[G.R. No. 111324.

July 5, 1996]

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO
REYES and LORNA REYES,respondents.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

In this petition for review, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila elevates procedural issues for the
Court's resolution. Does this case involve multiple appeals, where a record on appeal is necessary to perfect
the appeal? Does the appeal embrace purely questions of law? Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction
over an appeal from the Regional Trial Court raising only questions of law?
The case at bar springs from a lease agreement executed by petitioner-lessor, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, and private respondent-lessees, spouses Ernesto and Lorna Reyes on August 1, 1985
over a parcel of land located in Intramuros, Manila. The property has an area of 470.30 square meters and is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3764 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The lease contract
provided for a ten-year lease, renewable for another ten years at the option of the lessor. The contract
likewise provided for a graduated schedule of rental fees, starting with P4.50 per square meter on the first
and second years, increasing up to P6.50 per square meter on the ninth and tenth years. Private respondent
lessees were also given the right of pre-emption, with first priority to purchase the property if the owner,
herein petitioner, offered it for sale.
Intending to have a fire wall constructed, private respondents allegedly had the property relocated. As a
result, they discovered that the adjacent owner's concrete fence abutted on and encroached upon 30.96
square meters of the leased property. Private respondents requested petitioner to make adjustments in order
to correct the encroachment problem. The spouses Reyes claim that despite repeated follow-up, petitioner
has failed to take any action on their demand. Consequently, they decided to withhold rental payments as
"leverage" against petitioner and to force the latter to make corrections or adjustments in the area of subject
land.
On March 9, 1987, petitioner informed private respondents in a letter of its intention to sell the leased
property. Although the Reyeses conveyed their interest in buying the property, no deal was finalized. In 1989,
private respondents reiterated their desire to purchase the property in response to petitioner's demand for
the payment of P68,000.00 in unpaid rentals for the period October 1986 to January 1989. In the same letter,
private respondents countered that they intend to pay as soon as the proper correction with respect to the
encroached area is made by petitioner.
In 1989, petitioner offered to sell the parcel of land on terms, at P2,127.45 per square meter. Private
respondents argued that the same lot should be sold to them at P1,600.00 per square meter, the prevailing
price when the lot was first offered for sale in 1987.
No agreement was reached. Private respondent spouses filed an action for specific performance and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.[1] The correction or adjustment of the encroached portion
of the property constituted their first cause of action. For their second cause of action, the spouses Reyes
prayed that petitioner be compelled to sell the leased premises to them at P1,600.00 per square meter,
claiming that there was already a contract of sale between the parties.
Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss was not immediately resolved by the trial court. It later filed its Answer with
Counterclaim for rental payments owed by private respondents. Petitioner also filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings for unpaid rentals on 439.34 square meters of the 470 square meter leased property.
PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 1
 On October 17, 1990 the trial court issued an Order denying petitioner's (defendant below) motion to
dismiss insofar as the first cause of action is concerned but granted it for the second cause of action.[2] In
effect, the case was allowed to proceed with respect to the first cause of action, the request for correction in
the encroachment problem, but not with the second cause of action to compel petitioner to sell the property
to the spouses Reyes. The Order reads in part:

"With respect to the first cause of action, this Court feels that the action cannot be dismissed as the matter
treated therein has got to be ventilated in this proceeding in a trial on the merits. The pleadings of the parties
really tendered issues regarding this particular point and the Court, at this point, cannot as of yet resolve the
same without the evidence thereon by the parties sustaining their respective postures.

However, with respect to the second cause of action, the Court feels that the complaint, on this particular
issue, should indeed be dismissed. It is underscored that the lease contract simply gives the plaintiffs a right
of pre-emission over the leased premises. There was as yet no definite offer and acceptance as regards the
sale of the property. The several communications submitted by the parties clearly established such fact. The
parties are still in the process of negotiations; therefore, there is no contract, agreement or undertaking
between the parties which can be enforced by this Court (See Article 1305 & 1319, Civil Code). In the absence
of a definite offer and unconditional acceptance as to the sale of the property in dispute, as in this case,
neither of the parties may sue for specific performance of a non-existent contract."[3]

The following day, October 18, 1990, the trial court acted on petitioner's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings Relative to Counterclaim for Rental[4] and rendered a Partial Judgment in the case. The dispositive
portion of the Partial Judgment reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered in this case ordering the plaintiffs to
pay to the defendant the total sum of P108,297.31 representing rental arrearages from October 1986 to the
present, and the further amount of rentals accruing hereafter, computed in accordance with the
ratio/schedule of the contract."[5]

The lower court held that private respondent spouses were indeed obligated to pay rent after having
admitted that they deliberately defaulted in payments. Moreover, the law grants the lessee the right to
suspend payment of rentals only for the area of the leased property which is not delivered, in this case an
area of 30.96 square meters. The trial court found that since there is "no issue as to the non-payment of the
rentals as admitted by the plaintiffs themselves, at least on the occupied area of 30.96 (sic),[6] from October
1986 up to the present time, partial judgment on the pleadings is indeed warranted."[7] Rent was computed
on a per-square-meter basis as provided for in the lease contract's schedule of rents.
Private respondent spouses filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.[8] They
raised three issues: the lawfulness of dismissing the second cause of action (to compel the sale of the lot);
the propriety of holding that there was no contract of sale between the parties; and ordering the payment of
rental arrearages from October 1986 without any hearing on the merits.[9]
Petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the case raises only pure questions of law and
that respondent appellate court had no jurisdiction over the same. The latter court denied petitioner's motion
to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 14, 1992.[10] Respondent court
ruled that private respondent spouses, appellants below, raised factual issues on the offer and acceptance
regarding the sale of the lot in question and on the trial court's order to pay back rentals. "These factual
issues revolt against the appellee's conclusion that the issues on appeal are purely questions of law."
Respondent court likewise stated that the case before it is a single appeal and does not necessitate multiple
appeals even if it involves an October 17, 1990 Order and a Partial Judgment rendered on October 18,
1990. Hence, even if only a notice of appeal was filed without a record on appeal, the appeal was effectively
perfected.
In its decision promulgated on May 20, 1993, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
October 17, 1990 Order but reversed and set aside the October 18, 1990 Partial Judgment.[11] The case was
PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 2
ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings on the merits to determine the exact amount of
unpaid rentals. The Court of Appeals also declared that the insufficiency of private respondents' second cause
of action (to compel the sale) is patent from the face of the complaint and that the trial court had no other
recourse but to dismiss the same. On the issue of whether or not the trial court properly rendered partial
judgment on the rental arrearages, the Court of Appeals ruled in the negative, saying that the averments and
available evidence tendered a valid issue which could not be resolved merely on the pleadings.[12]
The Court of Appeals also held that the jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner has already been passed
upon in its Resolution of September 14, 1992, rendering the said issue moot and academic.
On July 27, 1993, respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Petitioner, through counsel, filed this petition for review, not questioning the substantive aspects of the
case but raising only the procedural issues which it had earlier presented before the Court of Appeals.
I
Petitioner insists that this case involves multiple appeals which, therefore, necessitates the filing of a
record on appeal for the perfection of the appeal. It notes that while the motion to dismiss was granted for the
second cause of action (to compel sale), the case was left to proceed in connection with the encroachment
issue. With the filing of the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, leaving the trial court bereft of any record with which to continue trial.Petitioner adds that when a
partial judgment is rendered in the case, the original record of the case should not be transmitted to the
appellate court in case of an appeal from such partial judgment. Without the records of the case, trial on the
unresolved issues cannot proceed a situation "hardly conducive to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business."[13] It further alleges that as more than one appeal is permitted in this case, a record on
appeal is required and the period to appeal should be thirty days.[14] In the instant case, private respondents
failed to file the record on appeal, hence, their appeal should have been dismissed.
The Court finds no merit in the above arguments.
The case at bar is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary. Multiple appeals are
allowed in special proceedings,[15] in actions for recovery of property with accounting,[16] in actions for
partition of property with accounting,[17] in the special civil actions of eminent domain[18] and foreclosure of
mortgage.[19] The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the
case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.
The disputes in the case below for specific performance have arisen from the demand to make
adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise
of the right of pre-emption and the payment of rental arrearages. A ruling on the issue of encroachment will
perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals. These two points do not arise from two or more
causes of action, but from the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does not require multiple appeals. There
is no ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it involves an Order granting (and denying) a
motion to dismiss and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The subject
matter covered in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessor-lessee relationship, lease
contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be violative of the rule
against multiplicity of appeals.
The conclusion is irresistible that since a case has not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on
appeal is unnecessary to perfect the appeal.
II
Petitioner also contends that the issues raised on appeal to respondent court are pure questions of law
over which the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction.
It further claims that since the Order and the Partial Judgment rendered by the trial court were based
exclusively on the admissions and averments contained in the parties' pleadings, an appeal therefrom
involves only pure questions of law. Citing the Court's pronouncement in People v. Enguero,[20] petitioner

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 3

maintains that involved herein is a purely legal question "where the statement of facts is admittedly correct
and undisputed by the parties, and the only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence
on the matter.[21] Having raised only pure questions of law, private respondents, it is alleged, should have
elevated their appeal to this Court and not to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner is correct in saying that decisions of the Regional Trial Court may be directly reviewed by the
Supreme Court on petition for review only if pure questions of law are raised.
Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (e) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved."

According to the aforequoted section, the Supreme Court may review decisions of a lower court, such as
the Regional Trial Court where only errors or questions of law are raised, pursuant to law or the Rules of
Court.
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, states that the Court of Appeals (formerly the Intermediate Appellate Court) shall exercise:

"(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts . . . , except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948." (Emphasis supplied.)

This provision of law states the general rule that appeals from the Regional Trial Courts shall be brought
before the Court of Appeals unless it is properly to be elevated to the Supreme Court in accordance with (a)
constitutional provisions, (b) B.P. Blg. 129 and (c) the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These being in
the nature of exceptions, the Court deems it proper to summarize them below.
Article IX A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that any decision, order or ruling of each of the
Constitutional Commissions, namely, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections and the Civil
Service Commission,[22] may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.[23] Cases decided by the National Labor Relations Commission and
the Sandiganbayan may also be reviewed by the Supreme Court in a petition forcertiorari by virtue of the
Court's inherent power of judicial review[24] and Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[25] respectively.
Portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which have not been repealed likewise provide what
cases fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 17 reads, inter alia:

"Section 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. x x x

The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal,
as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment;
and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same
PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 4
 occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that
giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as
principals, accomplices or accessories or whether they have been tried jointly or separately;[26]
xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as
herein provided, in

xxx xxx xxx

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if,
in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next
preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of
certiorari,"[27] (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, the following principles may be formulated: decisions of the Regional Trial
Court may be elevated directly to the Supreme Court oncertiorari in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment, including cases arising out of the same occurrence[28] and in all other
cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.[29] When the Constitution states that cases
involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be appealed to the Court of Appeals, it
merely restates in another way the principle that if only questions of law are raised, these cases should be
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Circular 2-90,[30] number 4 (c), which petitioner cites, likewise indirectly states that cases from the
Regional Trial Court raising only questions of law should be taken to the Supreme Court since appeals under
Rule 41 from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals involving only questions of law "shall be
dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court." Number 4 (c) and (d) of Circular 2-90,
reads:

"4. Erroneous Appeals. An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Raising issues purely of law in the Court of Appeals, or appeal by wrong mode. If an appeal under Rule
41 is taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and therein the appellant raises
only questions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by
said court. x x x

(d) No transfer of appeals erroneously taken. No transfers of appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme
Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be
allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals will not be tolerated." (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals does not exercise jurisdiction over appeals from
the Regional Trial Court which raise purely questions of law.Appeals of this nature should be elevated to this
Court. Notwithstanding the confirmation of this legal rule, still, the instant petition cannot be granted
because the appeal brought before the Court of Appeals by private respondent spouses does not involve
questions or errors of law alone, there being factual issues to be resolved.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 5

 Petitioner has correctly defined what is a "question of law," thus: there is a question of law when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[31] The
question that begs answer is whether the issues raised by the private respondent spouses are solely
questions of law which would, therefore, appertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Upon a careful analysis of the issues raised by private respondent in its appeal to respondent court, the
Court finds that they are not purely questions of law.Specifically, when private respondent questioned the
conclusion of the trial court that there was no meeting of the minds between lessor and lessee regarding the
sale of the leased property, private respondent raised a factual issue. Similarly, the issue of whether or not
there was a perfected contract of sale necessitates an inquiry into the facts and evidence on record. Likewise,
the question regarding the propriety of granting judgment on the pleadings on the matter of rental arrears
demands a scrutiny of the facts of the case.
The appeal elevated by private respondents, therefore, was properly cognizable by respondent
court. There being no reversible error in the decision under review, the instant petition is denied for lack of
merit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals dated May 20, 1993 and July 7, 1993, respectively, in CA G.R. CV No. 29905 entitled "Spouses
Ernesto Reyes and Lorna Reyes v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila" are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA V. CA

198 SCRA 300

FACTS:
The spouses donated property to the archbishop with the condition that no disposition shall be made within
100 years.

HELD:
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is stipulation for automatic reversion.
Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 6

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 7
Case title: Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila et. al vs. CA

Topic: Donation; condition may be imposed by the donor tothe donee but such condition must not be contra
bonusmores (contrary to law, morals, public policy or public order)so as to unreasonably restrict his right to
dispose or alienatethe property as a right springing from ownership.Facts:On August 23, 1930, Spouses
Eusebio de Castro and MartinaRieta (donor), now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor
of therein defendant Roman CatholicArchbishop of Manila (donee) covering a parcel of land withan area
of 964 square meters, more or less.

On or about June 30, 1980, and while still within theprohibitive period to dispose of the property,
petitionerRoman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose administration allproperties within the province of Cavite
owned by theArchdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26,1962, executed a deed of absolute
sale of the propertysubject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio andSoledad C. Ignao.Private
respondents on Nov 1984 as plaintiffs, filed acomplaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission
of contract and reconveyance of real property with damagesagainst petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.
Ignao and church( defendants therein).Trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on theground
that the cause of action has prescribed.The case was elevated to CA. CA holding that the action hasnot yet
prescribed, rendered a decision in favor of privaterespondents (plaintiff therein).Petitioners contended that
the cause of action of hereinprivate respondents has already prescribed, invoking Article764 of the Civil Code
which provides that "(t)he donationshall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when thedonee fails to
comply with any of the conditions which theformer imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action
shallprescribe after four years from the non-compliance with thecondition, may be transmitted to the heirs of
the donor, andmay be exercised against the donee's heirs."Thus should have raised the action between Jan
1980- Jan1984. On Nov. 1984, it has prescribed.Issues:1.WON judicial declaration is required as the
revocatory actof the donation in this case2.WON the cause of action of respondents has prescribedunder Art.
7653.WON respondents have a cause of action granting thecause of action has not prescribedRuling:1.No
judicial declaration needed. Automatic revocation byvirtue of the stipulation in the deed of donation2. Action
has not prescribed

SC quoting CAs decision:

The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides forautomatic reversion of the property donated in
case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declarationrevoking the same is not necessary."By
the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the condition thereof would
render ipsofacto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of theopinion that there would be no legal
necessity anymore tohave the donation judicially declared null and void for thereason that the very deed of
donation itself declares it so.Phrase reading 'would render ipso facto null and void' wouldnot appear in the
deed of donation, if the intention wasotherwise.The Court of Appeals committed no error in holding that
thecause of action of herein private respondents has not yetprescribed since an action to enforce a written
contractprescribes in ten (10) years ( 1980-1990, respondents filedthe case on 1984 Nov). Article 764 was
intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the
deed of donation if and when theparties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of suchdonation upon
the occurrence of the contingencycontemplated therein.

3.The issue whether or not the action by respondents hasprescribed is not really the case at bar.
Private respondentshave no cause of action from the beginning.

Action filed by private respondents may not be dismissed byreason of prescription; the same should be
dismissed on theground that private respondents have no cause of actionagainst petitioners.The cause of
action of private respondents is based on thealleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition inthe
deed of donation that the property donated should notbe sold within a period of one hundred (100) years
from thedate of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, inour opinion, constitutes an undue
restriction on the rightsarising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore,contrary to public

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 8

policy.Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in aneffective transfer of title over the property
from the donor tothe donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomesthe absolute owner of the
property donated. Although thedonor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation,the same must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,public order and public policy. The condition imposed in
thedeed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patentlyunreasonable and undue restriction on
the right of the doneeto dispose of the property donated, which right is anindispensable attribute of
ownership. Such a prohibitionagainst alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetualor for an
unreasonable period of time.Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of theaforesaid policy may be
considered applicable by analogy.Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testatormay prohibit
partition for a period which shall not exceedtwenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that
thedispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estateinalienable for more than twenty (20) years
are void.That the prohibition in the deed of donation against thealienation of the property for an entire
century, being
anunreasonable emasculation and denial of an integralattribute of ownership, should be declared
as an illegal orimpossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in saidstatutory provision, such condition shall be considered asnot
imposed.

The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action
for thenullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of
action, the case forprivate respondents must fail

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 9

 Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA/RIETA
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

FACTS:

. RIETA FILED NULLIFICATION OF DEED OF DONATION, RECISSION OF CONTRACT AND

RECONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY WITH DAMAGES against Ignao and ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS,
CAVITE/MANILA.
. Executed deed of donation covering a parcel of land

i. CONDITION: Donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period
of one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise would
render ipso facto null and void; deed and property would revert back to donors.

. Bishop of Imus executed a deed of absolute sale to Ignao for P114,000

. IGNAO: MOTION TO DISMISS

. No legal capacity to sue

. No cause of action
. Prescribed (added by Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus)
. Not a real party in interest (Bishop of Manila)

Was ruled that the complaint for cause of action has already prescribed.

. APPEALED TO CA:

. WON the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed
. WON the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale)
on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for reconveyance.

CA held that action not prescribed.

ISSUE:
Has the cause of action already prescribed? NO.
ARTICLE 764: "(t)his action shall prescribe after 4 years from the non-compliance with the condition,
may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.
Is there a cause of action? UNJUSTIFIED CAUSE OF ACTION

HELD:
Judgment SET ASIDE and another judgment DISMISSED.
1. DEED HAS AUTOMATIC REVERSION EXPRESSED, JUDICIAL DECLARATION NOT NECESSARY
HENCE.
a. Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it
may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.
b. Judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the power of
cancellation.

2. UNDUE RESTRICTION ON RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 10

 a. DONATION: effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although
the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
b. Condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 11

G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988

FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted
by her husband, JOSE TAGACAY,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The subject of this dispute is the two lots owned by Domingo Melad which is claimed by both the petitioner
and the respondent. The trial court believed the petitioner but the respondent court, on appeal, upheld the
respondent. The case is now before us for a resolution of the issues once and for all.

On January 29, 1962, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the then Court of First
Instance of Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from
Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. 1 In his answer, the
petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in
open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and
1943. 2 The case was dismissed for failure to prosecute but was refiled in 1967. 3

At the trial, the plaintiff presented a deed of sale dated December 4, 1943, purportedly signed by Domingo
Melad and duly notarized, which conveyed the said properties to her for the sum of P80.00. 4 She said the
amount was earned by her mother as a worker at the Tabacalera factory. She claimed to be the illegitimate
daughter of Domingo Melad, with whom she and her mother were living when he died in 1945. She moved out
of the farm only when in 1946 Felix Danguilan approached her and asked permission to cultivate the land and
to stay therein. She had agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the harvest from the farm to her,
which he did from that year to 1958. The deliveries having stopped, she then consulted the municipal judge
who advised her to file the complaint against Danguilan. The plaintiff 's mother, her only other witness,
corroborated this testimony. 5

For his part, the defendant testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and
his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own. He and
his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with the cultivation of
the farm. Domingo Melad signed in 1941 a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and
in 1943 another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that
the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death. 6 Danguilan presented three
other witnesses 7to corroborate his statements and to prove that he had been living in the land since his
marriage to Isidra and had remained in possession thereof after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. Two of said
witnesses declared that neither the plaintiff nor her mother lived in the land with Domingo Melad. 8

The decision of the trial court was based mainly on the issue of possession. Weighing the evidence presented
by the parties, the judge 9 held that the defendant was more believable and that the plaintiff's evidence was
"unpersuasive and unconvincing." It was held that the plaintiff's own declaration that she moved out of the
property in 1946 and left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to her claim of ownership.
She was also inconsistent when she testified first that the defendant was her tenant and later in rebuttal that
he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where there was doubt as to the ownership of the
property, the presumption was in favor of the one actually occupying the same, which in this case was the
defendant. 10

The review by the respondent court 11 of this decision was manifestly less than thorough. For the most part
it merely affirmed the factual findings of the trial court except for an irrelevant modification, and it was only
toward the end that it went to and resolved what it considered the lone decisive issue.

The respondent court held that Exhibits 2-b and 3-a, by virtue of which Domingo Melad had conveyed the two
parcels of land to the petitioner, were null and void. The reason was that they were donations of real property
PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 12
and as such should have been effected through a public instrument. It then set aside the appealed decision
and declared the respondents the true and lawful owners of the disputed property.

The said exhibits read as follows:

EXHIBIT 2-b is quoted as follows: 12

I, DOMINGO MELAD, of legal age, married, do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix
Danguilan, my agricultural land located at Barrio Fugu-Macusi, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, Philippine
Islands; that this land is registered under my name; that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one
to whom I will deliver this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will
die and also for all other things needed and necessary for me, he will be responsible because of this land I am
giving to him; that it is true that I have nieces and nephews but they are not living with us and there is no one
to whom I will give my land except to Felix Danguilan for he lives with me and this is the length175 m. and
the width is 150 m.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby sign my name below and also those present in the execution of this receipt
this 14th day of September 1941.

Penablanca Cagayan, September 14, 1941.

(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD

WITNESSES:
1. (T.M.) ISIDRO MELAD
2. (SGD.) FELIX DANGUILAN
3. (T.M.) ILLEGIBLE

EXHIBIT 3-a is quoted as follows: 13

I, DOMINGO MELAD, a resident of Centro, Penablanca, Province of Cagayan, do hereby swear and declare the
truth that I have delivered my residential lot at Centro, Penablanca, Cagayan, to Felix Danguilan, my
son-in-law because I have no child; that I have thought of giving him my land because he will be the one to
take care of SHELTERING me or bury me when I die and this is why I have thought of executing this document;
that the boundaries of this lot ison the east, Cresencio Danguilan; on the north, Arellano Street; on the
south by Pastor Lagundi and on the west, Pablo Pelagio and the area of this lot is 35 meters going south;
width and length beginning west to east is 40 meters.

IN WITNESS HEREOF, I hereby sign this receipt this 18th day of December 1943.

(SGD.) DOMINGO MELAD

WITNESSES:

(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE
(SGD.) DANIEL ARAO

It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the
properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee
was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the
properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of
his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 13

requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes
squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De Mesa, 14 where the Court held:

There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the donors
made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial
of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried out in his
own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore, in order to determine whether or not said donation is
valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the
law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument.

The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated and
the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or
gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and
not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the values
exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.

On the other hand, both the trial court and the respondent court have affirmed the factual allegation that the
petitioner did take care of Domingo Melad and later arranged for his burial in accordance with the condition
imposed by the donor. It is alleged and not denied that he died when he was almost one hundred years
old, 15which would mean that the petitioner farmed the land practically by himself and so provided for the
donee (and his wife) during the latter part of Domingo Melad's life. We may assume that there was a fair
exchange between the donor and the donee that made the transaction an onerous donation.

Regarding the private respondent's claim that she had purchased the properties by virtue of a deed of sale,
the respondent court had only the following to say: "Exhibit 'E' taken together with the documentary and oral
evidence shows that the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the appellants." This was, we think, a rather
superficial way of resolving such a basic and important issue.

The deed of sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old and the consideration
was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory. 16 This was
itself a suspicious circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to the mother herself,
who was after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in favor of Apolonia Melad although she
had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname, before that instrument was signed and in fact
even after she got married. 17 The averment was also made that the contract was simulated and prepared
after Domingo Melad's death in 1945. 18 It was also alleged that even after the supposed execution of the
said contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the owner of the properties and that she had never
occupied the same. 19

Considering these serious challenges, the appellate court could have devoted a little more time to examining
Exhibit "E" and the circumstances surrounding its execution before pronouncing its validity in the manner
described above. While it is true that the due execution of a public instrument is presumed, the presumption
is disputable and will yield to contradictory evidence, which in this case was not refuted.

At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that the private respondent did
not take possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of
the lands from the petitioner. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to the petitioner in 1946,
by her own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. 20 Her claim that
the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to administrator) was disbelieved by the trial court, and properly
so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract of sale by actual
delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of purchaser-owner.

As was held in Garchitorena v. Almeda: 21

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 14

Since in this jurisdiction it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not pass by mere
stipulation but only by delivery (Civil Code, Art. 1095; Fidelity and Surety Co. v. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51), and the
execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient delivery where the property involved is in the
actual and adverse possession of third persons (Addison vs. Felix, 38 Phil. 404; Masallo vs. Cesar, 39 Phil.
134), it becomes incontestable that even if included in the contract, the ownership of the property in dispute
did not pass thereby to Mariano Garchitorena. Not having become the owner for lack of delivery, Mariano
Garchitorena cannot presume to recover the property from its present possessors. His action, therefore, is
not one of revindicacion, but one against his vendor for specific performance of the sale to him.

In the aforecited case of Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wilson, 22

Justice Mapa declared for the Court:

Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in all matters of contracts and a well- known doctrine
of law that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum transferuntur". In conformity with said doctrine as
established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are
acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition". And as the logical application of this disposition article 1095 prescribes the following:
"A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he
shall not acquire a real right" (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to
him."

In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and
indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract. As
Manresa states in his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 10, pages 339 and 340: "Our law does not
admit the doctrine of the transfer of property by mere consent but limits the effect of the agreement to the
due execution of the contract. ... The ownership, the property right, is only derived from the delivery of a
thing ... "

As for the argument that symbolic delivery was effected through the deed of sale, which was a public
instrument, the Court has held:

The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be
delivered when it is placed "in the hands and possession of the vendee." (Civil Code, art. 1462). It is true that
the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing
which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition,
it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale,
its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and
the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever
to prevent the thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor, symbolic
delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the
instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it
himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the
interposition of another will, then fiction yields to realitythe delivery has not been effected. 23

There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession of the
litigated properties. Even if the respective claims of the parties were both to be discarded as being inherently
weak, the decision should still incline in favor of the petitioner pursuant to the doctrine announced in Santos
& Espinosa v. Estejada 24 where the Court announced:

If the claim of both the plaintiff and the defendant are weak, judgment must be for the defendant, for the
latter being in possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove a better right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court REINSTATED, with
costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 15

Danguilan vs. IAC
Thursday, September 11, 2014

Facts:

A parcel of lot owned by Domingo Melad was being claimed by petitioner Felix Danguilan and
respondent Apolonia Melad.
Apolonia Melad contends that she acquired the property when Dominggo Melad sold it to her when she
was just 3 years old in which her mother paid the consideration. (Evidence: Deed of sale dated
December 4, 1943 with a sum consideration of P80.00.)
Apolonia contended that she just moved out of the farm only in 1946 when Felix Danguilan approached
her and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein.
Dangguilan, on the other hand, presented for his part 2 documents executed in September 14, 1941
and December 18, 1943, to prove his claim that the properties were given to him by Dominggo Melad
through an onerous donation. The onerous part of the donation includes the taking care of the farm
and the arrangement of the burial of Dominggo.
RTC ruled in favor of Danguilan. CA reversed RTCs ruling. It ruled that there was a donation, which was
void for failing to comply with the formalities.

Issues:
1. Who has the better right between parties? Petitioner Danguilan.
2. WON there was delivery in favor of respondent for the alleged sale? NO.

Held:

Domingo Melad intended to donate the property to petitioner Danguilan

It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the
properties to the petitioner Danguilan. We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality.
While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to petitioner
Danguilan in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his
burial.

Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to
be effected through a public instrument, and the 2 private documents remain valid.

Assuming there was a valid deed of sale, PR Melad failed to show that it was consummated (no
actual delivery + no possession)
At any rate, even assuming the validity of the deed of sale, the record shows that Apolonia Melad did not take
possession of the disputed properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of the lands
from petitioner Danguilan. If she did have possession, she transferred the same to Danguilan in 1946, by her
own sworn admission, and moved out to another lot belonging to her step-brother.

Her claim that the petitioner was her tenant (later changed to administrator) was disbelieved by the trial
court, and properly so, for its inconsistency. In short, she failed to show that she consummated the contract
of sale by actual delivery of the properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of
purchaser-owner.

No constructive delivery allowed if property is in actual and adverse possession of a third person

In our jurisdiction, it is a fundamental and elementary principle that ownership does not pass be mere
stipulation but only by delivery and the execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient delivery
where the property involved is in the actual and adverse possession of third persons.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 16

Therefore, in our Civil Code it is a fundamental principle in all matters of contracts and a well- known doctrine
of law that "non mudis pactis sed traditione dominia rerum transferuntur".

In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership
and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and,
in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition".

In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and
indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue of a contract.

One who is in possession is presumed to be the owner

In this case, there no dispute that it is Danguilan and not Melad who is in actual possession of the litigated
properties. And even if the claim of petitioner and respondent are weak, judgment must be in favor of the
Danguilan for one who is in possession is presumed to be the owner, and cannot be obliged to show or prove
a better right.

DANGUILAN V. IAC

168 SCRA 22

FACTS:
Apolinia sought the recovery of a farm lot and house from Danguilan. She averred that she acquired the
property through sale. Danguilan on the other hand, contends that the property is his by virtue of a donation.

HELD:
The donation being of real property, it is void for not complying with the requirements given by law. Donation
of real property should be in a public instrument. In this case, it wasnt.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 17

CENTRAL PHIL UNIV. vs. Court of Appeals
246 SCRA 511

FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following
conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called Ramon Lopez Campus and any income from that land shall be put in the fund
to be known as Ramon Lopez Campus Fund.

However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance & damages against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU
had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.

Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action had prescribed.

ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated at the back of petitioners certificate
of title without a fixed period when to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO

HELD:

1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as well the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus,
when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is
such a resolutory one. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there was no
fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may be revoked & all
rights which the donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.

More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever
valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the
obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than
to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of
filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on
its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the
subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now
return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature & circumstance it can be
inferred that the period was intended, the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith &
such period has arrived. However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 18

of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to
avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so.

3) Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality & formality &
would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.

Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may
seek rescission before the court unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence
of any just cause for the court to determine the period of compliance there is no more obstacle for the court
to decree recission.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 19

Central Philippines University vs C.A., Remedias Franco, et al

FACTS:
In 1939, late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of Central Philippines University
(CPU) of a parcel of land with the following conditions:
The land shall be exclusively use for the establishment of and use of a medical college.
CPU shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party or any way the land.
The said land shall be called Ramon Lopez Campus
However in 1989, the respondents who are heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of
donation, re-conveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since 1939 has not complied with the
conditions of the donation and that the University negotiated with National Housing Authority (NHA) to
exchange the donated land with another land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all the rights of the done are deemed lost and extinguished because of the non-fulfillment of
the conditions?

SUPREME COURT RULING:

Supreme Court finds that since the records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the
deed of donation until filing of instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as done. CPU
has slept its obligation for unreasonable length of time so it is only just and equitable to declare the donation
ineffective.
Supreme Court declared that the conditions set forth in the donation were resolutory conditions which mean
the fulfillment of the conditions extinguishes the obligation.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 20

 CENTRAL PHIL UNIV. vs. Court of Appeals 246 SCRA 511

FACTS:
1. CPU: (1939) Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation
Conditions of the donation:
a) Land should be utilized exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college.
b) College shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party.
c) Land shall be called Ramon Lopez Campus
d) Income from that land shall be put in Ramon Lopez Campus Fund for improvement of the
facility.

2. HEIRS (LOPEZ): (1989) filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages:
a) Non-compliance with the conditions.
b) Negotiation with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land.
*CPU argued: right to file action has prescribed
no violation because did not use property
*Lower Court sided with LOPEZ HEIRS.

ISSUE:
1. WON CPU failed to comply conditions given there was no fixed period? YES
2. WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the condition? NO

HELD:
RTC ILOILO DECISION REINSTATED
CA DECISION MODIFIED
RECONVEYANCE TO LOPEZ HEIRS WITH COSTS

. RESOLUTORY CONDITION: upon fulfillment, terminates an enforceable obligation.

a. Rights are lost once the condition is fulfilled.
b. Entitles parties to resort back to original positions.
c. Takes effect if either parties do not comply with his/her engagements (in which complaining
party may sue for dissolution of contract with damages)

. ARTICLE 1181: CONDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Acquisition of rights, extinguishment/loss of acquired, shall depend on happening event that constitutes
the condition.
a. Donating land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school is
RESOLUTORY IN CONDITION. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition.
If there was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may be revoked and all rights the donee may have acquired shall be lost and
extinguished.
b. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of
the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in
its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix
the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality and
formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.
c. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just
and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes,
revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
d. RECONVEYANCE: property held by a trustee/mortgage is returned to its owner on his request.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 21

. ARTICLE 1197: OBLIGATIONS WITH NO FIXED PERIOD
GENERAL RULE: Period can be inferred from its nature or circumstances.
Court can fix the duration because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be
demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance.
a. CASE AT HAND: General rule cannot be applied in this case considering the different set of
circumstances existing more than a reasonable period of 50 years has already been allowed to
petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so.
b. Hence, there is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere technicality &
formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or load to unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.

PROPERTY ***** RAMIL O. MALIPOL Page 22