REGISTRATION (Case Digests) Issue:
1. KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE RAYMOND V. PALATINO, et. al. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009
Facts:
On February 12, 2009 the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 adjusting the deadline
of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections to October 31,
2009, instead of December 15, 2009 as fixed by their prior Resolution No. 8514 pursuant
to R.A. 8189 or the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
The public clamored for an extension but the COMELEC argued that they need more time
to prepare for the automated elections. Via the present Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus filed on October 30, 2009, petitioners challenge the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8585 and seek a declaration of its nullity.
Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino, a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan
Party-list, sues as a member of the House of Representatives and a concerned citizen,
while the rest of petitioners sue as concerned citizens.
Petitioners contend that the serious questions involved in this case and potential
disenfranchisement of millions of Filipino voters justify resort to this Court in the first
instance, claiming that based on National Statistics Office (NSO) data, the projected
voting population for the May 10, 2010 elections is 3,758,964 for the age group 18-19
and 8,756,981 for the age group 20-24, or a total of 12,515,945.
Petitioners further contend that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is an unconstitutional
encroachment on the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing
voter registration under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189), otherwise known
as The Voters Registration Act of 1996
They thus pray that COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void, and that
the COMELEC be accordingly required to extend the voter registration until January 9,
2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10,
2010.
The COMELEC maintains in its Comment filed on December 7, 2009 that, among other
things, the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to
promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections;
that Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 (RA 6646)4 and Section 28 of Republic Act No.
8436 (RA 8436)5 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voter
registration; and that its schedule of pre-election acts shows that the October 31, 2009
deadline of voter registration was impelled by operational and pragmatic considerations,
citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC6wherein the Court denied a similar prayer for an
extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14, 2001
elections.
Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of voter registration to October 31,
2009 instead of December 15, 2009, is null and void
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. The right of suffrage lies at the heart of our
constitutional democracy. The right of every Filipino to choose the leaders who will lead
the country and participate, to the fullest extent possible, in every national and local
election is so zealously guarded by the fundamental law that it devoted an entire article
solely therefor.
ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall provide a system of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote
without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under
existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the
secrecy of the ballot.
Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power
from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a
function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional
declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular
election and 90 days before a special election.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing
voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189,
Sec. 8 - daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the
May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise
its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of
voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is
directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the
same until January 9, 2010.
2. CARLOS T. GO, SR. vs. LUIS T. RAMOS, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009
Facts:
Luis T. Ramos files a complaint-affidavit for deportation before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging
that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy
represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth
certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which
indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from
Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the
document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming
managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal
circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis
presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as F-Chinese. Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are
Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos
appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred
that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified
documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from
the Department of Foreign Affairs.
On February 2001, Associate Commissioner dismissed the complaint for deportation
against Jimmy. Associate affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation
tasked to investigate the case that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law,
therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as
well.
A month later, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that
Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to
Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election
thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation
charges against Jimmy.
Carlos and Jimmy Go challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the
deportation proceedings in the RTC. RTC dismissed the petition.
The CA also dismissed the petition. It did not find merit in their argument that the issue
of citizenship should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and
that neither the Bureau nor the Board has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in
the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal
also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to
try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their
citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never
extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to ones claim of
Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal found that Carlos failed
to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three years upon reaching
the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the belated submission to the local civil
registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was
defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and
the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily
explained.
As to Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the government to have acquired
Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him on
September 11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned.
Issue:
Whether the evidence adduced by Carlos Go, Sr. and Jimmy Go, Sr. to prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction
from continuing with the deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal
judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage.
Ruling:
Petition is bereft of merit. Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau
has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once
the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out
and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, we said that
decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a persons
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Indeed, if the issue of ones citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the
courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the
government should not be precluded from questioning ones claim to Philippine
citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),[56] Article IV of the 1935
Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen. Since his citizenship hinges
on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter.
However, whatever will be the findings as to Carlos citizenship will in no way prejudice
him.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the
doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never
extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the
prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since
then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of
the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen
of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence
whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and
that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of
the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our
considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate
son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos
Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. It is
incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant
of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor
of the state.
As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented
substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction
over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are ruling that they are not
Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily has to pass
upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be
enjoined in order to give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the
opinion that said proceedings should not be enjoined.
3. PHILIP G. ROMUALDEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY,
DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9,
MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA,
LEYTE, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993
An event in this decade, which future generations would likely come to know simply as
the "EDSA People's Power Revolution of 1986," has dramatically changed the course of
our nation's history. So, too, not a few of our countrymen have by it been left alone in
their own personal lives. One such case is that of the petitioner in this special civil action
for certiorari.
Facts:
Philip Romualdez was a resident of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and in 1982 was
elected and served as barangay chairman. In 1986 fled the country and sought
asylum in the United States which was granted. In 1991, Romualdez returned to the
Philippines and upon arrival, he returned to his residence at Malbog and registered
himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9. Donato Advincula challenged the registration
before the trial court praying that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters alleging
that Romualdez was a resident of U.S.A.; that he had just recently arrived in the
Philippines; and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines
and the six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay
Malbog. Romualdez contended that he has been a resident of Tolosa since the early
1980s, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical absence
therefrom during the period from 1986 up to 1991.
Issue:
Whether or not Romualdez has voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence
in Tolosa, Leyte and, therefore may not register as a voter.
Ruling:
No. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile,
which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was
established during the early 1980s to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in
turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
4. JULIO OZAMIZ vs. HONORABLE MARIANO ZOSA as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental and ELEUTERIO QUIMBO, G.R. No. L-28228, August
31, 1970
Facts:
Petitioner Julio Ozamiz is a resident of the municipality of Jimenez, province of Misamis
Occidental, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1 of the same municipality. On
September 30, 1967, he filed with the Court of First Instance of said province, presided
over by respondent Judge, a petition for the exclusion of respondent Eleuterio Quimbo
from the list of voters of Precinct No. 16 of said municipality alleging that he is a citizen,
not of the Philippines, but of China.
Quimbo filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground "that the petition fails to allege
jurisdictional facts" namely, that he had "applied for registration" and that the same
had been "validated or approved;" that "the petition fails to include the election registrar
and members of the election board as indispensable parties;" and that having previously
exercised the right of suffrage and been elected vice mayor, he is "presumed to be a
Filipino citizen"
In an order of the same date, respondent Judge granted the motion and dismissed the
petition for exclusion, without costs, upon the theory that the court "has no jurisdiction
to inquire into the citizenship" of Quimbo and "that an inquiry" into such question "does
not come within the purview of Secs. 7 and 15, Republic Act No. 3588 and Sec. 123 of the
Revised Election Code Republic Act 180, as amended," in view of the summary nature of
such proceedings.
A reconsideration of said order having been denied, petitioner commenced the present
action, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of October 7, 1967, and, accordingly, prayed that the same be annulled.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue at bar has become purely academic," inasmuch as the 1967
elections to which said petition naturally refers is already over.
Ruling:
NO. Petitioners contention is well taken, inasmuch as the authority to order the
inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to
inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority unless the
law provides otherwise. We are not aware of, and respondents have not pointed out, any
such law. Apparently, respondent Judge could not conceive that so important an
attribute as ones nationality could be left for determination in an exclusion proceeding,
considering the summary nature thereof, and, that the decision therein of the Court of
First Instance is not he thought appealable to a higher court. This process of
reasoning overlooks, however, the fact that except insofar as the right to remain in the
list of voters for the elections in relation to which the proceedings had been held said
decision does not constitute res adjudicata, not only as regards the nationality of the
person concerned, but, even as to his right to vote. In other words, whatever said
decision may be, it would neither be conclusive on his political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.
Insofar as decisions in cases of exclusion do not bar subsequent litigations or constitute
res adjudicate.
In this connection, Dr. Jose P. Laurel a foremost constitutionalist and one of the
outstanding framers of our Fundamental Law, whose wealth of experience in the
practical operation of our political system is acknowledged had the following to say,
on behalf of the Court, in Abail v. Justice of the Peace Court of Bacolod:
"While the present controversy may seem academic because the 1938 election is over,
we have nevertheless assumed the task of deciding the same on its merits in view of the
imperative necessity and importance of having a correct electoral census in the
municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, and for that matter in any municipality or city
in the Philippines, for use in future elections. In the scheme of our present republican
government, the people are allowed to have a voice therein through the instrumentality
of suffrage to be availed of by those possessing certain prescribed qualifications (Article
V, Constitution of the Philippines; sections 93 and 94, Election Code). The people in
clothing a citizen with the elective franchise for the purpose of securing a consistent and
perpetual administration of the government they ordain, charge him with the
performance of a duty in the nature of a public trust, and in that respect constitute him a
representative of the whole people. This duty requires that the privilege thus bestowed
should be exercised, not exclusively for the benefit of the citizen or class of citizens
professing it, but in good faith and with an intelligent zeal for the general benefit and
welfare of the state. (U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 588). In the last analysis, therefore, the
inclusion in or exclusion from the permanent electoral list of any voter concerns not only
the latter in his individual capacity but the public in general."
The considerations that impelled this Court to decide the Abail case on the merits,
despite the fact that the election therein contemplated was over, acquire greater
significance in the present case. Indeed, the right of suffrage involved therein is
dependent upon the question whether or not respondent Eleuterio Quimbo is a
foreigner, and our laws are particularly, as well as justifiably, concerned about, any form
of alien intervention in our political life, whereas the Abail case hinged merely on the
ability of some Filipinos to prepare their own ballots as one of the requirements for the
possession and exercise of the right of suffrage.
Needless to stress, this right is but an attribute of sovereignty, which, in a democratic
state, particularly one of the republican type, like ours, resides in the Filipino people, and
"it is elementary that such sovereignty be exercised exclusively by nationals." For this
reason, it has been deemed necessary to warn courts "that they should ever endeavor to
bar the possibility that judicial proceedings should be utilized to circumvent the policy of
our constitution and laws, even temporarily." In the case at bar, by adopting a theory
neither supported by any statute, decision or legal principle, nor advanced by any of the
parties, who thus impliedly accept the jurisdiction of the lower court the same
allowed respondent Quimbo to vote in two (2) general elections, despite the debatable
nature of his right to participate therein. What is more, he would, also, manage to
participate in the processes for the amendment or revision of no less than our
Fundamental Law, soon scheduled to begin, even if he were not entitled thereto, unless
the exclusion proceedings against him were finally disposed of soon enough, and this is
likely to suffer delays, if the present case were dismissed as moot, to give way to a new
proceeding for his exclusion.
WHEREFORE, the order complained of is hereby set aside, and respondent Judge or the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental is hereby directed to immediately hear and
decide on the merits the petition for exclusion of respondent Eleuterio Quimbo, with the
costs of this instance against him. It is so ordered.
5. JUAN DOMINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY
B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., G.R.
No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani, indicating in item 9 of his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and two 2
months immediately preceding the election. Private respondents, however, filed with the
COMELEC a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Domino because he is neither a resident nor a registered voter of the province of
Sarangani. For his defense, Domino maintains that he had complied with the one-year
residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
The petition was assigned to the COMELEC Second Division, which rendered a resolution
declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position and ordered the cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy the position of representative of the lone district of
Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement. On the day of the election, the
COMELEC ordered that the votes cast for Domino be counted but suspended the
proclamation if he wins. The result of the election showed that Domino garnered the
highest number of votes over his opponents. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the COMELEC, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction alleging
that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. The
Court allowed the candidate who received the second highest number of votes in the
election to intervene.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring
petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding
upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
2. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
3. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the
disqualification of petitioner.
Ruling:
1. NO. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.
In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to
determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate
of candidacy that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate. The
determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of Domino to be included or excluded from the list of voters
in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in
the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of
compliance with the residency requirement. The proceedings for the exclusion or
inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on
matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are
not conclusive upon the COMELEC. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in
an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another
municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to
determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to
order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for
it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of
R.A. No. 8189. The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the
challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon
receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the
corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter
place the record in the inactive file.
2. NO. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing
the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile,"
which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one
residence or domicile at a time. Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was
Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at
24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
"residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani. A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change
of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual. It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in
Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications
under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family
residing in their locality. While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To
establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. The lease contract entered into sometime in January
1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of Domino's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere
absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of
the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one
of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give
rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino
registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a
deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to be,
his residence. The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a strong
factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.
3. YES. The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such
jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of
disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification
is voted for and receives the highest number of votes and provided further that the
winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of office. It has been
repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an
election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate
must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives. In the instant case, Domino was not proclaimed
as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by
reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the
election ordering the suspension of Domino's proclamation should he obtain the winning
number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality
of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying Domino as candidate for the position.
Considering that Domino has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of
the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal
which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the
COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc,
are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
6. MOZART P. PANLAQUI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NARDO M. VELASCO,
G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Mozart Panlaqui (Panlaqui) assails the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En
Banc Resolution of June 17, 2009 denying his motion for proclamation, which he filed
after this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051 the nullification of the proclamation of
private respondent Nardo Velasco (Velasco) as mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga.
Velasco was born in Sasmuan on June 22, 1952 to Filipino parents. He married Evelyn
Castillo on June 29, 1975. In 1983, he moved to the United States where he subsequently
became a citizen.
Upon Velasco's application for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 was
approved on July 31, 2006, he took on even date his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and returned to the Philippines on September 14, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, Velasco applied for registration as a voter of Sasmuan, which
application was denied by the Election Registration Board (ERB). He thus filed a petition
for the inclusion of his name in the list of voters before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Sasmuan which, by Decision of February 9, 2007, reversed the ERB's decision and
ordered his inclusion in the list of voters of Sasmuan.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, by Decision of March 1,
2007, reversed the MTC Decision, drawing Velasco to elevate the matter via Rule 42 to
the Court of Appeals which, by Amended Decision of August 19, 2008, dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In the meantime, Velasco filed on March 28, 2007 his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
mayor of Sasmuan, therein claiming his status as a registered voter. Panlaqui, who vied
for the same position, thereupon filed before the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course
to and/or to Cancel Velasco's COC based on gross material misrepresentation as to his
residency and, consequently, his qualification to vote.
In the electoral bout of May 2007, Velasco won over Panlaqui as mayor of Sasmuan. As
the Comelec failed to resolve Panlaqui's petition prior to the elections, Velasco took his
oath of office and assumed the duties of the office.
Finding material misrepresentation on the part of Velasco, the Comelec cancelled his COC In the present petition, it is Panlaqui's turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the
and nullified his proclamation, by Resolutions of July 6, 2007 and October 15, 2007, RTC properly cancelled Velasco's COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court
which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 180051. rejects the same.

Panlaqui thereafter filed a motion for proclamation which the Comelec denied by the
assailed Resolution, pointing out that the rule on succession does not operate in favor of
Panlaqui as the second placer because Velasco was not disqualified by final judgment
before election day.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec for not
regarding the RTC March 1, 2007 Decision as the final judgment of disqualification
against Velasco prior to the elections, so as to fall within the ambit of Cayat v. Commission
on Elections on the exception to the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer.
Ruling:
NO. Unwrapping the present petition, the Court finds that the true color of the issue of
distinction between a petition for inclusion of voters in the list and a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy has already been defined in Velasco v.
Commission on Elections where the Court held that the two proceedings may ultimately
have common factual bases but they are poles apart in terms of the issues, reliefs and
remedies involved, thus:
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter's inclusion/exclusion proceedings to
take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material
fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to
material fact and whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of
one's qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote
due to lack of residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible.
Assuming arguendo the plausibility of Panlaqui's theory, the Comelec correctly observed
that when the RTC issued its March 1, 2007 Decision, there was yet no COC to cancel
because Velasco's COC was filed only on March 28, 2007. Indeed, not only would it be in
excess of jurisdiction but also beyond the realm of possibility for the RTC to rule that
there was deliberate concealment on the part of Velasco when he stated under oath in
his COC that he is a registered voter of Sasmuan despite his knowledge of the RTC
decision which was yet forthcoming.
IN FINE, the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied Panlaqui's
motion for proclamation. Since Velasco's disqualification as a candidate had not become
final before the elections, the Comelec properly applied the rule on succession.

In terms of purpose, voters' inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
are different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a
voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a
candidate. Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues
and entail different reliefs, although the facts on which they rest may have
commonalities where they may be said to converge or interface. . . .
(underscoring supplied)

Voters' inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve the

issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters
based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession
of these qualifications.

On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether
there is a false representation of a material fact. The false representation must
necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that
refer to a candidate's qualifications for elective office. Apart from the requirement of
materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or,
otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate's qualifications for public office.