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Bouncing checks law (Batas Pambansa Blg.

22)
Statutory Basis:

The issuance of bouncing checks is an offense punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22)
also known as the "Bouncing Checks Law" which provides that:

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act. [Sec 1, BP 22]

Offense against Public Order

BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of addressing the problem of
the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm
caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an
unfunded check as an offense not only against property but also against public order. [Mitra vs People,
G.R. No. 191404, July 5, 2010]

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. [Lozano vs. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

Act punished is the issuance of a worthless check

The act sought to be prevented by the law is the act of making and issuing a check with the knowledge
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that, at the time of issue, the drawer issuing the check does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
bank for payment and the check was subsequently dishonored upon presentment. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a worthless check and not the purpose for which such check was issued nor
the terms or conditions relating to its issuance. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The crime is one against
public order and is malum prohibitum. The law is intended to safeguard the interests of the banking
system and the legitimate checking account user. It is not intended nor designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt, nor to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and
circumvention of the purpose of the law. [Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004]

Malum prohibitum

B.P. 22 covers any check which bounces. It does not matter then that the subject check belongs to the
accused or another person. xxx The mere act of issuing a worthless check, either as a deposit, as a
guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt or as a mode of payment is covered by B.P. 22.
It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum. The law is broad enough to include, within its coverage, the
making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a bank, or where such account was
already closed when the check was presented for payment. [Ruiz vs. People, G.R. No. 160893,
November 18, 2005]

Signatory of check is liable

In the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[G.R. No. 99032, March 26, 1997] the Court ruled that the
accused was liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer of the corporation. He
could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction as a defense because BP
22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or
in consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. [Mitra vs People, G.R. No. 191404,
July 5, 2010]

Elements of the offense

In criminal cases involving violations of Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the following elements:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.

2. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment.

3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or
credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment.
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[Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004; Bayani vs People, G.R. No. 154947, August 11,
2004; Rico vs. People, G.R. No. 137191, November 18, 2002; Mitra vs People, G.R. No. 191404,
July 5, 2010; Ongson vs People, G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005]

Dishonored check must be properly desccribed in the Information to sustain a conviction

The first element, i.e., making, drawing, and issuance of any check, requires that the check be properly
described in the Information to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Without a sufficient identification of the dishonored check in the Information, the conviction of the
accused should be set aside for being violative of the constitutional requirement of due process.
[Ongson vs People, G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005]

BP 22 applies to foreign checks

Under the Bouncing Checks Law, foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the
Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law. [De Villa vs Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991]

Presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds

Knowledge on the part of the drawer or maker of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the drawee bank
for the payment of a check upon its presentment is an essential element of the offense. This element
involves a state of the mind of the drawer or maker of the check which is difficult for the prosecution to
prove. To ease the burden of the prosecution, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer or maker of the check of the insufficiency of his fund
in the drawee bank, thus:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.-The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within
five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

However, for the presumption to arise, the prosecution must adduce evidence to prove the factual basis
for its onset, namely, (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b)
the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawer; and,
(c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawer. With the onset of the presumption, the burden of evidence is
shifted on the drawer/maker of the check to prove that, when he issued the subject check, he had no
knowledge that he had insufficient funds in the drawee bank to answer for the amount due. The notice of
dishonor may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the
offended party, either by personal delivery or by registered mail. The drawer or maker of a check has a
right, under the law, to demand that a written notice of dishonor be sent to and received by him to enable
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him to avoid indictment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. [Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004;
Mitra vs People, G.R. No. 191404, July 5, 2010]

(a) Notice of dishonor of check must be in writing

The service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity to make good the check within
those five days to avert his prosecution for violating BP 22. [Mitra vs People, G.R. No. 191404, July 5,
2010]

The notice of dishonor of a check to the maker must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer or
maker of the dishonor of his check is not enough. xxx While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not
state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law.
i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always
be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would
appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and
letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the
accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in
writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. [Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004
citing Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000]

Unless and until the drawer or maker of the check receives a written notice of dishonor of the check, or
where there is no proof as to when such notice of dishonor was received by the drawer or maker, the
five-day period within which the drawer or maker has to pay the amount due or made arrangements with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check, cannot be determined. In such case, the prima facie
presumption cannot arise. [Sia vs. People, G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004]

(b) Notice of dishonor must be actually received by the drawer/issuer of check

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a
check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified
that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the
notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment.
Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law cannot prosper. [Danao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122353, June 6, 2001; see also Rico vs
People, G.R. No. 137191, November 18, 2002]

A notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is necessary before one can be held
liable under B.P. 22. [see Rico vs People, G.R. No. 137191, November 18, 2002 citing Lao vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997]

When service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that conditions exist on which
the validity of such service depends. Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of
service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must
be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. [Victor Ting vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 140665, November 13, 2000]
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(c) Notice of dishonor sent to a corporation is not equivalent to notice sent to the
signatory-employee or officer

Responsibility under B.P. Blg. 22 is personal to the accused; hence, personal knowledge of the notice of
dishonor is necessary. Consequently, constructive notice to the corporation is not enough to satisfy due
process. Moreover, it is petitioner, as an officer of the corporation, who is the latter's agent for purposes
of receiving notices and other documents, and not the other way around. It is but axiomatic that notice to
the corporation, which has a personality distinct and separate from the petitioner, does not constitute
notice to the latter. [see Ofelia Marigomen vs. People, G.R. No. 153451, May 26, 2005

Similarly, in Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997, the accused, as part
of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks with the name of the payee and the amount drawn to
be filled later by another signatory. The notice of dishonor was sent to the main office of the corporation.
The court held that such notice was insufficient and does not constitute a valid notice to the
signatory-employee who holds office in a separate branch and who had no actual knowledge of such
notice.

Payment of the value of the dishonored check BEFORE the information is filed in court will justify
acquittal of the accused

Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace period
would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22. However, the court has held that
where the creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the dishonored
checks, holding the debtor to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Big. 22 after the said collection is
no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations. The Court ruled that albeit made
beyond the grace period, the payment collected justified the acquittal.

Although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5-day period provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, the Court acknowledges the existence of
extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of
the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan,
petitioner should not be penalized although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be
present. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after
having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the
Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the credibility and
stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made
amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed
against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the information has already
attained the purpose of the law.

It should be emphasized that payment of the value of the bounced check after the information has been
filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for
violation of B.P. Big. 22. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.

Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated from
cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code,
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where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the
offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value
of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil
liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.

[see Ariel Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014, citing Griffith vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 129764, March 12, 2002 and Tan vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 152666, April 22, 2008]

Estafa distinguished from BP 22; Estafa by issuance of bouncing check

Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code states as follows:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
herein below . . .

xxx xxx xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds
in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

[D]eceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not
required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored
gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without
sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between
the two also include the following:

(1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had
issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code
such circumstance negates criminal liability;

(2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses;

(3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system;

(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.

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[Nierras vs Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, January 11, 1990]

Pre-existing obligation

The issuance of a bouncing check in payment of a pre-existing obligation does not constitute estafa--

In the issuance of a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer derives no material benefit in
return as its consideration had long been delivered to him before the check was issued. In short, the
issuance of the check was not a means to obtain a valuable consideration from the payee. Deceit, to
constitute estafa should be the efficient cause of the defraudation. Since an obligation has already been
contracted, it cannot be said that the payee parted with his property or that the drawer has obtained
something of value as a result of the postdating or issuance of the bad check in payment of a
pre-existing obligation. [People vs Sabio, G.R. No. L-45490, November 20, 1978]

A check issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation does not constitute estafa even if there is no fund
in the bank to cover the amount of the check. xxx There is no estafa through bouncing checks when it is
shown that private complainant knew that the drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank at the time
the check was issued to him. Such knowledge negates the element of deceit and constitutes a defense
in estafa through bouncing checks. [People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 154159, March 31, 2005; see also
Pacheco v. Court of Appeals]

Criminal Action

BP 22 is a continuing crime-- Venue of criminal action

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed
in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered or dishonored. [Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004]

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the venue of the offense lies at the
place where the check was executed and delivered. The place where the check was written, signed or
dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. [De Villa vs Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991, referencing Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated
December 15, 1981]

Prohibits separate civil action

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Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states -

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based
on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing
fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. [Anita Cheng vs. Spouses William and
Tessie Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009]

Penalty- preference for fine only, but judge may still impose imprisonment

As clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001:

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for
in B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P.
Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
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should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge
decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.

[Lim vs People, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001; see also Magdayao vs. People, G.R. No.
152881, August 17, 2004, Lee vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005]

In Vaca vs Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 131714, November 16, 1998], the court, in deeming the
penalty of fine as more appropriate for the accused who were first-time offenders, held that: "It would
best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by [BP
22], the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of
redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order."

Prescriptive Period to File Action

Section 1 of Act No. 3326 states that the prescriptive period for filing a complaint for violation of BP 22 is
four (4) years from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, or if not known at that time, from
the discovery thereof.

Subsidiary imprisonment applicable

The Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001 that there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine.

[Narte vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004; Jao Yu vs People, G.R. No. 134172,
September 20, 2004]

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