9.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee-inquiries in aid of legislation

FACTS
1.30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the 1) is the the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;
the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs.
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with
the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
strategems to unjuestly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
The charged included an allegation of conspiracy and collaboratioN
with the lawyers of bengzon law offices to conceal and place out of
jurisdiction the funds of the romualdezs.
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan
Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege"
before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated,
the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC)
by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
section 21 v sec 22; executive priviledge
ISSUES RLAC
No, the inquiry it is not in aid of legislation.
Under article 6 section 21, The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed
legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They
may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
In the Bengzon case, the SBRC is directed to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with
regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act . The investigation being conducted
by the blue ribbon committee is not in aid of legislation but
of prosecution.

10.Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v Senate of the republic of the Philippines-

FACTS ISSUES RLAC

11.GR no. 169777-Senate v Ermita-EO 464-How may executive privilege be invoked?

FACTS ISSUES RLAC
1. Sept 21-23 2005-senate committee issued invitations to various officials Is the claim of executive privilege valid? No, the claim of executive privilege is not valid.
of the executive department, as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the NLRC with the CNMEG (northrail project) The claim must be done as stated in US v Reynolds. The court
itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate
2. The hearing was sparked by enrile. for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
3. September 28, 2005-The President issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question
464) ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers,
adherence to the rule on Executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under
the constitution.
4. Executive priviledge covers all confidential or classified information
between the president and the public officers covered by this executive
order.
5. Conversations and correspondence between the president and the public
official.
6. Military diplomatic and other national security matters.
7. Information between intergovernment agencies prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements.
12 Neri v Senate Committee On Accountability Of Public Officers And Investigations-executive privilege of presidential communications
FACTS
1. April 21, 2007-the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos).
2. The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
3. In connection with this, 4 resolutions directing the 1 for investigation, 2
inquiries and 1 for cancellation of the deal and it is avered that the inquiry is in aid
of 4 pending senate bills.
4. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to
certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
5. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on
September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007.
6. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of
town during the other dates.
7. On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for
eleven (11) hours.
8. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
that must be asked is not only whether the requested information
falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to
Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is
woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances
of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
invalidated.
ISSUES RLAC
1. are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by 1. Yes, it is covered by executive priviledge.
executive privilege?
Presidential communications are presumptively
priviledged. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee
In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President
that there are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is and those who assist him with freedom to explore
the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
process privilege. decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately.
presidential communications privilege - pertains to communications,
documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
deliberative process privilege.- includes advisory opinions, correspondence between the President and public officials
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
governmental decisions and policies are formulated. process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases
2. did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the are presidential communications privilege and executive
contempt Order? privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
The court used the elements stated below which was satisfied in
this case:
NBN Project.
9. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
10. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege.
11. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
12. Respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,
requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
13. November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of
executive privilege.
14. Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita,
15. November 22, 2007, the respondent committee issued the show cause Letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
16. December 7, 2007-petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for
certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
17. January 30, 2008, senate issued a contempt order ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of
the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyos cabinet. And
Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
2.Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion.
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional
infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the
requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the invitations
should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent
Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a
minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
was present during the deliberation.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in
aid of legislation conducted by the 14thSenate SINCE the Rules
of Procedure was not published,hence such is procedurally
infirm,
And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt
Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out that
respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of
executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead,
they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and
simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and
ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
 13.Akbayan v Thomas Aquino-executive privilege of deliberative process
FACTS
1. January 25, 2005 House Resolution No. 551-
calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being In both Fulbright and CIEL, the U.S. government cited a statutory basis for withholding JPEPA is of diplomatic negotiations, In, PMPF v. Manglapus,
negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA.
2.The Resolution became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by conditions: (1) it must be either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be
the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into
the negotiations of the JPEPA.
3.Senate and congress requested from january to august 2005 the full copy
of the JPEPA but to no avail.
4. December 9, 2005-Petitioners seek via the present petition for mandamus
and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and
all pertinent attachments and annexes.
4.September 9, 2006-JPEPA was signed in Helsinki.
5.the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.
6.while the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the .
[6]
public since September 11, 2006, respondents do not dispute that, at the
time the petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners Reply when the
JPEPA was still being negotiated the initial drafts thereof were kept from
public view.
ISSUES
1. Are the requested documents covered by executive privilege?
information, namely, Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).[39] In
order to qualify for protection under Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two
bothpre-decisional and part of the agency's deliberative or decision-making process.
Judge Friedman, in CIEL, himself cognizant of a
superficial similarity of context between the two cases, based his
decision on what he perceived to be a significant distinction: he
found the negotiators notes that were sought in Fulbright to be
clearly internal, whereas the documents being sought in CIEL
were those produced by or exchanged with an outside party, i.e.
Chile. The documents subject of Fulbright being clearly internal
in character, the question of disclosure therein turned not on the
threshold requirement of Exemption 5 that the document be inter-
agency, but on whether the documents were part of the agency's
pre-decisional deliberative process. On this basis, Judge
Friedman found that Judge Green's discussion [in Fulbright] of
the harm that could result from disclosure therefore is irrelevant,
since the documents at issue [in CIEL] are not inter-agency, and
the Court does not reach the question of deliberative process
RLAC
Yes, it is covered by executive priviledge.
the court held that The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential
characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. it is
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity
for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude
that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that historic confidentiality. would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of
the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
Ciel v Fulbright: In this jurisdiction, however, there is no
counterpart of the FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement
similar to FOIA Exemption 5 in particular. Hence, Philippine
courts, when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic
negotiations, are more free to focus directly on the issue
of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported
by public policy, without having to consider as the CIEL court
did if these negotiations fulfill a formal requirement of being
inter-agency. Important though that requirement may be in the
context of domestic negotiations, it need not be accorded the
same significance when dealing with international negotiations.