176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual Citizenship

Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition
for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence
disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that
his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship,
Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian
citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio
who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government
of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in
1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his
Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be
naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this
happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply
by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian).
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to
preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.

2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should
be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

Aquino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito
Icaro, respondents

Sept, 18, 1995

Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In
his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284
Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won
against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted
with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2
June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack
of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:

1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the
sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:

1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide:

This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.

Mrs. Braid:

On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence.

Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.

The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent
of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short
of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.

Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.

The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .

Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His
birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a
registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.

Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.

Decision

Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati
City made permanent.

Dicta:

I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:

A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of
representatives electional tribunal

B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and
the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent
with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned
decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed
again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction

D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the
petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for
less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in
Makati.

F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of
canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the
erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or
a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute
winner.

II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents
in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this
particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where
she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became
a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation
of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil
Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an
act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.