Cases:

a. GR No. 202692

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December
28, 2011 Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty
of drunk driving and resisting arrest.4

The factual backdrop:

On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed
against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that
court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No.
052527-CN for the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively
read:

1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and
operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the
influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.

Contrary to law.

2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN

That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino,
SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine National
Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual performance
of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving and pushing,
the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation of Article 151
of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.

By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be
governed by, the Rule on Summary Procedure.

When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral
testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos
Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while in the witness box, among which was Exh. "A",
with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest10executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police
officers. The defenses witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his wife,
Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.

The prosecutions version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the
CA decision now on appeal is as follows:

On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz
III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner
Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a swerving
red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team
members, all inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to alightfrom the
vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he resumes
driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and
insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking rudely to the
policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli."
Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had seen him
swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who put up
resistance. Despite petitioners efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded
in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was examined and
found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital, marked
as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for
disposition.12 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question,
adding in this regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and
arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-
Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he
together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his
restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his
pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their
flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the
petitioner to open the vehicles door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he
refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle
window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of
the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk, pointing
to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioners explanation about
being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as
P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at the
same time blurting, "Pg ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi." The
officers then pulled the petitioner out of the drivers seat and pushed him into the police mobile
car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The policemen then
brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of
alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the
afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual
medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained
physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-
Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police officers.

Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place
the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his drivers license.

On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN; and

2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two
hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.

For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this
case, stating further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.

Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1)
according credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records
custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician,
and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren
Bodino, and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court to
testify.

By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner,
addressing the first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucatings failure
to testify relative to petitioners alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal
as such testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino,
noting thatunder the Rules of Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the petitioners
behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latters drunken state on the day he was
apprehended.18

Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how
many witnesses it needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single
credible witness as to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction.
The RTC cited established jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not
necessarily with the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered."
Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a
petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated
December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt
affirmed that of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the
RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:

 I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by
the police officers; and

II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey
Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the Court.

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial courts findings of fact
does hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight
and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case wide
open for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace
officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees are bound to discharge their
duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their own affairs.22

In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period
material appearednot to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of
the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioners purported swerving vehicle.
They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of
the drivers license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required
under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this
Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x
confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed
in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.)
Instead of requiring the vehicles occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of
respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists right
of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what
appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless not to
their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3)
empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of
alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed
the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions
as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to an otherwise
reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this particular event in his
sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:

x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng
sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.

x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng
nasabing sasakyan.

x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang
aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.

x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG"
pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO
HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan
habang ang isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa
ulo si Kuya.

x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril.
x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at
nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang
kanilang baril.24

Panos above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers themselves
who admitted that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its
occupants to a body search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint affidavit:

xxxx

That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving
under the influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x
committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to
raise his voice and converse with us rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty
and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and driving
under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police station in which our
intention was to make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis
added.)

In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner
has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily
understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside
from a direct course of action or movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a
sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless
driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:

SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway
recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere
and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to
cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless
driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the
consequences is required.26 Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or
overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00
a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to
life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the
petitioners car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA
4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step
down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the
cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:

Q: On that particular date, time and place what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused
(sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?

A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi
maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the
accused swerving, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?

A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"

xxxx

Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?

A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.

x x x x27

Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between
the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the
vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Petitioners twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order.28 He may
have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal.
It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or
performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to
avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1)
That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person
or his agent.29

There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioners act of
exercising ones right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the middle of the night
cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation
of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar
circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of
the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover,
there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-manning policemen to
order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search. And it
bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the occurrence of a crime that
would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less
testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the vehicle was not because he
has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest
before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the apprehending officers, in an act
indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the
process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None of the police
officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioners allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before
being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen claimed
was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were
done in excess of their authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed no physical injuries. The medical
certificate was in fact challenged not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he
was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos
Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the
hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely stated:

At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor
who issued it. Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the
1wphi1

Prosecution to testify on the said documents.

However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the
contents of the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath),
this court finds that the observation of herein private complainants as to the accuseds behavior
and condition after the incident was sufficient.

Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding
xxxx

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the
trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses
who executed the same."32

In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr.
Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioners intoxicated state, as the former was not
able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he
and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be
emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are
differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether
a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under
the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May 2013
of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of operating
a motor vehicle while the drivers blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a
breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the [DOH], the
NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private
motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC [blood
alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver isdriving
under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had not been
tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period material
the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over. Under
Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the
accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even by force
of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner could very well be
acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed
inculpatory act occurred in 2006.

Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of November 21,
2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila
conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable
cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to
indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out,
the purported Dr. Balucatings finding as to petitioners true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost
no time incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr.
Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of
immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioners profession of innocence, particularly of the
charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact
that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper
motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had
a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to
harms way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.

Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring ones innocence be duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the
police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived
drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic
invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police
duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is
merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof that
obliterates all doubts as to the offenders culpability. In the present case, the absence of
conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful
manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast doubt on
the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.

In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or
at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost
elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution which must
rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is
hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No.
052528-CN.

No pronouncement as to costs.
b. GR No. 206379

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 206379 November 19, 2014

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this disposition is the petition for revievv' on certiorori filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which seeks to review, reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012 Amended
Decision1 and the February 20, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
120208, involving a complaint for falsification and misrepresentation.

Initially, the Court denied the petition in its July 10, 2013 Resolution3 for failure of the petitioner to
show any reversible error in the challenged amended decision as to warrant the exercise of the
Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. (Rollo, p. 101.)

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and on October 23, 2013, the Court granted the
said motion and set aside the July 10, 2013 Resolution. In the same October 23, 2013 resolution,
the Court reinstated the petitionand required the respondents to file their comments thereon. On
January 23, 2014, the private respondentfiled her Comment. On February 7, 2014, the petitioner
filed her Reply to Comment. (Rollo, p. 110)

The Facts:

On May 14, 1992, petitioner Cecilia Pagaduan (Pagaduan) filed a notarized complaint with the
Civil Service Commission-Regional Office No. 2 (CSC-RO II)in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan,
against respondent Rema Martin Salvador (Salvador), newly appointed Municipal Budget Officer
at that time, charging her with the administrative offenses of falsification and misrepresentation.
Pagaduan alleged that Salvador did not actually possess the necessary budgeting experience
required by her position; and that although she indicated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS)that
she performed book keeping and accounting functions for Veteran's Woodworks, Inc. (VWI) from
August 1, 1990 to February 15, 1992,she was never in fact employed by the said
entity.4 Salvador on the other hand, claimed that she had been employed by Alfonso Tuzon
(Tuzon), whom the Board of Directors of VWI had granted full management, direct supervision
and control of VWI's logging operations. She explained that her namedid not appear in the
employees' payroll because Tuzon's office was independent from VWI's original staff.5

Subsequently, on October 19, 1994, Pagaduan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Tuguegarao City(MTCC), a criminal charge against Salvador for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code in making
false statements in her PDS, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15482.
On May 22, 2000, a decision6 on the administrative complaint was rendered by the CSC-RO II,
holding Salvador liable only for Simple Misconduct and imposing the penalty ofone (1) month
suspension, after ruling that her act was a mere error of judgment.

Unsatisfied, Pagaduan filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied. She then
appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which found the appeal to be without merit,
ruling that she had no standing to file the appeal as she was not the party aggrieved by the CSC-
RO II decision. The CSC also approved Salvador's qualification as Municipal Budget Officer
because her experience in VWI was a "related field."7

Pagaduan ceased her pursuit and did not move for a reconsideration or appeal. Thus, on
January 21, 2002, the CSC-RO II issued the order, stating that its May 22, 2000 decision had
attained finality. Salvador then served the penalty of one (1) month suspension.8

Later, on October 22, 2008, the MTCC rendered a decision9 in Criminal Case No. 15842, finding
Salvador guilty of falsification of public documents. Salvador did not appeal and then applied for
probation. Her application was granted and she was placed under probation for a period of one
(1) year.

Thereafter, Pagaduan filed a second administrative complaint against Salvador, this time for the
offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Salvador submitted the required
counter affidavit, raising the defenses of res judicata, forum shopping, and double jeopardy on
account of the finality of the decision in the first administrative complaint for falsification. After
finding a prima faciecase in the second administrative complaint, Salvador was formally charged.
To answer the charges against her, she adopted her defenses inher counter-affidavit and
submitted documents to support her cause.

On January 12, 2010, the CSC-RO II rendered a decision,10 finding Salvador guilty of the
administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude because of her conviction
for falsification before the MTCC, and imposing the penalty of dismissal from the service with all
its accessory penalties. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, REMA MARTIN SALVADOR is hereby declared guilty of

CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE and is meted the penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES.11

Aggrieved, Salvador moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Salvador appealed
to the CSC, which rendered a decision12 on March 1, 2011 reversing and setting asidethe
decision of the CSC-RO II and exonerating her of the charge. She was sternly warned to be
more cautious and prudent in accomplishing public documents. The CSC ruled that the criminal
offense of falsification of public document did not per se involve moral turpitude, following the
Court's pronouncement in Dela Torre vs. COMELEC,13 citing Zari vs. Flores.14 The CSC stated
that since the liability of Salvador in the first administrative complaint was lowered to Simple
Misconduct, the crime ascribed to her could not be said to have been attended with inherent
baseness or vileness or depravity.15 The dispositive portion of the March 1, 2011 CSC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review (appeal) filed by Rema Martin Salvador is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated January 12, 2010 issued by Civil Service
Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) No. II finding her guilty of Conviction of a Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude and meting upon her the penalty of dismissal from the government service with
all its accessory penalties is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Thus, appellant Rema Martin
Salvador is EXONERATED of the charge of Conviction of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude
levelled against her. She is STERNLY WARNED to be more cautious and prudent in
accomplishing public documents.16
Pagaduan moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on June 1, 2011. Hence, an
appeal was made to the CA which ruled that following precedents, a conviction for falsification of
public document constituted the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.17 The
gravity of Salvador's falsification was highlighted by her commission of the same in her PDS,
which was no ordinary contract.18 Thus, on February 28, 2012 the CA disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Commission dated 1 March 2011 and
its Resolution promulgated 3 June 2011 affirming the same are hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision ofthe Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 2 of
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, dated 12 January 2010, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.19

Salvador then filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 28, 2012 CA Decision.20 On
August 31, 2012, in a turn-around, the CA granted her motion and issued the assailed Amended
Decision,21 reversingand setting asideits previous decision and reinstated the March 1, 2011 CSC
decision. It agreed with the findings ofthe CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador
did not involve moral turpitude as it was a mere error of judgment on her part. The dispositive
portion of the Amended Decision reads:

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, such

that Our Decision dated 28 February 2012 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDEand in view
thereof, the Decision and Resolution of public respondent Civil Service Commission dated 01
March 2011 and 01 June 2011 respectively, are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.22

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT FINALLY EXONERATED RESPONDENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE BY FINDING THE FALSIFICATION COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN
HER PERSONAL DATA SHEET AS ONLY A SIMPLE MISCONDUCT WHICH DOES
NOT AMOUNT TO MORAL TURPITUDE.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT APPLYING IN THE INSTANT CASE THE DOCTRINE LAID
DOWN IN THE CASE OF TEVES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN WHICH SPECIFICALLY
CATEGORIZED THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT FOR
WHICH RESPONDENT WAS CONVICTED AS A CRIME WHICH INVOLVES MORAL
TURPITUDE.

III. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED IN GRAVE
ABUSE OF ITS AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE CSC-ROII WHICH DISMISSED FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.23

In this case, the substantive issue for resolution is whether or not Salvador was convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the procedural issues of res judicataand
forum shopping were raised by the respondent.
 The Ruling of the Court

As previously recited, this petition arose from the second administrative complaint filed by
Pagaduan against Salvador. The first administrative complaint was for the offenses of
falsification and misrepresentation, where the CSC-RO II found her to be liable for simple
misconduct only. The CSC decision affirming the said CSC-RO II decision became final and
executory, and Salvador served the penalty of one (1) month suspension.

Meanwhile, the October 22, 2008, MTCC decision24 in the criminal case filed by Pagaduan
against Salvador, finding the latter guilty of the crime of falsification of public document, attained
finality as Salvador did not appeal. By reason of the said conviction, Pagaduan filed the second
administrative complaint for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Before discussing the substantial aspect of the case, the issues on the procedural aspect shall
first be addressed.

In her Comment,25 Salvador invoked res judicataand forum shopping in arguing that the second
administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case against her. It was her
contention that both cases involved the same parties, the same facts and issues, although with
different causes of action.26

The principle of res judicatais applicable either by way of "bar by prior judgment" or by
"conclusiveness of judgment." Here, Salvador's defense was res judicataby conclusiveness of
judgment. In Borra v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court stated that:

Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction.The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to
that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to
bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a
timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the
same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause
of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment. [Emphasis supplied]

Contrary to Salvador's contention,however, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in

the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of
1w phi 1

whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts necessary to resolve
the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second
case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact ofconviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne in mind that both administrative complaints were
based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and distinct from each other and
entailed different sets of facts.

Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is that for forum
shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and
circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.28 It exists
where the elements of litis pendentiaare present, namely: (a) there is identity of parties, or at
least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b) there is identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicatain the other.29 Since no res
judicata exists, no forum shopping either exists in this case.
Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude - a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service. On the other hand,
Salvador argues that the falsification she committed did not involve moral turpitude. In resolving
the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the existence
of only two elements is necessary: (1) the conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained
finality; and (2) the crime for which the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is
no dispute as to the first element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.

Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to the accepted and customary rule
of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.31 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that
the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of
falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.33 While Salvador invoked good
faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to
depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other
independent evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of
good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:

She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is
the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll
sheets of VWI.

However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:

1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G", "G-
1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings;

2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";

3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;

4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;

5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;

6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;

7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,

8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.

These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused
stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act
constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting
arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is immaterial as
such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is
jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public
officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent
to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal
thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the
public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at
least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36

Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation
which was granted. It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of
1wphi1

guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she admitted the making of an
untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment
of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in
connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein
was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in
connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal
obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false
statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a lawyer on
the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said
lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re -
Attorney Jose Avancea,42 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R.
No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court
reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and
good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44

Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in
reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction for such crime
already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere
error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based on the
finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That could not a
valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the
first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved
moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of falsification of public
document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the
settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere
error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a
final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is the
violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the
elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly
exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the
surrounding circumstances.

Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents
another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would defeat the purpose of
the Probation Law45which was to erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights that were
lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase the effects and fact of
conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation
Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation
does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The
reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the government
service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not his
administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case of Samalio vs. Court of
Appeals47 that:
Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty
imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been
decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not
have been suspended by the grant of probation.As petitioner himself contends, the criminal
action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is
administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case, not its administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied]

All told, if there is no compelling reason to deviate from what has already been established,
settled principles and jurisprudence should be respected. To do otherwise would only create
confusion and instability in our jurisprudence.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that a PDS is a public Document49 required of a
government employee and official by the CSC. It is the repository of all information about any
government employee or official regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility.
Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service rules to properly and completely
accomplish their PDS,50 in accordance with the constitutional principle that public office is a public
trust, thereby enjoining all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree or
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.51 Only those who can live up to such exacting
standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service.52 WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the August 31, 2012 Amended Decision53 and the February 20, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 120208 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals is UPHELD and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
c. GR No, 211703

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 211703 December 10, 2014

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner assailing the
Sandiganbayan's Decision1dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution2 dated March 14, 2014, finding
petitioner and his co-accused Rodolfo G. Valencia guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 24461, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo G.
Valencia, Carlo A. Maramot, & Edelbert C. Uyboco.

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in
convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More
importantly, petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the
Decision of this Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the
Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the
proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel
were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and gross
incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing serious prejudice to him.

According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former
lawyer" who informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to
present any evidence." His former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution
witness because said counsel was inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to
prepare and file a memorandum" and "merely relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of
co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the defenses of the other accused and all their
pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly not applicable to petitioners
defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due
process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.

In its Comment dated September 30,2014, the Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed
petitioners plea toreopen the case on the ground of denial of due process. In citing Lagua v.
CA,3 they claim there is no basis to set aside the assailed decision and resolution since "a client
is bound by the action of his counsel."

After a careful review of the records of the case, We find that the petition has no merit.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth, as held by this Court in Microsoft Corp. v.
Maxicorp, Inc.,4 to wit:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what
the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case, those findings should not be ignored.5 Absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.6

This rule admits of exceptions, asfollows: (1) where the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.7

Even if the foregoing rules were tobe relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
nevertheless finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. A
meticulous scrutiny of the records of the case persuades Us to conclude that the Sandiganbayan
did not err in its finding that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. The evidence on record
amply supports the findings and conclusions of the Sandiganbayan and petitioner has shown no
cause for this Court to apply any of the foregoing exceptions.

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross in excusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

For accused to be found liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must
concur:

1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2)
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and

3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.8

Based on the records of the case, the elements of the crime charged exist in the present case.
On the first element, accused Valencia was a public officer at the time the acts in question were
committed. Thus, while petitioner was a private individual, he was found to have been
inconspiracy with accused Valencia. This is in accord with the rule that private persons may be
charged in conspiracy with public officers, as We held in People of the Philippines v. Henry T.
Go:9
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this
Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.

The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner and accused Valencia acted in conspiracy to commit
the crime charged, to wit:

The records show that conspiracy existed by and between accused Rodolfo Valencia and
Edelbert Uyboco, president of Gaikoku, considering that the procurement of the subject dump
trucks for an overpriced amount of PhP6,994,286.00 could not have been possible without each
others participation and cooperation, as evidenced by their execution and approval of the
purchase order No. 4979 dated March 1993, and Gaikokus proforma invoice.10

Petitioner failed to dispute any of the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution and
relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. Thus, there appears to be no reason for this Court to review
such finding.

As to the second element, accused Valencia entered into a negotiated contract with Gaikoku
without authority from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). In fact, Valencia had already
approved the purchase request for the dump trucks as earlyas March 1993, prior to any SP
resolution approving such direct acquisition.

The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, and respondents aptly pointed out, that accused Valencia
failed to comply with the requirements of Section 369 of the Local Government Code on
negotiated purchase, which required that there must have been at least two failed public biddings
before a contract for a negotiated purchase may be entered into. The defense failed to present
any substantial evidence of the two failed biddings. In fact, it was proved by presented evidence
that the alleged failed biddings were merely simulated.

The present case is similar to the case of Plameras v. People,11 wherein this Court upheld the
conviction of the accused, to wit:

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies
of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKL
Enterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs,
despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality.

It must be borne to mind that any procurement or "acquisition of supplies or property by local
government units shall be through competitive public bidding". This was reiterated in the Local
Government Code of 1991 on procurement of supplies which provides:

Sec. 356. General Rule in Procurement or Disposal. Except as otherwise provided herein,
acquisition of supplies by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. x x
x

The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he
proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that
there was already a negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully
believed in, without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can
only be resortedto in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there isno public bidding to speak
of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to
protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least,
especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative and without authorization from the
Provincial School Board. This can be proved by his failure to present even a single witness from
the members of the Board whom he consulted as he claimed.12

Finally, the third element of the crime is also present since it had been proven that an
overpayment was made for the dump trucks, since these were directly imported by the Provincial
Government from the distributor in Japan. With this direct importation, the Provincial Government
should have only paid the tax-free amount of P4,594,119.85. Instead, accused Valencia had
already authorized and caused the disbursement of P6,994,286, or an excess of P2,400,166.15,
in favor of petitioners company, Gaikoku. This has clearly caused undue injury to the
government.

As to petitioners claim that his right to due process was denied due to his former counsels error,
abuse of discretion or gross incompetence, We find no merit in this claim. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence and mistake in
handling a case,13 and to allow a client to disownhis counsels conduct would render proceedings
indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel.14 While this rule has recognized exceptions,15 We find that there is no reason for this
Court to deviate from the findings of the Sandiganbayan. We held in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v.
Moral:16

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm
of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act performed by counsel withinthe scope
of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this
general rule certainly depends upon the surrounding circumstances of a given case, there are
exceptions recognized by this Court: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the
clients liberty or property;or (3) where the interests of justice so require."

The present case does not fall under the said exceptions. In Amil v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that "to fall within the exceptional circumstance relied upon x x x, it mustbe shown that the
negligence of counsel must be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court. Thus,
where a party was given the opportunity to defend its interests in due course, it cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process." To properly claim gross negligence on the part of the counsel, the petitioner must show
that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause.17

In the present case, the Sandiganbayancorrectly denied petitioners motion to re-open the
proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:

In the same vein, accused-movant Uybocos clear admission that "he had been given the
opportunity to present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel
decided/opted not to present any evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio
ndated November 20, 2012, that "after earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to present further evidence in his defense,
thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and documentary evidence," militates
against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to reopen proceedings must
likewise fail. Accused-movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious misjudgment or fault or gross
incompetence on his counsel aloneas the decision not to present further evidence in his defense
bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the said manifestation.18

The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an
opportunity tobe heard during trial. This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process.
1wphi 1

While petitioner claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the
presentation of evidence is no longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross
negligence or incompetence that would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not
once did petitioner refute, or at the very least, address the Sandiganbayans finding that he had
expressly consented to the waiver of the presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as
conformity to the manifestation submitted by his former counsel.

Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a
memorandum for him" since the records show that petitioners former counsel had belatedly filed
a memorandum on his behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice.
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 9, 2014 and Resolution
dated March 14, 2014 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24461 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
d. GR No. 207950

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 207950 September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the
accused has committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must
prove "the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide [was] actually carried out"1 !n order to convict for the crime of robbery with
homicide. The accused may nevertheless be convicted of the separate crime of homicide once
the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability for the victim's
death.

In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide:

That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and
intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill,
stabbing the latter repeatedly with a kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or
by reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:

One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone

One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone

Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring

Two (2) pcs. Necklace

One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all
belonging to said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner/or his heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.

Contrary to law.2

Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to
trial. The prosecution presented Angelo Peamante (Peamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia
Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3 Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen),
and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its
sole witness.3
The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.

On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a
janitor in Eastwood City.4 When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and
holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peamantes house.5

There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so
Peamante stated that he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6

Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked away. However,
he dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it.7 He walked
away after, and Peamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.8 Peamante
then entered his house and went to bed.9

Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI
Cayrel. She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a
fingerprint technician.10 They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating
with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section.11

The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbies dead
body inside.12 They took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence
such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbies left hand.13 They documented
the evidence then turned them over to the Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen
was called to conduct an autopsy on the body.14

At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found
dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at
2:45 a.m.15

At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of
death was approximately 12 hours prior to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbies body
21 were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and
one incised wound was caused by a sharp object.17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered
fatal.18

The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
Peamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving
Barbies parlor.19

Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3

Casimiro at the police station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old.21 His mother told the police that
she wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbies death.22

SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the
assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavezs mother still gave her statement, subscribed by
Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.23She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by
Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.24

The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the
person he saw leaving Barbies house/parlor that early morning of October 28,
2006.25 Peamante immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his
written statement.26 There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.
On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text
messages withBarbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to
Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend,
Maki.28 When Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at
around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie allowed him to enter the house, and he went
home after.30

On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y
BITANCOR @ NOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicideand hereby sentences him to suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.

Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00
as death indemnity and another P75,000 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.32

On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial courts decision.34 Chavez then
filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, elevating the case with this court.35

This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both
parties filed manifestationsthat they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.36

In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked
and misapplied some facts of substance that could have altered its verdict."37 He argued that
since the prosecution relied on purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral
certainty of guilt on the part of Chavez.38 In this case, even if Peamante saw him leaving
Barbies house, Peamante did not specify whether Chavez was acting suspiciously at that
time.39

As regards his mothers statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his
mother was not presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-
examination.40 He added that affidavits are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant
appears before the court and testifies on it.41

Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies wounds were caused by two sharp
bladed instruments, thus, it was possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also possible
that the assailants committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbies house.43 Given that many
possible explanations fit the facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should
be favored.44

On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the
prosecution isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial
evidence presented before the trial court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no
other conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing and robbing Barbie.46

On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers statement was inadmissible as hearsay,
plaintiff-appellee explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the
statements made by Chavezs mother.47
Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there
weretwo assailants, Dr. Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only one.48 The
sole issue now before us iswhether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide.

We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.

Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person
guilty of robberywith the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed. . . .49

Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the
prosecutions evidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty
of guilt.50

The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.51

The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no
other conclusion than the commission by Chavez of the crime charged:

In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally
stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances
form a solid and unbroken chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable
doubt, that accused Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]:
first, it has been duly established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the
victim at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was allowed by
the victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the victims two (2)
units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola)
without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings
of the victim, were handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C.
Tobias on 05 November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his
mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 oclock in the morning,
witness Angelo Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person holding and/or carrying
something and about toget out of the door of the house of the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to
successfully do so. He later positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK
JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the
accused decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with the victim and the circumstances
(Dr. Salens testimony that the body of the victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours)
when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence.

The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the
accused had indeed killed the victim.52

Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and
even its conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive
effect by this court, more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53

Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take
personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried
out."54 In cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed
for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.55

The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not
satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.

At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavezs mother in her statement
as follows:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari
[sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin
sabahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang
sanglaan sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin
ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.56(Emphasis supplied)

However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavezs
mother was never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.57

An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no
less than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbies body.58

The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination
of the nature and circumstances of the crime committed.

This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim
sustained a total of 36 stab wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this number of
stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a strong indication that appellants made sure of the
success of their effort to kill the victim without risk to themselves."59

This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as
indicative ofthe accuseds intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others.60
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of
the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses
to the commission of the crime."61 21 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The
sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal
intent of merely taking Barbies personal property.

In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of
homicide and theft for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was
committed for the purpose of robbing the victim:

But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its
allegations of the presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to
commit homicide. There is no evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery. The prosecution was silent on accused-appellants primary
criminal intent. Did he intend to kill the victim in order to steal the cash and the necklace? Or did
he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters personal property being merely an
afterthought? Where the homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no
conviction for robo con homicidio.63

II

This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the
separate crime of homicide.

First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October
28, 2006.

The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki.
Nevertheless, Chavez described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]ere like brothers."64 He
testified during cross-examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbies parlor that he cannot
recall how many times he had been there.65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez
and Barbie.

Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to
settle his misunderstanding with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbies
boyfriend:

MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two
(2) treated each other like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a
relationship with Maki Aover, Barbies boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a
misunderstanding between them. Mark Jason tried to patch things up with Barbie so thru a text
message he sent on the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they could talk. When Barbie
did not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 oclock in the morning. Barbie let
him in and they tried to talk about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not fixed
so he decided to gohome. Later on, he learned that Barbie was already dead.66

This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to
kill,67 and a confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victimsdeath has been
considered as circumstantial evidence for homicide.68

Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and
ensures his death.The prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found
indifferent parts of Barbies body and that a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavezs
house at No. 536, 5th Street, San Beda, San Miguel, Manila.69
The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavezs mother. This provides,
among others, her sons confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole
near their house:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni

Barbie at kasabay ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari
[sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.

Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin
sa bahay ay inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.

At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang
sanglaan sa Quezon City.

Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin
ang nakasugat sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang.70(Emphasis supplied)

Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation
conducted still led tothe unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near
Chavezs house.71

Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual findings giving credence to 1)
Peamantes positive identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbies house that early
morning of October 28, 200672 and 2) the medico-legals testimony establishing Barbies time of
death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time of death to
approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73

All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of homicide.

III

There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when
a person has possession of a stolen property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the
theft.75

Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavezs mother, and this was
never denied by the defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular
phones.77 The Court of Appeals discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary
accessory, no person would part with the same for a long period of time, especially in this case
as it involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by Barbies kababayan, witness
Raymond Seno[f]a."78

However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship having been established, there is still a
possibilitythat these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.

The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during
cross-examination that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were
removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?

A: No, sir.

Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.

Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?

Witness: No, Your Honor.

Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?

A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.

Q; No sim card and batteries?

A; Yes, Your Honor.

Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over
to the Public Prosecutor, no markings?

A: No markings, Your Honor.79

The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that
these weretaken by Chavez. The statement of Chavezs mother mentioned that her son pawned
one of Barbies necklaces ["At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay
naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon City"80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is
mere hearsay.

In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.81 The
lower court made no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the
information one Nokia cellphone unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two
pieces necklace, and one bracelet.

At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not
remember the model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it
was worth 19,000.00 more or less.82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge
on how Barbie acquired the cellphone or for how much.

These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing
personal properties of Barbie.

It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that
her son committed a heinous crime.

Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on
November 5, 2006 for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified
that the reason she surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and
"perhaps the accused felt that [the investigating police] are getting nearer to him."85 Nevertheless,
during cross-examination, SPO3 Casimiro testified:

Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son,
according to you she tried to help her son, is that correct?
A: That is the word I remember, sir.

Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr.
witness?

A: Maybe, sir.86

Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason
told her that said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the
incident and that the fatal weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."87 The
records are silent on whether Chavez objected to his mothers statements. The records also do
not show why the police proceeded to get his mothers testimony as opposed to getting Chavezs
testimony on his voluntary surrender.

At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was informed by the investigating officer at
the police station of the consequences in executing a written statement withoutthe assistance of
a lawyer.88 She proceeded to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons
confession of the crime despite the warning.89 SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-
examination:

Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit
you mentioned?

A: She was with some neighbors.

Atty. Villanueva

Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?

A: None, sir.

Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an
Affidavit?

A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.

Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?

A: Yes, sir.90

The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his
constitutional rights and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain
silent."91 This booking sheet and arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after
Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the police station.

The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that:

. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney
before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.92

The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the
statement thatany waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of
counsel."93

The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements."94

It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police,"
such as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the
pressures of a custodial setting:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures"
"generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist,"
and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanours as they
are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice
ofissuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law."97

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised
of their Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario.
Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an additional
pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the
police station.

This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable
doubt that Chavez is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.

On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in
that "as prayed for, the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused,
Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat
pending trial of this case and/or untilfurther orders from this court."98 The order of commitment
dated September 28, 2011 was issued after his trial court conviction in the decision dated August
19, 2011.

Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of
the trial. This period may be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the
1wphi1

Revised Penal Code, as amended:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being
informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
 1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of
any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be
credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from
thirty (30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is
not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the
trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period
of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of
the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30)
days of preventive imprisonment.99

Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not
properly handled, and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the
court. There was no examination of the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the
manhole near the house of Chavez.100 There were no results of the DNA examination done on the
hair strands found with the knife and those in the clutches of the victim. Neither was there a
comparison made between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no report regarding
any finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of
the victim or Chavezs. The results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence
at the trial court level had all these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be
as reliable or would have been belied had object evidence been properly handled and
presented.

We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life whether it be the victims or the
accuseds is valuable. The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high esteem.
Therefore, investigations such as these should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism
and more dedicated attention to detail by our law enforcers. The quality of every conviction
depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before the courts. The publics
confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we
promulgate against the accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should
realize this and take this to heart.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason
Chavez y Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the
separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not
attended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby
SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
e. GR no.179080

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias

"TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15,
2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.

Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged
with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).4 The
Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:

The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO

MARFIL Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:

That at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay
Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs, hence,
persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial order,
entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house against the
will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous consent of the
owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting injuries to the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.6 Thereafter,
trial ensued.

Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 oclock in the
evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He
roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered
the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle,
which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun.
Roberto Limbag, Balerianos nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and
corroborated his testimony.

Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of President
Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took the
witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he issued.
His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose, back portion
of the body at the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of the scapular region
as well as abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the axilliary
region.7 Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten days.8 For the
defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were in their
respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that the night
before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other barangay
officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen
carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed to
escape.

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one
(1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners
are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:

The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential elements of the
crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that
accused were named CVOs and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same were
admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to prove
that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence
other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there exist a
doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts should be
ruled in favorof the accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime charged as
violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged was not
established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; x x
x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial
courts judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor
Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile
considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche)
and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on
hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-
petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article
128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision
[correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is
double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such
judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal before
the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, focusing their
arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their constitutional
right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.

We deny.

An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate.13 An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.14 The appellate court may, and generally does,look into the entire
records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court.15

Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical
Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on
doublejeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be
found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when
the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged
in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a
barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such
positions, they are considered as public officers/employees.16

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the
RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years,
four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime
or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after
the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while
they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum
term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of
1wphi 1

the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code
requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period
of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and maximum
periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3
years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period.

On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby
sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution
dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
f. GR no.166680

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No.166680 July 7, 2014

ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before
an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 2181 of the Revised Penal Code.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
September 10, 2004 Decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26528 and its
January 11, 2005 Resolution3 denying reconsideration thereof.

The Information4 dated January 25, 2001 under which petitioner Aloysius Dait Lumauig
(petitioner) was tried and convicted has this accusatory portion:

That in or about August 1994 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Alfonso Lista, Ifugao
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused then Municipal
Mayorof Alfonso Lista, Ifugao, and as such accountable public officer, and responsible for the
amount of P101,736.00 which the accused received by way of cashadvance for payment of the
insurance coverage of the twelve (12) motorcycle[s] purchased by the Municipality, and, hence
with the corresponding duty under the law to account for the same, did then and there, willfully
and feloniously fail to liquidate and account for the same to the damage and prejudice of the
Government.5

The facts are matters of recordor otherwise undisputed.

Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan

examined the year-end reports involving the municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During
the courseof her examination of the records and related documents of the municipality, she came
across a disbursement voucher6 for P101,736.00 prepared for petitioner, a former mayor of the
municipality, as cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of
motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The amount was covered by Land Bank
Check No. 118942007 dated August 29, 1994 wherein the payee is petitioner. Her further
investigation of the accounting records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was
made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994. Thus, she issued a certification8 to
this effect on November 29, 2001. She likewise claimed that she prepared two letters to inform
the petitioner of his unliquidated cash advance but the same were not sent to him because she
could not get his exact address despite efforts exerted. She averred that on June 4, 2001,
petitioner paid the subject cash advance before the treasurer of the municipality, for which
reason, incumbent Mayor Glenn D. Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance.9
Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his incumbency as
municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao.10 This amount was intended for the payment of freight
and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to bedonated to the municipality by the City of
Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars.
He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the
vehicles were already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed
nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001
while he was claiming for separation pay when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated
cash advance. And so as not toprolong the issue, he paidthe amount of P101,736.00 to the
municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.

From the same facts stemmed an Information for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No.
301911 docketed as CriminalCase No. 26527 against petitioner for having allegedly utilized the
cash advance for a purpose other than for which it was obtained.

On September 10, 2004, after a joint trial, the Sandiganbayanrendered a consolidated

Decision12 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises consideredthe Court rules as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 26527, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby

ACQUITTED. No civil liability shall be imposed there being no basis for its award. The
cash bondposted for his provisional liberty is ordered returned to him, subject to the usual
accounting and auditing procedure; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 26528, accused ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG is hereby

CONVICTED of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to a straight penalty of
six months and one (1) day and a fine of Php1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.13

On January 11, 2005, the Sandiganbayanpromulgated its Resolution14 denying petitioners

UrgentMotion for Reconsideration.15

Hence, this Petition.

After a thorough review of the records of the case and a judicious consideration of the arguments
of the petitioner, the Court does not find sufficient basis to reverse the judgment of conviction.
From the prevailing facts, we entertain no doubt on the guilt of petitioner.

The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-

graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the
present case.

Petitioner stakes the present Petition on the assertion that since the cases for which he was
indicted involve the same subject cash advance in the amount of P101,736.00, his exoneration in
the anti-graft case should likewise exculpate him from further liability in the present case.

We are not persuaded.

It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. "However, [we have]
consistently held thatthe same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct
charges."16 Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the two offenses
charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will extend to the other
case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence.

To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e)of RA 3019, the following elements must be
present:

(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;

(2) That said public officer commitsthe prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

(3) That he or she causes undue injury toany party, whether the government or a private
party;

(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and

(5) That the public officer has acted withmanifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.17

On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code are:

(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;

(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;

(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a

provincial auditor; and,

(4) That he fails to do so for a period oftwo months after such account should be
rendered.18

The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily imply that the
requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would certainly differ in each
case. Hence, petitioners acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him inthe present
case given the differences between the elements ofthe two offenses.

Prior demand to liquidate is not a

requisite for conviction under Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code.

The central aspect of petitioners next argument is that he was not reminded of his unliquidated
cash advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218 does not require
the COA orthe provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public officer should render
an account. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account. The
question has been settled in Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan19where we ruled that prior demand to
liquidate is not necessary to hold an accountable officer liable for violation of Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code:

x x x [W]e are asked to resolve whether demand is necessary for a conviction of a violation of
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Citing United States v. Saberon, petitioner contends that Article 218 punishes the refusal of a
public employee to render an account of funds in his charge when duly required by a competent
officer. He argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime unless the prosecution has proven
that there was a demand for him to render an account. Petitioner asserts that COA Circular No.
90-331 provides that the public officer shall be criminally liable for failure to settle his accounts
after demand had been made. Moreover, petitioner asserts that the case had become moot and
academic since he already submitted his liquidation report.

For the People, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) counters that demand is not an
element of the offense and that it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring the public
officer to render an account. The OSP insists that Executive Order No. 292, Presidential Decree
No. 1445, the COA Laws and Regulations, and even the Constitution mandate that public officers
render an account of funds in their charge. It maintains that the instant case differs from
Saberonwhich involved a violation of Act No. 1740 where prior demand was required. In this
case involving a violation of Article 218, prior demand is not required. Moreover, the OSP points
out that petitioner even admitted his failure to liquidate the funds within the prescribed period,
hence, he should be convicted of the crime.

We shall now resolve the issue at hand.

Article 218 consists ofthe following elements:

1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;

2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;

3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit,

or to a provincial auditor; and

4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered. Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an
accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where
none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it
engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice
but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only
application.

Petitioners reliance on Saberonis misplaced. As correctly pointed out by the OSP,

Saberoninvolved a violation of Act No. 1740 whereas the present case involves a violation of
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218 merely provides that the public officer
berequired by law and regulation to render account. Statutory construction tells us that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.20

Petitioner is liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 5 of COA Circular No. 90-331, the circular in force at the time petitioner availed of the
subject cash advance, pertinently provides:

5. LIQUIDATION OFCASH ADVANCES

5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:

xxxx
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days after the end of
the year; subject to replenishment during the year.

Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to
liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he
should have liquidated the cash advance within two months from the time it was due, or on or
before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar, petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on
June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,petitioner was liable for violation
of Article 218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.

The penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified.

Petitioner argues that assuming that he is liable for violation of Article 218, he should be meted a
lesser penalty considering that (1) he subsequently liquidated the subject cash advance when he
later discovered and was confronted with his delinquency, and (2) the COA did not immediately
inform him of his unliquidated cash advance.

On this point, we partially agree with petitioner.

In sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six months and one day of prisin correccionaland
a fine of P1,000.00, the Sandiganbayan correctly considered the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, as borne by the records,21 in favor of petitioner.However, it failed toconsider
the mitigating circumstance of return or full restitution of the funds that were previously
unliquidated.

In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of the funds

misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogousto voluntary
surrender.22 Although this case does not involve malversation ofpublic funds under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code but rather failure to render an account under Article 218 (i.e., the
succeeding Article found in the same Chapter), the same reasoning may be applied to the return
or full restitution ofthe funds that were previously unliquidated in considering the same as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner.

The prescribed penalty for violation of Article 218 is prisin correccionalin its minimum period or
six months and one day to two years and four months, or by a fine ranging from 200to 6,000
pesos, orboth. Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances and there are no
aggravating circumstances, under Article 64 (5)23 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty is the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty which, in this case, is arresto mayorin
its maximum period or four months and one day to six months. 1w phi 1

The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2,24 is not applicable to, among others, cases
where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. In determining "whether an
indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty
actually imposed by the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not the
imposable penalty."25 In the case at bar, since the maximum of the imposable penalty is six
months, then the possible maximum term that can be actually imposed is surely less than one
year. Hence, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is notapplicable to the present case. As a result,
and in view of the attendant circumstances in this case, we deem it proper to impose a straight
penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayorand delete the imposition of fine.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Sandiganbayanin

Criminal Case No. 26528 dated September 10, 2004 convicting petitioner of the felony of Failure
of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Petitioner is sentenced to a straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, and
2. The imposition of finein the amount of P1,000.00 is deleted.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
g. GR No. 192912

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 192912 June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The Court resolves the appeal of the accused-appellant Democrito Paras from the
Decision1 dated February 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465.
The appellate court affirmed the Decision2dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729, which found the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape.

The prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing rape against AAA,3 a 17-year old
girl, allegedly committed as follows:

That at noon in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto, in [XXX] and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the use of a gun of unknown
caliber, by force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with [AAA] against the latter's will and as a result of which the latter became
pregnant, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.4

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 In the trial that ensued, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of AAA,6 Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
Field Officer Ma. Pamela Jusay,7and Dr. Marcelo Pilapil,8 the physician who physically examined
AAA. The defense thereafter presented the testimonies of the accused-appellant9 and his
mother, Luisa Paras.10

In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution summarized their version of the facts in
this wise:

Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while the victim [AAA], a house-helper of
spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding grass using a bolo at her employers farm in
[XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind (TSN, July 15, 1999, pp. 6-7). He
pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth.
While pointing the gun at [AAA], appellant pulled down her long pants and panties. Appellant also
pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted her. He
spread [AAAs] legs with his two hands after putting down his firearm. He then inserted his penis
into [AAAs] vagina. [AAA] felt pain (Ibid., p. 8). [AAA] struggled and tried to kick appellant but all
proved futile as appellant was physically stronger (TSN, Nov. 19, 1999, p. 10)[.]

Since [AAA] was afraid of appellant and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not
strike appellant with the bolo she was holding (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 3). Appellant told[AAA] not
to shout. He made a push and pull movement. [AAA] felt appellants organ inside her while she
continued to struggle. While struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at appellant (Ibid. p. 4).

After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while [AAA] went back to
the house of her employers (Ibid.).

Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She gave birth to a child who was more
than a year old when [AAA] testified on January 11, 2000. (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 5)[.]11

The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi:

Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper
at the house of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA. On March 19, 1996,
he was at the Lusaran market to buy dried fish and other household items to be consumed for
the whole week because he lived in a mountain barangay. He could not estimate the distance
between Lusaran Market and his house but it would take two (2) hours of travel time by walking
only. It was about 8:00 oclock in the morning when he went to Lusaran Market on March 19,
1996 and arrived home at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon already. AAA accused him of rape
because of the misunderstanding he had with the husband of his elder sister regarding the
mango trees owned by his mother. AAA is an employee of his brother-in-law, Sergio Agua,
whose house is about seventy (70) meters away from his house. Aside from their houses, there
are also other houses, about five (5) of them, located in their locality. The mango trees were
already allocated by his mother to each and every child. One of his brothers transferred
residence to Compostela abandoning the mango trees allocated to him. Accused-appellant took
over the said mango trees and sprayed them with chemicals. However, Sergio Agua also
sprayed them and accused-appellant chided him. This made his brother-in-law angry who pulled
out his bolo. Thereafter, he told accused-appellant to "beware". After that incident, accused-
appellant and Sergio no longer talked about the mango trees. Aside from this, accused-appellant
and Sergio also had a disagreement regarding the five (5) hectares of land owned by the latters
mother. Sergio wanted it divided but accused-appellant objected since he has other siblings who
are still single. Sergio got mad and again threatened accused-appellant to "beware"[.]12

The Decision of the RTC

In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA, finding the same frank, candid,
and straightforward. In contrast, the trial court rejected the accused-appellants defenses of
denial and alibi since the same were not corroborated even by the testimony of his mother, Luisa
Paras. The latter merely testified on an alleged feud between the accused-appellant and Sergio
Agua, who happened to be the employer of AAA. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellant as
follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court finds the guilt of the accused
DEMOCRITO PARAS to have been proved beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the sum of P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages plus the amount
of P100,000.00 as and for moral damages.13

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC in a Decision dated February 2,
2010. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts appreciation of AAAs testimony, which was
held to be steadfast and unyielding throughout the direct and cross-examinations. The testimony
of Luisa Paras on the alleged misunderstanding between the accused-appellant and Sergio Agua
was found to be insufficient to overturn the candid testimony of AAA and her positive
identification of the accused-appellant as the malefactor. The Court of Appeals also brushed
aside the accused-appellants arguments of alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in AAAs
testimony, i.e., that AAA could recall the details of the rape but not the birth date of her child and
the name of her neighbor, that AAA did not seize the opportunities given her to save herself, and
that the supposed date of the rape was not clearly established by the prosecution evidence. The
appellate court ruled that said inconsistencies were on inconsequential matters that did not bear
upon the essential elements of the crime of rape. The Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Toledo City, in Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 only as
moral damages plus exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. The award of civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 stands.14

The Ruling of the Court

The accused-appellant again appealed his case to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime charged even if his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.15

The appeal lacks merit.

As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the rape "in March 1996 or for
sometime subsequent thereto," the applicable provision of the law in this case is Article 33516 of
the Revised Penal Code.17 The relevant portions of said statutory provision read:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

xxxx

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of
rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The
courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this
case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the
accused-appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual
intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower courts appreciation of the
credibility of AAAs testimony. People v. De Guzman18 teaches that:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of
the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial
judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of
the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that
will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down
in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record
will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations
arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.

The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the inconsistencies pointed out
by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to remember the birth
date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her credibility as a witness. These
details had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a
person through force or intimidation. As held in People v. Maglente19:

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are
not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do
not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give
error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory.
Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been
rehearsed. (Citations omitted.)

Before the Court of Appeals and this Court, the accused-appellant also capitalized on the
findings of Dr. Pilapil that AAA was already three months pregnant when she was examined on
October 7, 1996. If that were the case, the accused-appellant argued that AAA could have had
sexual intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in March 1996 when the rape was
supposed to have been committed. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected this
contention. We had occasion to state in People v. Adora20 that "authorities in forensic medicine
agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact date
thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of pregnancy."
At any rate, we ruled in People v. Bejic21 that:

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape
victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What
is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the
latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner. (Citation omitted.)

Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do so,
we are not persuaded. Were iterated in Sison v. People22 that:

[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when
one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. In a given
situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first opportunity
cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse. (Citations omitted.)

Finally, the accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi also fail to convince the
Court. Given that the accused-appellant failed to support the same with strong evidence of his
1wphi1

lack of guilt, said defenses cannot prevail over the positive identification of AAA.

All told, the accused-appellant failed to show that the RTC and the Court of Appeals committed
any reversible error in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexually abusing AAA.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In
this case, the accused-appellants use of a gun in the commission of the rape against AAA was
both specifically alleged in the information and proven during the trial of the case. Considering
that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.23

As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals properly imposed the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On the award of exemplary damages, the
same is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence.24

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the Decision dated February 2, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The accused-appellant is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
h. GR No. 187769

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187769 June 4, 2014

ALVIN PATRIMONIO, Petitioner,

vs.
NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ and OCTAVIO MARASIGAN III, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the decision2 dated September 24, 2008 and the resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82301. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 77, dismissing the complaint for declaration
of nullity of loan filed by petitioner Alvin Patrimonio and ordering him to pay respondent Octavio
Marasigan III (Marasigan) the sum of P200,000.00.

The Factual Background

The facts of the case, as shown by the records, are briefly summarized below.

The petitioner and the respondent Napoleon Gutierrez (Gutierrez) entered into a business
venture under the name of Slam Dunk Corporation (Slum Dunk), a production outfit that
produced mini-concerts and shows related to basketball. Petitioner was already then a decorated
professional basketball player while Gutierrez was a well-known sports columnist.

In the course of their business, the petitioner pre-signed several checks to answer for the
expenses of Slam Dunk. Although signed, these checks had no payees name, date or amount.
The blank checks were entrusted to Gutierrez with the specific instruction not to fill them out
without previous notification to and approval by the petitioner. According to petitioner, the
arrangement was made so that he could verify the validity of the payment and make the proper
arrangements to fund the account.

In the middle of 1993, without the petitioners knowledge and consent, Gutierrez went to
Marasigan (the petitioners former teammate), to secure a loan in the amount of P200,000.00 on
the excuse that the petitioner needed the money for the construction of his house. In addition to
the payment of the principal, Gutierrez assured Marasigan that he would be paid an interest of
5% per month from March to May 1994.

After much contemplation and taking into account his relationship with the petitioner and
Gutierrez, Marasigan acceded to Gutierrez request and gave him P200,000.00 sometime in
February 1994. Gutierrez simultaneously delivered to Marasigan one of the blank checks the
petitioner pre-signed with Pilipinas Bank, Greenhills Branch, Check No. 21001764 with the blank
portions filled out with the words "Cash" "Two Hundred Thousand Pesos Only", and the amount
of "P200,000.00". The upper right portion of the check corresponding to the date was also filled
out with the words "May 23, 1994" but the petitioner contended that the same was not written by
Gutierrez.
On May 24, 1994, Marasigan deposited the check but it was dishonored for the reason
"ACCOUNT CLOSED." It was later revealed that petitioners account with the bank had been
closed since May 28, 1993.

Marasigan sought recovery from Gutierrez, to no avail. He thereafter sent several demand letters
to the petitioner asking for the payment of P200,000.00, but his demands likewise went
unheeded. Consequently, he filed a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 against the petitioner,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 42816.

On September 10, 1997, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Loan and Recovery of Damages against Gutierrez and co-respondent
Marasigan. He completely denied authorizing the loan or the checks negotiation, and asserted
that he was not privy to the parties loan agreement.

Only Marasigan filed his answer to the complaint. In the RTCs order dated December 22,
1997,Gutierrez was declared in default.

The Ruling of the RTC

The RTC ruled on February 3,2003 in favor of Marasigan.4 It found that the petitioner, in issuing
the pre-signed blank checks, had the intention of issuing a negotiable instrument, albeit with
specific instructions to Gutierrez not to negotiate or issue the check without his approval. While
under Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law Gutierrez had the prima facie authority to
complete the checks by filling up the blanks therein, the RTC ruled that he deliberately violated
petitioners specific instructions and took advantage of the trust reposed in him by the latter.

Nonetheless, the RTC declared Marasigan as a holder in due course and accordingly dismissed
the petitioners complaint for declaration of nullity of the loan. It ordered the petitioner to pay
Marasigan the face value of the check with a right to claim reimbursement from Gutierrez.

The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that Marasigan is not a
holder in due course. He contended that when Marasigan received the check, he knew that the
same was without a date, and hence, incomplete. He also alleged that the loan was actually
between Marasigan and Gutierrez with his check being used only as a security.

The Ruling of the CA

On September 24, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, although premised on different factual
findings. After careful analysis, the CA agreed with the petitioner that Marasigan is not a holder in
due course as he did not receive the check in good faith.

The CA also concluded that the check had been strictly filled out by Gutierrez in accordance with
the petitioners authority. It held that the loan may not be nullified since it is grounded on an
obligation arising from law and ruled that the petitioner is still liable to pay Marasigan the sum
of P200,000.00.

After the CA denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration that followed, the petitioner filed
the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that: (1) there was no loan between him and Marasigan since he never
authorized the borrowing of money nor the checks negotiation to the latter; (2) under Article
1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary for an individual to make a loan
or borrow money in behalf of another; (3) the loan transaction was between Gutierrez and
Marasigan, with his check being used only as a security; (4) the check had not been completely
and strictly filled out in accordance with his authority since the condition that the subject check
can only be used provided there is prior approval from him, was not complied with; (5) even if the
check was strictly filled up as instructed by the petitioner, Marasigan is still not entitled to claim
the checks value as he was not a holder in due course; and (6) by reason of the bad faith in the
dealings between the respondents, he is entitled to claim for damages.

The Issues

Reduced to its basics, the case presents to us the following issues:

1. Whether the contract of loan in the amount of P200,000.00 granted by respondent

Marasigan to petitioner, through respondent Gutierrez, may be nullified for being void;

2. Whether there is basis to hold the petitioner liable for the payment of the P200,000.00
loan;

3. Whether respondent Gutierrez has completely filled out the subject check strictly under
the authority given by the petitioner; and

4. Whether Marasigan is a holder in due course.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

We note at the outset that the issues raised in this petition are essentially factual in nature. The
main point of inquiry of whether the contract of loan may be nullified, hinges on the very
existence of the contract of loan a question that, as presented, is essentially, one of fact.
Whether the petitioner authorized the borrowing; whether Gutierrez completely filled out the
subject check strictly under the petitioners authority; and whether Marasigan is a holder in due
course are also questions of fact, that, as a general rule, are beyond the scope of a Rule 45
petition.

The rule that questions of fact are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari, as a petition
for review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, is not an absolute rule that admits of
no exceptions. One notable exception is when the findings off act of both the trial court and the
CA are conflicting, making their review necessary.5 In the present case, the tribunals below
arrived at two conflicting factual findings, albeit with the same conclusion, i.e., dismissal of the
complaint for nullity of the loan. Accordingly, we will examine the parties evidence presented.

I. Liability Under the Contract of Loan

The petitioner seeks to nullify the contract of loan on the ground that he never authorized the
borrowing of money. He points to Article 1878, paragraph 7 of the Civil Code, which explicitly
requires a written authority when the loan is contracted through an agent. The petitioner
contends that absent such authority in writing, he should not be held liable for the face value of
the check because he was not a party or privy to the agreement.

Contracts of Agency May be Oral Unless The Law Requires a Specific Form

Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines a contract of agency as a contract whereby a person "binds
himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with
the consent or authority of the latter." Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the
principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that
another person is acting on his behalf without authority.

As a general rule, a contract of agency may be oral.6 However, it must be written when the law
requires a specific form, for example, in a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein through
an agent.

Article 1878 paragraph 7 of the Civil Code expressly requires a special power of authority before
an agent can loan or borrow money in behalf of the principal, to wit:

Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:

xxxx

(7) To loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgent and indispensable for the
preservation of the things which are under administration. (emphasis supplied)

Article 1878 does not state that the authority be in writing. As long as the mandate is express,
such authority may be either oral or written. We unequivocably declared in Lim Pin v. Liao Tian,
et al.,7 that the requirement under Article 1878 of the Civil Code refers to the nature of the
authorization and not to its form. Be that as it may, the authority must be duly established by
competent and convincing evidence other than the self serving assertion of the party claiming
that such authority was verbally given, thus:

The requirements of a special power of attorney in Article 1878 of the Civil Code and of a special
authority in Rule 138 of the Rules of Court refer to the nature of the authorization and not its
form. The requirements are met if there is a clear mandate from the principal specifically
authorizing the performance of the act. As early as 1906, this Court in Strong v. Gutierrez-Repide
(6 Phil. 680) stated that such a mandate may be either oral or written, the one vital thing being
that it shall be express. And more recently, We stated that, if the special authority is not written,
then it must be duly established by evidence:

x x x the Rules require, for attorneys to compromise the litigation of their clients, a special
authority. And while the same does not state that the special authority be in writing the Court has
every reason to expect that, if not in writing, the same be duly established by evidence other than
the self-serving assertion of counsel himself that such authority was verbally given him.(Home
Insurance Company vs. United States lines Company, et al., 21 SCRA 863; 866: Vicente vs.
Geraldez, 52 SCRA 210; 225). (emphasis supplied).

The Contract of Loan Entered Into by Gutierrez in Behalf of the Petitioner Should be Nullified for
Being Void; Petitioner is Not Bound by the Contract of Loan.

A review of the records reveals that Gutierrez did not have any authority to borrow money in
behalf of the petitioner. Records do not show that the petitioner executed any special power of
1wphi1

attorney (SPA) in favor of Gutierrez. In fact, the petitioners testimony confirmed that he never
authorized Gutierrez (or anyone for that matter), whether verbally or in writing, to borrow money
in his behalf, nor was he aware of any such transaction:

ALVIN PATRIMONIO (witness)

ATTY. DE VERA: Did you give Nap Gutierrez any Special Power of Attorney in writing
authorizing him to borrow using your money?

WITNESS: No, sir. (T.S.N., Alvin Patrimonio, Nov. 11, 1999, p. 105)8
 xxxx

Marasigan however submits that the petitioners acts of pre-signing the blank checks and
releasing them to Gutierrez suffice to establish that the petitioner had authorized Gutierrez to fill
them out and contract the loan in his behalf.

Marasigans submission fails to persuade us.

In the absence of any authorization, Gutierrez could not enter into a contract of loan in behalf of
the petitioner. As held in Yasuma v. Heirs of De Villa,9 involving a loan contracted by de Villa
secured by real estate mortgages in the name of East Cordillera Mining Corporation, in the
absence of an SPA conferring authority on de Villa, there is no basis to hold the corporation
liable, to wit:

The power to borrow money is one of those cases where corporate officers as agents of the
corporation need a special power of attorney. In the case at bar, no special power of attorney
conferring authority on de Villa was ever presented. x x x There was no showing that respondent
corporation ever authorized de Villa to obtain the loans on its behalf.

xxxx

Therefore, on the first issue, the loan was personal to de Villa. There was no basis to hold the
corporation liable since there was no authority, express, implied or apparent, given to de Villa to
borrow money from petitioner. Neither was there any subsequent ratification of his act.

xxxx

The liability arising from the loan was the sole indebtedness of de Villa (or of his estate after his
death). (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).

This principle was also reiterated in the case of Gozun v. Mercado,10 where this court held:

Petitioner submits that his following testimony suffices to establish that respondent had
authorized Lilian to obtain a loan from him.

xxxx

Petitioners testimony failed to categorically state, however, whether the loan was made on
behalf of respondent or of his wife. While petitioner claims that Lilian was authorized by
respondent, the statement of account marked as Exhibit "A" states that the amount was received
by Lilian "in behalf of Mrs. Annie Mercado.

It bears noting that Lilian signed in the receipt in her name alone, without indicating therein that
she was acting for and in behalf of respondent. She thus bound herself in her personal capacity
and not as an agent of respondent or anyone for that matter.

It is a general rule in the law of agency that, in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real
property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in
the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough merely that the
agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the
principal. x x x (emphasis supplied).

In the absence of any showing of any agency relations or special authority to act for and in behalf
of the petitioner, the loan agreement Gutierrez entered into with Marasigan is null and void. Thus,
the petitioner is not bound by the parties loan agreement.
Furthermore, that the petitioner entrusted the blank pre-signed checks to Gutierrez is not legally
sufficient because the authority to enter into a loan can never be presumed. The contract of
agency and the special fiduciary relationship inherent in this contract must exist as a matter of
fact. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of agency, but also
its nature and extent.11 As we held in People v. Yabut:12

Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in
Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as
delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there.
He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as "payee" or "indorsee." And there
appears to beno contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the
acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal
that Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee." There was no special fiduciary
relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both
parties is essential, the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf,
and the agent consents so to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof.
The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also
its nature and extent. This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with
involves checks, which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as
payment of obligation.(at p. 630). (emphasis supplied)

The records show that Marasigan merely relied on the words of Gutierrez without securing a
copy of the SPA in favor of the latter and without verifying from the petitioner whether he had
authorized the borrowing of money or release of the check. He was thus bound by the risk
accompanying his trust on the mere assurances of Gutierrez.

No Contract of Loan Was Perfected Between Marasigan And Petitioner, as The Latters Consent
Was Not Obtained.

Another significant point that the lower courts failed to consider is that a contract of loan, like any
other contract, is subject to the rules governing the requisites and validity of contracts in
general.13 Article 1318 of the Civil Code14enumerates the essential requisites for a valid contract,
namely:

1. consent of the contracting parties;

2. object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and

3. cause of the obligation which is established.

In this case, the petitioner denied liability on the ground that the contract lacked the essential
element of consent. We agree with the petitioner. As we explained above, Gutierrez did not have
the petitioners written/verbal authority to enter into a contract of loan. While there may be a
meeting of the minds between Gutierrez and Marasigan, such agreement cannot bind the
petitioner whose consent was not obtained and who was not privy to the loan agreement. Hence,
only Gutierrez is bound by the contract of loan.

True, the petitioner had issued several pre-signed checks to Gutierrez, one of which fell into the
hands of Marasigan. This act, however, does not constitute sufficient authority to borrow money
in his behalf and neither should it be construed as petitioners grant of consent to the parties
loan agreement. Without any evidence to prove Gutierrez authority, the petitioners signature in
the check cannot be taken, even remotely, as sufficient authorization, much less, consent to the
contract of loan. Without the consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract
could not have been perfected; there simply was no contract to speak of.15
With the loan issue out of the way, we now proceed to determine whether the petitioner can be
made liable under the check he signed.

II. Liability Under the Instrument

The answer is supplied by the applicable statutory provision found in Section 14 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) which states:

Sec. 14. Blanks; when may be filled.- Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular,
the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order
that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority
to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed
may be enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must
be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any
such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual
for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in
accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.

This provision applies to an incomplete but delivered instrument. Under this rule, if the maker or
drawer delivers a pre-signed blank paper to another person for the purpose of converting it into a
negotiable instrument, that person is deemed to have prima facie authority to fill it up. It merely
requires that the instrument be in the possession of a person other than the drawer or maker and
from such possession, together with the fact that the instrument is wanting in a material
particular, the law presumes agency to fill up the blanks.16

In order however that one who is not a holder in due course can enforce the instrument against a
party prior to the instruments completion, two requisites must exist: (1) that the blank must be
filled strictly in accordance with the authority given; and (2) it must be filled up within a
reasonable time. If it was proven that the instrument had not been filled up strictly in accordance
with the authority given and within a reasonable time, the maker can set this up as a personal
defense and avoid liability. However, if the holder is a holder in due course, there is a conclusive
presumption that authority to fill it up had been given and that the same was not in excess of
authority.17

In the present case, the petitioner contends that there is no legal basis to hold him liable both
under the contract and loan and under the check because: first, the subject check was not
completely filled out strictly under the authority he has given and second, Marasigan was not a
holder in due course.

Marasigan is Not a Holder in Due Course

The Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) defines a holder in due course, thus:

Sec. 52 A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following
conditions:

(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;

(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had
been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;

(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;

 (d) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the
instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.(emphasis supplied)

Section 52(c) of the NIL states that a holder in due course is one who takes the instrument "in
good faith and for value." It also provides in Section 52(d) that in order that one may be a holder
in due course, it is necessary that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.

Acquisition in good faith means taking without knowledge or notice of equities of any sort which
could beset up against a prior holder of the instrument.18 It means that he does not have any
knowledge of fact which would render it dishonest for him to take a negotiable paper. The
absence of the defense, when the instrument was taken, is the essential element of good faith.19

As held in De Ocampo v. Gatchalian:20

In order to show that the defendant had "knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
instrument amounted to bad faith," it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew the exact
fraud that was practiced upon the plaintiff by the defendant's assignor, it being sufficient to show
that the defendant had notice that there was something wrong about his assignor's acquisition of
title, although he did not have notice of the particular wrong that was committed.

It is sufficient that the buyer of a note had notice or knowledge that the note was in some way
tainted with fraud. It is not necessary that he should know the particulars or even the nature of
the fraud, since all that is required is knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the note
amounted bad faith.

The term bad faith does not necessarily involve furtive motives, but means bad faith in a
commercial sense. The manner in which the defendants conducted their Liberty Loan
department provided an easy way for thieves to dispose of their plunder. It was a case of "no
questions asked." Although gross negligence does not of itself constitute bad faith, it is evidence
from which bad faith may be inferred. The circumstances thrust the duty upon the defendants to
make further inquiries and they had no right to shut their eyes deliberately to obvious facts.
(emphasis supplied).

In the present case, Marasigans knowledge that the petitioner is not a party or a privy to the
contract of loan, and correspondingly had no obligation or liability to him, renders him dishonest,
hence, in bad faith. The following exchange is significant on this point:

WITNESS: AMBET NABUS

Q: Now, I refer to the second call after your birthday. Tell us what you talked about?

A: Since I celebrated my birthday in that place where Nap and I live together with the other crew,
there were several visitors that included Danny Espiritu. So a week after my birthday, Bong
Marasigan called me up again and he was fuming mad. Nagmumura na siya. Hinahanap niya
si hinahanap niya si Nap, dahil pinagtataguan na siya at sinabi na niya na kailangan I-settle na
niya yung utang ni Nap, dahil

xxxx

WITNESS: Yes. Sinabi niya sa akin na kailangan ayusin na bago pa mauwi sa kung saan ang
tsekeng tumalbog (He told me that we have to fix it up before it) mauwi pa kung saan

xxxx
Q: What was your reply, if any?

A: I actually asked him. Kanino ba ang tseke na sinasabi mo?

(Whose check is it that you are referring to or talking about?)

Q: What was his answer?

A: It was Alvins check.

Q: What was your reply, if any?

A: I told him do you know that it is not really Alvin who borrowed money from you or what you
want to appear

xxxx

Q: What was his reply?

A: Yes, it was Nap, pero tseke pa rin ni Alvin ang hawak ko at si Alvin ang maiipit dito.(T.S.N.,
Ambet Nabus, July 27, 2000; pp.65-71; emphasis supplied)21

Since he knew that the underlying obligation was not actually for the petitioner, the rule that a
possessor of the instrument is prima facie a holder in due course is inapplicable. As correctly
noted by the CA, his inaction and failure to verify, despite knowledge of that the petitioner was
not a party to the loan, may be construed as gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Yet, it does not follow that simply because he is not a holder in due course, Marasigan is already
totally barred from recovery. The NIL does not provide that a holder who is not a holder in due
course may not in any case recover on the instrument.22 The only disadvantage of a holder who
is not in due course is that the negotiable instrument is subject to defenses as if it were non-
negotiable.23 Among such defenses is the filling up blank not within the authority.

On this point, the petitioner argues that the subject check was not filled up strictly on the basis of
the authority he gave. He points to his instruction not to use the check without his prior approval
and argues that the check was filled up in violation of said instruction.

Check Was Not Completed Strictly Under The Authority Given by The Petitioner

Our own examination of the records tells us that Gutierrez has exceeded the authority to fill up
the blanks and use the check. To repeat, petitioner gave Gutierrez pre-signed checks to be
1wphi 1

used in their business provided that he could only use them upon his approval. His instruction
could not be any clearer as Gutierrez authority was limited to the use of the checks for the
operation of their business, and on the condition that the petitioners prior approval be first
secured.

While under the law, Gutierrez had a prima facie authority to complete the check, such prima
facie authority does not extend to its use (i.e., subsequent transfer or negotiation)once the check
is completed. In other words, only the authority to complete the check is presumed. Further, the
law used the term "prima facie" to underscore the fact that the authority which the law accords to
a holder is a presumption juris tantumonly; hence, subject to subject to contrary proof. Thus,
evidence that there was no authority or that the authority granted has been exceeded may be
presented by the maker in order to avoid liability under the instrument.
In the present case, no evidence is on record that Gutierrez ever secured prior approval from the
petitioner to fill up the blank or to use the check. In his testimony, petitioner asserted that he
never authorized nor approved the filling up of the blank checks, thus:

ATTY. DE VERA: Did you authorize anyone including Nap Gutierrez to write the date, May 23,
1994?

WITNESS: No, sir.

Q: Did you authorize anyone including Nap Gutierrez to put the word cash? In the check?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did you authorize anyone including Nap Gutierrez to write the figure P200,000 in this check?

A: No, sir.

Q: And lastly, did you authorize anyone including Nap Gutierrez to write the words P200,000 only
xx in this check?

A: No, sir. (T.S.N., Alvin Patrimonio, November 11, 1999).24

Notably, Gutierrez was only authorized to use the check for business expenses; thus, he
exceeded the authority when he used the check to pay the loan he supposedly contracted for the
construction of petitioner's house. This is a clear violation of the petitioner's instruction to use the
checks for the expenses of Slam Dunk. It cannot therefore be validly concluded that the check
was completed strictly in accordance with the authority given by the petitioner.

Considering that Marasigan is not a holder in due course, the petitioner can validly set up the
personal defense that the blanks were not filled up in accordance with the authority he gave.
Consequently, Marasigan has no right to enforce payment against the petitioner and the latter
cannot be obliged to pay the face value of the check.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petitioner
Alvin Patrimonio's petition for review on certiorari. The appealed Decision dated September 24,
2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are consequently
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
i. GR No. 197293

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of
the. prosecutor, the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss
the case if, upon a personal assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not
establish probable cause.

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January
14, 2011, which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner
Alfredo C. Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.

This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative,
Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3

In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-
In/Used Car Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia,
conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and
released by Alfredo without Rolandos or the finance managers permission.4

The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to
remit the payments totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars
under Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo
failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars
alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda
City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage.5

In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars supposed failure to prove
ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted
payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage.6

On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7 finding probable
cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and
estafa.

Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a petition for review
with the Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9

While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion
for determination of probable cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a
motion to defer arraignment.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4, 2009,
the parties agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for
resolution.14

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an
order15 dismissing the complaint, stating that:

After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the
assailed Resolution dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not
support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16

Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17

Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or
not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."18

On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial court, and
reinstated the case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutors findings of probable cause with
her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."20

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he
argued that the trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by
the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than
[the] executive determination of probable cause"21and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the
determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x."22

In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that
were a mere rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.

The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment24 that the
appellate court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against
Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey
F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.

In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a
superior faculty[,] covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on
the existence of probable cause."26He argued that the findings of the trial court should be
accorded greater weight than the appellate courts. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial
court.

The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor
on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of
probable cause by the judge on the other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315,
fourth paragraph, no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, a preliminary investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial," in accordance with Rule
112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of
the existence of probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon
evaluation of the evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she
shall then cause the filing of the information with the court.

Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or
not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he
has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32

The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with
whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial
determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued. In People v. Inting:33

x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is
made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trialis the function of the
Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)

While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence
on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutors determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of
probable cause independent of the prosecutors finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan
Cerbo allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for
murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant,
executed a complaint-affidavit charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a
motion to amend the information, which was granted by the court. The information was then
amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and a warrant of arrest was issued
against him.

Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause.
The trial court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The
Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and
ordered the reinstatement of the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:

In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of
Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is
valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice
on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because
evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of
both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal
justice system should be clearly understood.

The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government
prosecutorial powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we
recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process.
Thus, when there is no showing of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a
public prosecutors duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering with such lawfully and judicially
mandated duties.

In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutors
finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move
for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the
facts and evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was
nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by
law and jurisprudence.

While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with trial.

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the
court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge
has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the
judge ex parte.

For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish
probable cause." Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint of information.

In People v. Hon. Yadao:38

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause.

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The 1w phi1

courts first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)

It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case,
whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court."40

In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record
and concluded that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the
offenses of qualified theft and estafa."41 Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by
competent evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully
possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to
substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with
particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been
removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to the prosecution of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She
also noted that:

x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory hearing
to clear out essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private
complainant to bring documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of
witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying itself that indeed probable cause exists to
commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.44

Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly
dismissed the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution
in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to
support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a
judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in
order that justice may be served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-
11604-05 against Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
j. GR no.193707

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM,Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse
and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to
a parents duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he
is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do
so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this
Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the
instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioners contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son
altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated
that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondents obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46which was not
disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support

his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioners
son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is
a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioners child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based
on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
k. GR No. 205136

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For the consideration of the Court is the Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the
Revised Rules of Court, assailing the ruling of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec)
which cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) and
denied the substitution of Kimberly by petitioner Olivia Da Silva Cerafica (Olivia).

On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections.
Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of
age on the day of the elections,1 in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig).2 As such, Kimberly was summoned to a
clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing,Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC
on 17 December 2012.3 Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly.
Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.

In a Memorandum dated 18 December 2012, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra (Director Amora-

Ladra) of the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and
consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on Comelec Resolution
No. 9551,4 Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she
cannot be substituted.

In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec on 3 January 2013,5 the Comelec adopted the
recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberlys COC, and denied the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, viz:6

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing

recommendation of Director Esmeralda-AmoraLadra, Law Department, as follows:

1. To cancelthe Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of aspirant Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica

without prejudice to any civil, criminal or administrative liability that she may have
incurred pursuant to Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution 9518; and

2. To deny the substitution of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica as

an effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Olivia then filed the present petition for certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, Status Quo AnteOrder, and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
raising the following issues:7

I.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED MINUTE
RESOLUTION RESULTING IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
(COC) OF ASPIRANT KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA AND THE DENIAL OF THE
SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA AS AN
EFFECT OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE COC OF KIMBERLY.

II.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
VALID SUBSTITUTION BY PETITIONER FOR KIMBERLY RESULTING IN THE MOTU
PROPRIO DENIAL OF PETITIONERS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

III.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION
WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, THEREBY RESULTING
IN THE MOTU PROPRIODENIAL OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF KIMBERLY DA SILVA
CERAFICA BY OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA.

In its Comment8 filed on 22 April 2013, respondent Comelec argued that Olivia cannot substitute
Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible for the post
by reason of her age, and that, moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was invalid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be
elected to.9 The Comelec further averred that it can cancel Kimberlys COC motu proprioas it may
look into patent defects in the COCs, such as Kimberlys failure to comply with the age
requirement.10

In her Reply11 filed on 10 May 2013, Oliviacountered that although Kimberly may not be qualified
to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied that she still filed a valid COC and
was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted.12 Olivia also claimed that there was no
ground to cancel or deny Kimberlys COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material
misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth dateto qualify for the position of
councilor, and as there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely
why she withdrew her COC upon learning that she was not qualified.13

At the outset, we note that a verification with the Comelec database yields the finding that Olivia
was not among the official candidates14 for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for.15 As
such, a ruling on the present petition would no longer be of practical use or value. Even if we
were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivias legal status as a legitimate
and qualified candidate for public office, such purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a
result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections.16
Be that as it may, the Court deems it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to
caution the Comelec against the precipitate cancellation of COCs.

In Albaa v. Comelec,17 we held that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
value. Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. In this case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues raised in
the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and peaceful
elections.

VALID SUBSTITUTION

In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC
and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion.

Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates18 and its power to deny due course to or
cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.19

In Cipriano v. Comelec,20 we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due
couse to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed
in due form is ministerial in character, and that whilethe Comelec may look into patent defects in
the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides for the procedure of
substitution of candidates, to wit:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election.

If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only "an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted.21 In the case at bar,
Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party;22 thus, she can be validly substituted.

The next question then is whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid
substitution; we answer in the affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC
after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same
political party to which Kimberly belongs;23 and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day
of election day.24

In Luna v. Comelec,25 where the candidate, who was also under age, withdrew his COC before
election day and was substituted by a qualified candidate, we declared that suchsubstitution was
valid. The Court eloquently explained:
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid

Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon
Hans Rogers withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna.
On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered tohave filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate
who could be substituted by Luna.

When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code(Election Code)
provides:

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.

In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004, the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans
Rogers certificate of candidacy.

On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code
allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election
by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a
candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election.

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section
77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for
the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
politicalparty dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later thanmid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal
or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and midday of election day,
said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the
country, with the Commission.

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna
complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute
for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid
certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may
not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of
the COMELEC.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among
others, the date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code
provides that in case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material
representation, a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of
said person may be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate
of candidacy.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.

In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacyof
Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of
candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel
Lunas certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.

It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy
1wphi1

after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a
person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. However,
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC.

Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC
declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of
candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election
Code, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by
Luna.26 (Emphases supplied.)

LACK OF DUE PROCESS

Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling

Kimberlys COC and denying the latters substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny
due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the Comelec once more gravely abused
its discretion. The Court reminds the Comelec that, inthe exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, the Constitution27 mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.

Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but
does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a
judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.28 As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of
quasi judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this
case.

In Bautista v. Comelec, et al.,29 where the Comelec Law Department recommended the
cancellation of a candidates COC for lack of qualification, and which recommendation was
affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, the Court held that the Comelec En Banc cannot short cut the
proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due
process to the candidate. The Court held:

A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this case. The COMELEC en banc can only
act on the case if there is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC division.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of
Bautistas certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary
hearing.
 xxxx

Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for the denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It isthus clear
that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the
COMELEC which the COMELEC in divisionshould first decide. More so in this case where the
cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of the election officer
regarding the lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en
bane cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division
because it denies due process to the candidate.30 (Emphasis supplied.)

The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions.31 We thus caution the Comelec against its practice of impetuous cancellation of
COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the
situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, with the cautionary counsel that cancellation of certificate
of candidacy is a quasi-judicial process, and accordingly is heard by the Commission on
Elections in Division and En Banc on appeal, we DISMISS the present petition for being moot
and academic.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
l. GR No. 206004

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

The power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of suffrage
should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC cannot motu proprio deny due course to or
cancel an alleged nuisance candidates certificate of candidacy without providing the candidate
his opportunity to be heard.

This is a Petition1 for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the following issuances of the COMELEC: first, Resolution No. 96102 dated January 11,
2013, declaring petitioner Joseph B. Timbol (Timbol) a nuisance candidate and ordering the
removal of his name from the certified list of candidates;3and second, Minute Resolution4 dated
February 5, 2013, denying his Petition to have his name listed in the certified list of candidates
and printed on the ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections.5

On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a Certificate of Candidacy6 for the position of Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. On January 15, 2013, he
received a Subpoena7 from COMELEC Election Officer Dinah A. Valencia (Election Officer
Valencia), ordering him to appear before her office on January 17, 2013 for a clarificatory hearing
in connection with his Certificate of Candidacy.8

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the
clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate. He contended that in
the 2010 elections, he ranked eighth among all the candidates who ran for Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Caloocan City. He allegedly had sufficient
resources to sustain his campaign.9

He pointed out before the clarificatory hearing panel that his name already appeared in the list of
nuisance candidates posted in the COMELEC website pursuant to Resolution No. 9610 dated
January 11, 2013. The clarificatory hearing panel allegedly assured him that his name would be
deleted from the list and that his Certificate of Candidacy would be given due course.10

In the Memorandum11 dated January 17, 2013, Election Officer Valencia recommended that
Timbols Certificate of Candidacy be given due course.12

Despite Election Officer Valencias favorable recommendation, Timbols name was not removed
from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the COMELECs website. With the printing of
ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013 a
Petition13 praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates for the May 13, 2013
elections.14
In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied the Petition for being
moot, considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.15

On March 15, 2013,16 Timbol filed his Petition for Certiorari with this court, arguing that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him a nuisance candidate.17 According to
Timbol, the COMELEC deprived him of due process of law when he was declared a nuisance
candidate even before Election Officer Valencia conducted the clarificatory hearing.18 He prayed
for a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the COMELEC to include his name in the certified
list of candidates for the position of Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District
of Caloocan City.19

In the Resolution20 dated April 16, 2013, this court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to
comment on behalf of the COMELEC.

In its Comment,21 the COMELEC argued that the Petition was already moot and academic,
considering that the May 13, 2013 elections had already been conducted.22

Even assuming that the Petition was not moot and academic, the COMELEC maintained that it
did not gravely abuse its discretion. Contrary to Timbols argument, he was given an opportunity
to be heard when Election Officer Valencia heard him during the clarificatory hearing. He even
admitted that he attended the clarificatory hearing with his counsel.23

Moreover, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Timbols Petition to be
included in the certified list of candidates, considering that the printing of ballots had already
started.24

With these arguments, the COMELEC prayed that this court deny the Petition for lack of merit.25

In the Resolution26 dated August 6, 2013, this court ordered Timbol to file a reply. When Timbol
failed to file his reply despite receipt of the order,27 we required Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras (Atty.
Aspiras), counsel for Timbol, to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
failing to file a reply on behalf of his client in the Resolution28 dated September 2, 2014. We
likewise reiterated our order for Atty. Aspiras to file a reply for Timbol.29 Still, Atty. Aspiras failed to
comply with our show cause resolution.

We dispense with the filing of the reply and resolve to decide this case based on the Petition and
the Comment.

The issues for this courts resolution are the following:

First, whether this case is moot and academic; and

Second, whether respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner
Timbols Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates.

We deny the Petition.

This case is moot and academic.

A case is moot and academic if it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of

supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."30 When a
case is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction over it.31
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot and
academic cases when:

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of
repetition yet evading review.32 (Citation omitted)

We may no longer act on petitioners prayer that his name be included in the certified list of
candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15,2013, 39 days
after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013
elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.

That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth
"controlling and authoritative doctrines"33 to be observed by respondent in motu proprio denying
due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance candidates. This motu
proprio authority is always subject to the alleged nuisance candidates opportunity to be
heard34 an essential element of procedural due process.35

II

Respondents power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to
the candidates opportunity to be heard.

Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]" This, however, does not guarantee "a constitutional right to run
for or hold public office[.]"36 To run for public office is a mere "privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law."37 Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance
candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy "to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of
the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."38 In
Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,39 this court explained why nuisance candidates are
prohibited from running for public office:

. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations
in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and
proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot
that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .

....

. . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
1wphi1

add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.40
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation
may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,"41 "subject to an
opportunity to be heard."42

The opportunity to be heard is a chance "to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."43 In election cases, due process
requirements are satisfied "when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand."44

In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,45 this court explained:

[T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of ones right to run
for public office, or, as in this case, ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that
the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the
opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as
the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commissions inquiry into the veracity
of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own
evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.46 Respondent
commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy
without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.47

Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his
bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610on
January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory
hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.

That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not
cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the
Petition had he been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute
Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioners Petition on the sole ground
that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.

We understand the "insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs

implications"48 of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioners name in
the certified list of candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to
the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are special as
they have the capability of being optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan machines.
Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly.

Still, "automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process."49 Respondent should also
balance its duty "to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and
peaceful"50 with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public
office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.

III

Counsel for petitioner must be fined for failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution dated
September 2, 2014.

Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the injunctive reliefs prayed for in time for the
May 13, 2013 elections. However, this was no reason for him to defy our orders to file a reply on
behalf of his client. For such contumacious acts, he should be ordered to show cause why he
should not be proceeded with administratively.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.

Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be the subject of
administrative actions for his contumacious attitude towards repeated orders of this court,
specifically, for his failure to comply with the Resolutions dated August 6, 2013 and September 2,
2014. The action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras will be docketed as a new and separate
administrative case.

Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the initiation of the
proper disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
m. GR No. 205867

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205867 February 23, 2015

MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, represented by JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO TAGUFA and ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
September 13, 2012 Decision1 and the January 25, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122648 which reversed and set aside the July 1, 2011 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela (RTC), in an action for reconveyance and
recovery of possession.

The Facts:

The undisputed facts were succinctly summarized in the August 31, 2010 Decision4 of the 3rd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tumauini-Delfin Albano, Tumauini, Isabela (MCTC) before which a
complaint5 for Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession with Damages was filed by petitioner
Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela (Hortizuela)represented by Jovier Tagufa against respondents
Gregoria Tagufa, Roberto Tagufa and Rogelio Lumaban (respondents). As quoted by the CA,
said undisputed facts are:

Gleaned from the joint testimonies of R[u]nsted Tagufa xxx and Jovier Tagufa xxx are the
following facts:

The property involved in this case is a parcel of land located at District IV, Tumauini, Isabela
containing an area of 539 square meters, more or less, and covered by OCT No. P-84609 of the
Registry of Deeds of Isabela. By virtue of the special power of attorney xxx executed by Mariflor
Tagufa Hortizuela, Jovier Tagufa instituted this case against herein defendants praying for the
peaceful surrender of the above-described property unto them and further ordering defendant
Gregoria Tagufa to reconvey in plaintiffs favor the same property which was titled under her
name via fraud.

Before it was titled in the name of Defendant Tagufa, said property was originally owned by
plaintiffs parents, Spouses Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez. Although untitled, the
spouses mortgaged the property with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for brevity).
For failure to redeem the property, DBP foreclosed the same and sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez
xxx who, in turn, sold it back to Runsted Tagufa, husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, on April
4, 2002 xxx using the fund sent by plaintiff Hortizuela who was in America and with the
agreement that Runsted will reconvey the said property to her sister when demanded. However,
plaintiff discovered that the same unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria
Tagufa under OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela xxx. Investigating further,
plaintiff discovered that Gregoria Tagufa was able to title the said property by virtue of a free
patent application before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
the execution of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses Leandro
Tagufa and Remedios Talosig dated May 9,2003 xxx. Plaintiff now seeks to recover possession
of the said property which is presently occupied by Gregoria Tagufa and her co-defendants and
have the same be reconveyed unto them.6

In its Order, dated May 5, 2010,the MCTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default
and allowed Hortizuela to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, the
MCTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit ruling that "in the judicious analysis by this court,
plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action."7

Not in conformity, Hortizuela appealed to the RTC. In its July 1, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed
the MCTC ruling. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted and the Decision dated August 31, 2010, is
hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant Gregorio Tagufa to reconvey to the plaintiff Mariflor Tagufa
Hortizuela the land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint;

2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the same land and to surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to the plaintiff;

3. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the following amounts, jointly and
severally:

a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as Moral Damages;

b) Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorneys Fees.

SO DECIDED.8

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.

The reversal being unacceptable to them, respondents filed a petition for review before the CA
questioning the RTC decision. This time, the case was disposed in their favor. According to the
CA, although Hortizuela filed with the MCTC a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of
possession of the subject lot, she was also questioning the validity of the Torrens title, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT)No. P-846609.9 The CA pointed out that this was in contravention of
Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529 which provides:

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law

It cited the well-settled rule that a Torrens title could not be collaterally attacked; that the issue of
whether or not the title was fraudulently issued, could only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose; and that an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession was
not the direct action contemplated by law.10 Hence, the dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 1, 2011 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The present Complaint
for reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11
Hortizuela filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution,12 dated January
25, 2013.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTIONFOR RECONVEYANCE AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
SUBJECT CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY LAW.

Hortizuela claims that respondent Gregoria Tagufa (Gregoria),being the wife of Runsted, was
certainly aware that the subject land was actually sold by Atty. Romulo Marquez (Atty. Marquez)
to her (Hortizuela). Runsted, only acted as attorney-in-fact in the sale transaction. Thus, the
action for reconveyance was not a collateral attack on the said title because Hortizuela was not
seeking the nullification of the title, but rather the reconveyance of the property, covered by the
said title, which Gregoria was holding in trust for her benefit as the real owner. Gregoria should,
therefore, reconvey the property and its title to her, being the rightful owner.

Position of Respondents

Respondents counter that although Hortizuelas complaint was denominated as one for
reconveyance and recovery of possession, its main objective was to nullify the title held by
Gregoria over the subject property. For said reason, the complaint would amount to a collateral
attack on the title which was proscribed under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. To
rule that the action for reconveyance was not a collateral one would result in the nullity of the
decree of registration.

Another argument that respondents want this Court to consider in resolving the subject petition is
the fact that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 3813 of
Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the free patent
by the government.

Finally, granting that the title over the property would be nullified and the property be reconveyed
to Hortizuela, still the latter would be ineligible to own the same pursuant to Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 223 which requires, among others, that an applicant for a free patent must be a
Filipino citizen. Hortizuela, by her own admission, is an American citizen who has been residing
in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of
P.D. No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack.14 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action is
to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.15 In its decision, the MCTC wrote:

Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of sale by and between Romulo
Marquez and Runsted Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and OCT
No. P-84609 registered in the name of Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the plaintiff,
fraudulently caused the titling of the same.

In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the following indicia of fraud committed by
GregoriaTagufa that would allegedly justify reconveyance:

First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses
Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only a grand
daughter-in-law,

Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent that plaintiff was already the owner
of the land she was applying for;

Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent that plaintiffs parents were not
anymore the owners of the land as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and

Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the property when she applied for it.

All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any valid right or legal title over the
property.

Studying the merits of this case and removing all its superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the
title generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation. However, in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a
wrong cause of action.16

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was convinced that fraud was attendant in
the registration of the land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an accepted remedy.
Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela
was not a collateral attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for
reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside
the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer
or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.17 There is
no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned through a
direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that in a
complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not
being questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the
registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as
a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.18

The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership
upon her of the subject land. "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used
to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor
of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned
with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner."19

Furthermore, respondents argument that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a
complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the
remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year,
counted from the issuance of the patent by the government, is weak. As was similarly held in
Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by respondent Gregoria through fraudulent
machinations by means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her name, she was
deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her actions.
Article 1456 provides: ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes.

The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes
in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be assailed
by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.21 In
Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc.,22 this Court
pointed out that:

x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public
land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even
existing authority, thru its duly-authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other
officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the
land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not
a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the
purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in
securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
Government.23

An action for reconveyance is proper

The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A recognized exception is that situation
where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of publicland unlawfully and in
breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. This was the
ruling in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.,24 where it was written:

A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title
thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person
who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.

In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or
mistake and has been registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the fraudulent
registration is an action for reconveyance, thus:

It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the patent
or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the title but to
have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the patent
and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known to the actual
possessors and occupants of the property. The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it
can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as
based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the patent here has
already been issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the
provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the
party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance. (Director
of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)
In the same vein, in Quiiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we stressed that:

The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a 1953
decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after
one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the instant
case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." Such a doctrine goes back to the
1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the
institution of registration would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to
cover and shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon:
"A different view would encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich himself at the
expense of another." It would indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the
circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his right to a property
to which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different
matter, and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator
to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions
coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded
against. So it has been before; so it should continue to be. (Citations omitted)

In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was
not seeking a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration
proceedings. What she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on account of
the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria. An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable
remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to
him.25 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance
of the subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the
commission of fraud. To reiterate,

The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership
upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
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create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely
an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used
to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor
of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned
with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.26

Finally, respondents' supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject property
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered for
having been raised only for the first time on appeal. It must be noted that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by
a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.27 The reason therefor is
due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, 2012 Decision and the January 25,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122648 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan,
Isabela, is hereby RE INST A TED.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
n. GR No. 206832

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 206832 January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is an Appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Alfredo Morales y Lam (Morales)
assailing the Decision2of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04287.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is an affirmance of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535, finding the accused
Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality or Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person
one (1) heat scaled transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline
substance, which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation orthc above-cited law.3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and
control three (3) heat-scaled transparent sachets each containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline
substance, which gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged.5

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases of
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses as against the bare denials of the accused. The
presumption or regularity of performance of duties was upheld in the absence of any improper
motive on their part to testify falsely against the accused. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

 (1) In Criminal Case No. 7534, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime or Sale or Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section 5,
1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500, 000.00).

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG
(Violation of Section 11, 2nct par., No. 3, Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years and one (1) day to Twenty
(20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence of
all the elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and preservation of
the corpus delicti of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in court. The
procedural steps required by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were liberally construed in
favor of the prosecution in view of the preservation of integrity and identity of the corpus delicti.
Conformably, the finding on the presumption of regularity of performance of duties was affirmed
in the absence of ill-motive on the part of the police officers.

On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal7 was filed by Morales through counsel before the
Supreme Court.

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-
Charge Emerenciana M. Divina8 informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died while
committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of Death
Report9 signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas. The death of
accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil and criminal
liabilities.

Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code:

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. x x x x

Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction by the lower courts.

However, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not entail any civil liability. No civil liability
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needs extinguishment.

WHEREFORE, in view of his death on 2 November 2013, the appeal of accused-appellant

Alfredo Morales y Lam from the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 August 2012 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04287 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76 in Criminal Case Nos. 7534-7535 convicting him of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby declared MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice