Tihamér Margitay Ed. Knowing and Being Perspectives On The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi

Knowing and Being
Knowing and Being:

Perspectives on the Philosophy
of Michael Polanyi
Edited by
Tihamr Margitay
Knowing and Being: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi,
Edited by Tihamr Margitay
This book first published 2010
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK
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Copyright 2010 by Tihamr Margitay and contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
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ISBN (10): 1-4438-2062-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2062-2

To the memory of Michael Polanyi,
the philosopher of inspiring thoughts
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
PART I: KNOWING
Chapter One............................................................................................... 10
Michael Polanyis Use of Gestalt Psychology
Phil Mullins
Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 30

Various Ideas of Tacit KnowledgeIs There a Basic One?
Iwo Zmylony
Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 50

Being-in-the-world in a Polanyian Perspective
Yu Zhenhua
Chapter Four.............................................................................................. 68
A Rose by Any Other Name? Personal Knowledge and Hermeneutics
Chris Mulherin
Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 80

Teaching to Form Character: A Polanyian Analysis of Practical Reasoning
Paul Lewis
Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 96

Individual and Community in a Convivial Order, or Polanyian Optimism
David W. Rutledge
Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 114

Polanyi on the Moral Dimension of Science
Mrta Fehr
viii Table of Contents
PART II: BEING
Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 128

From Epistemology to Ontology: Polanyis Arguments for the Layered
Ontology
Tihamr Margitay
Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 141

Downward Causation, or the Tacit Character of the World? Approach
to a Non-Reductive World-View through Polanyis Philosophy
Mrton Dinnyei
Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 151

Polanyi and Evolution
Daniel Paksi
Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 173

The Immortality of the Intellect Revived: Michael Polanyi
and his Debate with Alan M. Turing
Paul Richard Blum
Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 185

Emotion, Autonomy and Commitment
R. T. Allen
Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 192

The Social Thought of Karl and Michael Polanyi: Prologue to a
Reconciliation
Walter Gulick
List of Contributors ................................................................................. 216
Index........................................................................................................ 218
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund

(K72598), and the conference out of which it grew was organized with the
financial assistance of the National Office for Research and Technology
(NKFP6-00107/2005).
INTRODUCTION
We know more than we can tell1this famous citation from Polanyi

is the motto of the first half of a book that is not on Polanyi, and which is
not even on philosophy; rather, it is a cognitive psychology book on judg-
ment and decision making and other human cognitive capacities. Gigeren-
zers Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious (Gigerenzer 2007)
summarizes the results of one of the most distinguished scholars in cogni-
tive psychology who has given a new twist to the formerly dominant heu-
ristics-biases view of human judgment and decision making. Cognitive
unconscious (being strictly distinguished from the Freudian unconscious)
is a cutting edge research area within cognitive psychology, and somewhat
surprisingly Polanyi is often a point of reference here.2 The surprise is due
not only to the fact that an empirical scientist mentions a philosopher, but
also to that Polanyi himself proceeded from a psychological theory, from
Gestalt Psychology and then resolutely turned it into a philosophical the-
ory of knowledge;3 and, now, his revolutionary theory of tacit knowing
returns to psychology and fertilizes it. Another example of unpredicted
ramifications coming from Polanyis philosophy is given via the recent
developments in management sciences and organizational practices. His
theory of tacit knowing and his considerations on types of social coopera-
tion or his thoughts concerning the division of cognitive labour are relied
upon in knowledge4 and project5 management. The importance of implicit
knowing, its essentially collective features, and the role of spontaneous
order is realized in these areas of management theory and practice, going
so far in that Polanyis trademark, the term tacit knowledge, appears
even as a business dictionary entry nowadays.6
1
Polanyi(1969, 172) Cf. also Polanyi (1966, 4).
2
See, for example, Eysenck and Keane (1990), Myers (2002), Klein (2004), Ho-
lyoak and Morrison (2005), Koehler and Harvey (2007).
3
Mullins elaborates this theme in his paper in this volume.
4
For example, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Krogh et al (2000), Nonaka et al
(2008).
5
For example, Koskinen 2000, Koskinen et al 2003, Rang and Targama 2008.
6
E.g.: BusinessDictionary.com 2009 The Tacit knowledge entry in Wikipedia
(2009) also discusses this concept as, basically, a concept of knowledge manage-
ment.
2 Introduction
Polanyi has no less a lively presence in contemporary philosophy. Mo-

nographs are published on his life7, and his philosophy is widely discussed
in books as well as being approached from various perspectives by articles
in scholarly journals.8 This volume is just another documentation of his
presence in international intellectual life.
The originality of his thoughts and the uniqueness of his synthetic
views on many fundamental philosophical issues always made him hard to
classify inside the main currents of philosophy; indeed, his philosophy
initiated a new and independent philosophical tradition in the second half
of the 20th century. The papers in this volume analyze Polanyis ideas
concerning knowing and being (i.e. epistemology and ontology), and most
of them do it in a comparative way, in dialogue with other major tradi-
tions. In the title of our volume we are also making a respectful reference
to a collection of papers of Michael Polanyi (1969), Knowing and Being.
The first part of this book is devoted to different aspects of Polanyis
theory of knowing; Mullins essay explores the historical origins of its
basic notions, while Zmyslonys makes a conceptual analysis of them; and
the rest of the papers in this part investigate Polanyis theory within the
contexts of different major contemporary traditions and notes important
connections.
Gestalt psychology is one of the most important and seminal sources
for Polanyis philosophy. Mullins essay, Michael Polanyis Use of Ge-
stalt Psychology, traces Polanyis adaptation of ideas found in Gestalt
psychology, beginning with Polanyis early writing, which articulates a
vision of liberal society and ends with his late Meaning lectures (Polanyi
2006). Following Polanyis progressive transformation of Gestalt ideas,
Mullins charts the overall development of Polanyis philosophical ideas in
the course of his career. He points out the historical and conceptual con-
nections between Gestalt thoughts and Polanyis key ideas, including not
only his theory of tacit and personal knowledge but also his social views
on planned and dynamic order as well as his conception of meaning.
The theory of tacit knowledge is Polanyis most revolutionary and
most influential contribution to philosophy. Zmyslonys paper, Various
Ideas of Tacit Knowledge, offers a conceptual analysis and an analytical
typology of various notions of tacit knowledge occurring in the texts of
Polanyi and in the writings of some of his major interpreters. The author
concludes that although the idea of tacit knowledge varies according to
7
Scott and Moleski (2005)
8
It is remarkable that there are three philosophical journals inspired by and partly
devoted to Polanyis philosophy, namely, Appraisal, Polanyiana and Tradition and
Discovery.
Knowing and Being: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi 3
particular contexts one can distinguish its two basic concepts. The first
refers to the knowledge that one seems to have about the subsidiary par-
ticulars (the clues) of an experience; while the second refers to knowledge
of how to integrate these particulars into a meaningful whole. Both of
these ideas of tacit knowledge undermine the traditional analysis of know-
ledge as justified, true belief, as totally explicit propositional knowledge.
By claiming that Indwelling is Heideggers being-in-the-world, Po-
lanyi (1964) reveals the interconnectedness between his theory of tacit
knowing and the phenomenological tradition. Keeping in this direction,
Yus essay, Being-in-the-World in a Polanyian Perspective, explores the
epistemological implications of Heideggers notion of Being-in-the-
world from the perspective of the theory of tacit knowing. He points out
various intriguing and instructive analogies between Heideggers existen-
tial understanding and Polanyis tacit knowingand claims that Heideg-
gers analysis of being-in-the-world lends strong support to the theory of
tacit knowing in its effort to challenge the representational conception of
knowledge of modern epistemology. By creating a dialogue between the
Polanyian and the phenomenological tradition, Yu discloses intellectual
resources and inspirations for the development of the theory of tacit know-
ing.
Pursuing further the relationships between Polanyis philosophy and
the philosophical hermeneutics, Mulherins paper, A Rose by another
Name? Personal Knowledge and Hermeneutics, explores some parallels
between Polanyis personal knowledge and Gadamerian hermeneutics. It
is motivated by three questions: 1. To what extent are Gadamers theory of
understanding and Polanyis work on personal knowledge saying similar
things albeit in different languages? 2. How can philosophical hermeneu-
tics and Polanyis personal knowledge mutually inform one another? 3.
Can we move towards a fusion of Gadamerian universal hermeneutics and
Polanyian personal knowledge? Although, apparently, neither author was
significantly influenced by the other, Mulherin claims that Polanyi and
Gadamer draw a strikingly similar picture of human knowledge.
Moral knowledge is the central problem of Lewis essay, Teaching to
Form Character: A Polanyian Analysis of Practical Reasoning. Since the
1970s, philosophical and theological ethics has rediscovered the impor-
tance of character. While this renewed emphasis has served as a valuable
correction to earlier trends in these disciplines, it has made little progress
in determining how good character can be formed. Taking its bearings
from Aristotles claim that skillfulness in practical reasoning represents
the epitome of good character, this paper explores the ways in which Po-
lanyi's account of personal knowing is able to enrich Aristotle's account of
4 Introduction
practical reasoning and its formation. In many ways, an account of practi-

cal reasoning as informed by Polanyi extends the classical account in some
potentially fruitful ways. Polanyis treatment of perception as the tacit
integration of subsidiary clues into a focal entity in the from-to structure of
knowing, and his uncovering the phenomenon of indwelling as empathy
add new layers to what is involved in moral deliberation.
Rutledges essay, Individual and Community in a Convivial Order, or
Polanyian Optimism, analyzes the roles of the individual and the commu-
nity in what we call knowledge, and in how we come to know. The paper
sketches the critical view of knowledge, then articulates the features of
Michael Polanyis post-critical philosophy that preserve the freedom of
individual thought while also embedding that individual within a commu-
nity whose shared values make common life possible. Thus neither indi-
vidual nor society need be left out of our epistemology, but their relation-
ship must be redefined. Polanyis affirmation of the universal intent of all
our knowledge claims grounds knowing in individual commitments that
exist within the matrix of traditions and authorities that give those com-
mitments both logical force and intellectual reach. This strongly embedded
personal knowledge is in the service of human life, making it human
and, as Rutledge points out, this is, indeed, an optimistic stance on knowl-
edge, individual and community.
Fehr investigates the contemporary changes of the social role of sci-
ence in her paper, Polanyi on the Moral Dimension of Science. In Po-
lanyis view, science is essentially a moral venture for mankind and, thus,
scientific research is not merely a cognitive but also a moral task for scien-
tists. Knowledge claims need not only justification by means of methodo-
logical rulesit also requires a guaranty by the moral rules accepted by
and embodied in the moral integrity of scientists. Truth seeking needs not
only cognitive capacities but a moral stance as well. Today, however,
science has entered into the post-academic phase (in Zimans terms), in
which science is in the service of economics and industry. The moral di-
mension and the personal element of scientific research work within R+D
are fading away. Instead, its instrumental value and profitability is
strengthening. And the guaranty of truth of knowledge claims is, rather,
that they in actual fact work within the context of technology. Yet when
knowledge is no longer personal but is a result of a service delivered for a
big corporation on a project-financed basis, then something very important
is being lostnamely, trust in science and scientists. Bureaucracy and
economic constraints have come to take its place.
The second part of the volume explores Polanyis theory of being in
various contexts. Margitays contribution, From Epistemology to Ontology,
analyzes the hierarchical structure of ontology and the arguments for it.
Polanyi fervently proposes a layered ontology with emergent structures at
each level of it; and he has two kinds of argument to render this hierarchi-
cal picture of the world plausible. On the one hand, he seems to argue
from the structure of knowing for the emergent ontological structures,
while, on the other, he brings up a purely ontological argument. Margitay
analyzes how Polanyis theory of knowing bears on his own ontology and
offers two possible reconstructions concerning how the first could logi-
cally support the second. He claims that neither of them is satisfactory
nor is Polanyis purely ontological argument from identification. Though
Polanyis arguments are insufficient to support his multilayered ontology,
butMargitay concludesthe personal level remains fundamentally
novel to and emergent upon the physical provided that one accepts Po-
lanyi account of knowing.
One of the most powerful theories of contemporary analytical philoso-
phy of mind is the non-reductive physicalism. It is substance-monist while
claiming that mental or psychological properties are real, substantive, and
non-reducible elements of the world. Dinnyeis paper, Downward Causa-
tion, first sketches Jaegwon Kims argumentation, pointing out that
downward causation is a consequence of an ambivalent non-reductive
physicalism. For this problem, Kim suggests a strategy of a moderate
reductionism. Dinnyei offers an alternative solution, one based on Michael
Polanyis theory about the ontological consequences of tacit knowledge.
The author argues that if one accepts the Polanyian ontology, then one will
obtain a non-reductive version of physicalism that is, firstly, coherent and,
secondly, free from a problematic downward causation.
In his paper, Polanyi and Evolution, Paksi discusses Polanyis views
on life that have been much disputed and mostly misunderstood. He pro-
vides a comprehensive picture of Polanyis far-sighted idea of evolution.
In contrast to neo-Darwinian theories, Polanyi does not accept that the
mechanism of natural selection is the principle of evolutionary develop-
ment. Paksi reconstructs Polanyis criticism concerning the neo-Darwinian
theory, namely, that it is not able to explain complex forms of life. Varia-
tion and selection via the restricted resources of the environment can ex-
plain only change but not the evolution of the ever more complex biologi-
cal structures that it should. Paksi reconstructs the Polanyian principles of
life and evolution on the basis of Polanyis ideas of boundary conditions
and emergence. He argues that Polanyis theory is an improvement com-
pared to the neo-Darwinian ones, and it provides a more plausible account
of evolution and life than do rival explanations.
6 Introduction
In The Immortality of the Intellect Revived, Blum contrasts Polanyis

thoughts on the possibility of the thinking machine with Turings, and then
interprets their debate on the functionalist approach to the mind in the light
of ancient and medieval discussions of the immortality of the soul. He
shows that the debate between Turing and his opponents repeats a problem
that was important in the history of the philosophy of mind. Polanyi
responding to Turing's challengeexposes to the reader the mixture of
metaphysical and epistemological claims included in the seemingly tech-
nical question: Can computers think?; and he brings the traditional solu-
tion (operationalist vs. essentialist) further by showing that operation inso-
far as it is intellectual originates from beyond the area and objects of op-
eration (brain or computer). Polanyi thus helps interpret the immortality
debate of early modernity as a fallacy, as it identified the thinking subject
with its means of thought, although a brain is a brain only for a mind that
thinks with it.
The modern notion of radical autonomy represented, for example, by
Sartre is that, when faced with a meaningless and determinist world, each
of us has to choose all his beliefs and commitments for himself. Emotion
is therefore suspect because it arises from and engenders desires, attach-
ments and commitments that we have not chosen for ourselves. However,
as Allen argues in his study. Emotion, Autonomy and Commitment, this
notion of autonomy is incoherent. For to choose is to choose by principles
of preference which, in the act of choice, are themselves unchosen. Po-
lanyis philosophy recognises the necessarily acritically unchosen funda-
mental beliefs and commitments by which we must think and act. Belief,
trust and faith are prior to and presupposed by knowledge, suspicion and
doubt. Our autonomy can therefore be only a limited one.
Gulick illuminates Michael Polanyis theories of social being in a
comparative historical study, The Social Thought of Karl and Michael
Polanyi. The relationship between Michael and Karl Polanyi was strained
in part because their world-views were at odds. The typical description of
Michael as a market liberal and Karl as a socialist, however, does not
adequately capture the subtleties of their social thought, nor does it suggest
the many values and ideas they shared. Gulick traces the differences in
their world-views back to the time of the early maturity of the brothers,
highlights factors that sustained their differences, but then suggests that
the differences were somewhat mitigated in their later years. He argues
that ideas from both brothers can contribute to the formulation of policies,
ones especially needed now, which might support global justice, peace and
sustainability.
This book has grown out of a conference held in Budapest in 2008 at

the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Polanyis seminal opus mag-
num, Personal Knowledge. The presentations given at the conference and
the papers in this volume attest that his abiding thoughts inspire many
thinkers today, too, and demonstrate the long-standing effects of his works
on the history of ideas.
Bibliography
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ganizations manage what they know. Boston: Harvard Business School
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Eysenck, M.W. and Keane, M.T. (1990) Cognitive Psychology: A Stu-
dents Handbook. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gigerenzer, G. (2007) Gut Feelings: The Intelligence of the Unconscious.
New York: Viking.
Holyoak, K.J. and Morrison, R.G. (eds.) (2005) The Cambridge Handbook
of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Klein, G. (2004) The Power of Intuition. New York: Currency.
Koehler, D.J. and Harvey, N. (eds.) (2007) Blackwell Handbook of Judg-
ment and Decision Making. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Koskinen, K. U, and Pihlanto, P. and Vanharanta, H. (2003) Tacit knowl-
edge acquisition and sharing in a project work context. International
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8 Introduction
Polanyi, M. (1966) The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge.

. (1964) Preface to The Torchbook Edition. In Personal Knowledge.
New York: Harper and Row.
. (1969) Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. M. Grene
(ed.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
. (2006) Meaning lectures. Polanyiana 15:1-2, 69-160.
Rang, P. and Targama K. (2008) Planning and management: explicit
versus tacit knowledge. Polanyiana 17:92-102.
Scott, W.T. and Moleski, M.X. (2005) Michael Polanyi: Scientist and
Philosopher. New York: Oxford University Press.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_knowledge.
PART I
KNOWING
CHAPTER ONE
MICHAEL POLANYI'S USE

OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
PHIL MULLINS
Introduction
Anyone who has carefully studied Polanyis writings notices that Po-
lanyi frequently makes brief comments about Gestalt psychology and its
connection with his own epistemologically-oriented philosophical perspec-
tive. Some scholarly discussions of Polanyis perspectives do indeed
comment on the connections with Gestalt ideas. In a 1962 review of Per-
sonal Knowledge, biographer Bill Scott noted that Polanyi was working
out a Gestalt philosophy. Scott suggested that Gestalt psychology pro-
vided the chief philosophic background that allowed Polanyi to draw
attention to the tacit elements in the scientific process that he stresses
(Scott 1962, 366). Several of the introductions to Polanyis thought also
briefly note that Polanyi was influenced by Gestalt ideas.1 Richard Gel-
wicks short discussion intriguingly suggests that both the early and late
Polanyi recast some of the basic Gestalt ideas (Gelwick [1977] 2004, 61-
62). This essay explores in some detail the line of thought hinted at in
Gelwicks suggestions. I analyze how Polanyi at different stages of his
career progressively transforms Gestalt ideas. I argue that noting the path
of this transformation is a reasonably good way to chart the overall devel-
opment of Polanyis philosophical ideas during the course of thirty-five
years.
1
Mitchell (2007, 70-71), Scott ([1985] 1995, 55-58), Prosch (1986, 52-53).
Michael Polanyis Use of Gestalt Psychology 11
1. Two Kinds of Order

Polanyi left Berlin for Manchester in 1933, and the years before the
end of World War II were particularly important for the development of
his future philosophical ideas. Until 1948, Polanyi had a university ap-
pointment as a physical chemist, but after his move to Manchester his
interests seem to have become progressively broader. Polanyis interests
were never very circumscribed, but it is certainly clear that in the period
before and during the war Polanyi was drawn deeply into the public dis-
cussion about social organization and, particularly, about the relationship
between the scientific community and society.2 Marxist-influenced views
of science were popular in England before Polanyi arrived and they were
also very likely to have been of interest to Polanyi before 1933. His first
trip to the Soviet Union was in 1928, and Scott and Moleski suggest he
was, by this time, already deeply interested in political and economic is-
sues (Scott and Moleski 2005, 108-109). As Polanyis The Contempt of
Freedom,3 his comments in the 1963 introduction to the reprint of Science,
Faith and Society (Polanyi [1946] 1964, 7-9) and the Polanyi biography
(Scott and Moleski 2005, 154-192) make clear, Polanyi, in the late thirties
and early forties, became an important voice in the discussions about
planned science. I regard Polanyis 1941 essay The Growth of Thought
in Society as one of his most important early comments on science and
society and it is also an early essay in which Polanyis ideas are linked to
2
Gelwick is likely correct when he says of Polanyi the whole world is his only
genuine interest. He also notes, as I shall discuss below, that Polanyis involve-
ment in the freedom of science controversy required Polanyi to synthesize his
emerging philosophical ideas, which thus led him deeper into the problem of
knowledge (Gelwick [1977] 2004, 39).
3
As Polanyis June 3, 1940 Preface to The Contempt of Freedom notes, this mate-
rial comes from 1935-1940. It includes the 1939 essay Rights and Duties of Sci-
ence as well as the 1940 essay Collectivist Planning. The latter includes discus-
sion about liberal society and supervision as the method by which the cultiva-
tion of things of the mind is regulated (Polanyi 1940a, 37). There is thus thematic
overlap with the 1941 essay The Growth of Thought in Society (Polanyi
1941asee the extended discussion below), although there is no reference to
Gestalt ideas in Collectivist Planning. Some of the heavily redacted, unpublished
archival manuscriptwritten in Wales in Sept. 1940, and entitled Foundations of
Freedom in Science (Polanyi 1940b)apparently became part of the published
1941 essay The Growth of Thought in Society, although there is no mention of
Wolfgang Kohler here, as there is in the published article.
12 Chapter One
Gestalt theory.4 This essay is a review article focusing on J. G. Crowthers

1941 Social Relations of Science. Polanyi intended to rebut Crowthers
Marxist-oriented views, but he does this by articulating his own vision of a
4
There is at least one other Polanyi document before 1941 that makes reference to
Gestalt, a two-page 1939 unpublished archival piece simply entitled Notes on
Prejudice: Faith is in many cases a condition for understanding. Indeed, Gestalt
psychology shows that the very contents of our sensation depend on recognising
their meaning. Perception is interpretative (Polanyi 1939a). This early statement
is interestingly akin to the account of perception outlined in Science, Faith and
Society (which was originally published a few years later in 1946), and more care-
fully worked out in Personal Knowledge (which was originally published in 1958,
almost twenty years after "Notes on Prejudice" was written). It also resembles
Polanyis later discussions of Augustines faith seeking understanding, and, more
generally, what Polanyi calls the fiduciary program (Polanyi [1958] 1964, ix) in
the period of Personal Knowledge (see discussion below). However, this 1939
reference does not hint at the use of Gestalt ideas to describe dynamic orders and
produce a vision of a liberal society (matters that are focal interests in Polanyis
1941 essay The Growth of Thought in Society). Endre Nagy suggests that in the
earliest phase of Polanyis efforts to conceive the organization and dynamics of the
social order, he focused on growth, construction, and sectionalism (Nagy
1992/1993, 152-157). The unpublished manuscript The Struggle of Man is Soci-
etywritten in late 1939 and 1940does use these terms; Polanyi clearly does
not have his conceptual scheme well worked out. Polanyis growth is a method
of social cooperation in which there is adding elements, one at a time, at the
points where growth is indicated, and when the points at which growth is indicated
can become known to all of the individuals which are capable of making the con-
tribution in question (Polanyi, 1939-40). Construction is a rather vague cate-
gory but seems for Polanyi to be linked to non-organic social change. Sectional-
ism describes the somewhat distinct spheres in which authority is located:
Doctors, qua doctors, are not to be judged by artists, and vice-versa (Polanyi
1939-40). Between June and early October, 1941, Nagy suggests that Polanyi
discovered Kohlers Gestalt ideas about self-organization, and this led him to a
more careful and rich way to reformulate his social ideas in terms of his thesis
about two kinds of order (discussed below)which is a theme he carries for-
ward at least through The Logic of Liberty. Because Polanyi uses the term dy-
namic order, Nagy believes that the discussion in Polanyis unpublished October
7, 1941 lecture The Liberal Conception of Freedom (Polanyi 1941b) shows that
Polanyi had by early October read Kohler; so far as his social philosophy goes,
this is a turning point in Polanyis intellectual development (Nagy 1992, 110).
There is, however, no direct reference to Kohler that I can find. Nagy does offer a
plausible account that explains when Kohler is discovered by Polanyi, although
Polanyis Notes on Prejudice imply that he probably knew at least something
about Gestalt ideas before 1941. See also the related discussion in footnote 5 of
Polanyis 1940 discussion of planning and supervision, which apparently also
predates his discovery of Kohler.
liberal society, in which science is an important community of persons

pursuing truth:
this essay is to analyse the part played in society by the ideal of Science,
and by the ideals of other aspects of truth: We shall trace the principles of
organisation which are appropriate for the service of these ideas, and
through which the intellectual and moral order of society is established and
developed further. . We shall demonstrate that the abandonment of the
ideals of truth logically entail the replacement of these ideas by fanaticism
coupled with cynicismand that the establishment of a totalitarian rule of
unscrupulous fanatics must follow. (Polanyi 1941a, 419)
The key to the view of science and society that Polanyi sketches as an
alternative to Crowther and others more interested in centralization is what
Polanyi dubs his thesis about two kinds of order.5 This thesis is quite
general insofar as Polanyi applies it to both natural and social phenomena.
One kind of order consists in limiting the freedom of things and men to
stay or move about at their pleasure, by assigning to each a specific posi-
tion in a pre-arranged plan (Polanyi 1941a, 431). However, there is an
opposite principle underlying other kinds of order in both natural and
human settings:
In this type of order no constraint is applied specifically to individual parti-

cles; the forces from outside, like the resistance of the vessels [holding a
liquid] and the forces of gravitation, take effect in an entirely indiscrimi-
nate fashion. The particles are thus free to obey the internal forces acting
between them, and the resultant order represents the equilibrium between
all the internal and external forces. (Polanyi 1941a, 431)
5
As noted in footnote three, Polanyis 1940 essay Collectivist Planning has
distinctions similar to those discussed in terms of two kinds of order in The
Growth of Thought in Society. R. T. Allen includes the essay in the collection of
Polanyi essays entitled Society, Economics and Philosophy, Selected Papers of
Michael Polanyi, which he edited (Polanyi 1997, 121-143). Allen identifies the
essay as based on an April, 1940 talk: he says it was Polanyis first published
statement of the impossibility of central planning and his explanation of what in
fact passes under that name (Polanyi 1997, 121). In the essay, Polanyi identifies
two alternate methods of ordering human affairs (Polanyi 1997, 129) and he
describes planning or comprehensive planning, and supervision or supervi-
sory authority (Polanyi 1997, 129). He says supervision is in the first place the
method by which the cultivation of things of the mind is regulated (Polanyi 1997,
127). See my discussion of this essay in connection with Polanyis early discus-
sions about how science fits into larger society (Mullins 2003).
14 Chapter One
In his article, Polanyi cites Wolfgang Kohlers 1929 edition of Gestalt

Psychology as offering the view that the perception of a Gestalt is due to
the mutual interaction of the elements in the sensory field (Polanyi 1941a,
432) as an example of the complexity of some spontaneously arising or-
ders and he later credits Kohler with using the term dynamic order to
identify orders that are the result of a spontaneous, mutual adjustment of
elements (Polanyi 1941a, 435). Like Endre Nagy, I suspect it was Kohlers
larger discussion that helped Polanyi formulate his already incubating
two kinds of order thesis. Polanyis writing in the years immediately
preceding publication of this 1941 article was already moving in the direc-
tion suggested by the two kinds of order formula.6 Kohlers broader
discussion in Gestalt Psychology lays out the shortcomings in the ap-
proaches of those he termed introspectionists and behaviorists (Kohler,
1929, 106), psychologists who did not appreciate dynamical order and
regulation, which Kohler contends is well established by physical the-
ory (Kohler, 1929, 194). Kohler contrasts processes involving forces
operating under external limiting topographical conditions (Kohler,
1929, 112)as you might find in a machinewith forces whose interplay
is not so constrained. He contends that dynamical interaction, undisturbed
by accidental impacts from without, leads to orderly distribution, though
there are not special regulative arrangements (Kohler, 1929, 139)7
6
Nagy (1992/1993, 152-157) See the discussion in footnotes 3 and 4 above.
7
Wolfgang Kohler came to Berlin not long after Polanyi came to the Kaiser Wil-
helm Institutes. Kohler was appointed head of Berlins Psychological Institute in
February 1922, and he remained in the position until 1935, two years after Polanyi
left Berlin. I have here quoted material from Kohlers 1929 Gestalt Psychology
because this is the book Polanyi cites in his 1941 article The Growth of Thought
in Society. Certainly, Kohler was not the only figure involved in the discussions
that came to be called Gestalt theory or Gestalt psychology. It is not clear how
much Polanyi may have known about some of these Gestalt discussions stretching
back to the late nineteenth century and including figures like Dilthey, Lipps, Kurt
Lewin, Max Werheimer, and Kurt Kofka. There are references to all of these fig-
ures in Polanyis later writings, and the latter three were contemporaries of Kohler
and their work often seems to have been closely connected. In Personal Knowl-
edge ([1958] 1964, 418), there are over a dozen references to Kohler, as well as a
few references to Lewin, Wertheimer, and Kofka. A number of the references to
Kohler are references to his studies of animal problem solving. Mitchel Ashs
Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967 discusses the development of
Gestalt psychological theory in terms of four stages: Wertheimers work on motion
perception; Kohler and Kofkas expansion of Wertheimers theoretical perspective
and its application to perception and human behavior and animal problem solving;
Kohlers extension of the Gestalt principle to the external world and the psycho-
physical problem(Ash 1995, 118); and Wertheimers studies of productive think-
Some of Polanyis examples of dynamical order are interesting since

they seem to be drawn straight from the world of a chemist who has spent
some years studying crystals.8 It seems that there is a natural complemen-
tary between some of Polanyis developing social philosophy and Kohlers
discussions.9 Polanyi notes that when external forces are
absent or negligible, and the internal forces operate alone, the resulting
equilibria present even more striking regularities. Fluids, gases and liquids
take on spherical shapes; and at lower temperatures substances solidify into
crystals, in which the atoms are arrayed at faultlessly even intervals in the
three dimensions of space. (Polanyi 1941a, 431)
He emphasizes that by cooling a solution, millions of molecules can be

very quickly and cheaply sorted out and stacked in a regular formation.
Polanyi draws this general conclusion: . . . when very large numbers are
to be arranged carefully, this can be achieved only by the spontaneous,
mutual adjustment of the units; not by specific assignment of the several
units to positions in a pre-arranged plan (Polanyi 1941a, 432). Not all of
Polanyis examples of complex self-ordering systems are drawn from
chemistry. In a way that somewhat resembles later discussions in Part IV
of Personal Knowledge, Polanyi notes that the evolution of the embryo
from the fertilised cell may also be regarded as arising from the continuous
tendency of its particles, interacting with the nurturing medium, to come to
an internal equilibrium (Polanyi 1941a, 432 ).10 He also briefly sketches
ing and his interest in a new logic. I am indebted to Ashs rich book for back-
ground as well as some details about figures like Kohler and other Gestalt thinkers.
In sum, by 1941, Polanyi seems to know something about the Gestalt literature of
Ashs second stage; by 1958, in Personal Knowledge ([1958] 1964, 340-343,
discussed below), Polanyi has developed a detailed criticism of Kohlers isomor-
phism (stage three) and he has, additionally, carefully studied Gestalt treatment of
animal problem solving and makes much use of it.
8
Polanyi actually uses the term crystallizing forces (Polanyi 1941a, 432) at one
point to identify mutual adjustment or interaction among units controlled by inter-
nal forces seeking equilibrium.
9
Ash points out that Kohler was very broadly trained in the sciences and philoso-
phy and almost pursued work in physics, so perhaps it is not a surprise Polanyi
came to appreciate his interdisciplinary discussions. For Kohlers historical back-
ground, see Ash (1995, 111-113).
10
This is what Polanyi calls morphogenesis in discussions in Part IV of Personal
Knowledge; Polanyi contends that Kohlers isomorphism, an automatic process
bringing forces into equilibrium, is not an adequate explanation of intelligent
behavior since intelligent behavior must be recognized as an achievement by a
living creature. Similarly, morphogenesis is not adequately understood when con-
16 Chapter One
an account of evolution in terms of internal forces seeking equilibrium:

The entire evolution of species is commonly thought to have resulted
from a continued process of internal equilibration in living matter, under
varying outside circumstances (Polanyi 1941a, 432-433).
The primary thing that Polanyi does with his account of two kinds of
order is, of course, use it to articulate his vision of a liberal society, a
vision in which science is one important, self-governing sub-community.
He acknowledges that planned or corporate orders are appropriate for
some uses in social life, but he suggests that to be effective such orders
must have a carefully coordinated pyramid of authority; they are not, for
the most part, well suited for solving problems that are complex (i.e., ones
that have many agents involved)11 and administrative chaos follows when
one attempts to replace an order achieved by mutual adjustment with a
corporate order. Polanyi suggests that the best known dynamic order in
society is the economy, with its competitive production and consumption,
which are the internal forces working towards equilibrium. However, it is
really not the economy that interests Polanyi but what he calls the most
varied types of dynamic order ... found in the intellectual and moral heri-
tage of man. (Polanyi 1941a, 436).12 First, he briefly sketches the system
by which the law is reinterpreted using precedents; this is a process of
direct adjustments between succeeding judges (Polanyi 1941a, 436).
Next, he turns to science, the dynamic order of most interest in this essay,
where his purpose is to counter the vision of science put forth by Crow-
ther. Science is a community of inquiry in which discovery in the end
will be largely based on thousands of previous discoveries; and though the
new addition will always modify the previously prevailing ideas to some
extent, and sometimes may cause revolutionary changes in outlook, the
essential unity of science will be maintained (Polanyi 1941a, 437). In
ceived merely as a physical-chemical process paralleling isomorphism, according

to Polanyi, since morphogenesis is a process that may succeed or fail.
11
Somewhat later in The Logic of Liberty (1951, 176), Polanyi speaks of the po-
lycentric task that involves balancing a large number of elements.
12
In an unpublished archival manuscriptRemarks sent to Prof. Roupize, dated
February 2, 1939 (1939b)Polanyi ruminates on the spiritual weakness of
capitalism, insofar as the individual sees himself or herself as starkly acquisitive
and does not even feel that what he or she does is useful to anybody. Polanyi
seems to see central planning as a reaction against this spiritual weakness, but he
thought that education in economics might help remedy the weakness. As late as
1962, in The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, Polanyi
comments on the economy as a special case of co-ordination by mutual adjust-
ment (1969, 52), which he compares to the kind of adjustment in the intellectual,
dynamic order of science.
sum, what Polanyi does in his essay is sketch the operations of three dif-
ferent dynamic orders in societythe economy, the law and science
arguing that they are analogs. He briefly compares these different dynamic
orders, noting, for example, that science is a more cognitive order and that
law is a more normative order. The most important point, however, is that,
for Polanyi, society is a fabric chiefly constituted by many dynamic or-
ders. Here, he puts this matter clearly:
There exist many other systems in the intellectual and moral sphere. . . The
social legacies of language, writing, literature and of the various arts; of
practical crafts, including medicine, agriculture, manufacture and the tech-
niques of communications; of sets of conventional units and measures, and
of customs of intercourse; of religious, social and political thought; all
these are systems of dynamic order which were developed by the method
of direct individual adjustment, as described for Science and the Law. (Po-
lanyi 1941a, 438)
This 1941 article goes on to discuss the ways in which the work of the
many dynamic orders in liberal society can be preserved and fostered. As
part of this discussion, Polanyi articulates his claims for public liberty
which, unlike private freedom, is not for the sake of the individual at all,
but for the benefit of the community in which dynamic systems of order
are maintained (Polanyi 1941a, 438). Public liberty is concerned with the
freedom of the individual to be responsible, within the context of con-
science, to respond to the achievements of others in a dynamic order and
thus to be faithful to the transcendent ideals of the dynamic order. Public
liberty helps resolve disputes and reform tradition. In addition, Polanyi
works out his interesting understanding of the Totalitarian State, which
claims that it completely represents all the collective interests of the com-
munity, (and) must reject the rival claims of individuals to act independ-
ently for the benefit of society (Polanyi 1941a, 438). In other words, the
totalitarian state does not allow public liberty since it sees itself as the only
competent instrument for deciding what the social good is and how it
should be pursued. For Polanyi, communists and fascists alike fundamen-
tally misunderstand dynamic orders and their role as the foundations of
social life: The hope of progress through the pursuit of various forms and
aspects of truthartistic, scientific, religious, legal, etc.by a number of
autonomous circles, each devoted to one of them, is the essential idea of a
Liberal Society, as contrasted to a Totalitarian State (Polanyi 1941a,
448). In sum, Polanyis attack on Crowther presents a vision of liberal
society which is a creative social application of his thesis about two kinds
of order, a thesis that he develops from some of the ideas that Gestalt
18 Chapter One
theory popularized about the dynamics of forces. More broadly stated,

much of Polanyis philosophizing in the forties and early fifties is con-
cerned with what Scott and Moleski call articulating the philosophy of
freedom.13 And this philosophy was enriched by what he found in Gestalt
discussions.
2. Two Kinds of Awareness

Polanyis developing ideas in the forties reflect that his interests even-
tually shift somewhat from the project of articulating a vision of liberal
society. This shift is not truly a change in direction so much as it is a look-
ing for deeper roots that underlie his socially-oriented constructive phi-
losophical ideas emphasizing dynamic orders, public liberty and mutual
adjustment. His writing in the mid-forties also stresses tradition and au-
thority and the continuity between perception and the specialized percep-
tion (or skills) in science. Certainly, these themes might be construed as
being on the road to a broader epistemologically-grounded philosophical
vision akin to the kind of reflections found in the Gifford Lectures in the
early fifties and Personal Knowledge, published in 1958. Scott and Mole-
ski (2005, 202) suggest that in the Riddell Lectures (March, 1946) Polanyi
ends on a note emphasizing the role of belief and conscience in science.
Marjorie Grene reports that when she met and began working with Polanyi
in 1950, Polanyi was already interested in the strange way in which, in all
knowledge, the inarticulate outruns and outweighs its articulate aspect
(Grene 1977, 168).14 In the forties and fifties, Polanyi is not only increas-
ingly uncomfortable with materialist, Marxist-oriented accounts of science
and society, but also with non-Marxist accounts of science and society,
called, variously, positivist, empiricist, formalist and objectivist.
In May of 1947, Polanyi was invited to give the Gifford Lectures. He
postponed the dates for his lectures a couple of times as he struggled to
formulate his ideas, finally giving the First Series in May and June of
13
This is the title of Scott and Moleskis seventh chapter (2005, 171ff.), covering
the period in Polanyis life from Hitlers march into Austria (March, 1938) to the
point at which Polanyi formally leaves the Manchester Department of Chemistry
and joins the Faculty of Economics and Social Studies (March, 1948). They de-
scribe Polanyis interests in this period in terms of denouncing Bernalism and
working out the philosophy by which a free society operates (2005, 176) as well
as writing a physiology of a liberal society (2005, 177).
14
Marjorie Grenes 1977 essay, Tacit Knowing: Grounds for a Revolution in
Philosophy is, in my view, the best short review of Polanyis philosophical devel-
opment and achievements. My debts to her in this account are many.
1951, with the Second Series following in November 1952. The title for
Polanyis Gifford Lectures was Commitment: In Quest of a Post-Critical
Philosophy. The title of the fourth lecture in Series I was The Fiduciary
Mode and Polanyi in his lectures speaks of articulating a fiduciary phi-
losophy.15 In Chapter 7 of The Logic of Liberty (entitled Perils of Incon-
sistency), which is written and published in the period that the Gifford
Lectures are delivered, Polanyi provides a brief account of Western intel-
lectual history that helps clarify his emerging ideas:
The critical enterprise which gave rise to the Renaissance and Reformation,
and started the rise of our science, philosophy, and art, had matured to its
conclusion and had reached its final limits. We have thus begun to live in a
new intellectual period, which I would call the post-critical age of Western
civilization. Liberalism to-day (sic) is becoming conscious of its own fidu-
ciary foundations and is forming an alliance with other beliefs, kindred to
its own. (Polanyi 1951a, 109)16
Perhaps Marjorie Grene, Polanyis able associate who helped with the
Gifford Lectures and also with what grew out of these lectures, namely
15
The only manuscript of Polanyis Gifford Lectures comes from about 1954; the
text, in some sections, has apparently been somewhat revised. Polanyi gave this
manuscript to Marjorie Grene in May, 1957, and she gave it to Duke University in
the late sixties. Gerald L. Smiths 1969 Introduction to the Duke microfilm (of
the typescript) provides a good discussion of this material. The sometimes am-
biguous penciled notes on this typescript most likely imply that this material is a
very early (some of it perhaps as late as 1954) step toward Personal Knowledge.
Polanyi probably had some of the lectures carefully typed up for the original deliv-
ery, though for some lectures he may have had only handwritten texts. There is a
Syllabus for the 1951 First Series of Polanyis Gifford Lectures in the Polanyi
archival collection at the University of Chicago (Polanyi 1951b). The Syllabus
includes an interesting prcis of each lecture. I have used the Syllabus for the
references to titles. Fiduciary philosophy is a term used in the sixth Second
Series Lecture, entitled Skill and Connoisseurship (Polanyi 1954, 314). I have
been unable to locate a Syllabus for the Second Series, although Polanyis letter
to J. H. Oldham of 13 July, 1953 (Polanyi 1953) implies that there probably was
one.
16
The chapter Perils of Inconsistency, which Polanyi says is about intellectual
freedom (Polanyi 1951a, 93), is apparently the first published occasion in which
Polanyi used the term post-critical to characterize what he took to be the emerg-
ing intellectual era. It seems likely that, by this time, Polanyi has also begun to see
more clearly his own role as that of a figure setting forth a critique of modernity
and an alternative philosophical vision, one incorporating a Lebensphilosophie
appropriate to this new era.
20 Chapter One
Personal Knowledge, has most succinctly summarized the course of Po-

lanyis philosophical development. She describes Polanyis deepening
interest in belief, commitment, the fiduciary mode and post-critical phi-
losophy as a shift from a focus upon the problems of the structure of a
society of explorers to the question of the justification of dubitable
beliefs (Grene 1977, 165).17 Particularly in the forties, Polanyis first
philosophizing was motivated by the problem of the administration of
science (Grene 1977, 165), but by the time Polanyi puts together the
Gifford Lectures this problem is situated in the context of a larger problem
and statement about why belief is the foundation of knowledge and social
life. What Grene calls the problem of the administration of science
(Grene 1977, 165) is first addressed by setting forth a vision of a liberal
society; but the dynamic orders (such as science) in a liberal society Po-
lanyi recognized could prosper only because members of such orders trust-
ingly relied upon certain beliefs that conceivably could be doubted and
which are not exhaustively specifiable. In an unpublished 1940 manuscript
Further Notes on Relativism, Polanyi notes that in contemporary society
the persistent and dangerous urge toward the abandonment of a system of
Liberalism is rooted in its essential lack of definiteness (Polanyi 1940c,
52).18 Thus, Polanyi is led to address the problem of justifying dubitable
beliefs and his response is what (in the Gifford Lectures) is called a fidu-
ciary mode or a fiduciary philosophy or what Grene and Polanyi by the
time of Personal Knowledge refer to as the fiduciary program, which is
Polanyis earliest account of personal knowledge.19 Recently, Grene has
succinctly characterized fiduciary philosophy as a kind of lay Augustin-
ianism, in which we recognize that our reasoning always rests on the at-
tempt to clarify, and to improve, something we already believe, but be-
17
Grene makes it clear that Polanyis interest (as well as her own) in dubitable
belief is quite different from what occurs in standard discussions in philosophy of
justified true belief. She suggests that Polanyi is generally not attuned to philoso-
phers discussions about justification, but he wrestles with the problem coming
from a background in science (Grene 1977, 166-167).
18
An even earlier similar statementThe Value of the Inexactwas published
in 1936 in Philosophy of Science (Polanyi 1936).
19
Polanyi notes in the 1964 Torchbook edition Preface of Personal Knowledge
that there are forty declarations of belief listed under fiduciary program in the
index (Polanyi [1958] 1964, ix). Grene notes that she and her children did the
index, so she is certainly mindful of the importance of this key term (Grene 1977,
167). Polanyi was already discussing the fiduciary mode in 1948, before he met
Grene. See my discussion of J. H. Oldhams agenda advertising Polanyis paper
Forms of Atheism, prepared for a December, 1948, Oldham gathering (Mullins
1997, 184).
lieve, of course, in such a way that we recognize that we might be mis-

taken(Grene 2002, 13-14).
Fiduciary philosophy or the fiduciary mode is worked out in terms of
the operations of what, in the Gifford Lectures, is called two kinds of
awareness, which I suggest is, once again, Polanyis creative adaptation
of ideas in Gestalt psychology. Polanyi himself seems by 1953 to have
believed that his Second Series Gifford Lecture, entitled Two Kinds of
Awareness articulated the most fruitful thesis in his Gifford Lectures.20 In
this lecture, Polanyi discusses unspecifiability in terms of subsidiary and
focal awareness.21 While there are several general references made to
Gestalt ideas here, if you look back at Polanyis discussion in the previous
lecture, you find a broader treatment of skills and connoisseurship. Here
Gestalt ideas and Kohlers work serve as important resources for Polanyi.
Patterns or orders make a joint impression that is different from the im-
pression of separate elements. In cases of the connoisseurs judgment,
there is unspecifiability and hence, connoisseurship is taught by example
rather than precept. Polanyi notes Kohlers ability to judge the sex of apes
when seeing only the head, but, clearly, Polanyis firsthand admiration for
connoisseurship is for professional cotton classers, those highly skilled
judges of the quality of cotton fibers who Polanyi apparently learned
something about in his time at the Institute for Fiber Chemistry (Polanyi
1954, 320-322). What Polanyi works out in this section of the Second
Series Gifford Lectures and then more fully in Personal Knowledge is his
distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness, and the dynamic
through which we dwell in subsidiaries in order to focally attend to their
20
J. H. Oldhams August 3, 1953 letter to Polanyi reports that an earlier letter from
Grene indicated that Polanyi considered the subject of this lecture the most fruit-
ful thesis which you have reached so far (Oldham 1953). Oldham was trying to
organize a discussion meeting on Polanyis Gifford Lectures and was attempting to
summarize the main ideas put forward in the lectures. This lecture was apparently
the most difficult for him.
21
Polanyi notes that his previous lecture outlined the way, in skillful performances,
in which we may be ignorant of the procedure we follow; in this lecture he pro-
poses to explore further this logical unspecifiability (Polanyi 1954, 328). He later
mentions that the previous lecture had noted that Gestalt psychology made it clear
that a pattern or tune must be jointly apprehended, for to see the particulars only is
not to see the pattern. Polanyi suggests that he thinks this is also a case of logical
unspecifiability. As I note, this lecture treats this unspecifiabilty in terms of differ-
ences in subsidiary and focal attention. Some of this discussion is carried over in
the Personal Knowledge discussion of wholes and parts and meaning in connection
with Gestalt ideas in section 6 of the Skills chapter (4); some other sections of the
lecture are carried over in later sections of the Skills chapter.
22 Chapter One
joint meaning. As he puts it in his seventh Second Series Gifford lecture

Two Kinds of Awareness:
When we accept a certain set of presuppositions and use them as our inter-
pretative framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we do in our
body. Their uncritical acceptance for the time being consists in the process
of assimilation by which we identify ourselves with them. They are not as-
serted, for assertion can be made only within a framework which we have
identified with ourselves for the time being: but we are subsidiarily aware
of this interiorised framework by the results to which its operations lead us.
(Polanyi 1954, 334)
By the time Polanyi wrote the August 1957 Preface to Personal Knowl-
edge, he seems generally clear about where his adaptation of Gestalt ideas
has led:
I have used the findings of Gestalt psychology as my first clues to this con-
ceptual reform. Scientists have run away from the philosophic implications
of gestalt; I want to countenance them uncompromisingly. I regard know-
ing as an active comprehension of things known, an action that requires
skill. Skillful knowing and doing is performed by subordinating a set of
particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skillful achievement,
whether practical or theoretical. We may then be said to become subsidi-
arily aware of these particulars within our focal awareness of the coher-
ent entity that we achieve. (Polanyi [1958] 1964), xiii)
About a year later, in The Study of Man, Polanyi suggests, in a similar

vein, that by taking personal participation more seriously than do Gestalt
psychologists, he transposes their findings into a theory of knowledge:
They were probably unwilling to recognize that knowledge was shaped by

the knowers personal action. But this does not hold for us. Having realized
that personal participation predominates both in the area of tacit and ex-
plicit knowledge, we are ready to transpose the findings of Gestalt psy-
chology into a theory of knowledge: a theory based primarily on the
analysis of comprehension. (Polanyi 1959, 28)
To summarize, while Polanyis early articulation of a vision of liberal

society was enhanced by his adaptation of Gestalt ideas about self-
organization, Polanyis subsequent explorations of the role of belief led
him to a greater appreciation of skills and connoisseurship and ultimately
to his thesis concerning the operation of two kinds of awareness. His study
of some of the literature of Gestalt psychology, as he puts matters, led him
to embrace the philosophic implications of gestalt (Polanyi [1958] 1964,
xiii), to develop an account of knowing as an active, skillful comprehen-

sion. Ultimately, Polanyi presents in Personal Knowledge an account of
science focused on discovery, but it is an account intimately linked to
ordinary knowing and perceiving; ordinary perceiving and scientific dis-
covery are both cases of the pervasive operation of two kinds of aware-
ness.22 Polanyis ideas were thus developed in connection with Gestalt
discussions of wholes, patterns, skills and connoisseurship.
3. The Theory of Tacit Knowing and the Meaning

Lectures
Marjorie Grene, I believe, is correct in suggesting that in the years im-
mediately after the publication of Personal Knowledge, Polanyis develops
his fiduciary philosophywith his basic insight about two kinds of
awarenessinto his mature philosophys theory of tacit knowing, which
she regards as grounds for a revolution in philosophy.23 In the Preface to
The Tacit Dimension (1966), Polanyi himself notes that his earlier fiduci-
ary philosophyemphasizing commitment and two kinds of aware-
22
Gelwick seems to me on target in emphasizing that Polanyis account of science
focuses on discoverythough Polanyis focus is not on method but on seeing a
problem and solving it by recognizing and integrating clues into a gestalt, a mean-
ingful whole, that is a component of reality (Gelwick [1977] 2004, 43, 61-62).
Grene notes that Polanyis case in Personal Knowledge consisted essentially in
broadening and stabilizing the interpretive circle through a series of analogies, by
showing that human activities of many kinds are structures in the same hopeful yet
hazardous fashion as those of science; she says the account of commitment,
expanded to a fiduciary programme, showed us science as one instance of the way
in which responsible beings do their best to make sense of what is given them and
yet what they, by their active powers, have also partly already enacted (Grene
1977, 167).
23
Grene says Polanyi was not only right to call the distinction between two kinds
of awareness the most important feature of Personal Knowledge; he was righter
than he knew. For in the development of his thought that followed Personal Know-
ledge, it was the strengthening and extension of his conception of the tacit founda-
tion of knowledge that, in my view at least, proved most fruitful (Grene 1977,
168). In the title of her 1977 essay, Grene makes plain her evaluation of the mature
Polanyis theory of tacit knowing: Tacit Knowing: Grounds for a Revolution in
Philosophy. In the article she identifies three late Polanyi writings as places in
which the theory of tacit knowing is clearly and forcefully articulated in a way that
should provide the conceptual instrument for a one hundred and eighty degree
reversal in the approach of philosophers to the problems of epistemology (Grene
1977, 168).
24 Chapter One
nesshas developed a greater emphasis upon the from-to or embodied

nature of thought:
Viewing the content of these pages from the position reached in Personal
Knowledge and The Study of Man eight years ago, I see that my reliance on
the necessity of commitment has been reduced by working out the structure
of tacit knowing. (Polanyi 1966, x)
I suggest that in fact Polanyis ideas in the last section of Personal Knowl-
edge already in some ways anticipate the richer account in his theory of
tacit knowing that is found in The Tacit Dimension. Again, one of the
stimuli for this development apparently was Gestalt ideas.
The most extensive discussion of Kohler in Personal Knowledge
comes in the first chapter of Part IV, The Logic of Achievement. This
final section of the book is one in which Polanyi attempts to situate the
human knower in the larger context of evolutionary history. In a dense
three-page subsection early in Polanyis discussion, he sets forth a rebuttal
of Kohlers principle of isomorphism, which was Kohlers late theory
about how human beings produce perceptual and conceptual understand-
ing. Kohler held that neural traces of stimuli interacted as dynamic forces,
as, similarly, do other dynamic forces studied by Gestalt. According to
isomorphism, this interaction of forces is a physical-chemical equilibration
and it reproduces in a persons nervous system the comprehensive features
from which the stimuli arose. Kohlers process of equilibration is thus an
ordering principle that grounds human perception and judgments of phe-
nomena, such as behavior in other animals. But Polanyi rejects the princi-
ple of isomorphism in favor of his own account, emphasizing what in later
terminology is described as the tacit integration of a person. Polanyi sees
Kohlers isomorphism as a theory preoccupied with impersonally account-
ing for cerebral gestalts; it is a theory that completely fails to explain intel-
ligent behavior and it leads to certain absurd conclusions such as the claim
that physical-chemical equilibration produces the cerebral counterpart of
the richness of mathematics when a reader looks at the axioms of Prin-
cipia Mathematica (Polanyi [1958] 1964, 341). Polanyi insists that percep-
tion and certainly the understanding of complex phenomena like the be-
havior of other animals must be regarded as achievements rather than
merely the result of an automatic process, spontaneous equilibration,
which is a dynamic interaction of forces operating at the level of physics
and chemistry. Polanyi emphasizes the logic of achievement (the title of
his first chapter in Part IV), and achievement is an intentional action of a
centered subject. Polanyi thinks that seeing a gestalt, and especially the
sort of gestalts we regard as living forms, involves skillful judgments
about success and failure. Against the principle of isomorphism, Polanyi

argues that perceptions and more complex understandings of living forms
are intentional manifestations of connoisseurship, acts in which largely
unspecifiable judgments about rightness are embedded. Polanyi extends
his criticisms of Kohler to discuss the logical levels involved in knowing.
His primary aim is to show that knowing living beings involves recogniz-
ing individuals as centered subjects who interpret and respond. This means
the study of biology has a three-storied logical structure, which is to say
that living things have two levels of control and cannot be satisfactorily
described in terms of physics and chemistry. To use the terminology Po-
lanyi later suggests in The Tacit Dimension, biology is critical and conviv-
ialthat is, it necessarily involves recognizing the achievements of cen-
tered actors (Polanyi 1966, 51).24 Biology merges seamlessly with ul-
trabiology (Polanyi [1958] 1964, 363, 377) in Polanyis vision of the
spectrum of human knowledge undergirded by personal commitment.
To summarize, particularly things in Part IV of Personal Knowledge
that Polanyi suggests about knowing life and the levels of control in living
beings are akin to later formulations of his ideas. Interestingly, a catalyst
for some of Polanyis discussion in The Logic of Achievement is Koh-
lers discussions of isomorphism, which Polanyi categorically rejects.
Kohlers isomorphism seems to Polanyi to be a one-level account that
explains away what Polanyi thinks is most important: the dual control in
living creatures and the person as a skillful, intentional, intelligent center
understanding of the environment.
By the time of The Tacit Dimension (1966), Polanyi has worked out
more carefully the structure of what he calls tacit knowing. By this time,
he also more incisively articulates the ways his epistemological perspec-
tive draws on and differs from ideas developed by Gestalt psychologists.
Polanyi says he has taken the structure of Gestalt and recast it into a
logic of tacit thought (Polanyi 1966, 6). He credits Gestalt with percep-
tual studies that made clear that a whole is recognized by integrating our
awareness of its particulars without being able to identify these particu-
lars (Polanyi 1966, 6). He acknowledges that his analysis of knowledge
is closely linked to this discovery of Gestalt psychology (Polanyi 1966,
6). However, Polanyi contends he has fathomed some matters that Gestalt
neglected, because it focused on the autonomous process of spontaneous
equilibration. Rather than spontaneous equilibration, Polanyi claims that
he regards the grasping of a whole as the outcome of an active shaping of
experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge (Polanyi 1966, 6). By
24
See also the discussion in Personal Knowledge, where Polanyi notes the mutual-
ity involved in knowing life (Polanyi [1958] 1964, 346).
26 Chapter One
shaping of experience, Polanyi means what he calls intentional integra-

tion (Polanyi 1966, 6) which involves dwelling in and attending from
particulars to their joint significance. Polanyi emphasizes that his ideas
extend the interests of Gestalt, moving from perception to other, higher
forms of knowing. Perception, on which Gestalt psychology centered its
attention, now appears as the most impoverished form of tacit knowing
(Polanyi 1966, 7). In The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi succinctly lays out the
from-to dynamic of knowing in terms of its functional and phenomenal
structure and its semantic and ontological aspects. (Polanyi 1966, 10-13).
Tacit integration is what living beings do as alert respondents within their
environments. The tacit integrations of human beings as bio-social crea-
tures using language are much more complex than such integrations in
other living creatures but all living forms are akin (as Plato notes, drawing
from Pythagoras, in Meno [81d]). Effectively, the theory of tacit knowing
is an account of agency, and Polanyi portrays human agency as an oppor-
tunity that superbly skilled, self-conscious individuals have to explore the
universe as members of the society for explorers engaged in discovering
meaning that transcends the finite existence of individual human beings.
In his Meaning lectures (1969), Polanyi puts his differences with
Gestalt this way: I have claimed that my theory of meaning differs from
Gestalt psychology by including the effort of achieving a solid, real coher-
ence and also the risk of going astray in our judgment of coherence.25 At
the end of his life, Polanyi seems, additionally, to emphasize that the
force of imagination is the key to the effort to recognise coherence or
to contrive it (Polanyi 2006, 93). Imagination when combined with what
Polanyi calls spontaneous integrations (Polanyi 2006, 93) or intuition is
the combination that leads to discovery. Imagination is integral to both the
discoveries of the scientist and the kinds of discoveries of meaning by
those who give themselves to the more participative integrations required
for the study of art, myth and religion. Polanyi summarizes what he takes
to be his development of Gestalt ideas by saying the original conception
of gestalt appears now to cover only the case when integration occurs
without any marked effort of the imagination. Though, even so, intuitive
integration would in general differ from a classical gestalt formation by
claiming to be meaningful and true (Polanyi 2006, 93).
From about 1940 until the end of his life, Gestalt psychology seems,
for Polanyi, to have been a source of ideas that he often wrestled with and
recast to put together his own epistemologically-oriented philosophy. I
25
Polanyi (2006, 93) Subsequent quotations from the Meaning lectures are
simply noted after the quotation, in parentheses, by page number in the Polanyiana
edition of this material.
have argued that you can to some degree chart the development of Po-
lanyis ideas by examining what he says aboutand does withGestalt
ideas, particularly the ideas of Wolfgang Kohler. Let me note, in conclu-
sion, that I find that there is a similarity between Polanyis theory of tacit
knowing and the vision of a society of explorers spelled out in Polanyis
late philosophy and the philosophical ideas developed early in his 1941
essay The Growth of Thought in Society. The early essay articulates a
vision of liberal society in which persons are engaged in pursuing tran-
scendent ideals within a variety of sub-cultural communities or dynamic
orders that seem to overlap and cooperate in order to meet societys mate-
rial needs and intellectual aspirations. This is Polanyis alternative to a
centrally planned society, an alternative in which gradual growth brings a
stable, intellectually rich civil society. This is much the same social vision
that is found in Polanyis late thought, where he calls for a society of ex-
plorers in which human beings take on the challenge of inquiring about the
universe and the nature of human responsibility. It is a challenge to dis-
cover meaning by imaginatively using human tacit powers.
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CHAPTER TWO
VARIOUS IDEAS OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE

IS THERE A BASIC ONE?
IWO ZMYLONY
Introduction
Although the Polanyian idea of tacit knowledge became widespread
both in philosophy and science, it remains both vague and tacit. Since
Polanyi had not elaborated the notion systematically, it varies notoriously
according to context and still needs to be (re)interpreted. The first objec-
tive of my paper is to describe various ideas of tacit knowledge, dividing
those that are integral to Polanyis own views from those that are external;
the second objective is to look for the basic idea related to tacit knowledge
(if there is one). An open issue remains: is tacit knowledge, indeed, know-
ledge? What sense of knowledge are we assuming? (This will be discussed
in the last part of paper.)
Description Method
I shall explain, briefly, what I mean by having an idea of something
and how one should go on to discuss it. There is no intention here to dis-
cuss the nature of putative phenomenon called tacit knowledgesince I
believe that whether tacit knowledge really exists is an empirical question,
not a philosophical (conceptual) one. The objects of my inquiry are ideas
(notions) conveyed within the category of tacit knowledge in different
contexts.
One can conceive of an idea as a sort of mental content spontane-
ously associated while hearing or reading expressions (e.g. imaginative
picture of own cat, while hearing the word cat). Such a mental state may
then be equal to someones psychologically or subjectively arrived-at
Various Ideas of Tacit KnowledgeIs There a Basic One? 31
meaning of something. Yet this is not the idea of an idea I am referring

to. By saying various ideas of tacit knowledge I am relating to the fact
that each and every expression has an inter-subjective meaning in lan-
guage, one which might be called a logical or pragmatic. It is to be
supposed that such a meaning is concealed within a text and can be identi-
fied with a set of more or less hidden statements, ones that can be de-
scribed as a result of analysis. This is the idea of an idea (or a notion of a
notion) that I have. Hence, the various ideas (or notions) that relate to
tacit knowledge which I shall talk about need to be understood as different
ways in which the term tacit knowledge (or its synonyms) is actually
usedboth in texts by Polanyi, and by his interpreters (or any other au-
thor). Since my approach is descriptive (metaphilosophical), the paper
here will be focusing on descriptions and differentiations pertaining to
such ways of usage.1
The pragmatic idea related to tacit knowledge has two important fea-
tures: (1) its content must not be indicated within the intentions of the
author, for it will be outlined by other statements he makes, i.e. by context;
(2) the content must not necessarily be expressed by use of the term tacit
knowledge, i.e. literallyit may be implied by other expressions (like
intuition; paradigm; understanding; know-how; implicit pow-
ers; intellectual passions etc.). With the first feature, an author may not
be aware himself of the notion of tacit knowledge he is actually presuppos-
ingand it is our task to come to this. Via the second one, we have to
keep in mind that in some cases we may not be able to establish the differ-
ent ideas pertaining to tacit knowledge via mere analysiswe must go
further, and interpret it. This takes on board all of Polanyis works, for his
texts are neither clear nor systematic enough to be able to inform us clear-
ly when and what is meant by tacit knowledge in any specific context.
Typical Interpretations of Polanyis Philosophy

When looking at the results of research carried out in Polish, German
and English (American) literature, one can distinguish four typical ways of
interpretation of Polanyis philosophy. Depending on the author, views are
conceived as being: (1) a philosophy of science, (2) a philosophy of know-
ledge, (3) a philosophy of mind, (4) or as a non-philosophy. From a meta-
philosophical perspective, one should assume here that all such interpreta-
1
I derive this approach from the philosophical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw
School, especially from the legacy of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (see e.g.: Woleski
1995).
32 Chapter Two
tions do not preclude but, rather, fulfill one another. What makes them
essentially different are the interpretative clues that are assumed. The
typology will make us aware of their significance, as each of them lays
down a different context for the tacit knowledge categorythat is, the idea
of tacit knowledge varies with each of them.
Let us bring up the fourth type of approach relating to Polanyis phi-
losophy, which might be called the negligent one. There are some au-
thors, ones loosely associated with Polanyis name only, who are strongly
convinced that he should not play a significant role in contemporary phi-
losophy.2 This interpretation seems to predominate amongst orthodox
academic philosophers who have an analytical bent; they argue that Po-
lanyis views are vague and unjustified, his language is notoriously am-
biguous, while his method is far from analytical (e.g. Radnitzky 1989,
471; Wimmer 1995, 284-285; quotes also Neuweg 1999, 130).
It has to be admitted that such objections are not entirely without point,
since they note just the factual characteristics had by Polanyis writings.
However, I believe one must not jump to rapid, orthodox conclusions
instead, one should see such characteristics as an interpretative challenge.
There are two heuristic clues one may proceed to cope with this.
The first is to assume that Polanyis philosophy is holistic (e.g. Neu-
weg 1999, 53, 132; also Dua 2004, 40). Such an assumption lays down a
hidden rule, which one should follow in order to understand his ideas.
According to the rule, non-coherence or vagueness of statements needs to
be systematically ignored, while their reading and interpretation occurs
within the context of an anticipated and general idea.
The second clue is compatible with this, even though it sounds a little
more orthodox. With this one, some major Polanyis statements can be
understood in abstractoas a system of propositions (in logical sense).
The clue here enables us to bypass the ambiguity of his language and to
deal with his views as a set of perennial philosophical questions (prob-
lems) and answers (statements), ones had in common with other great
historical philosophers. Thus, Polanyis philosophy is not vague any-
moreit is just vaguely expressed.
For many authors Polanyi is, first and foremost, a philosopher of sci-
ence. His name is listed mostly within a wide anti-positivist stream, being
often placed next to authors such as N. Hanson, S. Toulmin, P. Feyera-
bend, and most frequently as a direct anticipator of Kuhns idea of para-
digm and a sturdy foe for Poppers idea of objective knowledge. Such an
2
It is noteworthy that Polanyis name and ideas are omitted among editors of some
prominent lexicons of the philosophy of science (e.g. Boyd, Gasper, Trout 1991;
Honderich 1995; Audi 1999; Losee 1993; Sandkhler 1990).
interpretation predominates among the major part of Polish authors (e.g.

Misiek 1995). It was presumably brought forth by Thomas Kuhn himself,
as he mentions Polanyis name in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
pointing to an explicitly close relation between the idea of tacit knowledge
and the paradigm idea (Kuhn 1996, 191).3 Some interpreters of the type
put Polanyis views into the radical stream of the sociology of science
evennext to R. Merton, D. Bloor and B. Barnes (e.g. Breithecker-
Amend 1992, 63; Laudan 1984, 10); yet this, I believe, is misleading re-
garding Polanyis strong, anti-relativistic claims.
The principal Polanyi thesis stressed within the context of such an in-
terpretation is the one about tacit knowledge of scientific methods,
something known and transferred in a non-verbal way within the commu-
nity of scientists and which cannot be revealed other than through theirs
skilful practices (e.g. Gutting 2000, 431). The other Polanyi thesis dis-
cussed within the context of the philosophy of science is his idea of scien-
tific discovery, something conceived to overcome the so-called Menons
Paradox. The discoverer is able to discover for he has a tacit knowledge
of what is being discovered (Bagood 1999, 153-243; Nickles 1980, 273-
289).4 The main objection brought against Polanyis meta-scientific claims
is the charge of irrationality. However, this objection can only be put for-
ward by assuming a positivistic notion of rationality, which is deliberately
put into question by Polanyi as too narrow (e.g. Misiek 1995; Nickles
1980, 18).
The second typical way to interpret Polanyis philosophy is seeing it as
a philosophy of knowledge. It is an approach that one may find only with
difficulty in Polish philosophical literature, though it does seem to be
prominent via English-language sources (e.g. Delaney 1998; Jha 2002;
Dua 2004). Polanyi is seen here as a radical critic of the traditional idea of
knowledge, seen as a justified true beliefand as contestant of traditional
models of perception, these being conceived as a simple (direct) appre-
hension of facts. Such an interpretation reflects declarations that Polanyi
has often made himself, e.g. in his introduction to Personal Knowledge
I want to establish an alternative ideal of knowledge, quite generally. []
I have used the findings of Gestalt psychology as my first clues to this
conceptual reform. [] I regard knowing as an active comprehension of
the things known, an action that requires skill (Polanyi 1962, vii; also in
3
Much of a scientists success depends upon tacit knowledge, i.e., upon know-
ledge that is acquired through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly
(Kuhn 1996, 44).
4
The idea is strictly bound up with Polanyis model of mind and cognition, and
will be briefly discussed in a last part of the paper.
34 Chapter Two
Polanyi 1983, 4). Such an alternative ideal of knowledge might be labeled

tacit or post-critical, most frequently being a personal one. This
goes with an extensive set of statements Polanyi made on the nature of
knowledge, cognition and realitysome of which are outlined below.
It is easy to remark that interpreting Polanyi as a philosopher of know-
ledge does not preclude ones seeing him as philosopher of science
rather, it extends the interpretation arrived at beforehand. Such a stand-
point is taken by Richard Allen, who divides Polanyian philosophy into
two periods linked by Personal Knowledge. In the first time period, Po-
lanyi criticizes the positivistic idea of knowledge, while during the second
phase he constructs an alternative for it (Allen 1990, 15). A similar propo-
sition is put forward by Mikhael Dua, claiming Polanyis philosophy re-
mains a philosophy of science for its origin and heuristic context, while
being gradually developed into a theory of knowledge (Dua 2004, 40).
There are at least three reasons for which, in my opinion, Polanyis
philosophy of knowledge should not be treated as an autonomic episte-
mologybut, rather, should be seen as an extension of his philosophy of
science. The first reason for this is clear, for as both interpretative catego-
ries (i.e. epistemology and philosophy of science) are ambiguous and
are mutually interconnected one cannot draw a line between the disciplines
they adhere to. The second reason is that most Polanyian statements in
relation to knowledge assume a common-sense notion of knowledge and
cognition, i.e. they relate only to such a notion of knowledge as is pro-
duced via scientific practice. A third reason seems to be the most decisive
one: Polanyi remained considerably detached from contemporary discus-
sions being held on the subject of epistemology. In spite of profound
claims expounded by him on topics such as the nature and origins of
knowledge and its justification, the nature of meaning and understanding,
and the structure of perception and scientific discovery, he developed his
views almost on a desert island. Due to his ambiguous use of associated
language and a non-close acquaintance with philosophical tradition, his
views were seldom discussed nor were they more deeply analyzed. So it is
no wonder that his brilliant ideas remain one step removed from the main-
stream of contemporary academic philosophy.
The third way of interpreting Polanyis views is to conceive them as a
philosophy of mind. This route remains compatible with the two others
outlined above, yet it extends the context of interpretation into the domain
of mind and cognitive actionswhich seem to be central to Polanyis
conception of tacit knowledge. This is the path exploited by two German
authorsPeter Baumgartner and Georg-Hans Neuweg. According to
them, the whole of Polanyis philosophy can be seen as a constant struggle
to construct a model of the mind by means of which one might be able to

give an explanation for those facts with which we seem to know more
than we can tell, especially facts connected with scientific discovery, the
right guess, expert knowledge and skilful action (Baumgartner 1993, 159;
Neuweg 1999, 141).
Linguistic Analysis
An etymology of terms is not crucial to an understanding of them,
though it may prompt ones awareness of a hidden connotation they can
adopt within a language. The term tacit descends from the Latin (1)
adjective tacite, which means quiet or without the use of speech;
without express statements; (2) verb taceo, which means to remain
silent; to pass over in silence; to make no utterance; (3) participle
tacitus, which means free of speech; not expressing itself through
speech, and refers to the behaviour of people or animals, actions, feelings
and attitudes (Glare 1982, 1899-1900).
In English, tacit means: expressed or carried without words or
speech; implied or indicated, but not actually expressed (Gove 1993,
2326). The closest meaning has the term implicit, which means, in a
sequence: to infold, involve, implicate, engage; involved in the nature
or essence of something though not revealed, expressed; capable of
being derived only as an implication from behaviour. The opposite mean-
ing has the term explicit, which means characterized by full clear ex-
pression; being without vagueness or ambiguity; and clearly and fully
developed or formulated (Gove 1993, 801, 1135).
It is worth noticing that non-English-speaking authors have notable
problems if translating the category tacit knowledge while wishing to
include all of the connotations laid out above. The Germans cope with it,
using the term Implicites Wissen, which, in the main, expresses the origi-
nal meaning. However, one may also come across other translations, like
e.g. Hintergrundwissen (background knowledge); stummes Wissen (mute
knowledge); more rarely: nicht-artikularbares- (unarticulated-); still-
schweigendes- (silent-) or peripheres-wissen (perypheric-knowledge) (e.g.
Breithecker-Amend, 84). In Polish literature the situation is more compli-
cated. Since use of the term implicit knowledge is limited to empirical
approach domains (psychology and cognitive science) there is no precise
way of reintroducing the original connotation of tacit knowledge. Most
often, the category is translated by Polish equivalents of silent, quiet
or mute, or perhaps as unexpressed or inarticulated knowledge.
36 Chapter Two
The opposition between implicit and explicit was introduced into

the language of modern philosophy by J. H. Newman, who used these
categories to distinguish between two different types of reasoningverbal
and non-verbal. His claim was that one can separate the explicit descrip-
tion of reasoning from the implicit process, the latter being undertaken
within the process of explicit description. The first is formal, while the
latter is irreducibly mental; the first one has no content, while the second
contains understanding; the first is secondary in the cognitive order, whe-
reas the second is prior and constitutive as regards every act of knowing.
Implicit reasoning has an instinctive, natural and basically non-conscious
character; its function is to abstract the content from things and to inden-
tify logical relations between them. The source of implicit reasoning is an
illative sense, which is common to every knower, though it is more
particularly perceptible within the actions of a genius, who may reason as
rapidly, as not being able to track the structure of his own steps that lead
him to conclusions (Artz 1976, 262).
Now, the expression tacit knowledge may occur in different texts
from numerous, mutually non-related disciplines, bringing about wide
range of different, mutually, non-related ideas of tacit knowledge. Apart
from in philosophy, it appears in cognitive science, psychology, linguis-
tics, pedagogy, business, economics, mathematics, religious studies, cy-
bernetics, artificial intelligence, and even theater studies (Gourlay 2002, 1;
also Sternberg, Horvath 1999, 231-236). The category became widely used
particularly in the area of cognitive psychology, where it is used synony-
mously with terms like background knowledge, implicit cognition,
implicit acquisition of knowledge, implicit memory or implicit learn-
ing (e.g. Underwood 1996). In the domain of philosophy the term is to be
found first and foremost in the philosophy of knowledge, philosophy of
mind and the philosophy of science, but also in the philosophy of lan-
guage, and the philosophy of religion, ethics and aesthetics (Allen 1990,
78). What seems to be symptomatic here is that the term tacit knowledge
is used most often without the slightest reference to Polanyis name, or
sometimes even in verbal detachment (e.g.: Runco 1999, 27).
Polanyi on Tacit Knowledge

Up to now, I have sketched out various contexts in which the tacit
knowledge category gains different meanings. I believe that these are all
external in connection with Polanyis viewpoints as put forth in his
texts. Here, I will outline the contexts that seem to be internal, i.e. which
can be found in the authors main works.
Neither in Science, Faith and Society nor in Personal Knowledge does

Polanyi clarify the notion of tacit knowledge. However, in the introduction
to the first work (written in 1963) he mentions about tacit coefficient,
referring the term to (1) something, by virtue of which every explicit
statement can bear on reality; (2) something by virtue of which ex-
plicit rules can be operated; (3) a skill of scientists which enables them to
perceive those aspects of reality that are not perceivable by ordinary peo-
ple; and (4) some inherent features of scientific theory by means of which
the theory can have a bearing on experience. Polanyi stresses in the intro-
duction that the notion of tacit coefficient needs to be strictly related to
the concept of cognition and knowledge that he finally develops, yet in
Science, Faith and Society he still refers to it by the category of intuition
(Polanyi 1966, 10).
In Personal Knowledge Polanyi uses the category of tacit knowledge
only twice, both times with a different meaning. One time, he refers to an
inarticulate knowledge of the content of a text that one seems to have
while expressing, reading or hearing it (Polanyi 1962, 91-92). With a sec-
ond meaning, he relates the term to a skill shared by scientists, one which
enables them to apply, in practice, even the most misleading scientific
methods by bringing them to bear on the notion of what science really is
(p. 169). Moreover, Polanyi combines the words tacit and knowledge
once more in the book, here referring to the way we understand the whole
meaning inherent in someones speech (p. 95).5
The category of tacit knowledge is systematically introduced, for the
first time, in The Study of Man, where Polanyi defines two kinds of human
knowledge:
what is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or

maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while un-
formulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of
doing, is another form of knowledge. If we call the first kind explicit
knowledge, and the second tacit knowledge, we may say that we always
know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true. (Po-
lanyi 1972, 12-13)
5
Admittedly, Polanyi assumes in Personal Knowledge some idea of tacit knowl-
edge, yet he does remain vague and ambiguous. The idea is concealed by terms
like: intellectual passions (Polanyi 1962, 132-201); inarticulate mental powers
(p. 83); tacit intellectual powers (p. 132); tacit premises of science (p. 161);
inarticulate understanding (p. 184); tacit judgments (p. 205), etc. However,
each of these terms gains its own, occasional meaning in relation to a specific
context, which hinders us when it comes to looking for their common content.
38 Chapter Two
Thus, explicit knowledge may be expressed by verbal statements

(which seems to correspond to propositions, i.e. with a justified, true be-
liefs) while tacit knowledge may be expressed only within acts of doing,
including the act of holding verbal statements to be true (acts of holding
propositions to be true and justified). Polanyi is referring here by the cate-
gory to the skill of cognitive actions we seem to perform while asserting
the statements, i.e. to the skill of carrying out acts of belief. The function
of the skill is described in terms of making sense of and understanding
the statement that is believed in. As Polanyi claims that such an act of
believing is both tacit and has a form of activity or performance, he terms
it tacit knowing (Polanyi 1972, 21-23).6
The introduced idea of tacit knowledge as the ability to undertake cog-
nitive actions (acts of tacit knowing) presupposes a distinction between
two kinds of awareness, this being inspired by experiments on perception
carried out by Gestalt psychologists. In each act of perception we are sub-
sidiarily aware of some particulars we perceive while being focally aware
of the joint meaning they have for us. Hence, both kinds of awareness are
differentiated by their function in the act of tacit knowing. The function of
subsidiary awareness is being able to collect elements of experience in
order to portray their whole meaning, while the function of focal aware-
ness is to grasp the general context for each and every element of experi-
ence. In consequence, Polanyi distinguishes two kinds of knowledge
focal (relating to the whole) and subsidiary one (of the elements). This
distinction reflects the two kinds of knowledge we use while operating
tools or our own bodywe have subsidiary knowledge regarding what is
being used (what particulars are in our subsidiary awareness) and how to
use them (how to make sense of them); while we have focal knowledge
regarding a tool or body as a meaningful (purposeful) whole (Polanyi
1972, 29-31).
Polanyi modifies the notion of tacit knowledge in The Tacit Dimen-
sion. First of all, he ceases to use the term so frequently. The central cate-
gory employed in the book is tacit knowing, referring to a kind of skill
inherent in every act of cognitiona skill that constitutes it. Secondly, he
modifies notions of subsidiary and focal awareness, introducing categories
of distal and proximal terms of knowing. Both are taken from the language
of anatomy, giving reference to different kinds of spatial attitude in rela-
tion to the body. By this distinction Polanyi seems to imply that every kind
of knowledge has an ultimately embodied character, i.e. it exists as the
6
In this context Polanyi refers to an idea of tacit knowledge using the following
categories, too: pre-articulate level, inarticulate knowledge, inarticulate intel-
ligence, pre-verbal knowledge, and tacit powers (Polanyi 1972, 15-16).
content of the proximal term, or has a bearing on it. Such knowledge re-
mains tacit as we are not able to say anything about elements of an experi-
ence that has been indwelled in our bodythey are inexpressible (Po-
lanyi 1983, 10).
The relationship between proximal and distal terms of knowing Po-
lanyi describes in vague terms of a from-to structure, discerning four
different aspects of acts of tacit knowing(1) functional, (2) phenomenal,
(3) semantic and (4) ontological. The functional aspect of tacit knowing
refers to the function of the proximal term, which focuses our awareness
on the distal term, i.e. moving towards a joint meaning of its content. The
phenomenal aspect reflects the fact that the content of the proximal term is
perceivable only within the context of a distal one, i.e. only as a part of a
whole. The semantic aspect bears on the fact that the distal term functions
as a meaning of the indwelled elements of experience (particulars), as
content within the proximal term, where these elements signify it; and the
ontological aspect relates to a new, meaningful entity constituted by a
linking of both terms of knowingthe proximal one comprises particulars
of this entity, while the distal contains the whole of it (Polanyi 1983, 10-
13).
As I see it, there are two crucial notions constitutive to the conception
of tacit knowing, as sketched out above: the first is the idea of indwelling,
and the second is the notion of emergence. The first one was inspired by
the hermeneutics of W. Dilthey, although Polanyi provides his own, spe-
cial interpretation. The idea denotes a unique disposition of the human
body, with the spontaneous inclusion of experienced data. This inclusion
Polanyi describes in terms of incorporation, interiorization or empa-
thy. It results in the constituting of the proximal form of tacit knowing,
i.e. in a gathering up of the comprised particulars (Polanyi 1983, 17). The
second notion occurs in the context of Polanyis ontological viewsas put
forward in the second part of The Tacit Dimensionjuxtaposing the
emergence of natural levels with the appearance of problem-solving and
scientific discovery. The notion ought to be able to explain the way by
which a new ontological entity (the new meaningful whole) is constituted
in the act of tacit knowing (Polanyi 1983, 44-45).
Polanyi describes the dynamic structure of the constitution by catego-
ries of tacit inference or tacit integration; for tacit knowing in both
cases [as of perception, as of scientific discovery] does exercise its charac-
teristic powers of integration, merging the subsidiary into focal, the prox-
imal into distal (Polanyi 1969, 141). I believe that this quotation moves
towards the crux of the Polanyis idea of tacitnessthat which makes
every form of knowledge personal and tacit, being the integration that
40 Chapter Two
must be undertaken by the knower (and no one else) in the act of tacit
knowing, so that one can understand what is about to be known as mean-
ingful. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what is precisely being inte-
grated in the act. Does the knower integrate both terms of tacit knowing or
just those particulars that are indwelled into a proximal one? What exactly
appears as the emergent property of a specific act? Is it the distal term or
a new entity, one emanating out of the integration of both terms? If the
latter, as seems likely, then the nature of the distal term, in itself, remains
problematic. Where does it come from? How does it exist? Is it known
tacitly? Is it indwelled within particulars or within another tacit process?
Or maybe it originates somehow from the knower? This does require fur-
ther study.
The Puzzle of Tacit Knowledge

There are some other circumstances that make the idea of tacit knowl-
edge problematic. The issue is not only that Polanyi did not deliver a
proper definition, or that neither he nor other authors use the term consis-
tentlythe problem has within it a notable methodological aspect, too:
what sort of definition is appropriate? Is there a chance of formulating a
classic definition, or is it only possible and most appropriate to utilize an
ostensive one?
An attempt at such a definition has been undertaken by Cornelius De-
laney, who describes tacit knowledge as a form of implicit knowledge we
rely on for both learning and acting (Delaney 1998, 286). This descrip-
tion gives the idea of tacit knowledge, defined by the notion of implicit-
ness, and notes crucial role of its denotata within processes of learning and
performing actions. However, the vague relation between definiendum and
genus proximum does make it oddly circular and inapplicable. One cannot
discern using this as a basis, any case of tacit knowledge as distinct from
any other kind of knowledge.
A similar effort was made by Peter Baumgartner, according to whom
tacit knowledge is such knowledge which cannot be made explicit (ver-
balized, passed on explicitly), but it is a necessary component in our cog-
nition and understanding, which is constitutive for all forms of practical
and theoretical knowledge (Baumgartner 1993, 163). The definition
seems to deliver an adequate meaning for the defined term, yet the prob-
lem remains akin to what we have seen above. The notion of knowledge
used as genus proximum is extremely vague for it somehow modifies the
traditional notion of knowledge. If we conceive knowledge as being a
system of justified and true beliefs, attributes such as explicitness, ver-
balisability or transferability are enclosed in the notion. Furthermore, is

not clear at all what criteria of inexplicitness, unverbalisability and un-
transferability might be applicable, i.e., on what basis one might clear up
whether something that is inexplicit, unverbalisable and untransferable
goes to constitute knowledge. Hence, Baumgartners definition appears to
be circular, for it presupposes in its definiens the notion actually defined.
The vagueness inherent in tacit knowledge is acknowledged by Georg-
Hans Neuweg, who argues that the category cannot be even scientifically
discussed, as it is notoriously ambiguous and is heavily burdened with
doubtful presumptions and mystic connotations (Neuweg 1999, 12). In-
stead of making a definition, the author traces different cases of tacit
knowledge, though it is not clear whether they serve to exemplify Po-
lanyis views, or refer directly to a presupposed, empirical phenomenon
that passes as tacit knowledge.
According to Neuweg, the term is being related to a set of statements
(listed below) on the nature of unconscious processes controlling our be-
haviour (Unbewute Verhaltensterung). Such an idea of tacit knowledge
might be expressed, firstly, by the category of tacit knowing, and connotes
actions commonly called intuitive or which are identified as cases of
practical knowledge. The second idea of tacit knowledge here relates to
the existence of implicit memory (implizites Gedchtnis), which contains
all past experiences. Those experiences may not be conscious, yet they
affect someones behaviour; a third idea refers to knowledge of the rules
one has to follow while performing actions. The existence of such knowl-
edge explains ones ability to resort to the same action within different
circumstances. A fourth notion points to the existence of a knowledge
indicating how one performs an action that cannot be expressed by any
other way but via the action itself (nichtberichtbares Wissen); a fifth asso-
ciates the preposition with the basically non-formalizable nature of the
human mind and cognitive actions. The sixth idea of tacit knowledge
strictly relates to the notion of expert knowledge and presupposes the
thesis in relation to the key role of personal experience, authority and
practice in every learning process (implizites Lernen) (see: Neuweg 1999,
12-19).
Typical Notions of Tacit Knowledge

I shall return to methodological concerns and queries at the end of my
next point. Yet on the basis of the hitherto outlined contexts, we may al-
ready be able to figure out some typical ideas of tacit knowledge, dividing
them into external and internal ones. By external I mean ideas developed
42 Chapter Two
outside Polanyis philosophy or referring to his views with a general label,

while internal would stand for ideas used and exploited by Polanyi him-
self; by figuring out I mean interpretationand types of notions de-
scribed below are a result of synthesis rather than analysis. The signifi-
cance of the distinction has a pragmatic importance since awareness of the
ambiguity should help to avoid risky confusions caused by the fact that the
category as a whole does carry within it different meanings.
Into external ideas of tacit knowledge one needs to include various
meanings attributed to the category (1) on the grounds of natural language,
and (2) on the grounds of different non-philosophical disciplines (e.g.
business, econometrics, artificial intelligence, theatre studies), which in-
cludes (3) the meaning set within the context of cognitive science, i.e. as
assumed with an empirical approach. These ideas of tacit knowledge are
not essential for an understanding of Polanyis philosophy since they have
little, or sometimes even nothing to do with the author. One has to keep
them in mind, otherwise one might be misled by language (i.e. by non-
variability of the term within different contexts).
Further contexts relating to external ideas of tacit knowledge are
marked out by different interpretations of Polanyis philosophy, since the
category is frequently used as a general label for (4) a set of Polanyis
statements on the nature of science; (5) a set of his statements on the na-
ture of knowledge; (6) a set of his statements on the nature of mind and
cognitive actions; or (7) a set of suspicious and ambiguous claims on the
non-rational origins of cognition and knowledge.
Those who regard Polanyi as a non-philosopher avoid using the cate-
gory of tacit knowledge, as such persons believe that everything meant to
be knowledge needs to be explicit, i.e. easy to express without either va-
gueness or ambiguity. In this context, the idea of tacit knowledge either is
meant self-contradictory, or implies a refutation of the positivistic idea of
rationality and refers to (allegedly) irrational cognitive strivings.
In the context of the philosophy of science, the idea of tacit knowledge
connotes first and foremost a set of anti-positivistic statements on the
existence of such scientific activities, ones which are essentially passionate
and non-formal; it additionally connotes the existence of inarticulate skills
of applying methods to scientific practice, apparent especially in acts of
mutual control and logical gap-crossing; also, the existence of common
non-verbal, quasi-aesthetical and emotional criteria of scientific values;
and then there is the nature of relations between master and apprentice. It
is quite evident that such an idea of tacit knowledge is very similar to
Kuhns notion of the paradigm. This notion was also anticipated by C. S.
Peirce via the idea of the community of inquirers, as is inherent e.g. in J.
Habermass notion of communicative action or H-G. Gadamers ideas of

prejudices, tradition and authority.
Within the context of the philosophy of knowledge, the idea of tacit
knowledge connotes a set of anti-positivistic claims concerning the nature
of cognition and knowledge, including primarily an allegation regarding
the existence of knowledge that cannot be expressed in any other way but
action; the existence of knowledge acquired only via practice; the struc-
tural unity between knowledge and skill; the groundlessness of the demar-
cation between practical and theoretical knowledge; the ultimately embod-
ied character of every form of knowledge; and, finally, the existence of an
irreducibly personal component in every act of knowingalong with the
cognitive character of emotions. Such a notion of tacit knowledge, al-
though expelled from the world of analytical philosophy, seems to endure
within B. Russells idea of knowledge by acquaintance or within G.
Ryles idea of knowing how. Its locus naturalis appears to be the notion
of a hermeneutic circle, as developed via the tradition laid down by M.
Heidegger and H-G. Gadamer.
In the context of the philosophy of mind, the idea of tacit knowledge
can be related to a distinction being made between subsidiary and focal
kinds of awareness, which is vaguely interlaced with a distinction showing
itself between the proximal and distal terms of knowing. The idea implies,
firstly, allegations relating to the existence of a specific structure of mind
comprising these two kinds of awareness andequal with thistwo types
of knowledge being bound up with them. It also presupposes the existence
of pre-cognitive and bodily access to reality, the existence of interpretative
frameworks affecting ones cognition, an idea of the dynamic structure of
cognition as rooted in acts of spontaneous indwelling, and the skilful inte-
gration of experienced data. Such an idea of tacit knowledge refers to a
conception of hermeneutical experience as initiated by W. Dilthey (Ein-
verlebung) and M. Heidegger (Verstndnis) as well as to H. Bergsons
idea of intuition. In addition, it appears to have been presupposed in C. S.
Peirces notion of the signs triad and also within the tradition of the
phenomenology of the body as developed by M. Merleau-Ponty.
Apart from these typical, external ideas of tacit knowledge, one can al-
so bring forth internal onesthose that crop up within Polanyis own
texts. The author uses the term connecting with this as follows: (1) the
skill of acquiring and making use of natural language as well as the lan-
guage of theories (scientific, moral or religious); (2) the skill of putting
formal (explicit) patterns and formulae into practice (including methods
related to scientific proceedings); (3) the skill of making sense of experi-
ence (in acts of perception; in discovering, learning or understanding); (4)
44 Chapter Two
the skill of acquiring and mastering practical and theoretical skills; (5) the
skill of apprehending the whole meaning of a phrase, including its whole
context; (6) the skill of posing the right question(s) and then pursuing the
right answer(s); (7) the skill of applying statements and prepositions to
reality; (8) the type of knowledge we seem to have about the part of reality
we are intending (the reference); (9) a kind of inarticulated knowledge
hinted at by the phenomenon of intuition (the right guess, expert knowl-
edge); (10) a kind of procedural knowledge one appears to use while per-
forming some action (practical or theoretical); (11) a set of self-evident
convictions one assumes while asserting, on their basis, that other state-
ments are true; (12) and a set of possible (pragmatic or logical) conse-
quences arrived at in connection with a statement that we assert to be true.
The Basic Idea of Tacit Knowledge

The aphorism on tacit knowledge says that we know more than we can
tellso what was left to investigate was (1) whether there is any basic
internal notion of tacit knowledge and (2) what idea of knowledge are we
presuming within, i.e. what idea of knowledge can we use as genus proxi-
mum in order to define the tacit form.
I think that the answer to the first question is no. There is no basic no-
tion of tacit knowledge coming from Polanyi, as there are two of them
both strapped within the context of the model of mind developed within
The Tacit Dimension. The first basic idea of tacit knowledge has in it a
proximal term contentwhat is known tacitly in the first sense of the term
are particulars indwelled in the knowers body; while the second basic
idea of tacit knowledge refers to the skill of integrating these particulars
what is known tacitly in the second sense of the term is a knowledge of
how to integrate them, i.e. how to perform acts of tacit knowing or any
other skill-based performance. As I believe, any other idea seen above can
be in a way reduced to these ones.
A perfect phenomenon serving to exemplify both ideas of tacit knowl-
edge is the act of perceiving an object (e.g. Polanyi 1983, 7; Polanyi 1969,
138). Within such an act, the knower indwells particularsthat is, data of
experienceinto a proximal term of awareness, and then integrates them.
Once the data is indwelled, there is then a tacit knowledge in the first
sense of the term, i.e. tacit knowledge of what one is about to see. The
knower will subsequently begin to perceive the object as soon as they
apply their tacit knowledge of the second kind, i.e. a knowledge of how to
integrate those indwelled particulars. The integration is performed within
the act of tacit knowing; so that skilful integration is a matter of expert

knowledge or mastery.
Another example of tacit knowledge, in both basic senses of the term,
is the act of problem-solving. As Polanyi stressed, the structure of the
action is the same as within acts of perception, fulfilling the model of tacit
knowing (Polanyi 1983, 29; Polanyi 1969, 107). What makes it different is
passionate experience of a problem and ones striving to solve it. When
applying the ideas of tacit knowledge outlined above, we can assume that
the problem is being experienced as a kind of frustration once particulars
are indwelled in the proximal termand it is solved once the knower finds
out a way of integrating them. Tacit knowledge of the first kind is knowl-
edge of the problem, whereas tacit knowledge of the second kind is know-
ledge of the correct ways to solve it. A similar process is carried out in acts
of scientific discovery and in acts of learning, conceived as comprehension
of completely new knowledge. The discovery is tacitly known, as the
knower makes guesses regarding the meaningful coherence of spontane-
ously indwelled particularswhile it comes to fruition when the discov-
erer grasps the right way for their integration. It is worth noting here that
from a personal perspective there is no difference between learning and
discoveringthe issue is raised only within the context of objective know-
ledge agreed upon by the community of explorers.
The first problem connected to both ideas of tacit knowledge is one as-
sociated with the vague status of the particulars. What are they actually?
What is their ontological or epistemic status? Are they merely physiologi-
cal, or could they have a mental or some other kind of status? What makes
them informative? Polanyi seems to understand the particulars first of all
as mere data relating to empirical experience. However, further studies are
worth making to see whether one may interpret them as e.g. convictions,
prejudices, memories or as subconscious drives.
The second puzzle raised in this context is a problem connecting with
the vagueness of the notion of emergence involved in the idea of tacit
knowing. Does it really explain the nature of logical-gap-crossing between
embodied particulars and the meaningful whole? Does it really explain the
nature or genesis of meaning? What knowledge about the essential causes
of meaning do we gain within the notion, apart from being solely able to
point to a correlation between some property called emergent and an-
other termed boundary conditions (or similar)? Is the relation of emer-
gence causal or quasi-causal? What makes it different from superven-
ience? Since there is no place to study the notion of emergence any fur-
ther, I would just like here to mark out its suspicious nature. Its being
suspicious bears on the fact that we cannot ever preclude any hidden or
46 Chapter Two
overlooked causes relating to the emergent state. In consequence, the no-

tion is able to smuggle in weighty agnostic presumptions into the very idea
of cognition and knowledge.
I would like to look into the third problem connected with idea of tacit
knowledge a bit more deeplywhat makes tacit knowledge a knowledge?
What sense of knowledge are we talking about? What kind of knowledge
is divisible into tacit and explicit parts? These questions are valid, for it is
clear that we are not taking on board the traditional idea of knowledge
when defining it. As has already been brought up in the paper, tacit know-
ledge cannot be justified as true belief as there seems to be no belief in
existence that might be justified.
The very same query is made by Thomas Kuhn in Postscript to The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As he says, conceiving tacit knowledge
as a kind of knowledge is justified due to its four attributes. First of all,
tacit knowledge is transferrable, i.e. it can be taught. A skilful psychiatrist
or a piano player cannot articulate his or her knowledge by any words, yet
he/she can pass it over to his or her pupils via demonstrating it in practice.
Secondly, tacit knowledge is repeatedly applicable, i.e. it can be used time
after time, in different circumstances. A psychiatrist is able to diagnose the
same case of epilepsy existing in different patients; a piano player is
skilled in performing the same complex passage on various instruments.
The third feature that makes the tacit coefficient a form of knowledge is
testability. Each time a psychiatrist performs an act of tacit knowing, diag-
nosing a case of epilepsy, he/she gives testimony to his/ her entire knowl-
edge when it comes to diagnosing epilepsy; while each time piano a player
gives a concert, he or she is giving testimony to his/her knowledge as
regards how to play. With regard to applicability and testability, Kuhn
links the fourth feature of tacit knowledge: modifiability. Each false diag-
nosis of a psychiatrist extends the content of his/her experience; and each
successive performance of a piano player masters his/her skills (Kuhn
1996, 196).
According to Kuhn, all characteristics of tacit knowledge (as de-
scribed) are properties of every possible form of knowledge, including its
tacit and explicit types. What makes tacit knowledge specific is the lack of
direct accessibility herethe fifth element, which all other cases of non-
tacit knowledge are supposed to fulfill.
Kuhns remarks bring us back to the methodological puzzle seen while
trying to define the idea of tacit knowledge. For in such a case we have to
presuppose a general idea of knowledgegenus proximum, in the defini-
tion. In other words, while claiming the existence of tacit knowledge, we
seem to be assuming the existence of a knowledge that is divisible into
tacit and explicit kinds. So what kind of knowledge are we actually pre-
supposing?
I have not solved this problem as yetbut I do expect to find the an-
swer in juxtaposing the two rival ideas of knowledge being discussed in
modern epistemology, namely externalistic and internalistic ones. Roughly
speaking, epistemic internalists claim that a true belief is knowledge if,
and only if the subject (believer) has direct introspective access to its justi-
fication. Epistemic externalists, however, reject such claim as being too
restrictive, pointing also to other ways of justificationones not accessi-
ble within introspection; or they seek out other characteristics that make
justified true beliefs knowledge (Alston 1998, 821-826).
It seems obvious that Polanyi is not delimiting the presupposed general
idea of knowledge to the internalistic form. Though inaccessibile, tacit
knowledge is some kind of knowledge, one that does not require introspec-
tive awareness of what is known to have it justified. Yet two issues remain
problematic here: (1) what is supposed to be regarded as its justification
and (2) what is the bearer of tacit knowledge, i.e. what shall be precisely
justified. After all, it is not only justification that may be inaccessible with
regard to tacit knowledgefor within the idea Polanyi modifies chiefly
the notion of belief, extending its terms of reference from deep hunches
and plain acts of faith to embodied dispositions towards behaviour. Then,
the presupposed, general idea embracing all cases of tacit and explicit
knowledge must have been able to link up justified and true beliefs with
unjustified beliefs on one handup to emotional states and behavioral
dispositions on the other. One then has to admit that such a general notion
of knowledge does not seem to be any less ambiguous or vague as a cate-
gory of tacit knowledge, i.e. which we are struggling to define.
I will have to leave this point open. The only conclusion that one can
offer at the moment is as follows: tacit knowledge seems to be conceivable
as knowledge only if we assume an externalistic notion of knowledge
combined with a behavioral idea of belief. The assumption does not ex-
haust the content of a general idea of knowledgeneither does it make it
clear enough. However, I do believe that it provides a promising direction
for further research. Certainly, the notion we are looking for is one that is
already held in common by all the different ideas related to tacit knowl-
edgeone just has to make it more explicit.
48 Chapter Two
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Press.
Wimmer, R. (1995) Polanyi, Michael. In J. Mittelstra (ed.)
Enzyklopdie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie. Stuttgart: Metzler
Verlag, 284-285.
Woleski, J. (1995) The Heritage of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Amsterdam:
Rodopi.
CHAPTER THREE
BEING-IN-THE-WORLD
IN A POLANYIAN PERSPECTIVE1
YU ZHENHUA
1. Introduction
In his preface to the Torchbook Edition of Personal Knowledge, Mi-
chael Polanyi claims that:
All understanding is based upon our dwelling in the particulars of that

which we comprehend. Such indwelling is a participation of ours in the ex-
istence of that which we comprehend; it is Heideggers being-in-the-world.
Indwelling is being-in-the-world. Every act of tacit knowing shifts our ex-

istence, re-directing, contracting our participation in the world. Existential-
ism and phenomenology have studied such processes under other names.
We must re-interpret such observations now in terms of the more concrete
structure of tacit knowing. (Polanyi 1964, x-xi)
By claiming that indwelling is Heideggers being-in-the-world, Po-

lanyi is putting his finger on the connection between his theory of tacit
knowing and the phenomenological tradition.2 This is a suggestive claim
and is rich in philosophical implications.
Since Polanyi coined the term tacit knowing/knowledge in his Per-
sonal Knowledge (1958), nearly half a century has passed. Admittedly, the
1
This research is supported by the Shanghai Key Subject Program B401 and the
Feng Qi Foundation of ECNU.
2
The other two points at which Polanyis theory of tacit knowing intersects the
phenomenological tradition are intentionality and embodiment, which I have
discussed elsewhere (Cf. Yu 2008).
Being-in-the-world in a Polanyian Perspective 51
theory of tacit knowing is Polanyis most original contribution to philoso-

phy. However, in my view, the theory of tacit knowing is not a finished
doctrine; rather, it is an open, ongoing discussion of the problem of human
knowledge. The conceptual potential of the notion of tacit knowing has not
been fully explored. For a further development of the theory of tacit know-
ing, I believe, it will be fruitful to draw on insights from other philosophi-
cal traditions.
In this paper, I will follow the direction pointed out by Michael Polanyi
and attempt to create a dialogue between the Polanyian tradition and the
phenomenological tradition. My goal is to dig up the epistemological po-
tentials of Heideggers notion of being-in-the-world on the one hand, and
to explore what the phenomenological approach can contribute to the
theory of tacit knowing on the other.3
It is import to note that, when I talk about the phenomenological tradi-
tion, I have in mind not only the classic authors like Husserl, Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, etc., but also contemporary thinkers like Charles Taylor
and Hubert Dreyfus. In the English-speaking world, Charles Taylor and
Hubert Dreyfus have accomplished a great deal in tackling issues in epis-
temology and cognitive science in a phenomenological approach. Their
work intersects the theory of tacit knowing in many ways. As will be
shown later in the text, in exploring the epistemological implications of
the notion of being-in-the-world, I am inspired by their ideas.
2. Existential Knowing How

An important feature of traditional epistemology is that it is preoccu-
pied with knowing that and overlooks knowing how. Gilbert Ryle
points out that, although we are all clear about the distinction between
knowing how and knowing that in our daily life, traditional episte-
mology either ignores knowing how, or tries to reduce knowing how
to knowing that. Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction
which is quite familiar to all of us between knowing that something is the
case and knowing how to do things. In their theories of knowledge they
concentrate on the discovery of truths or facts, and they either ignore the
discovery of ways and methods of doing things or else they try to reduce it
to the discovery of facts (Ryle 1946, 4).
3
It is worth noting that there are important differences between Polanyis in-
dwelling and Heideggers being-in-the-world, as is brilliantly brought out by
Margitay (Cf. Margitay 2010, forthcoming), but this does not prevent us from
seeking inspirations from Heideggers notion of being-in-the-world for a further
development of the theory of tacit knowing.
52 Chapter Three
The situation changed a great deal when Ryle elaborated on this dis-
tinction in 1940s. In his presidential address to the Aristotelian Society in
1946 which was titled Knowing how and knowing that, Ryle argued
openly for the legitimacy and the autonomy of knowing how as an impor-
tant form of knowledge. The theme was explored in a more systematic
manner later in his The Concept of Mind (1949). According to Ryle, while
knowing that can be articulated in various kinds of propositions, knowing
how is non-propositional. It is a kind of knowledge in action, or knowl-
edge in practice. Polanyi, in 1950s, pressed this line of though forward,
and came up with his famous distinction between tacit knowledge and
explicit knowledge. [H]uman knowledge is of two kinds. What is usually
described as knowledge, as set out in written words or maps, or mathe-
matical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while unformulated
knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is
another form of knowledge (Polanyi 1959, 12). The first kind of knowl-
edge is called explicit knowledge, the second tacit knowledge. In a world
where the ideal of wholly explicit knowledge prevails, knowledge is nor-
mally understood as something articulated by verbal means. However,
tacit knowledge does not take verbal forms, it is a type of knowledge that
we have when we are in the act of doing something. It is a kind of action-
inherent knowledge or action-constitutive knowledge. Polanyis distinc-
tion between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge can be seen as a
further development of the Rylian distinction between knowing how and
knowing that.
I would try to take a look at Heidegger from this perspective. Some of
his insights will help us to have a better understanding of this line of
thought. As a matter of fact, in the 1920s, Heidegger approached the
knowing-how type of knowledge in his own way.
Practical behaviour is not atheoretical in the sense of sightlessness.

The way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact
that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one
acts [gehandelt wird], and that action must employ theoretical cognition if
it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is
just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight. (Heideg-
ger 1962, 99)4
Different from the traditional understanding of the dichotomy of theory

and practice which takes the distinction between theory and practice as
4
All the quotations of Heideggers Being and Time in this paper are from John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinsons translation.
equal to the distinction between observation and action, and which holds
that action will be blind if it does not get the guidance from theoretical
cognition, Heidegger claims that practice is not sightless. Action has its
own sight, and its own kind of knowledge.
The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be ex-

hibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-
the-world, which we also call our dealings in the world and with entities
within-the-world. Such dealings have already dispersed themselves into
manifold ways of concern. The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as
we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of
concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; and this has its
own kind of knowledge (Erkenntnis). (Heidegger 1962, 95)
The sight or the kind of knowledge that our daily being-in-the-world, our
dealing with entities encountered in the world has, is characterized by
Heidegger as circumspection (Umsicht):
[W]hen we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this ac-
tivity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight by which our manipula-
tion is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character.
Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assign-
ments of the in-order-to. And the sight with which they thus accommo-
date themselves is circumspection. (Heidegger 1962, 98)
In the perspective of the theory of tacit knowing, circumspection, that is,

the sight and knowledge that our daily coping has, can be viewed as a kind
of action-inherent knowledge or action-constitutive knowledge, namely, a
kind of knowing how.
The circumspection that guides our daily dealings with things in the
world is related to understanding, which, according to Heidegger, is essen-
tially a kind of knowing how.5 Roughly speaking, the distinction between
knowing how and knowing that in English corresponds to the distinc-
tion between knnen and wissen in German.
When we are talking about ontically we sometimes use the expression un-
derstanding something with the signification of being able to manage
something(einer Sache vorstehen knnen), being a match for it(ihr ge-
wachsen sein), being competent to do something (etwas knnen). (Hei-
degger 1962, 183)
5
Hubert Dreyfus makes it clear in his commentary on Being and Time that for
Heidegger understanding is know-how. I am inspired by Dreyfus to interpret Hei-
deggers understanding as existential knowing how. (Cf. Dreyfus 1991, 184-5)
54 Chapter Three
In Being and Time, understanding, as a fundamental existentiale, is con-

ceived as a basic mode of Daseins Being. In understanding, as an exis-
tentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a what, but
Being as existing (das Sein als Existentiren). (Heidegger 1962, 183). As a
basic mode of Daseins Being, understanding as knowing how is not con-
fined to any specific kind of knowing how, such as knowing how to ham-
mer or knowing how to ride a bicycle. Rather, it should be taken in more
general terms. It refers to Daseins knowing how to be, knowing how to
exist. I suggest that we call it existential knowing how. In this sense Hei-
degger characterizes the being of Dasein as Seinknnen. I feel that the
expression Seinknnen is extremely profound. It brings up knowing
know at the ontological level and thus provides an ontological foundation
for the theory of tacit knowing in a unique way.6
In this connection, it might be helpful to take a look at different ways
of translating Seinknnen. From the perspective of the theory of tacit
knowing, I am in favor of Hubert Dreyfus translation, namely, ability-to-
be. Dreyfus says: Seinknnen. The standard translation, potentiality-for-
being, is both awkward and misleading, since knnen signifies a know-
how, not just a potentiality. We use ability-to-be (Dreyfus 1991, x).7 The
standard translation that Dreyfus talks about here is John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinsons English translation of Being and Time. I have noticed
that Joan Stambauh also translates it as the potentiality of being. By the
way, it is interesting to note that the Chinese translation of Seinknnenis
similar to Dreyfus rendition (Heidegger 1987).
3. The Transparency of the Ready-To-Hand

In the perspective of the theory of tacit knowing, Polanyi surpasses
Ryle in that he uncovers the dynamic structure of tacit knowing with his
theory of two kinds of awareness: focal awareness and subsidiary aware-
ness. In my view, Heidegger, in his analysis of the readiness-to-hand (Zu-
handenheit) of equipment (Zeug), touches upon something very similar.
In this section, I will follow closely a line of thought shared by Hei-
degger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein and Polanyi. In order to bring out the
inner connection between them, I suggest that we look carefully into some
extracts from their writings. The extracts will be put in a chronological
order as follows.
6
Micheal Polanyi develops the ontology of stratified reality to undergird his theory
of tacit knowing.
7
Here we refers to Hubert Dreyfus, John Haugeland and William Blattner.
In his discussion of the readiness-to-hand of equipment, Heidegger

points out:
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-

to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite au-
thentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not
the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern our-
selves is the workthat which is to be produced at the time. (Heidegger
1962, 99)
The famous example that he uses to illustrate this point is hammering:
[T]he less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold
of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and
the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it isas equipment.
(Heidegger 1962, 98)
It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty took notice of the same phe-

nomenon in his discussion of habit in Phenomenology of Perception
(1946). This time, the example is a blind mans stick.
The blind mans stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending
the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight.
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 143)
The stick example was once again mentioned in Wittgensteins Philoso-

phical Investigations (1953):
When I touch this object with a stick I have the sensation of touching in
the tip of the stick, not in the hand that holds it. But what difference
does it make if I say that I feel the hardness of the object in the tip of the
stick or in my hand? Does what I say mean It is as if I had nerve-endings
in the tip of the stick? In what sense is it like that?Well, I am at any rate
inclined to say I feel the hardness etc. in the tip of the stick. What goes
with this is that when I touch the object I look not at my hand but at the tip
of the stick; that I describe what I feel by saying I feel something hard and
round therenot I feel a pressure against the tips of my thumb, middle
finger and index finger. If, for example, someone asks me What are
you now feeling in the fingers that hold the probe? I might reply: I dont
knowI feel something hard and rough over there. (Wittgenstein 1958,
626)
In retrospect, it seems that this recurring theme calls for a better clari-
56 Chapter Three
fication. Polanyi accomplished it in his Personal Knowledge in 1958. With

his theory of two kinds of awareness,8 he provides us with a beautiful
exposition of both the hammer example and the stick example. Lets take a
look at the hammer example first:
When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and ham-
mer, but in a different way. The difference may be stated by saying that
the latter are not, like the nail, objects of our attention, but instruments of
it. They are not watched in themselves; we watch something else while
keeping intensely aware of them. I have a subsidiary awareness of the feel-
ings in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal awareness of
my driving in the nail.
About the stick example, Polanyi says:
We can think of the hammer replaced by a probe, used for exploring the in-
terior of a hidden cavity. Think how a blind man feels his way by the use of
a stick, which involves transposing the shocks transmitted to his hand and
muscles holding the stick into an awareness of the things touched by the
point of stick. (Polanyi 1958, 55-6) (italics original)
In the hammer example, the focus of our attention is on the nail, thus we
have a focal awareness of the nail, meanwhile we are also aware of our
hand and the feelings in our palm, but in a different way, namely, we have
a subsidiary awareness of them. In the stick or probe example, our aware-
ness of the hand holding the stick is subsidiary, and our awareness of the
things touched by the stick is focal. According to Polanyi, the act of know-
ing involved in hammering the nail has a structure similar to that in using
a stick. It can be briefly described as the following: by integrating the
subsidiary awareness of the particulars we get to know focally the com-
prehensive entity. Polanyi latter claimed that this is the basic structure of
tacit knowing.
In his Being-in-the-World (1991), Hubert Dreyfus also mentions in
passing this recurring theme in Heidegger, Merleau Ponty, Wittgenstein
and Polanyi (Dreyfus 1991, 65). While his interest there is primarily a
commentary of Heideggers text of Being and Time, I am here more con-
cerned about reinterpreting the observations made in other philosophical
traditions in the perspective of the theory of tacit knowing, a task advo-
8
According to Marjorie Grenes recollections, Polanyi thinks highly of his theory
of two kinds of awareness. He once remarked: The most original matter in the
book [i.e., Personal Knowledge] is the distinction between focal and subsidiary
awareness (Cf. Grene 1977, 168).
cated by Polanyi. Further, it seems to me that Dreyfus does not pay enough
attention to the difference Polanyi points out between the hammer example
and the stick example. Given the similar structure of the example of ham-
mering a nail and the example of using a stick, Polanyi nevertheless holds
that the kind of knowing in the hammer example is more practically ori-
ented, while the kind of knowing in the stick example is more intellectu-
ally oriented. In Personal Knowledge, after a discussion of the hammer
example and the stick example in terms of two kinds of awareness, Po-
lanyi claims, We have here the transition from knowing how to know-
ing what and can see how closely similar is the structure of the two (Po-
lanyi 1958, 56). Also, in Tacit Dimension, Polanyi says:
We have here examples of knowing, both of a more intellectual and more

practical kind; both the wissen and knnen of the Germans, or the
knowing what and knowing how of Gilbert Ryle. These two aspects of
knowing have a similar structure and neither is ever present without the
other. This is particularly clear in the art of diagnosing, which intimately
combines skillful testing with expert observation. (Polanyi 1983, 6-7)
These claims of Polanyi are a mixture of insights and blind spots. I

suspect that Polanyis understanding of Ryles famous distinction of two
kinds of knowing is not very accurate. Firstly, linguistically, Ryles distinc-
tion reads as knowing how and knowing that, not knowing how and
knowing what. Secondly, Ryles knowing that corresponds to proposi-
tional knowledge, or explicit knowledge, in contrast, Polanyis discussion
of hammer example and the stick example points to two kinds of tacit
knowing, the former is more practically oriented and the latter more intel-
lectually oriented. Thus when Polanyi refers to Ryles distinction, and the
distinction between knnenand wissen in his discussion of the two
examples, he actually confuses two categorical types. Notwithstanding this
unfortunate shortcoming, Polanyi displays his philosophical sensitivity in
distinguishing these two examples. The two examples suggest two differ-
ent kinds of tacit knowing; one is more connected to action, while the
other is more linked to observation. They correspond respectively to what
Harald Grimen, a Norwegian Wittgensteinian, calls the tacit knowledge of
the identity of a gestalt and the tacit knowledge of the choreography of an
action (Grimen 2005, 75-6), of which the more developed forms are re-
spectively skill and connoisseurship.
With Polanyis theory of two kinds of awareness, we will have a better
understanding of Heideggers discussion of the readiness-to-hand of
equipment (for instance, in Heideggers case, the hammer). In the act of
using an equipment to produce something, the focus of our attention is not
58 Chapter Three
the equipment, but the work to be produced. Thus Heidegger claims that
the ready-to-hand is not only not grasped theoretically, but also not the
theme of circumspection. The less we stare at the hammer and simply use
it, the more unveiled is what it is as equipment. To put it in another way, in
order to function as equipment, it has to withdraw in order to be ready-to-
hand quite authentically. The tendency to withdraw of equipment in our
act of producing something is characterized by Hubert Dreyfus as the
transparency of equipment (Dreyfus 1991, 64). We can, using Polanyis
terminology, paraphrase Heideggers phenomenological description of the
withdrawal of equipment in production as follows: our awareness of the
equipment is subsidiary; it is a clue to the work to be produced, of which
we have a focal awareness.
All these elements are covered in Charles Guignons interpretation of
Heideggers being-in-the-world. The following quotation may serve as a
nice summary of what we have thus far discussed:
Ordinary practical activities can be carried out only if what we are in-
volved with is, in a sense, transparent. We see through the equipment to the
work that is to be the outcome of the activity. For this reason, Heidegger
calls the mode of sight in everydayness knowing ones way around
(Umsicht) in contrast to the mere seeing of contemplative attitude. This
know-how is a generally tacit feel for the equipment at hand rather than
an explicit knowing-that. The tools we deal with are encountered as in
themselves in the concern which makes use of them without noticing them
explicitly. (Guignon 1983, 100) (italics original)
4. The Undermining of Representationalism

The term tacit knowing is theoretically fertile and has multiple con-
ceptual dimensions. One of its goals is to challenge the entrenched repre-
sentational conception of knowledge. Harald Grimen points out that the
concept of tacit knowledge alerts our theoretical sensitivity towards the
fact that there are important types of knowledge which are not representa-
tional (Grimen 2005, 98-9). Dale Canon, an American Polanyian, argues
that Polanyis tacit knowing is essentially a kind of first hand, direct rap-
port with reality, that is to say, it should be understood as knowing by
acquaintance in contrast to knowing by representation (Cannon 2002-
2003). In this section, I would argue that, Heideggers analysis of being-
in-the-world might help the theory of tacit knowing strengthen and shar-
pen its criticism of the representational construal of knowledge.
Representationalism has been viewed as one of the most important fea-
tures of modern epistemology. According to modern epistemology, Rorty
reports, To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to

understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the
way in which the mind is able to construct such representations. Philoso-
phys central concern is to be a general theory of representation (Rorty
1979). Representationalism takes mind as a mirror of nature, and Rorty
holds that we owe the invention of mind particularly to Descartes. The
origin of representationalism can be traced back to the ocular metaphor in
ancient Greek philosophy. In ancient Greece, the essence of knowledge
was taken as looking at something: by means of the eye of the body, we
have knowledge of the particulars; by means of the Eye of the Mind, we
gain knowledge of the universals. The representational construal of know-
ledge has been the basic presupposition of the mainstream Western epis-
temological tradition since modern times, the linguistic turn in the 20th
century did not change the situation very much. Rorty argues that analytic
philosophy is only one more variant of modern epistemology. The differ-
ence between analytic philosophy and modern epistemology lies in the fact
that the former thinks of representation mainly as linguistic while the latter
psychological. In a word, according to Rortys account, the representa-
tional understanding of knowledge has a deep root in the entire history of
Western philosophy.
An important feature of the representational construal of knowledge is
the disengagement of subject and object. With representationalism, as
Charles Taylor points out, we have the picture of the subject as ideally
disengaged, that is, as free and rational to the extent that he has fully dis-
tinguished himself from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity
is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies outside him in these
worlds (Taylor 1995, 7). The conception of the disengaged subject origi-
nates in Descartes dualism and continues in contemporary philosophy and
social theories. Taylor further characterizes various kinds of representa-
tionalism as mediational epistemologies. The representational construal
of knowledge is mediational to the effect that it understands knowledge on
the presupposition of the dualism of subject and object, the inner (mind)
and the outer (external world), and takes representation as something to
mediate the gap between them. In whatever form, mediational theories
posit something that can be defined as inner, as our contribution to know-
ing, and that can be distinguished from what is out there. Hence these
theories can also be called Inside/Outside accounts I/O for short (Tay-
lor 2003, 162).
Disengagement, which is characteristic of the modern epistemological
tradition, represents a distortion of the existence of human beings and
leaves many important things about the problem of human knowledge in
60 Chapter Three
the dark. To mention the most obvious, the Cartesian skepticism about the
existence of the external world seems to be an unavoidable consequence if
one subscribes to the disengaged picture of modern epistemology. Taylor
claims that Heideggers celebrated analysis of being-in-the-world puts
paid to the conception of disengagement of modern epistemology.
According to Heidegger, being-in-the-world, as an existentiale, is not
to be understood as a spatial in-one-other-ness of things present-at-hand,
one entity called Dasein and the other called world, also not as the
relationship between the disengaged subject and object. Rather, it indicates
Daseins involvement in the world, or Daseins being absorbed in the
world. Heidegger explains:
In is derived from innanto reside, habitare, to dwell. An signi-

fies I am accustomed, I am familiar with, I look after something. It
has the signification of colo in the sense of habito and diligo. The en-
tity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have
characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am [bin]. The ex-
pression bin is connected with bei, and so ich bin [I am] means in its
turn I reside or dwell alongside the world, as that which is familiar to
me in such and such a way. Being[Sein], as the infinitive of ich bin (that
is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies to reside
alongside, to be familiar with (Heidegger 1962, 80)
Heideggers elucidation of Being-in gives a strong support to Polanyis

claim Indwelling is being-in-the-world which I quote at the very begin-
ning of this paper. We have seen that tacit knowing displays a dynamic
structure by attending from the subsidiaries to the focal object. According
to Polanyi, to have subsidiary awareness of something is to dwell in it.
Thus, tacit knowing is essentially a kind of knowing by indwelling (Po-
lanyi 1983, 15-8). The claim Indwelling is being-in-the-world insight-
fully reveals the deep connection between Polanyis theory of tacit know-
ing and Heideggers phenomenology.9
Daseins being-in-the-world, according to Heidegger, is essentially
concern (Besorgen). Heideggers analysis of being-in-the-world is carried
out within the horizon of everydayness. As mentioned above, he calls our
everyday being-in-the-world dealings (Umgang) in the world, or dealings
9
It is insightful for Polanyi to identify the connection between his theory of tacit
knowing and Heideggers phenomenology by claiming Indwelling is being-in-
the-world. But it seems to me that Polanyi is not quite aware of a big difference
between himself and Heidegger, namely, while his thesis of knowing by indwell-
ing implies a dimension of embodiment, Daseins being-in-the-world, according
to Heidegger, in not essentially embodied. (Cf. Yu 2008)
with entities within-the-world. He holds that the kind of dealing which is

closest to us is the kind of concern which manipulates things and puts
them into use. Heidegger offers us a detailed phenomenological descrip-
tion of such dealings. One of the most important messages that Heidegger
wants to get across with his phenomenological description of our everyday
being-in-the-world is that, in such dealings, Dasein and World are interde-
pendent and thus inseparable.
Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the
possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with
involvement (ready-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus
make themselves known as they are in themselves [in seinem An-sich].
Dasein as such is always something of this sort; along with its Being, a
context of the ready-to-hand is already essentially discovered: Dasein, in
so far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a world which it en-
counters, and this submission belongs essentially to its Being. (Heidegger
1962, 120-1) (italics original)
On the one hand, the entities encountered in a world are discovered on the
condition of the being of Dasein. On the other hand, Dasein is always in
submission to a world. Worldhood is an essential characteristic of Dasein
itself. It is Daseins existentiale. Thus, what we see in everyday being-in-
the-world is the union of Dasein and world.
The thesis of the inseparability of Dasein and world in the structure of
being-in-the-world has the great potential to undermine the representa-
tional, mediational conception of knowledge. Charles Taylor makes much
out of Heideggers analysis of being-in-the-world in his effort to overcome
the modern epistemological enterprise. Avoiding the abstruse, technical
terms of Heidegger, Taylor speaks in a clear and plain way:
If we stare at the medium of explicit belief, then the separation can seem
plausible. My beliefs about the moon can be held, even actualized in my
present thinking, even if the moon isnt now visible; perhaps even though it
doesnt exist, if it turns out to be a fiction. But the grasp of things involved
in my ability to move around and manipulate objects cant be divided up
like that, because, unlike moon beliefs, this ability cant be actualized in
the absence of the objects it operates on. My ability to throw baseballs
cant be actualized in the absence of the baseballs. My ability to get around
this city and this house is demonstrated only in getting around this city and
this house. (Taylor 2003, 163)
What is essential to the representational, mediational construal of knowl-

edge is the way in which it understands our grasp of the world as some-
62 Chapter Three
thing that is separable from what it is a grasp of. This might be true for
explicit beliefs, but it simply does not hold for the kind of grasp involved
in our dealings with objects within the world. Taylors distinction between
explicit belief and the grasp involved in our dealings with things in the
world is parallel to Polanyis distinction between explicit knowledge and
tacit knowing. If we paraphrase Taylors insight in Polanyis terminology,
what Charles Taylor is pointing at in the above quotation, reveals an im-
portant dimension in the distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit
knowing. For explicit knowledge, talking about the separation of knowl-
edge and its object is to some extent plausible. However, when it comes to
tacit knowing that is involved in our everyday dealings, such separation
does not apply. In our dealings like moving around and manipulating
things, we are engaged with entities which are ready to hand. The problem
of the disengagement of the subject and the object will not arise. The in-
ner/outer account of knowledge and various mediational epistemologies
are completely irrelevant here, because the ability to move around and
manipulate things can only be realized and demonstrated in the direct
interaction with those objects.
In summary, we might claim that while explicit knowledge is represen-
tational, tacit knowing is non-representational; while explicit knowledge
accommodates disengagement, tacit knowing implies the engagement of
the knower with the known. The modern epistemological enterprise char-
acterized by the representational construal of knowledge is blind to the
non-representational type of knowledge. The recognition of non-
representational knowledge by the theory of tacit knowing undermines the
disengaged picture of modern epistemology. In this respect, the theory of
tacit knowing can learn a great deal from Heideggers analysis of being-in-
the-world.
5. The Derivation of the Disengagement from Engagement

The overcoming of the disengaged picture of modern epistemology
does not come to a halt with the recognition of non-representational know-
ledge. It is pressed further by the argument that the disengaged representa-
tions are based upon the engaged dealings in our daily life.
The theory of tacit knowing is not confined to arguing for the existence
of tacit knowledge. It has a much stronger claim that, in order to have an
adequate account of human knowledge, we must recognize the primacy of
the tacit over the explicit. Ryle claims that knowledge-how is a concept
logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that (Ryle 1946, 4-5). Polanyi
further points out: While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself,
explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly understood and applied.

Hence all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge (Polanyi
1969). Heidegger is in line with these thinkers in this regard. He claims,
Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon Being-in-the-world (Hei-
degger 1962, 90). He gives us a far more detailed phenomenological de-
scription of how our explicit knowledge of what is present-at-hand is de-
rived from the kind of knowing which is involved in our concernful deal-
ings with what is ready-to-hand. In this way, Heidegger further displays
the potential of his analysis of being-in-the-world in undermining the
disengaged picture of modern epistemology.
Heidegger claims:
Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is

concerned. If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature
of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must be a deficiency in
our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern holds back
from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into
what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying
alongside. This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us en-
counter entities within-the-world purely in the way they look (eidos), just
that; on the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explic-
itly at what we encounter is possible. (Heidegger 1962, 88-9)
According to Heidegger, the phenomenon of knowing the world in the

sense of looking at what is present-at-hand is grounded in Daseins con-
cernful dealings with entities that are ready to hand. Only when certain
deficiency occurs in our concernful dealings in the world, that is to say,
when such dealings break down, does theoretical, propositional knowledge
of the world become possible. Heidegger mentions three kinds of break-
down in our absorbed dealings in the world, namely, conspicuousness
(Aufflligkeit), obtrusiveness (Aufdringlichkeit) and obstinacy (Aufss-
sigkeit). The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all
have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-
hand in what is ready-to-hand (Heidegger 1962, 104).
With the three modes of breakdown, Heidegger concretizes the thesis
that the disengagement of subject and object is derived from the primor-
dial engagement of Dasein with entities in the world. However, according
to Hubert Dreyfus, Heidegger does not distinguish clearly the different
roles played by conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy in the proc-
ess of derivation. Dreyfus reorders the three modes and interprets them as
increasingly serious disturbances in which a conscious subject with self-
referential mental states directed towards determinate objects with proper-
64 Chapter Three
ties gradually emerges (Dreyfus 1991, 71). In my view, Dreyfus provides

us here a brilliant interpretation and a further development of Heideggers
thesis. The following is a recapitulation of Heidegger-Dreyfus careful and
sophisticated phenomenological description of the genesis, or the deriva-
tion of the disengagement of subject and object from the absorbed con-
cernful dealings of Dasein with entities in the world.
The genesis or the derivation process of disengagement from engage-
ment consists of three steps.
The first step is conspicuousness. Heidegger says:
When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are most
closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly
adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be dam-
aged, or the material unsuitable. When its unusability is thus discovered,
equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-
to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. (Heidegger 1962,
102) (italics original)
Dreyfus calls conspicuousness the malfunction of equipment. Normally

we have ready ways of coping with malfunction and can quickly resume
our transparent circumspective behaviour.
The second step is obstinacy. According to Heidegger, in our deal-
ings with the world, the un-ready-to-hand can be encountered as some-
thing which stands in the way of our concern.
That to which our concern refuses to turn, that for which it has no time, is
something un-ready-to-hand in the manner of what does not belong here,
of what has not as yet been attended to. Anything which is un-ready-to-
hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of
that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we
do anything else. (Heidegger 1962, 103)
Dreyfus calls obstinacy the temporary breakdown of absorbed dealing in

the world. When temporary breakdown happens, we experience the shift
from absorbed coping to deliberate coping, in which we act deliberately,
paying attention to what we are doing, and even further to deliberation, in
which we stop and consider what is going on and plan what to do. Dreyfus
probes into this situation and holds that:
Just as temporary breakdown reveals something like what the tradition has
thought of as a subject, it also reveals something like what the tradition
has thought of as an object, and just as the subject revealed is not the
isolable, self-sufficient mind the tradition assumed, but is involved in the
world, so the object revealed is not an isolable, self-sufficient, substance,

but is defined by its failure to be available. (Dreyfus 1991, 76)
Lets look at subject pole first. When temporary breakdown of equip-

ment happens, mental representations such as beliefs and desires arise on
the unavailable (un-ready-to-hand) level, but Dreyfus emphasizes, follow-
ing Heidegger, that they cannot be understood as self-sufficient mental
content. Deliberation is not pure detached theoretical reflection. It must
take place in the context of involved activity. Deliberative activity re-
mains dependent upon Daseins involvement in a transparent background
of coping skills (Dreyfus 1991, 75). What about the object pole? When
equipment temporarily breaks down, its situational characteristics such as
being too heavy for this job are revealed. They are not properties of
isolable, self-sufficient substance. Dreyfus calls these situational charac-
teristics aspects, to distinguish them from the decontextualized features,
which Heidegger, following the tradition, calls the properties of self-
sufficient substance. In a word, in temporary breakdown of equipment,
[s]uch equipment still does not veil itself in the guise of mere Things
(Heidegger 1962, 104).
The third step is obtrusiveness.
In our concernful dealings, however, we not only come up against unusable

things within what is ready-to-hand already: we also find things which are
missingwhich not only are not handy but are not to hand at all. Again,
to miss something in this way amounts to coming across something un-
ready-to-hand. When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that which is
ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. (Heidegger 1962, 103)
(italics original)
Dreyfus calls obtrusiveness total breakdown. When this happens, we un-

dergo a transition from involved deliberation to theoretical reflection. The
theoretical attitude is possible, only when absorbed, ongoing activity is
interrupted. By means of thematizing, theory makes the intraworldly enti-
ties that we encounter become mere objects. They reveal themselves as
something just present-at-hand and no more. The situational characteristics
are decontextualized from the context of everyday practices and the result
is that we are confronted with isolated properties. A further step in theo-
retical reflection is that the isolated properties are recontextualized in
scientific projection. They are combined and related by scientific laws.
However, theoretical reflection is not the end of the derivation of dis-
engagement from engagement. Dreyfus is keen to observe the subtle dis-
tinction that Heidegger draws between theoretical reflection and pure
66 Chapter Three
contemplation. Dreyfus points out:
Although he is detached from the everyday practical context, the scientist

is interested in his work and dwells in the disciplinary matrix that forms
the basis of his skillful observing and theorizing. Another possible stance
in the absence of involved activity, however, is pure, disinterested contem-
plation. (Dreyfus 1991, 83)
Corresponding to the distinction between theoretical reflection and pure

contemplation is the distinction between wonder and curiosity. While
wonder is something that motivates theoretical reflection, curiosity is pure
staring at things. It is this pure beholding that constitutes the basis of tradi-
tional Western ontology, according to which, mind is conceived as an
isolated, self-contained subject confronting an isolated, self-contained
object. We have seen that it is this disengagement of subject and object
that underlies the representational understanding of knowledge of modern
epistemology.
In conclusion, the representationalism of modern epistemology is not
only narrow but also superficial. It displays its narrowness when it fails to
recognize the non-representational type of knowledge; it betrays its super-
ficiality when it fails to see the primordiality of our engaged dealings in
the world. Heidegger and Dreyfus, with a detailed and sophisticated phe-
nomenological description of the derivation of the explicit, disengaged
knowledge from our engaged coping with the world, convincingly demon-
strate the priority of engagement to disengagement. I believe, by incorpo-
rating these insights, the theory of tacit knowing will work out a more
powerful argument for the thesis of the primacy of the tacit dimension.
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Philosophy Today 52:2.
CHAPTER FOUR
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME?

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND HERMENEUTICS
CHRIS MULHERIN
Why Gadamer and Polanyi?

It is an interesting accident of history that in the space of a couple of
years in the mid 20th century, two of the most significant critiques of the
Enlightenment dream of certain knowledge and detached objectivity were
published. Michael Polanyis Personal Knowledge was published in 1958
and Hans-Georg Gadamers Truth and Method in 1960. Yet, apparently,
neither author was notably influenced by the other.
This is not the place to justify the choice of these two authors as pro-
foundly significant figures. In hermeneutic circles the choice of Gadamer
can pass without justification: he is recognised as the towering figure of
20th century philosophical hermeneutics. Building on the work of Heideg-
ger, among others, he produced a manifesto on understanding in the hu-
man sciences that remains the ground of hermeneutic theory today.
Meanwhile, in the philosophy of science Polanyi does not command the
same overriding respectalthough I believe he should do so. This paper
explores parallels between Polanyis personal knowledge and Gadamers
hermeneutics, and is based on my conviction that they are saying similar
things, albeit in different languages.
While protesting against objectivism and the notion that knowledge or
understanding are the outcome of a detached objective method, both Po-
lanyi and Gadamer also rejected subjectivist and relativist implications of
their work. For present purposes I am taking objectivism to describe the
view which holds that epistemic outcomes are, at least ideally, independ-
ent of the knower. They are not constitutedthey are simply uncovered.
And in so far as these outcomes are tainted by human agency, objectivism
A Rose by Any Other Name? Personal Knowledge and Hermeneutics 69
holds this to be an unfortunate muddying of the waters, which should be

kept to a minimum. Subjectivism on the other hand, I take as that view that
sees this human clutter as inevitable and overwhelming, to the point that
while the truth may be out there it is unknowable across the gap between
knowing subject and the external object of knowledge.
Both of these extremes accept a Cartesian model of knowledge but
with, respectively, optimistic or pessimistic attitudes about its possible
success. What makes Polanyi and Gadamer alike and radical is not that
they simply reject the two extremes of this spectrumrather, they reject
the entire paradigm of knowledge implied in such descriptions. Both offer
another paradigm of human knowing that sees the subjective and objective
not as competing poles, but as mutually reinforcing characteristics of
knowledge; and, they hold, without such a perspective there can be no
knowledge. In Polanyian terms, natural science and hermeneutics both
result in personal knowledge consisting of truth claims made with univer-
sal intent. That is, their claims are humanly constituted but are also held
with a conviction that maintains they are not just true for me but in some
sense are universally true, for all people.
The work of both authors was also universal in another way. Gada-
mers hermeneutics, focusing on the human sciences, was an analysis of
the universal problem of human understanding; and while Polanyi focused
initially on knowledge of the natural sciences he soon found himself work-
ing towards a universal epistemology, or, in his own words, an alternative
ideal of knowledge, quite generally (1958, vii).
The Search: A Coming to Truth

Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism
As I have already hinted, the first thing that unites these thinkers is the
nature of their pursuit. Both Gadamer and Polanyi are anti-objectivist
believers in the truth. In their respective fields, both are driven to justify
their conviction that it is possible to talk of truth without falling into the
Enlightenment trap that binds truth to certainty and detached objectivity.
In the sense that both reject the possibility of an Archimedean standpoint
which is unmediated by tradition and unaffected by personal beliefs, they
are anti-objectivist. But both stand against relativism and extreme subjec-
tivism by holding that, while certainty is a chimera, we nevertheless can
talk of truth and make universal truth claims.
In line with the hermeneutic tradition, Gadamers is a search for under-
standing, though the title of his magnum opus makes it clear that it is truth
or true understanding that he seeks. While he is against objectivist inter-
70 Chapter Four
pretations, he would also not be satisfied with a merely subjectivist inter-

preter-response approach to art or texts or history. He believes that texts
can validly claim to be saying something true. In criticising a historicist
reading of a text, for example, Gadamer says, The text that is understood
historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying something true.
But, he says, when we read such a text in this way, we have given up
the claim to find in the past any truth that is valid and intelligible for our-
selves (1989, 303; italics mine).
Meanwhile, Polanyi is keen to use the word knowledge, but he does so
in the radically qualified sense of personal knowledge, defined most ex-
pansively in his magnum opus of that title. For Polanyi, personal knowl-
edge is knowledge that claims to have made contact with reality: a reality
which, being real, may yet reveal itself to future eyes in an indefinite range
of unexpected manifestations (1967, 24).
So, scientific discovery in Polanyis terms or coming to understanding
in Gadamers terms, is to arrive at truth. However, such knowledge cannot
be adequately theorised using a model that separates a knowing and im-
personal subject from the object of knowledge, and which imagines that
there are methodical guarantees of success. In summary then, for both
authors truth is to be had, though not by accepting the Enlightenment pa-
radigm.
A Significant Difference:
The Differing Objects of Investigation
Before moving on to other similarities between Gadamers and Po-
lanyis approaches to their respective objects of investigation, it is appro-
priate to comment on the obvious difference between these authors. Po-
lanyi, once one of the worlds leading physical chemists, is principally
interested in the knowledge that comes from the natural sciences, the ob-
ject of which is the material world, its functioning and its laws. In particu-
lar, Polanyi is interested in the process of scientific discovery. Gadamers
project, on the other hand, is about human understanding, the object of
which ranges from history and texts to art and music.
My own interest in these authors was sparked because while the ob-
jects of their work are distinct, I believe that their approach is similar. In
fact, I think they are describing remarkably comparable processes that lead
to knowledge of both sorts of objects. To put it another way, I am talking
of the grounds or justification for their knowledge claimsand not about
the fruits of such claims. Im concerned with the means of coming to
know, despite the different nature of the objects known.
The Nature of Knowledge:

Personal Knowledge with Universal Intent
While they use different language, there is a marked correspondence in
the way Gadamer and Polanyi describe what we might cautiously call the
epistemic products of hermeneutics and of the natural sciences, respec-
tively. We have already seen that both authors recognise the two poles of
interpreter and meaning, but they reject the inadequate descriptions im-
plied by either subjectivism or objectivism. Gadamers hermeneutics aims
at true understanding while the outcome of the epistemic search for Po-
lanyi is personal knowledge.
For Gadamer, true understanding is neither subjective nor objective;
nor can it ever be final. It is not merely subjective because it is in some
sense true. Meanings cannot be understood in an arbitrary way he says.
And he talks of the danger of failing to hear what the other person is
really saying or of ignoring as consistently and stubbornly as possible
the actual meaning of the text The important thing, he says, is to be
aware of ones own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its other-
ness and thus assert its own truth against ones own fore-meanings1
(1989, 268-9).
Now listen to Polanyi, who, although he uses the term objective,
does so in a strictly limited sense. He says:
Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a

responsible act claiming universal validity. Such knowing is indeed objec-
tive in the sense of establishing contact with a hidden reality; It seems
reasonable to describe this fusion of the personal and the objective as Per-
sonal Knowledge. By trying to say something that is true about a reality
believed to be existing independently of our knowing it, all assertions of
fact necessarily carry universal intent. Our claim to speak of reality serves
thus as the external anchoring of our commitment in making a factual
statement.2 (1958, vii-viii, 311)
For both authors, knowledge is not certainit is provisional, both in

the sense that it is always in the making and also in the sense that the in-
terpreter might simply be wrong. Whether we are referring to Newton and
Einstein or Romeo and Juliet, some interpretations are simply better than
others. Yet convictionnot certaintyis the appropriate description of
1
My italics.
2
Polanyis italics.
72 Chapter Four
beliefs that are no longer seen to lie on a spectrum between certainty and
uncertainty.
The Limits of Method and the Attitude

of Intellectual Humility
While neither Gadamer nor Polanyi are against method, they both ela-
borate their theories in conscious opposition to an Enlightenment confi-
dence in method as a guarantee of truth. They recognise the inevitably
partial nature of human exploration of truth, and both display humility that
challenges nave Enlightenment optimism and mastery, which in its posi-
tivist extremes claims that all that cannot be mastered is meaningless.
Polanyi highlights the impossibility of formalising the rules of scien-
tific discovery, and emphasises the personal agency, commitment and
creativity of the scientist. He says, for example:
Desisting henceforth from the vain pursuit of a formalized scientific

method, commitment accepts in its place the person of the scientist as the
agent responsible for conducting and accrediting scientific discoveries. The
scientists procedure is of course methodical. But his methods are but the
maxims of an art which he applies in his own original way to the problem
of his own choice. (1958, 311)
And, for his part, while Gadamer is happy to talk loosely of procedure
( a procedure that we in fact exercise whenever we understand any-
thing. 1989, 267) and of methodologically conscious understanding
(1989, 269), like Polanyi he is firmly against trusting in method to lead to
truth. Gadamer refers to the task of hermeneutics in the following terms:
Ultimately, it has always been known that the possibilities of rational proof
and instruction do not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge. We
must laboriously make our way back into this tradition by first showing the
difficulties that result from the application of the modern concept of
method to the human sciences. Let us therefore consider how this tradition
became so impoverished and how the human sciences claim to know
something true came to be measured by a standard foreign to itnamely
the methodical thinking of modern science (1989, 23-4).
The Question: How Do We Arrive at Truth?

Arising from the inability of method to guarantee truth, is the similar
concern of both thinkers: Both dedicate themselves to the task of articulat-
ing a description of the actual practice of human understanding or knowl-

edge production. They do so by focusing on an explication of that which is
neither certain nor final knowledge. And both see themselves as attempt-
ing an escape from what Gadamer calls the entanglement in traditional
epistemology (1989, 276).
Polanyi says that the implications of his analysis go far beyond the
domain of science, as he aims to establish [his] alternative ideal of
knowledge, quite generally (1958, vii). For him, the purpose of his work
is to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I
believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false
(1958, 214) and to enter avenues of legitimate access to reality from
which objectivism debars us (1958, 292).
For Gadamer, the project is predicated on the fact that all thinking is
done in the context of mostly unconscious prejudices or prejudgments. If
such prejudgments are an essential part of the understanding process, and
if the hope of objectivity or final knowledge are in fact blind alleys, then
what he calls the fundamental epistemological question (1989, 277)
concerns the legitimacy of prejudgments.
Yet this cryptic reference to prejudgments needs explanationand it
leads to the heart of the issue.
Unarticulated Starting Points:

Tradition, Authority and Prejudice
I have explained that both Polanyi and Gadamer reject the possibility
of an Archimedean vantage point from which to observe the world unfet-
tered by prejudice or presuppositions. The Cartesian dream of finding
certainty by casting aside all dubitable presuppositions has been thor-
oughly debunked in the last century, and for those who accept this model
of knowledge the end point is often some form of subjectivism or relativ-
ism. But it is writers such as Gadamer and Polanyi, in their respective
fields, who by working within a totally distinct paradigm, justify holding
on to the baby of truth as they throw out the bath water of Cartesian ra-
tionalism.
So where does their genius lie? Both of these authors highlight not on-
ly the inevitability but also the necessity of all thinking being entrenched
in history and tradition, and depending on authority and prejudgments.
Instead of entering the regressive cycle of fighting the phantoms of pre-
critical belief, they recognise and embrace them as allies to be co-opted in
the search for truth.
74 Chapter Four
For Gadamer, the search for understanding is couched in terms of the

ubiquitous nature of our prejudgments or prejudices (the word is the same
in German). According to Gadamer, the prejudice against prejudice was
the downfall of Enlightenment epistemology, and, in contrast, hermeneu-
tics is based on the doctrine that prejudgments are an essential precondi-
tion to understanding. In an oft-quoted passage he says:
Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-

examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family,
society, and state in which we live. The self-awareness of the individual
is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why the
prejudgments of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the
historical reality of his being. (1989, 276-77)3
Out of this awareness arises what Gadamer calls the fundamental episte-
mological question for hermeneutics, alluded to earlier. The question is,
according to Gadamer: What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from the
countless others, which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to over-
come? (1989, 277)
Polanyi, too, is in no doubt about the naivet of a program of Cartesian
doubt that aims to eliminate preconceived opinions (1958, 295). He says:
While we can reduce the sum of our conscious acceptances to varying de-
grees, and even to nil, by reducing ourselves to a state of stupor, any given
range of awareness seems to involve a correspondingly extensive set of a-
critically accepted beliefs. (1958, 296-7)
While Gadamers discussion is in terms of the role of prejudice and of

tradition, the conceptual link with Polanyi becomes clearer when Gadamer
talks of the sort of authority that can be a valid source of truth. He says:
authority cannot actually be bestowed but is earned It rests on ac-

knowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own
limitations, trusts to the better insight of others. The prejudgments that
[the teacher, the superior, the expert] implant are legitimized by the person
who presents them. But in this way they become prejudgments not just in
favor of a person but a content, since they effect the same disposition to be-
lieve something that can be brought about in other wayse.g. by good rea-
sons. (1989, 279-80)
3
Italics are Gadamers. In this quotation and in various places I have changed the
translators prejudice to prejudgment which equally represents the original
German Vorurteil.
Now listen to Polanyi talking about authority and tradition in science:
the knowledge comprised by science is not known to any single person.

Indeed, nobody knows more than a tiny fragment of science well enough to
judge its validity and value at first hand. For the rest he has to rely on
views accepted at second hand on the authority of a community of people
accredited as scientists. (1958, 163)
Not only does all thinking arise in the context of prejudgments or tradi-
tion and the acceptance of authoritiesall shared interpretation or discus-
sion is, in addition, history in the making. For Gadamer, this is the dou-
ble-edged sword of what he calls Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewutsein,
normally translated as historically effected consciousness. This is the dou-
ble awareness that recognises, on one hand, that our very thinking is his-
torically effected and, on the other hand, that our actual interpretations
inevitably contribute to form part of that history itself (1989, 299-301).
Polanyi also recognises something similar, when in the context of a
discussion of authority, he says that when we submit to authority or even
react against the prevailing consensus we also modify the balance of that
consensus (1958, 208-9).
Commitment, Responsibility and Fiduciary Assent

One implication of the necessity to work from prejudgments or acriti-
cally accepted beliefs is the commitment implied in holding such beliefs.
Both Gadamer and Polanyi highlight the personal involvement and com-
mitment of the knower or interpreter in the act of interpreting the world or
the data before them.
Polanyi talks of the fiduciary rootedness of all rationality (1958,
297) and says that the attribution of truth to any particular, stable [view of
the universe] is a fiduciary act which cannot be analysed in non-committal
terms (1958, 294). For him, the act of knowing includes an appraisal;
and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges
in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity (1958,
17).
So Polanyi speaks of the scientist as one who has decided what to be-
lieve, yet not arbitrarily, because:
he arrived at his conclusions by the utmost exercise of responsibility. He

has reached responsible beliefs, born of necessity, and not changeable at
will. To accept commitment as the only relation in which we can be-
76 Chapter Four
lieve something to be true is to abandon all efforts to find strict criteria of

truth and strict procedures for arriving at the truth. A result obtained by ap-
plying strict rules mechanically, without committing anyone personally,
can mean nothing to anybody. (1958, 311)
And in a paragraph that could almost have been lifted from a tome on
hermeneutics, Polanyi says:
into every act of knowing there enters a tacit and passionate contribu-
tion of the person knowing what is being known, and this coefficient is
no mere imperfection, but a necessary component of all knowledge. (1958,
312)
In my reading of Gadamer so far, while there is a paucity of explicit

reference to commitment, the element of personal involvement and com-
mitment in interpretation is obvious, and it seems that Polanyis view is
consonant with and possibly implied by Gadamers hermeneutics. One
explicit comment of Gadamers is to be found at the start of Truth and
Method, where he makes reference to the scientific integrity of ac-
knowledging the commitment involved in all understanding (1989,
xxviii).
Tacit Knowledge
We have seen that, for Gadamer, understanding is entrenched in and
presupposes a host of unexamined assumptions or beliefs. We ride a bicy-
cle or read Dostoevsky without a self-conscious attempt to make our pre-
suppositions explicit. The object of our understanding is tacitly intelligible
to us, and understanding is precisely this tacit ability to make sense of the
world. For Gadamer, it is not something mastered by method or rules but
is acquired in practice as we listen and trust that others are doing the same.
Those who know Polanyi will have noticed my deliberate use of the
word tacit to describe Gadamers hermeneutics. Much of Polanyis work
is based on his discussion of tacit knowledge summed up in his catch
phrase, we know more than we can tell. Polanyi goes to great lengths to
show that such knowledge is ubiquitous and has radical implications for
epistemology. He says:
..suppose that tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge,

then the ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in
effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge. The ideal of exact science
would turn out to be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source of

devastating fallacies. (1967, 20; my italics)
Let me comment briefly on two more examples of the role of tacit

knowledge found in both authors. The first is the tacit anticipation of a
meaning that has not yet been understood but that leads to further investi-
gation; the second is that of the circle or widening spiral of meaning dri-
ven by this anticipation, which is the more common sense of the term
hermeneutic circle.
Recognising Meaning:
The Anticipation of As Yet Undiscovered Truth
Both Polanyi and Gadamer highlight how understanding or discovery
is prefaced and driven by a tacit intimation and conviction of an asyet
undiscovered truth. Polanyi highlights this in the context of anticipating a
solution to a problem when he says:
to see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an inti-

mation of the coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars. The
problem is good if this intimation is true; it is original if no one else can
see the possibilities of the comprehension that we are anticipating. (1967,
21-22)
And elsewhere, describing the personal conviction involved, he says:
The enquiring scientists intimations of a hidden reality are personal. They

are his own beliefs, whichowing to his originalityas yet he alone
holds. Yet they are not a subjective state of mind, but convictions held with
universal intent, and heavy with arduous projects. (1958, 311)
Meanwhile Gadamer talks of this anticipated comprehension which gov-

erns our understanding of a text (1989, 293), in the following terms:
The anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes ac-

tual understanding when the parts that are determined by the whole them-
selves also determine this whole. The fore-conception of completeness
that guides all our understanding is, then, always determined by the spe-
cific content. Not only does the reader assume an immanent unity of mean-
ing, but his understanding is likewise guided by the constant transcendent
expectations of meaning that proceed from the relation to the truth of what
is being said. (1989, 291, 294)
78 Chapter Four
The Hermeneutic Circle

This anticipation of meaning leads to one sense of the hermeneutic cir-
cle where meaning is produced in the interplay between the interpreter and
that which is interpreted. Again, in the context of textual interpretation
Gadamer says:
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He pro-

jects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning
emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is
reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning.
Working out appropriate projections, anticipatory in nature, to be con-
firmed by the things themselves, is the constant task of understanding.
(1989, 267)
While I cannot recall that Polanyi talks explicitly about such a circle, a
parallel to be pursued can be found in his discussion of focal and subsidi-
ary awareness and the need to focus on the whole while indwelling the
particulars in order to arrive at meaning.
For Further Exploration

Let me finish with some brief clues about avenues for further explora-
tion of the relationship between these thinkers.
We could examine the relationship between Gadamers concept of the
two horizons and Polanyis outline of the role of the proximal and distal
poles of the knowing relationship. The following quotation is from
Gadamer, but it could almost as well have been written by Polanyi.
Gadamer says: To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond
what is close at handnot in order to look away from it but to see it bet-
ter, within a larger whole and in truer proportion (1989, 305).
We could also explore the way both authors understand the role of lan-
guage as a type or model for both Gadamers understanding and Polanyis
personal knowledge. Language is language when it is absorbed into
making what is said visible, and has itself disappeared, as it were
(Gadamer, 1976,126).
We could also examine what we might call the tests for knowledge in
both cases. If methodical proofs are not possible in either the human or
natural sciences, then it is characteristics such as abundant outcomes, and
the way truth has of revealing still more unexpected possibilities, that
come into play. And what of taste as a test for truth: the taste of the artist,
the connoisseur, or the experienced scientist, a factor that once again relies
on tacit judgement to label one thing true or meaningful and another as

spurious? To quote Gadamer again, The harmony of all the details with
the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve
this harmony means that understanding has failed (1989, 291).
Finally, it would be productive to return to something I alluded to at
the beginning of this paper and tease out the various senses in which both
Polanyi and Gadamer make universal claims for their work.
However, all of this will have to wait ...
Conclusion
So where have we come to in this very brief comparison? My hope is
that I have been able to convince you of a remarkable confluence of ideas
between these two descriptions of what are generally accepted as two
separate realms of human endeavour. If I am right, then, when following
the trajectory of both Gadamerian and Polanyian thinking, one can argue
that there is no divide between the way we arrive at knowledge in the
natural sciences and the way we come to understanding in the human
sciences; and, in Polanyian phraseology, the product of both is personal
knowledge held with universal intent.
Bibliography
Gadamer, H.-G. (1976) Philosophical Hermeneutics. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
. (1989) Truth and Method. New York: Crossroad.
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Phi-
losophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
. (1967) The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
CHAPTER FIVE
TEACHING TO FORM CHARACTER:

A POLANYIAN ANALYSIS OF PRACTICAL
REASONING1
PAUL LEWIS
1. On Exploiting Insights from Personal Knowledge

for Ethics
Since the 1970s, some philosophical and theological ethicists have
criticized the discipline for placing too much emphasis on making deci-
sions in a crisis situation while ignoring the character of the person making
the decision. These thinkers have argued that the first task of ethics is that
of forming character, since who one is shapes what one decides and does.
This shift to an ethic of character, while a valuable corrective to earlier
trends in the discipline has, however, made little progress in determining
how good character can be formed, a deficiency with which I, as a teacher
of ethics, am concerned. As a way of starting this inquiry into ways of
teaching that might form character, I take my bearings from Aristotles
claim that skillfulness in practical reasoning represents the epitome of
good character. If he is correct, then promoting skill in practical reasoning
should be at least one way in which one can teach so as to form character.
My suspicion has long been that the work of Michael Polanyi can con-
tribute to this task, although few have connected his ideas to ethics, even
1
This paper is a reorganized, expanded, and otherwise revised version of an article
published in The Political Science Reviewer XXXVII (2008, 122-138). I am grate-
ful to the editors of that journal and the publisher of this book for allowing this
paper to appear here.
Teaching to Form Character 81
fifty years after the publication of Personal Knowledge.2 This situation is

something of a surprise for several reasons. The first is that Polanyi's ac-
count of personal knowledge is motivated by an intensely moral concern,
one wrapped up in his notion of moral inversion.3 The second is that Po-
lanyi's epistemology promises to help resolve an ongoing conflict in ethics
between moral dogmatists and emotivists, one that results in the percep-
tion that moral debates are necessarily interminable and immune to rea-
soned resolution.4 To the extent that this debate mirrors the deficiencies of
positivism that Polanyi addresses there would seem to be good reason to
appropriate his work to address this problem in ethics. Yet another reason
that ethicists should pay attention to Polanyi is that if he is correct in argu-
ing that all human knowing is personal in nature, then moral knowing will
necessarily share its features (Polanyi and Prosch 1975, 64-5). Unfortu-
nately, Polanyi himself never develops this point in any detail, instead
making comments that only hint that knowing in religion, art, and politics
share these same features. He seems content to leave to others the task of
sorting out the implications of his theory for moral knowing.5
So it is at this point that I want to appropriate Polanyis insights about
personal or tacit knowledge.6 More specifically, I will demonstrate that
2
The most sustained investigation of Polanyian ethics can be found in the Polanyi
Society journal, Tradition and Discovery XXIX (No.1 2002-2003), the entirety of
which is devoted to bringing Polanyian insights to bear on ethics. Some additional
articles that relate Polanyis thinking to ethics can be found in the list of references
at the end of this article. While I do not claim that this list of works is exhaustive,
the contrast with the number of philosophically or theologically-oriented articles
remains striking.
3
Diane Yeager (2002-2003, 23) provides a succinct account of moral inversion.
See also her discussion of Polanyis ongoing use of the concept in note 1, p. 47.
4
The former group argues for the existence of clear moral truths that are univer-
sally accessible and to which all people must be held accountable, whereas the
latter group treats moral statements as nothing more than expressions of subjective
preferences. In the earliest versions of emotivism, statements such as killing is
bad are understood to be statements of disapproval, akin to saying, boo, killing,
or I dont approve of killinganything other than statements of any kind of
substantive truth. For discussion of A.J. Ayers and other variations on this theme,
see Frankena (1973, 105-107). Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 6-35) provides a helpful
account of this situation and the way in which emotivism has become the dominant
ideology of capitalist societies.
5
Mark Discher (2002-2003, 49-59) comes closest.
6
I will use the terms personal and tacit interchangeably. In his later writings, Po-
lanyi seems to prefer to talk about tacit rather than personal knowledge as he
comes to emphasize more the process of knowing rather than the status of the
knowledge produced.
82 Chapter Five
Polanyi's insights about tacit knowledge and its formation can help us
better understand the nature of practical reasoning and, by extension, how
to teach so as to promote the development of character. I will do so in
three steps, the first of which is to summarize the classical view of practi-
cal reason. I will then turn to Polanyis description of tacit knowing and its
formation. Finally, I will articulate a view of practical reasoning informed
by Polanyi and test it by analyzing how case studies might be used as
ways of teaching practical reasoning.
2. On the Nature and Development of Practical Reason

To talk of moral knowing is to speak of what has been classically
called the virtue of practical reasoning (phronesis or prudentia).7 When
one reasons practically, one deliberates about how to achieve the best good
possible in a specific set of circumstances. Because these matters are con-
tingent and imprecise, deliberation requires keen perception of the particu-
lars of a situation. Skillful perception and deliberation is an art that cannot
be achieved by following rules, since ethics does not allow for the same
kind of precision as physics. Hence practical reasoning cannot be assessed
quantitatively, but is instead measured against the model of an exemplary
person (real or imagined).8 As a virtue, practical reasoning develops like
all the other virtues, through constant practice under the tutelage of a
skilled practitioner in a well-ordered community. Moreover, this virtue is
not found in the young because its development requires the accumulation
of experience.
Given the requirement that one must both deliberate about and act on
the good, practical reasoning has been classically understood to combine
features of both the intellectual and the moral virtues. Aristotles way of
7
The following account of the classical view of practical reasoning draws primar-
ily from Aristotle (1986); on practical reasoning in general, see 158-173; on the
precision appropriate to ethics, see 5 and 35; on the mean, see 48-51; on the impor-
tance of exemplars, see 43, 64 and 285; on the well-ordered community, 214-216
and 296, (as well as hints on 21 and 289); finally, on the importance of experience
and good upbringing, see 5-6 and 160. A clear and succinct secondary account of
Aristotle can be found in Thiele (2006, 19-26). I have also drawn from Thomas
Aquinas medieval appropriation of Aristotle, found in selections of his Summa
Theologica (See Aquinas 1948, 586-589 and 640-642).
8
I say real or imagined because Aristotle is not entirely transparent on this point.
On the one hand, taking his language at face value, his statement that as a person
of practical wisdom would suggests that such people do, in fact, exist. On the
other hand, Aristotle also cautions about ascribing virtue to someone except over
the course of a whole lifetime (see Aristotle 1986, 22-27).
putting it is, ... it is impossible to be good in the full sense of the word
without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without mor-
al excellence or virtue (Aristotle, 1986, 172). As intellectual virtue, prac-
tical reasoning entails sound reasoning about the particulars needed to
attain the good life in community with others. As moral virtue, the practi-
cally wise person is someone whose passions are appropriately ordered
toward what is truly good. Since proficiency in practical reasoning can be
taken as synonymous with being virtuous, the development of practical
reasoning can therefore be assumed to be synonymous with the formation
of the moral or virtuous self. Put differently, understanding how to teach
practical reasoning can inform teaching that seeks to shape character.
Practical reasoning has been put back on the radar screen in contempo-
rary ethics by the work of Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, a medical
ethicist and philosopher, respectively. They have tried to recover and re-
habilitate practical reason as the model for moral knowing in contempo-
rary ethics, in part because they perceive it to be helpful in avoiding the
intractable character of moral debate mentioned earlier (Jonsen and Toul-
min 1988, 16-18). Practical reasoning, as Jonsen and Toulmin describe it,
begins with presumptions established by previous cases that then become
paradigms for moral reflection. New cases, when they arise, are compared
to these paradigms; sometimes they may connect in a straightforward
manner, at other times their connections may be ambiguous, marginal, or
even so radically different as to call established presumptions into question
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, 24-36, 323).
Jonsen and Toulmin compare practical reasoning to the practice of
clinical medicine. For example, if a doctor wants to cure a patients mal-
ady, the doctor must connect her knowledge of medicine with the particu-
lars of a patients symptoms. The doctor begins with certain presumptions
about a disease and its proper treatment and therefore treats the patient on
the basis of those presumptionsunless there are exceptional circum-
stances in this case that dictate a departure from the norm. There is obvi-
ously a certain degree of give and take in this process that Jonsen and
Toulmin describe as a matter of personal judgment and pattern recogni-
tion (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, 35-40). It is here that a connection be-
tween Polanyi and these two thinkers becomes explicit, for Polanyi often
compares personal knowing to making clinical judgments. As he says,
Medicine offers readily an illustration of what I have in mind here for
only clinical practice can teach [a medical student] to integrate the clues
observed on an individual patient to form a correct diagnosis of his illness
(Polanyi 1969, 125). With this connection in mind, we now turn to Po-
lanyis account of tacit or personal knowing.
84 Chapter Five
3. On the Nature and Development of Tacit Knowing

The first feature of tacit knowing is that it is, according to Polanyi, a
matter of appraisal or perception; one might also call it a matter of dis-
cernment. In tacit knowing, the perceiver actively and passionately inte-
grates clues from the environment in order to discover a meaningful
whole. Polanyi often explains this way of knowing by means of everyday,
non-controversial examples, such as that of viewing stereoscopic pictures.
In viewing such pictures, we simultaneously look at two photographs of
the same scene taken from two points only a few inches apart. The result is
that we perceive the scene in a richer way than if we view only one of the
photographs. We achieve this richer perspective by treating the dissimilari-
ties between the two photographs as clues that we integrate into a larger
whole (Polanyi 1969, 211-212).
A second feature of tacit knowing is its from-to structure. According to
Polanyi, we attend from one or more things that remain outside of our
focal awareness to the something else whose meaning we are trying to
discern. To continue with the example of viewing stereoscopic pictures,
we attend from the neurological and physiological mechanisms that make
vision and perception possible, along with the two separate pictures and
their associated machinery to the scene contained in the pictures. We focus
our awareness on the stereo-image but are only subsidiarily aware of the
rest. This from-to structure becomes most transparent at those times
when we are forced to shift our attention from the focal point to those
things by which are doing the attending. As Polanyi frequently notes,
Repeat a word several times, attending carefully to the motion of your ton-
gue and lips, and to the sound you make, and soon the word will sound
hollow and eventually lose its meaning. By concentrating attention on his
fingers, a pianist can temporarily paralyze his movement. (Polanyi 1983,
18)
In short, all physiological mechanisms, material props, and conceptual

apparatuses serve as tools for finding the meaning of the separate pictures,
a meaning that emerges from the perceptual process (Polanyi 1969, 212).
This notion of tools points to the process of indwelling, the third fea-
ture of tacit knowing, one implied by the from side of its from-to
structure. Polanyi perhaps best defines what he means by indwelling when
he says, We may be said to interiorize these things or to pour ourselves
into them (Polanyi 1969, 183 [emphasis his]). These things refers to
our body, tools that extend our bodies (whether simple ones like a stick
used to probe a hole or complex telescopes used to scan the skies), lan-
guage, cultureeven moral teachings (Polanyi 1969, 134, 148-149, 183;

1983, 18). Moreover, if we are to make sense of the actions of other peo-
ple, Polanyi says that we must enter into their situation and see things
from their point of view (Polanyi and Prosch 1975, 44). Tacit knowing
therefore also seems to require the capacity for empathy.
A fourth feature of tacit knowing is that the process of integration, of
sense-making, is a fluid process, one not governed by rules. One of Po-
lanyis favorite illustrations of this feature is that of wearing inverting
spectacles, i.e., glasses that make one perceive the world upside-down.
One eventually learns to compensate for the topsy-turvy visual cues and to
negotiate the world again, but one does not learn to do this by following
explicit rules such as, remember that what you perceive to be below you
is actually above you. In this situation, Polanyi finds such rules useless
on two counts:
First, they do not tell us that we have to re-integrate our senses, on the con-
trary they confirm their normal integration and hinder their re-integration;
second, even if some rule did tell us what we have to do, this would be use-
less, since we cannot directly control the integration of our senses. (Polanyi
1969, 199)
Instead, what happens is thatwith time and effortthe person develops

a new integration of visual clues, muscular cues, and a sense of balance
(Polanyi 1969, 198-199). More generally, Polanyi argues that any attempt
to specify rules for applying rules is ultimately self defeating, since it
results in an infinite regress of such rules (Polanyi and Prosch 1975, 61).
To say that knowing cannot be guided by slavishly following rules does
not mean, however, that Polanyi makes no place for rules in the process of
knowing. They come after the fact and serve more as rules of thumb, ap-
proximate articulations of what cannot be made totally explicit (Polanyi
1962, 162, 200).
Presupposed by Polanyis account of tacit knowing is the existence of
a reality, even if our knowledge of that reality is only partial and subject to
revision. As he says, From the very start, the inquiry assumes, and must
assume, that there is something there to be discovered (Polanyi 1969,
172). Polanyis notion of what is real is anything but straightforward,
however. He suggests that reality is marked by an unlimited range of
unsuspected implications, which means that what is real promises to
disclose itself in ever new and unpredicted ways (Polanyi 1969, 172).
Thus he argues that minds and problems possess a deeper reality than
cobblestones, although cobblestones are admittedly more real in the sense
86 Chapter Five
of tangible (Polanyi 1983, 32-33 [emphasis his]).9 Because reality cannot

be fully known, we cannot claim that our knowledge is universal in the
sense of something unchangeably true for all places and times. That does
not mean, however, that our knowledge is mere whim or preference. Ac-
cording to Polanyi, to claim that something is true is to claim it with uni-
versal intent. In doing so, we both commit ourselves to its truth and to the
expectation that others ought to adhere to it (Polanyi 1983, 78; Polanyi and
Prosch 1975, 194-195). The reality that we must make such commitments
under conditions of finitude constitutes the calling of the thinker, for
which one must take personal responsibility (Polanyi 1962, 321-324).
At this point, the question arises as to how these skills of perception
and integration are developed. Polanyis answer is deceptively simple to
understand, although difficult to practice. His answer can be summarized
by saying that such skills are learned under the tutelage of a master in a
convivial community of explorers who are committed to a tradition of
liberty that fosters a dynamic orthodoxy. This statement suggests two
dimensions of skill acquisition, the first of which is the relationship of
student/apprentice to a teacher or master.
The student first learns by observing the work of the master, trying to
indwell not only the patterns of action, but also the spirit of the master
thereby developing in Polanyis words, a feel of the masters skill (Po-
lanyi 1983, 29-30). Polanyi uses the evocative phrase thrusting forward
our imagination to describe this indwelling, which amounts to developing
a deep empathy with and for the master (Polanyi 1969, 200). By entering
imaginatively into the work of the teacher, the student picks up the rules
of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master
himself (Polanyi 1962, 53 [cf. Thiele 2006, 159]). The student also learns
to make connections between textbooks and life by analyzing cases. Again
comparing personal knowing to medical training, Polanyi argues that med-
ical students must learn to recognize symptoms in actual patients, not
books, and that this comes by repeatedly being given cases ... in which
the symptom is authoritatively known to be present, side by side with
cases in which it is authoritatively known to be absent, until he has fully
realized the difference between them and can demonstrate his knowledge
to the satisfaction of an expert (Polanyi 1962, 54-55). Such learning, like
adjusting to inverting spectacles, will likely be protracted and strenuous
(Polanyi 1969, 199).
9
The complexity of Polanyis view of reality can also be seen in his account of the
multileveled nature of reality, wherein principles pertaining to the lower levels of
reality define the boundary conditions for the characteristics of the higher levels
(1983, 35-46).
Such learning obviously demands much from the student, not least of
which is what Polanyi calls the students intelligent cooperation (Po-
lanyi 1983, 5). The student must submit to the authority of the teacher,
trusting that a teaching which appears meaningless to start with has in
fact a meaning which can be discovered by hitting on the same kind of
indwelling as the teacher is practicing (Polanyi 1983, 61; cf. Polanyi
1962, 53). What keeps that submission to authority from becoming dan-
gerous lies in part with the nature of the community to which student and
teacher belong, a topic that takes us to the second dimension in which skill
in tacit knowing is developed, i.e., the communal.
For Polanyi, the scientific community serves as a paradigm of a virtu-
ous community in which such skillful knowing is developed.10 This com-
munity exhibits several commitments, the first of which is to scientific
method as a way of knowing reality. Moreover, the community is commit-
ted to preserving the liberty necessary for scientists to coordinate their
work spontaneously. To be committed to liberty does not, however, mean
that there are no authority structures. Scientists share commitments to
standards of plausibility, scientific value, and originality, standards that are
employed in making decisions about appointments, publications, and
grants. Perhaps most striking about this community is the dynamic ortho-
doxy it fosters, one that grants the liberty to oppose prevailing ideas in the
name of truth. Polanyi therefore notes that the authority of scientific
standards is thus exercised for the very purpose of providing those guided
by it with independent grounds for opposing it (Polanyi 1969, 55). The
initial submission to authority is thus for the sake of becoming skillful
enough later to oppose that authority on its own grounds when, or if, the
need arises.
4. Practical Reasoning as a Form of Personal Knowing

So far, I have suggested that Polanyi might be able to enrich our under-
standing of practical reasoning, and have summarized salient features of
his description of personal or tacit knowing. Now it is time to articulate the
view of practical reasoning that emerges from a Polanyian perspective.
First, a Polanyian account would stress that practical reasoning is a matter
of perception in which one imaginatively integrates clues from the envi-
ronment for the sake of arriving at a response fitting or appropriate to the
10
The following description of the scientific community draws from Polanyi
(1969, 49-72.) See Polanyi (1951) and (1964) for more extensive treatments of
these issues.
88 Chapter Five
situation. A person who is skilled in practical reasoning will therefore be

someone who exhibits facility in making perceptive judgments about
situations so as to discern courses of action that promise to open up richer
possibilities for living than other options.
Polanyian practical reasoning will be understood to participate in the
from-to structure of all knowing. In making judgments, the agent attends
from or indwells several things, most significantly her own moral convic-
tions, shaped as they are by her experiences and personal history. More-
over, the agent indwells her own emotional constitution. In addition, the
agent must indwell the features of the situation because they define the
limits and possibilities of a course of action. At the same time that the
agent subsidiarily reasons from these things, she will attend to that elusive
course of action that would be appropriate under the circumstances.
Polanyian practical reasoning will also be understood as a fluid proc-
ess, one that does not mechanically follow a particular formula. Indeed, it
cannot, for the result is always indeterminate, something that emerges
from the striving to integrate the clues that come from convictions, emo-
tional constitutions, and situation. A moral principle, such as respect for
autonomy, might therefore have a role to play in deliberation, but only as a
rule of thumb. How, if at all, a principle might apply in situation X cannot
be specified in advance. That connection forever remains a matter of per-
sonal judgment for which the agent must assume responsibility.
Finally, the Polanyian agent will be committed to the reality of moral
truth. Polanyis perspective suggests that moral truths, despite their intan-
gible character, may be among the richest of realities, to the extent that
they promise to reveal themselves over time in surprising and unexpected
ways. Polanyis perspective suggests, finally, that whatever moral truths
one holds, the agent must commit himself to them, take responsibility for
them, and advocate for them with universal intent.
From a Polanyian perspective, facility in practical reasoning will be
developed in an apprentice-like relationship with someone who is a skilled
practical reasoner. The student will commit herself to the teacher and
begin to indwell imaginatively at least the teachers perceptual and thought
processes, if not other elements of that persons character. In their rela-
tionship, the student will at first seek to imitate the teachers reasoning so
as, later, to surpass the teacher in skill. One of the chief means by which
such reasoning can be taught is that of case studies.
I now turn to an examination of case studies in light of these Polanyian
observations. Advocates give many reasons for why case studies can be a
particularly useful way to teach ethics.11 One is that case studies promote
active learning on the part of students, in part because the narratives can
make abstract ideas come alive. Put differently, cases can be emotionally
engaging in ways that reading and discussion of theory are not. Moreover,
the dialogical character of case narratives can foster interpersonal relation-
ships among students, as well as between students and teachers, for case
discussion can create a community in which all participants are learners.
Another oft-cited advantage of case studies is their flexibility. They can
serve to attain any number of objectives, such as teaching a method, test-
ing a theory, analyzing problems, or forming critical consciousness. Case
studies are also flexible in that they can be taught in a variety of formats,
such as role play or debate. Finally, case studies allow students to gain
experience obliquely by learning from and identifying with the characters
in a case narrative.
Case studies do not provide a magic pedagogical bullet for making
students moral, however. A key factor in successful case discussions is the
willingness of readers to wrestle honestly with issues raised by the case
and to treat various perspectives with an open mind (Stivers et al 1994,
293, 296). Moreover, the effectiveness of case studies is quite difficult to
measure. Take for example, one particular form of case study used in
many medical schools, i.e., problem-based learning. Some studies indicate
that problem-based learning is no more effective in training medical stu-
dents to diagnose conditions accurately than other pedagogies. The most
significant factor in achieving diagnostic accuracy turns out to be the
number of years of training, or experiencenot pedagogy (Alston 2003,
slide 3, page 3).12 To the extent that moral judgment mirrors clinical
judgment, one should not expect the mere use of case studies to be more
effective in developing moral judgment than other factors.
Still others worry that excessive reliance on cases distorts our under-
standing of the moral life. Stanley Hauerwas notes that several aspects of
moral experience become hidden or neglected when ethics is treated as a
matter of making the kinds of difficult decisions around which cases are
usually built. Most seriously, this standard account of ethics assumes
that the character of the agent is superfluous to the decision. As he puts it,
the standard account simply ignores the fact that most of the convictions
that charge us morally are like the air we breathewe never notice them
because they form us not to describe the world in certain ways and not
to make certain matters subject to decision. Thus we assume that it is
11
This summary draws from Stivers, et al (1994, 10, 289-290).
12
The study compared three medical schools in Holland.
90 Chapter Five
wrong to kill children without good reason These are not matters that
we need to articulate or decide about; their force lies rather in their not
being subject to decision. (Hauerwas 1977, 18-21)
Note here the Polanyian tone of Hauerwas remarks: he suggests that our
moral convictions are held tacitly; we indwell them and use them subsidi-
arily in order to identify and respond to situations that require action.
Personal experience in teaching case studies bears out both the promise
and difficulty of this pedagogyfor I have, off and on over a period of
years, experimented with case studies in ethics classes. I have most often
used them to get students to apply theory and then reflect critically on
where that application of theory has taken them in comparison to their own
religious and/or moral convictions. Thus we spend class time discussing a
particular approach to Christian ethics, such as a feminist approach, and
then at the end of that unit discuss a case in which the insights gleaned
from the theory are used to provide advice to the central character(s) in the
case. Students, sometimes singly and sometimes in groups, lead the case
discussion following instructions I provide. Generally, I ask students to
identify certain features of the case: (1) the relevant actors, (2) the goods at
stake for those actors, (3) a range of live options for action, and (4) the
likely consequences, both good and bad, for each of those options. Then I
have students put themselves in the role of our theorist-author and advise
the actor from the authors perspective. I also ask students to reflect on
how their personal advice would differ from that of the author's. Finally, I
ask them to reflect on what they have learned from this exercise.
In monitoring discussions and grading case analyses, I have found that
students do indeed find cases more engaging than the standard fair. In
addition, I have discovered, not surprisingly, that students exhibit varying
levels of sophistication in their ability to connect theory with case and to
reflect critically in light of their own convictions. However, other parts of
my experience have left me ambivalent about using cases. Understanding
practical reasoning as personal knowing may help explain these difficul-
ties and suggest modifications for the use of case studies. Here I offer four
suggestions for ways that one might appropriate Polanyian insights when
teaching with cases.
One frustration in my experience with case studies is the difficulty that
many students have in articulating their moral convictions. By conviction,
I mean with James William McClendon, the gutsy beliefs that I live
outor in failing to live them out, I betray myself (McClendon 2002,
22). Understood in this way, convictions are not simply generic moral
principles such as love or beneficence to be applied to cases. Convic-
tions are instead best understood as something more foundational, for they
represent deeply-held commitments and loyalties that, at least in part,

constitute ones identity as a moral agent. From this perspective, moral
principles are better seen as something on the order of the rules of thumb
alluded to above, or perhaps even as shorthand summations of convictions.
From a Polanyian perspective, this difficulty should come as no sur-
prise because I am asking students to make articulate or explicit what they
indwell tacitly. As Polanyi is fond of pointing out, the process of knowing
is disrupted when one is forced to focus attention on that by which one is
doing the knowing. This would seem to be just as true for practical reason-
ers as it is for pianists or bicyclists. That difficulty in articulating the inar-
ticulate, as well as the disruptive nature of doing so, may well reinforce
the tendency to retreat into emotivism. Nevertheless, such articulation
needs to happen and ways need to be found to encourage such reflection
despite the awkwardness of the process.
I have also been frustrated by a very real hesitancy among students to
offer advice to the main character in the case or to engage critically the
advice offered by other students in the class. The dominant reason that
students have given to explain this hesitancy is that everyone has to make
his or her own decision or it depends on what she wants to do. These
comments reflect, for the most part, our cultures emotivism, i.e., its com-
mitment to toleration understood in practice as, let bygones be bygones
so long as no one is injured. But I wonder if two other factors might not
be at work here. The first is the inherent sloppiness of the process, in that
followings rules or procedures will not guarantee that everyone arrives at a
correct moral answer. Secondly, I wonder whether this belief that eve-
ryone has to make his or her own decision does not represent a grasping
(misdirected as it is) for something that Polanyi describes as the personal
component of knowing. After all, there is something deeply personal about
ones convictions and commitments, even if they cannot simply remain
private preferences. Developing, exploring, and stressing Polanyis ac-
count of personal knowing with students before, during, and after case
discussions may, over time, make inroads into student emotivism.
In addition, I have been disappointed by the difficulty that many stu-
dents have in digging very deeply into the cases. Students often fail to
enter cases imaginatively and have a hard time identifying goods at stake
for the central character, options for action, or even potential good and bad
consequences for a particular course of action. Part of this phenomenon
can likely be accounted for in terms of student motivation, i.e., some stu-
dents will cooperate intelligently with and submit to the authority of a
teacher and others will not, at least initially (and some never). At the same
time, pedagogical efforts can be made to explain and encourage the kind
92 Chapter Five
of indwelling necessary to reflect on a case at the depth required for stu-

dents to hone their skills in practical reasoning. Here again, the quality of
relationship between professor and student will become crucial to the
success of the effort.
Finally, I have not witnessed much, if any, increase in abilities to per-
form these tasks over the course of a semester. Polanyian insights can also
help explain this outcome, since he suggests that the relationship between
student and mentor must be a close one. That is difficult to achieve in a
class of even modest size, say 15-18. The formation of a moral self would
seem to require the professor to work one-on-one with a student, or at the
very least with only a few students at a time. The group must be small
enough for professor and student(s) to work through cases in a collabora-
tive way so that both professor and student offer insights, ask probing
questions, and make challenging comments. Moreover, if the dominant
objective of a class is to develop moral perceptivity, it will be important to
give students repeated hands-on experience with cases.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, Michael Polanyis work has most often been appropriated
by philosophers and theologians, a situation that leaves the ethical promise
of his work largely untapped. I have suggested that a promising place to
connect Polanyi to contemporary ethical theory and practice is by treating
practical reasoning as a form of personal or tacit knowing. In the classical
thinking of Aristotle, practical reasoning is the virtue or skill that unites
moral and intellectual dimensions of existence since it involves keen per-
ception of and sound thinking about how to attain the good in a specific set
of circumstances. Practical reasoning thus requires skillful perception of
particulars, something that is more art than science, in that it requires per-
sonal judgment and has an improvisational quality to it. Like all the vir-
tues, practical reasoning develops by practice over the course of a lifetime
under the tutelage of exemplary practitioners. Moreover, skill in practical
reasoning presupposes that one has had a good upbringing in a good com-
munity, along with a wealth of experience.
In many ways, this account of practical reasoning informed by Polanyi
reinforces the classical account. As with Aristotle, perception is central to
the knowing process. Like Aristotle, rules are relatively unimportant to
knowing. As with Aristotle, skill is developed through practice by well-
formed students who follow the example of a skilled tutor. As with Aris-
totle, the character of the community has a crucial role to play in develop-
ing practical reasoning.
At the same time, a Polanyian account of practical reasoning does not

simply repeat Aristotles work; it also extends it in some potentially fruit-
ful ways. In treating practical reasoning as a form of personal or tacit
knowing, we have seen that practical reasoning must be rooted in a con-
viction that there is a moral realitya good that is not merely subjective
preference, but is never fully captured in articulate thought, a reality that
promises to disclose itself in the future in unexpected ways. The agent, on
the basis of that conviction, reasons with universal intent by indwelling his
body, emotions, and moral convictions, all of which are shaped by per-
sonal history. In addition, one must passionately and imaginatively indwell
the details of the situation in search of clues to the moral reality that can be
integrated so as to inform action congruent with that reality. Such action
promises to open up previously unforeseen possibilities for living in the
particular, concrete confines of the situation. One of the best, although by
no means flawless, ways to develop these skills in personal practical rea-
soning is by means of practice with case studies under the tutelage of those
skilled in practical reasoning (or at least more skilled than the student) in a
community that promotes a dynamic orthodoxy.
In sum, Polanyis treatment of perception as the integration of clues, of
the from-to structure of knowing, and indwelling as empathy add new
layers to what is involved in moral deliberation. Moreover, his views that
meaning is emergent, that commitments have to be made with universal
intent, and that agents must take responsibility for their work all suggest
fresh ways of understanding moral truth that may prevent falling into the
trap of either moral dogmatism or emotivism. Finally, an understanding of
practical reasoning informed by Polanyi provides a way of understanding
and responding to the difficulties often encountered in the use of case
studies to teach ethics. Understanding practical reasoning from a Polany-
ian perspective thus suggests promising insights that can guide efforts in
teaching to shape character.
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22-48.
CHAPTER SIX
INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY IN A CONVIVIAL

ORDER, OR POLANYIAN OPTIMISM
DAVID W. RUTLEDGE
Introduction
This essay will focus on the roles of the individual and the community
in how we come to know the relation between these two, and will look at
some parallels to Michael Polanyis work in modern philosophy. My sug-
gestion is that neither critical philosophy nor postmodernism is very suc-
cessful at explaining how individual and community are both part of
knowing, emphasizing as these approaches do one or the other of these
poles. Polanyis Personal Knowledge at least points in the right direc-
tiontoward an account of knowing that is richly situated in the com-
plexities of persons and the many dimensions of sociality.
The background to Polanyis thought on these matters is the critical
philosophy of the 17th to 19th centuries; the story of critical thought has
been well and often told, so I want only to note certain features that are
relevant to Polanyis alternative view. First, the critical story tended to
place the individual knower over against society for a host of complex
reasons going back to the Renaissance, continuing with the Enlightenment
protest against the oppressive structures of lancien rgimethe monar-
chy, the aristocracy, the Church (Taylor 1989; Toulmin 1990; Dupr 1993,
2004). This robust individualism combined with the purely mental view of
knowledge to produce the solitary I of modernitydiscarnate, alone,
heroically confronting the darkness of ignorance with the light of con-
sciousness (Livingston 1997). As this pattern of individualism merged
with the growth of science, it tended to diminish the importance of the
community of scientists, for the discovery and verification of scientific
Individual and Community in a Convivial Order 97
knowledge were credited to the operation of the individual mind of the

scientist.
Second, one of the habits of critical philosophy was to imagine know-
ing as a purely mental activity: the mind is a tablet in an isolated head, on
which God or the world writes the story of ones (external) life. Through
the reflections of Descartesespecially his sharp distinction between
mind and bodyand of Locke and Hume, the conviction arose that know-
ing was purely mental, chiefly the act of doubting the various images and
perceptions that constantly crowd into our consciousness. If we learned to
doubt well enough, we would empty the mind of the prejudices, supersti-
tions and false opinions that society was always trying to put in it, and be
able to record a neat, clear, but complex structure of facts about which we
could have no serious reservations (Cannon 1992-93).
A third ingredient of this view was the explicit character of the minds
operations, at least where knowledge was concerned. The mathematization
of physical theory effected by Galileo and Newton, coupled with the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities, became general
throughout science and joined seamlessly with its mental and individualis-
tic character to yield an epistemology with great attractiveness and far-
reaching cultural power.
Knowledge, therefore, was widely accepted to be the explicit contents
of individual minds, connected to the world only by a visual correspon-
dence between these mental concepts and objects out there, things sepa-
rate from the mind. In William Poteats memorable words:
it is the perennial temptation of critical thought to demand total explicit-

ness in all things, to bring all background into foreground, to dissolve the
tension between the focal and the subsidiary by making everything focal,
to dilute the temporal and intentional thickness of perception, to dehistori-
cize thoughtto lighten every shadowy place, to dig up and aerate the
roots of our being, to make all interiors exterior, to unsituate all reflection
from time and space, to disincarnate mind, to define knowledge as that
which can be grasped by thought in an absolutely lucid moment without
temporal extension, to flatten out all epistemic hierarchy, to homogenize
all logical heterogeneity. (Poteat 1993, 261-62)
For roughly two hundred years, this picture of knowing was elaborated
and applied across many intellectual fields, especially by scientific disci-
plines.
In contrast to this critical model of knowledge, the last two hundred
years has witnessed a reaction to it that is often fierce, a reaction that
sometimes becomes extreme in the opposite direction. We can characterize
98 Chapter Six
this reaction as an effort to situate knowing within a broader, richer, dee-

per context than the mind alonean effort actually to alter the notion of
mind itself by revealing its bodily, temporal, intentional roots in a world
that is shot through with significance, prior to any of my conscious acts.
So Marx, Kierkegaard, Darwin, Nietzsche and a host of others began to
probe beneath the surface of Enlightenment Reason to find its roots in
class struggle, in the act of the committed subject, in biological inheri-
tance, or in the will to life. In the last century this re-situating of knowing
continued with Freud and Merleau-Ponty, with Wittgenstein and Michael
Polanyi attempting to uncover the deeper context of knowledge in psychic
instincts, or in our bodily being-in-the-world, or in language, or in know-
ings tacit structure.
To summarize this difference between the critical and the post-critical
we might say that Michael Polanyis philosophy embeds knowledge within
the ordinary life that almost all persons share, his experience as a scientist
and his reading of the history of science support the way in which claims
to knowledge are vindicated by the scientific community, and those claims
are made with a universal intent that future encounters with reality will
confirm. Both in its origin and in its results, knowing provides an imper-
fect but sound way of understanding the world. Its roots in the individ-
uals lived experience, and its fruits of articulate concepts in the com-
munities of science, or philosophy, or art, give knowing both an anchorage
and a transcendent power that enhance human life, indeed, that make it
human. There is a profound optimism in Personal Knowledge.
The Individual and Embedded Knowing

In contrast to the claim that knowing is what isolated minds do, Po-
lanyi suggests continually that articulate feats of knowing arise within a
rich context that includes both our body and our social being. He begins
his chapter 5, on Articulation, in Personal Knowledge with an account
of Gua the chimpanzee and his mental development, proceeding to the
learning of rats (by Skinner) and dogs (by Pavlov), and finally to the mas-
tery of language by human beings. He is endeavoring in these pages to
find the origins of the personal co-efficient of knowledge by tracing it to
the inarticulate levels of intelligence of the animal and the infant, in which
[it] is primordially preformed (Polanyi 1964a, 132). He continues: As
far down the scale of life as the worms and even perhaps the amoeba, we
meet a general alertness of animals, merely exploring what is there; an
urge to achieve intellectual control over the situations confronting it (Po-
lanyi 1964a, 132).
Polanyi does not trace this primordial intelligence of living things

out in any detail in Personal Knowledge, though he certainly wants his
readers to understand human knowing as a continuation of all kinds of
biotic achievements (Polanyi 1964a, 347). This contextualizing, or em-
bedding, or rooting, or grounding of knowing in the most basic physical
constituents of a person provides a powerful alternative to the disembodied
mentalism of the Cartesian, critical model. In The Tacit Dimension, Po-
lanyi describes the operation of tacit knowing in far more detail than in the
structure of commitment he outlines in Personal Knowledge, but I want to
note how consonant his claim is with a wide variety of similar efforts over
the past fifty years. Polanyi clarifies the logical relation of person to back-
ground in the structure of tacit knowing, but as the quotes above suggest,
he was still searching for an intellectual, a mental grounding of higher
powers (learning, intelligence of the animal, a general altertness of
animals, an urge to achieve intellectual control). A much fuller, thick-
er description, we might say, of this embeddedness is supplied via other
efforts to understand the same problem. Let us consider some of these
ways of being embedded which extend Polanyis insights:
(1) Biologically, we should remember Marjorie Grenes work in con-
necting knowing to our evolutionary inheritance in the genetic code; we
can think of being embedded in our DNA as a basic root of our knowing
(Grene 1995, chs. 4, 7; 1974). Distinguishing the purely scientific or tech-
nical aspects of genetics from its epistemological implications is not easy,
but Grene has indicated some of the ways such work should proceed. We
arrive with a history and a direction as standard equipment. Eugene
Wigner, the eminent physicist and student of Polanyi, puts it this way in a
private letter to Polanyi from December, 1962:
This brings me to the only point which I am missing in your discourses. It

is that much of our knowledge, or perhaps beliefs, is born with us. Thus,
the interest in the sounds which our parents produce, our desire to imitate
them, must be part of our genetic heritage. It seems to me that the
overwhelming majority of our capabilities is similarly inherited and that
the learned part, the whole learned part, of our knowledge is negligibly
small in comparison. Then, only part of what we have learned is conscious,
part of it is tacit. Our consciousness is a thin layer, comparable in its rel-
ative insignificance to the insignificance of the Earth in the Universe.
(Wigner 1962)
(2) Grene is unique perhaps in being able to talk of the genetic context
of the knower while at the same time using Heideggerian language to
speak of ones being-in-the-world. She writes: The world we are
100 Chapter Six
thrown into, the projects we have of preserving, changing, even rejecting

it, our additions to the petty claims of everyday existence: all that sums up
to our way of being.As-being-already-in-the-world: we are always al-
ready somewhere, not only in a natural world, certainly not just geo-
graphically, but always already in a human world, a tradition, a cul-
ture. Heideggers exploration of this dimension of our lives is part of
his explication of the hermeneutical circle, in which all discourse finds
itself already a part of a realm of meaning: Every human world is already
social, a fabric expressing the fundamental beliefs of a particular society,
more than individual, even though also parochial (Grene 1995, 71-73). So
meaning already exists, prior to our explicit articulations of it.
Grene is also struck by the way in which Merleau-Ponty clarifies this
phenomenological rendering of our context, our making sense of the
world. The Phenomenology of Perception is an attempt to describe per-
ception as it actually appears to us, which radically changes the notions of
body, space, motion, and time. Consciousness is being towards
the thing through the intermediary of the body, Merleau-Ponty declares,
which is an extraordinary claim for a fellow-countryman of Descartes to
make (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 138-39). Knowing is a part of the body, one
of its gestures towards the world it contemplates, and with which it is
unavoidably implicated.1
(3) Not only biology, and the body, but language, too, has been ex-
plored as a fuller account of the context out of which thinking arises.
With Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty as silent partners in his colloquy,
William Poteat has meditated powerfully on what tacit knowing means for
a new view of human understanding, summarizing evocatively:
It is my view that rationality, that is, the hanging togetherness of things

for us, and logic, that is, the articulated form of the making sense of
things for us, is more deeply and ubiquitously, though inexplicitly, embed-
ded in our ordinary thinking and doing than we are likely to notice I ar-
gue therefore that formalized rationalitymathematics and formal log-
icderives from and remains parasitical upon the hanging togetherness
and sensemaking of our integral mindbodily rootedness in the as yet un-
reflected world. I claim that languageour first formal systemhas the
sinews of our bodies, which had them first; that the grammar, the syntax,
the ingenuous choreography of our rhetorical engagement with the world,
the meaning, the semantic and metaphorical intentionality of our language
are preformed in that of our prelingual mindbodily being in the world,
which is their condition of possibility. (Poteat 1985, 9)
1
Polanyi refers to his affinity with aspects of Merleau-Pontys thought in Back-
ground and Prospect in the 1964 edition of Science, Faith and Society (12).
Here, Wittgensteins form of life is fleshed out, incarnated, in language

that itself attempts to perform, to create, a vivid experience and example of
the power of words to make meaning: A sentence uttered makes a world
appear (Poteat, quoting Auden 1985, 116). Thus, almost twenty-five
years after Polanyis probing of the prelingual performing of knowledge,
we have a rich elucidation of what that might mean, and how this under-
girds our formalized rationality.2
Beyond the helpful term mindbody that Poteat gives us is his attempt
to re-think language as speech and hearing, and his uncovering of the
insidious distortions of the model of visual perception which has been the
standard vehicle for knowledge in the critical paradigm. By stressing
speech rather than sight as the faculty that makes us human, Poteat is able
to re-direct knowing from the individual mind in contemplation of the
world, to the dialogue between the knower and the one who calls him or
her into personhood through address, through summons (Poteat 1985, chs.
7-10).
To summarize thus far: Polanyis simple assertion of a primordial pre-
figuring of articulate intelligence has been deepened through investiga-
tions of evolutionary biology, perception, and languageall elaborating
the kind of rootage that our knowing has which Polanyi himself traced
within the life of the practicing scientist. Such a record of converging
agreement makes it impossible to return to the isolated mind or con-
sciousness of critical thought as the originator of human knowledge. We
are rather led to see knowledge embedded in a common-sense world, in-
habited by a normal array of embodied minds and minded bodies, of natu-
ral things, personal gestures and activitiesthe everyday world, in other
words, in which we live, move, and have our being.
We should note here that the structure of tacit knowing clarifies how
embeddedness is related to knowledge. Our context, in all its richness,
provides the subsidiary clues which I indwell by relying on them in order
to intuitto see, to knowthat comprehensive entity of which they are a
part. Logically, therefore, the proximal or subsidiary particulars are the
clues from which I attend in order to see their joint meaning.
So, as a scientist confronts a good problem, she brings to her consid-
eration of that problem not simply explicit data and formulaethese may
be the least important part of the solutionbut she brings also her per-
sonal history and training; the art of doing science that she picked up
from her mentors; conversations with her research team, with her family,
2
I have written a quite introductory guide to approaching this book: Rutledge
(1987) I also have an article forthcoming in Appraisal which focuses more exten-
sively on Poteats thought.
102 Chapter Six
with friends at a caf; the richness of the languages she speaks, which give
her images, metaphors, and models; the community of peers whose views
she respects, whom she can trust for honest opinions; the data she collects
from her own and others experiments and theorizing; and all the other
elements of her bodily being-in-the-world. Thus the scientist confronts a
problem with a multitude of clues, which can be gradually indwelled in
order to see the meaning they jointly constitute.
In thousands of ways each day we speak of truth and knowledge mean-
ingfully, without any doubt ever arising. Our thinking hangs together in
our speech precisely because we speak within a world where speaker,
hearer, bodily gestures, tone of voice, and contextbody and mind to-
getherall cohere. If we were to examine carefully enough, we could
even assert that all order and meaning is ultimately rooted in the archaic
implications that tie us to our bodies, to our language, and to those with
whom we speak. Rather than ignoring this substratum of sureness, and
imposing some foreign test, such as the clarity and distinctness of a ma-
thematical proof, why not accept our personal knowledge as our starting
point? Knowledge is possible, and truth is real, because in the natural life
of couples, friends, colleagues, families, and communities we know things,
including the truth of some of them. This does not mean people know
everything they claim to know, or that people are never wrong, or that the
truth or falsity of things people say are never in doubt. But it does mean
that underlying such problems and questions is a ground of understanding
and assurance which gives us the support needed, the traction, to ask our
questions. It means that the burden of proof lies on those for whom noth-
ing hangs together, for whom every statement is as true or false as any
other, on those for whom the verities of the past are meaningless.
Before leaving the topic of the individual, let me address a question
that could legitimately be raised about the embedded character of know-
ing. If Polanyi moves away from the act of commitment found in Personal
Knowledge to the tacit knowing which primordially is present in our be-
ing-in-the-world (as in The Tacit Dimension), then does his theory of
knowledge not become less personal, less a matter of individual commit-
ment, and more a matter of phenomenological structure?
Perhaps. We must say this because Polanyi himself says it is at least
partly true. In the Introduction to The Tacit Dimension, he says my
reliance on the necessity of commitment has been reduced by working out
the structure of tacit knowing (x). Perhaps, however, this is a matter of
degree. Note that saying that our judgments, our knowing, our valuing are
rooted in pre-reflective powers does not say which judgments, which
knowledge or values will be affirmed by us. There is still a need for, and
room for, decision, creativity, choice, commitment.
An analogy might bring this point home. My ability to write, or run, or
paint is rooted in my body or rather my mindbodyin the musculature,
the nerve endings, the co-ordination or powers of articulation which I
possessand I have done each of these things. But such embeddedness
does not make me a Shakespeare, a Michael Jordan, a Vincent Van Gogh.
The harnessing of my embedded potential takes personal commitments in
acts of creativity that go far beyond the limits of context. They are the
qualities we call genius, and are a supreme example of personal know-
ing.
Community and Universal Intent

If one pole of human knowing is the individual person, immersed in a
world of meaning prior to any attempt at epistemological or scientific
reflection, the other pole, according to Polanyi, is the reality toward which
human curiosity continually reaches, that reality which we never see
whole, which is always sliding away as we gain some purchase on it, but
which nevertheless engages us so forcefully that we stake our lives on
trying to renew that contact, or on trying to get others to experience the
same. Michael Polanyi is a realist of sorts, believing that reality is largely
hidden to us, and existing therefore independently of our knowing it
(1964a, 311).
I want to pause here to note that an assertion of the reality of an exter-
nal world, with which humans beings may make contact and of which they
may gain real knowledge, immediately puts Polanyi at odds with some of
the claims of postmodernismdespite some real affinity between them.3
Best and Kellner, for example, begin their description of topics in post-
modernism that break with distinct modern concepts and themes with
the following statement: Postmodernists reject unifying, totalizing, and
universal schemes in favor of new emphases on difference, plurality, frag-
mentation, and complexity (Best and Kellner 1997, 255). They amplify
this by reference to Lyotards assertion of the end of grand narratives,
which in philosophy and social theory, stands for the renunciation of
grand systems of philosophy, of totalizing theory that attempts to capture
3
Jerry Gill discusses the placement of Polanyi in modern philosophy in 2000, Pt. I.
I will settle for thinking of Polanyi simply as post-critical. Typically, modernism is
divided into extreme and moderate branches, or deconstructive and constructive
(or reconstructive) postmodernists. Polanyi is placed in the latter group by Gill.
See also Sanders (1991-92), Best and Kellner (1997, 257) and Dyer (1992-93).
104 Chapter Six
the dynamics of the whole, in favor of local narratives. In science, they

argue, this means the refusal of foundations and a unified theorya turn
toward fractal knowledgesrather than searching for theories of the uni-
verse as a whole (Best and Kellner 1997, 256). This is followed, finally,
by their assertion that modern claims to truth and universal themes are
rejected as pretentious and overly serious (Best and Kellner 1997, 256-
57). In light of such a description, it is easy to see the differences between
Michael Polanyi and postmodernism, at least in some of its more extreme
forms. Polanyi never surrenders the conviction that he is attempting to
unify our grasp of human understanding across all of its fields, that he is
aiming to modify our conceptions of knowing quite generally. He also
remains a scientist, convinced that science has made progresspartial and
erratic, perhaps, but real progressin understanding physical reality, and
that the good scientist is in touch with true aspects of reality that will even-
tually reward his efforts. So there is a universal pole to knowledge for
Polanyi, and I will argue that, when properly understood, it overcomes the
critique of postmodernism.
If the person, immersed bodily and linguistically in a meaningful
world, reaches out to a reality dimly sensed in hopes of further confirma-
tion, where is the need for community? If we simply enrich the Enlight-
enment understanding of the individual, isnt that enough? Throughout his
work, Michael Polanyi argued that knowledge was not only personal, but
was possessed and transmitted by persons, and it is the dimension of
community that connects the two poles of individual and external reality.
The person cannot be understood apart from the expanded relations of one
knower to others, which forms a convivial order supporting our explora-
tions of reality. It may be helpful to picture three poles (centers? or hubs?)
related to one another in tension, in lines of force that constitute a contin-
ual push and pull of dialoguea triadic structure of knowing.4
In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi follows a similar pattern to that
sketched above with the individual: In Chapter 7, on Conviviality, he
traces the convivial order of a scientific community back to primitive
sentiments of fellowship, to the kind of physical sympathy which over-
comes the onlooker at the sight of anothers sharp suffering (Polanyi
1964a, 205, 209). Against the solitariness of the critical ideals knower,
Polanyi stresses the various ways in which an individual affiliates with a
larger community in order to understand the world. From the sympathy of
emotion, he moves to the role of mimesis or imitation in learning, where
4
A triadic structure avoids the dualism of the Cartesian tradition, though Polanyi
does not use this term in (1964a) on p. 396; he speaks of two poles of knowing,
in a casual way.
knowledge is communicated, though at an inarticulate level. The young

person submits to parents, teachers, and intellectual leaders in an alle-
giance that testifies to her confidence that such figures have knowledge to
communicate. Such acts of affiliation or submission to the consensus of
others gradually open up a larger vision of life:
I cannot speak of a scientific fact, of a word, of a poem or a boxing cham-

pion; of last weeks murder or the Queen of England; of money or music or
the fashion in hats, of what is just or unjust, trivial, amusing, boring or
scandalous, without implying a reference to a consensus by which these
matters are acknowledgedor denied to bewhat I declare them to be.
(Polanyi1964a, 209)
Here again, we find that Polanyis discussion in Personal Knowledge

has been confirmed and extended in a variety of ways by other thinkers,
who bring out different features of the communal character of knowing:
(a) In developed communitiesbeyond mere casual associationswe
find intentional acts that carry knowing beyond the given place or context
we occupy, and this dimension of the person has been explored by the
sociology of knowledgefor example, by Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality, and more recently by
Charles Taylor in Modern Social Imaginaries. In the words of the anthro-
pologist Clifford Geertz:
From about the 1920s what came to be called the Sociology of Knowl-
edge was applied to one field of intellectual activity after another. Relig-
ion, history, philosophy, economics, art, literature, law, political thought,
even sociology itself, were subjected to a form of analysis that sought to
expose their connections to the social context in which they existed, that
saw them as human constructions, historically evolved, culturally located,
and collectively produced. (Geertz 2000, 161)5
This is a more abstract sense of how knowing is embedded in a social

context, but one which extends Polanyis treatment of science into larger,
more contemporary social and political dimensions. Charles Taylor refers
to the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together
with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expecta-
tions that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images
that underlie these expectations (Taylor 2004, 23). He has tried to extend
our grasp of communal identity into the kinds of political disputes that
5
A few pages further on, Geertz places Michael Polanyi in this movement in the
history of science.
106 Chapter Six
today divide Muslims and Christians, Protestants and Catholics, first

people and European settlers, or black and white races (Taylor 1991;
1994). Individual knowers occupy roles in their communities, and possess
agency or power in political arrangements that actually shape their gaining
and transmitting of knowledge. Polanyi gives a remarkably rich account of
the social structures of science in Personal Knowledge, and also in Sci-
ence, Faith and Society, and in numerous essays (1969). He describes the
immersion of the scientist in the working of a research team, apprentice-
ship to a master, seeking funding, mastering the physical challenges of
building equipment and doing experiments, presenting findings to meet-
ings of fellow scientists, struggling to publish ones results, accepting or
being denied prizes or awards for ones work, and other features of the
practice of science that play such a real role in determinations of scientific
promise, validity, and application.
(b) An additional resource for the understanding of community is the
work of H. Richard Niebuhr, who has explored theologically the role of
trust in establishing community. Niebuhrs posthumously published essays
on faith argue that
without acknowledgment in trust of other persons who have bound them-

selves to us in loyalty and without a covenantal binding of ourselves to
them as well as to causes that unite us, we do not exist as selves; we cannot
think, we cannot communicate with objects or with one another. (Niebuhr
1989, 83)6
We might consider Niebuhrs work as a further exploration of Polanyis

claim that commitment, trust, reliance are at the bottom of knowing, that
all knowledge has a fiduciary grounding. A covenant or promise, as Nie-
buhr describes it, is a relation of trust between persons, so to a significant
degree human knowing can be said to be defined by relationships. I want
to take a moment to describe his views more fully.
We can begin by considering the suggestion that western society
makes it easier to be individuals than to be part of a community (Bellah
1985; Taylor 1989). Most of us are much better at improving ourselves
than in developing friendships. Though we can find a thousand people to
help us improve our individual selves, we cannot find, without a great deal
of hard searching or a good bit of luck, people who are interested in enter-
6
Niebuhrs work was helpful to Poteat, his student, and has been related to Polanyi
in R. Melvin Keiser (1988). Keisers book was published before Niebuhrs post-
humous reflections on faith, and so he focuses primarily on Niebuhrs views on
religious language.
ing into genuine community with us. As a concrete example, we might

consider occupants of the Academy. Bruce Wilshire argues that the great
stress in the United States since the Second World War on improving one's
economic condition and on becoming a part of the professional classes has
led academics, members of a collegium (from which derives collegial)
to copy the patterns and values of the economic world: one must be effi-
cient, productive, up-to-date; one must use good marketing techniques to
position oneself favorably vis-a-vis the competition (Wilshire 1990). If
we ask why collegiate faculty might have been seduced into defining
themselves not by collegiality but by an alien standard, I think we have to
recognize that the assumptions about knowledge that the university en-
courages today make it all but impossible for a faculty member to be
committed to knowing and teaching as a way of life. Our very standards of
knowledge do not allow us to commit ourselves to much of anything
commitment and knowledge are believed to be antithetical states of being,
as Polanyi has shown us.
We have been so bewitched by theory, by abstraction, by formalisms
and formulae, that we have almost forgotten where we firmly stand each
day. We need to reverse the Enlightenment obsession with finding univer-
sal laws of reason, and become adept at uncovering the particular logic of
ordinary life. As Polanyi put it, Logically, the whole of my argument is
buta systematic course in teaching myself to hold my own beliefs (Po-
lanyi 1964a, 299).
When we look at the etymology of the word logic, we are led to the
Greek logos, and find that its first meaning is speakingfirst human
speech generally, and then speech about revelation by God, as both Greeks
and early Christians used the word. So logic resides properly, appropri-
ately, in the speech and the conversations of human beings. When there is
an order, a pattern, a meaning in human speech, which we find when real
communication occurs, then we say there is a logic to that speech. We
do not go out and establish truth, and then import it into our livesit
arises from the midst of life. Or, as Niebuhr suggests, life moves not from
idea to personality, but rather from personality to idea.
Earlier, when I spoke of how our everyday speech of knowing and
truth hangs together, I mentioned the context in which such speaking oc-
curs. Human thinking, including the knowledge that the university is con-
cerned with, begins in normal conversation between people who are phys-
ically together, looking at one another as they speak, bound together by the
language and bodily natures in which they are both implicated. The picture
Niebuhr urges on us is one of knowing as a thoroughly social activity. In
widely separated fields, men and women affirm the importance of com-
108 Chapter Six
mitment in knowing, that knowledge is gained by communities that share a

common language, a common discourse to which all its members give
allegiance.
When we look at any field of knowledge, we find that it begins with
students (some, at least) listening with confidence to their teachers, believ-
ing in the information and the picture of reality they are given, trusting
their textbooks and their equipment, relying on the help of their classmates
to understand difficult points, assuming that the special language of the
discipline that is used has a meaning that the student can eventually dis-
cover. As the student demonstrates in conversations and writings that she
is grasping more and more of the knowledge of the field, that she can
begin to speak the language, she is introduced to other parts of the
communityto upper-level courses, perhaps to a majors club, to lab pro-
cedures, to internships, to research teams or programs, to honorary socie-
ties, to professional meetings, to disciplinary journals, and perhaps eventu-
ally to graduate school or a job in the field, where the process begins
again, at a more advanced level. At every stage, the students knowing is
conditioned by her believing. Without trust in the persons who initiate us
into a field of knowledge, we could not get started; without a community
to mentor us, to show us how it is done in sociology, or music, or geol-
ogy, we would wander around for a long time clueless.
Some people, upon hearing such talk, see an abyss of relativism open
up before them, and instinctively pull back from the brink, rejecting any
social dimension to knowing. But Michael Polanyis work is one long
asseveration that this fear is misplaced. To say that knowledge is social
does not mean that we must become soft, that we must give up hard
knowledge of the world for some kind of mushy social consensus. An
important part of conversations, after all, is correcting and improving our
speech, and this applies to the dialogue with naturein scienceas well
as the dialogue with other cultures, with history, or with art. Indeed, to
read earlier conversations, whether Galileo on sunspots, or Luther on obe-
dience to the state, or Samuel Johnson on Milton, reminds us that assess-
ments of knowledge have changed considerably even in the modern pe-
riod. So to know something reliably is to believe in persons, and in the
relations between persons that we call community. Knowledge is ac-
knowledgement.
A crucial element of the social character of knowledge is that our rela-
tion to other knowers with whom we are in dialogue is necessarily one of
trust, for we do not see the other person as simply a knower, or a subject,
but as a self, a person, one who is bound by promises and as such can
betray me, can tell a lie, or can speak truth. Niebuhr continues: When we
believe a person we acknowledge that there is present to us a moral self ....

who has bound himself to us by explicit or implicit promises not to de-
ceive us but to be faithful in telling us the truth about what he knows
(Niebuhr 1989, 41). Here we find deeper ground for the hanging to-
gether of things, the logic that establishes knowledge and truth in the
various disciplines. Such knowledge is rooted not only in the language of
communities of scholars, but also in the personal relationships of knowers
who trust one another, who believe one another to be moral beings.
This introduces yet another dimension to our picture, for we see that
the conversational situation is not just two people talking, say a student
and a teacher, or two partners in dialogue. There is also a third element in
the relation, namely a common object or goal in which both partners are
interested, and about which they are speaking, namely the subject of their
common speech, the shared world to which their speech refers. Though
normally unvoiced, all of our conversations are a triad of self, other, and
object; as Niebuhr puts it, I know you or acknowledge you in my act of
believing your statements about a common third (Niebuhr 1989, 40).
Even if the reality being discussed is a symbol system, as in mathemat-
ics, or a linguistic convention, as it might be in literature or philosophy,
there is still a third object in even the simplest conversation that binds the
speakers together in a common venture.
c) From talk of community it is not hard to see how tradition
inherited attitudes, norms, beliefs, standards, assumptions, and preju-
dicesforms an important authority that gives both unity and direction to
science, but which also guards against major challenges to the reigning
paradigm. Personal Knowledge insists on the importance of tradition or
authority, yet we find even more extensive treatments of the role of
tradition in other thinkers, for example in interpretation and philosophy in
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1990),
which, again, I see as confirming and elaborating many of the initial in-
sights of Personal Knowledge.
d) Even more helpful, perhaps, than these strictly philosophical treat-
ments are the discussions of custom and culture that anthropology offers.
Clifford Geertz has emphasized that human beings are immersed in cul-
ture, which provides the first context for the meaning they make. Culture,
he says, shapes our lives as gravity shapes our movements, that is, in a
total but largely unnoticed way. Through everything from language to
bodily gestures to artistic creations to childrearing practices, humans form
a world through symbolic contrivances by means of which individuals
imagine themselves as participants in a form of life (Geertz 1999; 1973,
ch. 1; 2000). Again, as with the individual pole of knowing, we have seen
110 Chapter Six
that a host of investigators in various disciplines have echoed Polanyis

insight into the communal nature of knowledge.
Before finishing, however, I wish to return to the complaint of post-
modernists that I mentioned earlier, namely their objection to the univer-
salizing tendency of critical knowing.7 Does Polanyi escape this charge, or
is the charge itself in need of critique? Postmodernism indicts universal
claims because they are abstract; unacknowledged projections of the par-
ticular; totalizing or hegemonic; reflections of foundationalism, an at-
tempt to found knowledge on absolutely certain grounds. Platonic
FormsJustice, Truth, the Good, etc.are perhaps the clearest historical
examples of such universals (Polanyi 1961, The Republic, Bks VIff., and
Parmenides).
However, Michael Polanyis use of universal intent is quite different.
He is describing our confidence that the integration we have performed in
an act of knowing actually bears on reality, that we have discerned some
aspect of what is true and real. We are convinced that others can perform
this same integrationnot exactly or slavishly, but recognizablyand
thus have the same experience. When led to indwell the same particulars
that we indwell, everyone ought to see generally what we see. What this
stresses is the second term of the phrase: universal intent. Our commitment
is genuine, but we are not making a claim about the totality of things; in
fact, our confidence can be in a very small particular, where we know that
the future will reveal that particular feature of the cosmos in new and sur-
prising ways. Though reality may confirm my discovery, my knowledge, it
will probably not be an exact duplicate of my experience that is confirmed.
This possibility of error is one reason we can be confident that we are not
simply projecting our ideas onto the cosmos.
I also think, however, that Michael Polanyi, the scientist, would agree
only partially with the postmodernist on this point, for while the dynamic
nature of reality and our knowing means we never get it right forever, it
does not mean we are adrift in a sea of whimsy. Galileos theory of the
tides was shown to be wrong, but his conjectures about the moons of Jupi-
ter were shown to be correct. There are, Polanyi believed, laws of nature
that have been discovered by science with near-universal validity: gravity,
the double-helical structure of DNA, the relation of elements in the Peri-
odic Table, etc. The properly universal character of such laws may not
be absolute, for they do not refer to timeless essences, but to aspects of a
reality that is dynamic and always revealing new features of itself to us. So
the language of Law of Nature does not mislead; it communicates.
7
I want to thank Walt Gulick and Phil Mullins for raising this question for me.
Thus, against the isolated mind of critical philosophy, Michael Polanyi

developed a powerful vision of embedded knowing, in which our thoughts
are rooted in our bodies, our language, our social networksin our being-
in-the-world. In contrast to the despairing skepticism of postmodernism,
he enables us to finally begin to claim the ground on which we stand, the
truth that we constantly encounter as real and sound, as our own. We can
look around us once more with hope, with a muted but genuine optimism
in the potential of human beings to make some progress of our own to-
wards an unthinkable consummation (Polanyi 1964a, 405).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
POLANYI ON THE MORAL DIMENSION

OF SCIENCE
MRTA FEHR1
The subtitle of Personal Knowledge is Towards a post-critical phi-

losophy. That is, towards an anti-Cartesian, anti-sceptical philosophy; a
philosophy based on trust, presupposing a fiduciary attitude; an epistemol-
ogy that is, instead of striving to attain an impersonal objectivity in cogni-
tion, emphasises the personal and moral character of knowledge.
At first sight, all this seems to be a withdrawal from the most important
achievements of the two millennia-long history of epistemology. Begin-
ning with Plato, the greatest European philosophers tried to find methods
conducive to impersonal knowledge by reducing the knower to a mere
attentive eye, orin Rortys termsto reduce us to our glassy essence.
And the view supplied by the impersonal, bodiless eye was generally
and especially in the last three hundred yearsassumed to be quite trans-
parent, explicit and explicable. According to Polanyi, however, perception
and all cognition, including scientific cognition, contains a residual per-
sonal component, an inextricable element without which there can be no
knowledge in the true sense of the word. As Polanyi famously put it:
knowledge is neither objective nor subjectiveit is personal.
What I intend to argue for in this presentation is that, as far as I see, in
Polanyis view science is essentially a moral venture for mankind; thus, to
do scientific research-work is not merely a cognitive but also a moral task
for the scientist. Knowledge claims not only need justification by means of
methodological rulesthey additionally require a guarantee emanating
from the moral rules accepted by and embodied in the moral integrity of
1
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the grant OTKA K72598 of
the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund.
Polanyi on the Moral Dimension of Science 115
scientists; truth-seeking needs not only cognitive capacities but a moral

stance as well. Today, however, in the three decades since Polanyis death,
science has entered into a new phase, the so called post-academic phase
(Ziman 2000) in which science has become the servant of economics and
industry; the moral dimension of scientific research work as R+D is fading
awayand its instrumental and usefulness value along with its profitabil-
ity is strengthening. A guarantee of the truth of knowledge would be: does
such a thing really work in the world of technology? However, when
knowledge is no longer personal but is, instead, the result of a service
delivered to a big corporation on a project-financed basis, then something
very important is being lostnamely: trust in science and scientists. For
bureaucracy and economic constraints have come to take their places; the
triple helix (Jacob 1997) arises.
This thesis will have the following arguments. To be a scientist meant,
for Polanyi, not merely the possessing of certain intellectual qualities
spiritual ones are there as well. The scientist is responsible to the scientific
community and to the whole of mankind for his knowledge claims and
even for his beliefs. (Hieronymi 2008) His personal moral integrity hinges
on what he accepts and recommends to others as being true; and this is
why othersfellow scientists and lay personscan and do trust him/her.
To do scientific research work is not simply a job, one arriving via the
social division of labour. It is something one is devoted to, so it is not a
job or just a matter of expertise. Neither is it a mere detached cognitive
achievementit is an almost sacred ritual, one that can be performed only
by a community of priest-like individuals. One can easily recall the figure
of Sarastro and the brotherhood in the Temple of Wisdom in Mozarts
Magic Flute; the young, would-be scientists (as Polanyi notes in several
places) must go through a kind of initiation process in order to acquire the
tacit elements of scientific knowledge, items that cannot be taught only by
explicit teaching techniques (See: Bks 2005, Brownhill 2007). Tacit
inference precedes and underlies explicit and logical ones. The training of
beginners in scientific research is emphatically more than a rational learn-
ing process. Above and beyond the educational process, it is the transmis-
sion of explicit and implicit (tacit) knowledgeand it must also be edify-
ing, a kind of character-forming process. What such trainee scientists
acquire in this process is the personal element of knowledge.
Polanyis republic of science is not a real, down-to-earth republic,
thereforeit is a very aristocratic, indeed almost monastic society, in
which its members, like the Knights of the Round Table, serve or seek
unselfishly the Holy Grail, the Truth and nothing but the Truth. As he
writes:
116 Chapter Seven
This also throws a new light on the nature of the Social Contract. In the
case of scientific community the contract consists in the gift of ones own
personnot to a sovereign ruler as Hobbes thought, nor to an abstract
General Will, as Rousseau postulatedbut to the service of a particular
Idea. (Polanyi 1946, 50)
Science thus becomes subject not to a this-worldly authority, either

private (like Hobbes sovereign ruler, a king or despot) or collective (like
Rousseaus volont gnrale or a Stalinist party will); the society of scien-
tists is a self-governing body, not a subordinated compartment within the
context of society at large. Science has no obligations as regards surround-
ing societyit has one single, general devotion: truth-seeking. And truth
is an ultimate and basic value, a good for each and every one of us.
The society of scientists is a cooperative community where there can
be no conflict of interest because truth belongs to a set of goods that is
indivisible, which is not diminished when shared or distributed, and with
which there can be no scarcity. Thus, the usual conflicts of interest in
everyday life are and must remain far from the world of science. Hence,
science is an essentially cooperativeand not competitivegame; what
one gains is not somebody elses loss. Even in cases of scientific contro-
versy this applies: when one researcher has shown to be false by another,
the outcome is truth instead of error, correctness instead of falsity.2 This is
a gain.
Yet what can we think about Polanyis almost religious enthusiasm
concerning science? Is it merely an ardent romantic conception, a remnant
of mid-19th century science-worshipping? Or does this Polanyian attitude,
beyond and above its emotional content, involve deep insight into the
workings of science and also into its epistemological stance? Is his image
of science irremediably idealisticand obsolete? Idealistic in the sense
2
Polanyi lived up to his own norms, the self-lauded moral principles of science
and this is attested to by his (1963) account of the unlucky fate of his potential
theory of absorption. As it appears in his paper (Grene 1969), he bears no grudge
against the scientific community for rejecting his theory and preferring Langmuirs
theory (awarding him with the Nobel Prize); yet, as it turned out more than 30
years later, his main opponent Langmuir was proved wrong, so that Polanyis
theory was then reassessed and has been rehabilitated. Polanyi did not reproach
those scientists whose faulty judgements deprived him of the due award (i.e. the
Nobel Prize); just the opposite, in fact: he explains how justified they were in
making their evaluations under the then prevailing circumstances, that is, accord-
ing to the strict methodological rules of physico-chemistry. Polanyi relates this
story with objectivity as well as with moral dignity and personal integrity; and he
proved to be a genuine scientist in his own sense.
that it hasor had formerlynothing to do with how scientific research is

really done; and obsolete because the social conditions pertaining to scien-
tific research work have completely changed since Polanyis times.
In trying to answer the above, let me first mention this: it is noteworthy
that Polanyi takes no account of contemporary sociologists of knowledge
(like K. Mannheim, who first edited Polanyis Logic of Liberty 1951) or of
sociologists of science (for example, R. Merton). Their names are not even
mentioned (in Polanyi 1958, or Polanyi 1951), let alone their standpoints
being actually assessed; and even though, as one can see, Mertons famous
norms and Polanyis moral norms of science are in almost complete
agreement (provided that one replaces the Mertonian requirement of
scepticism with Polanyis critical attitude). It seems that, for him, pure
(as opposed to applied) science is indeed pure, that is it is free from all
tarnished, down-to-earth social concerns, influences and interests. And it
must be free in order to be true knowledge. Truth has no value beyond
itself; and it is not useful in the economic sense of the word.
When dealing with the issue of whether the lay public has any right to
steer scientific developmentsas it is with tax-payers money that the
state finances research, and supports the universities where they are
donePolanyi argues as follows:
() the only justification for the pursuit of scientific research in universi-

ties lies in the fact that the universities provide an intimate communion for
the formation of scientific opinion, free from corrupting intrusions and dis-
tractions. For though the scientific discoveries eventually diffuse into all
peoples thinking, the general public cannot participate in the intellectual
milieu in which discoveries are made. Discovery comes only to a mind
immersed in its pursuit. () The soil of academic science must be extrater-
ritorial in order to secure its rule by scientific opinion. (Polanyi 1962, 64)
The word extraterritorial, used in this context, is characteristic, express-

ing succinctly Polanyis standpoint. He assumes and postulates a kind of
transcendent status for science, as if it were not part of the fabric of society
but, rather, a sacral service to a deity, a worshipping of the goddess Truth.
Should we rejoice to be servants of such great transcendent powers?

Polanyi asksPerhaps we are becomingand even ought to become in
other waysa society of explorers dedicated to the pursuit of aims un-
known to us. Perhaps the freedom of thought in which we take pride has
such awesome implications. I cannot tell. (Polanyi 1967, 85-86)
Of course the Arch Enemies of science for Polanyi in the 30s and 40s
were the Stalinist and Nazi dictatorships on one hand, because, for him,
118 Chapter Seven
political interference seemed to be an imminent threat to science; however,

he also rejected British initiatives concerned with a social steering of sci-
entific research for the benefit of the general public (as advocated by J. D.
Bernal). As for the first threat, Polanyi had seen its devastating conse-
quences during and after his visit to the USSR in 1935, when he had talked
to Bukharin, and later on when seeing developments occurring in the Lis-
enko case. With the British situation, he was afraid of attempts on the part
of even good-willed politicians to turn science into a maidservant of tech-
nology and into a way of increasing economic wealth. He considered such
strivings as attempts to prostitute science into the service of the lay
public and technocratic and economic requirements.
HencePolanyi wroteto defend science against lay rebellion on the

grounds of its technical achievements may be precarious. To pretend that
science is open-minded, when it is not, may prove equally perilous. But to
declare that the purpose of science is to understand nature may seem old-
fashioned and ineffectual. And to confess further how greatly such expla-
nations of nature rely on vague and undemonstrable conceptions of reality
may sound positively scandalous. But since all this is in fact true, might it
not prove safest to say so? (Polanyi 1967, 81)
The greatest good supplied by science is thus the intellectual satisfac-

tion provided by having a deeper insight into natures secrets and a reliable
world-view serving as a conceptual framework for understanding the uni-
verse. Science serves as the ultimate spiritual guide and glue of societyit
is not just a means of technological success. Science is edifying and not
instrumental. Polanyi does not want to see scienceat least pure sci-
encein a utilitarian perspective and relate it to economic values, which is
why he says that it is hazardous to merely refer to its technological poten-
tialities and achievements. As he writes:
The distinction between technology and pure science can be defined by

economic criteria. Applied science teaches how to produce practical advan-
tages by the use of material resources. But there is a limit to the urgency of
any particular practical advantage and a limit to the abundance of any par-
ticular resources. No technology can remain valid in the face of a sharp
drop in the demand for its produce () Pure science, on the other hand,
cannot be affected in its validity by variations of supply or demand. (Po-
lanyi 1951, 74)
Yet if (pure) science has and should have nothing to do with economic
or political interests nor popular demands, and if it must be kept com-
pletely free from such influences lest it become corrupted and its validity
thrown into question, then by what means can one measure its legitimacy
and its value for mankind? The question of criteria for accepting knowl-
edge claims as truly scientific ones is the more important one since, as one
can see in a quotation above, Polanyi admits that scientific explanations
of nature rely on vague and indemonstrable conceptions of reality; and
that there are no strict and water-proof norms of justification for distin-
guishing at any precise moment any knowledge claim regarding its truth or
falsityPolanyi does not suppose that there exists a well-defined set of
methodological rules to follow in order to achieve this. The availability of
objective norms is insufficient. It is, he writes:
a fact that the methods of scientific inquiry cannot be explicitly formu-

lated and hence can be transmitted only in the same way as an art, by the
affiliation of an apprentice to a master. The authority of science is essen-
tially traditional. Thus, the standard of scientific merit are seen to be
transmitted from generation to generation by the affiliation of individuals
at a great variety of widely disparate points, in the same way as artistic,
moral or legal traditions are transmitted. (Polanyi 1962, 66)
The two key words here are: tradition and authoritytradition, bring-
ing together a communitys cognitive and moral values, and authority,
acquired by sustaining these values. Because individual freedom of inquiry
is restricted by authority, created by the practitioners themselves, who are
assumed to be the ultimate guarantors of scientific value and merit. On
these two pillars rest the building of scientific inquiry, i.e. discovery and
justification. To be able to accept a knowledge claim it is necessary but
still not sufficient, according to Polanyi, that it can be justified by objec-
tive, rational methodological rulesit must also be seen as being true,
with the utmost moral severity, by the scientific community and the in-
quirer him/herself via his/her personal knowledge. These are the criteria of
truth. Let me quote Polanyi again.
When we reject today the interference of political or religious authorities

with the pursuit of science, we must do this in the name of established sci-
entific authority, which safeguards the pursuit of science. Let it also be
quite clear that what we have described as the functions of scientific au-
thority go far beyond a mere confirmation of facts asserted by science. For
one thing, there are no mere facts in science. A scientific fact is one that
has been accepted as such by scientific opinion, both on the grounds of
evidence in favour of it and because it appears sufficiently plausible in
view of the current scientific conception of the nature of things. Besides,
science is not a mere collection of facts, but a system of facts based on
120 Chapter Seven
their scientific interpretation. It is this system that is endorsed by a scien-

tific authority. (Polanyi 1962, 65)
This emphasis on the essential role of scientific authority lies at the

heart of Polanyis post-critical, anti-Cartesian philosophy. He admits that
in Descartes time the revolt against obsolete and petrified scholastic au-
thority was understandableand the doctrine of universal doubt so essen-
tial to Cartesian scepticism might have been justifiable, too. However,
Polanyi thinks that modern science is and needs to be built on trust and
governed by scientific authority as represented by the academic commu-
nity; there should be a meritocracy that is not an externally established
body of designated scientists but, rather, a community of people accredited
as scientists by their fellow scientists. And this accrediting depends in its
turn on a meritocratic organization from its topthe academy of sciences
(see Polanyi 1964, 163). Though he adds elsewhere:
Admittedly, scientific authority is not evenly distributed throughout the

body of scientists; some distinguished members of the profession predomi-
nate over others of more junior standing. But the authority of scientific
opinion remains essentially mutual; it is established between scientists, not
above them. (Polanyi 1962, 56)
Polanyis very idealised picture of the scientific community resem-

blesas I have saidmore a priestly brotherhood (or Mozarts freema-
sons) than a real scientific body3. Nevertheless, in the 1960s it could still
be accepted as an ideal to be approximated. It was constructed on the ideal
pattern of the antique Greek polis democracy. This dignified image of the
polis democracy had been inculcated in the minds of most of Polanyis
generation in their youth, before WW1. But as B. de Jouvenel was noting
in 1961:
3
There are, however, some doubts expressed in B. de Jouvenels (1961) paper on
Polanyis republic of science. In connection with the role of scientific authority,
Jouvenel writes: At this point the picture arouses some disquiet: so much seems to
rest upon that small number of senior scientists who apparently control all ave-
nues. Polanyi does not call attention, however, to the dangers of this structure of
power, but to its efficiency. Familiar as he is with the world of science, he would,
of course, denounce such evils, if there were occasion to do so. But this leaves us
with a question-mark. Is it not strange that the internal constitution of the Republic
of Science should present traits so similar to those which scientists so ardently
denounce in the body politic whenever they utter political opinion? (Jouvenel
1961, 139-40)
Large, sprawling, diverse modern society is definitely not a polis. It is per-

haps in order to note that the Catholic Church, when it ceased to be com-
posed of small churches of ardent believers and came to deal with all,
tempered the rigour of principles by the mildness of discretion, in the
words of Gregory VII. It is a simple idea but an important one that the dis-
cipline of the dedicated cannot be extended to the many without hateful
despotism. This, indeed, is at no point suggested by Polanyi. (Jouvenel
1961, 140)
My point is somewhat different, though, from JouvenelsI think that

recent developments in the world of science have run in parallel to those
of the Catholic Church, as described by him above. By this I mean that,
today, science is not the business of the devoted fewit is for the well-
paid, commissioned many; it is no more (or not typically) a vocation but a
joband the scientist is more of an entrepreneur working on a project-
financed task within an R+D team, rather than someone operating within
the confines of a devoted academic community. The most typical situation
now, about 50 years after the appearance of Polanyis outstanding papers
on science, is completely different from those prevailing in his times.
The new image of the successful and admired scientist is no longer mod-
elled on public scientists such as Linus Pauling and George Wald, who de-
voted themselves to pure science and to questioning sciences role in the
betterment of society. Rather, the successful scientist todaywrites Shel-
don Krimskyis the person who can make contribution to the advance-
ment of knowledge while concomitantly participating in the conversion of
the new knowledge into marketable products. As for the betterment of so-
ciety, such a notion now becomes captured by the phrase knowledge
transfer. It is said today that the scientists who can turn ideas into profit
are the ones who are contributing to a better world. (Krimsky 2003, 1-2)
Polanyis and Mertons norms are no more valid, even as governing

ideals for the moral dimension of scientific research. The famous Merto-
nian normscommunalism, universalism, disinterestedness, originality
and organised scepticism (Merton 1968)have been replaced by the more
realistic Zimanian norms. According to Ziman (1996 and 2000), post-
academic science is: proprietary, local, authoritarian, commissioned and
expert.
A very dangerous consequence of these changes is that the public trust
in science even as trust in scientists is decreasingand is even vanishing
in some disciplines (as, for example, in the bio-medical sciences, accord-
ing to Krimsky 2003). Trust, however, was the most important component
122 Chapter Seven
within the Polanyian ideal of the scientific communitytrust within and

towards the community of scientists. As John Hardwig (1991) noted:
In most disciplines, those who do not trust cannot know; those who do not
trust cannot have the best evidence for their beliefs. In an important sense,
then, trust is often epistemologically even more basic than empirical data
or logical argument: data and arguments are available only through trust. If
the metaphor of foundation is still useful, then the trustworthiness of mem-
bers of epistemic communities is the ultimate foundation for much of our
knowledge. (Hardwig 1991, 693-694)
What has happened? Why have the Polanyian high moral standards
and Mertonian norms now become obsolete? I do not think that this is in
consequence of a deplorable moral decline among scientistsit is, rather,
a consequence of a fundamental change in the social role, position and
context of scientific research.
Up to about the second half of the 20th century, scientific research was
not typically goal-directed, especially in relation to so-called pure science.
It was not steered by externals, i.e. by political or economic forces or so-
cial requirements; and its typical form of financing was via a countrys
budgetstate-financingwhere the income of the researcher did not
depend on his/her actual achievements. His/Her salary was a kind of
apanage paid by the state or by a philanthropic foundation. (N.B. The
pure/applied distinction was not overly sharp at that time; today it is even
less so. See: Johnson 2004).
Social demands appeared in a general and non-specific, indeed rather
diffuse and non-well-defined way. Regarding the discoveries of science,
technological applicability and profitability were of no concern. Basic
research (Polanyis pure science) was assumed to be a goal in itself,
serving the ultimate end only: true knowledge, and intellectual enlighten-
ment. Indeed, during the 18th and 19th centuries, science had an emancipa-
tory mission: it became the path-breaker for the Enlightenment; while
during the process of secularisation of western societies science slowly
began to occupy the former position held by the Church. It became the
highest authority, having a worldly transcendence, and it was seemingly
detached from all social, political and economic (let alone religious) con-
siderations, requirements and conflicts. It appeared to transcend such
things, serving as the highest instance to apply to for decisions in earthly
matters. It was science that provided educated people living in Europe
with the basics of a world-view (Weltanschauung), that which could, lead
to generally enlightened and rational ways of living. It was this mentality
that promoted and later sustained the rationalistic and democratic estab-
lishments of these societies.
In the second half of the 20th century however, the social role and posi-
tion of science fundamentally changed. In its last decades, a whole epoch
of science came to a close, and a new one (using Zimans term, a so-
called) post-academic science came into existence.
Science is being pressed into service as the driving force of a national
R+D system, a wealth-creating techno-scientific motor for entire econo-
mies (Ziman 2000, 73). In the new era, science is thus put into the service
of R+D, thereby of multinational corporations (Ziman 1996; 2000, Krim-
sky 2003). Researchers are no longer free to choose their own problems
to work uponthey work on R+D projects in transitory teams; so they are
no longer operating within stable academic communities. What they are
seeking is not a deep insight into things and intellectual satisfactionit is
profit and remuneration. Polanyi warned that political interference could
be lethal to true science, though today we have reasons to be concerned
about economic interference into science. Research has become an eco-
nomic enterprise and science education at universities is now a service-
industry (i.e. the first entrepreneurial universities came into being about
15- 20 years ago (Grit 1997, Jacob 1997)).
Richard Gelwick (1977, 115) describes Polanyis philosophy as having
a prophetic power. I think that Polanyis philosophy has not proved to be
prophetic in the sense of foreseeing what would be coming into exis-
tenceit is prophetic in the sense of anticipating what is going out to be
lost; namely, where the idealand to some extent even the practiceof
science, which has been based on trust and dedication instead of on profit
and instrumental value, suffers losses. Let me once more quote John
Hardwig:
Clearly, the implications of the role of trust in knowledge will reach be-
yond epistemology and the philosophy of science into ethics and social
philosophy The prevailing tenor of twentieth century Anglo-American
philosophy has been that epistemology is more basic than ethics But
scientific realismindeed any theory that grants objectivity to scientific
judgementturns out to be incoherent when combined with subjectivism
or scepticism in ethics. It remains true, of course, that ethical claims must
meet epistemological standards. But if much of our knowledge rests on
trust in the moral character of testifiers, then knowledge depends on moral-
ity and epistemology also requires ethics. (Hardwig 1991, 708)
I believe that Polanyis important insights into the moral dimension of

science imply that knowledge and rationality without morality would lead
124 Chapter Seven
to Dr. Mengele, while morality without rationality would lead to the Inqui-
sition and witch-hunting; and irrationality joined with immorality would
result in the Nazi and Stalinist nightmares, along with Lisenko cases. The
fourth variantrationality conjoined with moralityis thus our only
chance for finding true knowledge, something achievable by human be-
ings.
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PART II
BEING
CHAPTER EIGHT
FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO ONTOLOGY:
POLANYIS ARGUMENTS FOR THE LAYERED
ONTOLOGY
TIHAMR MARGITAY1
1. The Structure of Knowing

Let us proceed from the key elements of Polanyis theory of knowing.
The holistic structure of knowing consists of three elements. We know
something by relying on subsidiary clues and integrating them into a focal
whole. The focal whole may represent a recognized object, a discovery, a
skilful performance, a true belief, an achievement of learning, etc. The
clues and the integration are tacit elements of knowing. They are logically
unspecifiable, firstly because it is impossible to calculate from a focal
whole such clues and the way they are integrated. Different clues under
different integrations may lead to the same whole. Secondly, they are
logically unspecifiable because clues are clues only by bearing a certain
functional relation to the focal whole. Any specification would put them
into a focal position, thereby failing to capture them as subsidiary clues
and failing to represent their functional character.
Additionally, the same part-integration-whole triad has a semantic as-
pect too. The subsidiary element as a subsidiary contribution to the whole
gets its meaning from the whole, in so far as it contributes to the meaning
of the focal whole. The meaning of the subsidiary clue can be compre-
hended via having comprehension of the meaning of the focal whole. The
cognitive and the semantic sidesin other words, knowing and under-
standing (or sense-giving)are two sides of the same tacit knowing proc-
ess.
1
While working on this paper, I was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Re-
search Fund (OTKA K72598).
From Epistemology to Ontology 129
Knowledge of the focal object is emergent on the knowledge of the

subsidiary clues, and correspondingly, the meaning of the whole is emer-
gent on the meaning of its subsidiary constituents. Both the structure of
knowledge and the corresponding structure of meaning constitute an irre-
ducible, hierarchical, logical structure. They are irreducible because the
focal wholes cannot be reduced to, predicted by, or calculated from their
subsidiaries. Focal wholes are genuine novelties compared to their sub-
sidiary constituents. Such structures are hierarchical because a focal whole
can serve as a subsidiary constituent for some other focal wholes at the
next level.
2. The Structure of Reality

Now we need to turn to the key elements of Polanyis hierarchical on-
tology: the notion of reality, emergence and dual control.
To trust that a thing we know is real is to feel that it has the independ-
ence and power for manifesting itself in yet unknown ways in the future.
I shall say that minds and problems are more real than cobblestones.
(Polanyi 1966, 32-33)
This reality has a multi-level structure, and the levels are joined to-
gether meaningfully in pairs of higher and lower strata (Polanyi 1966,
35). A comprehensive entity on the higher level is emergent on its lower
level parts. It is emergent in two senses: the emergent entity has properties
that cannot be defined through the lower level properties of its parts, and it
is governed by laws that cannot be reduced to lower level laws.2
A comprehensive entity is subject to dual control; first by the laws
that apply to its elements in themselves and second, by the laws that con-
trol the comprehensive entity formed by them (Polanyi 1966, 36). The
dual control means that a comprehensive entity is governed by both the
upper level laws and the laws of the next lower level. How is this possi-
ble? The lower level laws do not fully determine the upper level and thus
the upper level laws operate in a zone left undetermined by lower level
laws.
Natural laws may mold inanimate matter into distinctive shapes, such as
the spheres of the sun and the moon, and into such patterns as that of the
solar system. Other shapes can be imposed on matter artificially, and yet
2
[T]he operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing
its particulars forming the lower level (Polanyi 1966, 36).
130 Chapter Eight
without infringing the laws of nature. The operational principles of ma-

chines are embodied in matter by such artificial shaping. (Polanyi 1966,
40)
The higher level sets boundary conditions for the lower level, and the
lower level determines what sort of higher level entities are possible.
The structure of reality is hierarchical in a relative and in an absolute
sense. A comprehensive entity is on a higher level compared to its parts
(relative), but entities also constitute a hierarchy by their growing com-
plexity (absolute). As, for example, speech is at the top of the consecutive
levels of voice, of words, of sentences etc. (e.g.: Polanyi 1966, 35) and
speech is higher in the (absolute) ontological hierarchy than any biological
organism (say, an elephant); while the latter is higher than a physical sys-
tem (say, the solar system).
3. Reality Is Hierarchical Because the Way We Know

It Is Hierarchical
Polanyi wishes to model the structure of reality on the structure of
knowing. But what is the relationship between the hierarchical structure of
knowing and the multi-level ontology exactly?
The interpretation that is probably most often implied by Polanyi and
by Polanyi scholars is revealed when one looks at key passages from The
Tacit Dimension. Polanyi proceeds from the knowing a skillful perform-
ance:
[W]e consider the way one man comes to understand the skillful perform-
ance of another man. He must try to combine mentally the movements
which the performer combines practically and he must combine them in a
pattern similar to the performers pattern of movements. Two kinds of in-
dwelling meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in
them as part of his body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves
by seeking to dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these moves by in-
teriorizing them. (Polanyi 1966, 29-30)
Mans skillful exercise of his body is a real entity that another person can
know, and know only by comprehending it, and that comprehension of this
real entity has the same structure as the entity which is its object. (Polanyi
1966, 33)
Then he generalizes this observation in the Correspondence Thesis:

We have shown that the kind of comprehensive entities exemplified by

skillful human performances are real things; as real as cobblestones It
seems plausible then to assume in all other instances of tacit knowing the
correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the structure
of the comprehensive entity which is its object. And we would expect then
to find the structure of tacit knowing duplicated in the principles which ac-
count for the stability and effectiveness of all real comprehensive entities.
(Polanyi 1966, 33-34)
We have a very important class of entities constituted by instances of

knowledge in the case of which the ontological structure of the entity is
the same as the epistemic structure of the knowledge concerning that en-
tity; and Polanyi infers from the structural identity that holds in these spe-
cial cases that a structural correspondence holds for all entities in general.
What does this correspondence mean exactly? The learning example
above suggests that the structural correspondence consists in that a lower
level in the structure of knowing of a particular comprehensive entity
corresponds to the lower ontological level of the same entity; and, simi-
larly, a higher level in knowing corresponds to the higher level in ontology
for any particular entity.
But why should they correspond in general, in the case of not knowl-
edge-like entities? Because, says Polanyi, the structure of tacit knowing
determines the structure of comprehensive entities (Polanyi 1966, 55). So
the world has a hierarchical ontological structure because our knowledge
of this world is hierarchical. The ontological structure of a particular entity
follows from the way we know it.
But how does the knowledge of a comprehensive entity determine the
ontological structure of that entity? We may say the following by virtue of
the learning example and the structural correspondence between levels. A
comprehensive entity is emergent on its parts because the knowledge of
that entity is emergent on (integrated from) clues, and the clues are pro-
vided by the parts. So the two consecutive ontological levels have the
same structural relationship as knowing dictates it because the two onto-
logical levels are actually linked up by such knowing.
A consequence of this is that the hierarchical view of the world rests on
the theory of hierarchically structured knowledge.
Let us assume that the structural identity does hold in all cases when
we learn, recognize or comprehend somebody elses knowledge. But why
is it plausible to assume the correspondence in general? How might
this correspondence work out in the cases of not knowledge-like entities?
Polanyi gives no further explicit arguments and treats these questions as if
the answers to them were prima facie obvious, if not self-evident.
132 Chapter Eight
However they are not like this at all. Let us take an example: a watch.
A watch, as a comprehensive entity, is emergent on the physical arrange-
ment of its parts. The watch is defined at the higher ontological level by its
operational principles. These operational principles include the definition
of the parts composing the machine and give an account of their several
functions in the working of the machine; they also state the purpose which
the machine is to serve (Polanyi 1966, 39). While its parts are described
by laws of physics and chemistry that are at the lower level, and we recog-
nize a watch as a higher level, holistic object by means of lower level
subsidiary clues. But we do not recognize it by means of its parts, or by
virtue of its physical-chemical structure; neither do we recognize a watch
simply by its operational principles. In fact, according to Polanyi, to rec-
ognize a watch we rely on clues emanating from different ontological
levels. We make use of impressions about its shape, color etc.; indeed one
might use as a clue that it is clasped on my arm. We also of necessity use
clues coming from our body and from the tradition we are dwelling in
and these are higher up in the ontological hierarchy than my watch. It is
also quite possible that we rely on its function as a clue under some cir-
cumstances, and completely neglect it on other occasions; at any rate most
of us are ignorant about the operational principles of a quartz watch. We
use some clues to recognize this object as a watch and usually rely on
other clues for other kinds of knowing, e.g. for understanding this watch,
for using it, for developing it etc.
Furthermore we know the partsas partsof this watch and their
physical structure only as focal objectsand by no means as constituents
of the whole.
According to Polanyi, there are ontologically non-emergent physical
objects, just as some parts of this watch. For instance, a planet, as Polanyi
said earlier, is completely determined by the laws of physics and chemistry
and, as such, it is a non-emergent object. When we recognize an object of
this kind, itas a focal wholeis always epistemologically emergent on
the clues. Emergence arises with respect to knowing, but there is no emer-
gence from an ontological point of view in such cases. One level of the
ontological hierarchy corresponds to two levels of knowing.
Let me summarize the lessons learned in these examples:
1. There are different kinds of cognitive achievements regarding a
particular comprehensive entity (we recognize it, identify it, use it, under-
stand it etc.). All have the same emergent structure, yet we rely on differ-
ent clues, and these clues are differently related to the parts of the compre-
hensive entity.
2. Knowledge of a comprehensive entity always relies on clues that

are at an epistemologically lower level compared to the integrated whole,
but some of these clues typically come from an ontologically higher level
than the comprehensive entity. As it has been pointed out, we necessarily
rely on our body and tradition etc. when we recognize an object.
3. Knowledge of an entity is always emergent on the clues inte-
grated into it, even in the case of ontologically non-emergent entities. The
parts and their physical descriptions at the ontologically lowest levels are
also known as epistemically emergent focal wholes. There is emergence in
knowing without the ontological emergence of the object known.
Consequently, in general, there is no systematic correspondence be-
tween the ontological levels and levels of knowing. The correspondence
thesis simply proves to be false as a general thesis as soon as we put the
details of the structure of knowing and the proposed ontological structure
in the equation. In other words, what Polanyi says about the knowing of
particular entities is inconsistent with what he says about the ontological
structure of those entities in light of the Correspondence Thesis. Such
correspondence obtains only in special cases of knowledge-like entities.
It also follows from all this that it is not possible that the structure of
knowing determines the ontological structure of entities in the way Polanyi
suggests they do because there is no even correlation between the emer-
gence in knowing and the ontological emergence. In general, it is not pos-
sible to infer the ontological structure of an entity from the way we know
that entity. And, finally, two consecutive ontological levels cannot have
the same structural relationship as knowing because the two ontological
levels are actually linked by knowing (though this may be for different
reasons).
To sum up, the Correspondence Thesis does not work in this strong
version.
4. The Correspondence Thesis Is Only an Heuristic Device

Now, what if we see the Correspondence Thesis as merely suggesting a
heuristic device? Plenty of textual evidence may be brought up to support
such an interpretation; and Polanyi has an explanatory paragraph right
after the one in which the Correspondence Thesis is stated.
Let me try to show what this [the Correspondence Thesis] means.

Take two points. (1) Tacit knowing of a coherent entity relies on our
awareness of the particulars of the entity for attending to it; and (2) if we
switch our attention to the particulars, this function of the particulars is
canceled and we lose sight of the entity to which we had attended. The on-
134 Chapter Eight
tological counterpart of this would be (1) that the principles controlling a

comprehensive entity would be found to rely for their operations on laws
governing the particulars of the entity in themselves; and (2) that at the
same time the laws governing the particulars in themselves would never
account for the organizing principles of a higher entity which they form.
(Polanyi 1966, 34)
It says no more than that the similarity between the structure of knowing
and the structure of reality consists in that the lower level partially, but not
fully determines the higher level in both cases and the higher level laws
determine it. Thats it. It is a much weaker claim than the earlier one.
There is no claim about that this determination relation between the onto-
logical levels holds because a similar relation holds between the levels of
knowing. Polanyi develops a revolutionary theory of knowing and within
this theory he gives cogent reasons why we should believe that the knowl-
edge of a comprehensive entity cannot be reduced to the cluesbecause it
is only partially, but not fully determined by them. But why should we
believe that the same type of determination relation holds for consecutive
ontological levels?
After having lost the firm ground provided by the structure of know-
ing, the architecture of reality should be able to stand by itself and should
be justified by purely ontological arguments. So unless Polanyi has some-
thing as good as his theory of knowing to support his grandiose ontologi-
cal architecture, it runs into the same troubles as other, prima facie even
less problematic multi-level ontologies did in the past.
5. Purely Ontological Arguments

The fundamental ontological claims are that each higher level princi-
ple controls the boundary left indeterminate by the next lower level (Po-
lanyi 1966, 49) and it is impossible to represent the organizing principles
of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars (Polanyi
1966, 36) on the lower level. That is:
(1) lower level laws are not able to determine an emergent entity ful-
ly, although
(2) higher level laws can do this in terms of boundary conditions, and
(3) higher level concepts and laws are irreducible to lower level con-
cepts and laws.
These are not independent; and (1) and (2) are necessary conditions for
dual control.
5.1. An Argument for Dual Control

Polanyi argues for (1) by using the example of machines. In the case of
machines, the lower level is governed by the laws of physics and chemis-
try determining the material and the shape of the parts of a machine, while
the boundary condition for this lower level is provided by the higher level
operational principles of the machine.
Thus a machine can be described as a particular configuration of solids.

[A] particular specimen of a machine is characterized by the nature of its
materials, by the shape of its parts and their mutual arrangement, which
can be defined by the boundary conditions of the system. [T]he laws of
physics and chemistry are equally valid for all solids, whatever their mate-
rials and shapes, and the boundary conditions determining their arrange-
ment. From which it follows that neither the materials nor their ar-
rangement, can be derived from physics and chemistry. (Polanyi, 1969,
175)
In brief, if laws of physics and chemistry are true for all kinds of configu-
ration then they cannot define a specific configuration that might constitute
a particular machine. To do so we need higher level principles.
This inference is faulty, howeverand this becomes clear if we substi-
tute the solar system for the machine, for the solar system is supposed to
be determined solely by physics and chemistry. It is true the initial values
for the parameters of a material system cannot be determined by the laws
of physics but, rather, merely by previous values and processes. Neverthe-
less, this does not mean that the values of these parameters should be set
by some ontologically higher level principle because the solar system has
a particular shape, material and arrangement; and, as Polanyi said earlier,
no higher level principles are needed to determine them. We are not told
why the physical level is able to determine in its entirety the physical
structure of the solar system, and why it cannot the physical structure of,
say, my watch.
My argument here points out an internal inconsistency of Polanyi
and this is not an accidental one. The following general problem lies be-
hind it. The physical parameters of material systems are supposed to be
fully determined by the laws of physics. Thus, the arrangement of the
particles in the Universe nowincluding the particles constituting a par-
ticular configuration of solids that we now call my watchare fully de-
termined by the laws of physics and the arrangement of the particles in the
purely physical state of the Universe, prior to any emergence and well
before the operational principles of this watch were invented. If physics is
136 Chapter Eight
completeand we generally think it isthen it should leave no indeter-

minacy with regard to the physical parameters in the background that are
waiting to be determined by higher level operational principles. So we
have good reasons to think that precondition (1), for dual control, does not
hold. The operational principle of a machine cannot determine the mate-
rial, the shape and the arrangement of its parts; at most, operational princi-
ples can give their functional description. Thus his argument above proves
to be defective, and Polanyi has nothing to counter such a conclusion.
5.2. A Semantic Argument for Unidentifiability

In order to show the irreducibility of the concepts and principles of the
higher level to that of the lower level, Polanyi tries show that machines
cannot be identified by their physical-chemical topography.
Nonetheless, it is obvious enough that if a machine is realized by a
configuration of solids, then nothing can prevent us from physically de-
scribing one particular machine, e.g. my watch.
But this could describe only one particular specimen of one kind of ma-
chine. It could not characterize a class of machines of the same kind, which
would include specimens of different size, often of different materials, and
with an infinite range of other variations. Such class would be truly charac-
terized by the operational principles of the machines It is by these prin-
ciples, when laid down in the claims of a patent, that all possible realiza-
tions of the same machine are legally covered; a class of machine is de-
fined by its operational principles. (Polanyi 1969, 175; my italics)
The task is to identify and generalize such features of this topography as

characterize a[n] engine. (Polanyi, 1969, 176)
But this can be done only in terms of the technical descriptions and not of
physics or chemistry, because
[p]hysics and chemistry include no knowledge of the operational prin-

ciples of machines. Hence a complete physical and chemical topography of
an object would not tell us whether it is a machine, and if so, how it works,
and for what purpose. (Polanyi 1966, 39)
The general structure of the argument is clear: according to the Quinean

tenet, there is no entity without identity. Identification is necessary for
something to be an entity. The concept of reality entails that machines are
entities, so they need to be identified. They can be identified only by con-
cepts and operational principles provided by engineering science and nei-
ther can be given in terms of physics. Therefore, the concepts and princi-
ples of engineering science cannot be reduced to physics, and machines
are ontologically distinct from physical objects; for machines are at a
higher level than physical objects.3
It is generally not true that concepts and laws of a scientific theory
cannot be reduced to that of another just because the latter does not have
the concepts of the former. A case in point is the reduction of the phe-
nomenological to statistical thermodynamics. Some would say that this is
a conceptual-nomological reduction. The theory (concepts and laws) TH,
describing a comprehensive system, can be reduced to the theory, TL,
describing its constituents if and only if non-mathematical concepts of TH
can be defined in terms of the concepts of TL and if the laws of TH in this
translation can be deduced from the laws of TL. But even a much weaker
reduction, in which the concepts of the higher level theory are identified
with or defined in terms of lower level concepts, would be enough to iden-
tify comprehensive entities by lower level descriptions. If such a weaker
conceptual reduction of the technical description of a machine to physics
is possible, then a physical description will serve to identify the machine.
The lack of concepts at the lower level is not enough to show the uni-
dentifiability of the higher level entities by lower level descriptions. To
show this, Polanyi should have shown that the higher level concepts can-
not be identified with or defined by lower level ones. Without this, his
argument for identification loses its force.
The possibility of a weak conceptual reduction is not only a theoretical
challenge for Polanyis argument, as we do have simple examples for such
conceptual identification. For example, some machines may beand
indeed are for some purposesidentified by their physical parameters in
industrial standards.
In order to appreciate how industrial standards define certain simple
types of machines, let us return to Polanyis argument (above). He admits
that a particular specimen of a particular type of machine can be character-
ized and thereby identified by its physical, chemical topography. However,
he claims that it is impossible to identify a class of machines by their
physical-chemical structure, not because we are ignorant of how to do so
3
The epistemic reading of this argument would be that you cannot identify a
comprehensive entity unless you know the appropriate concepts and its operational
principles (i.e. this is a necessary condition for us to perform an action of knowing.);
and you do not know it by knowing only physics. It was shown earlier that knowledge
of an operational principle is not a necessary condition for actual identification of a
machine.
138 Chapter Eight
but because no such description whatsoever could do this. Obviously, if a

class of machines of a particular type were finite, it could be identified by
the class of the physical descriptions of each specimen. This is not feasi-
ble, however, since the class of a particular type of machine is not finite
because a particular type admits an infinity of different realizations. But
this unidentifiability is not true of several types of machines. Industrial
standards reduce the possible variations of simple tools and fittings which
for Polanyi are emergent structures in the same way as machines are (Po-
lanyi, 1959, 49). Standards specify the physical-chemical topography of
nuts, bolts, etc. by specifying their dimensions and chemical compositions.
(It is odd that Polanyi was keenly aware of patents but overlooked the
significance of standards.)
One may object that there are non-standard nuts and bolts that can be
identified solely by their functional descriptionthough this is not an
objection that can save Polanyi because it is also true for a functional de-
scription. This objection is simply based on that no explicit description
be it physical or functionalcan provide a definition of the class of refer-
ents of a linguistic expression in terms of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions. We learned this from Wittgenstein, but Polanyi would also hasten to
acknowledge it. So standards specify/identify the class of nuts, bolts,
wrenches, cogwheels, pneumatic tyres, medicines, food coloring agents,
salami, bricks, paper formats (DIN EN ISO 216) and God knows what else
by physical, chemical descriptions just as successfully as they could ever
be specified by their functional description or by their operation principle
while all of them are emergent entities for Polanyi.
Industrial standards show that comprehensive entities can be identified
by physical-chemical parameters even without the general reduction of
higher level concepts and principles to lower level concepts and laws.
Thus, the lack of concepts is not enough to show the impossibility of iden-
tification and to establish ontological differences thereby.
6. What Is Left of Polanyis Ontological Hierarchy?

My arguments above, if cogent enough, might show only that Polanyi
fails to give good reasons for us to believe in his ontological hierarchy.
Alleged ontological boundaries and differences are left unjustified and are
relegated to mere postulatesthough not all of them. An exception here is
that Polanyis arguments do stand firm for that knowledge-like entities are
emergent entities. How convincing they are depends on whether the fol-
lowing two fundamental assumptions can be accepted. The first assump-
tion is that we have access to someone elses knowledge by copying her
effort of knowing by dwelling in and making use of the same/similar clues

as she is doing (see the example of skillful performance, above). That is,
learning from someone is essentially a form of imitation or, to put it in
terms of the appropriate philosophical tradition, understanding someone is
Einfhlung. This would guarantee that the structure of knowing is the
same as the structure of being for knowledge-like entities. The second
assumption needed is that Polanyis theory of knowing is correct in the
sense that the integrated whole is indeed emergent on the clues (dual con-
trol and irreducibility). To me, this seems to be well argued by Polanyi for
the first person perspective. It is less clear, however, why somebody from
the third person perspective cannot reconstruct my clues as well as my
integration by getting around the problem of the duality of focal-subsidiary
functional positions. This then leads to the first assumption excluding
flatly the possibility of a scientific study of cognition. Be that as it may,
the first condition for the emergence of knowledge-like entities is that
third person knowing should be like that of the first person as regards
emergence. To sum up, in so far as Polanyi account of knowing is con-
vincing, so is the ontological emergence of knowledge-like entities.
The ontological status of knowledge-like entities has far-reaching con-
sequences in Polanyis philosophy. Probably the most important emergent
level in the ontological hierarchy is the personal level. Polanyis argu-
ments are insufficient to support the claim that the level of machines or a
biological level are fundamentally novel to and emergent on the physical,
but the personal level is different. Knowledge-like entities are the most
fundamental constituents of person. To be a person is to have certain per-
ceptual capacities, to possess certain skills, to be able to accumulate know-
ledge, to adopt specific values, particular traditions etc.; and if we have
access to a person only by mimicking her knowing-like relation to the
world, it then follows from these two that the ontological structure of any
person tallies with the structure of knowing. Consequently, a person is
emergent only in so far as knowledge is. While the same line of thought
can be applied to such important entities within Polanyis philosophy like
truth, discovery, community and traditionthat is, to all those things that,
broadly speaking, are personal. This is the domain of applicability for the
Correspondence Thesis and this is what remains defensible from Polanyis
monumental multi-level ontology. And although it is much less than it was
originally meant to be, it is still quite remarkable.
140 Chapter Eight
Bibliography
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge. London: Routledge and Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
. (1966) The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge.
. (1969) Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi. M. Grene
(ed.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
CHAPTER NINE
DOWNWARD CAUSATION, OR THE TACIT

CHARACTER OF THE WORLD?
APPROACH TO A NON-REDUCTIVE WORLD-
VIEW THROUGH POLANYIS PHILOSOPHY
MRTON DINNYEI
1. The Ontological State of Higher-Level Properties and

the Problem of Downward Causation in Non-Reductive
Physicalism
1.1. The Non-Reductive Physicalist Theory
Contemporary ontological approaches looking at mind-body relations

see a stratified model of the world. Within the framework of a physicalist
approach, lowest-level entities are identical with fundamental, micro-
physical entities. The entities belonging to higher levels are built up from
their mereological compositions (being entity-monism). Mereological
relations can be expressed as being part of predicates. Furthermore,
the physicalist connects all entity levels containing characteristic particu-
lars with different properties that are characteristic of these appropriate
levels (Kim 1995, 162).
Now, a question arises for the physicalist: how should relations be-
tween properties belonging to neighbouring levels be characterized?
The non-reductivist theories note that higher-level properties belong to
the real ontology of the world, having their own explanatory powers. Thus
they are realistic with reference to high-level mental properties. However,
such high-level properties do possess special kinds of connection with
physical ones, which are not reductive relations.
142 Chapter Nine
There are different theses explaining the relations between properties

belonging to different entity levels. Realization and supervenience rela-
tionsif we bypass an exhaustive discussion of themcan be put into in
a basic thesis: mental properties are instantiated by a given physical sys-
tem if, and only if, this system instantiates appropriate physical properties
(cf. Kim 1993a, 167).
To put it briefly, the non-reductive physicalist theory that aims to ex-
plain mind-body relations is based on the following theses (Kim 1993b):
(1) Physical monism. (Every particular is to be considered as either a
fundamental physical entity or a physical, mereological composition of
them).
(2) Mental properties are irreducible to physical ones. (Mental realism)
(3) The non-reductive dependence relationlet us call this relation, in
brief, realization; although the following argumentation is valid within
wider limits.
1.2. The Problem of Causation

At this point, an important question arises: from a non-reductive point
of view how should one define causal relations? In Kims approach, the
notion of causation might be the following:
We shall assume here a broadly nomological conception of causality,

roughly in the following sense: an instance of M causes an instance of N
just in case there is an appropriate causal law that invokes the instantiation
of M as a sufficient condition for the instantiation of N. (Kim 1993b, 204)
Thus, in a nomological causal relation there is a given law, T, and if one

substitutes the values of the parameters of M in T, one provide values with
the parameters of N. At the physical level this means that there is a law-
based connection between physical properties, so that an instance of a
physical property P can determine an instance of another physical property
P* in a nomological causal relation. In other words, P has a causal power
in relation to P*and this is a special kind of realist attitude with regard
to physical properties.
How, then, can one comprehend the ontological status of a given prop-
erty within this framework? One might claim that attributing causal pow-
ers to a given property means having a realist attitude to it. As Kim notes
based on Samuel Alexander: This we may call Alexanders dictum: To
be real is to have causal powers. (Kim 1993b, 202) And how can one
now interpret the problem of mental causation?
Downward Causation, or the Tacit Character of the World? 143
Below, I shall interpret Kims argumentation using his nomenclature

(Kim 1993a; 1993b).
Assume that an entity instantiates mental properties (M). By virtue of
thesis (2) at a given time, the M mental property is real, that is, it has caus-
al powers. In the nomological sense it is able to lead to another property,
Q. Here, we can distinguish two different cases:
(I) Q is a mental property.
(II) Q is a physical property.
Case (I) is mental-mental causation, while case (II) is mental-physical
causation. Kim claims that mental-mental causation is possible only if
mental-physical causation is possible.
Suppose that a given instantiation of a mental property (M) is causally
efficacious in bringing about an instantiation of another mental property,
M*. In other words, an instantiation of M is nomologically sufficient for an
instantiation of M*. At the same time M* is physically realized. That is, ex
hypothesi, there has to be an instantiation of a given physical property P*
(or a set of physical properties) that determines M*. In this way, we find
two independent explanations for why an instantiation of M* occurs. First,
an instantiation of M causes an instantiation of M*; and second, an instan-
tiation of P* brings about M*.
In order to reconcile the tension between these explanations, one may
suppose that a joint occurrence of M and P* is a necessary condition for
M*. However, it might additionally be supposed that M and P* are two
distinct, independently sufficient conditions for M*. (In this case, M* is
over-determined). Neither the former nor the latter supposition is accept-
able, however, as there has to be a physical realization base, and P* is
itself sufficient for an instantiation of M*. To eschew this problem one
needs only to claim, coherently, that a given instance of M causes an in-
stance of P*, which can be seen as a sufficient physical base for an in-
stance of M*. And Kim shows why downward causation is incorrect.
Suppose that an instance of M causes an instance of P*. However, M is
realized by a physical property, let us call it P. Since Pby virtue of the
realization thesisis sufficient for M, consequently P is sufficient cause
for P* too. From all this it follows that since the causal relation between P
and P* holds, one need not attribute causal powers to Mso that M is a
mere epiphenomenon.
In order to avoid the problems mentioned above, Kim suggests a mod-
erate kind of reductionism. Based on this supposition, he rejects the lay-
ered ontological model, although he is not an eliminativist with regard to
mental concepts (Kim 1993a, 174-76).
144 Chapter Nine
2. An Interpretation of Higher-Level Properties in Michael

Polanyis Philosophy
2.1. The Structure of Argumentation
In the following I will expound Michael Polanyis point of view con-
cerning the ontological nature of the world. I will endeavour to show how
one can interpret higher-level properties within a framework of Polanyis
ontology and what kinds of relations hold between appropriate ontological
levels. I will also argue that the problem of downward causation does not
arise in such an ontology.
The structure of argumentation can be expounded as follows:
(Premise A) Comprehending a higher-level entity is a tacit from-to
process, in which an organizing principle serves as a clue (proximal term)
and the focal object is the entity itself (focal/distal term).
(Premise B) The higher-level entity is organized by the principle men-
tioned above, which has a real ontological state.
(Premise C) Properties and relations between properties of higher-level
(machine-like) entities are described via use of organizing principles (rules
of rightness). This terminology delineates the success or failure of this
kind of entity (let us provide it with rules of rightness terminology),
which differs from the causal terminology pertaining to lower-level enti-
ties.
(Premise D) Fundamental physical entities are described by resorting
to fundamental physical properties and causal physical laws.
(Premise E) The organizing principle is not reducible to the nomologi-
cal causal relations that pertain to the lower-level.
From these premises I will conclude the following:
(Conclusion F) Properties and relations between properties of higher-
level entities are not, as a result, reducible to those of lower-level entities.
(Conclusion G) Properties and relations between properties of higher-
level entities are not to be described in terms of nomological, causal rela-
tions. Consequently, the problem of inter-level causation does not arise.
2.2. The Structure of Tacit Knowing

Michael Polanyi emphasises in many of his papers the tacit structure of
knowing. When observing a certain object, one relies on an awareness of
clues to be able to comprehend the whole of the entity. Thus, the clues are
subsidiary elements (proximal elements), ones that direct the attention to
the focal one (distal element). Polanyi distinguishes between four kinds of
relation (function or aspect) between two terms (proximal and distal):
Functional relation: that the observer knows the proximal term only by
relying on his awareness of it so as to attend to the distal (Polanyi 1966,
10).
Phenomenal function: that awareness of the proximal term is simulta-
neous with the appearance of the distal term in a tacit knowing act (Po-
lanyi 1966, 11).
Semantic aspect: that the integration of proximal elements creates a
distal term that is the meaning of the proximal elements (Polanyi 1966 12-
13).
From these aspects, Polanyi deduced a fourth one, an ontological one:
The from-to relation between two terms has a meaningful connection
that can be identified with gaining an understanding of the real compre-
hensive entity constituted by these two terms (cf. Polanyi 1966, 13); and if
one turns his attention to the proximal, the meaningful connection disap-
pears.
The tacit knowing act presupposes a knowing person, one who is in-
eliminable from this process - so that the knowledge originating from this
knowing act is by definition personal.
2.3. The Ontological Base of Tacit Knowing

What are the consequences of this picture of knowing? Polanyi claims,
as we have seen, that there is a real ontological function within tacit know-
ing. To quote him:
It seems plausible then to assume in all [] instances of tacit knowing the

correspondence between the structure of comprehension and the structure
of the comprehensive entity which is its object. (Polanyi 1966, 33-34)
The proximal element, which serves as a clue concerning tacit knowing

of a higher-level entity, has a real ontological base. Observing a higher-
level entitylike a machine, or an organismin order to understand it,
we have to perceive a real principle that coordinates its parts; and this is
besides its empirically observable behaviour. Then, relying on this princi-
ple, we will be able to understand the entity as a comprehensive, focal
object (Premise A). Below, I will illustrate the nature of these principles.
In demonstrating the organizing principles, Polanyi uses the example of a
machine.
146 Chapter Nine
[] the machine as a whole works under the control of two distinct princi-
ples. The higher one is the principle of the machines design, and this har-
nesses the lower one, which consists in the physical chemical processes on
which the machine relies. (Polanyi 1969, 225)
Organizing principles are strategies that are applicable to an inanimate

physical system without violating its causal laws. According to Polanyi,
such principles can be defined as follows: These principles may be said to
govern the boundary conditions of an inanimate systema set of condi-
tions that is explicitly left undetermined by the laws of nature (Polanyi
1966, 40). Polanyi distinguishes between test-tube-type and machine-type
of boundary conditionand I will here be focusing on the machine-type
ones.
In Polanyis view, these principles determine boundary conditions for
laws of nature (the principle of marginal control) (Polanyi 1966, 40-41).
However, low-level physical laws represent restrictions determining the
set of possible principles. Therefore, the higher-level entity can come into
existence by a principle that is based on the lower-level physical laws and
causal relations. There is a mutual relation (Premise B); and utilizing all
these claims we can thus infer the following:
(I.) Principles can only account for the successful workings of higher-
level entities but leave their failures entirely unexplained (Polanyi 1974,
329); so that such principles (rules of rightness) can only be defined by
resorting to special rules of rightness terminology.
(II.) The principles are not reducible to physical laws. In Polanyis
words: [] the class of things defined by a common operational princi-
ple cannot be even approximately specified in terms of physics and chem-
istry (Polanyi 1974, 329).
Claim (I.) shows that causal relations have to be strictly distinguished
from principles, and rules of rightness terms cannot be defined via use
of causal terminology (Premise C). Quoting Polanyi:
It would be wrong to speak of establishing the physical and chemical

causes of success, for the success of a machine is defined by its opera-
tional principles, which are not specifiable in physico-chemical terms. If a
stratagem succeeds, it does so in accordance with its own premeditated in-
ternal reasons; if it is fails, this is due to unforeseen external causes. (Po-
lanyi 1974, 332)
Organizing principles are able to account only for the successful working
of higher-level entities but cannot explain their failures; so that such prin-
ciples (rules of rightness) can only be defined via use of rules of right-
ness terminology. This is what Polanyi noted when saying: [] we may

conclude [] that in our knowledge of a comprehensive entity, embody-
ing a rule of rightness, any information supplied by physics and chemistry
can play only a subsidiary part (Polanyi 1974, 331).
According to this claim (II.), we may say that the principles are not re-
ducible to the causal relations existing between basic physical properties.
Though the organizing principle is based on these fundamental laws, the
laws alone cannot define or govern its own boundary conditions. Conse-
quently, the connection between both of these is created by marginal con-
trolas laid out in premise E.
I would like to stress, here, that Polanyi goes beyond machine-like
structures to deal with living organisms, although the former are sufficient
for dealing with the problem being looked at in this paper.
2.4. A Reinterpretation of Causal Relations

In section 1.2., we saw that the fundamental theses of non-reductive
physicalism lead to unacceptable consequences concerning causal rela-
tionsand these would seem to be avoidable only by turning to a reduc-
tive strategy. Below, I seek to prove that within the framework of a spe-
cifically Polanyian type of ontology, the problem of downward causation
may also be eschewed (Conclusion G).
I will return to Kims nomenclature, althoughunlike KimI will
talk about higher-level properties instead of mental properties (symbol H
instead of M), though this will not violate the plausibility of the argument.
How can higher-level properties be interpreted via this terminology?
A higher-level property H is interpreted by the rules of rightness
terminology of an organizing principle. Suppose, then, that this property is
instantiated by a physical system, when a physical property (P) is instanti-
ated. Suppose, too, that an instance of the physical property P causes an
instance of another physical property P* (Premise D). At the same time an
instance of a higher-level property H* will appear.
How can we interpret the relation between P and H (or P* and H*)?
This relation is not a realizationit is, rather, a principle-governed deci-
sion and a statement about the fulfilling of a condition. What does this
mean? In order to define the operations of a physical system like a ma-
chine, there have to be some physical properties that serve as boundaries
for the system. These boundaries might be physical parameters along with
other conditions pointing to success or failure. Yet these parameters and
conditions are not to be inferred from the physics itself. According to
Polanyi, there has to be an independent principle that designates them,
148 Chapter Nine
because [] no level can gain control over its own boundary conditions
and hence cannot bring into existence a higher level, the operations of
which would consist in controlling these boundary conditions (Polanyi
1966, 45).
So how can we interpret the relation between H and H*? This relation
does not have any causal nature, although it can be described in terms of a
higher-level semantic system. These properties constitute [] a system
of rightness, which depends on certain not normative elements for its suc-
cess or failure.wrote Polanyi (Polanyi 1974, 369). Terms describing
this system do not refer directly to either P or P*.
From all this, we are able to arrive at two important consequences:
(I) Properties had by fundamental physical entities do not directly de-
termine or realize higher-level properties.
(II) Since causal relations can only be interpreted at the level of fun-
damental physical entities, inter-level causation does not arise here.
And this is what one is able to state in conclusion G.
It is misleading to speak about unsuccessfulness from physical causes.
It seems that physical causes could determine an instance of a higher-level
property. Yet this is incorrectinstead, physical causes serve to determine
the physical properties; and these properties will be reinterpreted by an
organizing principle. So it is not a case of inter-level causation.
In this nomenclature, how can one interpret the way of operation of
such a principle? At the level of fundamental physical entities we talk
about physical properties and causal laws. The organizing principle as-
signs to this level further initial and boundary conditions. Traditionally,
they are believed to belong to the semantic level of the physical world.
However, determining the boundaries and initial conditions of a physical
system can only be done by using an independent organizing principle,
one that determines and designates these parameters. Their special nature
can be interpreted only by using higher-level terms. Without such a princi-
ple, physics would be a set of merely meaningless properties and causal
relations. It would be empty Laplacean knowledge! Concerning the above,
Polanyi wrote this:
A Laplacean knowledge which merely predicts what will happen under any
given conditions cannot tell us what conditions should be given; these con-
ditions are determined by the technical skill and peculiar interests of chem-
ists and hence cannot be worked out on paper. (Polanyi 1974, 394)
Let us take an example from the field of the classical mechanical prob-
lems of the engineering physics. Newtons third law itself can only say
that the vectorial sums of all forces in the universe must be zero. Yet the
law itself cannot account for the change of state of a given physical system
caused by an external forcebecause, first, the system itself must be spe-
cified by separating the forces in the universe into two distinct sets (exter-
nal and internal)so that an organizing principle can be applied. After this
separation, one can apply causal, physical laws with the physical parame-
ters inserted in them, including boundary and initial parameters. Finally,
the results one can once more interpret using the principle in terms of
rules of rightness.
At this point, what kind of epistemological conclusions can we draw?
From the position of a Laplacean observer (if this is possible) we can ob-
tain a total description of the world at the level of fundamental entities.
However, a knowledge of systems of higher-level entities remains un-
specifiable. This is why Polanyi wrote: [] strictly speaking, it is not the
emerged higher form of being, but our knowledge of it, that is unspecifi-
able in terms of its lower level particulars (Polanyi 1974, 393-94).
Knowledge concerning higher levels is not reducible to ones knowledge
of lower levelsfor we have to step to a higher terminological level, one
that is unspecifiable via resorting to lower-level terms. The gap between
the two levels can only be filled by a tacit knowing act.
Of course, we now have to redefine the notion of existence by reinter-
preting Alexanders dictum: To be real is not only to have causal powers,
but also to have rules of rightness relations that can be interpreted by
an organizing principle.
Kims argument concerning the problem of downward causation is
based on an implicit premise: knowledge of properties belonging to differ-
ent ontological levels can be expressed at the same semantic level. This
commitment might be called deductivism, because it looks at properties at
one semantic level only, and expresses the relations in terms of nomologi-
cal laws. The ambiguous character of non-reductive physicalism can be
seen in the fact that it wishes to insert the relation of inter-level realization
just into one semantic framework; while, it is committed to the independ-
ence of higher-level propertiesespecially mental ones.
3. Summary
First, according to Jaegwon Kim we can see that theses of non-
reductive physicalism have contradictory consequences.
Yet by using Michael Polanyis concept of tacit knowing and its onto-
logical base, we are able to create a different ontological model. We need
to admit that between fundamental properties instantiated by fundamental
entities, relations are created by nomological causal laws. We have addi-
150 Chapter Nine
tionally seen that the higher-level properties and relations are causally
external to fundamental properties and laws, and that the connection be-
tween them is built up by an organizing principle. Then, we must above all
conclude that the problem of downward causation does not turn up in
terms of Polanyian layered ontology.
Finally, we are able to see that Polanyi went beyond Kims moderate
reductionism. The latter claims that higher-level entities and properties are
merely concepts or predicates; yet, according to Polanyi, to get an under-
standing of higher-level entities we need organizing principles, ones that
have a real ontological state and where their existence is closely connected
with tacit knowing.
Bibliography
Kim, J. (1993a) Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical
Issues 3: Science and Knowledge, 157-176.
. (1993b) The Non-Reductivists Troubles with Mental Causation. In
J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.) Mental Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
189-210.
. (1995) Mental Causation: What? Me Worry? Philosophical Issues
6:123-151.
Polanyi, M. (1966) The Tacit Dimension. New York: Doubleday & Com-
pany.
. (1969) Lifes Irreducible Structure. In Knowing and Being: Essays
by Michael Polanyi. (ed. Marjorie Grene) Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 225-239.
. (1974) Personal Knowledge. Towards to a Post-Critical Philosophy.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, London: Routledge & Ke-
gan Paul.
CHAPTER TEN
POLANYI AND EVOLUTION
DANIEL PAKSI
1. Why Does Evolution Play a Distinguished Role

in the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi?
1.1 Explicit and Tacit Knowledge
Polanyi states that the structure of scientific intuition is the same as
that of perception (Polanyi 1969c, 118). This means that both the process
of building up scientific knowledge and elementary perceptions begins
with clues. These clues are not the focal point of our attention (our focal
awareness); rather, they are in the background (as a subsidiary awareness),
though still determine our way of cognition in both cases. So
whenever we are focusing our attention on a particular object, we are rely

for doing so on our awareness of many things to which we are not attend-
ing directly at the moment, but which are yet functioning as compelling
clues for the way the object of our attention will appear to our senses. (Po-
lanyi 1969c, 113)
It is important to note that what is a clue in one given case can, in dif-
ferent situations of perception, be an object of the focus of our attention,
which is then determined by another clue, this occurring in exactly the
same way as another object is determined as we can see in the following
example: the Danube, as a clue in the background, indicates to us that we
sense ourselves moving on aimmobilebridge; yet if we raise our head,
thereby putting the Danube in the focus of our attention, then we do not
sense ourselves moving but, instead, the Danube, which is, in turn, deter-
mined as a percept by the clues of the existence of riverbanks in the back-
ground (Polanyi 1969c, 111). Consequently it is not only a twofold rela-
152 Chapter Ten
tionship in our cognition, where something is an object or a cluerather,

it is a much more complex, multiple process.
In accordance with our perception, all [scientific] research starts by a
process of gathering clues that intrigue the inquiring mind (Polanyi
1969c, 117). In other words, there is no recognition without skills and
previous knowledge underlying it in the background, because intuition is
a skill, rooted in our natural sensibility to hidden patterns (Polanyi 1969c,
118). Thus, both simple perceptions and obtaining scientific knowledge
are
based on clues that have bearing on reality:

x These clues are not fully specifiable.
x Nor is the process of integration which connects them fully definable.
x And the future manifestations of the reality indicated by this coher-
ence are inexhaustible. (Polanyi 1997a, 255)
Regarding these clues, we only have a tacit knowledge, as we cannot spec-

ify exactly what a skill is. We cannot learn to ride a bicycle from a physics
book no matter how much the laws of physics are operating on it (Polanyi
1969d, 144). Of course, we can explain to someone how one pushes down
on the pedals and holds the handle-bars, yet all of these explicit instruc-
tions are not enough because there are also those tacit powers by which
we know more than we can tell (Polanyi 1969a, 172).
There is no explicit knowledge without clues and tacit knowledge.
Tacit knowledge can, however, exist without explicit knowledge, and we
already find this in animals1 (Polanyi 1962, 71-77). While tacit knowl-
edge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being
tacitly understood and applied. Hence all knowledge is either tacit or
rooted in tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable
(Polanyi 1969d, 144). Owing to clues and to our tacit knowledge, there-
fore, we are able to obtain a well-defined, explicit knowledge that relates
to the object that is the focus of our attention, but we cannot possess solely
a knowledge that is wholly explicable and explicit. Furthermore, our ex-
plicit knowledge can be pushed into the background and there function as
tacit knowledge, which will then help us acquire new explicit knowledge.
This is the way our perception and our obtaining scientific knowledge
work, i.e. based on existing clues and our previous tacit knowledge.
So Polanyi states that our total knowledge has two clearly separate but
closely connected parts: explicit and tacit knowledge. The latter, firstly,
1
More specifically, in all living beings, as knowing belongs to the class of
achievements that are comprised in all forms of living (Polanyi 1962, 403).
Polanyi and Evolution 153
makes explicit knowledge accessible to us and, secondly, defines its mean-

ing in different cases of its application.
1.2 Emergence
The relationship between a whole and its parts also follows from the
structure of perception here. The process of integrating information into a
whole, being something new in the focus of our attention, is determined by
its parts, about which we have only subsidiary, tacit knowledge. In the
same way, a whole can function as a clue to attaining explicit knowledge
about one aspect of its parts; and due to the not fully definable integration
process, new qualities arise at the level of the whole. Thus, the whole has
emergent qualities that are consequences of the integration process and the
partswhich are not definable at the level of the parts and cannot be re-
duced to them. And, of course, as in perception, so in science: the obtain-
ing of scientific knowledge runs in parallel with this, and leads to the same
results. Let us take some examples.
Polanyi states that a complete physical and chemical topography of
a frog would tell us nothing about it is a frog, unless we know it previ-
ously as a frog. (Polanyi 1962, 342). The complete physical and chemi-
cal topography of a frog means that we have explicit knowledge of the
physical and chemical parts. If this were possible without ones having
previous knowledge of a frogit is not, as Polanyi claims, but let us sup-
pose it isthen we know atoms, molecules, and their qualities, yet no
more, because at the level of the parts there is nothing which resembles a
frog or its qualities. If we wish to become acquainted with the frog itself,
and if we want to understand the frog as a biological being, then any
information supplied by physics and chemistry can play only a subsidiary
part, (Polanyi 1962, 331) that is, it is something existing behind our pre-
vious knowledge of the frog, i.e. which we naturally have.
Another much loved example given by Polanyi is the notion of a ma-
chine. The complete knowledge of a machine as an object tells us nothing
about it as a machine (Polanyi 1962, 330); concerning the physical object
we may know everything, but we would still know nothing about the ma-
chine itself. Engineering and physics are two different sciences (Polanyi
1967, 39)they are two fundamentally different sciences on two essen-
tially different levels of entities:
Engineering includes the operational principles of machines and some

knowledge of physics bearing on these principles. Physics and chemistry,
on the other hand, include no knowledge of the operational principles of
machines. Hence a complete physical and chemical topography of an ob-
154 Chapter Ten
ject would not tell us whether it is a machine, and if so, how it works, and
for what purpose. Physical and chemical investigations of a machine are
meaningless, unless undertaken with a bearing on the previously estab-
lished operational principles of the machine. (Polanyi 1967, 39)2
Where do these principles of engineering come from, therefore? Po-

lanyi explains that we can distinguish between two different types of
boundary. One of them is the test-tube type, which has no influence on
elementary processes; while the other, the machine type, is the case where
boundaries have precisely the function of controlling and harnessing ele-
mentary physical and chemical processes for some kind of purpose (Po-
lanyi 1969b, 225-226).
The test-tube in which we observe different chemical processes has no
significant effect on them; it has the function of making these processes
observable, so it has purpose only in this sense. In contrast, the structure of
a machine does not have the function of making basic physical and chemi-
cal processes discerniblesuch processes will interest us only if a ma-
chine goes wrong. There is a utilizing of these elementary powers for a
purpose, i.e. for undertaking some kind of work. So the machine uses and
fundamentally determines elementary processes. In this regard, the role of
a test tube-like boundary condition is contingentyet a machine-like one
is always purposeful.3
2
This means that a Laplacean Mind knows nothing about a machinedespite its
complete physical knowledge of the worldif he has no engineering knowledge.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that we posses a complete atomic theory of
inanimate matter. We can then envisage the operations of a Universal Mind in the
sense of Laplace. The initial positions and velocities of all the atoms of the world
being given for one moment of time, and all the forces acting between the atoms
being known, the Laplacean Mind could compute all future configurations of all
atoms throughout the world, and from this result we could read off the exact physi-
cal and chemical typography of the world at any future point in time. But we now
know that there is a great and varied class of objects which cannot be identified,
and still less understood, by establishing their complete physical and chemical
topography, for they are constructed with a view to a purpose which physics and
chemistry cannot define. So it follows that the Laplacean Mind would be subject to
the same limitation: it could not identify any machine nor tell us how it works.
Indeed, the Laplacean Mind could identify no object or process, the meaning of
which consists in serving purpose. It would ignore therefore the existence not only
of machines but also of any kind of tools, foodstuffs, houses, roads and any written
record or spoken messages (Polanyi 1959, 48-49).
3
It is important to note that a machine-type boundary condition is, at the same
time, also a test-tube type boundary condition. When a machine goes wrong, its
An excellent example of the test-tube type boundary condition is the

shape of a rock or a crystal, since the shape of a crystal does not control or
harness the elementary physical processes of the crystal; also, the shape of
a crystal is in consequence of elementary processesin contrast to the
shape of a machine, which, of course, is not a result of elementary proc-
esses pertaining to a machine. The structure of machines and the working
of its structure are shaped by man4 (Polanyi 1969b, 225). Consequently,
the purpose and function of the workings of a machinethat is, the higher
level boundary condition controlling and harnessing the elementary proc-
essesare determined by some kind of human reasoning. This is the
source of principles that are fundamental when it comes to engineering,
though it can and has to be avoided with regard to physics.5
And what is the function of the structure of the frogor of other living
beings? Naturally, its function does not connect up with elementary proc-
esses that can be seen by humans. The structure of a living being has the
same purpose as the structure of a machine: to control and harness elemen-
tary physical and chemical processes and to utilize their powers. Concrete
purposes relating to biological beings are the growth (ontogeny) and re-
production (phylogeny) of the organism. So from the point of view of their
structure living beings fall under machine-type boundary conditions (Po-
lanyi 1969b, 226-227).
A difference between living beings and machines is that, in the case of
the former, structure is not shaped by man but by DNA6 and, naturally, it
is not engineering principles that stand behind it but the principles of evo-
lution and of life.7
Thus, a frog, a rock, a crystal or any other such item is, due to the
structure of our perception and of not fully definable integration processes,
an emergent whole, in contrast with the clues and different parts within.
structure will function for the mechanic as a test-tube type boundary condition that
makes the physical and chemical processes pertaining to the machine observable.
4
It is clear from this example that the machine-like structure is not simply a matter
of complexity.
5
This is why a Laplacean Mind knows nothing about a frog if he has no human-
based knowledge of it.
6
The structure of an organism is a boundary condition harnessing physical
chemical substances within the organism in the service of physiological functions.
Thus, in generating an organism, DNA initiates and controls the growth of a
mechanism that will work as a boundary condition (Polanyi 1969b, 229-230).
7
which are fundamental for biology but can and must be avoided with regard to
physics.
156 Chapter Ten
The first thing to observe here is that, strictly speaking, it is not the emer-
gent higher form of being, but our knowledge of it, that is unspecifiable in
terms of its lower level particulars. We cannot speak of emergence, there-
fore, except in conjunction with a corresponding progression from a lower
level to a higher conceptual level. (Polanyi 1962, 393-394)
However, it is important to note here that these parts of the integration

process are not precise, physical parts as provided via the science of phys-
ics. We do not know about an emergent whole, here being a frog, owing to
the integration process going on with its quarks and electrons8 but simply
we know it previously as a frog9. In contrast with its elementary, physi-
cal parts, therefore, the frog or other living being is emergent because it is
a purposeful individual that is determined by the principles of evolution
and of life10 and also because it has a centre of individuality (Polanyi 1962,
344). Such a centre of individuality is not present in a rock, a crystal or
any other non-living thing, the shapes and structures of which fall under
the test-tube type boundary conditions. I would acknowledge here, there-
fore, two distinguishable conceptual levels but not two separate levels of
existence (Polanyi 1962, 394). The emergent levels of existence are con-
sequences of the machine-like boundary conditions of living beings. It is in
this existential sense that Polanyi speaks about emergent levels in connec-
tion with machines and living beings.
1.3 The Theory of Boundary Conditions

As we have seen in the previous subsection, there are machine-type
boundary conditions in nature that control and harness lower-level, ele-
mentary (both physical and chemical) processes. However, we can also
find these boundary conditions in the lives of humans. For example,
speech restricts words at the lower level in the same way as the specific
structure of living beings restricts basic physical and chemical processes;
8
In the process of tacit knowing our sense organs, our nerves and brain, our
muscles and memories, serve to implement our conscious intention, our awareness
of them enters subsidiarily into the comprehensive entity which forms the focus of
our attention (Polanyi 1969e, 214). But, of course, the background to the focal
entitythe eye moving, and other skills, all as cluesare not existential, physical
parts of the focal whole (in our case here, of the frog).
9
A little boy who has never heard of quarks and electrons, or indeed of physics,
does know what a frog is.
10
That is, it does not follow from our tacit knowing but from the tacit dimension of
our personal knowledge.
thus, speech functions in relation to words as a machine-type boundary

conditionand it has its own emergent principles.
Thus a boundary condition which harnesses the principles of a lower level

in the service of a new, higher level, establishes a semantic relation be-
tween the two levels. The higher comprehends the workings of the lower
and thus forms the meaning of the lower. (Polanyi 1969b, 236)
Yet there are not only two levelsfor example, the level of physics and
chemistry, or the level of living beings, that is, the level of biologybut
several such levels. More precisely, in the case of our speech example too,
there are several levels of machine-type boundary conditions:
...namely the production (1) of voice, (2) of words, (3) of sentences, (4) of
style, and (5) of literary composition. Each of these levels is subject to its
own laws, as prescribed (1) by phonetics, (2) by lexicography, (3) by
grammar, (4) by stylistics, and (5) literary criticism. These levels form a
hierarchy of comprehensive entities, for the principles of each level operate
under the control of the next higher level. (Polanyi 1967, 35-36)
And, of course, the operation of a higher level cannot be accounted for by

the laws governing its particulars forming the lower level, for all of these
levels have their own different purposesto create a voice, form a word,
compose a sentence, etc.and they additionally have their own governing
laws and principles (Polanyi 1967, 36).
So, as we can see, there are not merely two levels, but severaland
these are gradually built up upon one another to create something essen-
tially new. One is, in our case, the faculty of speech, which is possessed
only by humans:
The theory of boundary conditions recognizes the higher levels of life as

forming a hierarchy, each level of which relies for its workings on the
principles of the levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to these
lower principles. (Polanyi 1969b, 233)
Each level relies for its operations on all the levels below it. Each reduces
the scope of the one immediately below it by imposing on it a boundary
that harnesses it to the service of the next higher level, and this control is
transmitted stage by stage down to the basic inanimate level. (Polanyi
1969b, 234)
Naturally, this base, inanimate level is the level of elementary physical

and chemical processes. Built upon this, the fundamental levels of life are
158 Chapter Ten
the following: 1. compartment; 2. cell; 3. multicellular organism; 4. organ-

ism with a nervous system; 5. culture/language11 (Polanyi 1962, 387-
389);12 while the principles additional to the domain of inanimate nature
are the product of an evolution (Polanyi, 1969b, 234).
So Polanyi states that the various, higher level faculties of living be-
ings as machine-type boundary conditions (perception, speech, obtaining
scientific knowledge, etc.) are consequences of the process of evolution
which is a sequence of machine-type boundary conditions being built up
on one another; and thanks to these faculties of ours, as we ascend a hier-
archy of boundaries, we reach to ever higher levels of meaning. Our un-
derstanding of the whole hierarchic edifice keeps deepening as we move
upwards from stage to stage13 (Polanyi 1969b, 236). Naturally, this has its
own consequences with regard to our higher level faculties as these are not
only independent achievements of evolution but are also determined by it;
we can see that as regards the structure of our perception or of our obtain-
ing scientific knowledge there is something here that cannot be entirely
independent of our personal biological and cultural nature at a totally ex-
plicit level of knowledgethus it cannot be entirely understood without
an evolutionary approach. And this is precisely why evolution plays such a
distinguished role in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi.
2. Why Does Polanyis Philosophy Lead to a Questioning

of the Ruling Views and Dogmas of Biology?
Polanyi sees it as being taken for granted today among biologists that
all manifestations of life can ultimately be explained by the laws govern-
ing inanimate matter. However, he asserts that this opinion is patent
nonsense (Polanyi 1967, 37).
We have seen Polanyis argument in subsection 1.2 telling us why we
are unable to explain the way of operation of a multilevel machine or a
living being only by reference to the laws governing its particulars form-
ing the lower level (Polanyi 1967, 36). However, if this is true, the fol-
11
The first and the fifth were the major rebellions, the beginnings of the biologi-
cal and cultural stages of evolution.
12
In The Tacit Dimension (Polanyi 1967, 41) or in Lifes Irreducible Structure
(Polanyi 1962b, 234-235) Polanyi does not refer to exactly the same stages; how-
ever, this has no particular importance for us, as it only goes to show that his the-
ory is not over-elaborated in any given respect.
13
Polanyi also explains it like this: We can recognize then a strictly defined pro-
gression, rising from the inanimate level to ever higher additional principles of
life (Polanyi 1969b, 234).
lowing question arises for Polanyi: how can the science of biology still be
successful in many cases if its fundamental assumptions, namely the re-
duction of life to physical and chemical principles, are false? Polanyis
answers this question in the following way:
While the declared aim of current biology is to explain all the phenomena
of life in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry, its actual practice is to
attempt an explanation in terms of a machinery, based on the laws of phys-
ics and chemistry. Biologists think that the substitution of this task for their
declared aim is justified, for they assume that a machine based on the laws
of physics is explicable by the laws of physics. (Polanyi 1967, 38)
According to Polanyi, therefore, biologists make two fundamental mis-

takes in one go. First, they want to explain all features of life solely by
resorting to the laws of physics and chemistry; and, second, they assume
that this goal is achievable if they actually operate with machines based
on the laws of physics and chemistry (Polanyi 1997b, 284-285). These two
mistakesfortunatelyserve to more or less totally neutralize each other.
As we have seen in subsection 1.2, machines are purpose-serving con-
structions that cannot be explained entirely by the laws of physics and
chemistry. The complete knowledge of a machine as an object tells us
nothing about it is as a machine (Polanyi 1962, 330). From this point of
view, only the lowest level elementary physical and chemical processes
can be explained; yet this is not the case with higher level operational
principles of machines (Polanyi 1967, 40), which determine the structure
of a machine as they harness the elementary processes.
We may confidently rely, therefore, on our analysis of machines to declare

that the predominant view of biologiststhat a mechanical explanation of
living functions amounts to their explanation in terms of physics and
chemistryis false. (Polanyi 1967, 41-42)
The process of evolution, as we saw in subsection 1.3, is a sequence of

machine-type boundary conditions being built up upon each other; conse-
quently, living beingsourselves includedare multilevel organisms
with higher level boundaries and functions, and owing to this we, as
higher level biological beings with a specific way of perception and
knowledge, can and have to recognize a multilevel character and centre of
individuality14. This is, however, not an explicit process pertaining to
14
because an innate affinity for making contact with reality moves our
thoughtsunder the guidance of useful clues and plausible rulesto increase ever
further our hold on reality (Polanyi 1962, 403).
160 Chapter Ten
either physics or chemistry as individuality is a personal fact, and to that

extent unspecifiable (Polanyi 1962, 343). Knowledge of the individuality
of a living being is part of our previous tacit knowledgewhich has been
formed by our evolutionary development. Thus, the science of biology
cannot be as entirely explicit as are physics or chemistry15, for it deals with
entities in the hierarchy of machine-type boundary conditions that are to
be recognized solely by our previous, tacit knowledge. Evolution can
give rise to ever new unformalizable operations only by acting, itself, as
an unformalizable principle; thus, new machine-like operations can
likewise emerge only in the same unformalizable manner (Polanyi 1962,
401). So living beingsand machinesare, for us, necessarily multilevel,
unformalizable organisms16; consequently, biology has to give up its goal
of being able to explain all manifestations of life by the laws governing
inanimate matterit needs to become a multilevel science (Polanyi 1962,
344-345). And this is why Polanyis philosophy leads to a questioning of
the ruling contemporary views and dogmas of biology.
3. In Contrast to Neo-Darwinian Theory,

Why Does Polanyi Not Accept that the Mechanism
of Natural Selection Is the Principle of Evolutionary
Development?
3.1 The Logical Structure of Boundary Conditions
Darwinism has diverted attention for a century from the descent of

man by investigating the conditions of evolution and overlooking its ac-
tion. Evolution can be understood only as a feat of emergence (Polanyi
1962, 390). We have seen in subsection 1.2 that, for living beings, DNA is
the source of the higher level boundary conditions that harness the elemen-
tary processes. To do this job, DNA has to function as a code determining
boundary conditions:
15
As with history, anthropology, and other disciplines.
16
It is worth noting that this is necessary only for us who are consequences of
evolutionary development; but, for example, for a Martian, this would not defi-
nitely hold because s/he is, of course, not a result of our evolutionary development.
So it is conceivable that s/he possesses an entirely different body of personal and
tacit knowledge and does not recognize the same things in organisms connected
with Earth as we, Earthlings, would do.
whatever may be the origin of a DNA configuration, it can be function

as a code only if its order is not due the forces of potential energy. It must
be as physically indeterminate as the sequence of words is on a printed
page. As the arrangement of a printed page is extraneous to the chemistry
of the printed page, so is the base sequence in a DNA molecule extraneous
to the chemical forces at work in the DNA molecule. It is this physical in-
determinacy of the sequence that produces the improbability of occurrence
of any particular sequence and thereby enables it to have meaning. (Po-
lanyi 1969b, 229)
For if the chemistry of the printed page, more exactly the chemical laws
which determine the chemical structure of the printed pageor the pho-
netics of pronounced wordsdetermines the order of the words that can
be printed on that page, or can be said, then the words could not have
independent meaning; we could not print different texts on the same page.
In the same way, if the laws of chemistry determined DNAs configura-
tion, it could not code independent information and could not be the
source of higher level boundary conditions harnessing elementary proc-
esses; thus, living organisms could not have their specific, multileveled
structure.
Higher level boundary conditions can thereby restrict lower level proc-
esses only if the higher level boundary conditions and the lower level
processes correlate in a random way. Randomness alone can never pro-
duce a significant pattern, for it consists in the absence of any such pat-
tern (Polanyi 1962, 37). Otherwise, in accordance with meaning, the
lowermore fundamentallevel processes determine the structure of the
higher level which, in this way, cannot function as a boundary condition.
However, if the correlation of two levels is a random one when they are
compared to each other, this means, on one hand, that the higher level
boundary conditions can harness lower level processesin our case, the
elementary physical and chemical processesand, on the other, that in the
two different levels two essentially different principles are operating, and
these are not able to descend from one another. Thus the logical structure
of the hierarchy implies that a higher level can come into existence only
through a process not manifest in the lower level, a process which thus
qualifies as an emergence (Polanyi 1967, 45).
Polanyi describes three imaginary experiments which might help us
understand this logically independent correlation and its consequences in
relation to two different levels (Polanyi 1962, 39-40).
(1) Take a large number of perfect dice resting on a plane surface, all
showing the same facesay a oneon top. Prolonged Brownian mo-
162 Chapter Ten
tionacting at low temperaturewill destroy this orderliness and ulti-

mately produce a state of maximum disorder.
(2) Take a similar set of dice showing the one on top but let them be
biased in favour of showing a six on top. Prolonged Brownian motion
acting at low temperature will cause a rearrangement in the sense that most
dices will show a six on top.
(3) Take, again, a similar set of dice showing the one on top being bi-
ased in favour of showing a six on top. Prolonged Brownian motion acting
at high temperature will destroy this pattern and produce instead the same
kind of random aggregate as seen in experiment (1).
Experiment (2) shows that random processes are able to create condi-
tions where a well-arranged pattern occurs at the higher level with the
dices; however, it is clear from the experiment (1) that random proc-
essesones not according with the most appropriate conditionswill lead
to a well-arranged pattern only if there is the action of a higher-level or-
dering principle restricting and controlling these lower level random proc-
esses. And experiment (3) shows us that a higher level principle is not
enough by itself if there is an absence of suitable conditions at the lower
level which means that any kind of lower level processes cannot be con-
trolled by a specific principle. More simply, no matter how skilfully we
are able to roll we will win for certain only if we have loaded dices. This
boundary condition follows on from an entirely different, logically inde-
pendent principle when set against the skills of dice rolling.17
In this approach, the randomness is clearly only a correlation between
levels. The lower or the higher levels can be regarded as random if exclu-
sively put in correlation with another levelin this case with each other
but not if by itself. By saying a factor is random, I do not refer what the
factor is in itself, but to the relation it has with the main system (Ashby
1957, 259).
It follows from this that the higher level can never be a random conse-
quence of the lower because, given this, it ought to itself be random too,
yet it is not the case. In itself it is entirely deterministic and it has to be so,
otherwise it could not have meaning, it could not be purposeful and it
could neither control nor harness lower level processes. The randomness is
only a correlation of the two different structures and principles had by the
levels. If their correlation is not random, it means that the higher level
depends entirely on the lower; thereby, there is no essential difference
between them, and they are determined by onelower levelprinciple.
17
Here, what is random is which face of the dice is being referred to, and this is
not determined solely by the laws of physics for the principles of higher levels
come into play too, and, in this case, are fully determined by them.
This is why Polanyi, when recognizing the logical structure inherent in

the hierarchy of living beings, can say when referring to the source of this
structure that:
...the assumption of an accidental formation of the living species is a logi-

cal muddle. It appears to be a piece of equivocation, unconsciously
prompted by the urge to avoid facing the problem set to us by the fact that
the universe given birth to these curious beings, including people like our-
selves. To say that this is the result was achieved by natural selection is en-
tirely beside the point. Natural selection tells us only why the unfit failed to
survive and not why any living beings, either fit or unfit, ever came into
existence. As a solution for our problem it is logically on a par with the
method of catching a lion by catching two and letting one escape. (Polanyi
1962, 35)
To sum up here, we can say that random impacts can release the func-
tions of an ordering principle and suitable physico-chemical conditions
can sustain its continued operation; but the action which generates the
embodiment of a novel ordering principle always lies in this principle
itself (Polanyi 1962, 401).
3.2 The Deficiencies of the Darwinian Theory of Natural

Selection and of the Neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution
In the 19th century, evolutionary theories as well as other contemporary
theories of nature, culture and science were influenced by the notion of
progress (e.g. Hegel, A. Comte, H. Spencer). Evolution meant a teleologi-
cal process of progression, therefore, during which the most highly
evolved man necessarily developed from the primitive germ plasma of
lifes beginnings. This picture was significantly influenced by the phe-
nomenon of ontogeny, where, if needed conditions are provided, an adult
human necessarily develops from the initial zygote because of DNA, in
which general regularities operate that unambiguously control and deter-
mine the stages, the process, and the end of the process of development.
The fundamental and most important difference between these two
ways of development is that, when it comes to theories of progress, such
development is determined by an absolute, external principleset by God,
nature, rationality or something elsewhile in the case of ontogeny it
occurs by a non-absolute, internal principle of evolution.
In contrast to the early evolutionists, Darwin himself pursued research
only on those material mechanisms, by which he could explain the appear-
164 Chapter Ten
ance of new species,18 whose existenceat least in relation to one of

themhe originally supposed.19 In his work, in accordance with the con-
temporary Newtonian paradigmand in contrast with the theories of pro-
gress, he did not take on board any teleological principle regarding evolu-
tion, i.e. as the early evolutionists did; and because of this he avoided use
of the contemporary concept of evolutionand created the substance of a
new one.
However, from Polanyis viewpoint, with this, Darwin did not only
displace an old, out-of-date teleological (absolute and external) princi-
pleunfortunately, he threw out all higher level principles concerning the
explanation of evolution, too.
Darwin based his mechanism of natural selection on the Malthusian
demographical mathematical model, where reproduction follows a geo-
metrical series while the development of production is linear, so that the
latter process restricts population growth. In connection with the descent
of species this means that environmental resources restrict any increase in
speciesi.e. many newborn individuals will die before maturity; so if
there is a difference between individuals, there is variability; and if there
are insufficient environmental resources, there is a restricting factor, a
kind of boundary condition. This might be termed a selectional restriction.
The mechanism of natural selection then starts its work, and with the se-
lective extinction of individuals who are different in contrast with the
survivors the given species begin to change.
This is the logical structure of natural selection, from which two things
follow. First, the process of replication is not a precondition for natural
selection solely pertaining to the lineage of a speciesreproduction is the
natural process of increase; and this will operate inside one generation if
its preconditions (variability, the restricting factor) are given.20 Second,
since both of the preconditions of the process are contingentthe differ-
ent features of individuals are the result of a random process and environ-
mental conditions and changes are occasionalin the long run, natural
18
The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Darwin 1872)
19
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been
originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this
planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a
beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are
being, evolved (Darwin 1872, 429).
20
As a matter of fact, in the case of many offspring the competitor is not an indi-
vidual from another species or an older one but another one from the same genera-
tion; indeed it could well be its littermate.
selection itself will also be a contingent, changing process, one from

which no development follows 21 (Darwin 1872).
Followers of a Neo-Darwinian theory (e.g. T. Dobzhanshy, J. Huxley,
E. Mayr, etc.), with this theory becoming the ruling evolutionary theory of
the 20th century, took over both the mechanism of natural selection and the
concept of evolution. In this new theory of evolution, the mechanism of
natural selection is combined with the theory of genetics. This means, first
of all, that the formation of different individuals was connected with the
replication process, with which such theorists could explain the occurrence
of variability22; secondly, the subject of evolutionary processes became
reduced to the existence of the genome23 (Dobzhanshy 1937; Huxley
1942; Mayr 1942). However, the logical structure of the process has re-
mained the same:24 the mechanism of natural selection is determined by
the two contingent factors of variability and of restricting insufficiency,
thus the Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory remains, too, a contingent,
changing process from which, in nature, no development will follow (De-
pew 1995; Mayr 1991; 2001).
The Darwinian notion of evolution thus means:
1. that the variants are consequences of a random physical chemical
processmutation;
2. that the selection-based restriction is a result of insufficient material
resources being had by the occasional environment;
3. natural selection is in consequence of these two, fundamental fac-
tors, and as both of them are determined by random physical processes, so
natural selection is only a random physical process too;
4. there is no other fundamental process or principle in evolution
only the mechanism of natural selection.
Yet, according to Polanyi, living beings that are the products of evolu-
tion have independent, fundamentally different ordering principles, in
21
In some cases variations or individual differences of a favourable nature may
never have arisen for natural selection to act on and accumulate. In no case, proba-
bly, has time sufficed for the utmost possible amount of development. In some few
cases there has been what we must call retrogression of organisation. But the main
cause lies in the fact that under very simple conditions of life a high organisation
would be of no servicepossibly would be of actual disservice, as being of a more
delicate nature, and more liable to be put out of order and injured (Darwin 1872,
99-100).
22
The source of the variation became a lower-level, random, physical chemical
process, called mutation.
23
or genes. Cf., for example, Dawkins (Dawkins 1976).
24
Alongside this, the formation of difference is now exclusively attached to the
birth of new generation.
166 Chapter Ten
contrast with what pertains to the laws of physics and chemistry;25and, an

independent ordering principle cannot be a result of random processes.26
So, along with the theory of natural selection, Darwinism looks at the
conditions of evolution, and overlooks its action; and this is why Polanyi
does not accept that the mechanism of natural selection is the principle of
evolutionary development.
4. Conclusions: According to Polanyi,

What Are the Principles of Evolution and of Life,
and How Do They Work?
Polanyi regards living beings as instances of morphological types and
of operational principles subordinated to a centre of individuality and he
states that no types, no operational principles and no individualities can
ever be defined in terms of physics and chemistry. From which it follows
that the rise of new forms of lifeas instances of new types and of new
operational principles centred on new individualitiesis likewise undefin-
able in terms of physics and chemistry (Polanyi 1962, 383). On the basis
of these considerations, he throws doubt on the ruling Neo-Darwinian
theory of evolution. I deny that any entirely accidental advantages can
ever add up to the evolution of a new set of operational principles, as it is
not in their nature to do so (Polanyi 1962, 385).
We have seen earlier in this paper what Polanyis main concepts are
that, for example, because of our necessary personal perspective and the
tacit dimension of our personal knowledge, we tend to recognize individu-
als that have a centre,27 that the acknowledgment of such a centre is a
logical novelty (Polanyi 1962, 344) and such a centre is not formalizable
in terms laid down by either physics or chemistry (Polanyi 1962, 401).
Nevertheless, perhaps the most important concept is that all machines and
living beings are multilevel entities that have functions and purposes (Po-
lanyi 1959, 47-48; 1962, 328-331; 1967, 35-36; 1969b, 226-227; 1997b,
286-291). In connection with this, Polanyi clearly states his position: All
physiology is teleological, (Polanyi 1962, 360) and this is logically
inherent in the conception of jointly functioning organs (Polanyi, 1962,
25
See subsection 1.2.
26
See subsection 3.1.
27
But a living individual is altogether different from any of the inanimate things,
like tunes, words, poems, theories, cultures, to which we have ascribed meaning
before it. Its meaning is different, perhaps richer, and above all, it has a centre
(Polanyi 1962, 344).
361). Of course, it is evident what the source of the purposefulness of a

machine is: human reason; but what are the sources of the purposeful
nature of a living being, like us? There is no other answer on offer except
that that these are the principles of life and of evolution actions of which
have led to the existence of living beings. Yet how is it all possible? How
can such principles be the source of all different forms of purposefulness
in our lives? Before we try to find some kind of answer to this, we will
have to ask another question: what are the principles of life and of evolu-
tion, according to Polanyi, and how do they work?
The ordering principle which originated life is the potentiality of a
stable open system (Polanyi 1962, 383-384) It is a fundamental prop-
erty of open systems, not described before now, that they stabilize any
improbable event which serves to elicit them (Polanyi 1962, 384). And
this is one of them: the principle of life. Although Polanyi does not iden-
tify the other one, the principle of evolution, it is clear that it is not the
same; he only supposes that it is something similar (Polanyi 1962, 384).
Yet how are we to understand this? Polanyi cannot help us in any major
way because, here, his theory is not overly elaborated. However, one does
have a chance to talk about stable open systems in two fundamentally
different waysone can do so with reference to cybernetics, via which the
stable open system28 will definitely be a stable self-regulating one29 which
is a centre of individual30 with boundary conditions harnessing the lower
level processes (in Polanyis words). This centre could be the initial aspect
of any evolution, the germ plasm31 of the beginnings.32 In addition, one
can also do so with reference to system theories; here, the stable open
system will be the evolutionary system of the whole Earth, one restricting
lower level processes.
28
It is important to note that these open, stable, self-regulating systems are sys-
tems that are open to energy but closed to information and control (Ashby 1957,
4).
29
Such a self-regulating system of cybernetics could be, with W. R. Ashbys ex-
ample, an incubator that, owing to some simple feedback process, is able to sift out
external disorders in order to maintain the desired temperature. We can understand
living beings in the same way, i.e. as being maintained via a similar simple feed-
back mechanismfor example, the desired pH of the blood or other important
biological parameters (Ashby 1957, 236-237).
30
This is not necessarily an individual organism in an everyday senseit might
be, at a higher level, an anthill or a cultural body.
31
The evolutionary process takes place in the germ plasm, but it manifests itself
in the novel organism which the germ plasm potentially (Polanyi 1962, 400).
32
The beginning of which cannot be explained by evolutionary theory (as seen in
Darwins words, subsection 3.2), thus it must be presupposed.
168 Chapter Ten
How do these principles work? With the first principle, DNA is the
regulating mechanism of the organism, according to the meaning of the
code that has been programmed in the evolutionary process. DNA de-
termines the individuals multilevel structure which harnesseswith an
organizational restrictionthe lower level elementary processes for the
purpose of the living being. But, of course, during this evolutionary devel-
opment, further boundary conditions are added to the organisms structure,
whereupon new regulating mechanisms form themselves, such as the
nervous system, or the second major rebellion, that of culture33.
In the second principle, natural selection is the regulating mechanism34
of the system according to its actual state.35 The prevailing state of the
system restricts the lower level processes. In this interpretation the logical
structure of the evolutionary process is changed. As seen in subsection 3.2,
the natural selection process is determined by two contingent factors:
random mutationsvariabilityand the occasional environment (a selec-
tional restriction); thus, there is no higher level principle that might control
the lower-level, the random processes, guiding them into a determined
direction. The determining selectional restriction is occasional. However,
in contrast to this, system restrictions are always determined by the pre-
vailing state of the stable, open system, which is the ordering principle of
evolution; the lower-level, random processesas mutationswill go into
a determined direction therefore.
Three remarks are necessary at this point.
First (with this also being an answer to our question above about the
purposefulness of life), within a required interval period, when the envi-
ronmental factor is not occasional but is mostly constant, natural selection,
on its own, is necessarily teleological (Ayala 1998, 32-43). Thus, for ex-
ample, the complicated anatomy of the eye like the precise functioning of
a kidney are the result of a nonrandom processnatural selection (Ayala
1998, 35). It must be teleological, otherwise based on Polanyis arguments
it could not serve as an explanation for any purposeful thing.36 Yet the
33
See subsection 1.4.
34
This role of natural selection, as a condition, is accepted by Polanyi; yet he
does not accept that it is the action and ordering principle of evolution. R. A.
Fichers observation of the way in which natural selection makes the improbable
probable is but a particular application of this theorem (Polanyi 1962, 384).
35
There is a splendid example of this: Vilmos Csnyis General Theory of Evolu-
tion (Csnyi 1982), because, among other things, he has based his theory on Po-
lanyis theory of boundary conditions (Csnyi 1988, 19-22).
36
Darwin himself emphasizes over and over again this teleological feature of
natural selection when, in connection with his several examples, he talks about
over-all process of evolution cannot be said to be teleological in the sense

of proceeding towards certain specified goals (Ayala 1998, 42).37 The
over-all process of evolution can be teleological only if we understand the
mechanism of natural selection from the perspective of the whole evolu-
tionary system in which we dwell. According to Polanyi, this is the only
way to explain the development and purposefulness of lifeand of the
fact of our being; so it does not deal with specific things only, like the
complicated anatomy of the eye.
Second, this teleology follows on from the principle of evolution being
a stable, open system. Thus, this principle is not an absolute, external,
substantially different, independent one, as seen with early evolutionists or
of theories of progress; instead, it is a non-absolute, internal, dependent
one. At the beginning, there is only a specific order in an entirely physical
universe.
Third, if the above statements are true, and if natural selection is neces-
sarily teleological when the required conditions occur and it worksand if
Polanyi is right and evolution is really the development of lifethen what
is the source of the notion that there is no real development in evolution?
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the system restrictionand
thus the mechanism of natural selectionis not always and is not in all
places in action; it is not an absolute principle. So, for example, within a
short time scale it could seem to be occasional.
Secondly, the system restriction is not an independent factor, i.e. as an
organizational restriction is in the case of an individual due to the inde-
pendent code from the DNA; and it is not an external one, as human rea-
soning would be in the case of a machine, but it is one which has a close
connection and way of interaction with the subjects of evolutionary devel-
opment.
Thirdly, the subject of evolutionary development is not an easily iden-
tifiable thing, e.g. as is a zygote is in the case of ontogeny; it is, in the end,
the whole complex ecosystem.38 Thus, natural selection is indeed the self-
how different species, organs and ecological systems become amended in a spe-
cific, directed way according to given environmental relations (e.g. Darwin 1872,
64; 165; 349-350; 401).
37
We have seen in subsection 3.2 that, here, and in contrast with earlier evolution-
ists, Darwin does not think that the evolutionary process is teleological.
38
All of this had already been emphasized by Darwin himself, when he says that
different species are connected with each other in many, very complicated ways
within a complex ecological system, and that the process of natural selection,
according to extensive biological and environmental conditions and circumstances,
is understandable only within these complex systems. See, for example, in the
170 Chapter Ten
regulating process of the whole system (Csnyi, 1988, 128) and this
gradually changes the prevailing state of the systemwith feedbacks.
Fourthly, the system restriction that determines evolutionary develop-
ment is not an entirely constant factor by itself because earthly conditions
are also influenced by changing processes in the solar system. The Earth,
home of the evolutionary system, is not alone, and it does not possess an
entirely stable, unchanging orbit. If a development is to be determined by
a non-random factor that is influenced by changing processes then, in
accordance with our meaning, the developmental process will be inter-
sperced with occasional changesas well as with regressions. However,
this does not mean that the basic process of development does not exist39
(where there will be a definite effect only if the influencing changing
processes are too extreme). The success of such development depends on
how extreme these changing processes are in being able to influence its
fundamental determining factor; and, of course, the impact of an enormous
asteroid or of slow changes in the suns temperature will be notably differ-
ent. As a matter of fact, the latter as well might well be positive within a
certain timescale.
Before coming to the end of this paper I will make one more remark.
We have seen in subsection 3.1. that the principles pertaining to different
levels are independent and essentially different; and the higher ones cannot
be merely random consequences of lower ones (and, at base, the lowest
physical one). In addition, they cannot be non-random consequences of the
physical one as, in such a case, they could not be independent or basically
different principles. Finally, the higher level processes are as deterministic
as the lowest ones. However, billions of years ago there did not exist as
many higher level principles as nowthere was only inanimate matter. So
how was this all possible?
The answer is that the new principlesof course, taking living beings
like us, tooare deterministic consequences of two essentially different,
independent principles, which contrast at random with each other.40 These
two principles are the laws of physics and the potentiality of stable, open
systems. A billion years ago, there were only these two, the laws of phys-
ics and a specific, unformalizable ordering of inanimate matter, and a
Complex relations of all Animals and Plants with each other in the Struggle for
Existence, subchapter (Darwin 1872, 55-59). Of course, this does not mean that
Darwin himself was thinking in terms of a complete system theoryyet, I believe,
his words do point in this direction.
39
For this, the fundamental determining factor has to be random.
40
More precisely, there are three, as (see above) the principles of life and of evolu-
tion are not exactly the same but are two types of the same kind of principle.
potentiality for the forming of a stable, open system, namely Earth, which
will be an entirely random processin contrast to the laws of physics, so
that it cannot be determined by it at all. In this senseover timeone can
reduce every emergent principle, machine, living being, function and the
purposes of our time to inanimate matter and its specific order within its
beginnings (Polanyi 1962, 404-405).
In spite of frequent accusations (e.g. Clayton 2003), Polanyi does not
suppose some kind of Bergsonian lan vital or something similar, e.g. a
non-physical power that serves to determine the evolution of living beings
and of emergent levels; he only applies a kind of system-based theoretical
approach (see the very similar interpretations of evolution and emergence
in, for example, Ludwig von Bertalanffys Robots, men, and minds
(1967)). This is why, when he explains that life transcends physics and
chemistry, he simply means that biology cannot explain life in our age by
the current workings of physical and chemical laws (Polanyi 1997b, 294-
295).
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Tihamr Margitay, Pter Fazekas, Barbara Rozmis and
especially George Kampis for their useful comments and suggestions
relating to earlier drafts of this paper.
Bibliography
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. (1988) Evolcis rendszerek: Az evolci ltalnos elmlete. Buda-
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283-297.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE INTELLECT

REVIVED:
MICHAEL POLANYI AND HIS DEBATE
WITH ALAN M. TURING
PAUL RICHARD BLUM
For a machine is a machine only for someone who relies on it (actually or

hypothetically) for some purpose, that he believes to be attainable by what
he considers to be the proper functioning of the machine: it is the instru-
ment of a person who relies on it. (Polanyi 1974, 262)
When I read this passage in Michael Polanyi's Personal Knowledge, it

struck me as a proof of the immortality of the soul by way of operation
and the purpose of my paper here is to provide an explanation for this. I
will first look at the context and importance of this passage within Po-
lanyi's philosophy of cognition, and I will then look at the context of the
debate about the immortality of the soul.
The quoted passage appears in the chapter The Logic of Affirmation.
The philosopher starts off with considerations concerning the usage of
language, especially the distinction between the confident or direct use of
a word and the skeptical or oblique way of employing language. What we
know elsewhere as the relationship between language and meta-language
(Polanyi will refer to Tarski in due course) is presented here as a distinc-
tion necessary for proving the existence of personality within knowledge
as being manifest through assent to the substantial character of any ut-
terance. Hence follows his emphasis on awareness (watching), which
takes place in the act of speaking: The formalization of the meaning relies
therefore from the start on the practice of unformalized meaning (250).
One might think that Polanyi puts a wedge between the mind and its ob-
174 Chapter Eleven
jects (i.e. everything that is intended, understood, and referred to), though
this is inappropriate: Polanyi circumscribes the process of understanding
through language as a transition from the unformalized towards the
form. And the form is not some kind of Platonic idea or Aristotelian
essence; it must be the processor the product of the processgoing with
the build-up of meaning.1
In the thinking subject, we have the act of confidence, i.e. that which
makes knowledge personal, as the book emphatically explains. Words are
used obliquely when we elevate the object of our utterance to meta-
languagevisible in writing when we put quotation marks around terms.
This skeptical use of words is a reflective act intended to eliminate the
unavoidable insecurity of making a confident utterancefor the confident
utterance always runs the risk of being misplaced (250-251). Thus, confi-
dence and insecurity coincide in the person who dares put forward a
statement. In the next step, Polanyi describes the strategies of oscillating
between direct and oblique speaking as loops (indefinite and futile re-
gress, 252) that can never escape the basic fact that language appears to
be a tool of the act of confidence: only a speaker or listener can mean
something by a word, and a word in itself can mean nothing (252). Po-
lanyi observes that the loop via which to create precision by the means of
words is logically meaninglessa fallacyfor the very reason that
words are instruments of meaning, yet neither meaning itself nor the per-
son that means whatever is meant (252). I am here reminded of Nicholas
of Cusa (1401-1464), who using his own terminology described the im-
possibility of attaining precision with the very same concepts that need to
be sharpened.2
In the next chapter we learn that in a critical epistemological operation
the act of an assertion-of-fact may be tentatively separated from the as-
serted fact. Polanyi suggests separating the act from the fact in an asser-
tion, and to compare the fact with experience. However, he is not speaking
1
Polanyi 1974, 250: The formalization of meaning relies therefore from the start
on the practice of unformalized meaning.
2
Cusanus (2001) Idiota de mente 3, p. 542: By means of a very lofty intellectual
grasp, enfold into a coinciding both naming and being named, and all will be clear.
For God is the Preciseness of whatsoever thing. Hence, if someone had precise
knowledge of one thing: then, necessarily, he would have knowledge of all things.
Likewise, if the precise name of one thing were known, then the names of all
things would be known, because there is no preciseness except with God. Hence, if
anyone attained unto a single instance of precision, he would have attained unto
God, who is the Truth of all knowable things. Precision is the overall topic of this
work.
The Immortality of the Intellect Revived 175
here of a fact, but of the sentence uttered in any assertion made; so he is

not endorsing the idea of an empirical verification but is inviting one to
make use of a phenomenological process, namely, to take account of the
assertion as-though-it-were-not-being-asserted. The content of the affirma-
tion will be scrutinized without the act. If as a result of this test we decide
to renew the act of assertion, the two parts are reunited and the sentence is
reasserted (254). Obviously, such verification is a self-referential process,
rooted in the knowing person: It is an act of tacit comprehension, which
relies altogether on the self-satisfaction of the person who performs it
(254). Assertion, in so far as it produces a statement held to be true, is a
personal act that nods towards a state of affairs that is given in a non-stated
statement, after assent had been withheld. However, we should eliminate
any temporal notion here for, phenomenologically speaking, the mental
experiment outlined is the essence of assentnot its gradual product.
Conversely, we may also infer that negation is the sustained withholding
of tacit comprehension.
After these premises there is no doubt that thinking, affirming, or
claiming anything originates in a fuzzy subjectivity, called the person,
which shapes itself in the act of understanding, uttering and affirming. At
this point, Polanyi addresses the question of thinking machines. This ques-
tion was a highly debated issue in the middle of the 20th century. In his
terminology, as said above, formalization is the act of shaping that which
is understood, and it presupposes a level that is itself unformalized. He
describes the operations of a computer, as follows:
a formal system of symbols and operations can be said to function as a

deductive system only by virtue of unformalized supplements, to which the
operator of the known system accedes: symbols must be identifiable and
their meaning known, axioms must be understood to assert something,
proofs must be acknowledged to demonstrate something, and this identify-
ing, knowing, understanding, and acknowledging, are unformalized opera-
tions on which the working of the formal system depends.... These are per-
formed by a person with the aid of the formal system, when the person re-
lies on its use. (Polanyi 1974, 258)
With this train of thought, a computer is de facto defined as a formalized

version of operations, which come prior to formalization. The legitimate
purpose of formalization lies in the reduction of the tacit coefficient to
more limited and obvious informal operations (259). As Polanyi explains
elsewhere in the book, the tacit coefficient is the contribution of the
person in the act of knowing, meaning, etc., for instance, having confi-
dence in a statement. Thus, the act of entrusting calculations to a machine
176 Chapter Eleven
is nothing but shifting confidence (260) from the personal utterance to

the correctness of the operation as formalized thinking. It is at this point
that Polanyi made the statement quoted at the beginning: For a machine is
a machine only for someone who relies on it (actually or hypothetically)
for some purpose, that he believes to be attainable by what he considers to
be the proper functioning of the machine: it is the instrument of a person
who relies on it. He further explains this via use of the following set of
parallels:
I II III
Mind Machine Functions, purposes etc.

entertained by the mind.
Mind Neurological model Intellectual purposes

(of neurologist) of subject attributed to the subject
by the neurologist.3
In this brain and machine analogy one can see that computingthat is, the
calculating operations of the computerare not only presented as thoughts
entertained by a mind but as the operations of the brain. Mind in the
computational sense can be seen as mechanical functions only if investi-
gated by a thinking subject which is not the thinking mind itselffor
instance a neurologist. Neuroscience looks at the mind as though it were a
machine, and not the other way around, i.e. a machine that operates itself
as though it were a mind. To treat a computer as though it were a mind
was, indeed, the challenge of the notion of thinking machines. We have
not yet arrived at immortality, but we have reached the interface between
machine and mindwhich was important to Polanyi and his contemporar-
ies. His statement underscores the dependence of the machine on the sub-
ject, which itself may be a machine, ifand only iflooked at it in this
way and with this perspective. As we have seen, his motive is logical (and
of course also anthropological) in that he emphasizes (via the mental ex-
periment of withholding affirmation) the indeterminacy of the mind in
judging and carrying out its operations. Polanyi comments upon the tripar-
tite diagram with the explicit warning that the neurologist's focus of inter-
est does not in any way represent personal functions of the subject's
3
Polanyi (1974, 262): I have combined two tables into one.
mind (262-263). The mind operates in the act of cognition in the same
way as words acquire meaning in the act of speaking, though the analogy
points to an unspecified level both in thinking and in speaking before
understanding or before meaning.
On October 27, 1949, an interdisciplinary discussion on The Mind
and the Computing Machine took place at Manchester University, Eng-
land (Hodges 1983, 415). A typescript of only five pages summarized
some of the issues.4 One of the participants was Alan Turing, who main-
tained that a machine may be bed (sic!) with incompatibles, but when it
gets contradiction as a result, there is then a mechanism to go back and
look at things which led to the contradiction. We can note here that he is
describing the operation of withholding an assertion and comparing the
outcome as though it were not being asserted, and then to deny the sen-
tence, which becomes the same as deciding not to repeat the assertion. A
participant in this discussion, Geoffrey Jefferson, objected that this is (a)
an argument against the machine, probably because he thought that a
machine is not able to go back by itself to the origin of an incompatibility;
and he further doubted that even intelligent beings would necessarily be
able to perform this control act. Then he asked (b) whether human beings
do this kind of thing?5 To which Turing answered: yesmathematicians.
Turing is on his way towards mechanizing human thought; he concedes
that only mathematicians would be willing to or care to repeat the opera-
tion in a reverse direction in order to find out the flaw in the calculation,
after having maintained that a computer would do what Descartes had
strongly suggested to do.
A Cartesian rule or stipulation is that inferences are viewed as opera-
tional chains. Yet what followed on from this was that rationalism was
wed with mechanicism. For Descartes, the mind was a ghost in a machine;
and in Polanyis terms, Turing was answering here like a neurologist, as
someone who switches his attention from thinking to the objectifying
mind and its outcome.
The transcript of the discussion reports that after Turing had confirmed
that, indeed, mathematicians do check up on operations for flaws, some-
one muttered: are mathematicians human beings? This was probably
4
I have used the version available at
http://www.turing.org.uk/sources/wmays1.html, which site is maintained by An-
drew Hodges.
5
Jefferson, as a neurosurgeon, seems to have had an ambiguous anthropological
position, for he advocatedin a 1949 speechfrontal lobotomy (which seems to
imply a mechanistic approach to the brain/mind, as described by Polanyi) but had
also famously praised nobility and infinity of humankind (Hodges 1983, 405).
178 Chapter Eleven
meant as a joke, but it does reflect a reversal of perspective, for Turing

went on to explain that he was thinking of the kind of machine which
takes problems as objectives, and the rules by which it deals with the prob-
lems are different from the objective, so he was clearly aiming to break
up a problem into manageable units: problem-objective-rule. He explicitly
referred to Polanyi, who had made the distinction between mechanically
following rules about which you know nothing, and rules about which you
know. At this point Polanyi intervened by saying that the rules of conduct
or behaviour are different from logical rules. Turing now emphasized the
parallel between conscious working and routine: a machine may act ac-
cording to two different sets of rules, the conscious method vs. the habit-
ual method. Even though there seemed to be a consensus so far, Polanyi
now began to doubt that the semantic function can ultimately be speci-
fiedand he stated firmly that whereas in point of fact a machine is
fully specifiable, while a mind is not. This so-called specification seemed
to be pointing to the illusion that a computing entity (brain or machine)
can be fully programmed and therefore, by extension, the mind also can
be... Turing replied that the mind is only said to be unspecifiable because
it has not yet been specified; but it is a fact that it would be impossible to
find the programs inserted into quite a simple machineand we are in the
same position as regards the brain. The conclusion that the mind is un-
specifiable does not follow. (Emphasis in the transcript.) He seems to be
making a very important concession herenamely, that it is impossible to
find the programming a posteriori, while he believes that it is possible to
program a machine completely, a priori. Polanyi answered that this
should mean that you cannot decide logical problems by empirical
methods. The terms by which we specify the operations of the mind are
such that they cannot be said to have specified the mind. The specification
of the mind implies the presence of unspecified and pro-tanto unspecifi-
able elements. He finally adds that acceptance as a person implies the
acceptance of unspecified functions.
It is known that this dialogue prompted Turing to publish his famous
paper on Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950; Turing 1982),
which suggested the later so called Turing Test; and this clearly guided
Polanyi's treatment of the question of acceptance in his book Personal
Knowledge. Here, the author purposefully refers to Turing's specula-
tions, which had made him famous. Polanyi translates Turing's opening
question Can machines think? into the experimental question, whether
computing machines could be constructed to deceive us... (Polanyi 1974,
263 note 1). Without entering the debate about the Turing Test, it is suffi-
cient to say here that Turing could make a machine:
suspend its judgment, when it returns to previous stages of an opera-

tion, if the results it gets prove to be contradictory
operate upon itself if it is fully specifiable
transform a posteriori experience into purposes.
All of these pertain to personal knowledge in Polanyi's view.
To come now to the immortality question, it needs to be emphasized
that Turing and Polanyi agree upon a certain type of dualism, in Turings
terms being the distinction between conscious and automatic. It is clear
that automatic actions are such that they work in apparently the same way
as do conscious actionsonly without the thinking.6 Remember that Aris-
totle had stated as a defining fact that technique does not deliberate, and
that a musician comes to perfection through practice, rather than delibera-
tion.7 Remember also Thomas Aquinass proof for the existence of God,
The Fifth Way, where he says that an arrow hits the target as though it
were purposefully going after it (Summa th. I 2.3). Automatic action with-
out consciousness is nothing new for philosophy; and where Turing and
Polanyi disagree is about the possibilityeven in theoryof program-
ming a machine so that the machine operates responsibly, in a variety of
senses of the word.8 Polanyi emphasizes that behind every determination
is a realm of indeterminacy, behind every form one has what is forming;
and it is hard to avoid at this point seeing the person that Polanyi in-
6
Cf. Turing's definition of an automatic machine (1936, 232, 2): If at each stage
the motion of a machine is completely determined by the configuration, we shall
call the machine an automatic machine (or a-machine). For some purposes we
might use machines (choice machines or c-machines) whose motion is only par-
tially determined by the configuration When such a machine reaches one of
these ambiguous configurations, it cannot go on until some arbitrary choice has
been made by an external operator. Obviously, choice is due to ambiguity and
made by a thinking subject that is not the machine itself.
7
Physics II 8, 199 b 28, and Nicomachean Ethics I 6, 1098 a 9 and II 1, 1103 a 34.
Giordano Bruno (Bruno 1998, De la causa II, p. 41) had stressed the absence of
deliberation by paraphrasing: This is what Aristotle himself shows with the ex-
amples of the perfect writer or perfect lute player : for great musicians and
writers pay less attention to what they are doing than their less talented colleagues,
who, because they reflect more, produce work that is less perfect and, what is
worse, not free from error.
8
Compare also Karl Popper's description of a machine, which perhaps was an
indirect reply to Turing: A wall-thermometer may be said not only to express its
internal state, but also to signal, and even to describe. Yet we do not attribute
the responsibility for the description to it; we attribute it to the maker. We do
not argue with a thermometer. (Popper 1953, 104-105).
180 Chapter Eleven
vokes in terms of the absolute.9 Given the possibilities and options inher-
ent within mechanized thinking, the question at stake is whether thinking
is indeed something mechanical.
Modern thought since the revival of the geometric method is no longer
described as a form of correspondence between things and thoughts but,
instead, as operations that are controlledby whomever. Although the
issue of accordance between propositions and states of affairs has been
debated again and again, the means by which to control and assess such
concord will always be operational. This is the case with Descartess four
rules of inference, and this is the case regarding modern geometry, i.e.
which does not inquire into the essence of geometrical proportions but into
their construction (as Kant, among others, has convincingly shown). The
fallacy committed by Turing, at least from the point of view of Polanyi,
consisted in transferring the orderliness of the operation into the essence of
the operation. Going back to the origin of the contradiction is the opera-
tional aspect of assent or denial. Polanyi stresses that the operation is not
its own origin. This is where the dualism has to be found. Traditionally
speaking, this dualism is that between mind and matter, i.e. that which
dominated the debate about the immortality of the soul.
The question of the immortality of the soul has an ontological and an
epistemological side. Of course, it has always been interesting for its onto-
logical aspects, the question being whether humans have eternal life.
However, epistemology has been the battleground for this debate because
it is the operation of the mind/soul that, at best, manifests features that
allow conjectures relating to immortality (cf. Blum 2007, with many refer-
ences to primary and secondary sources). The issue here (as everybody
will know) goes back to Aristotle, who had pondered the option that the
human intellect was able to be separated from the rest of the soul and the
living being (De anima III 5), thus bestowing the thinking power with the
ontological status of a spirit in materially untainted action. The mixture
between metaphysics and epistemology continued into the Renaissance,
with added urgency coming from the Christian doctrine. The following
were the most common solutions provided in relation to the problem:
Platonism: the human mind is the interface between the spiritual and
the corporeal worlds, though it remains on the spiritual side. The corporeal
world may be what it isor, at any rate, the mind has cognition of bodily
things by way of recognition of forms in the mind itself that correspond, in
9
The last two paragraphs of Personal Knowledge seem to invoke a super-
individual person evolving over time (perhaps akin to Pierre Teilhard de Char-
din) a cosmic field which called forth all individuals perhaps not different from
the Christian God. (Godis the last word of the book.)
some way, to the objects seen (Ficino 2001-2006, vol. 2; Platonic Theol-
ogy lib. 8). This is, in brief, termed innatism. The epistemological problem
is obviously the impossibility of verifying the objects that are supposed to
be cognized. However, the soul is exclusively busy with perfecting itself
and purifying itself from any contingency (and it is only purification why
the mind engages in cognition). Therefore the critical scientific question
cannot be addressed with Platonism. But immortality is guaranteed, be-
cause the mind remains un-entangled with mortal objects and especially if
it purifies itself it works its way up to the level of Angels and other im-
mortal beings. The Platonic answer to the question of immortality, there-
fore, is an essentialist answer, whereby the description of the functions of
the mind appears to be purely apologetic. Still, there is some epistemo-
logical merit if cognitive operations are analyzed as being able to shape
sensual reality.
Aristotelianism: the human mind processes data delivered via the
senses. The question is: Can the human mind think anything that has not
been delivered by the lower functions of the soul? Two answers are possi-
ble: nomind processes only sense data, and thinking is nothing but
building up higher and higher levels of complexity in ideas that allow an
understanding of reality in ever more complex ways, with the effect that
the illusion of an independent life of the mind can arise, though always
being an illusion. This is, with bold strokes, John Locke's sensualism. In
terms of essence, it is clear that the human mind is contiguous with the
soul and the soul is contiguous with the body, basically being a surface
phenomenon of bodily functions. The soul is not the root of thingsit is
the most complex material thing possible. In terms of epistemology, the
argument is that if the mind is not cognate with the senses, and if the
senses are not bodily, then nothing can be known. This is the solution
entertained by Aristotelians like Pomponazzi (1525), though he was not
alone here. The second answer to Aristotelianism is: yesthe mind thinks
via not only sense data but can work in relation to purely intellectual ob-
jects, too. To be sure, even sense data are not processed as such, but as
abstractions. So sense perception does not provide a valid argument
against the purely spiritual nature of mind.10 This answer is, in reality, a
hidden Platonism. What needs to be clarified is: where does the mind get
its criteria that allow the processing of all this wonderful sense data? Skep-
ticism and criticism ensued...
The basic distinction between solutions on offer concerning the im-
mortality problem is that existing between an essentialist versus an opera-
10
This position was defended by Cardinal Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) in comment-
ing upon Thomas Aquinas, Summa th. I 75-76 (Cajetan 1514, lib. 3).
182 Chapter Eleven
tionalist approach. Platonists defined the soul a priori as spiritual and,

therefore, as immortal. All the pains taken by Marsilio Ficino in 18 books
of the Platonic Theology to prove the immortality of the soul sought to
prove that the soul is spiritual; however, many of his arguments circum-
scribed the operations of the soul with greater attention being given to its
cleanness, i.e. that there were no material implications. Thus, it is still
safe to say that the Platonists approach is essentialist: whatever the mind
does, it is spiritual by definition, hence it is immortal.
The operationalist interpretation of the soul entangled the soul hope-
lessly in terms of matter. It was the way the mind operates that seemed to
prove that the mind is not something separate from its body and hence
subject to its fate. As I have said, the compromise solutionone given
already in Aristotle, according to which the mind is well able to process
non-material thoughtsdoes not have its argument from the operation of
the mind, but from its substance.
One more complication then came into the equation, namely the dis-
tinction between actuality and potentiality in Aristotles psychology. In the
famous passage of On the Soul III 5, he had speculated that if the intellect
in potentiality in relation to its objects, then there might be an actual intel-
lect. Arabic interpreters labored much about this passagethough for our
purposes we need not enter a debate dealing with the unity of the intellect,
namely the question of whether there is one and only one potential/actual
intellect, of which all individual minds are nothing but instantiations.11
Many philosophers have distinguished within the human intellect an active
and a passive/potential part. The passive part is the one that receives and
processes information from the lower parts of the soul. It does so, how-
ever, under the guidance and control of the active intellect (cf. Blum 2007,
221).
I hope it is clear what I am aiming at here: the mechanicist interpreta-
tion of mind, the one lending itself to computerization, focuses exclusively
on the passive intellect of medieval pedigree, whereas Polanyi's objection
aims to vindicate the active intellect. The active intellect is active in so far
as it controls the operations of the passive intellect, and since the passive
intellect has to be tainted by the objects it processesnamely, sense da-
tathe active intellect sets the rules of the game without being involved;
or, in Polanyis terms, without being specified.
11
Polanyi (1974, 405), could be read as a version of this, Averroistic, notion:
the centres of the phylogenetic fields of which individuals are offshoots But we
do know that the phylogenetic centres which formed our own primeval ancestry
have now produced a life of the mind which claims to be guided by universal
standards. This is beyond the purposes of the present paper.
Now, the whole pre-modern and early modern debate about the active
and passive intellect was aimed at securing immortality for the individual.
As the Platonists had established, mind can only be immortal if substan-
tially independent of the senses. The Aristotelian theory of the agent intel-
lect was always vulnerable to the operationalist attack, which identified
the intellect with a machine that processes information. The only way out
here is to show that in thinking about things there is a component that not
only remains independent in some way but it actively performs the opera-
tions that look as though they were working mechanically. And this is
what Polanyi did.
Under the conditions of Kantian criticism, once it was liberated from
the radically sceptical and the psychologist garb given it by Neo-
Kantianism, and under the conditions of phenomenology that scrutinizes
the availability of reality in thinking, it was possible for Polanyi to aim at
the core of the mind without recourse to psychologism and without lapsing
into the mechanistic fallacy that had haunted Aristotelianism. For Neo-
Platonists the mind was immortal in spite of its operations. For Aristote-
lians, the operations of the mind make it look like matter. Turing seems
not to have been aware of this problem, though, for he appears to think of
consciousness according to the model of a loop, a control procedure that
needs programming. In the same way as Platonists would have told Aristo-
telians that their epistemology misses the point regarding the metaphysics
of the spirit, Polanyi appreciates the computerization factor in mental
processes but warns against overstretching the claims here. It is exactly
because of the operation of the mind, which follows a controllable set of
rules, that Polanyi emphasizes personality. Personality means: a priori
independence from the rules set, while authorship of the same rules is
necessary to explain the operation of the human mind. Being independent
it must be free, which traditionally means that is immortal.12
With these considerations I hope to have shown that the debate be-
tween Turing and his opponents is dealing again with a problem that was
important in the history of the philosophy of mind or intellection. Polanyi,
in responding to Turing's challenge, reveals to the reader the mixture of
metaphysical and epistemological claims included in the seemingly tech-
nical question: Can computers think?and he moves the traditional
solutions (operationalist vs. essentialist) further by showing that operation,
insofar as it is intellectual, originates from beyond the area and objects of
operation (be it brain or computer). Polanyi thus helps to reveal (for those
interested) the immortality debate occurring in early modernity as a fal-
12
Polanyi (1974, 405): the centres of the phylogenetic fields of which indi-
viduals are offshoots may endure for ever
184 Chapter Eleven
lacy, one that identified the thinking subject with its means of thought,
even though a brain is a brain only for the mind that thinks with it.
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Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 211-233.
Bruno, Giordano (1998) Cause, principle, and unity. (ed. Richard J.
Blackwell) Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Cajetan, Tommaso de Vio. (1514) Commentaria in libros Aristotelis De
anima. Venice: Scotus.
Cusanus, Nicolaus (2001) Complete Philosophical and Theological Trea-
tises. (trans. Jasper Hopkins) Minneapolis: Banning, 2. vols.
Ficino, Marsilio (2001-2006) Platonic theology. (ed. James Hankins)
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 6 vols.
Polanyi, Michael ([1958] 1974) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Pomponazzi, Pietro ([1525] 1995) Tractatus acutissimi, utillimi et mere
peripatetici. Venice: Scotus, 1525; reprint Casarano: Eurocart (fol.
41r-51v: De immortalitate animae).
Popper, Karl R. (1953) Language and the Body-Mind Problem. In Pro-
ceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy. Brussels,
August 20-26, vol. 7, Amsterdam/Louvain: North Holland/Nauvelearts,
101-107. [reprinted in his Conjectures and Refutations, 1963, 293-
298].
Turing, A. M. (1936) On computable numbers, with an application to the
Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical So-
ciety, Series 2, Vol.42 (November 1936) 230-265.
. (1982) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. In Douglas R.
Hofstadter and Daniel Clement Dennett (eds.) The mind's I: fantasies
and reflections on self and soul. Toronto: Bantam Books, 53-67.
CHAPTER TWELVE
EMOTION, AUTONOMY AND COMMITMENT
R. T. ALLEN
When I was asked to speak at this conference upon Polanyi and emo-
tion, I thought I had already said everything I have to say directly about
that theme, especially in my own contribution to Emotion, Reason and
Tradition (Jacobs and Allen eds, 2005). Yet there is one reason for the
contemporary distrust of emotion which I did not mention there and to
which Polanyis personalist, post-critical and fiduciary philosophy con-
tains the answer: that is, the modern cult of autonomy and the consequent
suspicion of explicit commitment.
Autonomy, in the modern sense, means that we can, should and can-
not do otherwise than, choose and legislate everything for ourselves. The
clearest statement of this is in Sartres Ltre et le Nant where man is
tre pour soi and not tre en soi, and therefore has no essence, is
nothingness and a fold in being, and is condemned only to choose,
that is, to choose everything, even that by which he chooses, and thus
always to choose without any reason for his choices. To believe that one is
this or that, or must do this or that, is bad faith. In less dramatic language
the same picture of human being has pervaded Anglo-Saxon analytic phi-
losophy. This view of humanity is a product of the late 17th C. and the
18th C., when prominent European thinkers, as a result of the triumphs of
the new physics, came to see man as a self-determining subject standing
over and against a determinist, mechanical, impersonal and therefore
meaningless world, who therefore had to choose for himself all the laws,
ideals and ends by which to live.1 According to Kant, autonomy, though
not by name, is the meaning of the Enlightenment:
1
I owe this formulation to the Introduction to Taylor (1975).
186 Chapter Twelve
Enlightenment is mans emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Im-

maturity is the inability to use ones understanding without guidance from
another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of
understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guid-
ance. (Kant [1784] 1983, 41)
This can be read in two ways: (a) each individual is to stand upon his
own reason and not be guided by tradition and authority; and (b), all man-
kind is to stand on its own reason and not be guided by anything above it,
such as God or Natural Law. Kant, of course, believed there to be a pure
reason and a pure practical reason which would both constrain the individ-
uals thinking and choices and which also were not external to humanity
but its defining essence. Hence the two forms of reason were not matters
of choice but of internal obligation. But the general trend was to assume
that one can be and should be wholly self-determining, because the uni-
verse as a system only of matter in motion could not embody any moral
law, standards, values or Way. Therefore, because we all must choose, any
formation of ones beliefs by others is an imposition. The result would be
either an anarchy of purely individual choices or a totalitarian democracy
in which everyone together somehow chooses what everyone together will
do.
Yet there is another version of the modern view of man: that man too is
part of the universal determinist system, and, in one variation of that alter-
native view, each person is determined by the social system in which he is
placed. In reductivist sociologies, we are merely the dimensionless points
at which roles, customs, traditions, and other social forces intersect. Au-
thority, in the form of researchers, teachers and influential persons, is seen
as the exercise of mere power because their opinions are merely what they
think or what they have been socially conditioned to think. Hence when
students are presented with these accounts they become unsettled and
alienated from their cultural heritage because it seems to them that what
we believe is merely the result of what we have taught, often tacitly, and
has nothing to do with its own meritsPolanyi mentions this in Personal
Knowledge (Polanyi 1958, 203-4, 211, 216, 219, 322). Of course, the
creators and expositors of the sociologies in question tacitly exempt them-
selves from debunking by their own doctrines and do not flinch from using
their authority, that is, mere power, to instil them and their own liberal-left
or hard-left opinions. Deconstructionism, the hermeneutics of suspicion
and other postmodernist influences have similar effects. The net result is
both a fear of committing oneself to anything and a simultaneous com-
mitment to preserving ones autonomy and the validity of what one has
been taught about social conditioning and authority, and the need for sus-
Emotion, Autonomy and Commitment 187
picion, except, of course, in respect of these beliefs and attitudes and of

those who have instilled them.
It follows that emotion is regarded with suspicion because by it one is
made to feel something by events external to oneself, perhaps being swept
away by them. Likewise the rituals that sustain the emotions needed for
everyday life, what Collingwood called magic and to which Polanyi also
referred (Polanyi 1958, 211-2). For example, I remember very clearly the
hostile reaction of those with typical liberal-left attitudes when, in a course
on emotion and its place in life, I mentioned the role of school assemblies
and uniforms in engendering corporate identity and solidarity. But emotion
will not go away, and the fear of being committed by ones emotions is
itself an emotion. Denial of the essential roles of emotion in our lives, and
the yearning for an impossible autonomy, will result only in disavowed
and disordered emotions and not freedom from them.
What, then, is the correct account of autonomy, commitment and emo-
tion?
First, autonomy. The modern notion of autonomy is very similar to the
state of mind of the miser. Why does a miser accumulate money and treas-
ure that he can gloat over and which he never spends, while living shab-
bily? It is because he values the sense of power that his possession of
money and readily convertible treasure gives him. The more he has the
more powerful he feels. But, he thinks, were he actually to use that power
and purchase things with some part of his hoard, then he would lose his
power. When used, it has gone, but he fails to realise that while he has it, it
is idle and useless. He is bewitched by the feeling of power and hence
fears its actual exercise. The autonomous person is in the same position:
he loses his precious autonomy once he exercises it and commits himself
to believing or to attaching himself to something. It is an utterly empty and
indefinite freedom. And so the empty selves of the wholly self-choosing
will and that of determinist views of man coincide. For the wholly self-
choosing will, as in Sartre, can will nothing because it can choose nothing.
And it cannot choose anything because it has to choose everything. But to
choose A is to employ some principle of preference, P, which one there-
fore acritically relies upon and does not choose while choosing something
else with it. And to choose P one would have to employ P1, and so on. For
example, in the restaurant I choose one dish rather than another on the
basis of one or more of, say, comparative taste, substantiality (especially if
I am hungry), or price, or at random when I have no preference for any
over the rest but prefer, on the basis of one of the other principles, to eat
something rather than nothing. But to do that presupposes an unchosen
standard of good which makes any option better than none. Therefore
188 Chapter Twelve
Sartrean man, having no standards or values independent of his arbitrary

choice, is not condemned only to choose but is condemned never to
choose. Even the famed acte gratuite is beyond him, because to choose to
perform a random act is possible only when one can also and primarily
choose non-random acts, that is, acts for the choice of which there is some
definite reason. Indeed, one could not act at all but ones body would
make only meaningless and random movements and thoughts would
merely move through ones mind, as in the case of new born children. The
wholly self-choosing will turns out to be no will at all and the wholly
autonomous self to have no autonomy and not to be a self but to be merely
the locus of the interplay of unwilled forcesas neat a piece of Hegelian
dialectic as one could desire. Our autonomy can be only a limited auton-
omy which relies upon unchosen principles of choice, some of which we
may later be able to modify or abandon. Sartres philosophy was itself an
exercise in bad faith precisely because he tacitly relied upon his own and
the readers tacit and unchosen respect for truth and logic in order to con-
vince the reader that all such attitudes and principles are chosen and thus
arbitrarily chosen. In contrast Polanyi calls us, especially in Pt III of Per-
sonal Knowledge, explicitly to acknowledge that we tacitly and therefore
acritically rely upon certain fundamental beliefs such as that there is a real
world that anchors our commitments, the general validity of induction, and
the general reliability of our perceptual and intellectual powers. None of
these can be critically tested, for any such test must itself tacitly employ
them, and this unavoidability of relying upon them while we live and think
is the only justification they can have and all they need. Again, he shows,
in Personal Knowledge Pt IV and later publications, that in the levels of
existence above those studied by physics and chemistry events are primar-
ily achievements, successes or failures to attain or maintain the standards
immanent in life, sensory-motor systems, intelligence and personal exis-
tence. In this way he overcomes the fact-value dichotomy of modern phi-
losophy which denies the validity of the valuations implicit in almost all
emotional experiences, and which therefore reduces emotion to a blind and
merely subjective upsurge of sensations.2
Consequently, at the end of Pt III of Personal Knowledge, Polanyi bids
us to accept our situation, or rather situationssuch as the body and men-
tal powers we are born with, our mother tongue and its store of concep-
tions and beliefs, the customs and traditions in which we have been
brought upand to exercise our calling to act responsibility within them
2
See Allen (1996, 1993) on the destructive nature of the modern idea of autonomy,
and for further applications of Polanyis philosophy to it, see Allen (1992, 1978,
1982).
according to transcendent and universal ideals and standards, while also

acknowledging that we could be mistaken.
The same applies to commitment. As Polanyi shows at the start of Per-
sonal Knowledge Ch. 8, we commit ourselves, whether we like it or not,
every time we confidently use a word, make a statement, judge that some-
thing is the case, or perform an action. In each and every case we commit
ourselves to the truth of what we utter and the rightness of what we do.
Even to qualify what we say, I think ....; I believe ....; It seems to me ....,
is nevertheless confidently to assert that one does think or believe it or that
it does seem to oneself. Likewise one can qualify a particular word and
say, The cat [or so-called or apparent cat] sat on the mat, but to qualify
all the words in an utterance would be to assert nothing at all (Polanyi
1958, 249-51). Again as Polanyi (1958, Ch. 9, 2-3) shows, even in doubt-
ing something we commit ourselves to the validity of the grounds on
which we doubt it, such as lack of evidence for it and that it could yet be
true or possession of definite evidence against it and that it is not true. To
this I would add that doubt is parasitic upon belief in another way: one has
to believe that the other person has said something significant and that one
understands it correctly before one can doubt it. Finally, avoidance of all
commitment is self-defeating, for it would require a continuous and firm
commitment to a general policy of non-commitment and commitment to
judging if, when and how far one has committed oneself in particular
cases.
Emotion arises from and engenders desire, attachment and commit-
ment. If we do not care about something, then we shall feel nothing in
respect to it and thus to what benefits or harms it. Oriental and Hellenistic
sages sought to diminish or even wholly eliminate their desires and at-
tachments in order the more or completely to insulate themselves against
disappointment and suffering, for they despaired of any effective action
within the world. Modern concerns are about the threat to ones autonomy
and the fear of being mistaken: if we do not commit ourselves to what we
have been told, we shall retain our autonomy; and if we do not commit
ourselves to claiming to have the truth, even of what we have decided for
ourselves, we cannot be mistaken. As for the former, without trust and
belief in at least some things which we have been told, we would have no
idea of autonomy and no articulate thoughts at all. For we would have no
language with its stock of conceptions and beliefs in their applicability to
reality. Children can learn their mother tongue only by tacitly trusting that
it means something and that what is said in it is true. Even before sounds
acquire the conventional meanings of a given language, they are under-
stood as natural expressions of love and care, anger and rejection, and the
190 Chapter Twelve
like, all of which are genuine (i.e. true) or faked (i.e. false). At an early
stage, children learn to distinguish a playful attack, such as tickling, from a
real one, and then later fiction from fact, although they often have to be
told that it is fiction. At every stage, something new can be learned only by
trusting those who are teaching it, especially when it and the language
used for it are radically new and hence initially incomprehensible, as when
Polanyi himself began the study of the diagnosis of diseases of the lung
from X-ray plates (Polanyi 1958, 101). By the time a student is told about
radical autonomy, it is already far too late for him to exercise it. As for the
latter, Polanyi exposes evasions of commitment which used pseudo-
substitutions for truth such as simplicity, economy, fruitfulness and
regulative principles (Polanyi 1958, 16, 147-8, 306-8, 354), to which we
may add Poppers contention that hypotheses can be refuted, even by a
single counter-example, but that nothing can be known to be true. This
entails that we could not even know that experiment A has proved hy-
pothesis B to be false, and so Poppers contention refutes itself. As we
have already seen, doubt presupposes and is parasitic upon belief, and
error truth.
Emotion is therefore essentially implicated with the very unmodern
and unenlightened attitudes of belief, faith, trust and authority, which are
the antitheses of suspicion, doubt and radical autonomy. Even worse it is
also bound up with tradition, as that which we have learned often tacitly,
and, horror of horrors!, with prejudice itself. For prejudice, forejudgment,
includes that global and immediate apprehension of persons, events and
things in which we grasp the whole meaning and value and disvalue of
something before its factual details: I dont know what it is, but theres
something about him that worries me. In a small but valuable book pub-
lished over 40 years ago, Anthony Kenny (1963), using Scholastic phi-
losophy, revived the notions of intentionality (but more in the meaning
Brentano gave to it), and formal and material object, and thus broke the
empiricist and associationist treatment of emotion, and other mental acts
and states, as merely internal events, caused by and causing other mental
and also bodily events and states, in which, as far as I have seen, analytic
philosophy is still somewhat stuck, that is, when it does admit that we
have minds in the first place. But Kenny explicitly denied that emotions
could yield knowledge: whereas one can infer from seeing a flash of blue
that there was a policeman at hand, one cannot infer the same conclusion
from feeling a wave of hatred (Kenny 1963, 56). But global apprehensions
of the values or disvalues of objectsas lovely, intriguing, suspicious,
dangerousdo open up their bearers to us or warn us against them before
we know exactly what they are. That is, we tacitly sense significant details
and integrate them into a focal apprehension of the overall quality and
value of the comprehensive entity or complex performance. As I have
previously argued at greater length and with reference to Polanyi and oth-
ers, emotion has an essential role in all knowing and action (see Allen
2000, 1991). Polanyis rehabilitation of emotion is therefore a central part
of his rehabilitation of belief, faith, trust, authority and tradition, within a
postcritical, fiduciary, personalist and fallibilist philosophy.
Bibliography
Allen, R. T. (1978) The philosophy of Michael Polanyi and its signifi-
cance for education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 12:167-177.
. (1982) Rational autonomy: the destruction of freedom. Journal of
Philosophy of Education 16:2, 119-207.
. (1991) Governance by emotion. Journal of the British Society for
Phenomenology 22:2, 15-29.
. (1992) The Education of Autonomous Man. (Avebury Philosophy
Series) Guildford: Ashgate Publishing Group.
. (1993) The Structure of Value. (Avebury Philosophy Series) Guild-
ford: Ashgate Publishing Group.
. (1996) Polanyis overcoming of the dichotomy of fact and value.
Polanyiana 5:2, 5-20.
. (2000) The cognitive functions of emotion. Appraisal 3:1, 38-47.
Jacobs, S.; R.T. Allen (eds.) (2005) Emotion, Reason and Tradition.
Guildford: Ashgate.
Kant, I. ([1784] 1983) An Answer to the Question: What is Enlighten-
ment? In Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, (trans. T. Humphrey)
Indianapolis: Hacket Pub. Co.
Kenny, A. (1963) Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge.
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge. London: Routledge.
Taylor, Ch. (1975) Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF KARL

AND MICHAEL POLANYI:
PROLOGUE TO A RECONCILIATION
WALTER GULICK
Among those who have only a superficial understanding of the social

and political thought of Karl and Michael Polanyi, there is a stereotyped
formula that goes something like this: Karl is an old-fashioned socialist,
while Michael is an unrestrained free-market advocate. If the stereotype of
the intellectual identity of the brothers were accurate, then it would seem a
foolish mission to try and discover any common ground being shared by
the twomuch less to think that their thought might be integrated into a
coherent whole. Yet the stereotype is not accurate. One aim of this paper is
to explore the degree to which important elements of the thought of each
are compatible.
As I greatly respect the ideas coming from each brother, an analysis
drawing from the insights of each would seem to me to be a sensible ave-
nue of approach in order to be able to theorize constructively about the
leading political, economic, environmental and social issues of our day.
While many distinct syntheses might be attempted, my selection of ele-
ments from their thought that should be utilized will be partly guided by
the degree to which they help support three social values possessing over-
riding importance in todays world: peace, justice, and sustainability. For
if an intellectual reconciliation was achieved that had little or no bearing
on such issues, an exercise seeking a form of reconciliation would seem
rather pointless.
The approach to be used will be respectful of Michael Polanyis dem-
onstration that there is a personal contribution that necessarily contributes
to the shaping and final form of all thought and action. This personal ele-
The Social Thought of Karl and Michael Polanyi 193
ment includes embodied skills but also lessons derived from personal
experience. Therefore, this essay includes an examination of personal
correspondence (particularly that existing between the brothers) and for-
mative experiences that might help illuminate the distinctive world-view
of both thinkers. The seriousness with which each brother held his views
would make it unlikely that either would approve of the suggestion that a
coherent synthesis of their ideas is possible, but total approval should
never be expected when one is asked to compromise some of ones firmly
held ideas. This paper, however, is only a prologue to the difficult task of
articulating a comprehensive theory that incorporates some of the most
fruitful ideas given by these thinkers. It undertakes the more modest task
of presenting a comparative study of the social thought of the Polanyi
brothers that reveals insights from each that are not only compatible, but
also useful in our time (while it will largely ignore the writings of those
who have developed their political or social ideas).1
A Golden Age?
Endre Nagy, in his informative article about the relationship between
the brothers, postulates a Golden Age that existed between Karl and
Michael up until 1934, when severe disagreements about the Russian ex-
periment, capped by Michaels publication of his monograph on Russias
economic policies in 1935, led to a period of estrangement (Nagy 1994,
83). The most explicit basis for speaking of estrangement and dating its
inception to this period is Karls letter to Michael of January 21-23, 1957,
in which Karl wrote, Except for our father and my wife, I have never
loved anyone as dearly as I loved you, and our differences some twenty-
three years ago darkened my life as his death had done. Some six years
later you wrote to me that what had separated us was our attitudes toward
1
Two works making good use of Karl Polanyis thought come to mind that would
enrich this paper were there space to address their claims. I have learned much
from Daly and Cobbs constructive work (1994). A second work worthy of deeper
study is that of OConnor (1998), who offers the following fetching comment
about Karls masterpiece, The Great Transformation: Polanyis work remains a
shining light in a heaven filled with dying stars and black holes of bourgeois natu-
ralism, neo-Malthusianism, Club of Rome technocratism, romantic deep ecology-
ism, and United Nations one-worldism. (158). For a helpful elaboration on
OConnors use of Karl Polanyi, see Stroshane (2007). Michael Polanyis influ-
ence has been less extensive in political and social thought than in epistemology,
philosophy of science, and religious thought.
194 Chapter Thirteen
Russia and my hypochondria.2 Since Michael visited the USSR in 1928,

1931, and 1932 (Scott and Moleski 2005, 160), and he corresponded with
Karl concerning his dismay at the gap existing between Russian propa-
ganda and truth, his rejection of the Soviet experiment must have been
clear to Karl before Michael published his monograph on Russian eco-
nomics. So it seems to make more sense to speak of a growing revelation
of difference rather than a moment of estrangement.
Quite possibly a factor that contributed to estrangement occurred when
Karl moved from Vienna to England shortly after Michael and his family
had moved there from Berlin in 1933. Michaels wife Magda was unhappy
with the demands Karl made upon Michael and his family when they were
themselves having a difficult time adjusting to their new English environ-
ment. The difficulties included Michael and Magda having to house Karls
daughter Kari when such a thing was quite inconvenient.3
What certainly compounded the rift, though, was the way Karl refused
to acknowledge that there were grave difficulties with Soviet communism.
The brothers utterly opposed views about Soviet Russia come to the fore
most clearly in their differing interpretations concerning how their niece,
Eva Zeisel, was treated by the Russian police and judicial system.4 Mi-
chaels righteous anger concerning her treatment and his general indict-
ment of Soviet totalitarianism stands in strong contrast to Karls bland
2
This letter is found in box 17, folder 12 of the Michael Polanyi Papers housed in
the Regenstein Library at the University of Chicago. Hereafter, citations from the
Polanyi Papers will take the form: (MPP box number, folder number) and be cited
within the text.
3
This was surely more of a sore point with Magda than with Michael, for some-
what later Michael wrote to his friend Hugh ONeill that he found these arrange-
ments satisfactory (Scott and Moleski 2005, 154).
4
Michael, in his letter of June 16, 1944, wrote to Karl, What shocked me was the
fact that you suggested with the emphasis of a person telling me an obvious fact,
that Eva was treated by the most fair judicial methods. Eva had told me that they
had impressed it upon her that she must confess just a little, in order to make it
possible for them to have a separate trial. Otherwise she would be shot without
trial. Under continued pressure of this kind she broke down and made false confes-
sions implicating other innocent persons. Back in her cell she tried to commit
suicide but failed (MPP 17, 11). While Nagy suggests that there is no response to
this letter among the correspondence (101), in fact in a letter of July 11, 1944 Karl
wrote Michael, As to Evas accounts, they would differ of course widely accord-
ing to her mood and situation. Karl goes on to suggest that things went downhill
when Eva threatened to lodge a complaint against the Auditor with the Public
Prosecutor (who, she said, was supposed to follow the law). In his muted response
to Michaels outrage, Karl still refused to confront any idea of Russian injustice.
apologetics. This is one of the relatively few issues in which the position
of one brother (in this case, Michael) is to be categorically affirmed while
the others position is rejected.
Acknowledgement of their estrangement can be analyzed in different
ways, yet I myself wonder about the legitimacy of Nagys claim that there
was a Golden Age during which the brothers were in basic agreement
with respect to the main elements of their Weltanschauung (Nagy 1994,
83).5 It may have seemed to Karl that all was right in his relationship with
Michael when they were at a distance prior to 1933, but if we look at the
evidence of their writings, it appears that from the time of Michaels matu-
ration the brothers dwelt within quite different world-views, ones that
would inevitably lead to disagreements. How as young men they proposed
to avoid war and promote peace illustrates their differing perspectives on
persons and society.
Differing World-views
Karl and Michael each saw World War I as a devastating experience,
and each brother was motivated to spend great amounts of energy seeking
to determine its causes and find ways to prevent its reoccurrence.6 Both
brothers were suspicious of the monolithic sovereign state (although Karl
had a blind spot with regard to Russia) and advocated that an association
of interests should take its place. But their interpretations of how the asso-
ciation of interests might best work and their general interpretations of 19th
and 29th century history display seeds of difference that go back at least to
the First World War.
In the early 1920s Karl advocated governance by an association of in-
terests that was based on input from both producers and consumers, whom
he saw as the same persons.7 This cooperative association, set within a
5
The biography by Scott and Moleski also casts doubt on the imputed Golden
Age. After their father died, Karl saw himself as head of the family. Karls efforts
to act like a father toward Michael were not welcome after the younger brother
reached maturity; Michael often kept his distance from his older brother, much to
Karls dismay (15).
6
Thus, for instance, Michaels first article on social affairs, published in 1917,
dealt with the cause of war and the prospects for peace, and one of his last articles,
published in 1970, was Why Did We Destroy Europe?
7
See Congdon (1991, 217-233) for a helpful summary of Karl Polanyis thought as
it developed during his time in Austria, especially as influenced by G.D.H. Cole.
Congdon describes Karls form of socialism in these terms: The state would
defend the interests of consumers, while the industrial guilds defended those of
socialist government, would adjust the market to meet social needs. Karls
reliance upon intentional cooperation for the common good is typical of
the distinctive brand of socialism that he came to advocate.
Michael was sympathetic to Karls notion that an association of inter-
ests ought to take precedence over unrestrained national autonomy in order
to avoid war and support human welfare. His first articles dealing with
society and the war show that he is leery of any governmental activity
claiming to advance the countrys common good but also of any idealis-
tic political program. In 1917 Michael wrote that:
the State goes to war not as an association of interests, but as an idea, and
what is a bad business for an association of interests is vital food for the
idea. Business requires rational investments, an idea demands bloody sacri-
fices. If the State acted in the interests of its citizens, it would join its
neighbours in a permanent and stable co-operative effort, i.e. it would
cease to exist in a sovereign way! (M. Polanyi 1917, 22)
The blame Michael directs here toward the State (supported by the jeal-
ous love of people for the greatness and wealth of their own State [M.
Polanyi 1917, 21]) was further reinforced by his experience while serving
in the troubled government of Count Karolyi in Hungary shortly after
World War I. He finds it fitting to criticize not only nationalism, but po-
litical activity as such. Politics is a blind eruption of fear and hope (M.
Polanyi 1919, 30). Michael in his criticism of political activity includes
socialism as well as liberal democracy; he sees both as being merely or-
ganizational means of supporting nationalism. [T]he idea of the State is
actually alive within the minds of the people as a whole, including the
minds of Socialists, and it was this that made the Internationale fail at the
outbreak of the war (M. Polanyi 1917, 24). Thus from his earliest writ-
ings on social thought Michael reveals his distrust of any traditional politi-
cal solution to war, including developing the sort of socialist remedy that
intrigued Karl. Instead he advocates a twofold strategy. First, he writes,
Our job is exploring the truth; dissecting the confused images of politics
and analyzing the belief in political concepts; finding the originating con-
ditions of political illusions ... (M. Polanyi 1919, 31). Second, he pro-
motes a community less dangerous to itself than todays, one without
producers. Harmony would be assured because, as functional organizations, guilds

represented the same persons in their various social functions. By this brilliant
theoretical breakthrough, according to Polanyi, Cole had liberated socialism from
bondage to collectivist-Communist nationalization. At a stroke he had discredited
centralization, with its attendant threat of bureaucratization, and reaffirmed social-
isms commitment to human freedom (222).
politics and democracy (M. Polanyi 1919, 31). People will be freed to
tend to their personal interests rather than be inflamed by nationalistic or
other political illusions of greatness.
Michael followed his own advice and turned away from politics to em-
brace science fully. Implicit in his appeal to individual interests rather than
political programs is his support for the social superiority of individualistic
calculations involved in the market rather than political influence in eco-
nomic decision making. This preference becomes explicit in his writings
in subsequent decades. But it is not clear to me that his rejection of politics
and his implied embrace of the marketplace would advance the prospects
for peace. For capitalisms reliance on a world-view advocating self-
interest, within a world of scarce goods, only encourages aggression and
suspicion, while the military-industrial complex searching for profit in the
marketplace provides economic incentives to go to war.
Karls sophisticated interpretation of the causes of World War I, devel-
oped over several decades of reflection, reaches markedly deeper into the
economic and social structures of Europe than Michaels early view that
competing ideals of national glory were to blame for the war. According to
Karl, in the 19th century the European States, arranged in a balance of
powers, became the guardians of a remarkable hundred years of general
peace from 1815 to 1914.
The backwash of the French Revolution reinforced the rising tide of the
Industrial Revolution in establishing peaceful business as a universal inter-
est. Metternich proclaimed that what the people of Europe wanted was not
liberty but peace. Gentz called patriots the new barbarians. Church and
throne started out on the denationalization of Europe. Their arguments
found support ... in the tremendously enhanced value of peace under the
nascent economies. (K. Polanyi [1944], 7)
The nationalistic interests that grew during the 19th century sometimes
promoted war as a means to glory, but romantic notions of war were in
practice defused by international commercial interests that had risen into
power via the Industrial Revolution. The vast majority of the holders of
government securities, as well as other investors and traders, were bound
to be the first losers in [general] wars, especially if currencies were af-
fected .... Loans, and the renewal of loans, hinged upon credit, and credit
upon good behavior (K. Polanyi [1944], 14, see also 273). Good behavior
supported stable, peaceful conditions in which trade could flourish. Thus
in the 19th century, economic pressures on the State motivated it to be-
come, contra Michael, the supporter of peace, not the instigator of war.
So, then, what does Karl think caused World War I? The collapse of
the world economy, falsely bolstered by the myth of the benevolent self-
adjusting free market, is seen as the culprit. To avoid collapse, the free
market requires a sacrificial flexibility on the part of ordinary persons and
governments. Those in the labor force must be willing to be treated as
commodities subject to the uncaring forces of the market. That is, they
must be willing to accept unemployment if working in areas of overpro-
duction, they must be willing to move to wherever jobs open up, and they
must tolerate unpredictable fluctuations in income. These sacrifices are
politically unacceptable. To avert such strains on the citizenry, nations put
into place protective tariffs, accepted the gold standard, and developed
imperialistic zones of influence to ensure they had access to sources of
energy and natural resources. For reasons Karl describes, these attempts to
stabilize the economy and fend off political discontent were not success-
ful. The market could not adjust to the strains placed upon it, and the
trade-sensitive balance of power structure, which had been crucial in
maintaining peace, failed. The Great War followed.
It can be seen that Karl bases his analyses both of the causes of World
War I and the way peace is best maintained on a broad, historically-based
social analysis, whereas Michaels understanding is more linked to the
dominant thought processes of individuals as they affect governance. Later
in his thinking, Michael developed the notion of moral inversion to ac-
count for the wars, and this notion again emphasizes the corrosive power
of malformed ideas employed by individuals, in contrast to Karls more
institutional historical-social analysis. At no time did Michael think social-
ism was a helpful antidote to the centurys problems. All this suggests that
the brothers did not share the same world-view during Nagys imputed
Golden Age. If prior to 1935 they had no major disputes, it was because
their professional liveseconomic and social analysis in contrast to phys-
ical chemistrydid not have many points of intersection.
Liberty with a Social Perspective

Even if their overall world-views did differ, Michael and Karl agreed
upon the fundamental importance of liberty to a life well led both at an
individual and a social level. However, they disagreed about in what cir-
cumstances liberty was practiced in its most ideal form and what consti-
tuted the greatest threat to liberty in their time. On the one hand, Michael
responded positively to the liberal society that he experienced as a youth at
the turn of the century, and he sought a way of returning to its cosmopoli-
tan culture. He viewed communism in particular and totalitarianism in
generaltypically employing top-down control of societyas the greatest

threat to liberty. Karl, on the other hand, viewed the nineteenth century
through the eyes of Marx and the workers of the Industrial Revolution; for
him it was a time when servitude of the masses and degradation prevailed.
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, he saw governments as enti-
ties desperately seeking (and finally not successfully) to counteract the
destructive social consequences of a market economy. Thus he believed
that an unbridled market society was the greatest threat to liberty. He
thought that governmental attempts to control the social damage caused by
the market would almost inevitably produce a reaction, one leading to
fascismthe ultimate sacrifice of liberty.
Karl saw clearly how economic institutions in the Western world had
become disengaged from the constraining influence of such social forces
as kinship, friendship, and communal solidarity. The degree to which
economic motivations have become autonomous forces in society has
accelerated since Karls death, and now the power of multinational corpo-
rations in a globalized society has come in some ways to exceed the power
of national governments. Karls ideal was to return to a pluralistic social
order in which economic forces were re-embedded within social relations
and institutions. In such a society, persons would not be self-centered
competitors for scarce resources; they would live cooperative, communal
lives not driven by market forces. The social organization of hunter-
gatherer societies, based on reciprocity, might serve as a distant, albeit
overly simple, model of such a life; the structure of medieval society,
employing economic redistribution as well as reciprocity, would be a
model more closely attuned to the social possibilities and opportunities of
our time. The early writing of Marx serve to shape and provide color to
Karls portrait of the ideal social life, as do the contributions of Robert
Owen and the writings of the British Socialist G.D.H. Cole.
One way Karl advanced his thesis was by distinguishing the formal
from the substantive view of the economy. The formal view is centered on
the idea that humans are, at core, homo economicus, the rational animal
that, upon deliberation, chooses among alternatives to promote self-
interested ends. This is the view adopted by most economists. Prices are
seen as the social measure that allows the self-seeking individual to select
rationally among scarce goods or services those that most efficiently ad-
vance her/his interests within a competitive world. The formal view is
rooted in a logic of choices. The substantive concept, in contrast, can be
defined as the human interchange with his natural and social environ-
ment, in so far as this results in supplying him with the means of material
want satisfaction (K. Polanyi 1957, 243). It has to do with a human live-
lihood and way of life that is freed from anxieties about monetary profit or
loss. Karls distinction has echoes of Marxs contrast between exchange
and use values. Karl would like to prioritize the substantive view and re-
turn economics to the control of some sort of democratic system of gov-
ernance. In the 1920s and most of the 1930s, Karl embraced Christian
Socialism as his preferred political model; later his brand of socialism was
less attached to any specific political organization.
Michael expressed strong reservations both about Karls notion of the
substantive and formal views of the economy and about his aim to bring
economic choice under governmental supervision. In his letter to Karl of
December 3, 1953, Michael wrote:
I cannot help disagreeing with your own formulation of your fundamental

distinction between formal and substantive economics. I think what you
call the logic of choice is deeply embedded in all manifestations of ration-
ality down to the level of the amoeba. It is inherent likewise in the concep-
tion of all machines and indeed of any purposive device. Throughout this
domain a balance is struck between a large number of particulars which
mutually require or supplement each other. Economy in this sense is the
most general characteristic of life and of all artifacts produced by living be-
ings.
In my opinion, therefore, the classical or formal definition of econom-
ics as a logic of choices is wrong. Modern economics is characterized by
the interaction of systems of choices operated independently at a large
number of centers. This is what I call polycentricity. (MPP 17, 12)
At first glance, Michaels assessment seems confused, for he first

praises (versus Karl) the logic of choice as an aspect of a basic trait of life
but then denies its appropriateness for serving as a defining characteristic
of economics. Here is what I think he means, though: he sees the inquisi-
tive, thrusting, discriminating impulse suggested by the more limited term
logic of choice as an essential quality of all living beingsindeed, as
the core of rationality. So he could not follow Karls lead of rejecting the
logic of choices and replacing it with a substantive view of economics.
However, because the logic of choice as used in economics involves such
a narrow view of intellectual rationality, he would agree with Karl in see-
ing it as an impoverished basis for understanding human economic activ-
ity. There are many tacit factors influencing individual economic decision
making that the term logic of choice ignores. The market itself, as a
social institution, is best understood from a systemic perspective, one
involving many mutually adjusting centers of choice.
Furthermore, Michael does not consider Karls substantive view to ac-
cord with the basic inquisitive and acquisitive passions that serve to char-
acterize all living beings, each in its own unique way. He states the issue
as follows: We have seen how the urge to look out for clues and to make
sense of them is ever alert in our eyes and ears, and in our fears and de-
sires. The urge to understand experience, together with the language refer-
ring to experience, is clearly an extension of this primordial striving for
intellectual control (M. Polanyi [1958], 100). The primordial striving for
control extends to actions as well as thoughts, but Karls advocacy of
substantive rather than market economics only weakly supports the natural
human proclivity to advance ones interests that is embedded in our civic
culture. This proactive, intentional, and purposeful activity is fundamental
to Michaels understanding of human nature; it is this dimension that he
adds to Gestalt notions of equilibration that gives his epistemology its
distinctive twist. Michael believes that an economy which does not use
the market or does not use it to the full is necessarily an economy of re-
stricted choices ... (MPP 17, 12). Humans naturally view the world as full
of opportunities that must be exploited or lost. Anxiety about a scarcity of
satisfactions is a natural human state. Thus runs Michaels critique.
To sum up here, Michael believes that Karls formal definition ignores
the systemic aspect of economics and the a-rational nature of many choic-
es, and he thinks the substantive definition, with its tribal and pre-modern
notions of reciprocity and redistribution, offers no clearly delineated pro-
gram for producing and distributing goods relevant to the institutionalized
practices of the modern world. It does not take sufficient account of the
human interest in maximizing purposeful satisfactions. Yet at a time when
there is a pressing need to support peace, justice, and sustainability, Mi-
chaels criticism seems to miss the target with respect to these issues. Has
not our fear of scarcity and our irrepressible search for material satisfac-
tions through the market contributed to the many environmental problems
that are becoming more and more severe: global warming, resource deple-
tion, pollution, and increasingly costly energy, among others? Moreover,
is not Karl correct in his concern that once consumerism becomes habitual,
it fosters narrow self-interest and thus dehumanizes society? So does Mi-
chael offer any helpful advice concerning how society might be better
organized to counter such problems rather than simply serve narrow self-
interest?
In Personal Knowledge he contrasts ways of thought that support indi-
vidual action with ways of thought devoted to civic involvement. The life
of thought in society depends on its civic institutions, that is, on group
loyalty, property, and power.... [L]oyalty is parochial, property appetitive
and public authority violent (M. Polanyi [1958], 215). The standards
coordinating civic engagement are thus basically utilitarian and materialis-
tic. Michaels social realism stands in contrast to Karls social idealism.

For Michael, the price we pay for enjoying moral and intellectual con-
summations is putting up with societys inevitable shortcomings. The
alternative to muddling through an imperfect society is striving for some
sort of utopia, and it is precisely such striving, Michael believes, that all
too easily may lead to a Russian gulag or an Auschwitz. It would not be
productive to turn to Michaels thought for a detailed program designed to
solve the worlds problems. However, whereas practical individual and
civic thought may all too often be self-serving, he also notes that intellec-
tual and moral thought about social conditions may incorporate universal
intent that transcends self-interest. Michaels anti-utopianism does not
preclude him from thinking about ways of improving life.
Scarcity
The systemic perspective Michael advocates is certainly a helpful aid
in understanding how the market functions, but there is something to
Karls substantive view that I believe is of great importance today if our
threefold interest to secure peace, justice, and sustainability in society is to
be advanced. One issue at stake here is the notion of scarcity. Michaels
view implies that humans naturally think and act in terms of a world-view
in which scarcity is presupposed. Karl would concede, of course, that
humans have basic material needs for food, clothing, shelter, and other
components of habitation, and some economic system should provide such
things. But as social animals, humans are most content, he believes, when
they dwell in communities where general welfare and mutual support
define the quality of lifenot material needs.
The notion of scarcity is not generally accorded the attention it de-
serves. A belief that scarcity prevails (whether this is a false perception or
an actuality) tends to degrade the experienced quality of life. In the Soviet
Union, the scarcity of goods needed for survival or at least for a reasona-
bly comfortable life was often a realityand it was frequently cynically
used as an instrument of social control. Persons who lined up to get scarce
bread or other basic consumer items would feel gratitude to a state that
provided such items. Moreover, criticism of that state would be muted if it
might threaten ones being provided with such scarce items. What Karl
calls the tormenting problem of poverty (K. Polanyi [1944], 131) is
doubtless a threat to human flourishing.
A presupposition of scarcity not only tends to damage the quality of
life, it threatens environmental integrity and sustainability, too. Within
capitalism, it is advantageous for businesses to encourage consumers to
perceive the world in terms of scarcity, for that motivates persons to pur-
chase more and more goods and services to make sure that they have
enough of that which is presumed to be in short supply. Because the per-
ception of scarcity increases sales and boosts profits, marketers work at
enhancing the perception of scarcity. Hurry, the sale ends Saturday.
Without product X, you will miss out on a world of pleasure. Quanti-
ties are limited, so make your purchase today. Amid a surfeit of goods,
many Americansironicallylive with a mentality of scarcity.
With the advent of economic globalization, concern about what one
doesnt have is being promoted worldwide through increased advertising
and other processes of commercialization. Through its promotion of a
lifestyle of consumption, global capitalism is placing a great strain on
natural resources, is increasing pollution dramatically (e.g. in places like
China, where industrial production has moved), and there are now eco-
logical effectsclimate change being perhaps the most obviousthat
severely threaten the viability of living in many areas of the planet. As has
become obvious, business enterprise as it is now being done will not be
sustainable in the future. Increased pressure for clean water, arable land,
energy and natural resources not only degrades resources, it also threatens
world peace. Furthermore, economic activity as presently practiced is
increasing the wealth of the wealthy while doing little to help the poor, and
in some cases it is producing more poverty. Hence, the current economic
system is contributing to patterns of global injustice. So all three of the
values that I believe an economic system needs to supportincreasing
world security and peace, bringing about increased distributive justice, and
ensuring that business and social practices are sustainableall are threat-
ened by the current type of global economics, which is much more akin to
Michaels market-based model than Karls substantive model of econom-
ics. So is Michaels view more harmful than helpful?
Such a conclusion is not warranted. He demonstrates that markets are
the most efficient means of making economic decisions, but as we shall
see, he does not support the sort of laissez faire economic policy that led to
the world wars and Great Depression. Governmental regulation of the
economy in recognition of peace, justice, and sustainability is possible
within Michaels theory. Moreover, the perception of scarcity, when it is
accurate and not a perpetual mind-set, is an important ingredient in any
viable economic theory. The market performs a valuable service by alert-
ing potential customers to shortages and surpluses through the signaling
device of rising or falling prices. That is, when not interfered with via
speculation, an unjust concentration of power, manipulation, and/or ru-
mor-mongering, the self-regulating market is a reality-signaling mecha-
nism. For example, the recent greatly increased cost of petroleum products
tells the long range truth about supply and demand (even if in the short run
prices are manipulated), truth that could initiate change away from our
current reliance upon petroleum. The great trick, of course, is to institute
ways of eliminating, or at least minimizing the impact of speculation,
inappropriate concentrations of power, and other impediments to a just and
peaceful world order that is sustainable.
How Can the Markets Deleterious Side-Effects

Be Softened?
While an ideal market economy is able to make known the economic
truth via the impersonal information provided by prices and initiate change
in search of profit, a command economy will often be conservative in
initiating needed changes for reasons of political expediency. Karls chap-
ter in The Great Transformation on Speenhamland in England is a study in
the harmful effects of legislation designed to protect the rural poor from
the effects of the market economyyet Karl believes that government
should be charged with preventing the suffering that so frequently accom-
panies economic change. In his letter to Michael of April 23, 1943, he
argues that governments ought to use the principles of retardation, ca-
nalization, and relief to assist those suffering from economic dislocations
(MPP 17, 10). John Chamberlain, in his review of The Great Transforma-
tion, notes the inconsistency in Karls thought: Karl criticizes Speenham-
land, yet essentially asks us to return to it by arguing for the primacy of
society (Chamberlain 1944). Michael responds to Karls advocacy of
protectionism in a letter of November 12, 1943 by asking, What are the
limits to such a principle, which, it would seem, could be applied to pre-
serve obsolescent producer groups everywhere at the expense of the rest of
the community, as expressed in loss of potential economic progress? Sure-
ly you must have formulated some limitations to protectionism, so as to
allow for economic change (MPP 17, 10). Karl replies on December 9
that because land and labor are market commodities, all persons are af-
fected by market fluctuations. He sees the real problem, thus, to be Mi-
chaels: how can the suffering of people caused by a volatile market econ-
omy be properly dealt with (MPP 17, 10)? Michael in turn refers to Adam
Smiths invisible hand when he wishes to show how self-interested
action in an ideal market increases social welfare. Persons can make prof-
its by supplying goods and services that are desired but which are not
available in enough quantity to meet the demand. Decreasing prices for a
product signal that there is over-production of the item. Thus the market
structure is an efficient guide for regulating production and giving people

what they want. Unfortunately, ideal, perfectly competitive market condi-
tionsneeded for the invisible hand to be able to work fairlyare almost
never obtained. We live under conditions in which the most powerful
banks and corporations control the essential market transactions to their
own benefit. Devising a more just and beneficent economic system con-
tinues to be a challenge.
The conflict between the Polanyis economic models could justifiably
be expressed as a clash between a) Karls non-Marxian form of socialism
with economic activity being guided by workers guilds in collaboration
with the state and b) Michaels free-market capitalism backed by a liberal
democracy possessing some regulatory power. However, in his letter to
Michael of November 9, 1943, Karl astutely recognizes that the terms of
the debate have changed since the 1920s and 1930s, and are no longer so
ideologically pure. From the point of view of international organization
the cleavage is not between capitalist and socialist states but between lib-
eral capitalism and any type of planned or semi-planned economy; be-
tween old style and new style economies. The latter are able to cooperate,
the former, not (MPP 17, 10). Similarly, the terms of debate in the 1940s
are no longer the same as what is at stake today, for they do not consider
the contemporary predominance of multinational corporations, the fluidity
of international finance, and similar manifestations of globalization. Here
is how economist Herman Daly succinctly but comprehensively outlines
the current problematic world situation:
Globalizationthe erasure of national boundaries for economic pur-

posesrisks serious consequences. Briefly, they include, first of all, stan-
dards-lowering competition to externalize social and environmental costs
with the goal of achievement of a competitive advantage. This results, in
effect, in a race to the bottom so far as efficiency in cost accounting and
equity in income distribution are concerned. Globalization also risks in-
creased tolerance of mergers and monopoly power in domestic markets in
order that corporations become big enough to compete internationally.
Third, globalization risks more intense national specialization according to
the dictates of competitive advantage. Such specialization reduces the
range of choice of ways to earn a livelihood, and increases dependence on
other countries. Finally, worldwide enforcement of a muddled and self-
serving doctrine of trade-related intellectual property rights is a direct
contradiction of the Jeffersonian dictum that knowledge is the common
property of mankind. (Daly 2001, 19)
It is evident that some fairly far-reaching reforms are needed, but how
might Michael and Karl bring about reforms when they each advocate a
trimming back of the nationalistic powers that potentially can control

economic activity? They would most likely agree that there is now too
great a concentration of power in corporations, although the manner in
which they would like that power to be diffused or broken up differs. I
believe they would each agree with Dalys proposal that internationaliza-
tion, not globalization, ought to be the aim of political and economic pol-
icy. Internationalization refers to the increasing importance of relations
among nations. Although the basic unit of community and policy remains
the nation, increasingly trade, treaties, alliances, protocols, and other for-
mal agreements and communications are necessary elements for nations to
thrive (Daly 2001, 17). Under the current practices of globalization, cor-
porations are able to play one country off against another in the pursuit of
lower wages and more relaxed environmental regulations. Karl would
surely speak up on behalf of the workers of the world against such an
arrangement. International controls on corporate power and environmental
impact plus a flexible scale of minimum wages pegged in part to a nations
standard of living would provide helpful initial steps toward correcting the
current imbalance of power. Nothing in Michaels world-view would
oppose such a step so long as the process was not carried out by a mono-
lithic power threatening a new kind of totalitarianism.
Public Liberty
Michaels notion of public liberty could play a useful role in moving
society toward a more just and sustainable distribution of the worlds re-
sources. He believes that too much attention has been directed toward
individual freedomwhich has within it contradictions. During the En-
lightenment there was a legitimate demand for freedom from repressive
religious and political authority so that truth might be discovered. But the
struggle for greater personal freedoms was accompanied by a growing
skepticism about the authority not only of entrenched institutions, but of
any beliefs or ideals. This skepticism bore nihilistic fruit that is impotent
to institute regulations restricting the actions of persons or institutions that
would use any means to gain and secure power for themselves. When the
individual bearer of rights is made supreme, even socially beneficial con-
straints upon personal liberty can be rejected. The privileging of the sover-
eign individual has an unfortunate twist in our current situation, for in the
US corporations have been legally granted the status of persons and so
have benefited from the liberal antipathy against restricting those freedoms
it is claimed individuals should enjoy.
An implication of the stress upon individual liberty is laid out by Mi-

chael as follows: If you apply this claim for the supremacy of unique-
nesswhich we may call Romanticismto single persons, you arrive at a
general hostility to society ... (M. Polanyi 1951, 124). A resentment di-
rected against taxes and governmental regulations has fueled political
conservatism in the West for over 25 years now, and this has freed up
space for global economic powers to grow to a degree that currently
threatens peace, justice, and sustainability.
A curious by-product of the stress on securing individual liberty is that
private liberty is compatibleironicallywith an unhealthy totalitarian
rule. Polanyi explains:
Private nihilism prepares the mind for submission to public despotism; and
a despotic regime may continue to tolerate unrestrained forms of private
life, which another society living under public freedom would have
stamped out by social ostracism. Under Stalin the scope of private freedom
remains much wider than it was in Victorian Britain, while that of public
liberties is incomparably less. (M. Polanyi 1951, 194)
Public liberty, as delineated by Michael, is based on the imposition of

public structures (laws and regulations, especially if they serve to support
publicly-beneficial systems of spontaneous order) through which individ-
ual actions have a positive social function.8 A totalitarian government is
amenable to private liberties that do not threaten its sovereignty, yet it
opposes any public liberty that might give rise to activities it cannot di-
rectly control. In our time, multinational corporations are grasping for
control of anything which offers the possibility of making a profit.
Through having patents relating to genes and via intellectual property
rights, they control quality-of-life issues and specific sorts of knowledge,
domains having intrinsic value that are arguably best protected and devel-
oped for public benefit rather than being allowed to be made into vehicles
for private profit. In effect, then, multinational corporations are becoming
increasingly analogous to totalitarian governments: they encourage indi-
vidualistic freedom to buy, but resist public restrictions on their activities.
The sorts of controls that Daly discusses can be seen as an expression of
Michaels public liberty and as being compatible with Karls substantive
economics, both of which are designed to conduce to the benefit of all.
In utilizing Smiths notion of the invisible hand, it might appear that
Michael is affirming the laissez faire economic policy option, which cor-
8
The logic of public liberty is to co-ordinate independent individual actions
spontaneously in the service of certain tasks (M. Polanyi 1951, 244).
porations tend to favorthough this is, in the final analysis, incorrect.

While in the 1930s and early 1940s Michael Polanyi spent a great deal of
intellectual effort opposing the planning of scienceand he explicitly
extended his critique of planning to other areas as welllater in his career
he came more clearly to see that governmental or other sorts of external
regulations are needed to guide most areas of public activity.9 This is
implicit in his idea of public liberty. Thus he writes:
The shortcomings of the market principle have been increasingly demon-

strated over the past decade or two. The market system is notably blamed
because the market cannot balance collective demands. It is incapable of
deciding whether priority should be given to the construction of a network
of highways or a system of high schools. It cannot balance social costs, nor
can it correct imperfect competition, monopolies, or oligopolies. It cannot
evaluate or regulate the list prices of newly developed industries or public
works. Finally, it cannot control effective demand, at least in the sense that
Keyneswhose theory I subscribe tounderstood it. These operations or
functions should therefore be carried out, insofar as it is possible and even
if it is done imperfectly, by the public authorities. By so doing, public au-
thorities serve to regulate, guide, and supplement market tendencies. This
function, which is now generally known as over-all planning, enables the
market tendencies which do appear to be utilized, but not suppressed. (M.
Polanyi 1963, 95-96)
That Michael arrives at such a statement can be attributed in part to his

interactions with his brother. It can be interpreted as demonstrating Mi-
chaels retreat from the position he took in his 1945 work, Full Employ-
ment and Free Trade. There Michael advocated keeping governmental
economic policy free of any political considerations. That is, he argued
that the supply of money in circulation should be carried out in a neutral
form, i.e. in a way requiring no materially significant economic or social
action to accompany it. (M. Polanyi 1945, 29, the emphasis is Polanyis)
This principle of neutrality evoked one of the most passionate re-
sponses from Karl to Michael, for in his letter of November 1, 1945, he
wrote that Michael was directly criticizing his support for political and
economic integration, which Karl saw as a way to prevent the ravages
9
Even fairly early in his social writings Michael avoided any notion of a totally
free market. I consider that the alternative to the planning of cultural and eco-
nomic life is not some inconceivable system of absolute laissez faire in which the
State is supposed to wither away, but that the alternative is freedom under law and
custom as laid down, and amended where necessary by the State and public opin-
ion (M. Polanyi, 1940, 22).
imposed upon the working class during the 19th century (i.e. when the
marketplace was supreme). Karl expressed his view on this issue as fol-
lows: The institutional separation of politics and economics, which
proved a deadly danger to the substance of society, almost automatically
produced freedom at the cost of justice and security (K. Polanyi [1944],
263). Lee Congdon agrees with Martin Malia that Karl was wrong and
Michael was right to support the separation of politics from economics
since a combining of the two would lead to arbitrariness, oppression, and
corruption (Congdon 2001, 82-83). I disagree with Congdon, though, and
support Karl in this matter so long as the political control operates within a
transparent democratic system that contains checks and balances. This is
the view to which Michael later gravitated, as indicated in the passage
above and as suggested by his notion of public liberty. Michael thus grew
closer to Karl in this important aspect of economics.
Here I would differ somewhat from Nagy when he speaks of the
brothers inability to exert any influence on each others theoretical devel-
opment. Though they exchanged remarks, critiques and interpretations of
their own and each others writings, the reader may feel that these too
often appear to miss the mark (Nagy 1994, 82). My reading of the corre-
spondence in English between the brothers suggests that they articulated
their beliefs firmly, never omitting criticism to avoid hurting the others
feelings. They valued the others honesty in a world where frankness is too
often lacking. Karls wife Ilona, in a letter to Michael dated 24. a, 43,
makes a claim that could well be extended to the relationship between the
brothers. Writing from the US, she says, This is an inarticulate, sophisti-
cated country in which no one offers opinions. So your letter which ab-
ounded with them was like sweet Kent, or Piccadilly to me (MPP 17, 10).
Yes, the brothers exchanged strong opinions, but generally within a con-
text of brotherly concern. Thus, in the letter where Karl accuses Michael
of attacking his views via his principle of neutrality, he also says of the
book in question, However, my sweet brother, I am very happy with your
achievement. I never expected such a performance since I couldnt imag-
ine that important and significant ideas could be provoked by the attempt
to produce a popular version of Keynesianism (MPP 17, 11). So while
the letters never contain statements like Your arguments have made me
change my views, I do detect long-term patterns of influence, one of
which is Michaels recognition of the need to constrain the free market.
Karls acknowledgement of a (fairly limited) place for the market is an-
other.10 Both see the need for the efficiency of the market but also the
necessity of regulating it.
In Service to Transcendent Values

Michaels 1919 article contains one phrase that I see as articulating the
most central and persistent commitment existing in his life: Our job is
exploring the truth (M. Polanyi 1919, 31).11 He pursued truth through
science, social thought, and philosophy. It was the lack of truthfulness in
the claims of the Soviet Union and its supporters that, more than anything,
sparked his campaign against communism.12 A society whose leaders deny
strong scientific consensus (as, for instance, regarding global warming) or
ignore the strong advice of experts in the field (for example, about the
advisability of waging a particular war) is bound to undermine any drives
toward peace, justice, and sustainability.
In his later philosophy Michael came to augment his commitment to
truth with commitment to what he termed the whole firmament of values
(see, for instance, Polanyi and Prosch 1975, 214 and 216). These values
are worthy of respect insofar as they are instantiated in individual and
social life. And here we come to one of the most helpful ideas Michael
bequeaths to our time. It is his concept of a free society, which is worth
quoting in detail:
10
Thus Karl writes, The end of market society means in no way the absence of
markets. These continue, in various fashions, to ensure the freedom of the con-
sumer, to indicate the shifting of demand, to influence producers income, and to
serve as an instrument of accountancy, while ceasing altogether to be an organ of
economic self-regulation (K. Polanyi [1944], 260). Michael comes to affirm much
the same point of view.
11
Truth is not only a central value for Michael, it is highly esteemed by Karl.
Kenneth McRobbie notes that Karl greatly admired the Hungarian poet, Attila
Jozsef, citing Jozsefs admonition to Say what is true, not merely what is fac-
tualsee McRobbie 2000, 102 (n. 2). And Karls wife, Ilona Duczynska, says
Karl detested being a lawyer, apparently in large part because winning a case was
more important than telling the truth. Not only could he not tell a lie, he found his
true vocation in telling disagreeable truthsat all times and in all circumstances
(Duczynska Polanyi 2000, 308).
12
In this respect, see his 1936 article The Struggle between Truth and Propa-
ganda (in R. T. Allen, ed., Society, Economics, and Philosophy: Selected Papers,
47-60) directed against the extravagant claims made by the Webbs on behalf of the
USSR.
The ideal of a free society is in the first place to be a good society; a body
of men who respect truth, desire justice and love their fellows. It is only
because these aspirations coincide with the claims of our own conscience
that the institutions which secure their pursuit are recognized by us as the
safeguards of our freedom. It is misleading to describe a society thus con-
stituted, which is an instrument of our consciences, as established for the
sake of our individual selves; for it protects our conscience from our own
greed, ambition, etc., as much as it protects it against corruption by others.
Morally, men live by what they sacrifice to their conscience; therefore the
citizen of a free society, much of whose moral life is organized through his
civic contacts, largely depends on society for his moral existence. (M. Po-
lanyi 1951, 36)13
The free society, it should be noted, is not just committed to a free market,
one properly structured to support peace, justice, and sustainability, but it
would orient all of its activities in accordance with transcendent values.
Both Michael and Karl believe that it is religion, more than any other
institution or set of beliefs, that anchors those values needed for a good
society. Nagy (1994, 102) has suggested that in his later thought Karl
backed away from his earlier commitment to Christianity as an ideal (he
was never involved in institutional Christianity). It is true that he withdrew
his support from the Christian Socialists in Austria because they did not
support the workers (K. Polanyi [1944], 249). But he never withdrew his
faith in Jesus as the ideal model of loving acceptance between persons.14
In his letter of May 6, 1944 to Michael, Karl wrote, As you know, I al-
ways strongly felt that no other than a spiritual approach to mans nature
makes sense. ... More than ever I believe in the Christian interpretation of
13
In thus recognizing the essential role that has to be played by society in securing
moral existence, Michael is in basic agreement with Karls notion of the reality of
society, something ideally grounded in the moral relationships of persons. Set
against the person-denying abstractions of fascism and all forms of totalitarianism,
Michael and Karl agree on the two-faceted fundamental reality of the individual
person and the community in which the person dwells. Karl explains the point in
this manner: [P]ersonality is not real outside community. The reality of commu-
nity is the relationship of persons (K. Polanyi 1936, 370).
14
In a letter from 1923 to Michael, Karl articulates what I see as his moral ideal.
He claims that the basic human desire is to live together, by one another and for
one another. To love one another boundlessly and in an immediate way (quoted in
Congdon 1991, 221). Here I wish to register my dependence upon and gratitude for
Congdons wide ranging and insightful scholarship. The tenor of Karls letters to
Michael consistently expresses a loving solicitude that is lacking in Michaels
responses. Yet Michaels dogged commitment to truthfulness in his letters mani-
fests his commitment to transcendent values.
existence even though I am now convinced the New Testament is insuffi-

cient. We are living in a post-Christian world (MPP 17, 11). After the
Industrial Revolution, humans came to recognize the reality of society,
something that is not present in the teachings of Jesus. Robert Owen, more
than anyone else, corrected that lack. Owen recognized that the freedom
we gained through the teachings of Jesus was inapplicable to a complex
society. His socialism was the upholding of mans claim to freedom in
such a society (K. Polanyi [1944], 268). I would suggest that Karls ulti-
mate commitment is to loving relationships between persons as exempli-
fied by Jesus, plus Owen and Cole-style socialism, as supportive of lib-
erty. He opposes the acquisitive, overly competitive individualism that is
characteristic of capitalism, and in this respect his thought contains re-
sources for those seeking to establish a more sustainable way of living
than our current economic system encourages.
Michaels support for religion as a social glue turns on his recognition
that humans need a world-view that integrates the many incompatible
aspects of their lives, connects at an emotional level with their deepest
beliefs and values, and offers a vision of hope and meaningfulness that
supports them through the ups and downs of living. Perhaps this way of
putting things makes religion seem more a matter of pedestrian self-
interest than he intends. We do not accept a religion because it offers us
certain rewards. The only thing that a religion can offer us is to be just
what it, in itself, is: a greater meaning in ourselves, in our lives, and in our
grasp of the nature of all things (Polanyi and Prosch 1975, 180). In open-
ing people up to the nature and meaning of all things, religion is a poten-
tial ally of sustainability. Such a set of values for the individual and soci-
ety is congruent with Michaels ultimate support of the individuals com-
mitment to transcendent values (truth above all else) and public liberty as
supportive of spontaneous social order.
Conclusion
The philosophies of Karl and Michael Polanyi eventually come to have
far more in common than they have differences. It is not so much the case
that they grew apart after an early Golden Age of common belief as that
they gradually partially overcame the quite different world-views of their
earlier years. The perception that they dwell in very different world-views
derives in part from the genuine differences connoted by the terms each
uses to define his position: socialist versus reformed liberal. In practice,
these labels serve to identify opposing and antagonistic political parties
and programs. However, Karls socialism is distinct from any standard
brand of political socialism, such as Marxism or Democratic Socialism;

while Michaels liberalism rejects the notion that a self-adjusting market
can in any way replace governmental policy making. In their modifica-
tions of socialism and liberalism, Karl and Michael move closer together.
To be sure, for a long time they disagreed viscerally about the value of the
Russian experiment, and while Michael supported some regulation, he
never could accept the feasibility of governmental planning of a whole
economy. And temperamentally, the brothers are quite different. Yet for
all this, their core values are remarkably alike, and this suggests that once
the urgency posed by particular issues has faded, a reconciliation of their
more theoretical ideas is possible.
Between Karls emphasis on love and Michaels commitment to tran-
scendent values there is no conflict. Karls form of socialism or any form
of democracy would benefit from Michaels notion of public liberty, just
as Michaels support of a finely-tuned market might be usefully supple-
mented by Karls notions of reciprocity and redistribution. Thus, beyond
all the differences between Karl and Michael Polanyi, some of which have
been noted here, in the essentials there are harmonies which could be the
basis of an inclusive vision. This inclusive vision can be firmly grounded
in Michaels hierarchical vision of reality, in which the truths of social
organization can be compatible with the rather different truths of individ-
ual commitment without one level having to be reduced to the other level.
Both thinkers believe the adequacy of social structures must be tested
against such transcendent values as love, justice, and truth. If the ideal of
sustainability is to be realized, truthful projection of current policies and
global trends indicates that the efficient, profit-producing practices of the
market, affirmed by Michael, must not be allowed to trump all other social
considerations, but rather market processes must be re-embedded, Karls
concern, in social processes in which peace, justice, and sustainability
have a leading role. Both the details of such a re-embedding and how that
re-embedding might be achieved are issues that take one far beyond the
scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the insights of both Michael
and Karl Polanyi can contribute usefully to the formulation and implemen-
tation of policies and regulations supportive of these values, so crucial in
our time.
Bibliography
Chamberlain, John (1944) New York Times April 13, 1944: np.
Congdon, Lee (1991) Exile and Social Thought: Hungarian Intellectuals
in Germany and Austria, 1919-1933. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
. (2001) Seeing Red: Hungarian Intellectuals in Exile and the Challenge
of Communism. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
Daly, Herman E. (2001) Globalization and Its Discontents. Philosophy
and Public Policy Quarterly 21:2/3.
Daly, Herman E. and John B. Cobb (1994) For the Common Good: Redi-
recting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sus-
tainable Future, 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon Press.
Duczynska Polanyi, Ilona (2000) I First Met Karl Polanyi in 1920. . . In
Kenneth McRobbie and Kari Polanyi Levitt (eds.) Karl Polanyi in Vi-
enna: The Contemporary Significance of The Great Transformation.
Montreal: Black Rose Books.
McRobbie, Kenneth (2000) Vision and Expression: Literature and The
Great Transformation. In Kenneth McRobbie and Kari Polanyi Levitt
(eds.) Karl Polanyi in Vienna: The Contemporary Significance of The
Great Transformation. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
Nagy, Endre J. (1994) After Brotherhoods Golden Age: Karl and Mi-
chael Polanyi. In Kenneth McRobbie (ed.) Humanity, Society and
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. (1957) The Economy as Instituted Process. In Karl Polanyi, Conrad
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Polanyi, Michael and Harry Prosch (1975) Meaning. Chicago: University
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Polanyis The GreatTransformation. Capitalism Nature Socialism
8:3. [online] [cited 9 March 2007] Available from:
www.centerforpoliticalecology.org/Cyberbooks/part9.html
CONTRIBUTORS
Richard T. Allen
chairman and editor of Appraisal, Nottingham, UK,
rt.allen@ntlworld.com
Paul Richard Blum

professor, Loyola University Maryland, Baltimore, USA,
prblum@loyola.edu
Mrton Dinnyei
PhD student, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hun-
gary, dnm1@freemail.hu
Mrta Fehr
professor, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary,
feherm@filozofia.bme.hu
Walter Gulick
professor, Montana State University Billings, USA,
wgulick@msubillings.edu
Paul Lewis
associate professor, Mercer University, Macon, GA, USA,
lewis_pa@mercer.edu
Tihamr Margitay
professor, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary,
margitay@filozofia.bme.hu
Chris Mulherin
DTheol candidate, Melbourne College of Divinity, Australia,
chrismulherin@gmail.com
Phil Mullins
professor, Missouri Western State University, St. Joseph, MO, USA,
mullins@missouriwestern.edu
Daniel Paksi
PhD student, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hun-
gary, daniel.paksi@filozofia.bme.hu
David W. Rutledge
professor, Furman University, Greenville, S.C., USA,
david.rutledge@furman.edu
Yu Zhenhua
professor, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China,
zhyu@philo.ecnu.edu.cn
Iwo Zmylony
PhD student, University of Warsaw, Poland,
zmyslony.iwo@gmail.com
INDEX
Aristotle, 3, 80, 82, 92, 93, 179, Dreyfus, H., 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58,
180, 182 63, 64, 65, 66
authority, 12, 13, 16, 18, 41, 43, 73, emergence (emergent), 5, 39, 40, 45,
74, 75, 87, 91, 109, 116, 119, 46, 93, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134,
120, 122, 186, 190, 201, 206 135, 138, 139, 153, 155, 156,
autonomy, 6, 52, 88, 185, 186, 187, 157, 160, 161, 171, 186
188, 189, 190, 196 Enlightenment, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74,
awareness 96, 98, 104, 107, 122, 185, 186,
focal see focal awareness 206
subsidiary see subsidiary epistemology, 2, 3, 4, 23, 34, 47, 51,
awareness 58, 60, 62, 63, 66, 69, 73, 74, 76,
two kinds of, 21, 22, 23, 24, 38, 81, 97, 114, 123, 180, 181, 183,
43, 54, 56, 57 193, 201
boundary condition, 5, 45, 86, 130, ethics, 3, 36, 80, 81, 82, 83, 89, 90,
134, 135, 146, 147, 148, 154, 93, 123
155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, evolution, 5, 15, 16, 155, 156, 158,
161, 162, 164, 167, 168 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166,
cause (causation), 5, 45, 142, 143, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171
144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 fiduciary, 12, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 75,
clues, 3, 4, 22, 23, 32, 33, 83, 84, 106, 114, 185, 191
85, 87, 88, 93, 101, 102, 128, focal, 39
129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 139, awareness, 21, 22, 38, 54, 56, 58,
144, 151, 152, 155, 156, 159, 201 78, 84, 151
commitment, 4, 6, 20, 23, 24, 25, entity, 4, 156
71, 72, 75, 76, 86, 87, 91, 93, 99, object, 60, 129, 144, 145
102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 110, freedom, 4, 11, 13, 17, 19, 117, 119,
149, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 187, 196, 206, 207, 208, 209,
196, 210, 211, 212, 213 210, 211, 212
community, 4, 11, 16, 17, 27, 33, from-to, 4, 24, 26, 39, 84, 88, 93,
42, 45, 75, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 92, 144, 145
93, 96, 98, 102, 104, 105, 106, Gadamer, H-G., 3, 43, 68, 69, 70,
108, 109, 115, 116, 119, 120, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79,
121, 122, 123, 139, 196, 202, 109
204, 206, 211 Geertz, C., 105, 109
connoisseurship, 21, 22, 25, 57 Gelwick, R., 10, 11, 23, 123
Darwin, Ch., 98, 163, 164, 165, 167, gestalt, 2, 10, 12, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24,
168, 169, 170 25, 26, 201
Descartes, R., 59, 97, 100, 120, 177, psychology, 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 21,
180 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 33
Grene, M., 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 56, organizing principle, 134, 144, 145,
94, 99, 100, 116, 125 147, 148, 149, 150
Heidegger, M., 3, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, personal knowledge, 2, 3, 4, 20, 68,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 78, 79, 81, 102, 119,
64, 65, 66, 68, 100 156, 166, 179
hermeneutics, 3, 39, 68, 69, 71, 72, physicalism, 5, 147, 149
74, 76, 186 Polanyi, K., 6, 192, 193, 194, 195,
indwelling, 3, 4, 39, 43, 50, 51, 60, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201,
78, 84, 86, 87, 92, 93, 130 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
Kim, J., 5, 141, 142, 143, 147, 149, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213
150 Popper, K., 32, 179, 184, 190
knowing, 51, 52, 53 Poteat, W., 97, 100, 101, 106
knowledge, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 43, practical reasoning, 3, 80, 82, 83,
62, 69, 71, 78, 97, 102, 108, 114, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93
131, 133 reality, 23, 34, 37, 43, 44, 54, 58,
claims, 4, 70, 114, 115, 119 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 85, 86, 87, 88,
explicit, 3, 22, 35, 37, 38, 47, 52, 98, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 118,
57, 62, 63, 152, 153 119, 129, 130, 134, 136, 152,
implicit, 35, 40 159, 181, 183, 189, 202, 203,
management, 1 211, 212, 213
personal see personal knowledge moral, 93
propositional, 3, 57, 63 reductionism, 5, 143, 150
representational, 3 relativism, 69, 73, 108
tacit see tacit knowledge Rorty, R., 58, 59, 114
theory of, 1, 22, 34, 102 Ryle, G., 43, 51, 52, 54, 57, 62
Kohler, W., 11, 12, 14, 15, 21, 24, Sartre, J-P., 6, 185, 187, 188
25, 27 science, 4, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
Kuhn, Th., 32, 33, 42, 46 23, 37, 42, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74,
liberty, 17, 18, 86, 87, 197, 198, 75, 76, 79, 92, 97, 104, 105, 106,
199, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212, 213 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118,
Merleau-Ponty, M., 43, 51, 54, 55, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 208
98, 100 growth of, 96
Merton, R.K., 33, 117, 121 history of, 98
moral inversion, 81, 198 human, 68, 69, 72, 79
Niebuhr, R., 106, 107, 108, 109 philosophy of, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36,
ontology, 2, 5, 54, 66, 129, 130, 42, 68, 123, 193
131, 139, 141, 144, 147, 150 pure, 118, 121, 122
operational principles, 130, 132, republic of, 115
135, 136, 137, 146, 153, 159, 166 sociology of, 33
order society, 4, 11, 13, 17, 18, 97, 100,
dynamic, 2, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 106, 117, 118, 121, 195, 199,
20, 27 201, 202, 204, 206, 209, 211
planned, 2, 16 civil, 27
spontaneous, 1 free, 18, 210, 211
two kinds of, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, liberal, 2, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18,
17 20, 22, 27, 198
220 Index
market, 199, 210 Toulmin, S., 32, 83, 94, 96

of explorers, 20, 27, 117 trust, 4, 6, 74, 76, 102, 106, 108,
of scientists, 116 109, 114, 115, 120, 121, 122,
planned, 27 123, 189, 190, 191
subsidiary, 39 Turing, A., 6, 173, 177, 178, 179,
awareness, 21, 22, 38, 54, 56, 60, 180, 183, 184
78, 84, 151 understanding, 3, 24, 25, 34, 40, 43,
particulars, 3, 101 50, 53, 54, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73,
tacit integration, 4, 24, 26, 39 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 98, 100, 102,
tacit knowing (knowledge), 1, 2, 3, 104, 106, 128, 132, 139, 145,
5, 7, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 150, 174, 175, 186
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, universal intent, 4, 69, 71, 77, 79,
40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 86, 88, 93, 98, 110, 202
51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62, unspecifiability (unspecifiable), 21,
63, 66, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 25, 128, 149, 156, 160, 178
92, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 128, Wittgenstein, L., 54, 55, 56, 98, 100,
131, 145, 149, 150, 152, 153, 101, 138
156, 160 Ziman, J., 4, 115, 121, 123
Taylor, Ch., 51, 59, 60, 61, 62, 96,
105, 106, 185

Tihamér Margitay Ed. Knowing and Being Perspectives On The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi

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Knowing and Being

Knowing and Being:

This book first published 2010

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Copyright 2010 by Tihamr Margitay and contributors

ISBN (10): 1-4438-2062-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2062-2

Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 30

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 50

Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 80

Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 96

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 114

PART II: BEING

Chapter Eight........................................................................................... 128

Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 141

Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 151

Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 173

Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 185

Chapter Thirteen...................................................................................... 192

List of Contributors ................................................................................. 216

This book was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund

We know more than we can tell1this famous citation from Polanyi

Polanyi has no less a lively presence in contemporary philosophy. Mo-

practical reasoning and its formation. In many ways, an account of practi-

In The Immortality of the Intellect Revived, Blum contrasts Polanyis

This book has grown out of a conference held in Budapest in 2008 at

Polanyi, M. (1966) The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge.

MICHAEL POLANYI'S USE

1. Two Kinds of Order

Gestalt theory.4 This essay is a review article focusing on J. G. Crowthers

liberal society, in which science is an important community of persons

In this type of order no constraint is applied specifically to individual parti-

In his article, Polanyi cites Wolfgang Kohlers 1929 edition of Gestalt

Some of Polanyis examples of dynamical order are interesting since

He emphasizes that by cooling a solution, millions of molecules can be

an account of evolution in terms of internal forces seeking equilibrium:

ceived merely as a physical-chemical process paralleling isomorphism, according

theory popularized about the dynamics of forces. More broadly stated,

2. Two Kinds of Awareness

Personal Knowledge, has most succinctly summarized the course of Po-

lieve, of course, in such a way that we recognize that we might be mis-

joint meaning. As he puts it in his seventh Second Series Gifford lecture

About a year later, in The Study of Man, Polanyi suggests, in a similar

They were probably unwilling to recognize that knowledge was shaped by

To summarize, while Polanyis early articulation of a vision of liberal

xiii), to develop an account of knowing as an active, skillful comprehen-

3. The Theory of Tacit Knowing and the Meaning

nesshas developed a greater emphasis upon the from-to or embodied

about success and failure. Against the principle of isomorphism, Polanyi

shaping of experience, Polanyi means what he calls intentional integra-

. (1992/93) Civil society in Michael Polanyis thought. Polanyiana

. ([1958] 1964) Personal knowledge: towards a post-critical philoso-

VARIOUS IDEAS OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE

meaning of something. Yet this is not the idea of an idea I am referring

Typical Interpretations of Polanyis Philosophy

interpretation predominates among the major part of Polish authors (e.g.

Polanyi 1983, 4). Such an alternative ideal of knowledge might be labeled

to construct a model of the mind by means of which one might be able to

The opposition between implicit and explicit was introduced into

Polanyi on Tacit Knowledge

Neither in Science, Faith and Society nor in Personal Knowledge does

what is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or