Adm. Case No.

3086 February 23, 1988 the Manila International Airport the following foreign currencies in cash
ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, and in checks:
vs. Japanese Yen Y 32,800,000.00
THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City Branch 113, respondent. Swiss Franc SW. FR 6,9000.00
RESOLUTION
Australian Dollar A$ 17,425.00
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Singapore Dollar S$ 9,945.00
Customs, Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115,
Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to gross Deutsche Marck DM 18,595.00
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P,
Canadian Dollar CS 13,330.00
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense
charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out of the country. Hongkong Dollar HK$ 15,630.00
Required by the Court to answer the complaint, the respondent judge filed an Answer, dated
October 6, 1987, reciting his "commendable record as a fearless prosecutor" since his HFL Guilder HFL 430.00
appointment as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila on December 4, 1962, until his appointment
eventually as RTC Judge on February 18, 1983; that at in the reorganization of the judiciary French Franc F/6,860.00
after the February 26, 1986 revolution, he was reappointed to his present position; that his length
of service as prosecutor and judge is "tangible proof that would negate the allegations of the US Dollar US$ 73,950.00
petitioner" (should be complainant), whereas the latter did not last long in the service for reasons
English Pound 5,318.00
only known to him; that the decision involved in the complaint was promulgated by respondent
on September 29, 1986, but the complaint against him was filed only on August 6, 1987, a clear Malaysian Dollar M$. 14,760.00
indication of malice and ill-will of the complainant to subject respondent to harassment,
humiliation and vindictiveness; that his decision, of which he submits a copy (Annex A) as part (in checks)
of his Answer, is based on "fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and justice" and
that if there are mistakes or errors in the questioned decision, they are committed in good faith. Australian Dollar A$ 7,750.00
Accordingly, respondent prays for the dismissal of the petition (should be complaint).
The issue before the Court is whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence British Pound 700.00
or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question. A judge can not be held to
account or answer, criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by US Dollar US$ 17,630.00
him in good faith. Canadian Dollar C$ 990.00
The case in which the respondent rendered a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fai,
who was caught by a Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to without authority from the Central Bank.
smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. Lo Chi Fai, was Contrary to Law.
apprehended by a customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9, 1986, while on board The case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently raffled to
Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air Lines bound for Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension, Branch 113, presided by herein respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
he was found carrying with him foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces) Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central Bank provides as follows:
amounting to US$ 355,349.57, in various currency denominations, to wit: Japanese Yen, Swiss Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange; exceptions. No person shall
Franc, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder, French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in
Pound, Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any any form, out of the Philippines directly, through other persons, through the
authority as provided by law. At the time the accused was apprehended, he was able to exhibit mails or through international carriers except when specifically authorized
two currency declarations which he was supposed to have accomplished upon his arrival in by the Central Bank or allowed under existing international agreements or
Manila in previous trips, namely, CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated May 4, 1986 for Central Bank regulations.
US$39,600.00 and Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
June 29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00. Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai, with the RTC of Pasay City for violation of Sec. foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the
6, Central Bank Circular No. 960, as follows: amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1986, in the City of Pasay, Metro and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their
above-named accused, Mr. LO CHI FAI, did then and there wilfully, foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to take out of the Philippines through entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1, P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign Exchange . That any person who
shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in
violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall
be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal, (minimum of 12 years and I day
and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
At the trial, the accused tried to establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong,
engaged in the garment business, in which he had invested 4 to 5 million Hongkong Dollars;
that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 1 0 times, although the only dates he could remember
were April 2, 1986, May 4, 1986, June 28,1986, and July 8, 1986; that the reason for his coming
to the Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines and also to play in the casino; that
he had a group of business associates who decided to invest in business with him, namely:
Wakita Noboyuki, Kobayashi Nabuo, Lee Shiang Pin, Lee Chin and Cze Kai Kwan, who had
their own businesses in Japan and Hongkong; that when he came to the Philippines on April
2,1986, he brought US$50,000.00 and 8,500,000.00 Japanese Yen which he tried to declare but
the Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration, until he could get a
confirmation as to the source of the money, for which reason he contacted his bank in Hongkong
and a telex was sent to him on April 3,1986 (Exh. 4). He also brought in with him US$39,000.00
and 4,000,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on May 4,1986 which he declared (Exh. 1).
Again, he declared 8,600,000.00 Japanese Yen when he arrived on June 28, 1986 (Exh. 2). He
also testified that his business associates, as per their agreement to invest in some business with
him in the Philippines, started putting their money for this purpose in a common fund, hence,
every time anyone of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the money they were
bringing in, and all declarations were handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations
were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense. When asked by the court why he did not
present all of these declarations when he was apprehended at the airport, his answer was that he
was not asked to present the declaration papers of his associates, and besides, he does not
understand English and he was not told to do so. He also testified on cross-examination that the
reason he was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all the money intended to be invested
in the Philippines was because of the fear of his group that the "revolution" taking place in
Manila might become widespread. It was because of this fear that he was urged by his associates
to come to Manila on July 8, 1986 to bring the money out of the Philippines.
The respondent judge, in his decision acquitting the accused, stated:
The factual issue for this Court to determine is whether or not the accused
wilfully violated Section 6 of Circular No. 960. The fact that the accused
had in his possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart
from the Philippines did not by that act alone make him liable for Violation
of Section 6.
What is imperative is the purpose for which the act of bringing foreign
currencies out of the country was done the very intention. It is that which
qualifies the act as criminal or not. There must be that clear intention to
violate and benefit from the act done. Intent is a mental state, the existence
of which is shown by overt acts of a person.
The respondent proceeded to analyze the evidence which, according to him, tended to show that
the accused had no wilfull intention to violate the law. According to the respondent in his
decision:
... this Court is persuaded to accept the explanation of the defense that the
currencies confiscated and/or seized from the accused belong to him and his
business associates abovenamed. And from the unwavering and
unequivocal testimonies of Mr. Templo and all of currencies in question
came from abroad and not from the local source which is what is being
prohibited by the government. Yes, simply reading the provisions of said
circular will, readily show that the currency declaration is required for the
purpose of establishing the amount of currency being brought by tourist or
temporary non-resident visitors into the country. The currency declarations,
therefore, is already (sic) intended to serve as a guideline for the Customs
authorities to determine the amounts actually brought in by them to
correspond to the amounts that could be allowed to be taken out. Indeed,
this Court is amazed and really has its misgivings in the manner currency
declarations were made as testified to by the Central Bank employees. Why
the Bureau of Customs representative never took part in all these
declarations testified to by no less than five (5) Central Bank employees?
Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of these travellers. It is the
hope of this Court that the authorities must do something to remedy the
evident flaw in the system for effective implementation of the questioned
Central Bank Circular No. 960.
But even with a doubtful mind this Court would not be able to pin criminal
responsibility on the accused. This is due to its steadfast adherence and
devotion to the rule of law-a factor in restoring the almost lost faith and
erosion of confidence of the people in the administration of justice. Courts
of Justice are guided only by the rule of evidence.
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to
know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished
by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by
his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had in his possession the amount of
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces),
without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law. At the time of his
apprehension, he was able to exhibit only two foreign currency declarations in his possession.
These were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his previous trips to the Philippines.
Although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 960, the respondent nonetheless chose to exonerate the accused based on his
defense that the foreign currency he was bringing out of the country at the time he was
apprehended by the customs authorities were brought into the Philippines by him and his alleged
business associates on several previous occasions when they came to the Philippines,
supposedly to be used for the purpose of investing in some unspecified or undetermined business
ventures; that this money was kept in the Philippines and he precisely came to the Philippines
to take the money out as he and his alleged business associates were afraid that the "attempted
revolution" which occurred on July 6,1986 might spread. Such fantastic tale, although totally
irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused under the information, was
swallowed by the respondent-judge "hook, line and sinker." It did not matter to the respondent
that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the
accused when he was apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the
accused at the trial. It did not matter to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted,
in effect, that he was a carrier" of foreign currency for other people. The respondent closed his
eyes to the fact that the very substantial amounts of foreign exchange found in the possession
of the accused at the time of his apprehension consisted of personal checks of other people, as
well as cash in various currency denominations (12 kinds of currency in all), which clearly
belied the claim of the accused that they were part of the funds which he and his supposed
associates had brought in and kept in the Philippines for the purpose of investing in some
business ventures. The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB Currency declarations
presented by the defense at the trial were declarations belonging to other people which could
not be utilized by the accused to justify his having the foreign exchange in his possession.
Although contrary to ordinary human experience and behavior, the respondent judge chose to
give credence to the fantastic tale of the accused that he and his alleged business associates had
brought in from time to time and accumulated and kept in the Philippines foreign exchange (of
very substantial amounts in cash and checks in various foreign currency denominations) for the
purpose of investing in business even before they knew and had come to an agreement as to the
specific business venture in which they were going to invest. These and other circumstances
which make the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the
findings of the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the accused,
thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the decision "in good faith." His actuations
in this case amount to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair
administration of justice.
He not only acquitted the accused Lo Chi Fai, but directed in his decision the release to the
accused of at least the amount of US$3,000.00, allowed, according to respondent, under Central
Bank Circular No. 960. This, in spite of the fact that forfeiture proceedings had already been
instituted by the Bureau of Customs over the currency listed in the information, which according
to the respondent should be respected since the Bureau of Customs "has the exclusive
jurisdiction in the matter of seizure and forfeiture of the property involved in the alleged
infringements of the aforesaid Central Bank Circular." In invoking the provisions of CB Circular
No. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the respondent judge again
displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. There is nothing in the said CB
Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said amount of U.S.
Currency to the accused. According to the above-cited CB Circular, tourists may take out or
send out from the Philippines foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them; for the purpose of establishing such amount, tourists or
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in
other foreign currencies must declare their foreign exchange at points of entries upon arrival in
the Philippines. In other words, CB Circular No. 960 merely provides that for the purpose of
establishing the amount of foreign currency brought in or out of the Philippines, a tourist upon
arrival is required to declare any foreign exchange he is bringing in at the time of his arrival, if
the same exceeds the amount of US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies. There
is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to him the amount of at least US$3,000.00,
if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange in excess of said amount without specific
authority from the Central Bank.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon,
guilty of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct
affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the
just and proper administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining
the people's faith in the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered
that the Respondent Judge be DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement benefits
and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with prejudice to his being
reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned and/or controlled
agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision*
of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to
the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been
clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for
the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did
not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another
problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to
purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner,
representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his
needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no
sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS
Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President,
Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he
requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the
equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon
Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short
term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of
Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful performance of
its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory
completion of the entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause
1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby
LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent
with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were
delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who,
unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured,
Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer
banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two
(2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were
the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held
momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient
funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859
dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43
and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the
garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng
was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon
Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks
were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-
petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695
and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in
subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this
Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by
the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the
"warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng
is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement
subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service
equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the
transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash
out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the
equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment
on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the
additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price.
As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for
the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed
to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and
just that the warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it
was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust
"debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while,
said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised
and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even
know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation
was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the
transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to
divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery,
gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the
supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or
lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately
need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances
victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing
of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing
equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim
off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal
sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the
refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the
contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should
be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit"
for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor
encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention
of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the
prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed
the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely
said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose
operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not
be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition,
Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon
that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society.
This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon
a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an
external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the
amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note
also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual
and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks
were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account
or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the
"potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified
by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by
the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the
"warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the
accused to complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the
leasing agreement by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced
 by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee and that as the unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount nor for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that the amount was b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the
already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may
that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.
We have already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe-
the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the keeping or as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.
element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
account or for value it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and
being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in payment regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the
of an obligation. depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only
issuance of the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the deposits payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-
checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or
the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30) or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of
same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have
guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty been different if this predicament was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with
deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.
interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby
even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced". SO ORDERED.
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the
warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:
And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused
violated BP Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which
are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases ofmala
prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof
of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the
acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good
faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for
said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-
terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the
more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that
certain facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain
so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is,

G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y
MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite,
under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the
decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body
of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda
which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior
strength, and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the
wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting
in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin
Samson y Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals by direct participation of the crime of murder for the death of
Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance
in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The
accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal
penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS
DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
SUPPRESSION BY THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS
FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE
OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-
appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982,
a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of
ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As
the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a
can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of
the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring
the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to
Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police
officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal
building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion
and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants
for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured
a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the
accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his
statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him
on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on
Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole
basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that
"even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing
testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable
testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the
case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption
that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime.
In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo
Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of
pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by
Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed.
Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does
not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs.
Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<re||an1w> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for
the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange
for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book
during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify
and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she
never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was
tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the
other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion.
Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants
quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on
the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body
was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-
examination that you were reading comics when you
saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and
lighted by Samson. How could you possibly see that
incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw
what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured
with gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a
talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I
was trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago
you had a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you
told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to
know from you, if that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his
ass, do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay
will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to
pour gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on
his ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and
then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did
Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on
Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to
know he was going to pour gasoline that is why you
prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline.
I thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with
a stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline,
is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that
the time you told him not to pour gasoline when he
merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour
gasoline he was already in the process of pouring
gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was
while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion
warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of
criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the
commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay
or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the
accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed
by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having
taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents
on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging
smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same.
Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence
arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making
fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
 A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it
is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery
as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage"
(p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill
the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his
act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to
exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed
the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call
be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on
fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of
the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony
defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place
in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code
provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there
is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified
that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn,
June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<re||an1w>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's
parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00.
Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00
as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the
accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal
of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the
motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief,
not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having
been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to
file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and
private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek
relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the
Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to
review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance
on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an
accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped
bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the
mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section
8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could
be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds
status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light
of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would
have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided
in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to
give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2)
a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a
generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not
a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent
to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification
or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce
the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13,
specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety.
But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a
grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision
mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal
negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class,
or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x
[but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article
365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found
expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the
complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be
shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception
of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting
act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless
driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court,
that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution
for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in
1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero 27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported,
per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon
J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v.
City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan,
where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property
thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable
as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-
war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the
second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid
to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused
for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which
the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the
strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case
of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan,
22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence
of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in
the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable
as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places
the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if
double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then
the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage
to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of
a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend
in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting
jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court
initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them
(Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and
another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed
by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case
No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending
that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose
Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one
for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of
the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following
language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney
filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have
been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of
Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit
the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to
light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should
such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and
filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach
the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies
because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized
as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act
penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less
grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-
crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-
conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its
conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a
quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double
jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to
make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and
intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes
under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace
x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven.
In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006
and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1477 January 18, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
Mariano A. Albert for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Francisco A. Carreon for
appellee.
PER CURIAM, J.:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2746, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C.
Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the
of the deceased Simeon Valera (or Barrela) in the sum of P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided
over by the honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before arraignment,
counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The
court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the accused to questions
propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he was not suffering from any
mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for Hospital, there to be examined
by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according
to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National
Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said report (Exhibit L), under the heading
"Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was
not a single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under
observation.
The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narcosynthesis. That the narco-synthesis was
successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only
reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive
behind the act.
Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in
Mr. Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right
from wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally
decided to suffer for it in any manner or form.
His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative
thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those
of an individual with a sound mind.
On the other hand he is an man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a
decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission
of the act at Plaza Miranda.
What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of
some overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an
employee in la Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Manzano,
a Span-wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them.
One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being provoked to a fight
several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before
when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila,
after hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not
insane but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
Final Diagnosis
Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis.
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary
opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the
court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tired, as he was tired, for the offenses he
committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the
Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between
the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present
criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affirmed with any
particular political group, has voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held
in 1946. Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the
Commonwealth and subsequently President of the President of the Philippine Republic.
According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas,
instead of looking after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval
of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas,
the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held
by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila attended by a big crowd, President
Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and
gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a platform erected for that purpose
and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousand of listeners of the
advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having
lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given
him by an American soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two
bottles of whisky. He had likewise been weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either
by going to Malacaan, or following his intended victim in the latter's trips to provinces, for
instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to speak, but having
encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at
Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that he went to the house of Amando Hernandez whom he requested to
prepare for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their pervious understanding in the
preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion
of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its materially in this case, we deem it
proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An English translation (Exhibit B-2)
from its original Tagalog reads:
FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I
carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this
 act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was
my duty.
I did not expected to live long; I only had on life to spare. And had I expected to lives
to spare, I would not have hesitated either ton sacrifice it for the sake of a principle
which was the welfare of the people.
Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands,
of their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their
hopes were frustrated.
I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all
this: he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with no other purpose than
to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future
generations. For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life would mean
nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls. And why should I not
give up my life too if only the good of those eighteen million souls.
These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up
the consequences of my act. I t matters not if others will curse me. Time and history
will show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in my
performance of my said act.
Hurrah for a free Philippines.
Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
May God pity on me.
Amen.
JULIO C. GUILLEN
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by
his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for
which reason said Exhibit B-1 appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at
Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a
paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a
plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he
stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven meters, he
hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed his speech, was being
congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castaeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and without
losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards
an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to do the least harm; and,
covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The
grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a group of persons who were standing
close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that
the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela ) who died on
the following day as the result of mortal wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade
(Exhibits F and F-1) Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence.
It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one spectators at that meeting, saw how a person
who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away
towards a barber shop located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person
was the thrower of the object that exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in
holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape.
Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the
author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and
some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio
Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years
and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours
after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police
headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the
platform the object which exploded and whom Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although
at the same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also
indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so called last will quoted above and
marked Exhibit B, which was then unsigned by him and subsequently signed at the police
headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-
1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement
which contained his answers to question propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila
Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary
statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the declarations and made by him on the
witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned
allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder
for the death of Simeon Varela"; second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime
of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third, "in applying sub-section 1 of article 49 of the
Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused"; andfourth, "in
considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of
public authorities in the commission of crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused,
shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him
two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas,
he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand grenades in his possession at
President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent the persons who were around
his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly explosive
nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page
96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that
his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were
some people around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who
surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the President, in view of the fact that those
persons, being loyal to the President being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter.
In other word, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the
President, he felt no conjunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing
the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of
homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less
serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio
Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the different
felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the penalty to be
imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance
with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony
incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words by over acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accident
of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that either malice other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused
nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should on the four other persons already named as merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the In this connection, it should be stated that , although there is abundant proof that , in violation
actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, of the provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed
vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure
Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at him in his official capacity as the
be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the appropriate
Squarely on the point by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain: allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall refrain making a
Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar finding to that effect.
tabaco, y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira a quel sin mediar entre The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with
ambos disputa alguna; pero; trnscurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating circumstance. But
calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero; supuesta la no intencion en A we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating circumstances because in any event
de matar a C y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that the penalty for the most serious
de c de imprudencia temeraria? La Sala de lo Criminal de la Auudiencia de of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion
Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorse anos de reclusion por el temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.)
homivcidio y a un ao de prision correctional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme penalty provided
muerte del estanquero debio calificarse de assesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
ejecutado con aleviosa. es evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we
propusiera ejecutaria el procesado, no pudo calificarse de imprudencia teme raria, sino hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with
que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo puesto en este article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working
apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the record shall have been remanded.
hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato It is so ordered.
en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que en el antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos JJ., concur.
del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo
muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 junio de 1872.
(Gaceta de 1,0 de agosto.) (I Viada, 5th Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The
case before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that a
throwing highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave
felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple
attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and
Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the
case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could
in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware of it. In the same case it was
held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly taken into the
account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one who
became his victim.
G.R. No. L-38773 December 19, 1933 intention in some of his letters to the deceased by way of a threat to induce him to accept his
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GINES proposal for the benefit of his daughter. That the act of the appellant in stabbing the deceased
ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant. resulted in the fatal wound at the base of his neck, was due solely to the fact hereinbefore
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta, for appellant. mentioned that appellant did not have control of his right arm on account of paralysis and the
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. blow, although intended for the face, landed at the base of the
AVANCEA, C.J.: neck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the
The judgment appealed from finds the appellants Gines Alburquerque guilty of the crime of death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
homicide committed on the person of Manuel Osma and sentences him to eight years and one authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
day of prision mayor, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with consideration in favor of the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Under the facts above stated, we cannot entertain the appellant's contention that he acted in
The appellant herein, who is a widower of fifty-five years of age and father of nine living legitimate self-defense inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping
children, has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time, walks dragging one leg and out and brandishing his penknife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
has lost control of the movement of his right arm. He has been unable to work since he suffered The defense likewise claims that, at all events, article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, which
the stroke of paralysis. One of his daughters was named Maria and another, are married, while refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended by the accused, should
still another one is a nun. With the exemption of the other married daughter and the nun, of all be applied herein. This article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been
of them, including the appellant, live with Maria upon whom they depend for interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different person (decisions of
support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library the Supreme Court of Spain of October 20, 1897, and June 28,1899), which is not the case
Among the daughters living with Maria, one named Pilar became acquainted and had intimate herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
relations later with the deceased Manuel Osma about the end of the year 1928. It was then that The facts as herein proven constitute the crime of homicide defined and penalized in article 249
the appellant became acquainted with the deceased who frequently visited Pilar in his house. of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. In view of the concurrence therein of three
The relations between Pilar and the deceased culminated in Pilar's giving birth to a child. The mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in
appellant did not know that his daughter's relations with the deceased had gone to such extremes, degree, that is prision mayor, should be imposed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
that he had to be deceived with the information that she had gone to her godfather's house in law library
Singalong, when in fact she had been taken to the Chinese Hospital for delivery. The appellant Wherefore, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the appellant is hereby sentenced to
learned the truth only when Pilar returned home with her suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year of prision correccional to eight (8) years
child.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library and (1) day of prision mayor, affirming the judgment appealed from in all other respects, with
Naturally the appellant was deeply affected by this incident, since which time he has appeared the costs. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
sad and worried not only because of the dishonor it brought upon his family but also because Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.
the child meant an added burden to Maria upon whom they all depended for support. For some
time the appellant wrote letters, that at times were hostile and threatening and at other times
entreating the deceased to legitimize his union with Pilar by marrying her, or at least, to support
her and his child. Although the deceased agreed to give the child a monthly allowance by way
of support, he never complied with his promise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The appellant was in such a mood when he presented himself one day at the office where the
deceased worked and asked leave of the manager thereof to speak to Osma. They both went
downstairs. What happened later, nobody witnessed. But the undisputed fact is that on that
occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the deceased, causing his
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After excluding the improbable portions thereof, the court infers from the testimony of the
appellant that he proposed to said deceased to marry his daughter and that, upon hearing that
the latter refused to do so, he whipped out his penknife. Upon seeing the appellant's attitude, the
deceased tried to seize him by the neck whereupon the said appellant stabbed him on the face
with the said penknife. Due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm, the weapon landed
on the base of the neck of the deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court found that the appellant did not intend to cause so grave an injury as the death of
the deceased. We find that his conclusion is supported by the evidence. In his testimony the
appellant emphatically affirmed that he only wanted to inflict a wound that would leave a
permanent scar on the face of the deceased, or one that would compel him to remain in the
hospital for a week or two but never intended to kill him, because then it would frustrate his
plan of compelling him to marry or, at least, support his daughter. The appellant had stated this
[G.R. No. 75369. November 26, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO ILIGAN y
JAMITO, EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN and JUAN MACANDOG (at large), Defendants,
FERNANDO ILIGAN y JAMITO and EDMUNDO ASIS y ILIGAN, Defendants-
Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Cesar R. Canonizado, for Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; THROWS THE CASE OPEN FOR A COMPLETE REVIEW
OF ALL ERRORS AS MAY BE IMPUTABLE TO THE TRIAL COURT. While the factual
findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate court, an appeal of a
criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by commission or omission, as
may be imputable to the trial court. (People v. Valerio, Jr., L-4116, February 25, 1982, 112
SCRA 208, 231) In this instance, the lower court erred in finding that the maceration of one half
of the head of the victim was also caused by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different
conclusion. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen
from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding,
however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; REQUISITES THEREOF, PRESENT IN THE CASE AT
BAR. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado"
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), (People v. Ural, G.R. No. L-
30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144) the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be
the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (People v.
Mananquil, L-35574, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 196, 207). We hold that these requisites
are present in this case.
3. ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE, DEFINED. The intentional felony committed
was the hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point. What is material is that by the
instrument used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and the location of the wound, the assault was meant
not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at a vital and
delicate part of the body: the head. (See: People v. Diana, 32 Phil. 344 [1915]). The hacking
incident happened on the national highway where vehicles are expected to pass any moment.
One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running scared and having
barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run over by a
vehicle. Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head
might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate
legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Urbano v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1 quoting Vda. De Bataclan v.
Medina, 102 Phil. 181). In other words, the sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to
the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time
between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape
liability.
4. ID.; ALIBI; NOT CONSIDERED WHEN ACCUSED IS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
WITNESSES. We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in
favor of Iligan because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the
prosecution witnesses. (People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 72400, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 71).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION, WRONGLY APPRECIATED IN THE CASE AT BAR. But we
disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the lower court in view
of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of such attack,
however, does not by itself show treachery. (People v. Gadiano, L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115
SCRA 559) There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the
appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. (People v.
Crisostomo, L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47). In this case, the hacking of Edmundo
Asis by Iligan followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the
deceased and his companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiones,
Jr. was therefore placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. (People v. Mercado,
L-33492, March 30, 1988, 159 SCRA 455). The requisites necessary to appreciate evident
premeditation have likewise not been met in this case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all
of the following: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime; and
(c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2,
1989, 176 SCRA 46).
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONSTITUTED BY MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT WITHOUT COOPERATION OR
AGREEMENT TO COOPERATE NOR BY MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE
CRIME. Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide.
Again, contrary to the lower courts finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take
any active part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his
running over by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he
was carrying a stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated
and coming from an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo
Asis must have known of the formers criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or
approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People v. Izon, 104 Phil. 690 [1958]) Such
being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the crime did not make him a co-conspirator,
a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault perpetrated by Iligan. (Orobio v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316) Edmundo Asis therefore deserves
exoneration.
7. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY; ABSENT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AND
APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. There being no mitigating
circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal medium (Arts. 249 and 64,
Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is that
within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the victims unrealized income
and therefore, the same is disallowed.
DECISION
FERNAN, J.:
In this appeal, uncle and nephew, Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis, seek a reversal of the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch II 1 convicting them of
the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. in the amounts of P30,000 for the latters death
and P256,960 representing the victims unrealized income.
On October 21, 1980, the following information for murder was filed against Fernando Iligan,
Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
"That on or about 3:00 a.m., August 4, 1980, at sitio Lico II, barangay Sto. Domingo,
municipality of Vinzons, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused Fernando Iligan armed with a bolo
(sinampalok) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, gang up and in a sudden unexpected manner, hacked Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., on
his face, thus causing fatal injuries on the latters face which resulted to (sic) the death of said
Esmeraldo Quiones.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library
Juan Macandog was never apprehended and he remains at large. At their arraignment on January
12, 1981 Fernando Iligan and Edmundo Asis pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
the prosecution presented the following version of the commission of the
crime.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of August 4, 1980, Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. and his
companions, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban, were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte after attending a barrio fiesta dance. In front of the ricemill of a
certain Almadrones, they met the accused Fernando Iligan, his nephew, Edmundo Asis, and
Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed ("winahi") them aside thereby prompting Zaldy Asis to
box him. 2 Felix Lukban quickly told the group of the accused that they had no desire to fight.
3 Fernando Iligan, upon seeing his nephew fall, drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy
Asis but missed. Terrified, the trio ran pursued by the three accused. They ran for about half an
hour, passing by the house of Quiones, Jr. They stopped running only upon seeing that they
were no longer being chased. After resting for a short while, Quiones, Jr. invited the two to
accompany him to his house so that he could change to his working clothes and report for work
as a bus conductor. 4
While the trio were walking towards the house of Quiones, Jr., the three accused suddenly
emerged on the roadside and without a word, Fernando Iligan hacked Quiones, Jr. with his
bolo hitting him on the forehead and causing him to fall down. 5 Horrified, Felix Lukban and
Zaldy Asis fled to a distance of 200 meters, but returned walking after they heard shouts of
people. Zaldy Asis specifically heard someone shout "May nadale na." 6
On the spot where Quiones, Jr. was hacked, Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban saw him already
dead with his head busted. 7 They helped the brother of Quiones, Jr. in carrying him to their
house. 8
That same day, August 4, 1980, the body of Quiones, Jr. was autopsied at the Funeraria
Belmonte in Labo, Camarines Norte by the municipal health officer, Dr. Marcelito E. Abas. The
postmortem examination report which is found at the back of the death certificate reveals that
Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr., who was 21 years old when he died, sustained the following
injuries:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to multiple fracture of the entire half of the
frontal left, temporal, parietal and occipital bone of the head, with massive maceration of the
brain tissue.
"2. Other findings Incised wound at the right eyebrow, medial aspect measuring about 4 cms.
in length, 0.5 cm. in width and 0.5 cm. in depth, abrasion on the left shoulder and right side of
the neck." 9
The death certificate also indicates that Quiones, Jr. died of "shock and massive cerebral
hemorrhages due to a vehicular accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants denied having perpetrated the crime. They alleged that they were in their
respective houses at the time the crime was committed.chanrobles law library
Accused Fernando Iligan testified that at around midnight of August 4, 1980, he left his house
to fetch his visitors at the dance hall. 10 Along the way, he met his nephew, Edmundo Asis,
whom he presumed was drunk. He invited his nephew to accompany him to the dance hall.
However, they were not able to reach their destination because Edmundo was boxed by
somebody whom he (Edmundo) sideswiped. 11 Instead, Fernando Iligan brought his nephew
home. 12 On their way, they were overtaken by Juliano Mendoza whom Fernando Iligan invited
to his house to help him cook. 13 After bringing his nephew home, Fernando Iligan and Juliano
Mendoza proceeded to Iligans house and arrived there between 1:30 and 2:00 oclock in the
morning of the same day. 14
Edmundo Asis corroborated Iligans testimony. He testified that while they were walking in
front of the Almadrones ricemill, he sideswiped someone whom he did not recognize because
there were several persons around. He said, "Sorry, pare" but the person to whom he addressed
his apology boxed him on his left face. He fell down and Iligan helped him. Later, Iligan
accompanied him to his home in Lico II. 15 After Iligan and Juliano Mendoza had left his house,
he slept and woke up at 7:00 oclock the following morning. 16
The defense made capital of the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Abas to the effect that
Quiones, Jr. died because of a vehicular accident. In ruling out said theory, however, the lower
court, in its decision of May 7, 1986, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The accused, to augment their alibi, have pointed to this Court that the Certificate of Death
have shown that the victims death was caused by a vehicular accident. To this, notwithstanding,
the Court cannot give credit for some reasons. First, the fact of the alleged vehicular accident
has not been fully established. Second, Esmeraldo Quiones, Sr., (the) father of the victim,
testified that Dr. Abas told him that if his son was hacked by a bolo on the face and then run
over the entire head by a vehicles tire, then that hacking on the face could not be visibly seen
on the head (t.s.n., pp. 16-17, October 13, 1981) Third, Exhibit 2 (the photograph of the victim
taken immediately after his body had been brought home) is a hard evidence. It will attestly (sic)
show that the entire head was not crushed by any vehicle. On the contrary, it shows that only
half of the face and head, was damaged with the wound starting on a sharp edge horizontally.
There are contusions and abrasions on the upper left shoulder and on the neck while the body
downwards has none of it, while on the right forehead there is another wound caused by a sharp
instrument. Therefore, it is simple, that if the victim was run over by a vehicle, the other half
portion of his head and downward part of his body must have been likewise seriously damaged,
which there are none." 17
The lower court also found that Iligans group conspired to kill anyone or all members of the
group of the victim to vindicate the boxing on the face of Edmundo Asis. It appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and accordingly convicted
Iligan and Edmundo Asis of the crime of murder and imposed on them the aforementioned
penalty.
Iligan and Edmundo Asis interposed this appeal professing innocence of the crime for which
they were convicted. For the second time, they attributed Quiones, Jr.s death to a vehicular
accident.
No eyewitnesses were presented to prove that Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle. The
defense relies on the testimony of Dr. Abas, a prosecution witness, who swore that the multiple
fracture on the head of Quiones, Jr. was caused by a vehicular accident 18 which opinion was
earlier put in writing by the same witness in the postmortem examination. Dr. Abas justified his
conclusion by what he considered as tire marks on the victims left shoulder and the right side
of his neck. 19 He also testified that the incised wound located at the victims right eyebrow
could have been caused by a sharp bolo but it was so superficial that it could not have caused
the victims death. 20
Circumstantial evidence on record indeed point to the veracity of the actual occurrence of the
vehicular mishap. One such evidence is the testimony of prosecution witness Zaldy Asis that
when he helped bring home the body of Quiones, Jr., he told the victims father, Esmeraldo
Quiones, Sr. that "before Esmeraldo Quiones (Jr.) was run over by a vehicle, he was hacked
by Fernando Iligan." 21 When asked why he mentioned an automobile, Zaldy Asis said that he
did not notice any vehicle around but he mentioned it "because his (Quiones, Jr.) head was
busted." 22 It is therefore not farfetched to conclude that Zaldy Asis had actual knowledge of
said accident but for understandable reasons he declined to declare it in court. Defense witness
Marciano Mago, the barangay captain of Sto. Domingo, also testified that when he went to the
scene of the crime, he saw bits of the brain of the victim scattered across the road where he also
saw tire marks. 23
For its part, the prosecution, through the victims father, presented evidence to the effect that
Iligan authored the maceration of half of the victims head. Quiones, Sr. testified that from
their house, which was about five meters away from the road, he saw Fernando Iligan holding
a "sinampalok" as he, together with Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog, chased someone.
During the second time that he saw the three accused, he heard Iligan say, "Dali, ayos na yan."
24 Hence, the lower court concluded that the victims head was "chopped" resulting in the
splattering of his brain all over the place. 25 It should be emphasized, however, that the
testimony came from a biased witness and it was uncorroborated.
While the factual findings of the trial court are generally given due respect by the appellate
court, an appeal of a criminal case throws it open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court. 26 In this instance, the lower
court erred in finding that the maceration of one half of the head of the victim was also caused
by Iligan for the evidence on record point to a different conclusion. We are convinced beyond
peradventure that indeed, after Quiones, Jr. had fallen from the bolo-hacking perpetrated by
Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan
from liability for the death of Quiones, Jr.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), 27 the essential requisites of Article
4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the
aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the
offender. 28 We hold that these requisites are present in this case.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quiones, Jr. by Iligan. That
it was considered as superficial by the physician who autopsied Quiones is beside the point.
What is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiones, Jr. and the location of the
wound, the assault was meant not only to immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it
was directed at a vital and delicate part of the body: the head. 29
The hacking incident happened on the national highway 30 where vehicles are expected to pass
any moment. One such vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis, running
scared and having barely negotiated the distance of around 200 meters, heard shouts of people.
Quiones, Jr., weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented highway, was run
over by a vehicle.
Under these circumstances, we hold that while Iligans hacking of Quiones, Jr.s head might
not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal
cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom." 31 In other words, the sequence of
events from Iligans assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is,
considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having
triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.chanrobles law library
We agree with the lower court that the defense of alibi cannot turn the tide in favor of Iligan
because he was positively seen at the scene of the crime and identified by the prosecution
witnesses. 32
But we disagree with the lower court with regards to its findings on the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery has been appreciated by the
lower court in view of the suddenness of the attack on the group of Quiones, Jr. Suddenness of
such attack, however, does not by itself show treachery. 33 There must be evidence that the
mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the
person attacked to defend himself. 34 In this case, the hacking of Edmundo Asis by Iligan
followed by the chasing of the trio by the group of Iligan was a warning to the deceased and his
companions of the hostile attitude of the appellants. The group of Quiones, Jr. was therefore
placed on guard for any subsequent attacks against them. 35

The requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have likewise not been met in this
case. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to
their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between
the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 36

Absent any qualifying circumstances, Iligan must be held liable only for homicide. Again,
contrary to the lower courts finding, proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established
to hold Edmundo Asis liable as Iligans co-conspirator. Edmundo Asis did not take any active
part in the infliction of the wound on the head of Quiones, Jr., which led to his running over
by a vehicle and consequent death. As earlier pointed out, the testimony that he was carrying a
stone at the scene of the crime hardly merits credibility being uncorroborated and coming from
an undeniably biased witness. Having been the companion of Iligan, Edmundo Asis must have
known of the formers criminal intent but mere knowledge, acquiescense or approval of the act
without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. 37 Such being the case, his mere presence at the scene of the
crime did not make him a co-conspirator, a co-principal or an accomplice to the assault
perpetrated by Iligan. 38 Edmundo Asis therefore deserves exoneration.

There being no mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable on Iligan is reclusion temporal
medium (Arts. 249 and 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the proper penalty is that within the range of prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. We find insufficient proof to warrant the award of P256,960 for the
victims unrealized income and therefore, the same is disallowed.cralawnad

WHEREFORE, appellant Fernando Iligan y Jamito is hereby convicted of the crime of homicide
for which he is imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and he shall indemnify the heirs of Esmeraldo Quiones, Jr. in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). Appellant Edmundo Asis is hereby acquitted of
the crime charged against him. Costs against appellant Iligan.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 162540
GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
23761 dated December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified
Theft, and its Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera
and Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM
INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y
CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with
grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their
own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the
sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino
to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals
the events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount
of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l.,
Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited
in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is
the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time,
Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who
was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject
BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding
the bounced check.Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message
through Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached
through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca
of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner
Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for
her purchases from Mega Foam.[4] Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced. [5] Verification
from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in
August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.[6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in
his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown
woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check
rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank that
the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman who
rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by
Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills
were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's
plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan
did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was
only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the
premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However,
the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money
previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon returning to the
jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valenciawere
arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valenciahandled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife
of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997,
but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time
before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest,
Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she
accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal
check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former
and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had
no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked outside the house
of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the
NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June
30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on
the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia)
could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she
agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where
Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's
place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her
in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her
money and so she even asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma
Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN
(11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS
AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial
court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is
reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for
petitioner Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged
in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[8]
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of
the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner,
as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer and,
instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another the check belonged
to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with
intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that
the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done
without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the check payment from
her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5) it was accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things the check
was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the
company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence petitioner is admittedly entrusted
with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused
is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides
that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises
on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since the
intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held
Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only
of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article
59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing the
crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime
because the means employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the
person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for
the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are
essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having
in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the
offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[10] in this
wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense
is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To
be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by
its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal
the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given
in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act
of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance
of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime
from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely
worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash
to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she
thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held
in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking of
personal property of another.Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308,
there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft
is already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of another
without the latters consent.
xxxx
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain
unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from
that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able
or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from
the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
xxxx
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. x x x
 x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x [13]

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this
case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for
the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check
was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be
considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving
the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with
cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme
was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce
judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of
criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004,
are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE
CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor,
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO SALADINO Y
DINGLE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CONRADO SALADINO y Dingle was convicted of three (3) counts of rape and one (1)
attempted rape and sentenced to death.[1] He is now with us on automatic review.
Lourdes Relevo is the niece of accused-appellant Conrado Saladino. Her mother and
Conrado's wife Rosita are sisters. Lourdes calls him Kuya Conrad. The parents of Lourdes live
in Balayan, Batangas.
Sometime in 1995 Lourdes, then thirteen (13) years old, was sent by her parents to Manila
to live with Conrado and Rosita Saladino in Pasig City because her own parents could not afford
to send her to school. Rosita was a factory worker while Conrado was a money-changer in a bus
terminal. Rosita, whom Lourdes called Ate Rose, gave the young girl weekly allowance; in turn,
she helped out in the household chores.
The Saladinos lived in a small two-storey house in 126-D Pastor Compound, Rosario,
Pasig City, along with the spouses Zaldy and Corazon Cedeo and their three (3) children,
Estrella, Elizabeth and Evelyn, together with three (3) boarders whom Lourdes only knew
as Tita, Liza and Glenda. There were three (3) rooms separated only by curtains. Conrado,
Rosita and Lourdes slept in a small cramped room - the couple on a bed and Lourdes on a
mattress on the floor.
Sometime in September 1995 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening while Lourdes was
lying on her mattress resting and feeling sick, Conrado woke her up and asked her to transfer to
the bed as she might catch cold. Rosita was already dressed up because she was working in the
10:00 oclock PM to 6:00 oclock AM shift. Conrado conducted Rosita to the jeepney stop and
returned to their room about fifteen (15) minutes later. He laid down beside Lourdes. About
twenty-five (25) minutes later, he started fondling her breasts. He poked a kitchen knife at her
waist and threatened to kill her if she shouted. He dropped the knife, pinned down Lourdes
hands to her belly, and removed her shorts and panty with his hand that was free. He then
removed his own shorts and underwear, went on top of Lourdes, and inserted his penis inside
her vagina.[2] Lourdes struggled and Conrados penis slipped out several times, but he re-inserted
it everytime and resumed his bestial movements for about fifty (50) minutes according to
Lourdes. When she finally succeeded in pushing him away, he warned her not to tell anyone or
else he would kill her.
Lourdes confided the sexual assault to Rosita. But Rosita refused to believe her and even
said that her husband was not capable of doing such a dastardly act. Lourdes also told Corazon
Cedeo who reacted by asking the Saladinos to leave the house. It took the Saladinos almost a
year to find a house.
Meanwhile, Lourdes slept in the room of Corazon and Zaldy. The Saladino couple finally
transferred to 101-B Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City, leaving behind Lourdes
with the Cedeos. But Lourdes did not tell her mother, who was in Batangas, about the rape.
After some time, Rosita invited Lourdes to live with them in their new house. Rosita
assured her that the incident would not happen again because they had a
boarder. Wanting to finish her schooling and in need of money, Lourdes relented and moved in
with the Saladinos again.
Despite Rositas assurances, things did not turn out well for Lourdes. On 17 December
1996 at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, while Lourdes was sleeping in the living room,
Conrado again held her at knifepoint and threatened her into silence.He removed her shorts and
panties, then his own shorts and underwear and had forced intercourse with her. Again, she cried
and struggled but her efforts were in vain.
Lourdes told Rosita about the new incident but Rosita, as in the past, refused to believe
her. She turned to Corazon who advised her to wait for her mother, who was spending Christmas
in Manila, before going to the police. When Lourdes and Rosita went to Batangas to fetch
Lourdes mother Elena Relevo, the complaining witness could not summon enough courage to
tell her mother about the rape. Elena stayed in Pasig City for eleven (11) days after which, on
28 December 1996, she, Lourdes, Rosita and Conrado went to Batangas to celebrate New Years
Eve.
On 1 January 1997 Lourdes, Conrado and Rosita returned to Manila. The following day
at 7:00 o'clock in the morning Conrado again raped Lourdes at knifepoint. On 3 January 1997
at about the same time the day before, he again poked a knife at her and proceeded to remove
her shorts and panties and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. This time, when Lourdes
saw him let go of the knife, she freed herself from his grasp and kicked him. Then she ran to the
bathroom and stayed there until he left the house.
Lourdes packed her clothes and went to Corazon Cedeos house. Finally, she gathered
enough strength to tell her mother about the sexual abuses, which prompted Elena to fetch her
and take her home to Batangas.
Elena had Lourdes examined by a doctor, who confirmed that Lourdes was no longer a
virgin. They then filed a case with the Pasig City Prosecutors office. Lourdes underwent another
physical examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame. The examination by Dr.
Romeo Salen, Medico-Legal Officer, revealed that Lourdes had deep healed lacerations at 3:00
oclock and 9:00 oclock positions. Dr. Salen concluded that Lourdes was already in a non-virgin
state physically.[3]
Four (4) Informations for rape were filed against Conrado Saladino for the incidents in
September 1995, on 17 December 1996, 2 January 1997 and 3 January 1997. All four (4)
Informations similarly alleged that on the dates indicated accused-appellant with lewd design
and by means of force had sexual intercourse with Lourdes Relevo y Mendoza, against her will
and consent.
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant Conrado Saladino claimed that on the night
of the alleged first rape, he was drunk. After taking his wife to the jeepney stop, he went back
to his room where he saw Lourdes lying on bed. He then laid beside her. Being in an amorous
mood, he started fondling her breasts. According to him, he was not met with any
resistance. Emboldened, he proceeded to kiss her lips, breasts and private parts. He then took
off both their undergarments and went on top of her. He attempted to insert his penis into her
vagina but since he was drunk, he failed to achieve an erection. According to him, Lourdes was
fully aware of what was happening yet did not show any reaction.
Conrado also testified that the reason they left the old house was because they did not
have any privacy since the rooms were separated only by curtains that were fastened together
only by safety pins. Also, Corazon and Rosita had a misunderstanding over Rositas jewelry that
disappeared. After some time, Lourdes and one of the boarders in the old house, Glenda
Andrade, followed them to their new house. He tried to avoid any intimate contact with Lourdes
but he noticed that she was seducing him, parang tinutukso niya ako.[4] Unable to resist, he gave
in to fondling her at least once a week,[5] then kissed her everyday before going to work. But he
did not have sex with her because he was afraid she would get pregnant.He also testified that
Lourdes would get angry every time he refused to insert his penis into her vagina.
The trial court found accused-appellant Conrado Saladino guilty of rape in Crim. Cases
Nos. 112410-H, 112411-H and 112412-H. Taking into account the qualifying circumstance of
the minority of the victim and her relationship to accused-appellant, the lower court meted
Conrado Saladino three (3) death penalties pursuant to RA 7659. He was also sentenced to pay
the private complainant P150,000.000 as indemnity, and P90,000.00 as moral damages. The
trial court also found accused-appellant guilty of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 112413-H
and sentenced him to serve an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, and to pay the offended party P50,000.00 in civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 for moral damages.
The complaining witness and accused-appellant presented conflicting versions. Lourdes
Relevo, on one hand, told a harrowing account of a young girl's life utterly destroyed because
of the satyrical urges of a man who was entrusted with her life and future. Accused-appellant,
on the other hand, painted a tale of consensual sex between an unwilling but weak male adult
and a young temptress.
Which of the two (2) conflicting narrations of what transpired between the parties deserves
greater weight and better entitled to full credence, is the crux of this controversy. Indeed, this
matter involves the assessment of credibility, a task best left to the trial court, which had the
advantage of observing the witnesses directly, picking up on the subtle nuances of human
behavior, and the emphasis, gesture and inflection of voice; and, of testing their credibility by
their demeanor on the stand.[6]We have often said that we will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.
In giving credence to the testimony of the private complainant, the lower court said -
The testimony of the Private Complainant, Lourdes Relevo, was candid, straightforward and
firm. She testified with spontaneity, only interrupted when she was overcome with emotion. She
cried when asked to recall details of the incidents when the Accused assaulted her virtue. She
remained steadfast and firm in her declarations notwithstanding humiliation and embarrassment,
especially when, upon cross examination, she was asked to narrate the lurid details of the sexual
acts committed upon her. On the witness stand, she pointed an accusing finger at the Accused,
her uncle, and in an avenging tone, reaffirmed her accusations against him. [7]
In contrast, the lower court observed that accused-appellant appeared evasive, answered
in a low voice, which was hardly audible. It also pointed out that Conrado appeared uncertain
when he admitted that he touched the breasts, kissed the lips and private parts of the private
complainant and laid on top of her, insinuating that she consented to this sexual activity. This
led the trial court to conclude that accused-appellant "did not have the demeanor of a man
unjustly accused of a serious offense."[8]
Such observations do not portend well for accused-appellant. In reviewing with utmost
scrutiny the records of this case, we fail to see any reason to disturb the findings of the court a
quo. The emotion displayed by private complainant thoroughly convinced the trial court that
her testimony was genuine. Even the transcripts of her direct and cross examinations would
point to no other conclusion. In her testimony, she revealed sordid details of the assault with
such clarity and lucidity that could only come from the victim of the malevolent act. When asked
questions designed to elicit conflicting answers, she stood her ground and answered the
questions in the manner of a person with nothing to tell but the truth.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely for a young girl like Lourdes to falsely accuse an uncle of a
heinous crime, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to the
humiliation of a public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation, unless motivated by
a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[9] In the absence of evidence
of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused, her testimony
deserves credence.[10]
On the other hand, accused-appellant's perverted version of the "sweetheart theory" is
uncorroborated, self-serving and deserves scant consideration from the Court. Save for his own
declaration, accused-appellant was unable to present anything else to prove that carnal
knowledge between him and Lourdes was consensual. Indeed, this Court finds it unlikely that a
young girl like Lourdes would consent to have sexual relations with a person she calls Kuya and
more than ten (10) years her senior, and an uncle-in-law in fact. There is no evidence on record
that she is a pervert, nymphomaniac, temptress or in any other condition that may justify such a
theory.
Contrary to accused appellant's assertions, the long delay in the filing of the charges is not
an indication of false accusation, since the delay was satisfactorily explained. After the first
incident, Lourdes confided to her aunt Rosita and to Corazon; however they refused to do
anything. Faced with two (2) prior rejections, it is understandable for a young girl like Lourdes
to remain silent rather than endure the humiliating experience of being rebuffed once again by
disbelieving adults.
It has also been held that there is no standard form of behavior when people, particularly
young girls, are confronted by shocking and frightful incidents such as rape.[11] A thirteen (13)-
year old girl who kept silent about being raped and becoming pregnant as a result thereof, is not
necessarily lying. It would not have been easy to speak of such a humiliating
occurrence. Besides, Lourdes also feared for her life and that of her family. Her assessment of
the threatened risk caused by accused-appellant might have been overestimated, but considering
her youth and inexperience, this fact alone does not render her testimony unreliable.
One cannot expect a thirteen (13)-year old girl to act like an adult or a mature and
experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat to her
life and complain immediately that she had been forcibly sexually assaulted. [12]
Accused-appellant assails the lower court in concluding that he used force and
intimidation. He insists that "the resistance of a woman in rape must be tenacious and
manifest. A mere verbal objection unaccompanied by physical resistance may amount to
consent."[13] He asserts that since there was no showing that he ever covered the mouth of the
victim during the alleged rape, her failure to shout for help to the other house occupants was an
indication that the intercourse was consensual.He also posits that if indeed Lourdes was raped,
she would not have agreed to transfer to the house of the person who abused her.
We do not agree. According to Lourdes, accused-appellant poked a knife at her waist
while threatening to kill her and her aunt if she resisted. That act of accused-appellant was more
than sufficient to subdue the victim and cow her into silence, because of the imminent danger
not only to her life but to her aunt as well. Under the circumstances, her failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of the accused-
appellant.[14] Also, we have held in People v. Grefiel[15] that "(i)ntimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim
does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused something would happen to her at that
moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident."
It might be that to the depraved mind of accused-appellant, the lack of resistance or
shouting on the part of his poor victim was a sign of consent, nay, even enjoyment. But in the
crime of rape, what is given paramount consideration is the state of mind of the victim and not
that of the perpetrator. From the point of view of the victim, the knife aimed at her waist was a
real threat to her life. Her failure to shout or offer resistance was not because she consented to
the deed but because shehonestly believed she would be killed if she shouted or resisted. Such
threat is sufficient intimidation as contemplated by our jurisprudence on rape. And be that as it
may, if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's participation
in the sexual act voluntary.[16]
Lourdes' transferring to the new residence of accused-appellant despite the rape does not
affect her credibility. It was established that she depended on accused-appellant and his wife
Rosita for support. Her return to the house of Conrado after she was raped was out of
necessity. If she did not do so, she would not have been able to continue her schooling in
Manila. Besides, she was assured by accused-appellant's wife, her very own aunt, that the
incident would not happen again.
In an attempt to discredit the private complainant, accused-appellant pointed out
supposed "inconsistencies" in her testimony, to wit: (a) Every time Lourdes testified she always
brought with her a copy of her complaint-affidavit; (b) Her claim in her complaint-affidavit that
accused-appellant removed her panties is inconsistent with her claim at the witness stand, where
she said that accused-appellant removed her shorts; (c) Her claim that accused-appellant held
her two (2) nipples while he was holding a knife is a physical impossibility; (d) Her testimony
that accused-appellant told her to be quiet or he would kill her and Rosita is contrary to what
she alleged in her complaint-affidavit that he would kill her Ate Rosita only; (e) Her statement
that accused-appellant held her two (2) hands with one hand while his other hand was removing
her shorts and panties is a physical impossibility; (f) Her claim that when she was first raped the
private parts of accused-appellant pumped her for more than fifty (50) minutes is physically
impossible; and, (g) Her testimony that in the first rape accused-appellant attempted to kiss her
on the lips and her cheeks but he failed is another impossibility considering that he was on top
of her and could have easily kissed her on the lips and cheeks.[17]
The crux of Lourdes' testimony was that accused-appellant had copulated with her, and
the act was accomplished through intimidation. The alleged "inconsistencies" raised by
accused-appellant are of minor significance and do not impinge upon her assertion that she was
raped. Errorless testimonies cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting details
of a harrowing experience.[18] A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to give
a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory. Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and experience that
honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the
credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to the conscience and
numbing to the senses.[19]
However, the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty. In People v. Ramos[20] the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender, being special
qualifying circumstances should be alleged in the information, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although the prosecution did prove complainants minority
and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed to implead both minority and relationship in the
four (4) Informations filed against accused-appellant. It is not enough that the relationship was
subsequently proved during the trial. Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the
Information to qualify the crime as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny accused-
appellants constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.[21] Thus, he can only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
The imposition of an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, in attempted rape is also erroneous. The proper
penalty for rape in the attempted stage should be two (2) degrees lower than the penalty for
consummated rape,[22] or prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum imposable penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period and the
minimum from prision correccional.
In the three (3) cases of simple rape, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count is upheld, consistent with current jurisprudence.[23] The award of P30,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape is increased to P50,000.00 also consistent with
jurisprudence.[24] In addition, an award of P30,000.00 in exemplary damages is also imposed,
the relationship between the sex offender and his victim being aggravating.[25] In the case of
attempted rape the P30,000.00 award as moral damages is reduced to P15,000.00.[26] The award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is removed, there being no legal basis therefor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Crim. Cases Nos. 112410-H (G.R. No. 137481), 112411-H (G.R. No. 137482) and
112412-H (G.R. No. 137483) accused-appellant Conrado Saladino y Dingle is found guilty of
three (3) counts of Simple Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count. He is also ordered to pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, another P50,000.00 for moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages, for
each count of rape.
2. In Crim. Case No. 112413-H (G.R. No. 138455), accused-appellant Conrado Saladino
y Dingle is found guilty of Attempted Rape and is sentenced to ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as maximum. The accused-appellant is further ordered to
pay private complainant Lourdes Relevo moral damages of P15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant.
Manuel Roxas for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
We believe that the accused is guilty of frustrated murder.
We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The
blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill,
thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared
that he had killed the complainant.
There was alevosia to qualify the crime as murder if death had resulted. The accused rushed
upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing
a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and
two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had
theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with
being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such
at the time the crime here charged was committed.
That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of
which he should be convicted. It is contended, in the first place, that, if death has resulted, the
crime would not have been murder but homicide, and in the second place, that it is attempted
and not frustrated homicide.
As to the first contention, we are of the opinion that the crime committed would have been
murder if the girl had been killed. It is qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, the accused
making a sudden attack upon his victim from the rear, or partly from the rear, and dealing her a
terrible blow in the back and side with his bolo. Such an attack necessitates the finding that it
was made treacherously; and that being so the crime would have been qualified as murder if
death had resulted.
As to the second contention, we are of the opinion that the crime was frustrated and not
attempted murder. Article 3 of the Penal Code defines a frustrated felony as follows:
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
An attempted felony is defined thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily
desistance.
The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant
performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime
and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the
offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his
will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In
other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign
force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his
intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation
of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The
essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there
is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of
the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes
before the subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing
through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the
intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to
commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond
his control.
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which,
with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase
is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which
he has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where
he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause
outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
The penalty should have been thirteen years of cadena temporal there being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the
reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution 2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David
(CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging petitioner with
attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully
covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with
dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the
commission of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her
but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among them were private
complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa,
Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some
detail in the decision of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building", ) along A.H.
Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou
Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around 10:30. Outside, right
in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece
of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her
mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this
the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she
then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused Marvilou. xxx.
Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan
ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made out
during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and weight. His upper garment was
of cotton material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He
was wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo
Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was stained with blue
(TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room
going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate , was
friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto
kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at the Building at
1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a marking on
the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted letters the word
1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the
brand name Adidas (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room
306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking
permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when CHITO could not, S/G
Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] . S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the
security guards logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a Request letter
from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be
our tenant this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was corroborated by
Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. xxx by
the time CHITOs knocking on the door woke him up, . He was able to fix the time of
CHITOs arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23)
when he let the latter in. . It was at around 3 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991
when he woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista
(Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat was shown by Bernard the
open window through which the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was finally able to talk
to CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that something had happened and that they were not
being allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray bag. xxx. None
was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401
to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning . They likewise invited
CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that in the afternoon
of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and
Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people to look
for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking
with the authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search
the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid,
pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not know was there and surrender the same to
the investigators. When he saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to
CHITO (Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the classroom
(Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among others, a white t-
shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief
, three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the
handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs because CHITO had lent the very same one to him
. The t-shirt with CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the
handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13, 1991, was what
consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4 feet and appeared
to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time
Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 oclock that
afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom
where Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 oclock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M.
Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted
laboratory examination on the specimen collated and submitted. Her Chemistry Report No.
C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic poison on the above
stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the following results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis. approached him and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid.,
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou.
Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as
culled from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With Robert Chan and
Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity . MALOU, ,
was known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing the prescribed barong
tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at Dos
Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was
included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street,
North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool . Soon after, the four
(4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one
into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt and long pants when he
was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the
white t-shirt with the Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt with the symbol
TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15),
CHITO left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December
13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19).
He had left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and
toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin, looking at his watch,
approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and saw that the time was
1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already about ten (10)
minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the opened jalousie
window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door until Rommel Montes,
pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO
then decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, , at last answered the
door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO
and went inside the bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still
had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994,
p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up . He was already in his
school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked
the latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had
happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom MALOU was not
able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36).
xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the Building . When
two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself.
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room
306.
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was told to dress up and
the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside his room and
talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later instructed them to
undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital .. At the hospital, CHITO and
Joseph were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip .
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short pants lent to him
by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to
7 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to
9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag
were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask
CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied putting in his gray
bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to
the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray
bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in the early morning of December
13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at about 6 oclock in the morning
to go to school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December
13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid).
He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among
the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners fraternity brothers, Alberto
Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991
party held in Dr. Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and coming from
the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were
one in saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants
and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room
310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M.
of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and
white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of short pants with
stripes after the dunking party held in her fathers house.8 Presented as defense expert witness
was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court
showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor
staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted
rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the offended party
Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages,
plus reasonable Attorneys fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated January 13, 1999,
affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings of the court a
quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its equally assailed
resolution of March 31, 1999.12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have committed the attempted
rape imputed to him, absent sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove
the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of circumstantial
evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based
thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the petitioner are
unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact that the award
was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence and
that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground
that the offense charged against him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether or not the CA
erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of applicable
jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners acquittal, but not necessarily because
there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who
pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very act
of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of the persons last
seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.13 In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will
be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in
question.
We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence that led to the identity
of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress
and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G
Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas"
shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of
December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel
of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and shorts that felt
satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin
short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time,
Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the
incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform,
a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that
part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malous face the piece of cloth
soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced
the performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that
petitioners actuation thus described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can
not be any other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after
he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said,
adds that if petitioners intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal
knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation
to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of
the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain,
meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in
the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an
overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe
petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce
her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was
no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason
petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is
anybodys guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would
not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the
next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been rendered unconscious.
Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His
sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the
intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her
guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the
rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute
for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. 21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the crime of attempted
rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus,
for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. 25 The
paramount question is whether the offenders act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress
or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. 26 That Malou, after the incident
in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and
the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal
Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5.00 to 200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner,
however, is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of
arresto menor and to pay a fine of 200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her
breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly
obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner
actually commenced to force his penis into the complainants sexual organ. xxx.

Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:

xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito Onio arrived at the alleged
locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude
that mere holding of the feet is attempted rape.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises,
of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And
during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth
and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the
series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed,
they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring
an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 24 it
cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930
proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to
enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it
vs.
were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason
BASILIO BORINAGA, defendant-appellant.
that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of
Paulo Jaro for appellant. question propounded by stating that the crime committed was that of frustrated murder. This is
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. true notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured in the least.

MALCOM, J.: The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution,
attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant
Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent
the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known
fish corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On as the subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. (U. S. vs. Eduave [1917], 36 Phil., 209;
the morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried People vs. Mabugat [1926], 51 Phil., 967.)
to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about
two-thirds of the fish corral had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to establish a lesser crime than
the price agreed upon at that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned him that if that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life
he did not pay, something would happen to him, to which Mooney answered that if they wanted fully meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court.
to do something to him they should wait until after breakfast, Lawaan then left with his men,
and Mooney, after partaking of his morning meal, returned to his shop. Based on foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant.
On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of the Perpetua, his back being to the window. Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.lawphi1>net
Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike
with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair
on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow,
but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should
be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an
American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of
Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly
ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so
because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga,
frightening him away. Again the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed Separate Opinions
his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife
was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.

The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The defense was alibi, which was not given
credence. The accused was convicted as charged, by Judge Ortiz, who sentenced him to fourteen
We dissent from the opinion of the majority in so far as it finds the defendant-appellant guilty
years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory
of the crime of frustrated murder instead of that of an attempt to commit murder.
penalties and the costs.

Article 3 of the Penal Code provides as follows:

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More than mere
menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his ART. 3. Frustrated felonies and attempts to commit felonies are punishable, as well
friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed as those which are consummated.
treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for
accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
of the circumstance of treachery. should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do no produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The only debatable question, not referred to in the briefs, but which must be decided in order to
dispose of the appeal, is: Do the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony
the meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code? Although no exact counterpart to the facts at bar has directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute
been found either in Spanish or Philippine jurisprudence, a majority of the court answer the
 the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntary preventing of the performance of all the acts of execution which constitute the felony, as in the
desistance. present case. The interference of the frame of the back of the chair which prevented the
defendant-appellant from wounding Mooney in the back with a deadly knife, made his acts
The pertinent facts as found by the court below and by this court are the following: constitute an attempt to commit murder; for he had commenced the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts, and did not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony
by reason of a cause or accident other than his own voluntary desistance.
On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the window.
Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike The foregoing considerations force us to the conclusion that the facts alleged in the information
with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair and proved during the trial are not sufficient to constitute the crime of frustrated murder, but
on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, simply the crime of an attempt to commit murder.
but was not injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should
be stated that Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an Johnson and Street, JJ., concur.
American brute." After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of
Mooney but only the back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly
ten minutes after the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so
because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga,
frightening him away. Again that same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed
his mark and was unable to give another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife
was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found embedded in it.

Since the facts constituting frustrated felony and those constituting an attempt to commit felony
are integral parts of those constituting consummated felony, it becomes important to know what
facts would have been necessary in order that the case at bar might have been a consummated
murder, so that we may determine whether the facts proved during the trial constitute frustrated
murder or simply an attempt to commit murder.

In order that the crime committed by the defendant-appellant might have been a consummated
murder it would have been necessary for him to have inflicted a deadly wound upon a vital spot
of the body of Mooney, with treachery, as a result of which he should have died.

Since according to the definition given by the Code a frustrated felony is committed "when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence,
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator" let us examine the facts of record to find out whether the said defendant-appellant
has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the murder of Mooney as a
consequence. The prisoner at bar, intending to kill Mooney, approached him stealthily from
behind and made movement with his right hand to strike him in the back with a deadly knife,
but the blow, instead of reaching the spot intended, landed on the frame of the back of the chair
on which Mooney was sitting at the time and did not cause the slightest physical injury on the
latter. The acts of execution performed by the defendant-appellant did not produce the death of
Mooney as a consequence nor could they have produced it because the blow did not reach his
body; therefore the culprit did not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony. There was lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital spot of the body of
Mooney.

It is true that the frame of the back of the chair stood between the deadly knife and the back of
Mooney; but what it prevented was the wounding of said Mooney in the back and not his death,
had he been wounded. It is the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator, after all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence
had been performed, that constitutes frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the