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ABSTRACT
This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scien-
tific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian
sense. One would have to employ (1) description (2) within the attitude of
the phenomenological reduction, and (3) seek the most invariant meanings
for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by
Klein and Westcott (1994), that presents a typology of the development of
the phenomenological psychological method.
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PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD
The philosophical phenomenological method encompasses three in-
terlocking steps: (1) the phenomenological reduction, (2) description,
and (3) search for essences. Each will be commented upon in turn.
The phenomenological reduction The phenomenological reduction
is a methodological device invented by Husserl in order to help
make research findings more precise. In everyday life, according to
Husserl, one lives in the "natural attitude," wherein one takes things
for granted, where the existence of things and events is not chal-
lenged unless they are somehow bizarre. From a philosophical view-
point, this is naive because things and events do not simply appear,
nor are they always what they seem to be. Natural science brings a
healthy skepticism to this "naive realism" and more carefully, sys-
tematically, and critically tries to understand just how phenomena
come to be what they are; usually it tries to link things and events
to causes and/or conditions. The philosophical project pushes the
problem deeper and wants to understand why there are things and
events at all, even scientifically determined things, concepts, or laws.
Implicitly, science takes the world for granted and wants to under-
stand it. Phenomenology goes a step further and doesn't even want
to take the world for granted. That is, it doesn't automatically want
to say that something "is," but it wants to understand what moti-
vates a conscious creature to say that something "is." Thus, it has to
begin at a more fundamental place, where there is "presence" but
not yet that type of presence to which one attributes "existence."
That is why the distinction between intuition and experience is so
important, since one does not attribute "existence" or "realness" to
all of the types of presences that one experiences. Thus, before one
attributing "existence" to a presence, Husserl wants to examine it
closely in order to see what characteristics a presence has to have in
order to be motivated to attribute "existence" to it. For Husserl,
what are real in the empirical sense are objects that are given in
space, time, and with causal regularity. However, even when one
encounters in experience things and events that "obviously" have
existence, the reduction directs one to step back and describe and
examine them as a presence. Husserl claims that nothing about the
object is lost in this way, except its existential status. Everything that
was present in the natural attitude is retained within the phe-
nomenological reduction, except that one refrains from saying that
the object is as it presents itself; one only says that the object presents
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one should never force the data into a single structure. One does it
only if the data lend themselves to the process. Otherwise, one writes
as many structures as required. For example, if a study is conducted
with five subjects, the results could be a single structure or five struc-
tures-one for each subject-or any number between.
Two issues implied in the above process need further comments.
The first is the question of the appropriate language for each disci-
pline. To be consistent with phenomenological theory, the concepts
and terms used in expressing the intuitions gained through research
should be phenomenologically grounded. However, the present his-
torical situation is such that such a goal is not yet an historical achieve-
ment. That is, with all of the human sciences, a consensual common
language is not yet an achievement. Rather one confronts compet-
ing theories and schools of thought. In psychology, for example,
one is either a behaviorist or a cognitive psychologist, or a psychoanalyst,
and so on. No one is just a psychologist, with an agreed- upon per-
spective and language that covers the entire field. Consequently,
part of the task of the researcher is to introduce appropriate disci-
plinary (psychological, sociological, etc.) terms in phenomenologically
grounded ways. One cannot simply use the subject's words because
they were given from the perspective of everyday life. From a
phenomenological viewpoint, the life-world is pre-theoretical and
prescientific and not yet theoretical or scientific in itself. It is the
foundation of all sciences, and so its expressions must be taken up,
examined, and re-described more rigorously from the perspective
of a chosen discipline. The fact that there is not, as yet, an estab-
lished language (instead, there are several competing languages)
simply calls for a truly original effort by contemporary human scien-
tists and makes the challenge greater, but not less important.
The second issue requiring further commentary is the interpreta-
tion of results as structures. Structures can be understood as essences
and their relationships. What is important about structures is not so
much the parts, as such, but the interrelationship among the parts.
Moreover, structures are not ends in themselves. Rather, to use sta-
tistics as an analogy, they represent "measures of central tendency."
They express how the phenomenon being investigated coheres or
converges. But there are also differentiations or variations that have
to be accounted for that would correspond to "measures of disper-
sion" in statistics. Consequently, once the structure has been delin-
eated, one has to go back to the raw data and render intelligible
the clusters of variation that are also contained in the data. The
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I have already mentioned that the tone of Klein and Westcott's (1994)
article2 is sympathetic to the appearance of a phenomenological
approach on the psychological scene, but I do have some reserva-
tions about their approach and conclusions with respect to the
phenomenological method. Obviously, not every limitation can be
spoken to, but I will point out how the neglect of some issues makes
their evaluation of the phenomenological method dubious. I will
limit myself to three issues: A) no acknowledgment is made about
the equivocations surrounding phenomenological psychology, B)
critical evaluation of alleged new methodologies is lacking, and C)
no allowance is made for contextual factors despite the authors'
profession of appreciation for context.
both his philosophical allies and opponents" (p. 134). What is curi-
ous is that they do not see any ambiguities surrounding Husserl's
meaning of phenomenological psychology nor any difficulties in
applying the generic phenomenological method to psychological
phenomena, despite voluminous literature indicating the difficulties
Husserl had defining his work vis-a-vis psychology (Scanlon, 1977;
Giorgi, 1981, 1986c; Gurwitsch, 1974; Stroker, 1981; Davidson, 1988,
1979; Spiegelberg, 1972; Willard, 1984). After all, Husserl began as
a descriptive psychologist attacking psychologism, and then went to
phenomenology as distinct from descriptive psychology. Then he
found himself wrongfully accused of the very psychologism he
critiqued, wrote critically of the empirical psychology developing at
the time he was writing, both identified and differentiated phenome-
nological psychology with/from transcendental phenomenology, and
finally had to worry about transcendental psychologism. It is a murky
and zigzag history that requires careful contextualization if precise
meanings are to be communicated.
Obviously, the entire history cannot be dealt with here, but a good
indication of the type of problems can be obtained by quoting Scanlon
(1977, pp. x-xi), a reference that Klein and Westcott cite.'
far from being universal, but it doesn't make them less essential.
Of course, the necessary character of the essential intuition would
remain even if it is less than universal, for it simply refers, if cor-
rect, to the guiding or constraining ideas surrounding the develop-
ing patterns of experience. Necessity can exist independently of
universality. This also implies that phenomenological analyses can
be performed that are sensitive to contextual limits. After all, to be
intuitively sensitive means that when a phenomenon is context-de-
pendent, that dependency also announces itself as being intrinsic
to the meaning of the phenomenon. As Husserl (1962/1977, p. 63)
said, "In a related but so to speak impure method of investigation,
a universal which is empirically laden can become seen." Context-
dependency is a kind of empirical-ladenness.
Thus, the two main features of phenomenological psychology that
the authors held to be problematic, universality and necessity, when
properly understood, are not problematic for phenomenological
psychology in either sense I have been discussing. If they refer to
phenomenological psychology in the sense of foundational concepts,
of course one would want those concepts to be necessarily relevant
for every instance of psychical experience or behavior. If one tries
to apply them to phenomenological psychology, in the sense of a
scientific set of practices by scientific psychologists, then the sense
of necessity remains and the idea of universality does not. Rather,
the idea of different types of essences is introduced.
Finally, it should be pointed out that universality, necessity, and
systematic character apply more to the results of phenomenological
psychology as interpreted by Klein and Westcott, and not to the
method, even though the article was meant to deal with the alleged
development of the phenomenological psychological method. In other
words, the brief parallel description of the phenomenological psy-
chological method that the authors provide (pp. 135-136) was never
used as a frame of reference for evaluating the articles that were
allegedly developing the phenomenological method. Rather, Klein
and Westcott use the criteria for the characteristics of the results of
the application of the method to advance another agenda. They
argue (pp. 150-151) that the cultural relativity of experience neces-
sitated a change in the phenomenological method, and then they
argue for the replacement of essentialism by hermeneutics and of
description by interpretation. The point cannot be argued further
here, but the reader can see that the above critiques of Klein and
Westcott's approach and conclusions show that their reasoning is
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NOTES
1. Many of the points made in this and subsequent sections about the
scientific phenomenological method are based on sources that discuss
the same issues in greater detail. For an overview of the method and its
legitimation, see Giorgi (1987; 1989a; 1989b); for the question of validity;
see Giorgi (1988); for some applications of results or strategies, see Giorgi
(1986; 1987; 1989c; 1989d; 1990a; 1990b); and for more theory and
legitimation, see Giorgi (1970; 1983a; 1983b; 1986).
2. I was originally an external reader of this article before it was published
by Canadian Psychology,when I was at the University of Qu6bec at Montreal.
I did not, at the time, recommend that it be published as it stood. I had
listed some serious objections and I gave some references to be consulted.
I never heard from the editors again. Then a colleague told me that the
article had been published, and several months after its appearance I
got copies of it. I noticed that the authors consulted the references I
had mentioned but they did not take up and incorporate the primary
meanings and implications of the sources to which I referred.
3. This reference was one of those suggested to the authors (unknown to
me at the time of the review) in my review of the first version of the
article. Obviously, the authors did get the text, but instead of seeing the
complications (my motive for the reference) implied in Scanlon's text,
they simply acknowledged that another interpretation existed without
further comment (Klein & Westcott, 1994, p. 137) and then proceeded
to justify their own comparison with Husserl, "because the methods
frequently employed in current research are avowedly, and in fact, based
on Husserlian techniques, especially a priori reflection on essence through
free imaginative variation" (p. 137). But this still does not clarify the
sense in which Husserl is the basis. Is Husserl the basis as ground or
foundation? Or is Husserl a basis as a model to be imitated? The authors
do not say, and they are not explicit in their comparison, but it seems
that Husserl's method is meant to be fixed and impermeable (1994, pp.
141-143). In contrast, the earlier part of this article indicated how even
the search for essence would have to be modified when using the
phenomenological method in a scientific context.
REFERENCES