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14.Belgica v Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr.

-PDAF-riders-separation of powers
FACTS ISSUES RLAC
1. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that I. No, it is not constitutional. For the following reasons:
for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers a) separation of powers-
(PDAF)
in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that government The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily
funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is an undue delegation contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
ghost projects. of power.(PD 910. PD 1869)
2. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Executive branch of government. ." Upon approval and
3. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed Pork Barrel System is the collective body of rules and practices that govern the passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary fudetermine the manner of its necessarily comes to an end and from there the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system. utilizationnds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
Executives role of implementing the national budget
4. They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of
government, including its members begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
System:
between them, Congress must "not concern itself with
(a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to
an individual officer; details for implementation by the Executive."The
(b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: participation of members of congress even if only to
Power Of The Purse

funds will be used or expended; recommend amounts to an unconstitutional post-


(c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation 1. Congressional Pork Barrel- as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund enactment interference in the role of the executive.
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
(d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds
(b) non-delegability of legislative power.
particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 states that: "No money shall
Example: the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
5. July 2013- NBI probed allegations of 10 Billion peso fraud of budget Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows
appropriation made by law.
being used for ghost org. individual legislators to wield a collective power
6. JLN-20 ghost orgs/dummy NGO It is clear that the power to appropriate must be exercised only
7. August 16,2013-COA report use of legislators Priority Development 2. Presidential Pork Barrel- as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
through legislation. In the PDAF Article, said legislators are
Assistance Fund. which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. .
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
a. 772 projects-82 ngo Example: Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is lodged in
b. 6.156 billion budget, no liquidation, spurious documents Congress, not individual legislators.
RA 10352. ARTICLE XLIV
General appropriations act of 2013.national budget circular no.547 (c) checks and balances;
-all requests for issuance of allotment shall be supported by the following
..sic.. written endorsements by chairman on the senate committee of finance Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution The President
and the chairman of the committee of appropriations. shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object

An item of appropriation must be an item characterized by


singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."
the amount only appears as a collective allocation limit since the
said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations
and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion.
Line item veto cannot be done in lump sum appropriations.

II. although the said law remains constitutional the provisions


below, since these are severable and unfettered are deemed
unconstitutional because it is an undue delegation of power

(a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed


by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, relating to
the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines"

The appropriation law must contain adequate legislative


guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the
Executive. It must satisfy the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.

Therefore it is an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as


it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the
said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.

15.Araullo v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III-Power of Augmentation


FACTS ISSUES RLAC
1. September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege No, the DAP is not a valid exercise of the power of
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, Is there a valid exercise of the power of augmentation? augmentation.
including himself, had been allotted an additional 50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the DAP. One of The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section
Renato C. Corona. the principle of savings is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes 25(5), supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following
2. Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement something that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, requisites, namely:
explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of the One of the principle of savings is that savings should be actual, as opposed to
DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical. (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
accelerate economic expansion. Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
3. He explained that the funds under the DAP releases had been sourced Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
from savings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;-
funds; and that the savings had been derived from: GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize
(1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased transfers of funds under the DAP; The provisions cited by the
Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the DBM lacked the words, for their respective offices which
year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and makes it constitutionally unfaithful hence invalid.
discontinued projects per zero based budgeting findings; and
(2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving (2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of appropriations for their respective offices;- One of the principle
the National Government. of savings is that savings should be actual, as opposed to
4. DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or
savings, namely, among others: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the hypothetical. The power to augment was to be used only when
1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were
augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist,
5. the petitioners brought to the Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption for only then could savings be properly realized. The DBM
of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came
Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. from "pooling of unreleased appropriations, which means they
541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings
of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies can be generated.
and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and
current allotments. DAP is forced savings, because the withdrawals were upon the
6. At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears out,
Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that that the DBM directed the departments to compute their
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an unobligated allotments and even if there is no submitted
appropriation made by law." computation the DBM will use the latest report and will withdraw
7. The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against the funds.
the DAP indicate that:
8. the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
allocate public money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed general appropriations law for their respective offices- Section
funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his 25(5) has delineated borders between their offices, such that
constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing
transfer funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a
within the Executive Branch of the Government. deficient item or items.The records show, indeed, that funds
9. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of amounting to 143,700,000.00 and 250,000,000.00 were
allegations of transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA and the House
Executive. of Representatives. Cross-border augmentations from savings are
prohibited by the Constitution.

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