .
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without warrant against the

accused is valid
RULING: There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by

a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of
probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about
to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as
the present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
126
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two

days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. From the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
The accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that
he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was
the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the
trial court since the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the
poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search
was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of
arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions
allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
PEOPLE VS. SAYCON
Shelumiel Espaldon
FACTS: NARCOM officers were informed by the Coastguard that

suspected shabu courier Alvaro Saycon was arriving in Dumaguete at
6:00 am on board MV Dona Virginia that day. NARCOM agents posted
themselves at the piers gate. When Saycon disembarked and went
thru the Coastguard checkpoint, a NARCOM agent identified him. He
was invited to the Coastguard Headquarters where they discovered
shabu inside a Marlboro pack. Saycon was arrested and convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search was illegal
127
RULING: No.
The requirement of a warrant obtained prior to a search is not
absolute. The exception most pertinent in respect to the case is
moving vehicle. Warrantless search and arrest against Saycon would
be permissible only if the officer conducting the search had reason to
believe Saycon was violating some law or the contents of his luggage
included instruments, subject matter or proceeds of a criminal
offense.
Drug pushers or couriers do not customarily show external
visible signs. However, records show that there is probable cause: 1.)
test buy three weeks earlier confirms that Saycon was courier; 2.)
information received that morning of his arrival. With regard the first,
it was not denied of refuted. As for the second, there was not enough
time to procure a warrant. The tip was received a few hours prior to
arrival. Although, they knew Saycon was a transporter, NARCOM had
no idea when he would be taking a boat from Manila to Dumaguete.
Thus, they were unable to get a warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARI MUSA Y

HANTATALU
GR 96177 January 27, 1993 Aretha
Eugenio
FACTS: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM
128
leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.

The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the
description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his
right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani
proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves
about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see
what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what
he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the
P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back,
giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the
other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa
inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then
placed under arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the plastic bag and the
marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence
RULING: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it

may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure,
as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where
the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain
view of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of
the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved
into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the
plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object.
129
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was
seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 80806 October 5, 1989 Nhorrie
Franco
FACTS: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut

Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila and several
other officers seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila. Among
the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said
defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or
from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming
that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine
which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
An Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order was
also filed by the plaintiff which was granted but the trial court
promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police
officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate
petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that
they are obscene
RULING: The Supreme Court, after making an extensive exposition of

the interpretation of the word obscenity, declared that copies of a
magazine entitled Pinoy Playboy could not be summarily confiscated
in line with an anti-smut campaign of the City of Manila. A search
warrant must have first been issued after the judge shall have been
convinced of the existence of probable cause that the materials sought
to be seized were indeed obscene.
130
GUANZON VS. DE VILLA

GR 80508 January 30, 1990 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction

to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila. The forty one petitioners state that they are
all of legal age, bona fide residents of Metro Manila and taxpayers and
leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have
a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law,
protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in
their communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro
Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the police actions (saturation drives)

complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power without
search warrant /or warrant of arrest
RULING: The Supreme Court remanded the petition to the Regional

Trial Courts of Malabon and Pasay for the determination of the facts
of the case. Evidences should properly be brought to this trial of facts.
The allegations of the herein petitioners, as taxpayers, that the
saturation drive violated several human rights, are not supported by
evidences but only by second hand information. The Court also
emphasized that the herein petitioners are not the proper party to
raise the issue of constitutionality of the said saturation drive. The
Court affirmed the side of the Solicitor General that injured party,
131
alleging to be of thousands, should have raised their complaints and

not the herein petitioners. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the
police are to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the
kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas
for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if
these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts
which are shocking to the conscience. Petition remanded.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA

GR 120515 April 13, 1998
Marielle Magrata
FACTS: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as
Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City
the following day,with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip,
P/Lt. Abello assembled a team and proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac,
Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body
number 474 and the letters BGO arrived. It was at this stage that the
informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who was then carrying
a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the
team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of
her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana
leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak. The team
132
confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then
brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the
illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating
accused-appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible

evidence against the accused
RULING: In searches and seizures affected without a warrant, it is

necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any probable
cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as
evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases,
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior
knowledge from their informant regarding Arutas alleged
activities. However, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting
suspiciously. Also, the police officers had reasonable time within
which to secure a search warrant when Arutas identity was priorly
ascertained.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a
crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street
and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable
ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM
agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for
the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by
the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to
suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. Based on the circumstances of the
case, there was unlawful search and seizure.
GAANAN VS. IAC
133
GR L-69809 October 16, 1986 Nhorrie

Franco
FACTS: Petitioner Edgardo Gaanan was requested by his client Atty.

Leonardo Laconico to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
with Atty. Tito Pintor through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed condition without complainants consent,
complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act (Republic Act No. 4200).
After trial on the merits, the lower court found both Gaanan and
Laconico guilty of Violating Section 1 of RA No. 4200. The petitioner
appealed to the appellate court. The Intermediate Appellate Court
now the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding that the communication between the complainant and the
accused Laconico was private in nature and therefore covered by RA
No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication and that
the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear
the telephone conversation is covered in the term device as
provided in the RA No. 4200.
ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the

prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act such that its use to overhear
a private conversation would constitute lawful interception of
communications between the two parties using the telephone line
RULING: The unlawful refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use

of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installations
of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or recorded
the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be place in the
same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone
line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a
rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true
intent of the legislative, the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Hence, the phrase device or arrangement in Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should not be construed to comprehend instruments of the
same or similar nature, that is, instrument the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of telephone. It refers to
134
instrument whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the

party or parties being overheard because by their very nature, they
are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 107383 February 20, 1996 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, the wife of private respondent

Alfredo Martin, entered the clinic her doctor husband. Together with
her mother, driver and her husbands secretary, she forcibly opened
drawers and cabinets and took documents evidencing her husbands
affair with another woman. She took such documents pursuant to the
legal separation and disqualification from the practice of medicine
cases that she filed against her husband. Private respondent filed an
action to recover such documents which was granted by the trial
court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documents are admissible as evidence
RULING: No. The constitutional injunction protecting the privacy of

communication and correspondence is no less applicable simply
because it was the wife who is the party against whom the prohibition
was enforced. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her right to privacy as an individual. Freedom of communication is
one thing; compulsion to share something is something else.
135
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR

GR L-2690 January 1, 1949 Vanessa
Bugayong
FACTS: An employment agency detained one of its employees for

having an unpaid advance in its agency. The maid, the employee
herein was transferred to another residence because she has not yet
paid the amount advanced by the employment agency which was used
for her transportation from the province.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the maid were violated in

detaining her and was required to render domestic services in
payment for the money advanced
RULING: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may

advance to a prospective employee, has absolutely no power to curtail
the freedom of said employee. The fortunes of business cannot be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human
dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of writ
of habeas corpus, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving her
employ because of the influence detaining her. This Court releases on
habeas corpus a housemaid who was being detained and required to
render domestic services in payment for the money advanced for her
transportation from the province.
136
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR L-62100 May 30, 1986 Genevive
Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans

Insular management Inc., wherein he acts as the president, and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. Having transferred the management of the
latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no position.
Petitioner together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee for both companies. However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission requested the Commission of Immigration
not to clear petitioner for the departure and a memorandum has been
issued. A Torrens title that was submitted and accepted by Manotoc
Securities Inc. was suspected to be fake and six of its clients filed a
separate criminal complaint against the petitioner. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail. Moreover, petitioner filed a
motion for permission to leave the country but the trial judge denied
it.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be allowed to leave the country
RULING: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail

from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond. The petitioner has not
137
satisfactorily shown his necessity to travel abroad. The constitutional

right to travel is a not an absolute right.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUZ

Laida Isidro
FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from

the presidency via the people power revolution and was forced into
exile. Three year after, Mr. Marcos and his family wanted to return to
the Philippines. However, respondents refused to issue them the
necessary travel documents. Thus, Mr. Marcos filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition asking the Court to order the respondents
to issue the same, invoking the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
abode and travel, among others. Respondents argue that such
prohibition is in accordance to their duty to serve and protect the
people.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines
138
RULING: The Court sustained the respondents argument of the

dominance of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. In balancing the general welfare and the common good against
the exercise of certain individuals, the President, as his prime duty,
must serve and protect the people through the promotion of the
general welfare. In prohibiting Mr. Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines, the President considered her duties as the protector
of peace in order to arise with the decision that their return is a
serious threat to national interest.
SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 94284 April 8, 1991 Marielle
Magrata
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of the Revised

Securities Act. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
More than two years after the filing of the information, respondent
People of the Philippines filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel
passport of and hold the departure Order against the petitioner on the
ground that he had gone several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearings.
139
The Regional Trial Court ordered to cancel the Petitioners

passport and to deny his application thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to travel was impaired
RULING: The circumstances of the case will tell that the pendency of
a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings and
arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of
Petitioners non-appearance.
Bail is the security given for the release of person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court when so required by the Court.
The foregoing condition imposed upon the accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires, operating
as a valid restriction of his right to travel. The violation made by the
petitioner against the condition of his bail, warrants his arrest. The
bail and other processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused
were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in criminal
cases within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from
the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right
to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. It for
the best interest that criminal prosecution should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding him
amenable at all times to Courts order and processes.
SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ

GRs 99289-90 January 27, 1993
Anton Malamug
140
FACTS: An information was filed against petitioner with the

Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices. An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein
petitioner with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15000.
Petitioner filed an Urgent ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor Santiago.
Meanwhile, in a resolution of Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner by reason of the announcement made by
petitioner, which was publicized in both print and broadcast media,
that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship
supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy school of government at
Harvard University, hence, this Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan
from enforcing its Hold Departure Order with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and/of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUES: Whether or not the hold departure order violates her right
to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech. Whether or not
under the 1987 Constitution, courts can impair the right to travel only
on grounds of national security, public safety or public health
RULING: As to the first issue, no. It is averred that the hold

departure order was issued without notice and hearing because of the
fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure
order was filed by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. A court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being
the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper
coercive measure where he disobeys a proper order. Petitioner does
not deny and even made a public statement that she in taking judicial
notice of such fact of petitioners plan to go abroad and in issuing sua
sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent
courts inherent power to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
As to the second issue, no. In the more recent case of Silverio
vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits
only on the basis of national security, public safety and public
health, and as may be provided by law. Article III, Section 6 should
by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
courts to use all means necessary to carry their power of the effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or Judicial Officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
141
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by

such court or officer.
MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 115132-34 August 9, 1995
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Marcos is a defendant in several criminal

cases for violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending in
Sandiganbayan. In two of these cases, Sandiganbayan found
petitioner guilty. Petitioner, while a motion for reconsideration is
pending, filed a motion for leave to travel abroad to seek diagnostic
tests and treatment allegedly because of a serious and life threatening
medical condition requiring facilities not available in the Philippines.
Sandiganbayan denied said motion for failure of petitioner to give
notice to the prosecution. Again, petitioner filed the same urgent ex-
parte motion. The motion was supported by ambulatory blood
pressure and medical reports and scan results, prepared by her
physician. The Chairman of the Sandiganbayan contacted a doctor for
expert opinion. Sandiganbayan received a report of the committee
containing findings which were contrary to the conclusion of
petitioner's physician. Hence, the court denied petitioner's motion. A
motion for reconsideration was filed attaching the letters of Vice
President Estrada offering to be the guarantor for the return of
petitioner and twenty - four members of the House of Representative
requesting Sandiganbayan to allow Marcos to travel abroad.
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit and warned them that
repetition of any attempt to influence the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan will be responded appropriately. Hence, petitioner
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to travel was

impaired
RULING: Sandiganbayan had to seek expert opinion because

petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The
court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's
physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. When even
in their field of expertise, courts are allowed to invite amicus curiae to
enlighten the unclear points of law; there is no reason for denying
them assistance on other subjects. What would be objectionable would
142
be if Sandiganbayan obtained information without disclosing its

source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. If
petitioner did not agree to the procedure adopted by the
Sandiganbayan, her counsel should have objected when informed by
the court that an expert opinion would be taken. Hence, petitioner is
estopped from questioning this manner of resolving her request.
Considering that petitioner is facing charges before the courts in
several cases, two of which she was convicted although decision is
pending for reconsideration, petitioner did not have the absolute right
to leave the country. The burden was on her to prove that because of
danger to health, there was necessity to seek medical treatment to
foreign countries. Therefore the petition was dismissed. Should
petitioner still desire to travel based on her medical condition, the
determination should be made by a joint panel of medical specialists
recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.
RUBI VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

(SUPRA)
GR 14078 February 28, 1919
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and

other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said
to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against
their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
directed the Manguianes to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site
on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected
by provincial governor.- With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
143
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be

selected by him and approved by the provincial board."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners constitutional right to

freedom of abode is violated
RULING: One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law, has
not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law
and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to
be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and
which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section
2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards
the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we
are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Tennessee writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a
ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the
courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not
determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of
cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In
balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its
probable operation as a general rule 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law
and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy
of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
GR 45459 March 13, 1937
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Petitioner Monsignor Aglipay, Supreme Head of the

Philippine Independent Church, questions the validity of the issuance
144
and selling of the postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third

International Eucharistic Congress, which is organized by the Roman
Catholic Church. The petitioner contends that such order violated the
Constitution because it benefited a particular religion as it would
involve the usage of public funds in order to issue the questioned
postage stamps.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance and the selling of the said
postage stamps were violative of the Constitutional provisions
regarding the Separation of the Church and State
RULING: Since the purpose of issuing and selling of the said postage
stamps was not to publicize the Eucharistic Congress but was focused
on the site where it was to be held, the idea being to attract tourists
to the country, it was held that the stamp issue was not invalid.
Respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act 4052, which contemplates no
religious purpose in view but a subject that would be advantageous
to the Government. The postage stamps were not issued and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church nor were the money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to the church. The sole purpose of
issuing and selling of the postage stamps was to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. The religious
event was merely taken advantage in order to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people.
145
GARCES VS. ESTENZO

GR L-53487 May 25, 1981 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: On March 23, 1976, the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc

City adopted several resolutions regarding the acquisition of the
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebrations of
his annual feasts day and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds
for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets
and cash donations. With those funds, the waiting shed was
constructed and the wooden image was acquired.
The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic
Church of Barangay Valencia. A controversy arose after the mass
when the parish priest refused to return the image to the barangay
council. A replevin case was filed against the priest. In his answer to
the complaint, the priest assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions violated the constitutional

provision prohibiting the use of public funds for religious purpose
RULING: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly

establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty nor appropriate
public money or property for the benefit of any religious sect, priest
or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with
tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular
matter.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente
Ferrer, and neither for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass,
consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the
church when the mass celebrated.
The barangay council, as owner of the image has the right to
determine who should have custody thereof.
146
BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. ALLEN

392 U.S. 236, 1968 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: New York's Education Law required local public school

authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades 7
to 12, even those attending private schools.
Some local school boards challenged this regulation, arguing
that it violated both State and Federal constitutions. The boards asked
for an order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from
removing board members from office for failing to comply with the
regulation, and an order that stopped any use of state funds to buy
textbooks that would be lent to parochial students.
A trial court found in favor of the school boards, an appellate
court reversed this decision, and the New York Court of Appeals
agreed that the regulation was constitutional.
ISSUE: Did the law violate the Non-establishment Clause
RULING: The Supreme Court gave six reasons why the law in
question did not violate the Establishment Clause:
The primary purpose of the statute was to advance education in
general, not advance religious education in particular.
There was no evidence of specifically religious books being
loaned.
Parochial schools also perform the task of secular education,
and so helping them does not automatically help religion.
There is no evidence of unconstitutional state involvement with
religion.
There is no evidence of anyone being coerced into the practice
of religion.
The focus of the Court decision was mostly the fact that the law had a
secular purpose:
147
The express purpose of 701 was stated by the New

York Legislature to be furtherance of the educational
opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown
us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is
contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes
available to all children the benefits of a general program to
lend schoolbooks free of charge. Books are furnished at the
request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least
technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to
parents and children, not to schools.
148
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA

GR L-9637 April 30, 1957 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: American Bible society, a non-stock, non-profit, foreign,

religious, missionary corporation duly registered in the Philippines,
has been distributing and selling bibles. The acting city treasurer of
Manila informed them that they were conducting the business of
general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license in violation of certain
ordinances. Plaintiff protested but the city treasurer continued to
demand and warned them that for failure to comply, the business
might be struck down. Plaintiff paid under protest and filed a petition
that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional as they are not
organized for profit and does not come under the classification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said ordinance violates the freedom of

religion
RULING: The ordinances are of general application and not

particularly directed against the business of the plaintiff. The license
fees to be paid are asked from those engaged in the retail business of
any king. It made a category for such. The constitutional guaranty of
the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
Ordinance 300 is not unconstitutional but it cannot be applied to
plaintiff.
149
GERMAN VS. BARANGAN

GR 68828 March 27, 1985
Jeffrey Santos
FACTS: The petitioners composed of fifty businessmen, students and

office employees converged at J.P Laurel, Manila for the ostensible
purpose of hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins at the
Malacanang Grounds located in the same street. They were wearing
yellow T-shirts and they started marching down the said street with
raised clenched fists and shouting anti-government invectives. They
were, however, prevented by Major Isabelo Lariosa from proceeding
further. The petitioners contended that their purpose for converging
at J.P Laurel was to pray and hear mass at the St. Jude Church. The
respondents, on the other hand, contend that the real purpose of the
petitioners was not really to perform an act of worship but to conduct
anti-government demonstration and they further lament petitioners
attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and as
solemn as the holy sacrifice of the mass.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the freedom of religion

of the petitioners
RULING: The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the

sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it
is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom and exercise thereof and of all fundamental
rights for that matter must be done in good faith. Assuming that the
petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is still valid and
genuine still the respondents reaction to there mass action is not
violative of the freedom of religious worship because reasonable
restriction in use of thoroughfares near Malacanang Palace are valid
but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the
same into action.
150
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF

SCHOOLS OF CEBU
GR 95770 March 1, 1993 Ria
Castro
FACTS: This decision consolidates two separate cases. The first case
involves forty three high school and elementary students while the
second case involves twenty five high school and grade school
students enrolled in public schools in Cebu, whose parents belong to
the religious sect known as Jehovahs Witness.
In both cases, the students were expelled by their schools for
refusing to participate in the flag ceremony. They refuse to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. The
petitioners claim that participating in the flag ceremony violates their
religious belief, as Jehovahs Witnesses are taught that saluting the
flag and such are acts of worship or religious devotion, which
their religion says they can only give to
God. To the Jehovahs Witnesses, the flag is an image/idol
representing the state and their religion prohibits the worship of idol.
ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members of a

religious sect can be expelled from school for refusing to participate
in the flag ceremony.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court abandoned its previous ruling in

the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education. It held that the
Jehovahs Witnesses treatment of flag as a religious symbol is well
151
founded and well documented and is based on grounds of religious

principle. The message conveyed by their refusal to participate in the
flag ceremony is religious, shared by the entire community of
Jehovah's Witnesses and is intimately related to their theocratic
beliefs and convictions. The subsequent expulsion of members of the
sect on the basis of the regulations assailed in the original petitions
was therefore clearly directed against religious practice. It is obvious
that the assailed orders and memoranda would gravely endanger the
free exercise of the religious beliefs of the members of the sect and
their minor children.
FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR L-5917 January 28, 1955 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: Mons. Fonacier was elected as Obispo Maximo/Supreme

Head of the Philippine Independent Church upon the death of Aglipay.
The Supreme Council of Bishops convened and approved the
designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Mons. Remollino
was assigned in the diocese of Cavite.
Mons. Fonacier wrote him a letter enjoining him from assuming
his office until he approves the appointment made by the Supreme
Council. Remollino replied and told him that he was ready to defend
his stand before the courts of justice. Subsequently, Fonacier ordered
for his expulsion and of one Bishop Aguilar whom he suspects to be
the instigator of certain acts of insubordination and defamation
against him.
Aguilar filed charges against Fonacier before the Supreme
Council. The Council ordered the forced resignation of Fonacier and
152
designated a new Supreme Bishop. Fonacier was notified of his

removal and was ordered to turn over all the funds, documents and
other property of the Church to his successor. Fonacier refused to
comply with such order.
A case was filed against Fonacier before the Court of First
Instance seeking to require him to render an accounting of his
administration of all temporal properties he has in his possession and
recover the same.
Meanwhile, Fonacier claims that he was improperly removed.
Furthermore, he questions the amendment of Churchs Constitution
which he claims to be a radical change in the profession of faith and
fundamental doctrine and practices of the Church.
ISSUES: Whether or not the civil courts may decide the validity of
Supreme Councils decision. Whether or not the civil courts can
decide on the amendments of the Constitution of the Church
RULING: As to the first issue, yes. In case of disputes involving the

property rights of the religious group, or the relations of the members
where property rights are involved, the civil courts may assume
jurisdiction.
As to the second issue, no. Amendments of the Constitution,
restatement of the articles of religion and abandonment of faith or
abjuration, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, custom and rule of the Church and having reference to the
power of excluding from the Church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil court.
PAMIL VS. TELERON

GR L-34854 November 20, 1978
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: In the 1971 elections, Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga ran for the
position of mayor for the province of Albuquerque, Bohol. The latter
153
won the said election and was duly proclaimed. A file for quo warranto
was filed by petitioner herein, an aspirant for the same position, on
the basis of Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code (1917).
The suit, however, did not prosper for herein respondent judge ruled
that the Election Code of 1971 had impliedly repealed such
prohibition.
Petitioner, however, argues that there was no such repeal and
that Section 2175 of the 1917 Administrative Code is still in force.
ISSUES: Should Fr. Margarito R. Gonzaga remain as the mayor of

Abuquerque, Bohol. Was Section 2175 of the 1917 Administrative
Code been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971
RULING: It has been held by the Supreme Court that the challenged
Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares
ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its
face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. There is
thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision
relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.
However, the necessary eight votes needed to make Section
2175 ineffective were not sustained; therefore giving it full force and
application.
154
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for immoral

acts. The latter, being employed as court interpreter, was having a
relationship with a man without the benefit of marriage. Estrada
claimed that such an act was immoral and therefore respondent
should be ousted from the court as an employee thereof. Respondent
claimed that her act of living together with a man without the benefit
of marriage was in conformity with her religion as a Jehovas witness.
They need not to be civilly married because they have already sworn
in the pledge of faithfulness according to the Jehovas witness
tradition. Therefore, her freedom of religion would be impaired if she
would be ousted from her work as an employee of the court solely
because of her relationship with a man without being civilly married.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can properly invoke her right to

religion
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that such conduct and
actuation of the respondent is not immoral in nature because before
she was employed as a court interpreter she was already living with a
man without the benefit of marriage. But prior to that, her husband
had been dead already for almost two years when she started living
with her live-in partner. Being a Jehovas witness, she maintained her
fidelity to her religion by fulfilling all her obligations as a member of
such. Her intention in swearing in the pledge of faithfulness in her
religion, that she would live with her live-in partner as husband and
wife was sincere. Therefore, if the cause of her being ousted from her
work, as claimed by the petitioner, would be immorality because of
living with a man not legally married, it would violate her freedom of
religion. The case is remanded to the court administrator for further
proceeding.
155
ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL. VS.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 153888 July 9, 2003 Kenneth
Buncayo
FACTS: The Petitioner is a corporation that works under DSWD, a

non-governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the
Filipino people, in particular to the Muslim communities. It claims to
be a Federation of National Islamic Organizations and an active
member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic
Da'wah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific (RISEAP) and The
World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The RISEAP acknowledged
Petitioner to issue Halal certifications in the country. Consequently,
among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars,
orient manufacturers on HALAL food as well as issue Halal
certifications to qualified manufacturers and their products. Petitioner
contends that, the actual need to certify food products as Halal and
also due to Halal food producers' request, Petitioner formulated
internal rules and procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for
the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of Halal
certifications. Also, the Petitioner began to issue, for a fee,
certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. They even
implemented the use on its Halal certificates a unique sign or logo
registered in the Philippine Patent Office.
The Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued
Executive Order 465 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and appointing Respondent OMA to oversee its realization.
Under the Executive Order, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue Halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities.
ISSUE: Was there any violation of the Executive Order pertaining to

the separation of the state and the church pursuant to the
Constitution
156
RULING: According to petitioner, a food product becomes Halal only

after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Only
practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A
government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore
perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as
Halal. Without doubt, classifying a food product as Halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and
Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food
products as Halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on the religious
freedom of Muslim organizations like petitioner to interpret for
Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
By arrogating to itself the task of issuing Halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
the Qur'an and Sunnah on Halal food. There is no compelling
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as Halal,
even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue
Halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the muslim
Filipinos' right to health are already provided for in existing laws and
ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that
food products released in the market are fit for human consumption,
properly labeled and safe. Unlike Executive Order 46, these laws do
not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.
NEAR VS. MINNESOTA

238 U.S. 697, 1931 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: In 1927, when Minnesota government was dominated by

gangsters and hoodlums, Jay Near started publishing a newspaper
called Saturday Press, which described the government ties to the
mob and provided juicy tidbits which are sometimes vulgar about the
citys residents and elected officers. To stop the newspaper from
causing further damage in their political careers, public officials
called upon the statute which allowed a court to shut down anyone "in
the business of regularly and customarily producing, publishing.... a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical." Said statute also considers as public nuisance any
publication that will be adjudged as violative of the statute. The
Saturday Press was thus closed down due to the statute. Near
assailed the constitutionality of the statute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is violative of freedom of speech
157
RULING: Yes. The statute in effect gives public officials the power to
bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before a
judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing
scandalous and defamatory matter -- in particular, that the matter
consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction -- and,
unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent
evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or
periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as
a contempt. This is of the essence of censorship.
The chief purpose of the liberty of speech is to prevent previous
restraints or censorship upon publication. The liberty is especially
cherished for the immunity it affords a person from prior restraints of
the publication of charges of official misconduct of public officers. In
effect, what the publisher would do is to play safe and make sure that
the article is not of character that will subject it to contempt. Such
surely infringes ones freedom of speech.
RAMON A. GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
GR L-28196 April 18, 1969 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner, is admittedly a Filipino

citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted the case
as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters
similarly situated.
The Senate and the House of Representatives passed several
resolutions, all praying for amendments to be done on the
Constitution. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
158
approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing

that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the resolutions
be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a

constituent assembly violates the Constitution
RULING: When amending the Constitution, Senators and Members of

the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such,
the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution,
unlike the people, when performing the same function, for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very
source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
In the case at bar, the resolutions have been approved by a vote
of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged
that said resolutions are null and void because: the Members of
Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the
resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best,
de facto Congressmen; Congress may adopt either one of two
alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but
may not avail of both at the same time, and; the spirit of the
Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for
amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be
held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to
give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the
nature and implications of said amendments. Such factors affect the
wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of the resolutions, not the
authority of Congress to approve the same.
Congress was not shown to have exceeded the limits thereof in
enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is
beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be
constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe,
however, said Act and the resolutions violate the spirit of the
Constitution. Inasmuch as there are less than eight votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and the resolutions unconstitutional and
invalid, the petition was dismissed.
159
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 119673 July 26, 1996 Shelumiel
Espaldon
FACTS: Iglesia ni Cristo has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia

ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioners religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions.
INC submitted to the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and
Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as X or not for public
viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of INCs TV programs on the

ground they offend and constitute an attack against other religions is
valid
RULING: Yes. The right to religious profession and worship has a

two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones
beliefs. The former contends that the individual is free to believe (or
disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. Every one has a
right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he
cannot prove what he believes. The second aspect comes under the
States regulation. The inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society. This is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not
merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
INCs postulate that its religious program is per se beyond
review by the Board is untenable. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public welfare or public
morals.
Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against
all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any
act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity
and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption.
160
The Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by

petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. The board cannot squelch the speech
of Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if
said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country.
The decision of the Board is completely bereft of findings of
facts to justify the conclusion that the subject videotapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially
the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical
fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil
which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and
not the time, place or manner of speech.
ADIONG VS. COMELEC

GR 103956 March 31, 1992 Aretha
Eugenio
FACTS: Petitioner, a senatorial candidate, assails the COMELEC

resolution which sought to prohibit the posting of decals and stickers
in mobile places (e.g. cars and other moving vehicles). According to
petitioner, such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section II(a) of Republic Act 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of the COMELEC is valid
RULING: The Comelecs prohibition is null and void on constitutional

grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes the citizens fundamental
right of the free speech enshrined in the Constitution. There is no
public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in the case. The posting of decals and car stickers in moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. The
regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his
preference, and by displaying it on his car, convince others to agree
with him.
161
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC

GR 102653 March 5, 1992
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: Representatives of the mass media which were prevented

from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements,
some candidates for office in the May 1992 elections, and taxpayers
and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues
and of credentials was being curtailed, filed petitions raising the issue
of the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act 6646. Section
11 (b) provides that In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of BP 881, it shall be unlawful xxx for any
newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90
and 92 of BP 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public
office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.
162
ISSUE: Has the prohibition gone beyond permissible supervision or

regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
RULING: The constitution itself has expressly authorized the

COMELEC to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication
and information. (Article IX-C, 4). The fundamental purpose of that is
to ensure equal opportunity, time and space and the right to reply, as
well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the used of such
media facilities, in connection with public information campaigns and
forums among candidates.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability, i.e. within election period. It does not cut off the flow of
media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio
broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out
their regular and normal information and communication operations.
It does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the
part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of
media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which
the individual candidates are quite free to present within their
respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is no
officious functionary of a repressive government dictating what
events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may
talk or write about or display on TV screens. There is here no
censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. The provision merely
limit paid partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern
mass media, and to Comelec time and Comelec space in such
mass media; in an attempt to equalize the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue
advantage offered by huge campaign war chests.
US VS. BUSTOS
GR 12592 March 8, 1918 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Several citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,

prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The
petition transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four
163
citizens apparently owners (now the defendants), and contained the

statements set out in the formation as libelous. Defendants claimed
that said judge extorted money from people who wants their case to
be dismissed or otherwise. The Court of First Instance found the
accused guilty of libel.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to their

constitutional rights of freedom of speech, expression and assembly
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that such criticisms and
petition of the citizen were not libelous but in fact a clamor to cleanse
the judiciary from people who wanted to make a mess out of their
office. The people who petitioned such even formally sent the petition
to the Executive Secretary so that the latter could act concerning the
matter. The Court of First Instance erred in holding the defendant
guilty of the crime of libel because it constitutes a violation against
the defendants constitutional right to freedom of speech, expression,
the press or assembly. The defendants are therefore acquitted.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SUPRA)
164
GR 80806 October 5, 1989 Nhorrie

Franco
FACTS: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut

Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila and several
other officers seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in
public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila. Among
the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"
magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said
defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or
from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming
that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine
which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by
the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
An Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order was
also filed by the plaintiff which was granted but the trial court
promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police
officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate
petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that
they are obscene
RULING: The Supreme Court, after making an extensive exposition of

the interpretation of the word obscenity, declared that copies of a
magazine entitled Pinoy Playboy could not be summarily confiscated
in line with an anti-smut campaign of the City of Manila. A search
warrant must have first been issued after the judge shall have been
convinced of the existence of probable cause that the materials sought
to be seized were indeed obscene.
165
AYER VS. CAPULONG

GRs 82380 & 82398 April 29, 1988 Genevive
Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his

movie production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions Ltd. (Ayer
Productions), envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, of the historic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer
Lope V. Juban who suggested that they consult with the appropriate
government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events
proposed to be filmed. Petitioner Hal McElroy informed private
respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture
enclosing a synopsis of it.
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-
enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is
designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters
interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background.
However, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not
and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family
in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised
petitioners that in the production, airing, showing, distribution or
exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether
written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member
of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the
name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script,
and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that
166
the mini-series firm would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce
Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would
amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner
Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is a valid freedom of expression
RULING: This freedom is available in our country both to locally

owned and to foreign owned motion picture companies. Furthermore,
the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," like the right
of free expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a
person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character
LOPEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR L-26549 July 31, 1970
Marielle Magrata
FACTS: In a newspaper story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the

Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz sends a distress signal informing the
authorities that the people in the said place were living in terror.
When the scout rangers arrived to the island, instead of seeing the
alleged killers, they found Fidel Cruz, merely wanted transportation
home to Manila. He was then branded as a hoax to use his own
descriptive word to the abovementioned incident.
In the January News Quiz of the Week Magazine of the Manila
Chronicle, they referred to the story of Fidel Cruz and given the
appellation of Hoax of the Year to him. The magazine also carried a
photograph of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately
the picture that was published was that of the private respondent
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman from Santa Maria Bulacan. The
magazines people expressed their profound regrets on the error they
made. Petitioners published the picture of fiddle Cruz and a correction
was made to call the attention of the readers regarding the
amendment made in the article.
Respondent Fidel G, Cruz sued the petitioners for the recovery
of damages on the defamatory character of the publication of his
picture.
167
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for libel arises from the publication
of the picture of respondent
RULING: Newspapers have the legal right to express opinions and

legal question so long as it is done in good faith. On the other hand,
libeling a person results in depriving a person of his good reputation.
Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather to be chosen than
great riches, an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this
wrong, money damages is awarded to the injured person.
Honest mistake cannot be presumed in the present case. Here
there was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet, no occasion to act
with haste as the picture of respondent was published in a weekly
magazine. The clarification made by the petitioner does not wipe out
the responsibility arising from the publication. Petitioners are
ordered to be liable for the damages incurred by the respondent.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GRs 79690-707 October 7, 1988
Anton Malamug
FACTS: Petitioner Zaldivar was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
criminal informations. Petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzales, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no
longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate
and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public
officials and employees. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
restraining order against the charges against the accused and
ordered the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing and
trying the criminal case against the Petitioner. The Sandiganbayan
still went ahead with the Petitioners trial. Petitioner filed with the
168
Supreme Court to cite in contempt Raul Gonzalez, the current

Tanodbayan, for having caused the filing of the information against
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan and issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez

may reasonably be regarded this contumacious or as warranting
exercise of the disciplinary authority
RULING: The principal defense of respondent defense of respondent

Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee
of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community
It is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. The Supreme Court ordered for Atty. Raul Gonzalez
to be suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.
J.B.L. REYES VS. BAGATSING
169
GR L-65366 November 9, 1983

Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Petitioner, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a

permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally
starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy,
hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. It was stated that after the
delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution
adopted by the International Conference for General Disbarment,
World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in
Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any
of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the
United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local
and foreign participants of such conference. The filing of this suit was
due to the fact that petitioner had not been informed of any action
taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally.
Petitioner was unaware of denial of the permit as it was sent by
ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police
intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of
issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for. There
were persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive
elements to disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people are expected to attend. Respondent Mayor
suggested, however, that a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to
be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be
ensured. The Court granted the mandatory injunction prayed for on
the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. A dissent was made on the ground that the holding of a rally
in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295
of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence, the petitioner
appealed.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners rights to free speech and peaceful

assembly were denied
RULING: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment whether in libel suits, prosecution
for sedition, or contempt proceedings. It is not to be limited, much
less denied unless there is a clear and present danger of a substantive
170
evil that the State has a right to prevent. Its value may lie in the fact
that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. There
are, of course, well-defined limits. For the constitutional right to be
invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property and acts of vandalism
must be avoided. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the
choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man being a
promenade for public use. Neither can there be any valid objection to
the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two
block-away at the Roxas Boulevard. Respondent Mayor relied on
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila. There was no showing,
however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy
gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such is
satisfied, it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act
the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could
still be challenged.
BAYAN vs. EDUARDO ERMITA

GR 169838 April 25, 2006
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: The first petitioner, Bayan, allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally
they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa 880. The second group
consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, who
allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when
a peaceful mass action they held was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police. The third group,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., allege that they conduct
peaceful mass actions and that their rights as
organizations and those of their individual members as
citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are
affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
"Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR) being followed to
implement it.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in
toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as
the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under
the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.
171
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation

of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
which the Philippines is a signatory
RULING: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble

and petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed
by the constitutions of democratic countries. However, exercise of
those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to
regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign
police power is exercised by the government through its legislative
branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal
and city councils enact ordinances for purpose.
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response
policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as
a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P.
No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail
or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public
places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
"permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound
"clear and present danger" standard.
FERNANDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR 159757 December 6, 2006 Anton
Malamug
FACTS: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic

materials, officers of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region
(PNP-CIDG NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing
the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). A search
172
warrant was issued by the Regional Trial Court for the violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E.
Fernando. On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR
served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the
prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair.
The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five VHS
tapes and ten different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
The prosecution offered the confiscated materials in evidence.
Thereafter, the accused waived their right to present evidence and
instead submitted the case for decision. Both men were convicted,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners participated in the distribution

and exhibition of obscene materials
RULING: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has

the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as
parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent
materials must justify the regulation or limitation. One such
regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable,
the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture
or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited,
published or gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. The that mere
possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell, exhibit, or
give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the
purpose of the law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene
materials to the public, is untenable. The law does not require that a
person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting
obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are
offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public. In the present
case, the evidence shows that petitioners are engaged in selling and
exhibiting obscene materials.
173
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO

GR L-1800 January 27, 1948 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: The respondent Mayor sought to defend his refusal to allow

the Nacionalista party to hold meeting at the Plaza Miranda by what
he called a reasonable ground to believe basing upon previous and
upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing
groups, remain bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered
tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly peace constituted authorities which
might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mayor has the discretion to allow holding
of a meeting in a public place
RULING: The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of

police power to the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, which
according to Section 2444 of the Administrative Code has the power,
among others, to regulate the use of streets, avenues, parks,
cemeteries and other public places and to enact ordinances it may
deem necessary.
The Supreme Court rejected the Mayors argument noting that
the condition of Manila at that time did not justify the mayors fears.
The power of local officials is only one of regulation and not
prohibition. The said provision does not confer the Mayor the power
to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion in issuing the
permit to determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. They
cannot bar the use of public places for lawful assemblies.
174
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO

GR 62270 May 21, 1984 Francis
Villanueva
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO

Villanueva
FACTS: Petitioners were officers in the Supreme Student Council of

the Gregorio Araneta University. The school authorities allowed the
students to hold a meeting from 8-12 AM on August 27, 1982. At
10:30 of that day, the students marched out of the area covered by the
permit. They continued their march while criticizing the University
authorities. As a result, disturbance to the other classes being held
and some employees stopped work. The University placed the
students under preventive suspension for holding an illegal assembly.
When brought to a Court of First Instance, the court ruled in favor of
the University and penalized the students with a suspension of one
year.
ISSUE: Did the decision of the CFI violate the right of the students to
peaceably assemble
RULING: The Court respects the constitutional rights to peaceably

assemble and calls for the setting aside of the decision because the
penalty was too severe. While it is true that they violated the terms of
the permit causing disturbance to other students and workers, the
penalty of one year is too severe for the misdeed.
The rights to peaceably assemble and free speech are
guaranteed to students of educational institutions. Their acts of
discussing matters affecting their welfare or public interest should not
be subjected to previous restraint. Note that if assembly is made in
school, permit must be sought from school authorities. These
authorities have no power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably but there may be conditions to granting such permit and
violations may be punished. However, the punishment must not be
disproportionate to the offense.
175
Therefore, the petitioners cannot be totally absolved for the

events that transpired. Admittedly there was a violation of the permit.
The penalty, however, should only be censure. The rule of fairness
should only be proportionate to the offense committed. The Supreme
Court deems that a one-week suspension is enough.
176
NON VS. DAMES

GR 89317 May 20, 1990 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges,

Inc. in Daet Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the
school for the academic year 1988-89 for instituting mass actions
against the school. The petitioners claim that this is covered by their
freedom of expression.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school can refuse to admit the students
RULING: The contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest. The 'termination
of Contract' theory is for the protection of the school with regards to
the payment of tuition fees on an installment basis. The theory cannot
be made as the basis to justify the refusal of the school to accept the
students. The mass actions of the students comes within their freedom
of expression which is considered as their right.
177
IN RE: TULFO
A.M. No. 90-4-1545-0 April 17, 1990
Jeffrey Santos
FACTS: Ramon Tulfo, a well-known columnist derided the members of

the highest court in the land the Supreme Court as sangkatutak na
bobo (a bunch of morons) not including Justice Cruz and
Sarmiento, who dissented for its decision in the Checkpoints Case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Tulfo merely exercised his right to

Freedom of Expression
RULING: No, Tulfo while respecting his right to criticize, the Court
nevertheless found him guilty of contempt for his disrespectful
language that was obviously intended to ridicule the Court and insult
its members.
178
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG.

VS. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
GR L-31195 June 5, 1973 Ria
Castro
FACTS: Petitioners (PBMEO) agreed upon having a mass

demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against the alleged abuses of
police officers of the municipality of Pasig, to be participated in by all
members of the union who are workers of respondent company. When
respondent company learned about the planned demonstration, a
meeting was called. The union, thru Atty. de Leon, company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration for that matter is
an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
accentuated the fact that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. Atty. De
Leon warned the PBMEO representatives, should those workers who
belong to the first and regular shifts without leave of absence fail to
report for work shall be dismissed, because it is a violation of the
existing CBA, thus tantamount to an illegal strike.
Despite the pleas of the respondent company, petitioners and
their members numbering about four hundred proceeded with the
mass demonstration. The respondent company filed a charge against
petitioners with respondent court, which caused petitioners loss of
their status as employees of the respondent company.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners together with its members are guilty
of bargaining in bad faith
RULING: No. The Supreme Court did not sustain the conclusion of
the Court of Industrial Relations.
Petitioners did not violate the CBA no strike no lock-out
provision. The demonstration held by petitioners before Malacaang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen not against their
employer. It was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
179
governmental agency, the President, against the police officers of

Pasig. The respondent company failed to appreciate the sine qua non
of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well as the demonstration
site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of
their cause but also immediate action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression.
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN

GR L-4880 May 18, 1953 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: Rutter filed a collection suit against Esteban to recover the

remaining balance of the price of a sale made between them in 1941
and the interest thereon. Esteban claimed that under Republic Act No.
342, pre-war obligations cannot be enforced until after the lapse of
eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War
Damage Commission, and such period has not yet expired.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Rutter filed a motion
for reconsideration claiming the constitutionality of the Moratorium
Law. Motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Moratorium Law is constitutional
RULING: No. Although the implementation of moratorium laws would

be justified on a valid exercise of police power by the State, such
exercise should not overlook the extent to be given to the legislation
which attempts to encroach upon the enforcement of a monetary
obligation.
The purpose of the moratorium law is to allow pre-war debtors
an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable
time within which to pay their pre-war debts so as to prevent them
from being victimized by their creditors. The true test of the
constitutionality of a moratorium law lies in the determination of the
180
period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such

suspension be definite and reasonable.
In the case at bar, Rutters claim had been pending since 1945
as a result of the issuance of Executive Order Nos. 25 and 32 and
their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during
the eight-year period granted to pre-war debtors. This means that he
must wait for at least twelve years before he may effect a liquidation
of his investment which dates back so far back as 1941. The hope of
the creditors to effect collection, in this case, becomes extremely
remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. This period is
unreasonable and oppressive. Such law works injustice to creditors
who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors.
ORTIGAS & CO. VS. FEATI BANK

GR L-24670 December 14, 1979
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: Plaintiff was engaged in real estate business. It was

developing and selling lots to the public situated in Highway Hills
Subdivision. In July, 1962, Plaintiff issued a deed of sale to one Emma
Chavez. Said deed contained stipulations which states that the subject
land of the deed of sale shall only be used for residential purposes and
that all buildings or improvements which shall be built in the said land
shall be of strong materials and properly painted; provided with
modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or
to an approved septic tank; and shall not be at a distance of less than
two meters from its boundary.
Subject property was later acquired by herein respondent.
181
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, in 1960, conducted a zoning

in the said area where the bought lands were located and declared
such area as a commercial and industrial zone. In 1963, Respondent
began constructing buildings. The next day, Plaintiff demanded for
defendant to stop the construction of the building in the said property.
ISSUE: Was there an impairment of the stipulation as agreed upon by

the contracting parties
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the State may interfere with
personal liberty, with property and with business and occupation if it
concerns the general welfare. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health
and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of the
Government, the rights of the individual is subordinated.
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution
being reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a felt public
need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts
clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipalitys proper
exercise of the power.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ (SUPRA)

GR L-63419 December 18, 1986
Vanessa Bugayong
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 22, or popularly known as the Bouncing

Check Law, was approved on April 3, 1979. Batas Pambansa 22
punishes a person who makes or draws and issues any check on
182
account or value knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
the said check in full upon presentment The essential element of
the offense is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit. Batas Pambansa 22 aims at
putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless. The petitioners herein, question the constitutionality of the
said statute because it forbids imprisonment for debt. Since
statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored
checks consisted of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Batas Pambansa 22 is constitutional and

does inhibit the Bill of Rights that no person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax
RULING: The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under penal sanctions,

the making of worthless checks and putting them in the circulation.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against the property, but
an offense against public order. There are instances that the
constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to
the police power of the state. The enactment of Batas Pambansa 22 is
a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment of debt.
183
PEOPLE VS. FERRER

GRs L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of

the Anti-Subversion Act, which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines and other subversive association, and punishes any
person who knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself
with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other
subversive organization.
A criminal complaint for violation of Section 4 of the Anti
Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. Judge Jose de Guzman conducted a preliminary
investigation and finding a prima facie case against Co.
The accused feloniously became an officer/ranking leader of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, aimed to overthrow the
government by means of force and violence.
That in the commission of the offense, following aggravating
circumstances are present: that the crime has been committed in
contempt of or with insult to public authorities, that the crime was
committed by band, and with aid of armed men or person who insure
impunity.
Co moved to quash on the Ground that Anti-Subversion Act
is a bill of attainder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder
RULING: A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts

punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. History in perspective,
bills of attainder was employed to suppress unpopular causes and
political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional
prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of burden on it, suffices to stigmatize the statute as bill of
attainder.
Applying the said principle in the present case, if the Act be
viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify
the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for
the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in Section 4,
against membership organization. The term, Communist party of the
Philippines: is used solely in definitional purposes. In fact the Act
applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but to any
organization having the same purpose.
184
Indeed, Anti-Subversion Act will only be a bill of attainder if

it charges a communist without a trial. But the facts will tell that the
guilt still has to be judicially established by the government in a trial.
As to the claim that under the statute organizational guilt is
nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing
membership in the Party, is precisely the nature of conspiracy which
causes the criminal liability. The statutes specifically requires that
membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further
the illegal activities of the Party. Section 4 means that when it
requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have
been acquired. The intent must be shown in the overt acts. The
former requires proof of direct participation in the organizations
unlawful activities.
BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR L-61776 to GR L-61861 March 23, 1984
Yves Dalisay
FACTS: Petitioner is accused of one hundred counts of estafa thru

falsification of public document before the Sandiganbayan for the
encashment of fictitious checks for non-existent obligations of the
Teachers Camp. During pendency of cases, he ran for and won
mayoralty of Amadeo, Cavite. He was later convicted in all but one of
thirty two counts. Appeals are currently pending.
Two years after he assumed position, Batas Pambansa 195 was
passed, suspending all public officers against whom any criminal
prosecution is pending. He was suspended pursuant to that but is now
alleging that Batas Pambansa 195 is an ex post facto law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa 195 is an ex post facto law
RULING: No. Paragraph 3, Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code

states that suspension from employment or public office during trial
shall not be considered as penalty. They are merely preventive
measures before final judgment. Suspension from office, pending trial,
of a public officer charged with crimes mentioned in Batas Pambansa
195 committed before its effectivity does not constitute an ex post
facto law.
185
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE

SANDIGANBAYAN AND CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR.
GR 101724 July 3, 1992 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza

of Agusan del Sur, filed two letter-complaints with the Tanodbayan
shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as
OIC/provincial governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986. Gelacio's
complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was
still the provincial attorney in 1976, of a free patent title in the
Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
The Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City Fiscal of
Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the
subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station Commander of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes.
Despite the absence of notice to Paredes, a preliminary investigation
was conducted ex-parte. An information against Paredes was later
filed. Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the
Sandiganbayan. On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest, which
was granted on the ground of prescription of the offense charged.
186
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa 195 (which amended Section

11 of Republic Act 3019 by increasing the period of prescription from
10 years to 15 years) would apply to Paredes
RULING: Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March

16, 1982, amending Section 11 Republic Act No. 3019 by increasing
from ten to fifteen years the period for the prescription or
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was
committed by Paredes in January 1976 for it would be prejudicial to
the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the
shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, Republic Act
3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he
committed it.
To apply Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an
ex post facto law for it would after his situation to his disadvantage by
making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution, the
Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that Paredes
may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of Republic
Act 3019 in 1976, six years before Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was
approved on March 16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that
law should apply only to those offenses which were committed after
the approval of Batas Pambansa 195.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG

A.M. 297-MJ September 30, 1975 Shelumiel
Espaldon
FACTS: Judge Santiago Lindayag was dismissed from office for

causing the arrest and detention of Avelina Serafin. A criminal case
for estafa against Serafin was filed by spouses Carmelito and Corazon
Mendoza. The complaint states, the accused with intent to gain
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously owe the some of one thousand five
hundered pesos (P1,500.00), that said amount has long been due and
Mrs. Avelina N. Serafin failed to pay her account despite due notices
187
an up to the present obligation. Based on the preliminary

investigation by Judge Lindayag, it appears that Serafin failed to pay
the Mendozas her Php 1,500.00 debt. Despite the fact that Serafins
failure to pay constitutes simple indebtedness and not estafa, Judge
Lindayag issued a warrant for her arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and detention of Avelina Serafin a

violation of the constitutional right of non-imprisonment for debt
RULING: Yes.
Serafins failure to pay her debt lack the essential elements of
estafa. Thus, making her omission a civil offense and not criminal.
Section 20 of the Constitution states: no person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of poll tax. Since the failure to pay a simple
debt does not constitute a criminal offense of estafa which imposes
imprisonment of penalty, Serafins subsequent arrest and detention
constitutes a violation of the Constitutional right.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ (SUPRA)

GR L-63419 December 18, 1986
Laida Isidro
188
FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,

the Bouncing Checks Law. BP22 incarcerates a person who makes or
draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing that at
the time of the issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioners challenge the validity of BP22 on the grounds that it
contravened the impairment clause and violates the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa 22 contravenes the

impairment clause and violates the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt
RULING: The Court held that Batas Pambansa 22, or the Bouncing
Checks Law, is a valid exercise of the police power as such offense
contravenes public policy. Flooding the system with worthless checks
is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nations economy.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. Also, checks cannot be categorized as
mere contracts as it is a commercial instrument which is now a
convenient substitute for money. It forms a part of the banking system
and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the State.
Thus, it cannot be held to contravene the impairment clause.
More importantly, Batas Pambansa22 did not transgress the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt as the
challenged statute does not punish the person for non-payment of a
debt but because of the malicious act of issuing a worthless check.
The law does not intend to force a person to pay a debt but aims to
prohibit the issuance of a worthless check and putting them in
circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against the
property, but an offense against public order.
189
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR (SUPRA)

GR L-2690 January 1, 1949 Vanessa
Bugayong
FACTS: An employment agency detained one of its employees for

having an unpaid advance in its agency. The maid, the employee
herein was transferred to another residence because she has not yet
paid the amount advanced by the employment agency which was used
for her transportation from the province.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the maid were violated in

detaining her and was required to render domestic services in
payment for the money advanced
RULING: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may

advance to a prospective employee, has absolutely no power to curtail
the freedom of said employee. The fortunes of business cannot be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human
dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of writ
of habeas corpus, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving her
employ because of the influence detaining her. This Court releases on
habeas corpus a housemaid who was being detained and required to
render domestic services in payment for the money advanced for her
transportation from the province.
190
LANSANG VS. GARCIA

Aretha Eugenio
FACTS: On August 21, 1971, through Proclamation no.889, President

Marcos suspended the privilege writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners having been arrested without a warrant therefore
and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its
validity, as well as that of their detention.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to inquire
into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus. Whether or not the suspension is
valid
RULING: Analyzing the constitutional provisions, the two conditions

must concur: 1. That there is invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof; and 2. That public safety requires the state
of rebellion and that public safety requires that immediate and
effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure
the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State.
The Court was unanimous in the conviction that it had the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to
determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. The court overruled
Barcelon vs. Baker arguing that Barcelona had relied chiefly on
Martin vs. Mott which involved not the power of suspend the privilege
but much broader power to call the militia. Moreover, according to the
Court, the suspension in Barcelon was the act of the American
Governor General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign,
191
affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with

that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of
the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides and from whom all
government authority emanates. Having thus disposed of Montenegro
v. Castaeda which was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and,
hence, cannot have more weight than the same, and finally, the court
said that since the power to suspend the privilege was surrounded by
constitutional limitations like the limitations and restrictions imposed
by the Fundamental Law upon the Legislative department adherence
thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by courts of justice.
What however are these proper bounds on the power of the
Courts? The Court first gave the general answer that its power was
merely to checknot to supplant---- the executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the Court said that its power
was not even comparable with its power over civil or criminal cases
elevated thereto by appeal in which cases the appellate court has all
the powers of the court of origin, nor to its power over quasi judicial
administrative decisions where the Court is limited to asking whether
there is some evidentiary basis for the administrative finding. Instead
the Court accepted the Solicitor Generals suggestion that it go no
further than to satisfy {itself} not the Presidents decision is correct
and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified
the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the
president did not act arbitrarily.
GAMBOA VS. CRUZ
Bugayong
FACTS: On July 19, 1979 petitioner was arrested for vagrancy,

without warrant of arrest. The following day he was lined up with
other five detainees and that complainant Erlinda Bernal pointed
petitioner as one of the companions of a robbery incident. An
arraignment occurred where accused filed for a demurrer of evidence
on the ground that the line up, with out notice to him, and in the
absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights and due
process.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused was under custodial investigation

when he was lined-up with the other detainees for identification of the
complainant
192
RULING: As aptly observed the police line up is not part of the

customary inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled at such
stage, to counsel. He had not held yet to answer criminal offense. As
only police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may
not yet avail the services of his lawyer. He was therefore not deprived
of his right to be assisted by counsel because accusatory process had
not yet set in as the confrontation between the State and he had not
begun.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not in any way
deprived of substantive and constitutional right as he was duly
represented by a member of bar upon arraignment. Instead of hearing
his defense, he opted to file a motion to acquit only after the
prosecution had presented evidence and rested its case.
His petition was dismissed.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON

GR 85215 July 7, 1989 Nhorrie
Franco
FACTS: Felipe Ramos, a freight ticket clerk of PAL, was invited for
investigation on February 9, 1986 by the Management, in accordance
with PALs Code of Conduct and Discipline on allegations of
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. On Feb. 8, 1986, Ramos
193
gave to his superiors a handwritten note or admission. At the

investigation before the Branch Manager and in the presence of the
station agent, ticket freight clerk and PALEAs shop steward, he was
informed of the charge before him. Thereafter, his answers to the
questions by the Branch Manager were taken down in writing.
After two months, Ramos was charged for estafa. Trial on the
merits ensued. At the close of the peoples case, the private
prosecutors made an offer of evidence to 1) the handwritten note or
admission and 2) to the written question and answer before the
Branch Manager. The defense objected to the offered evidence on the
ground that the admission or confession was taken without the
accused represented by counsel. Judge Ayson ruled in favor of the
defense declared that the written admission or confession and record
of the investigation was inadmissible because the accused was not
informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: Was there a violation of constitutional rights of the

respondent under Article III, Section 12 of 1987 Constitution (Article
IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution). Did the respondent judge
erred in ruling in favor of the defense declaring the evidence
presented inadmissible pursuant to Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution
RULING: It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial investigation, as the term
should be properly understood, prior to or during the administrative
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he
appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to
the inquiry. It is also clear that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the
record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal
action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious
that the note that he sent to his superiors the day before the
investigation, offering compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They
may not be excluded on the ground that the so called Miranda
rights had not been accorded to Ramos.
It is apparent that the respondent Judge has misapprehended
the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the
same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he
has grossly erred.
194
PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA

GR 112983 March 22, 1995 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Accused was apprehended for the crime of robbery with

homicide and frustrated homicide. When the arresting officer told him
of his constitutional right, he confessed his guilt through signing in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay. After which, he voluntarily admitted his
involvement in the crime to the prosecutor and to another person.
Thus, he was convicted of such crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accuseds constitutional right was violated
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
It held that even though the extrajudicial confession of guilt by the
accused through singing the Sinumpaang Salaysay was violative of
his constitutional right, his conviction lies not at the latter but at his
voluntary confession to the prosecutor and to another person and the
circumstancial evidences against him which are beyond reasonable
doubt. Therefore, his voluntary confession made to the prosecutor
after being made aware of his constitutional right was not violative of
his right to remain silent and right to counsel. Petition is dismissed.
195
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA

GR 89223 May 27, 1994 Genevive
Gutierrez
PEOPLE VS. BANDULA

GR 89223 May 27, 1994 Genevive
Gutierrez
FACTS: Six armed men barged to the compound of Polo Coconut

Plantation in Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by the
Security Guard Antonio Salva as Aurelio Bandula,Teofilo Diananano,
Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo and the two others who wore
mask were referred to as Boy Tall and Boy Short. At gunpoint, the
two masked men held Salava, disarmed him and tied his hand behind
his back. They went to the house of Leonico Pastarano, hog-tied him
and divested him of his .38 caliber snubhose revolver. From there, the
six armed men with Salva and Pastrano went to the house of Atty.
Juanito Garay. After forcing their way into the house, the masked men
and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and of
the valuables. They locked Pastarno and Salva inside Garays house
and thereafter, the two heard gunshots. After suceding in untying
themselves, Pastarno and Slava went to report the matter to the
police but found the lifeless body of Garay outside the gate.
In arriving at its conclusions, the trail court considered the
alleged confession of accused bandula that after the incident he gave
his .38 caliber revolver to Jovito marimat and the extrajudicial
confessions of Bandula and Dianano that they were merely forced to
participate in the commission of the crime by Boy Tall and Boy
Short. These extra judicial confessions made by the accused were
extracted during the custodial investigation, the trial court ruled, have
all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an
admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that
accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding
custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession is admissible

evidence
196
RULING: From the records it can be gleaned that the accused were
investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel
present. If at all, the counsel came in only a day after the custodial
investigation. Hence, if there is custodial investigation, any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible evidence against him.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to
focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the
police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself elicit
incriminating statements.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent.
Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Diananano and Bandula
when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still
their confession are inadmissible evidence because Atty. Zerna does
not qualify as an independent counsel.
PEOPLE VS. LUCERO

GR 97936 May 29, 1995
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Accused-appellant Alejandro Lucero, among others, was

charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
Atty. Peralta was provided as counsel to Lucero as the latter had
no lawyer. Before the interrogation, Atty. Peralta explained to Lucero
he has a right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any
statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a
statement, he may refuse to sign it. Atty. Peralta concluded that
Lucero understood what he said when the latter gave no reaction.
When the investigator started to ask preliminary questions, Atty.
Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero
and two CIS agents went to Atty. Peraltas house to show the
extrajudicial statement Lucero signed. Atty. Peralta examined the said
statement and explained to Lucero its legal implication. When he
asked Lucero if he signed it voluntarily and the latter replied
affirmatively, he signed the extrajudicial statement.
The trial court convicted Lucero based on the extrajudicial
statement.
197
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Lucero

during the custodial investigation is admissible as evidence
RULING: Luceros conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial

confession as the same was obtained in violation of Section 12(1),
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. What the Constitution requires is not
just any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.
In the case at bar, Lucero received no effective counseling from
Atty. Peralta, who was not even his choice of counsel. Atty. Peralta was
not present during the custodial investigation of Lucero. Also, Atty.
Peralta signed the extrajudicial statement signed by Lucero, simply
based on the yes that the latter gave when asked if he signed it
freely, which was obviously uttered under pressure from his military
escort.
PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN

GR 110290 January 25, 1995 Marielle
Magrata
FACTS: Accused Jaime Jimmy Agustin was charged with two counts
of murder, frustarated and attempted murders. The murder occurred
on September 6,1986 in Baguio City. The deceased Dr. Bayquen, a
dentist together with his family rode a Brasilia on their way home at
Malvar Street. Cruising the street, Anthony, the son of the deceased,
was driving the car when a man came out of a car parked two meters
from the Baptist Church, aimed his armalite rifle and fired at the
passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit the fence. Dr, Barquen and
Ana Theresa died on the spot. Dominic, the other son of the victim
198
was able to get out of the car and phoned her mother and told her the
incident.
The accused was picked up in Sto. Tomas Pangasinan by military
personnel and brought him to Baguio City for investigation. The
accused insisted that his extrajudicial confession was taken in
violation of his rights. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him
was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal.
Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor and
conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he understood
only Ilocano. Moreover, he was interrogated in the presence of
military personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused was violated
RULING: Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily

and intelligently accepted by the accused as his counsel. He was not
even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice. While it is true that in
custodial investigation the party has the final choice of counsel and
may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator, the
circumstances obtaining the case did not left the accused no freedom
to intelligently and freely do so.
The circumstances convince the Court that the counsel was
unable to assist the accused in a satisfactory manner. For one, the
counsel was an associate of the private prosecutor. The accused was
informed of his constitutional rights in English and Tagalog
considering that the accused is only a fourth grader and a farmer who
could only understand Ilocano.
The day he was unlawfully arrested in Pangasinan and on the
way to Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened to death if he
would not admit his participation to the crime. The presence of the
military officers and the continuing fear vitiates his free will.
Thus, the extrajudicial confession of the accused is inadmissible
evidence against him.
199
PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS

GR 101808 July 3, 1992 Anton
Malamug
FACTS: Ramon Bolanos was found guilty for the murder of Oscar
Pagdalian. According to the police, the Body of the victim was found
in a pool of his own blood at the scene of the crime. The police were
informed that the victim was with two companions the previous night
one of whom was the accused who had a drinking spree with the
victim. Corroborating testimony of the police indicated that they
found the firearm of the victim when they apprehended the accused.
When they brought them to the police vehicle on the way to the police
station they asked the accused if he killed the victim. The accused
admitted to the killing because the victim was abusive. The conviction
of the accused relied on his admission of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the accused is admissible as

evidence
RULING: Being already under custodial investigation while on board

the police patrol jeep on the way to the police station where formal
investigation ma have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under Article 3, Section 12.
Paragraph 1 states that, any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferable of his own choice In relation to this, Paragraph 3 states
that any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to
the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and
the glaring fact that the alleged confession was the only reason for
the conviction, the Supreme Court has no recourse but to reverse the
subject judgment under review.
200
PEOPLE VS. MACAM

GRs L-91011-12 November 24, 1994
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Accused-appellants Danilo and Ernesto Roque, together with

Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., were
accused of Robbery with Homicide for robbing Benito Macam and for
killing Leticia Macam. All the accused went to the house of Benito
Macam, uncle of Eduardo. After having lunch, Eduardo suddenly
grabbed the Benitos clutch bag and pulled out Benito's gun and after
they announced a hold-up, they started ransacking the place and took
the valuables. Leticia was killed while the other members of the
household, including Benito, were stabbed. Accused-appellant
Ernesto, the alleged `tricycle driver', testified that went to the factory
of accused Eduardo Macam's father a day after the incident happened
to allegedly collect the fare of P50.00 from accused Eduardo Macam
as he was allegedly contracted by Eduardo to bring them to Benito's
residence. They were suddenly approached by the security guards of
the factory and brought inside the factory where they were mauled by
the security guards and factory workers and told they were involved
in a robbery-killing; thereafter, appellants were brought to a police
department for investigation and detention; the other accused, were
in the jail of the Station Investigation Division, the accused including
accused-appellants were forced to admit to the robbery killing, but
accused-appellants Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque. All the accused
were brought to a hospital where the surviving victims were being
treated for identification. They were made to line up in handcuffs and
bore contusions on their faces caused by the blows inflicted on them
by the police investigators. The policemen spoke to the victims before
being asked to pinpoint the perpetrators of the crime charged. The
lower court convicted the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the legality of the arrest of accused-appellants

that was raised first time on appeal before the Supreme Court can be
questioned
201
RULING: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an

investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the
accused. The right to counsel was extended to critical stages of
prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement machinery at
present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings where the result might well settle
the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. A
police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings. After
the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This
was made applicable in this case where the police officers first talked
to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances
were such as to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the
victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants were
handcuffed and had contusions on their faces. The arrest of appellants
was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest and without the
assistance of any counsel. However, appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest; the issue being raised first
time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Accused-appellants have
not moved for the quashing of the information before the trial court
on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their arrest was
cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating
in the trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENNY DY

GR L-74517 February 23, 1988
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: At around midnight of 7 May 1984, death cost its shadow

over Boracay Island, an internationally known tourist spot famous for
its powdery white sand beach. Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck,
which caused his death approximately, six hours later, was Christian
Langel y Philippe, a Swiss tourist who was vacationing on the Island
together with his sister and some friends.
The following day, the following police report was entered as
Entry No. 3904 in the police blotter of the Malay Police Sub-station,
Malay, Aklan. Judgment was rendered finding the accused Benny Dy y
Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The accused stoutly denied having made any oral confession
alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to
state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor
while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at
202
his (Accused's) request. The Accused argues that even if he did make
such a confession, the same would, be inadmissible in evidence. The
Trial Court found the testimonies of defense witnesses enmeshed in
contradictions on material points, rejected the disclaimers they had
made, accorded more credence to the prosecution version, and as
previously stated, rendered a judgment of conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of Benny Dy may be used as

evidence against him
RULING: The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a

witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it
must be given in substance.
What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary
manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. The Trial Court,
therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance
with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error VII.
With the indubitable official and documentary evidence on record, the
identity of the Accused as the victim's assailant is indisputable. The
denials by the defense immediately lose their credibility and the
errors it has assigned are rendered without any merit whatsoever.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR 97214, July 18, 1994
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Petitioner, the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of a school,

was charged with violation Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised
203
Penal Code for misappropriating to his own private benefit, public

funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines
when he failed to account during an audit and failed as well to
restitute despite demands by the auditor. A warrant of arrest was
issued but accused-petitioner Navallo still then could not be found.
Meanwhile, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the
Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however,
later released on bail. The RTC transferred the case and its records to
the Sandiganbayan. Special prosecutor opined that since Navallo had
already been arraigned on the RTC before the case was transferred to
the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the
case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which
held otherwise. The Sandiganbayan issued a new order for Navallos
arrest. The Sandiganbayan approved a new bond the previous one
having found to be defective. Navallo filed a motion to quash,
contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offense and the person of the accused and that since the accused had
already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him
before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.
Sandiganbayan denied Navallo's motion. Navallo was arraigned
before the Sandiganbayan and was found guilty by the said court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt to prosecute the petitioner before

the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy
RULING: Section 8 of PD No. 1606 states, "any case cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where none of the
accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan. An offense which falls under Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code shall be triable by the Sandiganbayan. Navallo's
arraignment before the RTC is several years after Presidential Decree
No. 1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan, had
become effective. Accused-petitioner pleads double jeopardy. The
Supreme Court disagrees. Double jeopardy requires the following
requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal
charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
Jurisdiction of the court to try the case; (3) The accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express
consent. When all elements are present, a second prosecution for the
same offense, or an attempt to commit the said offense, or a
frustration of the said offense, or any offense which necessarily
includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can
rightly be barred. The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it
204
conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already

been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Neither did the case there
terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. Also, a
person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.
PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO

GR 117487 December 12, 1995 Fritz
Sandoval
FACTS: In the morning of June 13, 1994, the lifeless body of Khaye
Mae 4 years old, was discovered. The autopsy report revealed that she
was raped and that the proximate cause of her death was asphyxia by
strangulation.
A neighbor pointed appellant as the offender. Forthwith, he was
arrested and interrogated by the police. He verbally confessed his
guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of this follow up
interrogation, the police recovered from his house the victims
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt, all of which were later presented as evidence for the
prosecution. The appellant was arraigned with the assistance of
counsel. He pleaded guilty. The trial court found him guilty of the
crime of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: Is the confession of the accused admissible against him
RULING: No. The Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible

evidence any uncounselled confession or admission.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense
to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing.
Neither did he present any writing shown that appellant waived his
right to silent and to have competent and independent counsel.
Despite the blatant violation of appellants constitutional right, the
trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the
records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as
inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the
T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the
appellant.
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain
silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under
custodial investigation rests with the prosecution. The burden has to
be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, paragraph 1
205
of Section 12 Article III of the Constitution provides that the waiver

must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar,
the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this
burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant
failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these
constitutionally prescribed evidence. The lack of objection did not
satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN

GRs 98321-24 June 30, 1993 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: Major Antonio Carteciano was driving toward Camp General

Arcadio Maxilom in Lahug, Cebu City. With him in the jeep were his
wife, Lorna Carteciano, who was seated beside him, his mother-in-law,
Juanita Ricaplaza, his 13-year old son Reiser, his brother, Francisco
Carteciano, Jr., a neighbor, Engr. Jose Bantug, Jr., and Bantug's
daughter, Jennifer Near the intersection of M. Velez and V. Rama
streets, the sound of gunfire was heard coming from the left side of
the street. Major Carteciano drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired
toward his left. Several gunmen emerged from their hiding places and
approached the jeep. Victor Nuez, Jr., demanded from Lorna
Carteciano her husband's firearm. Lorna pleaded that there was
nothing to give, offering instead her valuables. Thereupon, accused-
appellant Nuez fired at Major Carteciano point-blank, hitting his
head which was resting on Lorna's lap. The shooting resulted in the
death of Major Antonio Carteciano, Francisco Carteciano, and
Engineer Jose Bantug. Lorna Carteciano was seriously wounded, and
would have died were it not for the timely medical assistance
rendered to her.
Fifteen persons were presented to Juanita Ricaplaza at the
VISCOM Hospital and she identified seven of them as the perpetrators
of the crimes. Reiser Carteciano identified Celso Bustamante as
another participant in the shooting. Because of the identification, the
accused were found guilty by the Regional Trial Court.
206
ISSUES: Whether their arrest was unlawful because no warrant of

arrest was issued against him and his co-accused. Whether accused-
appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when he
was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel
RULING: It is much too late for accused-appellant to raise the

question of his arrest without a warrant of arrest. It bears emphasis
that accused-appellant, together with his co-accused, pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment. Appellant is, thus, estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest. Any irregularity attendant to his
arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by
participating in the trial.
Reliance on his constitutional right to counsel at the time he
was given a paraffin test is misplaced for he was not then under
custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches only upon the
start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from the accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from
the lips of the person undergoing interrogation
207
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO

GR 79269 June 5, 1991 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Rodolfo Salas, alias Commander Bilog and his co-accused

were charged for the crime of rebellion. Salas filed a peition for bail
which was opposed by petitioner on the ground that rebellion became
a capital offense and his evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, the
President issued Executive Order 187 restoring to full force and effect
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that rebellion
shall be punished by less than reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is entitled to bail
RULING: Yes. The Executive Order restored the provision of the

Revised Penal Code that rebellion shall only be punished by prision
mayor. The right to bail is given to everyone except when the accused
is charged of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong. Salas does not come under the exception,
he is entitled to the right to bail.
208
CARPIO VS. MAGLALANG

GR 78162 April 19, 1991 Jeffrey
Santos
FACTS: NBI Director Carpio as petitioner filed a special civil action

for certiorari charging respondent judge with grave abuse for having
grant bail to Benjamin Escano, an accused in the ambush slaying of
Dinalupihan, Bataan mayor Jose C. Payumo.
A few months after the ambuscade of the mayor, Escano, assisted
by citizens attorney, executed before an NBI agent a sworn statement
admitting he was one of the seven persons who gunned down mayor
Payumo. Subsequently, information for murder was filed against
Escano and ten other persons by the Provincial fiscal of Bataan
Regional Trial Court. Four days later, acting executive judge of said
court issued an order of arrest against Escano recommending no bail
for his provisional release. Balanga police informed the court that the
NBI refused to turn over to them the custody of Escano because
according to an agent Gonzales. Escano was still under investigation.
The court, claiming that it should aquired the jurisdiction over
Escano, ordered the director of NBI to deliver the person of Escano to
the provincial warden of Bataan within five days from notice.
In his motion for reconsideration, Director Carpio admitted that
the court had jurisdiction over Escano but alleged that effective
dispensation of justice to the victim dictates that the accused be
placed under the physical custody of the NBI in view of the continuing
further investigation pursued by the NBI on the case, Escanos
counsel opposed said motion for reconsideration.
Before the court could act on the directors motion for
reconsideration, Escanos counsel filed an application for bail. In
opposing the application, the prosecution averred that the accused
was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of.
The court granted the application for bail premised on the notion
that since the death penalty has been constitutionally abolished, and
reclusion perpetua has replaced it, bail may be granted to Escano in
as much as at that particular point, no legislative enactment has yet
been made restoring the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not abolition of the death penalty and lack of

legislative enactment restoring it justify the grant of bail
209
RULING: No, the premise of the lower court is invalid. As the phrase
capital offense has been replaced by the phrase offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
instead of those punishable by death penalty, when evidence of guilt is
strong, are the exception to the rule that the right to bail should be
made available to all accused. All the courts had to do was to
determine whether evidence of guilt is strong in the light of the
provision of Section 13 Article 3. The order granting bail are declared
void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion because
without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the
court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their
respective testimonies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FORTES

GR 90643 June 25, 1993 Ria
Castro
FACTS: Agustin Fortes y Garra was convicted by the Regional Trial

Court at Irosin, Sorsogon, for the rape of a young girl named Merelyn
Gine. The Regional Trial Court found Fortes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20, 000.00 to answer for
damages and costs. The accused seeks to annul and set aside 2
related orders of the said trial court denying his application for bail,
filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional liberty pending the
resolution of his appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court's refusal to grant Fortes

application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the same
amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail is
proper.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court sustained the Regional Trial

Courts decision. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution 23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
as amended, that before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or
of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if the offense
210
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of

discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of
guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is
not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by
the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part
of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only
determined that the evidence of guilt is strong, which would have
been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction. It would have
likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

GR 93177 August 2, 1991 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: The officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines were

charged for the violation of the provisions of the Articles of War for
their alleged participation in the failed coup d etat. A general court
martial was created to try and decide their case. One of the officers,
Ltc. Ligot applied for bail but it was denied by the said Court.
Subsequently, Ligot went to the Regional Trial Court to apply for
bail. The said court ordered for his provisional liberty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to bail is applicable to military men

facing court martial proceedings
RULING: No. The right to bail is not applicable to military personnel

because of the unique structure of the military. Mutinous soldiers
operate within the framework of the government, thus, they pose a
211
great threat to national security if they would be allowed to be

provisionally released.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SUPRA)

GR L-62100 May 30, 1986 Genevive
Gutierrez
FACTS: Petitioner is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans

Insular management Inc., wherein he acts as the president, and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. Having transferred the management of the
latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no position.
Petitioner together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee for both companies. However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission requested the Commission of Immigration
not to clear petitioner for the departure and a memorandum has been
212
issued. A Torrens title that was submitted and accepted by Manotoc

Securities Inc. was suspected to be fake and six of its clients filed a
separate criminal complaint against the petitioner. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail. Moreover, petitioner filed a
motion for permission to leave the country but the trial judge denied
it.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be allowed to leave the country
RULING: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail

from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond. The petitioner has not
satisfactorily shown his necessity to travel abroad. The constitutional
right to travel is a not an absolute right.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA (SUPRA)

GR L24674 June 20, 1977
Sarah Abraham
213
FACTS: Respondent judge Villanueva issued warrants of arrest based

on two complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioners. The
latter assailed the validity of such warrant on the ground that the
fiscal and not the respondent judge should have conducted the
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, the petitioners have posted
the required bail bonds after the issuance of the warrants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants issued are valid
RULING: Yes. The posting of the bail bond constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity attending the arrest of a person. From the moment the
petitioners posted the required bail bond, they are already estopped
from questioning the validity of the warrants issued.
214
FRANSISCO TATAD VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN

GRs L-72335-39 March 21, 1988
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: In October 1974, Antonio De Los Reyes, former Head

Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information
(DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts,
filed a formal report with the Legal Panel Presidential Security
Command, charging the Petitioner, then Secretary and Head of the
Department of Public Information, with alleged violations the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner was accused of giving D
Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official functions through manifest partiality and evident bad faith. On
October 1979, the petitioner resigned as Minister of Public
Information. On December 1979, Antonio De Los Reyes filed a
complaint with the Tanodbayan against the petitioner, accusing him of
graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then
Secretary of Public Information. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan
referred de los Reyes complaint for a fact-finding investigation.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but such was denied.
On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution,
recommending that the informations regarding violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be filed against petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to
quash the informations. He argued prescription and that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense. The
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion to quash.
ISSUES: Have Sandiganbayans charges against the petitioner

prescribed. Did it violate the constitutional mandate of due process
and speedy disposition of cases in unduly prolonging the case against
the petitioner
RULING: The Supreme Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors
and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been
deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed
rights. A painstaking review of the facts reveal that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life,
as it were, only after petitioner had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed
215
by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of

affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the
complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
partiality, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues,
certainly do not warrant or justify the delay of three years. The
inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and
filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and
to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Kenneth Buncayo
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action alleging that the Tanodbayan did

not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert
genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial
and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the
Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of
the accused. The court resolved to dismiss the petition and lift the
Temporary Restraining Order issued earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration. The court required the respondents to comment
on the the MR but issued no restraining order. On December 2, 1985,
Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused of the crime charged and
absolved them of civil liability. The petitioners filed their second
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the President ordered
the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution
panel to whitewash the criminal cases against the twenty six
respondents. The Supreme Court thus created a factfinding
commission to determine the allegations of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the interference and pressure of the President

violative of due process and prevented a fair and impartial trial
216
RULING: The fact of the secrete Malacanang conference of January

10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution
panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against
all twenty six accuses (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez
to have been confirmed by him to the then Presidents Coordinator
Manuel Lazaro on the proceeding day) is not denied. This illegality
vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
court healed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the
commission noted: The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang
and their ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then
obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified.
Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or
resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very
moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985.
No court whose presiding justice has received orders or
suggestions from the President who by an amendatory decree made
it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan can be an impartial
court, which is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction
over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of
the executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a
means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Herrera) completely
disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict.
PEOPLE VS. DRAMAYO

GR L-21325 October 29, 1971 Vanessa
Bugayong
FACTS: Accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Escubing were pointed

as prime suspects by the deceased of one robbery. On January 9,
1964, the accused and his company were in the house of a co-accused
Priolo Billons, when accused Dramayo and his companions had a
drinking session at the back of a school house. It was at the time that
he thought of the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza, the deceased herein
so that he could no longer testify in the robbery case. The victim was
sighted buying a cigarette, Escubin hit him with a piece of wood on
217
the side of the head while Dramayo continued stabbing him with a
pointed bolo.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the accused was proven beyond

reasonable doubt
RULING: The trial was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi of
the defense witness that pushed their counsel stressing the absence
the absence of sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable
doubt to be implied from the fact that only two of the seven suspects
were held culpable. The credibility of facts as testified concerning the
manner and motive why the deceased was killed prompted appellants
to put an end to his life. That such version could not have been
concocted by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly
convicted of robbery. It is understandable that accused wants to do
away with the principle witness. Wherefore, the conviction of the
accused by the trial court was affirmed.
DUMLAO VS. COMELEC (SUPRA)
218
GR 52245 January 22, 1980 Jeffrey

Santos
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 52 was enacted in connection with January

30, 1980 Local Elections. The petitioners question Section 4 of the
said law on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause and
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The first paragraph of
Section 4, reads any retired elective provincial city, municipal
official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which
he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age
at the commencement of the term of office, to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective office from
which he retired. On the other hand, paragraph 2 of Section 4
provides: Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the
State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection rebellion,
or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be candidate for any
of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein and the filing of charges for the commission
of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such facts.
ISSUE: Whether or not aforecited provisions of Section 4 and Batas

Pambansa 52 are violative of the constitutional principles of equal
protection and presumption of innocence.
RULING: Paragraph 1, Section 4 of Batas Pambansa 52 does not

transgress the constitutional guarantee mentioned the first par. of
Section 4 is valid. As adverted to in many decisions, the equal
protection clause does not prohibit classification, provided it complies
with the requisites what is prohibited is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. The distinction here is substantial. The
second paragraph of Section 4 however, violates the constitutional
guaranty of presumption of innocence. This is so, since a candidate is
disqualified from running for a public office on the ground alone those
charges have been filed against him. In this wise, it is as if he is
placed in the same category as a person who has already been
convicted of a crime whose penalty carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold public office.
219
PEOPLE VS. ALCANTARA

GR 91283 January 17, 1995 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Dr. Remedios Patricio owned a ten-wheeler truck which was

used in her hauling business and was being driven by her brother-in-
law, Venancio Patricio. Venancio, with helper Larry Salvador, drove
the truck to Antipolo Coca-Cola plant to load softdrinks to be
delivered in Makati. When they were about to leave Antipolo,
appellant asked for a ride in the truck, to which Venancio agreed,
after ascertaining that appellant knew his helper. When they were in
Ortigas, appellant poked a gun and grabbed the steering wheel from
Venancio. They were taken to the North Diversion Road wherein they
were tied and stabbed by appellants companions. Only Venancio
survived. The truck was late found abandoned.
Six days after, appellant was arrested and was brought to the
hospital for Venancio to identify him. Upon seeing appellant, Venancio
exclaimed and said, iyan, iyan ang umagaw sa manibela ko while
pointing to appellant which act was photographed.
According to the accused, he was merely looking for a job in the
company located across Antipolo Coca-Cola plant. While he was
eating at the plant, he was arrested and detained. He was later
brought to the hospital and was made to confront Venancio whom he
saw for the first time. Venancio did not respond twice when he was
asked if appellant was part of the hijackers, so the police just made
him point at the suspect which was photographed. He was urged to
confess guilt without being apprised of his rights nor provided with
counsel. He was also boxed, kicked, hit and electrocuted by them.
Water was even continuously poured on his face while he was lying
down. When he could not take it anymore, he confessed that he was
one of the hijackers. He was later convicted of robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants guilt was proven
220
RULING: No. Appellant was not positively identified as the

perpetrator of the crime at bench. Venancio pointed to another person
as the suspect when asked in court. It was only during the next
hearing that he identified appellant as the suspect. It is also important
to note that appellant is familiar to Venancio, as he admitted.
Venancio frequently saw appellant around the plant prior to the
hijacking. His credibility, by such, was greatly damaged.
The credibility of the law enforcers is also put to question. Their
testimonies were not corroborated by Venancio. There was also the
existence of improper suggestion when Venancio allegedly pointed to
appellant as the hijacker. Prior to that, the arrest of the appellant was
illegal, his detention arbitrary. He was physically abused and coerced
to make a confession.
Hence, the guilt of the accused being not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, his conviction was reversed and set aside.
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
GR 74259 February 14, 1991 Ivan
Desierto
FACTS: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the

Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated
Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he
received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and
withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. On April 13, 1981,
his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on
April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between
the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed
a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08.
A letter of demand required the petitioner to produce the
missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The balance
was demanded in another letter. This was subsequently reduced by
P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily
disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his
dismissal from the service. On September 27, 1982, a final letter of
demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the
petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for
malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the
respondent court .
221
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. He insists,

however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage
imputed to him was malversed by other persons. Petitioner was found
guilty by the Sandiganbayan, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was given due process
RULING: The above findings are mainly factual and are based on
substantial evidence. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the
facts as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the
offense charged.
Petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is
negated by the following factors: First. When he entered the said
amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make any notation
that said amount, though entered, was not actually received. Second.
At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over, he did not make any
certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged
against him. Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez
misappropriated the money, he did not file any case, whether civil,
criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design"
to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less than
convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to
account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a
scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by
the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime is a mere emotional
appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed
injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his
conviction is reversed must be rejected as an warrant
presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case
the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of
the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding
that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public
whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO
GR L-1990 March 15, 1950 Shelumiel
Espaldon
FACTS: Frisco Holgado was charged with slight illegal detention. On

the trial day, the court asked him: Do you have an attorney or are you
222
going to plead guilty? To which he answered: I have no lawyer and I

will plead guilty. Two days later, the trial court convicted him for
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Holgado by

pleaing guilty without assistance of counsel
RULING: Yes.
When the defendant appears without an attorney, it is the courts duty
to:
1. inform defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before
being arraigned
2. after giving him such information, court must ask him if he
desires the aid of an attorney
3. if he desires the aid and is unable to employ attorney, court
must assign attorney de oficio to defend him
4. if accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, court must
grant him a reasonable time therefore.
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused

be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important
that it has become a constitutional right. It is not enough for the court
to appraise the accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign on de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.
223
PEOPLE VS. MAGSI

GR L-32888 August 12, 1983 Aretha
Eugenio
FACTS: Eloy Magsi and del Rosario, along with other accused were
charged and convicted with the murder of Jesus Gallardo. However,
only del Rosario went on appeal. He claims that the trial court erred
in appointing as counsel de officio, a lawyer who is the compadre of
the person killed by the accused. Del Rosario contends that because of
the special relationship with the deceased, the lawyer reluctantly
discharged his duties as counsel, after the court denied his repeated
petition to be relieved of such appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was valid.
RULING: No. It was established that Atty. Rivera and accused del
Rosario were not given opportunity to discuss the case together.
Moreover, the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the courts
prodding rather than from the spontaneity of the accused. Where
defendants are charged with capital offenses, mere pro forma
appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect and
defend the interest of the accused is not sufficient.
224
SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR L-65952 July 31, 1984
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: In the course of an investigation for qualified theft alleged to

have been committed by Thomas Tan, herein petitioner demanded
from the latter an amount of P4,000.00 as consideration for
dismissing the case. The same was reported to the NBI thus an
entrapment was made. A complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner with the public
respondent. Petitioner contends that an investigation cannot be
regarded as a contract of transaction within the purview of the said
Act hence cannot be convicted of violation thereof. Public respondent
then convicted him for Direct Bribery. Petitioner now raises the
defense of violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him considering that he was charged of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: Can the defense of the petitioner as regard to violation of his

Constitutional rights be sustained
RULING: No. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the

petitioner was not a contract. Neither was if a transaction because
this term is analogous to the former term. A transaction, like a
contract, is one, which involves some consideration, like a credit
transaction, and this element is absent in the investigation conducted
by the petitioner, thus he cannot be liable for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He however could be liable for Direct
Bribery. A reading of the information filed against him clearly shows
that the same is a case of Direct Bribery, thus he cannot claim that he
was deprived of his right to be informed. It is not the title of the
information that counts but the contents thereof.
225
BORJA V. MENDOZA
GR L-45667 June 29, 1977 Jay
Gernale
FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of the crime of slight physical

injuries by Judge Senining without the process of arraignment. Upon
appeal, Judge Mendoza also convicted the accused without however
requiring him of the memorandum for such. A petitition for certiorari
was brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused was

violated
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the infirmity of the
municipal judge in not arraigning first the accused before convicting
him was upheld by the trial judge by simply convicting him of the
same. The due process was not present when the accused was
convicted even without his presence during the trial and that the
proceeding was without arraignment. Thus, the court nullified and set
aside the decision of Judge Senining because the accused should be
arraigned first. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Mendoza is
nullified and set aside for failure to correct the erroneous decision of
the precedent judge and failure to require the accused to come up
with a memorandum. Thus the accuseds constitutional right to
arraignment, and information was violated. Decision is remanded to
the trial court.
226
CONDE VS. RIVERA

GR L-21741 January 25, 1924 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena,

Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for
various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses
and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only
to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more
than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she
was when originally charged.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner Conde was deprived of her right to a

speedy trial
RULING: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the

right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused
persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may
go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. .
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without
resources, but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the
other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal
227
obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
228
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL

GR 102485 May 22, 1995
Yves Dalisay
FACTS: Defendant and several others were charged with Robbery

with Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries. They pleaded
not guilty during the arraignment. The hearing was postponed to
September 20, 1991 because the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
cannot contact his material witnesses. On the said date, however, the
prosecutor failed to appear, prompting the respondent Judge
Ochotorena to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The motion for
reconsideration was based on the fact that September 20 is a legal
holiday for Muslims. Such motion was denied by respondent judge,
contending that the court or the defendant may move for dismissal
when the plaintiff does not appear during trial or prosecutes his
action for an unreasonable length of time, and that the acquittal that
he granted would amount to double jeopardy if subsequent
prosecutions be commenced against the defendant. The present
action of certiorari seeks to hold respondent judge guilty of having
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he dismissed the criminal complaint for failure to
prosecute despite prosecutions failure to prosecute stems from a
valid reason. The respondent judge justifies his act on the rights of
the accused to speedy trial and double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants rights to speedy trial and

against double jeopardy were violated
RULING: In dismissing criminal cases based on the right of the

accused to speedy trial, courts should balance the right of the accused
and the right of the State to punish people who violate its penal laws.
Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process.
Public prosecutors failure to attend the hearing was based on
his good faith and belief that said date was a Muslim Legal Holiday.
He cannot be faulted because even the Provincial Prosecutors office
was closed that day to observe that holiday.
With regard to the accuseds right to a speedy trial, what
offends such right is the unjustified postponements which prolong
trial for an unreasonable length of time. The hearing for the case was
postponed only twice, the first without the counsel for the defendants
objection, while the second was for a valid cause. Respondent judge
erred in holding that the defendant was unjustly delayed by the
prosecution.
Private respondents cannot invoke double jeopardy. Verily,
dismissal on ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an
229
acquittal that would bar further prosecution. However, the right to a

speedy trial must have been clearly violated. Such cannot be applied
in the case at bar, for no violations by the State against the
defendants right to a speedy trial was made.
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE TV OF TRIAL OF JOSEPH

ESTRADA
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Several members of the media petitioned for the live

coverage of the judicial proceedings of Joseph Estradas plunder case,
on the grounds of freedom of the press and the peoples right to
information.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition should be granted
RULING: No. The Supreme Court prohibited live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings
for news purposes were limited and restricted.
The propriety of granting or denying the petition involve the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and
right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused on the other hand. Jurisprudence shows that in
such case the rights of the accused prevail.
Due process guarantees the accused the presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proven in a trial that is not made an
object of public attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded.
230
PEOPLE VS. SALAS

GR L-66469 July 29, 1986
Nhorrie Franco
FACTS: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI
of Cebu but before he could be arraigned, the case was reinvestigated
on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the investigation,
amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which
he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress,
the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide,
succeeded in deceiving the said court into granting him bail and
ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent judge,
learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and
ordered Abongs re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the
constitutional provision authorizing trial in absential under certain
circumstances. Respondent judge denied the motion, however, and
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. The order
of the trial court is now on certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: Did the judge err in denying the motion and suspended all
proceedings pursuant to Section 14 paragraph 2, Article III of the
Constitution
231
RULING: The judge erred. He mistakenly allowed himself to be

tethered by the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed
it from the broader perspective of its intendment.
The doctrine laid down in People vs. Avancea has been
modified by Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution which allows
trial in absentia. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his
continued prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only
that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the
trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The right to be
present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage
where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify
the accused. The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of
this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to
remedy a situation in which criminal prosecution could not move
because the accused has either escaped or jumped bail.
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALAO

GR 92415 May 14, 1991 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Quiambao is a businessman engaged in the business of

selling textile materials in Baguio and Benguet. One day he went to
Benguet with his driver and four Muslims rode with them. He went to
several towns in Benguet to collect fees from his customers. On their
way back to Baguio, Magpalao declared a hold-up and his companions
served as lookouts. A fight ensued injuring the driver, the Muslims
wanted to direct the fierra to a ravine and they all jumped out for
safety. Quiambao and his driver were able to hitch with a vegetable
truck but the latter died the next day due to the stab wounds. One of
the accused escaped while being treated in the hospital, so trial in
absentia continued as to him.
232
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal could be made while on trial in

absentia
RULING: The appeal of the one who escaped should be dismissed, he

has waived his right to seek relief from the court. If he fails to appear
within fifteen days, his right to appeal is deemed waived. His act of
escaping is unjustified and could not be used to his advantage.
PEOPLE VS. ENGRACIO VALERIANO Y TUMAHIG,

MACARIO E. ACABAL, ET AL.
GR 103604-05 September 23, 1993
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: The information for frustrated murder alleged that

immediately after the commission of the murder charged in Criminal
Case No. 4585, the accused hacked and struck Wilson Silvano, son of
233
the victim in the murder case, with bladed weapons such as bolos and
pinuti inflicting upon him multiple hack wounds which would have
produced the crime of murder were it not for the timely and able
medical assistance given to him. It also alleged that the crime was
committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity, and that craft,
fraud or disguise were employed.
At the arraignment, all the accused, except the John Does who
remained unidentified and at large, pleaded not guilty in both cases.
Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, joint trial was ordered by
the trial court. Trial on the merits was conducted. But a fire gutted
the building and the records of these two cases were burned. The
records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the
prosecuting fiscal. The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken,
however, before it could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano
jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest was returned unserved
because he could not be found. An alias warrant for his arrest was
issued but he remains at large up to the present.
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi because "[i]t was not
shown by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to go to the scene of the crime and to return to the place of
residence." Upon the other hand, it ruled that "the prosecution
witnesses clearly, positively identified them as the culprits, they being
neighbors for a long time." All accused filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for immediate release,
which was denied. A day earlier, accused Macario Acabal and Juanito
Rismundo had filed their notice of
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid trial and judgment can be rendered in

the absence of the accused
RULING: The trial court erred in holding that no penalty could be

imposed on accused Engracio Valeriano because he "is nowhere to be
found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or
at large." The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after
he had been arraigned, just before the retaking of evidence
commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution
permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned
provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to
appear thereat is unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a
justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly,
after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case
and promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in
the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel,
234
provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the

promulgation is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
US VS. TAN TENG

GR 7081 September 5, 1912 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Tan Teng was charged with raping a 7 year old girl. Accused
held that there was error because a chemical analysis was taken from
him while he was confined in jail. It appeared that defendant went to
the house of the sister of the victim. Tan Teng followed the 7 year old
into her room to ask for face powder then raped her. The sister of the
victim discovered that the latter was suffering from gonorrhea. The 7
year old recounted the story to her older sister. An order was then
given to gather all chinamen to look for the rapist. Tan Teng was not
present at first then, upon his arrival, he was positively identified. He
was then ordered arrested and stripped off of his clothes. A substance
was taken from him and the results showed that he was suffering from
gonorrhea.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can invoke his right to self-
incrimination
RULING: The substance was taken from his body without objection. It
was made by competent medical authority. It would have been
different if it was the blood stained shirt or any other evidence that
was taken from him. The right to self-incrimination is to prohibit use
of physical or moral compulsion and not exclusion of his body as
evidence. Therefore, he cannot invoke the right mentioned.
235
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

GR 16444 September 8, 1920 Sarah
Abraham
FACTS: Emerita Villaflor and Florentino Sovingco were charged with

the crime of adultery. The assistant fiscal filed a petition to order
Villaflor to submit her body for an examination by one or two
competent doctors to determine whether she was pregnant or not.
The court granted the petition. Villaflor refused to obey the order on
the ground that such examination was a violation of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination. Because of her refusal she was
found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she submits herself to the medical examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order is violative of the constitutional

provision against self- incrimination
RULING: No. The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself is
limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. Thus, a person may be compelled to submit himself to a
physical/ medical examination to determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused.
236
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

Genevive Gutierrez
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON
Genevive Gutierrez
FACTS: the petitioner was ordered to appear before the provincial

fiscal to take dictation in this handwriting from the latter, for the
purpose of comparing the petitioners handwriting and determining
whether he wrote the alleged documents to be falsified. The petitioner
challenged himself the order, invoking his constitutional right to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writing from the fiscals dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latters handwriting
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional prohibition
RULING: The order challenged by the petitioner is unconstitutional.

Writing is something more than moving the body, hand or fingers.
Writing is not purely mechanical act but requires the application of
intelligence and attention.
Petitioner furnished a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier. There is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen
of his handwriting. The witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. The latter is even more serious than the former since the
237
witness is compelled to write and create evidence which does not

exist.
PASCUAL, JR. VS. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

GR L-25018 May 26, 1969
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Petitioner-appellee Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for

prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondent
appellant Board of Medical Examiners (BME). Pascual alleged that at
the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality,
counsel for BME announced that he would present Pascual as their
first witness. Pascual, through counsel, objected invoking the right to
self-incrimination. BEM, however, insisted that on the second hearing,
Pascual would still be called upon to testify as witness, unless the
latter could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
The lower court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting BEM
to continue with the administrative case until a judicial disposition has
been made. Subsequently, the lower court rendered a decision
prohibiting BME from compelling Pascual to act and testify as a
238
witness against himself. Hence, BME and interveners Gatbontons,

filed this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the person proceeded against may be

compelled to take the witness stand
RULING: The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. As held
in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also, to take
the witness stand. The court also corrected the mistaken assumption
of BME and interveners that the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination should be limited to allowing the witnesses to object to
incriminatory questions. The court explained that the rights of the
accused stands for the belief that while the crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objectives should not be accomplished according to the means and
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality.
PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN

GR L-26376 August 31, 1966
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Accused Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide for

killing Leonicio Bulaoat. Upon being arraigned, accused entered a
plea of guilt. However, he was allowed to present evidence to prove
239
mitigating circumstances. The accused testified to the effect that he

stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling
him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered
himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the above-
mentioned testimony of the accused, the court a quo rendered a
decision acquitting the accused. The prosecution appealed there from.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused by the trial court
for the offense charged without a valid plea would constitute double
jeopardy
RULING: Appellant's contention was given credit. A plea of guilty is

an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and
leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances. In this case, the defendant was only
allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for
the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not
be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. On the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the
accused, the proper course should have been for the court a quo to
take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the
case, as prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In
deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court
not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in
court and right to be heard. The existence of a plea is an essential
requisite to double jeopardy. In this case, the accused had first
entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the
course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances that he
acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore had the
effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court should have required
him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of
not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. There having been
no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of
acquittal; there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal.
Therefore, this case was remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings of plea by the defendant.
240
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA

GR L-24447 June 29, 1968 Nhorrie
Franco
FACTS: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that through

violence and intimidation, Obsania had carnal knowledge of one
Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will. Later, the fiscal amended the
complaint to allege therein that the offense was committed with lewd
designs. The accused after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the first information was fatally
defective for failing to allege "lewd designs," and that the amended
information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The judge
sustained the motion of the defense. Hence the appeal.
ISSUES: Did the trial court err in dismissing the case by failing to
distinguish between concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in
substance of an indictment. Whether or not the case was dismissed
without prior consent of the accused; hence, may the accused invoke
his Constitutional right particularly of double jeopardy
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd designs" in

the first information does not affect the sufficiency in substance of the
information, for unchaste motives are deemed inherent in the very act
of rape itself. In any case, the lower court erred in dismissing the case
by failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and
insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
As to the question of double jeopardy, the following requisites
must have been obtained to invoke the constitutional protection
against it:: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
As to the issue whether or not the case was dismissed without
the prior consent of the accused, the Supreme Court ruled that as a
general rule, when the case is dismissed, other than on the merits,
upon motion of the accused, such dismissal is to be regarded as with
the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to
have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped
from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in
another indictment for the same offense.
241
The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought by the

accused on the ground that they were denied their right to a speedy
trial and that the government failed to prosecute; in which case
double jeopardy will set in. The case of herein accused falls under the
general rule.
PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ

GR 103323 January 21, 1993 Francis
Villanueva
FACTS: The jeep ridden by private respondent and Barangay Captain

Castro Belme Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan Patrol ridden by
petitioners, the spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin, smothering the
former with dust. Mabuyo followed the Nissan Patrol until it entered
the back gate of Rattan Originals in Tanke, Talisay, Cebu. Inquiring
from a nearby security guard as to who owns the Nissan Patrol, he
was informed that it belonged to and was driven by petitioner Dr.
Ramon Paulin. Dr. Ramon Paulin and his wife, Angie, allegedly pointed
their guns at Mabuyo while Jose Bacho, a companion of the spouses,
acted as back-up. Mabuyo instructed one of the barangay tanods to
call the police in Talisay and the rest to block the exit of the spouses
and their lone companion.
Station Commander P/Lt. Ariel Palcuto filed a complaint for
"grave threats", the station commander filed a complaint for, "grave
threats and oral defamation," against private respondent Mabuyo.
Acting on a motion of the Spouses Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed
Criminal Case No. 5204. Mabuyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the said dismissal order which the court granted. At the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 5213, petitioners vigorously sought the setting
aside of the July 3, 1990 resolution in Criminal Case No. 5204, but the
same was denied in another resolution. Petitioners filed on July 31,
1990 a petition for "certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief for
preliminary injunction and the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. Judge Celso M. Gimenez, who dismissed the petition, The
decretal portion of the decision states: "All the foregoing considered,
for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading under the Rule
242
on Summary Procedure, as revised, the instant petition is hereby

dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipal trial court's dismissal of

Criminal Case No. 5204 against petitioners precludes a subsequent
reconsideration or reversal of such dismissal as the same would
violate petitioners' right against double jeopardy
RULING: The original case was dismissed without the proper

information having been filed, it appearing that the proper charge
should have been, "disturbance of public performance," punishable
under Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code instead of "grave
threats," under Article 282 of the same penal code. Petitioners' motion
to dismiss premised on procedural grounds cannot be considered a
demurrer to evidence nor was the dismissal sought by them
predicated on the denial of their right to speedy trial. The exceptions
mentioned find no application in the instant case, especially so
because when the municipal trial court dismissed the case upon
petitioners' motion, the prosecution still had to present several
witnesses
The municipal trial court thus did not violate the rule on double
jeopardy when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of
further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its
error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without
giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its
evidence.
243
PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT OF SILAY

GR L-43790 December 9, 1976
Laida Isidro
FACTS: Private respondents were charged with falsification by

private individuals and use of falsified document for falsifying a
sugar cane weight report card or tarjeta, a private document
showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias de la Paz.
Private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the
ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion,
respondent court dismissed the case.
The People filed a petition for review of the said decision.
Private respondents claim that there was no error in the dismissal of
the case and that to grant the present petition would place said
respondents in double jeopardy. People asserts that the plea of double
jeopardy is not tenable as the case was dismissed upon the motion of
the private respondents, and the dismissal having been made with
their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of double jeopardy is available to

private respondents.
RULING: The court held that although the case was dismissed on the
motion of the accused, it was noted that the motion was filed after the
prosecution has rested its case, allowing the respondent court to
determine the conviction or acquittal of the private respondents based
on the merits of the evidence presented. Thus, the dismissal of the
case on the merits results to the acquittal of the private respondents.
Even if respondent court erroneously dismissed the case thus
resulting to the miscarriage of justice, it cannot be denied that all the
elements of double jeopardy is present in this case: 1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of
the crime charged, 2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and 3) and
unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution has
rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused.
244
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA

GR L-45129 March 6, 1987 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: The Batangas City Police, together with personnel of the

Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant,
searched Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been
installed, without the necessary authority from the city government,
and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned
by the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions
were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric
meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the
subsequent investigation, Opulencia admitted in a written statement
that he did install the electrical devices to lower the readings of his
electric meter. An information was filed against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1. The Batangas City Court dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time
of its discovery, and it appearing further that the information was filed
by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense
charged.
Fourteen days later, another information was filed against
Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article
308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code. Before he could be arraigned, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion
to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof
was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The
Motion to Quash was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second information constitutes double

jeopardy
245
RULING: Yes. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that
it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The second sentence of Article IV (22)
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged
are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of
an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under
either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other.
In the case at bar, the relevant acts took place within the same
time frame. During the same period, Manuel Opulencia had electrical
wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary
permit from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he
effected such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of
reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from
the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. In other
words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the
unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
GENEROSO ESMEA AND ALBERTO ALBA VS. JUDGE

POGOY
GR L-54110 February 20, 1981
Isabel Oliver
FACTS: Petitioners Generoso Esmea and Alberto Alba and their co-
accused, Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and Bernardo Villamira were
charged with grave coercion in the City Court of Cebu City for having
allegedly forced Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the Jaro
Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from
the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest
lost it in a game of cards.
The case was calendared on October 4, 1978 presumably for
arraignment and trial. Upon the telegraphic request of Father Tibudan
the case was reset on December 13, 1978. Because Esmea and Alba
were not duly notified of that hearing, they were not able to appear.
The two pleaded not guilty at their arraignment. No trial was held
after the arraignment because complainant Father Tibudan requested
the transfer of the hearing to another date.
246
Since the fiscal lost his record of the case, the hearing
scheduled was cancelled at his instance. Respondent judge issued an
order setting the trial "for the last time on August 16, 1979, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning". When the case was called on that date, the
fiscal informed the court that the private prosecutor received from
complainant Father Tibudan a telegram stating that he was sick. The
counsel for petitioners Esmea and Alba opposed the cancellation of
the hearing. They invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy
trial. Respondent judge provisionally dismissed the case as to the four
accused who were present because it "has been dragging all along
and the accused are ready for the hearing" but the fiscal was not
ready with his witness. The court noted that there was no medical
certificate indicating that the complainant was really sick. The case
was continued as to the fifth accused who did not appear at the
hearing. His arrest was ordered twenty-seven days later, the fiscal
filed a motion for the revival of the case. He attached to his motion a
medical certificate under oath attesting to the fact that Father
Tibudan was sick of influenza.
Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of double jeopardy. They pointed out that they did not consent
to the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the provisional
dismissal amounted to an acquittal which placed them in jeopardy. Its
revival would place them in double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused will be placed on double jeopardy
RULING: For legal jeopardy to exist, there should be (a) a valid

complaint or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction
and (c) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or information. When these three conditions exists, the
acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination
of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is included therein.
The petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional
dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would
not have place the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had
taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their
consent The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to
the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in
jeopardy.
247
PEOPLE VS. DELA TORRE

GR 137953-58 April 11, 2002 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Dela Torre was charged of several counts of rape and acts of
lasciviousness against his eleven year old daughter. While the trial
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, it did not impose on
him the penalty of death on the ground that mitigating circumstances
were present. The prosecution seeks to increase the penalty as it was
proven that the victim was his daughter who was a minor when the
crimes took place.
ISSUE: Whether or not increasing of penalty constitutes double

jeopardy
RULING: Yes. Where the accused did not appeal his conviction, an
appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed
places the accused in double jeopardy. The prosecution cannot appeal
on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty. Also, assuming the imposed penalty was indeed erroneous,
the proper action is to petition for certiorari for grave abuse of
discretion.
248
FRIVALDO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR 87193 June 21, 1989
Michelene Malasa
FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of

the province of Sorsogon and assumed the office. The League of
Municipalities of Sorsogon filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's proclamation on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election. In his answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States but pleaded that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos.
Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court to ask that the said orders
be set aside.
Pending resolution of the petition, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the
COMELEC and required comments from the respondents. The
Solicitor General supported the contention of respondents that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated
himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. Frivaldo insisted
that he was a Filipino citizen because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. In support he
cited the Nottebohm Case, where a German national's naturalization
in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for
reasons of convenience only. His oath in his certificate of candidacy
that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. In addition, his active participation in the congressional
elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of
the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was Filipino citizen at the time of

his election as provincial governor of Sorsogon
RULING: In the petitioners certificate of candidacy, he described

himself as a "natural born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention
of any subsequent loss of such status. As an enemy of Marcos at that
time, the Supreme Court disagree that as a consequence thereof he
249
was coerced into embracing American citizenship. There were many

other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as he, even
subject to greater risk than petitioner, who did not find it necessary to
abandon their status as Filipinos. The Nottebohm case cited by the
petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which was held not applicable in this case because it dealt
with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided
by a third state. No third state was involved in this case. Petitioner
should have disavowed his American citizenship and reacquired
Philippine citizenship in accordance with the Philippine law either by
the direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Petitioners claim that by actively participating in the elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the
United States, thus repatriating himself was not well-taken by the
Court. The alleged forfeiture was between him and the United States
as his adopted country. Such forfeiture did not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. There are procedures to be taken under our laws
to restore his former citizenship by formally rejecting their adopted
state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines. Therefore,
the petition was dismissed and petitioner was declared not a citizen of
the Philippines.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO

GR 135083 May 26, 1999 Yves
Dalisay
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and private respondent Eduardo

Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. Private respondent won. His proclamation was
however suspended due to a pending disqualification suit filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril, alleging that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
The Second Division of Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
granted Mamarils petition, contending private respondent is a dual
citizen and therefore, disqualified to run for public elections. The
COMELEC en banc however, reversed said decision and held that
being born in the United States did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, especially as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship nor took an oath of allegiance to the United States. The
instant petition for certiorari seeks to reverse such decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is disqualified to run for public office
250
RULING: No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The

former arises when, because of concurrent application of different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. The latter arises when a person is
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states.
Mere dual citizenship does not disqualify a person from running
for public office. All that is needed is for them to file their certificate
of candidacy and such constitutes election of Philippine citizenship
that terminates their status as persons with dual citizenship.
In the case at bar, although private respondent was born in the
United States and at birth he is considered an American citizen, his
filing of certificate of candidacy was enough to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen.
TECSON VS. COMELEC

GR 161434 March 3, 2004
Cheryl Banaria
FACTS: Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy in the
COMELEC for the highest position in the land the presidency. In his
certificate of candidacy, he declared himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen. One Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition for the disqualification
of FPJ alleging that the latter made a misrepresentation in its
certificate of candidacy for FPJ was not a natural-born citizen. Fornier
argues that FPJ cannot be a natural-born citizen for his mother was an
251
American and his father was a Spanish national. If in case his father
became a Filipino, FPJ cannot transmit his fathers citizenship for he
was an illegitimate son.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. was a natural-born Filipino

citizen
RULING: The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include

"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Based from the evidence presented by both parties, what has been
established are the following facts: a) the parents of FPJ were Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley; b) FPJ was born on them on Aug. 20, 1939; c)
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on Sept. 16,
1940; d) the father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and e) at the time
of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The presented birth certificate of FPJ shows that, FPJs father
did not sign the said document. But as held in the case of Pareja vs.
Pareja, other public documents which can prove the voluntary
recognition of Allan F. Poe of him being the father of FPJ can either be
executed by private individuals which, must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of
their office.
In the case of FPJ, a duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of FPJs mother, submitted to the COMELEC
declaring that Allan F. Poe recognized FPJ as his son. This declaration
was duly accepted as an alternative in proving Allan F. Poe
recognizing FPJ as his son.
Petitioner argues that the grandfather of FPJ cannot be deemed
to be a Filipino citizen because none of the records show that the
grand father of FPJ was in the Philippines before its death,
particularly from 1898 to 1902. Since no record shows that the latter
was not in the Philippines before its death and theres a proof that he
died in San Carlos, Pangasinan, as stated in his death certificate, the
Supreme Court held that In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. The Supreme Court also ruled that it is very
doubtful for the Records Management and Archives Office to have a
record of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Therefore, the court ruled that: while the totality of the
evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held
guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
252
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate

his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity
given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation must
not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
BENGZON VS. HRET
Villanueva
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960,
of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. On
March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who

became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
RULING: To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he

possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen Filipino citizens who have
lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA No. 63) enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition
and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in
World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time; 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political and economic necessity. Repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided. Repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality. If he was originally a
253
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be

restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in
said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
254
MO YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF

IMMIGRATION
GR L-21289 October 4, 1971 Eliza
Yamamoto
FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeng applied of a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. It was granted for a period of one
month. It was extended to over a year. A few weeks before it was set
to expire, she contracted marriage with Mo Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino
citizen. The Commission of Immigration wanted to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation after her authorized
stay. However, she filed for a petition for injunction on the ground that
she has already acquired Filipino citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeng is a Filipino citizen by virtue

of her marriage to Mo Ya Lim Yao
RULING: The Court ruled that she is considered as a Filipino citizen

due to her marriage. Article 48 of the Civil Code provides for those
who can be citizens of the Philippines. Number 5 of the said article
provides that one can acquire Filipino citizenship through: 'THOSE
NATURALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW' which is applicable to
her. But this should be read as provided, that she possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. She was able to show
that she has the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
therefore she can be considered as having acquired the citizenship.
255

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SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

COLLEGE OF LAW ATTY. BRUCE RIVERA

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fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the

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SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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