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Abstract
This paper investigates the meanings and distribution patterns of modal affective
demonstratives in Japanese (i.e., kono lit. this, sono lit. that, and ano lit. that).
Modal affective demonstratives are different from other kinds of demonstratives (e.g.,
spatial (deictic)/non-spatial (anaphoric and recognitional) uses) in that they have modal
meaning. Although these demonstratives are demonstratives in that they specify how the
speaker construes the target (similar to regular demonstratives), they express the
speakers attitude toward a proposition. Namely, they signal that the at-issue proposition
with respect to a specific individual target (i.e., a proposition without tense, modality, or
speech act operators) is highly unlikely to be true at the non-at-issue level. We will
argue that this non-at-issue modal meaning automatically explains the puzzling behavior
of modal affective demonstratives. That is, these demonstratives can co-occur with a
proper noun, the nominative case marker ga, and a stage-level predicate, but they cannot
co-occur with a common noun, the topic marker wa, or an individual-level predicate.
It is theoretically important that the modal affective demonstrative is situated
within the domain of DP, but their meanings have to do with the probability of the
at-issue proposition. This is because it causes a problem of mismatch between an
at-issue level and non-at-issue level in terms of predicate-argument structure. To
overcome the problem of mismatch, this study proposes that a modal affective
demonstrative behaves as an overt type shifting (lifting) operator in the at-issue
domain in addition to having a non-at-issue modal meaning.
The theoretical implication of the modal affective demonstratives is that if there
is a mismatch between an at-issue dimension and a non-at-issue dimension in an
argument-predicate structure, the former adjusts to the latter. This can be another
fundamental difference between non-at-issue and at-issue meanings.
1
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the meaning and distribution patterns of modal affective
demonstratives in Japanese as exemplified in (1):
In (1) the speaker uses ano to express his/her surprise that Federer lost. Note that ano
in (1) is different from the ordinary (spatial) demonstrative ano that because here,
the speaker is not physically or deictically pointing to Federer (a professional tennis
player) by using ano; instead, he/she is mentally construing Federer as a highly unlikely
person to lose. 1 Note that if make-ta lose-PAST in (1) is replaced with kat-ta
win-PAST, the sentence becomes odd, as shown in (2):
Sentence (2) is odd because, although Federer is a highly likely person to win
(according to our world knowledge) 2, the sentence implies that he is an unlikely person
to win. In terms of use, the sentence (1) has a similar effect as mirrativity (or
exclamativity). 3 According to DeLancey (2001), the term mirativity refers to the
linguistic marking of an utterance which is as conveying new or unexpected information
to the speaker. However, unlike the mirative markers like wow, ano in (1) is a
(adnominal) demonstrative that morphologically combines with a DP. Although there
have been many studies on the meanings and use of Japanese demonstratives, to
knowledge, no serious attention has been paid to the phenomenon like (1). In this paper
we will call the demonstrative that triggers the meaning of unexpectedness/unlikelihood
the modal affective demonstrative.
1
The follow data are the examples from the Internet:
(i) Ano Brazil-ga make-ta. Dare-ni kii-temo yuusyoo
That Brazil-NOM lose-PAST Who-to ask-even championship
machigai-nashi-to iwa-re-ta Brazil-ga makeru-towa
doubt-NEG-that say-PASSIVE-PAST Brazil-NOM lose-Interjection
Ano Brazil lost. The Brazil team which everyone said to win the championship
without fail lost...
(http://www.k4.dion.ne.jp/~neeskens/sakka22.html)
(ii) (Context: A writer is writing about Ichiro Suzuki, a Japanese professional baseball
player who currently plays for the New York Yankees.)
Ano Ichiro-ga yowane-o hai-ta-koto-ni
That Ichiro-NOM complaint-ACC express-PAST-fact-to
bikkuri-desu-ga
surprise-PRED.POLITE-but
I am surprised that ano Ichiro made complaint, but ....
(http://www.ichiro-meigen.com/page01/)
2
Federer is a very strong tennis player (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Federer).
3
Thanks to Anastasia Giannakidou for her valuable discussions of the connection with
the notion of mirativity.
2
The modal affective demonstrative has several puzzling properties that other
kinds of demonstratives do not. First, although modal affective demonstratives naturally
combine with a specific noun phrase, they cannot naturally combine with a common
noun:
(3) ?? Ano senshu-ga kat-ta. (The spatial (or recognitional) reading only) 4
That player-NOM win-PAST
lit. That player won.
This feature clearly contrasts with the spatial demonstratives. Spatial demonstratives
can combine with a common noun (e.g., ano/sono/kono gakusei that/this student), but
they cannot usually combine with a proper noun (e.g. ??ano/sono/kono Taro that/this
Taro).
Second, the modal affective demonstratives naturally co-occur with nominative
case marker ga, but they cannot co-occur with the topic marker wa:
4
We will explain the spatial and recognitional uses of ano in section 2.
3
Fourth, the modal-affective use of demonstratives is pervasive, but each
demonstrative seems to have a different selectional restriction regarding the targeted
DP:
The modal affective ano can naturally combine with a third person, but usually it is not
natural for the modal affective ano to combine with a first person or a second person, as
shown in (7). (However, as we will discuss in detail, the modal ano can select for the
first person or the second person if interpreted as a third person.) On the other hand, the
modal affective kono can combine with a first person; however, it is not so natural to
combine it with a second or a third person, as shown in (8). As for the modal affective
sono, there seems to be no person restrictions to the modal affective sono, as shown in
(9).
The following questions will naturally arise from the above observations:
This paper will investigate the meaning and distribution patterns of modal affective
demonstratives and attempt to address these questions.
As for the meaning of modal affective demonstratives, we will argue that unlike
other types of demonstratives, modal affective demonstratives have a modal meaning:
They signal that the at-issue proposition with respect to a specific individual target (i.e.,
a proposition without tense, modality, or speech act operators) is highly unlikely to be
true at the non-at-issue level.
It will be shown that this (non-at-issue) modal meaning automatically explains
the puzzling behavior of modal affective demonstratives. That is, these demonstratives
can co-occur with a proper noun, the nominative case marker ga, and a stage-level
predicate, but they cannot co-occur with a common noun, the topic marker wa, or an
individual-level predicate.
However, we will also claim that modal affective demonstratives retain their
status as a demonstrative. Unlike pure modal expressions, modal affective
4
demonstratives are situated within the DP domain and specify how the speaker
construes the targeted DP: The modal affective ano selects an entity that is in the
speakers memory. As for the modal affective, kono specifies that the target is in the
speakers personal space. Finally, the modal affective sono anaphorically refers to an
entity that has previously appeared in the discourse. We will argue that these properties
naturally explain the difference in the selectional restriction of a targeted DP (e.g.,
(7)-(9)).
It is theoretically important that the modal affective demonstrative has a property
of demonstratives but also trigger a modal meaning (i.e. the proposition with respect to
a targeted entity is highly unlikely to be true). This is because it causes a problem of
mismatch between an at-issue level and non-at-issue level in terms of
predicate-argument structure. To overcome the problem of mismatch, this study
proposes that a modal affective demonstrative behaves as an overt type shifting (lifting)
operator in the at-issue domain in addition to having a non-at-issue modal meaning.
The theoretical implication of the modal affective demonstratives is that when
there is a mismatch between an at-issue dimension and an non-at-issue dimension in an
argument-predicate structure, the former adjusts to the latter. This can be another
fundamental difference between at-issue and non-at-issue meanings.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 will present an overview of previous
studies on the spatial (deictic) and non-spatial (non-deictic) demonstratives and the
so-called affective demonstratives, and will show that the modal affective
demonstratives, which we are going to focus on, are different from the spatial and
non-spatial demonstratives (including affective demonstratives) in meaning. Section 3
will look at the semantic properties of modal affective demonstratives in terms of the
semantics/pragmatics interface and consider the differences between modal affective
demonstratives (kono, ano, and sono). We will also compare the modal affective ano
and the so-called famous ano. Section 4 will discuss the distributional properties of
modal affective demonstratives and claim that the distribution pattern of modal affective
demonstratives can be explained naturally on the basis on their meanings. Next, section
5 will analyze the meaning of modal affective demonstratives and discuss the problem
of mismatch between an at-issue level and a non-at-issue level in terms of a
predicate-argument relationship and argue that the problem of mismatch can be solved
by assuming that modal affective demonstratives behave like an overt type-shifting
(lifting) operator in the at-issue domain, in addition to having a non-at-issue modal
meaning. We will also claim that our analysis of modal affective demonstratives can
naturally apply to analyses of more complex cases, including conjoined determiner
phrases (DP), transitive sentences, and sentences with multiple modal demonstratives.
Section 6 will discuss the alternative approach where the modal affective demonstrative
only has a non-at-issue meaning and the mismatch between the at-issue and the
non-at-issue level is solved independently of the modal affective demonstrative.
However, it will be shown that this confront with a problem of compositionality. Lastly,
section 7 will present the conclusion.
5
Before moving to the discussion on modal affective demonstratives, we will first
present an overview of the meaning and use of spatial/non-spatial uses of
demonstratives and the so-called affective demonstratives.
5
The following table shows the paradigm of the Japanese demonstratives ko/so/a
(Yoshimoto 1986: 54):
6
On the other hand, in the non-spatial use, the referent is anaphoric and it is not
visible in the speech location. In this use, ko- refers to something which is salient in the
discourse context (e.g., discourse topic)(see Kuno 1973b; Shoho 1981; Yoshimoto
1986; Kinsui and Takubo 1992; Iori 1995, 2007; Tsutsumi 2012):
As for the non-spatial (anaphoric) use of so-, many researchers consider that it
neutrally refers to something introduced in the discourse context, as in (13) below:
Finally, in terms of the non-spatial use of a-, it is well known that it refers to
something located in the speakers episodic memory (see Yoshimoto 1986; Kinsui and
Takubo 1992; Kinsui 1999; Tsutsumi 2012, among others):
In the above example, the speaker is referring to the speakers memories of the meat
bun he/she ate at Kobe. Some scholars calls this use as a recognitional use (Diessel
1999; Levinson 2004).
The above data clearly show that Japanese demonstratives (ko-, so-, and a-) have
both spatial and non-spatial uses.
7
into three types: (i) spatio-temporal deixis; (ii) discourse deixis; and (iii) emotional
deixis; she claims that emotional deixis express emotional closeness between the
speaker and the addressee (Lakoff 1974: 347, 351).
Lakoff also claims that emotional deixis links to the speakers emotional
involvement in the subject matter of his utterance. The most natural use seems to be
with proper names the speaker expects the hearer to be familiar with, as follows:
(15) I see theres going to be peace in the mideast. This Henry Kissinger really is
something. (Lakoff 1974: 347)
Lakoff (1974: 347) notes that there is another use of the emotional deictic this, which
seems to replace indefinites (a or one) in emotional-deictic contexts, where syntactically,
the indefinite article is usually the only possibility:
(16) a. There was this traveling salesman, and he (Lakoff 1974: 347)
b. He kissed her with this unbelievable passion. (Lakoff 1974: 347)
an
*the
Lakoff observes that this in (16) seems to give greater vividness to the narrative in
order to involve the addressee in it more fully.
On the other hand, Lakoff (1974) also notes that the distance marker that
establishes emotional closeness between speaker and addressee, as follows:
Diessel (1999: 107) observes that sentence (17a) shows the speaker shares the hearers
concern about his or her throat, and sentence (17b) suggests that the interlocutors share
the same view about Henry Kisssinger. Diessel (1999) then opines that the
demonstratives in (17) have the properties of a recognitional demonstrative.
Based on Lakoffs study, Naruoka (2008) claims that the Japanese adjectival
demonstratives konnna, sonnna, and annna (-na series) can behave as affective
demonstratives and can express negative emotion (rejection) or surprise on the part of
the speaker, as follows (see also Suzuki 2006):
In (18), we see the speakers negative evaluation that the food is not good. 6
6
Notice that the negative emotive meaning of anna, konnna, and sonna can only arise
in a negative environment (environments including negation or a negative predicate
like kirai hate. If they are used in a positive environment, they do not trigger a
negative meaning:
(i) (Pointing to a bag)
Konnna baggu-ga hoshii.
This kind of bag-NOM want
I want this kind of bag.
8
Following Lakoff (1974) and Naruoka (2008), Davis and Potts (2009) investigate
English and Japanese affective demonstratives and address the question of where
affective readings come from. 7 Those authors argue that they can be traced to Horns
division of pragmatic labor, where unmarked expressions are generally used to
convey unmarked messages and marked expressions are generally used to convey
marked messages (Horn 1984: 400). Davis and Potts (2009) further argue that because
the affective demonstratives this in English and konna in Japanese are
morphosyntactically more complex than the definite article the and the adnominal
demonstrative kono respectively, they convey marked messages.
In (19) there is an implication that Federer is a highly unlikely person to lose. One
might think that this kind of implication just a matter of our world knowledge and has
nothing to do with ano. However, this idea is not correct. The unlikelihood implication
arises regardless of who the target is. For example, in (20) even if we do not know
anything about Taro, we can infer that Taro is a highly unlikely person to eat
vegetables:
If we delete ano in (20), the sentence only describes the fact that Taro ate vegetables; as
a result, the modal meaning does not necessarily arise. Thus it is safe to assume that it is
the demonstrative ano that triggers an unlikelihood meaning.
In this paper we propose that the modal affective demonstrative triggers the
following meaning at the non-at-issue level:
What is interesting is that ano is not the only demonstrative that can express the modal
meaning. Kono this and sono that also have a modal use. In this section we will
investigate the difference among the modal affective kono, sono, and ano and consider
the semantic status of each modal affective demonstrative in terms of
semantics/pragmatics interface.
As for the modal affective kono, it is naturally combined with the first person
pronoun; however, it usually cannot be naturally combined with the third person
specific noun or the second person:
The sentence with kono sounds self-centered because there is a strong implication that
I am the person who is highly unlikely to lose.
Finally, the modal affective sono is neutral about the selection of a target but
specifies that the target is already discourse given:
Note that (24a) with yowai weak is odd because it does not fit with the non-at-issue
meaning of (24b) (see also Iori 1995, 2007).
10
We propose that these differences in selectional restriction come from the
differences in how the speaker construes a target:
(25) a. The modal affective ano recognitionally refers to an entity in the speakers
memory.
b. The modal affective kono deictically specifies that the target is in the speakers
personal space.
c. The modal affective sono anaphorically refers to an entity that is described in
the previous discourse.
The above characteristics on construal can naturally explain the selectional restriction
on the target. As for the modal affective ano, it is similar to the recognitional ano that.
We can say that the reason that the modal affective ano cannot be combined with a first
or second person pronoun is because the first and second person are participants in the
conversation. We usually do not consider them to be in the speakers episodic memory.
However, if we interpret the first person and second person in accordance with the
speakers memory, the modal affective ano can be combined with them.
With regard to the modal affective kono, it cannot naturally combine with the
third or second person pronouns because we usually do not consider a third
person/second person to be in the speakers personal space. However, if we posit a
context whereby the third person (here Taro) or the second person is in the speakers
space, then the sentence might sound natural.
Finally, with regard to the modal affective sono, this property is similar to the
anaphoric use of sono that in that it refers to a discourse-given entity.
The above discussion strongly suggests that although modal affective
demonstratives have to do with a speakers attitude toward an at-issue proposition, they
retain demonstrative (or referential) status. They provide information regarding how the
speaker construes the target. As we will see later, this point will become important in
considering the compositionality of the modal affective demonstrative.
11
(26) Ano Taro-ga make-ta.
That Taro-NOM lose-PAST
At-issue: Taro lost.
Non-at-issue: Taro is unlikely to lose.
Unlike (30) in (31), the speaker cannot ask a question using dono NP, which NP?.
This is because in this sentence, ano and its host NP do not semantically interact, so we
cannot form a question using dono NP.
Fourth, similarly to other CI-triggering expressions, modal affective
demonstratives never appear within the scope of logical operators, such as a question
and the past tense:
12
(33) Ano Taro-ga make-ta-no? (Confirmation question)
That Taro-NOM lose-PAST-Q
At-issue: Did Taro lose? (I cant believe it.)
Non-at-issue: Taro is highly unlikely to lose.
13
becomes odd/infelicitous if the content of the modal ano/kono (i.e. the unlikelihood
meaning) is discourse old:
However, the meaning of the modal affective sono can naturally be backgrounded, as
shown in:
Actually, the sentence with the modal sono must always be discourse old. If it is uttered
in an out-of-the-blue context, the sentence becomes infelicitous. This is expected if we
consider that the modal affective sono anaphorically refers to an entity that is described
in the previous discourse (see section 3.1). Notice, however, that unlike the typical
examples of presupposition, there is no dependency between at-issue entailment and a
presupposition in the case of the modal affective sono. Even if the presupposition part is
false, we dont think that the whole sentence is meaningless. 8
Although the theoretical status of conventional implicature/presupposition is still
being debated, based on the behavior of (anti-)backgroundedness, we would like to take
the position that the modal affective kono and ano are CI-triggering expressions while
the modal affective sono triggers a presupposition.
8
The famous example of the dependency between a presupposition and an at-issue
entailment is The King of France is bald. Strawson (1950) considers that the definite
article the presupposes the existence of its reference, but if the presupposition fails, the
at-issue statement is meaningless (i.e., neither true nor false).
14
(39) Kore-ga ano John Lennon-no shuki-desu.
This-NOM that John Lennon-GEN memo-PRED.POLITE
lit. This is that John Lennons memo.
However, the famous ano is similar to the modal affective ano, in that, it is
combined with a proper noun and that its meaning is not part of what is said.
Furthermore, the famous ano and the modal affective ano are similar, in that, they both
have to do with the speakers recognition (similar to the recognitional ano). The famous
ano refers to an entity in the speakers memory.
Note that the following sentence with ano can be ambiguous between two
readings, a modal reading and a famous reading:
We can say that the difference between the two readings resides in whether ano only
scopes over John Lennon or it scopes over an entire proposition (without tense). In this
paper, we focus only on the modal affective reading.
4.1 Modal affective demonstratives take a proper noun, not a common noun
The first puzzling property is that modal affective demonstratives are combined with a
proper noun, but they cannot naturally be combined with a common noun:
This clearly contrasts with spatial demonstratives. As the following example shows,
spatial demonstratives can be combined with a common noun, but they cannot be
combined with a proper noun:
15
(42) (Context: Pointing to the person)
Ano {gakusei/*Taro}-o koko-ni tsure-te ki-nasai.
That student/Taro-ACC here-to bring-TE come-IMP
lit. Bring that {student/Taro} here.
It makes sense that the modal affective demonstrative cannot be combined with a
common noun because if a target is unspecified, the speaker cannot trigger a feeling of
surprise. It does not make sense to convey that it is highly unlikely that a student lost.
On the other hand, it is natural that spatial demonstratives can be combined with
common nouns but not with proper nouns. The main function of spatial demonstratives
is to specify a target from a set of individuals. Thus, if a target is already
individuated/specified as in the case of a proper noun, there is no reason to use an
adnominal demonstrative.
On the other hand, the other uses of demonstratives (spatial/recognitional uses) do not
have this kind of contrast:
Our analysis of modal affective demonstratives can naturally explain why they can
naturally co-occur with ga but not wa.
According to Kuroda (1972), a statement made by a wa-sentence expresses a
categorical judgment. A categorical judgment is assumed to have two separate acts; one
is the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject, and the other is the act
of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject. On the
other hand, Kuroda argues that a statement made by a ga sentence expresses a thetic
judgment. A thetic judgment represents the perception of a situation (see also Brentano
(1874 [1924]) for the distinction between thetic vs. categorical judgments). In our
analysis, modal affective demonstratives convey that the speaker thinks that the at-issue
proposition is highly unlikely to be true. The non-at-issue meaning of the modal
affective demonstrative creates a gap between the at-issue level and the non-at-isuue
level. In order to conceive a gap between the at-issue situation and the speakers
assumption, the at-issue proposition must be new (unexpected) to the speaker; the
particle ga, which reports the perception of a situation, naturally fits this situation. On
the other hand, the sentence with wa sounds odd because it does not fit the situation
whereby the speaker contrasts the current situation and the expected situation. As
Kuroda argues, wa involves two steps within the at-issue level, and this is not useful for
making a contrast between an at-issue situation and the speakers expected situation.
16
4.3 Stage-level predicates, not individual-level predicates, co-occur with modal
affective demonstratives
The third point is that modal affective demonstratives are sensitive to stage-level and
individual-level predicates (Carlson 1977; Carlson & Pelletier [eds.]1995; Kratzer 1995;
Krifka et al. 1995).
On the other hand, regular demonstratives (spatial/recognitional use) can co-occur with
both individual-level and stage-level predicates:
It makes sense that modal affective demonstratives cannot co-occur with individual
level predicates because the latter express permanent properties. The modal affective
demonstrative is used in a situation where there is a gap between the at-issue situation
and the speakers expected situation. However, if we use an individual-level predicate,
the at-issue part of the sentence denotes a permanent situation, and we cannot create a
gap between the at-issue situation and the speakers expected situation. On the other
hand, stage-level predicates fit naturally with sentences containing modal affective
demonstrative because the former denote temporary properties.
Note that if time adverbs like kyoo-wa today-TOP are added contrastively, then
(46b) becomes natural:
17
(48) Ano Taro-ga kyoo-wa naze-ka okori-ppoi. (Modal affective use)
That Taro-NOM today-CT.TOP why-KA get angry-easy to
lit. I dont know why but today that Taro is easy to get angry.
We can say that (48) is natural because the time adverb with the contrastive wa
conventionally implicates that usually, Taro is not a person who easily get angry.
We have so far focused on the data pertaining to the modal affective ano, but the
same explanations can apply to the other modal affective demonstratives:
Based on the above discussions, it is safe to conclude that the distribution patterns of the
modal affective demonstrative is affected by its meaning.
All kinds of modal affective demonstratives have the same meaning of unlikelihood;
that is, they take an individual and a predicate and signals that the degree of
unlikelihood of P(x) is much greater than a contextually determined standard/norm at
the non-at-issue level. That is, P(x) is highly unlikely to be true. (>!! STANDc stands
for greater than a contextual standard by a large amount; cf. much, (Kennedy and
McNally 2005)).
9
This is corroborated by the fact that it can form comparatives and accept degree
modification:
(i) a. It is more likely that the Yankees will win than it is that the Blue Jays will.
b. It is very likely that the Yankees will win.
(Lassiter 2011: 56)
(ii) a. # It is completely likely that the Jets will win this year.
b. # It is slightly likely that the Jets will win.
c. It is likely that the Jets will win, but it could be more likely.
(Lassiter 2011: 67)
19
predicate-argument structure. Let us consider this based on the following example:
The crucial point of modal affective demonstrative is that although it is situated within
the DP domain, it meaning has to do with the probability of the at-issue proposition. It
takes not only the subject noun (here Taro) but also a main predicate (here make to
lose). The box part shows the semantic domain of the modal affective ano:
VP I
-ta
DP V
make lose
D
Ano NP
that Taro-ga Taro-NOM
Potts (2005) argues that the expressive damn in (54) is speaker oriented and it is
independent of the at-issue entailment, although it attaches to a noun Republicans, just
like usual modifiers (e.g., young, old, etc.):
20
(55) Syntactic structure of the damn Republicans
DP
D NP
the
AP NP
damn Republicans
(Potts 2005: 164)
There are various types of evidence that expressives such as damn and jerk are
independent of the at-issue entailment. First, as Potts (2005) shows, the expressive
cannot be under the scope of negation as in (56):
(56) Its just not true that Sheilas damn dog is on the couch!
(Potts 2005: 159)
As Potts says, (56) cannot be read as negating the speakers disapprobation of Sheilas
dog. Furthermore, the expressive cannot be under the tense operator as well, as in (57):
(57) That jerk Ed skipped work last week. # But Ed isnt a jerk now, not since he has
started showing up regularly. (Potts 2005: 159)
For additional evidence of the CI-hood of expressives, see Potts (2005, 2007).
To account for the semantic independency of CI expressions such as damn in a
semantic composition, Potts (2005) proposes a novel compositional rule, called CI
application (cf. Karttunen and Peters (1979) two-dimensional semantic composition
system for presupposition/conventional implicature):
: <a, c> : a
21
(59)
republican: <ea, ta>
damn (republican): tc
Regarding the lexical entry for expressives like damn, Potts offers a general lexical
entry, in which an expressive can take an argument (slightly simplified):
(60) damn
bloddy = X. bad(X): <<a, ta>, tc>
fucking (Potts 2005: 167, slightly simplified)
The expressives in (60) take any function and return the plural individual composed of
all members of the input set. Notice that the measure function bad does not always
induce a negative emotion. Potts (2005) claims that it expresses that the speaker is in a
heightened emotional state regarding X. See McCready (2012) for a detailed
investigation of how an expressive with underspecified emotive content is interpreted. 10
At first glance, this analysis can naturally extend to the modal affective
demonstrative (at least for the modal affective ano and kono that clearly have the
property of CIs). Similarly to the case of damn, the modal affective demonstrative takes
a noun phrase, and its meaning is independent of at-issue entailment. However, if we
apply the CI application to the modal affective demonstrative, the problem of
compositionality arises. Let us suppose that the modal affective demonstrative ano has
the following pure CI meaning:
If ano is combined with Taro via the CI application, the argument Taro is not only
saturated by ano; it also passed up to the higher level as shown in (62):
10
In Potts (2007), expressives like damn and bastard are analyzed as
context-shifters. In this version, expressives alter expressive indices and create new
context. Note also that in Potts (2007) the expressive fucking has stronger emotion than
damn.
22
(62)
??
ano Taro-ga: ea
xP. unlikely(P(x))>!!STAND
lose(Taro)(PAST): ta
unlikely(lose(Taro)(PAST))>!STAND: tc
ano
p. unlikely(p)>!STAND: <ta,tc> lose(Taro)(PAST): ta
In this structure, the modal affective demonstrative behaves like a sentential operator,
similar to the focus particle even (e.g., Karttunen and Peters 1979: 28; Rooth 1985). 12
However, a logical structure like (63) is problematic for several reasons.
First, we cannot assume that it is a sentential operator because, as discussed in
the previous sections, each modal affective demonstrative has different selectional
restrictions regarding the targeted DP. One factor providing evidence that we cannot
analyze the modal affective demonstrative as a pure modal operator is that there is a
semantic difference between the following two transitive sentences:
11
Readers may wonder what if we type-shift the denotation of Taro from the
individual ea to <<ea,<ia, ta>>, ta>. We will consider this possibility later in section 6 and
show that this approach is problematic in terms of the resource insensitivity of CI
application.
12 Note that the modal affective demonstratives is not a focus sensitive operator like
even (e.g. Karttunen and Peters 1979: 28; Rooth 1985) in that they does not create a set
of alternatives.
23
(64) a. Ano Taro-ga Ziro-ni kat-ta.
That Taro-NOM Ziro-DAT beat-PAST
At-issue: Taro beat Ziro.
Non-at-issue: Taro is a highly unlikely person to beat Ziro.
b. Taro-ga ano Ziro-ni kat-ta.
Taro-NOM that Ziro-DAT beat-PAST
At-issue: Taro beat Ziro.
Non-at-issue: Ziro is a highly unlikely person to be beaten by someone.
The first sentence conventionally implicates that it is highly unlikely the subject Taro
can beat Ziro. On the other hand, the second sentence conventionally implicates that it is
highly unlikely the object Ziro can be beaten. This clearly suggests that the modal
affective demonstrative triggers a modal meaning in relation to the attached DP, and it
cannot be analyzed as a pure modal operator. 13
Another problem for a logical structure like (63) is that it triggers an incorrect
interpretation for the CI meaning of the modal affective demonstrative. The logical
structure will generate a CI meaning that it is highly unlikely that Taro lost. However,
this meaning is not what we want. The sentence in (52) conventionally implicates that
Taro is highly unlikely to lose and there should be no past tense information in the CI
part of the sentence. How then can we solve the mismatch problem? In the next section,
we will attempt to do this based on the notions of type shifting and mixed content.
In the at-issue dimension, the modal affective demonstrative behaves as an overt type
shifting (lifting) operator in the at-issue dimension, which makes it possible for the DP
(with the modal demonstrative) to take a main predicate as its argument in the at-issue
dimension. Note that the modal affective demonstratives in (65) are not typical cases of
13
Thanks to Kai von Fintel for the valuable comments regarding this issue.
24
mixed content. McCready (2010: 4-5) claims that in order to be mixed content, a
mixed-content element should introduce semantic content in both the at-issue and the
CI/non-at-issue dimensions and that it should be monomorphemic. Typical examples of
mixed content are pejoratives like Kraut (e.g., Bach 2006; McCready 2010; Williamson
2009). Kraut has a descriptive meaning of German, but it also triggers a CI meaning
that a speaker construes German negatively. Clearly, modal affective demonstratives do
not have a descriptive meaning as in the case of Kraut. The truth condition of a
proposition with a modal affective demonstrative does not change even if we delete it.
However, this does not mean that the modal affective has no function at the at-issue
level. It changes the logical structure in terms of the predicate-argument relationship. In
this sense, modal affective demonstratives are considered to be mixed content.
We now consider the compositionality of mixed content. In this paper, we will
follow McCready (2010) that the meaning of mixed content is computed on the basis of
the rule that involves an operation of shunting (McCready 2010):
Here, we introduce a new superscript s for the CI type. The superscript s is used for a
special kind of CI-triggering expression that involves the resource-sensitive semantic
operation of shunting:
: <a, s> : a
Unlike in Potts CI function application, the at-issue element is shunted. The same
resource sensitivity is observed in mixed application in (66). In the mixed application,
does not pass up to the above level. Recall that Potts CI application is resource
insensitive, in that, the argument of a CI-triggering expression passed up to the above
level.
We will also assume following McCready (2010: 20) that the following rule
applies for the final interpretation of the CI part of mixed content:
25
The rule in (68) instructs us to replace mixed-type terms involving the conjunction
with terms conjoined by the bullet when the CI part of mixed content is propositional
(of type t).
If we apply the above rules to the sentence (69), we can get the logical structure
like (70):
ano Taro-ga: ea
xP.P(x)xP. unlikely(P(x))>!!STAND
<ea, <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>> <ea, <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ts>>
The structure correctly analyzes both the at-issue and non-at-issue meanings of the
sentence (69). Then what about the case where the modal affective sono is used? In
section 3.2 we assumed that the modal affective ano and the modal affective kono have
the property of a CI but the modal affective sono has the property of a presupposition.
In this paper we will consider that the same analysis can be made for the modal
affective sono. Similarly to a CI, a presupposition is independent from at-issue
entailment (i.e. it is a non-at-issue meaning). Thus we think that it is possible to analyze
the meaning of the modal affective sono based on the same compositional
mechanism/rules (i.e. the mixed application and the shunting application).
14
We thank Kenta Mizutani for the valuable comments and discussion regarding this
fact.
26
(71) Ano Taro-to Hanako-ga ie-o ka-tta.
That Taro-and Hanako-NOM house-ACC buy-PAST
At-issue: Taro and Hanako bought a house together.
Non-at-issue: Taro and Hanako are highly unlikely persons to buy a house.
In (71), the speaker is assuming that Taro-to Hanako denotes one group; that is,
according to the speakers memory, Taro and Hanako are the kind of people who will
never buy a house. Maybe Taro and Hanako became bankrupt 10 years ago, and the
speaker knew they were having difficulties.
One possibility for analyzing the interpretation of (71) is to assume Links
operator, which joins Taro and Hanako together to denote the plural individual (i.e.,
TaroHanako). This results in a plural individual of type e (see Link 1983; Partee and
Rooth 1983). Note that it is not possible to parse sentence (71) as sentence (72), because
the modal affective ano only scopes over one of the conjoined elements, as shown
below:
Theoretically, this makes sense because ano(Taro) cannot skip Hanako and combine
with the predicate part ie-o kau to buy a house. Taro intervenes between ano Taro
and a predicate, and this prevents the interpretation of a CI component.
The crucial point is that there is asymmetry between (73a) and (73b) in terms of the
domain of CI computation. In (73a), the modal affective ano takes the object Ziro as its
(second) argument. Thus, the sentence conventionally implicates that Taro is a highly
unlikely person to beat Ziro. On the other hand, in the case of (73b), the modal affective
ano, which attaches to the object Ziro, does not take the subject Taro as its argument.
That is, the CI meaning is Ziro is a highly unlikely person to be beaten by someone,
27
and the identity of the subject is not relevant.
The following evidence supports the idea that ano in the subject position takes
the object DP as its argument, but ano in the object position does not take the subject
DP as its argument. Let us suppose that the speaker and the hearer are talking about
sumo (the traditional wrestling sport in Japan), based on the following background:
(74) a. Mainoumi: a sumo wrestler. He is known for being small (but strong.)
b. Akebono: a sumo wrestler. He is Yokozuna (the highest rank in sumo). He is
gigantic and strong.
c. Konishiki: a sumo wrestler. He is extremely gigantic/heavy and strong. He is
Ozeki, the second highest rank in sumo.
According to this situation, (75a) is quite odd, but (75b) is perfectly natural, as follows:
(75a) is odd because it conventionally implicates that Akebono is highly unlikely to lift
Konishiki. This conflicts with our world knowledge (common ground) on Akebono.
Akebono is gigantic and strong (Yokozuna), so it is not unlikely that he can lift
Konishiki (although he may be lighter than Konishiki). By contrast, (75b) sounds
perfectly natural because the CI of (75b) matches our knowledge of Mainoumi.
On the other hand, in (76) where the modal affective ano arises in an object
position, both (76a) and (76b) are perfectly natural:
The crucial point here is that (76a) is perfectly natural. If the modal affective ano takes
the subject argument into consideration, the sentence (76a) should sound odd, because it
is false that Konoshiki is a highly unlikely person to be lifted by Akebono (who is also
gigantic and strong.) However, in reality, (76a) is perfectly natural. This strongly
suggests that if the modal affective ano appears in an object position, it does not take
28
the subject DP as its argument in order to trigger a modal CI meaning.
Based on the above discussion, we will assume that modal affective
demonstratives are polymorphic and a denotation of modal affective demonstrative can
differ according to the environment in which it occurs:
(78) and (79) show the logical structures of (73a) and (73b), respectively:
beat(Taro)(Ziro)(PAST): ta
ta PAST: ia
t. beat(Taro)(Ziro)(t): <ia, ta>
unlikely(t. beat(Taro)(Ziro)(t)) >!!STAND: ts
29
(79) The logical structure of (73b)
beat(Taro)(Ziro)(PAST): ta
ta PAST: ia
t. beat(Taro)(Ziro)(t): <i , t >
a a
The above sentence has two kinds of non-at-issue meanings. One relates to the subject
Mainoumi, and the other relates to the object Konishiki. 15 The two non-at-issue
meanings are compatible and the speaker is surprising at the fact that Mainoumi lifted
up Konishiki in terms of two perspectives. The following figure shows the logical
structure of (80):
15
Mainoumi was a sumo wrestler who was known for being small (but strong), and
Konishiki was a sumo wrestler (Ozeki) who was gigantic/heavy and strong.
30
(81)
lift-up(Mainoumi)(Konishiki)(PAST): ta
ta PAST: ia
t. lift-up(Mainoumi)(Konishiki)(t): <i , t >
a a
unlikely(t. lift-up(Mainoumi)(Konishiki)(t)) >!!STAND: ts
a
Ano that Mainoumi-ga Mainoumi-NOM: e
xP. P(x)xP. unlikely(P(x)) >!!STAND
<ea, <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>> <ea, <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ts>>
(82) Generalizations about the relation between at-issue and non-at-issue meanings.
If there is a mismatch between an at-issue dimension and a non-at-issue dimension
in an argument-predicate structure, the former adjusts to the latter.
6. An alternative approach
One might argue against our analysis by saying that we do not need to posit modal
affective demonstratives as mixed content because the proper names (type e) can be
lifted to <<e,t>,t> independently, as a general type-shifting operation (Partee and Rooth
31
1983; Partee 1987). 16 In this view the modal affective demonstrative only contains a
non-at-issue meaning.
Under this approach, the meaning of Taro in (83) can be represented as in (84),
and the meaning of the modal affective ano in (83) can be represented as in (85) (Here
tense information is included):
(85) [[ ano MOD.AFF]] : <<<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>, <<ea, <ia,ta>>, tc>> (alternative view)
= P<<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>Q<ea, <ia, ta>>. unlikely(P(Q)) >!! STANDc
(P = x where x is in the speakers memory)
The modal affective demonstrative in (85) takes a type-shifted proper noun and a
verbal predicate and returns an unlikelihood CI (non-at-issue) meaning. The important
point of this approach is that since the modal affective ano is a pure CI trigger it has to
combine with a type shifted individual (of type <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>) via Potts CI
application, which is a resource insensitive compositional rule (= (87)), as in (86):
(86)
ano Taro-ga
P<<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>Q<ea,<ia, ta>>. unlikely(P(Q)) >!! STAND: P<ea,<ia, ta>>. P(Taro)
<<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>, <<ea,<ia,ta>>, tc>> : <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>
: <a, c> : a
(Potts 2005: 64)
16
We thank Yasutada Sudo for the valuable comments and discussions regarding this
approach.
32
However, it turns out that this approach becomes problematic in the course of
semantic derivations. We cannot compute the meaning of the CI part of ano(Taro):
(88)
??
ano Taro-ga
P<<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>Q<ea,<ia, ta>>. unlikely(P(Q)) >!! STAND P<ea,<ia, ta>>. P(Taro)
: <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>, <<ea,<ia,ta>>, tc>> : <<ea, <ia, ta>>, ta>
Since ano involves a CI type (tc), the CI part of ano(Taro) (the meaning right below the
bullet) needs to be combined with the verb make lose via the CI application. This
means that the verb make lose must pass up to the higher level. However, this is not
what we want. The verb is not necessary in the later computation. 17 The above
independent typeshifting approach is not consistent with the recourse insensitive
property of CI application.
On the other hand, our proposed mixed approach is not problematic because it
assumes that the modal affective demonstrative is mixed content. In our analysis, a
modal affective demonstrative behaves as an overt type shifting (lifting) operator in
the at-issue domain, in addition to having a likelihood CI meaning, and these meanings
are computed on the basis of a mixed application that involves a shunting type
(superscript s).
17
McCready (2010) also discusses the same kind problem based on the example of the
honorific verb irassyaru come/go/exist [Hon]. He then proposed to add a shunting
type and proposed a resource-sensitive CI application, a shunting application. See
section 5.3.
33
However, we also argued that modal affective demonstratives are not pure
modal expressions and retain demonstrative status. Although all demonstratives series
(kono, sono, and ano) can have a modal use, they have different properties regarding
how the speaker construes the target (similar to regular demonstratives). That is, the
modal affective ano selects an entity that is in the speakers memory. The modal
affective kono specifies that the target is in the speakers personal space. Finally, the
modal affective sono that anaphorically refers to an entity that has previously appeared
in the discourse.
We then looked at the compositionality of modal affective demonstratives and
showed that their dual property of having a modal meaning despite behaving as a
demonstrative causes a serious problem for the compositional theory of
non-at-issue/conventional implicature. Namely, the phenomenon creates a mismatch
between the at-issue meaning and the CI in terms of the predicate-argument relationship.
To overcome the mismatch, the study proposed that a modal affective demonstrative
behaves as an overt type shifting (lifting) operator in the at-issue domain, in addition
to having a likelihood CI meaning. We then proposed the following generalization
regarding the relationship between at-issue and non-at-issue meanings:
ii. If is an at-issue type for L+CISand is a shunting type for L+CIS, then <, > is a
shunting type for L+CIS.
iii. If is a shunting type for L+CIS and is a shunting type for L+CIS, then <, > is a
shunting type for L+CIS.
In (92), there is an implication that Taro is highly unlikely to fail the exam.
However, it seems that unlike modal affective demonstratives, the expression
tomo arou mono also conventionally implicates that the speaker has a high level of
evaluation in relation to the DP. This idea is supported by the fact that the following
sentence is odd:
(92) is perfectly natural but (93) is quite odd. (93) is odd because although the sentence
conventionally implicates that the speaker evaluates Taro positively, it also
conventionally implicates that Taro is highly unlikely to pass the exam, which is clearly
a contradiction. This kind of asymmetry cannot be observed with the modal affective
demonstrative. If we delete tomo arou mono a great person as and add the modal ano
before Taro, both versions (i.e., (92) and (93)) become perfectly natural.
Note that tomo arou mono does have a modal meaning. If tomo aro-u mono only
expressed the speakers attitude toward a DP (i.e., the speakers positive evaluation in
relation to the target), (93) should have been natural. However, in reality, it is odd. The
phenomenon of tomo arou mono seems to suggest that there is an
expression/construction that inherently has multiple CI meanings, i.e., a local CI,
which is computed as a DP domain, and a global CI, which targets a proposition.
35
Acknowledgements
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