IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA GENERAL JURISDICTION DIVISION CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 BRUCE C. MATHESON, a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Plaintiff, vs MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Defendants, / ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MIAMI-DADE COUNTY AND 0101 MIAMI PROPERTY, LLC’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE This case presents an important question regarding the limits of economic power granted to local government pursuant to Florida law. Specifically, this Court has been asked to determine whether the conveyance of land by Miami-Dade County in the name of economic development under section 125.045 of the Florida Statutes is subject to the competitive bidding process established by section 125.35, Plaintiff maintains that the conveyance made in this case for the construction and operation of a Major League Soccer stadium—a conveyance of 2.79 acres of County-owned property explicitly intended to promote employment opportunities and the creation of business enterprises—cannot circumvent the mechanics of competitive bidding designed to yield the market rate for the real property in question. Plaintiff seeks relief via his Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Verified Complaint (“Complaint”), which requests a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Count I, and, in the altemative, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief pursuant to Count I Page 1 of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 On August 11, 2017, Defendant, Miami-Dade County (“County”), filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (“County Motion”). Defendant 0101 Miami Properties, LLC (“Stadium Developer”) followed suit on September 1, 2017 by filing its own Motion to Dismiss (“Stadium Developer Motion”). Plaintiff, Bruce C, Matheson (“Matheson”), filed a response in opposition to both Motions on October 4, 2017 (“Response”), and a hearing was held on October 11, 2017, during which time the Court heard argument from all parties. The Court, having carefully considered the County Motion and the Stadium Developer Motion, the Response thereto, all the Exhibits attached to the pleadings, and the arguments of the parties, as well as being otherwise fully advised the premises, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that, as explained ore fenus on the record at the ion conclusion of the hearing held on October 11, 2017, Defendant Miami-Dade County’s Mi to Dismiss and Defendant 0101 Miami Properties, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss are both GRANTED for the reasons set forth herein. BACKGROUND! On June 6, 2017, the Board of County Commissioners of Miami-Dade County (“Board”) adopted Resolution No. 567-17 (“Resolution”) conveying 2.79 acres of County-owned property (“Property” or “Stadium Property”) to the Stadium Developer for the construction and operation of a Major League Soccer stadium. In that Resolution, the County declared that it desires to attract a Major League Soccer stadium (“Stadium Project”) to ' Any exhibit attached to a complaint is considered a part thereof for all purposes. Fla. R, Civ P. 1.130, Where allegations in a complaint are contradicted by its attached exhibits, this Court looks to the plain meaning of the exhibits, and may rely on such exhibit in resolving a motion to dismiss. See Hunt Ridge at Tall Pines, Inc. v. Hall, 766 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); see also Peoples v. Sami II Trust 2006-AR6, 178 So. 3d 67, 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing judgment of foreclosure when exhibit attached to complaint demonstrated that plaintiff lacked standing in foreclosure action). Page 2 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 Miami-Dade County because “{the] County has demonstrated its support of soccer, and seeks to promote economic development, to strengthen the County’s vibrancy, and to attract tourism and attendant hospitality industries ....” Compl. Ex. A. To accomplish this, the County further found that “the conveyance of the Property to [Stadium Developer], the construction of the Stadium Project, and [Stadium Developer's] economic investment in the Stadium Project in Miami-Dade County will enhance and expand economic activity in this County, which would be conducive to economic promotion and would facilitate the growth and creation of business enterprises in Miami-Dade County” such that “the Board finds that the anticipated economic and community benefits would justify the economic development conveyance set forth herein pursuant to section 125.045, Florida Statutes.” Jd. And, as to the Stadium Property, the County found that “the Property at 2.79 acres is insufficient as a stand-alone property to construct a soccer stadium, the construction of the Stadium Project, thereby resulting in economic development, is made possible by the assemblage of the Property with adjoining land owned by [Stadium Developer].” Id, A review of the agreement approved by the Resolution demonstrates that the County and the Stadium Developer agreed to accomplish the goals stated in the Resolution through contractual conditions imposed on the Stadium Developer to promote economic development including, but not limited to, the following: © The Stadium Developer must expend a minimum of $175,000,000 in private funds to purchase the land and construct the stadium facilities; ‘* The Stadium Developer must obtain a building permit for the construction of the Stadium Project within two years of the date of conveyance; Page 3 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 ‘* The Stadium Project must be completed within four years from the date of conveyance; ‘+ The Stadium Developer is required to create a minimum of 50 permanent jobs at the Stadium Project, and to maintain those 50 permanent jobs for 15 years from the date of conveyance, with the majority of the permanent jobs paying the greater of an annual salary of $27,069 or the living wage then in effect ‘© The Stadium Developer must comply with the County’s Small Business Enterprise Programs during construction, including the (i) SBE-Construction Program, (ii) SBE-Goods Program, SBE-Services Program, (iv) Responsible Wages and Benefits Program, (v) Community Workforce Program, (vi) Residents First Training and Employment Program, (vii) First Source Hiring Referral Program, (viii) Employ Miami-Dade Program, and (ix) use of CareerSource South Florida to recruit workers for skilled labor positions; and ‘© The Stadium Developer must develop a permanent skilled jobs training program for workers seeking permanent skilled jobs related to the long-term operations of the Stadium Project once the project is completed, including upper management training, Compl. Ex. A, Att. 1. Although the Resolution specifically identifies section 125.045 of the Florida Statutes as the authority for the conveyance of the Stadium Property, Plaintiff Matheson filed the instant Complaint seeking mandamus and declaratory relief alleging that the County failed to comply with “competitive bidding as required by Florida Statute § 125.35] Compl. at 15. Moreover, Matheson alleges that he is willing to buy the property “at the same price and on the same terms the County has offered” the Stadium Property to the Stadium Developer, and that he “will be substantially and adversely affected by the increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic, congestion, noise, decline in property values, and other impacts the project will cause.” 1d. at 6. The County and Stadium Developer filed their respective Motions to Dismiss arguing, that mandamus relief is inappropriate because, as set forth in the Resolution incorporated into Page 4 of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 the Complaint, the conveyance was accomplished pursuant to the independent authorization of section 125,045, and section 125.35 is simply inapposite to economic development conveyances, The Defendants further argue that, even i iff section 125.35 did apply, Pla Matheson lacks standing to raise either the mandamus challenge or seek a declaratory judgment because he is not, and cannot be, a bidder under section 125.35 for the Stadium Property to be used for a Major League Soccer stadium, The Defendants also argue that any impact to his property from the land use of the Stadium Property is properly raised in a land use proceeding, not a challenge to the process used to convey the property Plaintiff Matheson responds by arguing that while section 125.045 “empowers counties to expend public funds to attract and retain business enterprises as a means of economic development,” section 125.35 “mandates that such properties be sold through competitive ” Resp. at 2. Matheson also posits that because he ® xpressly alleges that he is willing and able to purchase the County property on the same financial terms as those set forth in the Resolution and Minutes attached to the Complaint” and alleges that his property will be harmed by the stadium, he has standing to sue, Resp. at 3 ANALYSIS L THE CONVEYANCE OF STADIUM PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS INDEPENDENTLY AUTHORIZED BY THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND THEREFORE MANDAMUS IS NOT AN AVAILABLE REMEDY. In Count I of his Complaint, Matheson petitions this Court to issue an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the County to show cause as to why it should not be compelled to follow the competitive bidding provi ions of section 125.35 for the conveyance of the Stadium Page § of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 Property. Florida law is well-settled, however, that “[m]andamus is available only to ‘enforce an established legal right . .. not to establish that right.”” Miami-Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs v. An Accountable Miami-Dade, 208 So. 34 724, 731 (Fla. 34 DCA 2016) (qui 1g Morse Diesel Int'l, Inc. v. 2000 Island Blvd., Inc., 698 So, 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)), see also Fla, League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 397, 400-01 (Fla. 1992), A writ of mandamus may not be issued unless the allegations in the petition make a prima facie case that the respondent has a duty imposed by law and the petitioner has a right to require its performance. Reedus v. Friedman, 287 So, 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 34 DCA 1973). This is because mandamus is intended to accomplish the limited function of compelling officials to perform lawful duties and “not to redress every grievance or disagreement.” Bichelberger v. Brueckheimer, 613 So. 2d 1372, 1373 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), see also City of Coral Gables v. State ex rel. Worley, 44 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla. 1950) (“It is well established that mandamus is . .. not used to enforce or determine equitable rights.”) Indeed, to compel the issuance of @ writ of mandamus, the following key factors must, be present: 1. The petitioner must show a clear legal right to the performance of a legal duty by a public officer; 2. There must be an indisputable legal duty to perform on the part of the public officer; and Matheson claims that this Court must issue an alternative writ of mandamus asserting that a motion to dismiss is inappropriate under Rule 1.630 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Matheson is incorrect. Rule 1,630(d) only requires a court to issue an altemative writ of mandamus “fiJf the complaint shows a prima facie case for relief.” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630. Moreover, Rule 1,630(e) permits defendants to “respond to the writ as provided in rule 1.140.” Id. As set forth herein, the Complaint fails to state a prima facie case for mandamus and is, therefore properly dismissed under Rule 1.140 as incorporated into Rule 1,630. See, e.g., Inmer v. City of Miami, 898 So. 24 258, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (dismissing petition for writ of mandamus because plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)). Page 6 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 3. There must be mo other adequate legal remedy available to the petitioner. See Hatten v. State, 561 So, 2d 562, 563 (Fla, 1990); Holcomb v, Dep't of Corrs., 609 So, 24 751, 753 (Fla. Ist DCA 1992). Here, the Complaint fails to satisfy the aforementioned factors because it does not allege that Matheson has a clear legal right to require the County to perform. an indisputable legal duty by competitively bidding the conveyance of the Stadium Property. To the contrary, Florida statutes provide multiple and independent methods for a county to convey real property. The statute upon which Matheson relies, section 125.35, authorizes the County to lease or sell property “whenever the board determines that it is to the best interest of the county to do so, to the highest and best bidder for the particular use the board deems to be the highest and best, for such length of term and such conditions as the governing body may in its discretion determine.” Fla, Stat. § 125.35(1a). Accordingly, if a county desires to sell its property to the highest bidder, it can utilize this statutory mechanism to do so, provided the Board determines that such sale is in the County’s best interests, As demonstrated by the Resolution attached to the Complaint, the County did not seek to lease or sell the Stadium Property under section 125.35. Instead, the County acted to convey the Stadium Property under section 125.045 titled “County Economic Development Powers.” The economic development statute was enacted in 1995—almost 50 years after the enactment of section 125.35—upon the Legislature’s finding that [Thhis state faces increasing competition from other states . .. for the location and retention of private enterprises within its borders Furthermore, the Legislature finds that there is a need to enhance and expand economic activity in the counties of this state by attracting and retaining manufacturing development, business enterprise management, and other activities conducive to economic promotion, in order to provide a stronger, more balanced, and stable economy in the state; to enhance and preserve purchasing power and employment opportunities forthe residents of this state, and to improve the welfare and compet Page 7 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 position of the state, The Legislature declares that itis necessary and in the public interest to facilitate the growth and creation of business enterprises in the counties of the state. Fla, Stat. § 125.045(1). By its plain language, the statute expressly authorizes counties to “expend public funds to attract and retain business enterprises.” Fla, Stat. § 125,045(2), The statute further identifies that “[f]or the purposes of this section, it constitutes a public purpose to expend public funds for economic development activities, including, but not limited to leasing or conveying real property . . . for the expansion of businesses existing in the community or the attraction of new businesses to the community.” Fla. Stat. § 125,045(3). Additionally, the statute requires that each county annually report, infer alia, any below market deeds for real property it has conveyed. Fla, Stat, § 125.045(5)(a)(4). Importantly, the statute also contains express instruction on its interpretation directing that all provisions of Chapter 125 be liberally construed to promote economic development by requiring that “[t]he provisions of this chapter which confer powers and duties on the governing body of a county, including any powers not specifically prohibited by law which can be exercised by the governing body of a county, must be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this section.” Fla. Stat. § 125.045(2). Plaintiff Matheson concedes in his Response that section 125.045 authorizes the sale of land “to attract and retain business enterprises as a means of economic development,” but argues that the competitive bidding provisions of section 125.35 must be read into section 125.045 to require that the conveyance of land be done by competitive bid. In support of his argument, Matheson cites the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision Pandya v. Israel, which held that section 125.35 applied to the sale of property under section 125.01. 761 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that “section 125.35 specifically addresses the procedural Page 8 of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 requirements for the sale of property by the County and thus controls over the more general terms of section 125.01”) (emphasis in original). However, Pandya is readily distinguishable because, unlike section 125,045, section 125.01 is merely a general grant of authority “which gives counties, not operating under county charters ... such powers of self-government as are provided by general or special law.” Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207, 210 (Fla. 1979) As opposed to the general grant of authority in section 125.01 to convey property generally, section 125.045 is a specific grant of authority to all counties to “expend pul ic funds to attract, and retain business enterprises.” Fla. Stat. § 125.045(2), The Fourth District in Pandya simply did not address the interplay between the procedural elements of section 125.35 and the alternate avenues afforded to counties to convey or lease property in specific circumstances — such as for economic development. Thus, Pandya is inapposite to the instant case, and Matheson fails to point to any supplemental authority supporting his contention that section 125.35 must be read into the specific grant of power gi ven to counties to promote economic development. In Op. Att'y Gen, Fla. 74-219 (1974), on the other hand, the Attomey General addressed a perceived conflict between the conveyance authority afforded in section 125.35 versus section 125.38, a separate land conveyance statute to the United States or the State of Florida. The Attorney General opined that, although section 125.35 “covers county leases in general,” section 125.38 is mote specific, “amounting, in effect, to an exception to the general statute” and that, because “the lease falls within the terms of the specific statute, that one ~ and * Counties operating under a home rule charter already possess such authority under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(g) of the Florida Constitution of 1968. Thisis particularly true for Miami-Dade County See Fla. Con, Art. VIIL, Sec. 6(¢). of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 not the general statute ~ applies.” While not binding, such opinions are persuasive in statutory construction, See McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So, 2d 1204, 1214 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We have long recognized that ‘[allthough an opinion of the Attorney General is not binding on a court, itis entitled to careful consideration and generally should be regarded as highly persuasive.) (quoting Stare v. Family Bank of Hallandale, 632 So, 2 474, 478 (Fla. 1993)). Notwithstanding the lack of any clear direction by binding precedent, this Court finds, based on the plain language of the statute, that section 125.045 is a separate and independent authorization for counties to convey real property and the provisions of the inapposite section 125.35 do not apply for four reasons. First, the plain language of section 125.045(2) authorizes counties to “expend public funds to attract and retain business enterprises” and then defines the expenditure of public funds in subsection (3) to include the “leasing or conveying of real property . . . for the expansion of businesses existing in the community or the attraction of new businesses to the community.” In broadly defining the expenditure of public funds, the Legislature recognized that money is not the only public fund that can be used to attract or retain businesses. The lease or conveyance of real property as a means of attracting, retaining or expanding a business serves as another means, explicitly referenced by the Legislature within the language of section 125,045, that a county may use to attract business and fulfill its economic development objective. Reading section 125.35 into section 125.045 would limit the unambiguous grant of authority to counties to attract, retain or expand economic development in their communities See Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla. Ist DCA. 1968) (courts may not “construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, Page 10 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 or li 1, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications . . . [tJo do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.”); see also W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ine. v. See, 79 80. 3d 1, 9 (Fla 2012) (if a statute's “language is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, this Court will apply that unequivocal meaning and not resort to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction.”).! Second, section 125,045(2) contains direction in interpreting all provisions of chapter 125 stating that “[t]he provisions of this chapter which confer powers and duties on the governing body ofa county ,.. must be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes of this section.” This unusual direction of the Legislature makes clear that all provisions of chapter 125 must be read to “facilitate the growth and creation of business enterprises in the counties of the state.” Fla, Stat. § 125,045(1), Reading the competitive bidding requirements of section 125.35 into the express grant of authority to convey real property will undoubtedly frustrate rather than facilitate this goal. Attracting businesses that will promote economic development is far more effective if the invitation includes property conveyed at below market value to support a relocation from a competing state rather than merely an opportunity to bid on the property—a power which exists regardless of the Legislature's creation of section 125.045, Third, reading a competitive bidding requirement into section 125.045 would render portions of the statute meaningless and is therefore inappropriate. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. + Even if the plain language of section 125.045 were unclear as to whether section 125.045 or section 125.35 controlled, section 125.045 as the more specific, later filed statute, would take precedence. See Adams v. Culver, 111 So, 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959) (“a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms"; see also McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (when two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent” Page IM of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 ¥. J.A., 963 $0.24 189, 199 (Fla, 2007) (“a basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.’”) (quoting State v. Goode, 830 So. 2d 817, 824 (Fla. 2002)). “[R]elated statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and... . ‘[wJhere possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 829 So. 24 891, 898 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)). The economic development conveyance authority exists not only to attract new businesses, but also to retain and expand existing businesses. An economic development conveyance to retain or expand an existing, busines ity could bid. by its own terms, may only be fora single business where no other e Injecting a competitive bidding requirement into such transactions would essentially invalidate those portions of the statute. Moreover, the statute requires counties to report economic development incentives that include “[bJelow-market rate leases or deeds for real property” to the State’s Office of Economic and Demographic Research, which then reports the incentives to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Department, of Economic Opportunity, Fla. Stat. § 125.045(5). Because competitive bidding yields the “market rate” for the conveyance of real property, inserting that requirement into section 125,045 would essentially render this reporting provision a nullity and is thus rejected, Finally, reading the competitive bidding provisions of section 125.35 into specific grants of statutory authority for counties to convey real property would not only materially limit the legislative direction in the economic development statute, but would also eviscerate legislative authority for the conveyance of real property in other similar statutes. For example: Page 12 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 section 125.38 provides for disposition of County property by conveyance to a not-for-profit organization for community interest and welfare purposes; section 125,379 provides for disposition of County property for affordable housing purposes; section 125.37 provides for disposition of County property by exchanging it for other property owned by the requesting property owner; and section 125.39 provides for the disposition of any property conveyed for a specific purpose and containing a reversionary clause to the original grantor, Importing a competitive bidding requirement into each of these statutes would upset this carefully crafted legislative scheme and lead to the absurd result of nullifying each of these aforementioned provisions. See Tampa-Hillsborough Cty. Expressway Auth. v. K.E. Morris Alignment Serv. Ine., 444 So, 2d 926, 929 (Fla. 1983) (emphasizing that courts must attempt to avoid statutory, construction and interpretation that could lead to “an absurd result”) As such, this Court finds that, on the face of the Complaint and its attached Exhibits, section 125.045 of the Florida Statutes contains independent authority for the County to convey the Stadium Property to the Stadium Developer as an economic development project, and said conveyance is not subject to the competitive provisions of section 125.35. Matheson has thus failed to allege a clear legal right to an indisputable legal duty, and this Court declines to issue an alternative writ of mandamus to the County pursuant to Rules 1.440 and 1.630 of the Florida Rules of Ci Procedure. Il, | MATHESON LACKS STANDING TO COMPEL A COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCESS IN WHICH HE CANNOT BID. In Count II of his Complaint, Matheson maintains, in the alternative, a purported need for declaratory and injunetive relief, “The test of the sufficiency of a complaint in a declaratory judgment proceeding is not whether the complaint shows that the plaintiff will succeed in Page 13 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 getting a declaration of rights in accordance with his theory and contention, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all.” Conley v. Morley Realty Corp., 57S So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 34 DCA 1991) (citing Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, 56 So. 24.445, 448 (Fla. 1952)); see also Durand v. Metropolitan Dade Cnty., 472 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla, 1985). Similarly, a plaintiff may only seek mandamus relief if the plaintiff “suffered a special injui apart from the injury suffered by any member of the general public” as a result of the alleged government action or inaction. Centrust Savings Bank v. City of Miami, 491 So. 24 576, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (dismissing writ of mandamus for lack of standing for failing to allege special injury). Here, Matheson is not entitled to a declaration of rights or mandamus relief because he lacks the “special injury” necessary to afford him standing to bring the action Even if this Court were to assume that section 125.35 applied to the County’s conveyance of the Stadium Property to the Stadium Developer for economic development, Matheson lacks the standing to raise such a claim. “{C]itizens and taxpayers lack standing to challenge government action unless they demonstrate either a special injury, different from the injuries to other taxpayers, or unless the claim is based on the violation of a provision of the Constitution that governs taxing and spending powers.” Solares v, City of Miami, 166 So, 3d 887, 888 (Fla, 3d DCA 2015), see also Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty. v. Clayton, 691 So, 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla, 1997) (“The requirement that a taxpayer seeking standing allege a ‘special injury” or a ‘constitutional challenge’ is consistent with long established precedent”). Moreover, “[s]tanding is a threshold issue which must be resolved before reaching the merits of a case.” Solares, 166 So. 3d at 888. Matheson attempts to allege a special injury to challenge the conveyance by (1) asserting that the Property “is less than a quarter mile from Mr. Matheson’s property” and Page 14 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 he “will be substantially and adversely affected by the increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic, congestion, noise, decline in property values and other impacts the project will caus and (2) asserting that he is “wil ling and able to purchase the County Property at the same price and on the same terms” as the Stadium Developer. Compl. at 6. In his Response, Matheson further clarifies his offer to meet “the same financial terms as those set forth in the Resolution and Minutes attached to the Complaint.” Resp. at 3 Matheson’s allegations regarding his disagreement with the future use of the Stadium Property do not confer standing to challenge the process for the conveyance of the Stadium Property. See Smith v. City of Fort Meyers, 944 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 34 DCA 2006) (holding standing to challenge a zoning decision is insufficient to confer standing to challenge the legality of the transfer of city property). At best, these purported impacts to his neighboring property and other alleged harms may potentially provide standing for Matheson to challenge a zoning application approving the property for stadium development, but fall short of providing standing to challenge the conveyance itself. [d.; see also Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972) (“In determining the sufficiency of the parties’ interest to give standing, factors such as the proximity of his property to the property being zoned or rezoned, the character of the neighborhood, including the existence of common restrictive covenants. and set-back requirements, and the type of change proposed are considerations.”). Nor does Matheson have standing to challenge the means of conveyance by merely stating that he is willing to meet the financial terms of the stadium agreement attached to the Complaint, To have standing to challenge a proposed award of a public contract, a party must have a “substantial interest” in the bid sufficient to show that, if the challenge is granted, the protestor would receive the award of the contract, North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 Page 15 of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 1985) (holding that taxpayers lacked standing to raise challenge alleging failures in bidding procedures); Preston Carroll Co. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 400 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 34 DCA 1981) (holding that a second low bidder establishes standing to challenge an award, but a fifth low bidder does not), see also Brasfield & Gorrie v. Ajax Constr. Co., 627 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. Ist DCA 1993) (holding that a non-bidder is prohibited from filing a bid protest). Simply put, a non-bidder does not have standing to file a protest alleging a violation of the competitive bidding process. Fi Howard Co. v. Dep't of Mgm 't Servs., 624 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. Ist DCA 1993) (holding that non-bidder did not have standing to challenge award of bid because he lacked sufficient interest in the procurement). The terms set forth in the Exhibits attached to the Complaint expressly require the construction of a sports stadium to house a Major League Soccer franchise within four years of the date of conveyance. In the County’s judgment, this use of the land is the best way to promote economic development. The Resolution attached to the Complaint makes clear that & Major League Soccer stadium is desired because “Miami-Dade County has demonstrated its support of soccer, and seeks to promote economic development, to strengthen the County’s vibrancy, and to attract tourism and attendant hospitality industries...” Compl. Ex. A. Matheson cannot create a substantial interest in a potential competitive bid by requiring the County to conduct the bid on Matheson’s preferred terms. Such discretion is, as a matter of constitutional law and under section 125,35, left exclusively to the County.* Indeed, ordering the County to procure a different use of its property than the County's legislative body has chosen to pursue would violate the separation of powers. See, e.g., Brown v, Feaver, 726 So, 2d 322, 325 (Fla. 34 DCA 1999) (“The legislature has not given the courts, control over the state's resources, nor could it without a constitutional amendment, and hence, the courts may not direct the Department to use them in any particular manner . .. [t]o do so ‘would constitute a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine”) Page 16 of 19CASE NO. 2017-017478 CA 22 Moreover, the Resolution makes the express finding that “the Property at 2.79 acres is insufficient as a stand-alone property to construct a soccer stadium, the construction of the Stadium Project, thereby resulting in economic development, is made possible by the assemblage of the Property with adjoining land owned by [Stadium Developer].” Compl. Ex AS Matheson has not pled, argued, or asserted that he can meet anything but the financial terms of the transaction, and the Exhibits attached to the Complaint directly contradict Matheson’s conclusory assertion that he is able to meet the terms and conditions of the agreement, At best, Matheson’s allegations are a sham bid, which is insufficient to confer him standing. Westinghouse Elec. v. Jacksonville Trasp., 491 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. Ist DCA 1986) (bidder who submits a “ruse” bid does not have standing to challenge the process used to award a contract because “such ‘sandba; ing,” if permitted, would erode the integrity of the public bidding process.”) Matheson will have the opportunity to raise his objections to the construction of a private soccer stadium and the business that it will generate in an appropriate zoning hearing, But such objections are insufficient to give im standing to challenge the County’s decision to invoke its economic development powers under section 125.045. Nor can Matheson cure this defect by repleading or amending his cause of action because “the Property at 2.79 acres © The terms do not end there, The Stadium Developer is required to create $0 permanent jobs, hold job fairs, conduct community outreach, develop a permanent skilled jobs training program, run shuttles to and from the stadium, form a partnership with the Overtown Youth Coalition to provide its members with training session and interactions with players, develop a partnership with the Miami-Dade County School Board to provide opportunities for youth education and athletics, comply with County Small Business Enterprise programs, and hire County police and fire rescue personnel for events within the stadium. Likewise, the conveyance terms require not only the payment of a purchase price of $9,015,000 (less costs), but also a total investment of no less than $175 Million in private funds for the construction of the stadium. Page 17 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 is insufficient as a stand-alone property to construct a soccer stadium, the construction of the Stadium Project . . . is made possible by the assemblage of the Property with adjoining land owned by [Stadium Developer].” Compl. Ex. A.” CONCLU! Ultimately, Matheson lacks standing to raise a complaint to seek mandamus or request declaratory judgment to compel competitive bidding for the Stadium Property under section 125.35 of the Florida Statutes. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 1. Defendant Miami-Dade County’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 2. Defendant 0101 Miami Properties, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiff Bruce C. Matheson’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami-Dade County, Florida, on 11/14/17. DOLFO RUIZ CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE FINAL ORDERS AS TO ALL PARTIES SRS DISPOSITION NUMBER 12 THE COURT DISMISSES THIS CASE AGAINST ANY PARTY NOT LISTED IN THIS FINAL ORDER OR PREVIOUS ORDER(S). THIS CASE IS CLOSED AS TO ALL PARTI Judge’s Initials RR 7 Even if Matheson could make such an allegation, given this Court’s finding that section 125.045 contains independent authority for the County to convey property not subject to the competitive provisions of section 125.35 in resolving Count | of the Complaint, any further request for declaratory judgment would be futile. Page 18 of 19CASE NO, 2017-017478 CA 22 The parties served with this Order are indicated in the accompanying 11th Circuit email confirmation which includes all emails provided by the submitter. The movant shall IMMEDIATELY serve a true and correct copy of this Order, by mail, facsimile, email or hand- delivery, to all parties/counsel of record for whom service is not indicated by the accompanying 1th Circuit confirmation, and file proof of service with the Clerk of Court, Signed and stamped original Order sent to court file by Judge Rodolfo Ruiz staff. ce: All counsel of record Page 19 of 19