Desarrollo y Psicoanalisis

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS: I. THE CONTEXT FOR A

REVOLUTION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
MAKIIN LEICHT~IAN,
PH.D.
After describing the manner in which (lie integration of psjcho-

anal$ and developiiieiital p s y l i o l o ~becaine a central probleni
f o r ego psjcliology, the author examines the conditioiu that make
it possible for new research and theory in developieittal psyltology
to contribute to a revolution iii coiiteiiiporary psjclioaiia&ic theory.
They include: (1) the emergence of a state of %risisiii Aiiiericait
psjcltoanalpk centering on questioiu of [lie nature of early devel-
opment and how it can be known; (2) the explosive growth of
developmental research on earb ciiildliood dealing with issues at
the heart of that crisis; and (3) (lie presence of a new generatioit
of psjchoana~stsand psjclioana~ticalboriented researchers ca-
pable of bringing Ilia[ research to bear on those issues.
S INCE THE hiID-19705. T H E SITUATION I N contemporary Amer-

ican psychoanalysis has resembled Kuhns (1962) charac-
terization of the crises from which scientific revolutions emerge.
Early in the period, Model1 (1975) observed that, although until
recently ego psychology had functioned as a normal science,
new knowledge about the psychology of object relations had
challenged this system, creating uncertainty regarding the abil-
ity of the central paradigm to organize the facts of the science
and a sense of disquietude which may at times approach the
intensity of an actual crisis regarding the future of the science
itself (p. 57). Focusing on a wide range of theories of object
relations and the development of the self that had become in-
creasingly prominent in the decade following Modells paper,
Eagle (1984) described a state of ferment in which there were
Chief Psychologist, Childrens Division, The hlenninger Foundation,

Topeka, Kansas.
Accepted for publicationJune 30, 1989.
915
Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at COLORADO COLL on March 23, 2015

916 hlARTIN LEICHThIAN
widespread doubts about traditional theories, a blurring of

boundaries of those theories, and heated debates about whether
they could be stretched to assimilate new findings or whether
radical change was necessary and, in fact, under way. In lan-
guage that could easily have been lifted from Kuhns chapter
on scientific crises, he wrote:
In the last number of years the very face of psychoanalytic
theory has been changed radically. Some of what wcre
once thought to be the very foundational propositions of
psychoanalysis have been markedly reformulated. It is not
at all certain that these alterations are consistent with clas-
sical psychoanalytic theory as developed by Freud and his
early followers. Indeed, when one takes a comprehensive
look at the range of reformulations one is not at all clear
as to what remains of traditional psychoanalytic theory
IP. 31.
Even some psychoanalysts who are reluctant to apply Kuhns
model to this situation acknowledge that there is no longer a
consensus in American psychoanalysis about fundamental is-
sues of theory and practice (Cooper, 1985). Indeed, as the grow-
ing number of recent works devoted to discussions of models
of the mind and their implications for clinical practice attest,
psychoanalysis is now an arena for a host of contending per-
spectives that offer disparate outlooks on the nature of per-
sonality, development, psychopathology, and treatment (Pulver,
1987; Rothstein, 1985).
Although the controversies at the heart of this crisis have
centered on theories growing out of work with severe person-
ality disorders and on epistemological challenges to metapsy-
chology, there is little to suggest that their resolution will emerge
from these quarters. To the contrary, a decade-and-a-half of
debate about such topics as hermeneutics, self psychology, and
object relations theory has spawned more debate and growing
doubts that psychoanalysis will produce an integrated explan-

DEVELOPhlENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 9 17
atory system capable of finding wide acceptance in the near

future (Wallerstein, 1988).
Yet there are indications that the impetus for a major reo-
rientation of psychoanalytic theory may come from a different
direction, that of developmental psychology, here broadly con-
strued to include research and theory in related fields such as
developmental psychobiology and genetics, linguistics, and so-
cial systems insofar as such work enters into concrete theories
of psychological development. In the last decade psychoanalysts
have become increasingly interested in the implications for psy-
choanalytic theory of current developmental research and the-
ory on early childhood in particular (Emde, 1980a, 1980b, 1981,
1988~1,1988b; Emde and Buchsbaum, 1980; Goldberg, 1988;
Lichtenberg, 1981, 1983; Lichtenberg and Kaplan, 1983; hlay-
man et al., 1982; Peterfreund, 1978; Sander, 1980; Silver,
1985). In the process, many have recognized that such work
requires fundamental changes in basic psychoanalytic theories.
In some cases, such views are presented in conciliatory ways
which may play down their rellolutionary implications. For ex-
ample, reviewing research that points to the need for major
changes in traditional psychoanalytic ideas about infancy, Emde
(1981) proposed that the task ahead be viewed as one of re-
modeling rather than shaking the foundations of the theory.
In other cases, notably Sterns (1985) Tlie Interpersonal World of
!lie Infant, contemporary developmental research and theory
are used to advance a powerful critique of the most influential
psychoanalytic theories of early development and to construct
an alternate view of the subjective experience of young children.
While Sterns and others interpretations of developmental re-
search and its bearing on psychoanalytic theory will be subject
to vigorous debate, to the extent to which such critiques are
even partially sustained, they will necessitate a reappraisal of
basic psychoanalytic methods and a reformulation of basic psy-
choanalytic theories. In addition, this debate itself will demand
that psychoanalysts examine these issues in the light of new
types of evidence and different forms of argument.

918 MARTIN LEICHTMAN
This paper will explore the growing influence of devel-

opmental psychology on psychoanalysis, advancing the thesis
that, impelled by new research and theory in developmental
psychology, psychoanalysis is in the early stage of a revolution
that promises to alter profoundly the theories that have served
as cornerstones of its conceptions of personality and develop-
ment and change the manner in which those theories are for-
mulated and evaluated. Approaching the topic in this way risks
overstating the role of one set of factors in changes in contem-
porary psychoanalytic theory and perhaps exaggerating those
changes. Yet such risks are offset by heuristic advantages, since
even to err on the side of overstatement can serve to delineate
those factors clearly and highlight critical issues facing psycho-
analysis today.
This paper will focus on the conditions that make it possible
for developmental psychology to have a revolutionary impact
on contemporary psychoanalysis. Reviewing trends in both
fields over the last 40 years,it will examine (1) how the inte-
gration of developmental psychology into psychoanalysis came
to be a central problem for ego psychology at the peak of its
influence, and (2) how major changes in the two fields in the
last 15 years have altered their relations in ways that make it
possible for developmental psychology to contribute to a fun-
damental transformation of psychoanalytic theory.
Psjclioanaljsis and Deuelojmental Psyhology in a Period of

N o m a 1 Science
Ego Psychology and the Problew of Developiiieizt
Although psychoanalysis has generated competing viewpoints
almost from its inception, at certain times and among certain
groups conditions within the discipline have approximated
those Kuhn describes as normal science, a situation in which
a single theoretical perspective provides the basis for the prac-
tice of a science. As Modell (1975) noted, within that community
defined by the American Psychoanalytic Association, such con-

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 9 19
ditions were present in the period from the mid-1940s to the

early 1970s. For this group during this time, ego psychology,
the structural model as articulated and extended by theorists
such as Hartmann and Rapaport, provided a widely accepted,
largely unquestioned framework for the conduct of psychoa-
nalysis as a science and as therapy.
While striving to remain faithful to the classical psychoan-
alytic tradition, the major ego psychologists oriented their work
around an effort to exploit opportunities opened up by Freuds
introduction of the structural model, and especially by a broad-
ened conception of the ego. Although concerned with preserv-
ing the major achievements of the earlier periods of
psychoanalysis (notably the concept of the unconscious and the
theories of instinctual drives and psychosexual development),
the central problems they set for themselves were those of de-
lineating the nature of the ego and its functions, offering a
conception of ego development to complement that of libidinal
development, exploring the role of the ego and superego in
different forms of psychopathology, and spelling out the im-
plications of these new views of the ego for psychoanalytic treat-
ment (Rapaport, 1959).
For Hartmann and Rapaport, however, these aspects of
ego psychology were subordinate to a still broader task, that of
realizing Freuds vision of psychoanalysis as a general science
constructed on the model of the natural sciences. This task had
two facets, one substantive and one methodological. Though
convinced that focusing on conflict and pathology would always
be important for psychoanalysis, they believed that it was no
less important to recognize autonomous ego functions and
come to terms with the problems of adaptation and normality,
because these aspects could provide bridges permitting com-
merce with psychology and the social sciences (Hartmann, 1939;
Rapaport, 1959). Even more important, while continuing to
accept classical technique as a primary mode of investigation,
they believed that for psychoanalysis to lay claim to being a

920 MARTIN LEICHThIAN
science it was essential to make use of observational methods

in gathering data and testing theories (Hartmann et al., 1946).
As Hartmann realized from the first, the integration of
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology was a critical as-
pect of all of these tasks. In arguing for the necessity of ad-
dressing nonconflictual aspects of ego development within
psychoanalysis and outlining his strategy for doing so, Hart-
mann (1939) asserted:
We must recognize that though the ego certainly does grow
on conflicts; these are not the only roots of ego develop-
ment. Many of us expect psychoanalysis to become a gen-
eral develo~tiientalpsjcliology: to do so, it must encompass
these other roots of ego development, by reanalizing from
its own point of view and with its own methods the results
obtained in these areas by nonanalytic psychology [pp. 7-
81.
The central concepts around which Hartmann ( 1939) organized
his monograph-the concepts of adaptation, fitting together,
equilibrium, maturation, and development as a process of dif-
ferentiation and integration-were all prevalent among Euro-
pean functionalist psychologies of the period. He acknowledged
the significance of the work of such academic developmental
psychologists as Charlotte and Karl Buehler, E. ClaparMe, and
H. Werner in providing the observations and theories he pro-
posed to reanalyze from a psychoanalytic point of view. The
particular conception of autonomous ego functions and the
problem of adaptation advanced in this work, in turn, provided
the cornerstones of what became the chief developmental the-
ory of ego psychologists, one positing an initial undifferen-
tiated phase and the gradual emergence of the id, ego, and
superego as a consequence of an interaction of libidinal devel-
opment, the maturation of ego capacities, and relationships with
caretaking figures (Hartmann et al., 1946). However, it was in
his 1950 paper, Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychol-

DEV EI.OII\l ENTA L ISY CHOLOGY A N D ISYCH OA N ALY SI S 92 1
ogy, that Hartmann presented the case for the importance of

such an integration most forcefully.
This paper is worth exploring in some detail not only be-
cayse of the impetus Iiartmanns program provided for de-
velopmental research in psychoanalysis, but also because it
defined the terms and anticipated many of the central issues
of the contemporary debate about tlic topic. The term psy-
choanalysis in the title was intended to designate a theory of
personality and development based on reconstructive tech-
niques and data derived chiefly from therapeutic work with
adults and children suffering from pathological conditions.
Developmental psycholog); referred to a body of theory and
an approach to the study of personality and development based
on direct observations of children, particularly normal children.
Seeking to persuade a wary psychoanalytic community of the
necessity of expanding psychoanalytic methods and theories to
include those of developmental psychology, Hartmann.put for-
ward three sets of arguments: one methodological, one theo-
retical, and one centering on the very definition of psychoanalysis
itself.
Hartmanns methodological arguments were organized
around the assumption that all scientific methods have both
inherent strengths and weaknesses. He noted, for example, that
psychoanalytic methods can contribute to the study of problems
which the observational methods of developmental psychology
had difficulty approaching. Psychoanalysis deals with essen-
tially a real life situation as opposed to the more artificial world
of the psychological laboratory (p. 8); by including not only
observations of behavior, but also the conscious and uncon-
scious attitudes of the observer and the interaction with the
patient, it allows for an understanding of meanings of events
that are closed to objcctive methodologies; and, by focusing
on unconscious, instinctual conflicts that lie at the core of an
individuals being and using a method that holds the promise
of tracing these conflicts back to events in early childhood,
psychoanalysis affords an unparalleled perspective on human

922 hiARTIN LEICHThiAN
development. Yet Hartmann reminded psychoanalysts that

their methods have limitations. For example, although uniquely
suited to the study of instinctual drives and unconscious con-
flicts, psychoanalysis by its very nature sheds less light on the
nonconflictual sphere, which had long been the domain of
developmental psychologists. Equally important, insofar as the
psychoanalytic method relies on what can be recalled and de-
scribed, it does not serve as a reliable guide to the earliest pe-
riods of development: It does not provide us with data
[memories] about the undifferentiated phase during which the
demarcation line between the ego and id, and between the self
and the objects, are drawn and it gives no direct information
at least up to the end of the preverbal stage (p. 10). Trans-
ference and extrapolation from experiences described later in
life do offer means for psychoanalysts to make inferences about
early development, but such inferences can be made with less
assurance than those about later ages. Hence, he stressed, the
psychoanalytic study of the first years of life not only can benefit
from, but, in fact, almost requires the addition of direct but
analytically informed observations (p. 10).
The theoretical argument for the necessity of direct ob-
servation was closely related to the methodological one. For
Hartmann, the study of the preverbal period, for which this
methodology is essential, was not simply one problem among
many of concern to psychoanalysis, a problem that could be
ignored in favor of others to which traditional psychoanalytic
methods are better suited; Rather, this problem was the preem-
inent one confronting psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis,he
asserted, is above all a genetic theory that assumes that events
in the early years are decisive in the formation of personality.
With the advent of the structural model, charting the earliest
phases of development-in particular, the manner in which
psychic structures emerge during and after the undifferen-
tiated phase and the process by which self- and object repre-
sentations arise-became a, if not the, major task of psychoanalytic
theory. Hence, Hartmann argued, . . . the study of the pre-

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 923
verbal stage is a testing ground for many of our most general

assumptions, and also a prerequisite for theoretical advances
in a variety of aspects (p. 10).
. Beyond its implications for the handling of specific theo-
retical and methodological issues, the integration of psycho-
analysis and developmental psychology was important to Hart-
mann because of its bearing on his definition of psychoanalysis
itself, a definition that gave a second meaning to the title of his
paper. In a narrow sense, psychoanalysis could be viewed as a
theory of personality tied to a particular methodology and fo-
cused chiefly on the study of psychopathological phenomena.
But this was not a definition of psychoanalysis he could accept.
For him, psychoanalysis was, above all, a science. Consequently,
he insisted: . . psychoanalytic psychology is not limited to
what can be gained through the use of the psychoanalytic
method . . .and the meaning we give to analysis transcends its
psychiatric aspects. Analysis is also, and has always been in
Freuds word, a general psychology (p. 10). To advance serious
claims to being a science, Hartmann recognized, requires that
a discipline encompass a multiplicity of methods that permit
gaining as full a picture of phenomena as possible and that
permit a mutual checking of data revealed by one method
against those revealed by the other (p. 9). To be a science
requires a serious consideration of the process by which theories
are constructed, which in the case of psychoanalysis leads to a
recognition that . . the conclusions about childhood which we
la.
reach on the basis of analysis with adults have the disadvantage

that we gain them through a complicated system of reconstruc-
tions only, and through many detours of thought (p. 7). The
longitudinal observations of developmental psychology help fill
in gaps in this inference chain and provide a check on specu-
lative theorizing. Among other things, such observations allow
psychoanalysis to . . discard hypotheses which arc not con-
sistent with behavioral data (p. 10).
After providing examples of potentially fruitful applica-
tions of developmental research to psychoanalysis, Hartmann

924 MARTIN LEICHThlAN
concluded his paper with a passionate plea for an integration

of the two disciplines, an integration, he assumed, that could
be accomplished most fruitfully within a framework provided
by ego psychology. To fail to consider such a program seriously,
he insisted, is to reduce psychoanalysis to a more or less oc-
casional by-product of the clinic, abandon Freuds vision of his
discipline, severely handicap technical work and invite stag-
nation, and limit applications of psychoanalysis in the cause of
prevention, an area which, Hartmann believed, might well
become more essential than therapy and is directly depend-
ent on the trends of developmental research he had just dis-
cussed (p. 17).
Iinplem entation of Hart ma tins Program

The publication of The Ps).chological Birth of the Hriiiiaii Infant
(biahler et al., 1975) affords a good opportunity to examine the
success of the program articulated in Hartmanns paper over
the next quarter century, since Mahlers work embodied that
program and provided a measure of the place it had found
within American psychoanalysis. Exploring the establishment
of self- and object representations in the first years of life, the
book focused on the problem of the differentiation of psychic
structure which Hartmann was convinced would lay at the heart
of advances in psychoanalytic theory. While making use of con-
ceptions of early development derived from reconstruction in
the formulation of hypotheses, and relying heavily on meta-
psychological concepts for the characterization of the earliest
phases of development, hlahler and her co-workers based their
study of the separation-individuation process chiefly on the
kind of psychoanalytically informed, direct observation of
normal children Hartmann advocated. Having an impact on
psychoanalytic theory rivaled by only a handful of other books
in the period, their work testified that Hartmanns program has
found a substantial measure of acceptance in American psy-
choanalysis. Finally, the book also provided an example of how

DEVELOPNENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 925
normal science works in approaching problems. Conceived

as an extension of the ego psychology with which Hartmann
was identified, it encouraged viewing the integration of devel-
opmental psychology into psychoanalysis as a natural evolu-
tionary process, one perhaps shifting emphases, but not
challenging the basic framework of metapsychology.
The significance of The Psjcliological Birth of the Human In-
fant in each of these respects lies not in its uniqueness, but
rather in its capacity to represent general trends in psychoan-
alytic theory in the 25 years following Hartmanns paper. For
example, hlahler and her colleagues were hardly alone in acting
on Hartmanns conviction that understanding the formation of
psychic structure in the first years of life constituted the preem-
inent problem for theoreticians concerned with genetic aspects
of psychoanalysis. Not only was this issue the focal point of the
work of the main British object-relations theorists (e.g.,Klein,
1975; Fairbairn, 1954; Winnicott, 1965; B a h t , 1968; Guntrip,
1961, 1969), but many of the major original contributors to
psychoanalysis in the United States during this quarter century
(e.g., Spitz, 1965; Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1975, 1976; Ko-
hut, 1971) struggled with this problem and placed solutions to
it at the heart of their theories of personality. Moreover, these
theories of development were closely linked to new conceptions
of borderline conditions, narcissistic disorders, and other severe
forms of psychopathology, and to new approaches to their treat-
ment, generally viewed as the most significant clinical advances
in psychoanalysis in these years.
Similarly, MahIer was hardly the only analyst engaged in
empirical research. In this quarter-century, developmental re-
search gained increasing acceptance in psychoanalytic circles.
Pioneers such as Benjamin (1950, 1961, 1965), Bowlby (1944,
1958, 1960a, 1960b; Robertson and Bowlby, 1952), Escalona
(1963, 1968; Escalona and Heider, 1959; Escalona and Leitch,
1949; Escalona et al., 1953) and Spitz (1945, 1965; Spitz and
Wolf, 1946~1,1946b) were joined by growing numbers of ana-
lysts and analytically trained researchers, many of whom con-

centrated on the earliest periods of development-Brody,

(1956), Call (1964), Call and Marschak (1966), Decarie (1965),
Emde and Harmon (1972), Fraiberg (1977), Kestenberg (1965a,
1965b, 1967), Lustman (1956), Provence and Lipton (1962),
Robson (1967), Sander (1962, 1964), and Wolff (1963, 1965,
1966, 1969). Moreover, a far larger group of psychoanalysts
who were not themselves engaged in developmental research
were increasingly prepared to recognize its value and make use
of it in their theories. Hence, although developmental research
may not have had as $reat a hold on psychoanalytic thinking
as Hartmann might have wished, as the reception of hlahlers
work demonstrates, such research had found a respected niche
in psychoanalytic theory.
There are, of course, limits to how much hlahlers work
can be taken as representative of the influence of developmental
research on psychoanalysis in this period. In fact, three differ-
ent types of developmental research can be distinguished, each
having a different relation to psychoanalysis, but none consti-
tuting a serious threat to the basic theoretical structure of ego
psychology.
Much of the work being done by academic developmental
psychologists either did not directly challenge the basic tenets
of psychoanalytic theory or was sufficiently remote to have little
impact. The most important developmental research on young
children in this period focused on cognitive, perceptual-motor,
and language skills, the areas best suited to applications of es-
tablished empirical methodologies (Cairns, 1983). The aca-
I
demic theorists best known to psychoanalysts (e.g., Piaget and

Werner) concentrated on problems in these areas and advanced
ideas leading psychoanalytic theorists such as Hartmann ( 1939,
1956) and Rapaport (1951, 1967) to believe they could be in-
tegrated comfortably within ego psychology. In contrast, less
psychological research and, for the most part, less impressive
work was done on problems of affect, early relationships, and
the subjective life of young children, the areas psychoanalysts
took as their primary domain. Indeed, much developmental

research in this period was done by behaviorists whose meth-

odology placed the problems of greatest concern to analysts off
limits. To be sure, there was academic research influenced by,
and even purporting to test, psychoanalytic ideas (Fisher and
Greenberg, 1977). The most significant of these studies were
probably those growing out of Sears efforts to integrate psy-
choanalytic and learning theories (Sears et al., 1953, 1957,
1965). However, most of this work contained serious method-
ological flaws (Cairns, 1983), much of it was at best linked only
tenuously to ideas used by practicing analysts, and little of it
elicited more than passing attention within the psychoanalytic
community.
As a consequence, throughout this quarter-century, it was
possible for even psychoanalysts with an interest in academic
developmental psychology to adopt a stance modeled on that
of Hartmann, one assuming that developmental psychology was
well suited to the study of the non-conflictual sphere, that
psychoanalysis was ideally suited to the study of psychic conflict,
and that the two fields should grant each others strengths and
learn from one another. Moreover, the definition of learning
from one another was quite loose. While a few psychoanalysts
made serious efforts to grapple with the theories of develop-
mental psychologists such as Piaget (Wolff, 1960; DCcarie,
1965), most were content to borrow ideas they found useful,
while largely ignoring the rest. Hence, in describing the relation
of developmental psychology and psychoanalysis at the end of
this period, Murphy (1973) found little evidence of overt con-
flict, but rather called attention to a communication gap. Her
efforts to bridge this gap resembled those of a hostess trying
to bring together two of her friends who, she was sure, would
discover mutual interests once they were better acquainted. At
this time, her hope seemed to be that a polite conversation
could, at somepoint, ripen into a serious dialogue (see also
Escalona, 1968, pp. 9-10).
A second type of developmental research, one that could
seriously influence psychoanalytic theory in these years, was

represented by the work of Benjamin, Sander, Spitz, and Wolff.

It may best be described as developmental research undertaken
by psychoanalysts. Although the hypotheses tested were often
generated from within a psychoanalytic perspective, and find-
ings were brought to bear on issues of concern to psychoana-
lysts, this work was based on methods and forms of hypothesis
testing characteristic of the broader community of empirical
researchers. Focused on problems such as the development of
ego functions and early relationships, for the most part the
work of this group did not seriously question established psy-
choanalytic theories. Individual ideas such as that of a stimulus
barrier might be revised (Wolff, 1966) and greater emphasis
would be placed on the roles of the ego and real interactions
with the mother in the first years of life than in theories based
on reconstruction (Sander, 1962; Spitz, 1965). However, typi-
cally these researchers either did not see or did not choose to
emphasize fundamental disagreements with the general theo-
retical framework of psychoanalytic ego psychology. Their
work, insofar as it was considered by analysts, could be por-
trayed as an expansion and deepening of basic psychoanalytic
theories.
A third type of research, that represented by hlahler, Par-
ens (I979), and Galenson and Roiphe (1971, 1974; Roiphe and
Galenson, 198 I), can be described as psychoanalytic develop-
mental research. Conducted by researchers who took the psy-
choanalytic community as their primary reference group and
wrote chiefly for this audience, work of this kind focused on
specific problems raised by psychoanalytic theories and utilized
a method of naturalistic observation in which the clinical sen-
sitivity and the theories of the observers played a significant
role. Often such observations were so heavily laden with inter-
pretation that, from the standpoint of academic psychologists
(Osofsky, 1982) and even psychoanalysts (Gedo, 1982), they
were fraught with methodological problems. Research of this
kind was capable of raising questions about particular aspects
of psychoanalytic theory and could lead to shifts in emphases.
For example, Galenson and Roiphe (1971,1974) suggested that

DEVELOPhiENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 929
genital instincts play a significant role in development by the

end of the second year of life, and Mahlers work led to greater
stress being placed on object-relations issues than psychosexual
ones. At the same time, as Gedo (1982) noted;because this
research tended to presuppose the basic tenets of psychoanal-
ytic metapsychology and cast its observations in terms of these
theories, it typically led to an elaboration of that theoretical
framework rather than a challenge to it.
In sum, then, by 1975, developmental psychology in a va-
riety of forms was at least beginning to have the kind of influ-
ence on psychoanalysis Hartmann had anticipated. For example,
the thesis and theme of the Report of the Preparatory Com-
mission on Child Analysis at the 1974 American Psychoanalytic
Association Conference on Education and Research was that
the discipline had reached a degree of maturity that required
a shift in emphasis in its conceptual framework, one in which
the treatment of neurosis would still bc important for under-
standing and evaluating advances in theory and analytic method,
but in which the developmental orientation and approach
would be recognized as providing a broader frame of refer-
ence (Goodman, 1977, p. 52). Yet, as is characteristic of a
period of normal science, this process appeared to be one in
which the results of developmental research could-be assimi-
lated within the established psychoanalytic metapsychology.
Hence, in defending the Commissions controversial proposal
regarding the centrality of the developmental orientation in
psychoanalytic theory, its chairman, C. Settlage, stressed that
no radical break with the past was intended: In T. S . Kuhns
(1962) terms we are operating within the framework of normal
science, attempting the further articulation and refinement of
an existing theoretical paradigm rather than suggesting a new,
revolutionary paradigm (Goodman, 1977, p. 95).
Revolutionaty Potential of Develo~meiztalPsjcliology

There was one noteworthy exception to this picture of the in-
tegration of developmental research within psychoanalysis as

930 hlAKIIN LEIClllhIAN
a relativcly smooth, evolutionary process. In the late 1950s

Bowlby (1958, 1960a, 1960b) presented a series of papers on
attachment, separation, and loss that focused on the nature of
early object relations, a problem not only of concern to I-Iart-
niann, but also a main battleground upon which the bitter con-
troversies that divided the British psychoanalytic community
had been fought during the preceding two decades. \Vhether
classical Freudians, Kleinians, followers of Ferenczi, o r icono-
clasts such as Fairbairn, the various parties to these controver-
sies conducted their debate in a similar manner, basing their
arguments chiefly on reconstructions from psychoanalytic treat-
ment of older patients and deductions from particular meta-
psychological preniises that were taken as given. In contrast,
Bowlby approached the problem from the standpoint of de-
velopmental psychology. He sought to cast contending psy-
choanalytic theories about the nature and significance of
attachment, separation anxiety, and loss in the form of poten-
tially testable hypotheses; he examined these hypotheses in the
light of direct observations of children; and, insofar as he found
them wanting, he suggested an alternative theory based on ideas
derived from contemporary science. As is well known, he con-
cluded that the concepts that provide the foundations of the
economic and dynamic viewpoints could not provide the bases
for a satisfactory account of early attachment. I-Ieturned instead
to ethology for concepts upon which to build his own theory.
Opposition to his views provided one small area of common
ground for the folloivers of Anna Freud and hlelanie Klein
(Grosskurth, 1986), and for the next decades Boivlby was a
relatively isolated figure in psychoanalysis. Some of the reasons
for this isolation undoubtedly involved personality factors and
the social psychology of the psychoanalytic movement. Others
had to d o with questions about the soundness of his reading of
particular psychoanalytic ideas, his nietliods, his theories, and
his approach to treatment (cf. A. Freud, 1960; Schur, 1960;
Spitz, 1960; Engel, 1971). Certainly, as is the case with any

DEVELOPhIENTAL PSYCHOLOGY A N D PSYCHOANALYSIS 93 1
potent conceptual system, psychoanalytic metapsychology pro-

vided a basis for a host of counterarguments to opposing views.
Yet the major reason for Bowlbys isolation was probably the
form of his work. From its birth, psychoanalysis was based on
the primacy of the consulting room as a means of formulating
and testing theories, and on an allegiance to at least some aspects
of a body of metapsychology rooted in scientific theories of the
late 19th century. Insofar as Bowlby displayed an unmistakable
commitment to empirical methods as the ultimate arbiter of
theories of early development and a readiness to repudiate
older metapsychological doctrines in favor of ones derived from
contemporary science, his work could not fail to generate in-
tense opposition in a discipline with fundamentally different
commitments.
While Bowlbys work departed from Hartmanns in many
respects, the two were in accord in their views of psychoanalysis
as a science. Ironically, at a time when psychoanalytic meta-
psychology is now being challenged on the basis of a repudiation
of the model of psychoanalysis as a natural science, Bowlby
remains. among the most vigorous proponents of that model
(Bowlby, 1984). However, it is precisely in the rigor with which
Bowlby has pursued this aspect of Hartmanns program that
he demonstrates its revolutionary potential for undermining
the particular metapsychological position to which Hartmann
was equally committed.
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Ps-cliology in a Period of

Chis
Nature of the Crisis
Even as Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975) were publishing The
Pgcliological Birth of the Human Iffatit, major changes were tak-
ing place in both fields that make it possible for developmental
psychology to contribute to the kind of transformation of psy-

choanalytic theories anticipated by Bowlbys work. Of these

changes, the most significant was the emergence of the scientific
crisis in psychoanalysis. Since the early 1970s, ego psychology
and psychoanalytic metapsychology in general have been under
siege from a number of directions, giving rise to deep uncer-
tainty of many analysts about the adequacy of their basic ex-
planatory theories. Although the initial contributions of
developmental psychology to this situation were relatively mod-
est, questions about the developmental theories of psychoanal-
ysis and, even more important, about whether psychoanalytic
methods provide a sound basis for establishing theories of early
development at all were raised from other directions. Conse-
quently, as these questions have become central issues for con-
temporary psychoanalysis, a significant role for developmental
psychology in the resolution of this crisis has opened up.
One major precipitant of the crisis has been a wide-ranging
revolt against metapsychology which has included not only
attacks on the physicalist and biological assumptions of classical
metapsychology, but also diverse epistemological challenges
ranging from the hermeneutic position of Ricoeur (1970) to
the positivist critique of psychoanalytic modes of theory testing
of Grunbaum (1977, 1979). For present purposes, the aspects
of this revolt that are most instructive are the central roles
played by George Klein, Schafer, Gill, and other students, col-
leagues, or, in a loose sense, disciples of Rapaport. That rig-
orous critiques of the theoretical system of their mentor should
now be advanced by individuals who, by virtue of their initial
theoretical commitments and intimate knowledge of psychoan-
alytic metapsychology would have been expected to be in the
forefront of its defenders, offers testimony to the existence of
a crisis.
This break with classical metapsychology began to be ap-
parent in 1970 with the publication of Schafers reappraisal of
Hartmanns contribution to psychoanalysis, and Kleins reev-
aluation of ego psychology. Although both Schafer (1970) and
Klein (1970) argued that major substantive aspects of classical

DEVELOPhIENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 933
metapsychology were untenable (e.g., the postulate of psychic

energy and the form in which the tripartite structural model
is cast), the main grounds for their repudiation of metapsy-
chology centered on the contention that, in adhering to an
outmoded 19th-century conception of science, psychoanalysis
was faced with a radical split between its mode of theorizing
and its mode of investigation (Schafer, 1970, p. 445). Clinical
psychoanalysis, they asserted, is above all a search for meaning
based on efforts to understand purposes and intentions; in
contrast, metapsychology involves the adoption of a natural
scientific approach to explanation that excludes such teleolog-
ical concepts and casts theories in terms of energies, forces, and
structures. From a clinical standpoint, the effort to translate
data constituted of reasons, meanings, and purposes into a the-
oretical language from which those concepts are eliminated
distorts those data and, insofar as clinicians allow such theories
to enter their work, diverts attention from the essence of psy-
choanalytic practice (Schafer, 1976). From a scientific stand-
point, such an enterprise is at best superfluous since: (1)
although psychoanalytic concepts can be translated into quasi-
physiological or quasi-physical theories, theories are never
tested at this level and (2) there is no inherent connection be-
tween these metapsychological theories and the clinical discov-
eries of psychoanalysis (Klein, 1969; see also Gill, 1976). Equally
important, . . .meaning and purpose-conscious and uncon-
scious-define principles of regularity that are translatable to,
but not reducible to, physiological and neurophysiological spec-
ifications (Klein, 1973, p. 116). As a consequence, efforts to
seek ultimate explanations at this level are forever doomed to
inadequacy and contradiction, a fact attested to by the inability
of even the most rigorous practitioners of this approach to
explanation to expunge anthropomorphism from their theories
(Schafer, 1970). In short, the pursuit of classical metapsychol-
ogy was held to lead to bad psychoanalysis and bad science.
While this critique contributed to doubts about psychoan-
alytic metapsychology in general, the hermeneutic positions that

934 hIARTIN LEICHThlAN
Schafer (1980) and Spence (1982, 1987) offered as alternatives

attacked claims for the validity of psychoanalytic theories of
development and personality formation in particular. Holding
to Freuds view that the manner in which analysts gather data
and construct and test theories conforms to the canons of pos-
itivist science, psychoanalysts have assumed traditionally that:
(1) data from the psychoanalytic situation-memories; free as-
sociations, resistances, and, above all, transference, conceived
as a form of remembering or enactment of early relation-
ships-can yield an accurate picture of the past; (2) the analyst
is capable of adopting the role of a detached, objective observer
who, discerning patterns inherent in this data, constructs a ver-
idical picture of the central determinants of personality for-
mation; and (3) these theories can be tested through the
response of the analysand to interpretations. Viewing psycho-
analysis as an interpretive discipline focused on an ongoing
dialogue between analyst and analysand, Schafer and Spence
challenged each of these assumptions.
First, they argued, the data generated in that dialogue can-
not be taken to provide relatively direct access to the past. Mem-
ories, Schafer (1980) noted, are always a present retelling of
the past; they are the analysands interpretations of earlier
events, which are recalled selectively and shared in ways influ-
enced heavily by current needs. The same is true of how events
are shared and the relationship with the analyst in that process,
i.e., the phenomena of defense, resistance, and transference.
For example, transference cannot be viewed simply as a reliving
or reexperiencing of the past; it is deeply affected by the current
concerns of the analysand and the ongoing relationship with
the analyst (Gill, 1982). The psychoanalytic dialogue, Schafer
(1980) asserted, is characterized most of all by its organization
in terms of the here and now of the psychoanalytic relation-
ship. Equally important, what analysts take to be their data is
thoroughly saturated with their own theories. The very act of
defining particular behavior as manifestations of defense, re-
sistance, or transference, let alone defenses, resistances, and

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY A N D PSYCHOANALYSIS 935
transferences of particular kinds, already involves interpreta-

tions based on specific theories. Hence, Schafer insisted:
. . . there are no objective, autonomous, or pure psychoan-
. alytic data which, as Freud was fond of saying, compel one
to draw certain conclusions. . . .What have been presented
as plain empirical data and techniques of psychoanalysis
are inseparable from the investigators precritical and in-
terrelated assumptions concerning the origins, coherence,
totality, and intelligibility of personal action [p. 301.
Similarly, this critique denied that the manner in which
psychoanalysts build theories of development conforms to a
natural scientific model of theory construction. These theories,
especially ones about the earliest phases of life, are not simply
derived from the facts. Although presented as the outgrowth
of fact-finding expeditions:
At the very outset, each such expedition is prepared for
what is to be found: it has its maps and compasses, its
conceptual supplies, and its probable destination. This pre-
paredness (which contradicts the empiricists pretensions
of innocence) amounts to a narrative plan, form, or set of
rules [p. 521.
In effect, the developmental theories of psychoanalysis are pre-
supposed in the interpretive principles that guide the process
of reconstruction from the first.
Finally, this view of the psychoanalytic process denied that
analysands acceptance of interpretations, production of new
material in response to them, and subsequent improvement
could be taken to validate reconstructions as veridical depictions
of the past. Not the least of the problems for the traditional
position in this regard is that analysts of different persuasions
produce such results in spite of different and at times contra-
dictory theories. What determines the acceptance of reconstruc-
tions, Schafer and Spence suggested, is not that they provide
an accurate account of ivhat actually occurred in the forma-

936 MARTIN LEICHThfAN
tion of an individuals personality; from the standpoint of the

psychoanalytic situation, historical truth may well be un-
knowable. Rather, the acceptance of reconstructions reflects
their capacity to convince both analysand and analyst. These
condctions are determined by such factors as: (1) the coherence,
consistency, comprehensiveness, and sensibleness of such ac-
counts; (2) their provision of a meaningful view of the past that
integrates it with the present, especially those aspects of the
present encountered in the form of resistances and transfer-
ences in the analytic situation, and with a vision of the future;
and (3) their efficaciousness, their ability to produce significant
changes in analysands lives (Schafer, 1980).
This conception of reconstruction as narrative was seen to
have a number of implications. First, multiple narratives are
possible. In principle, the narrative structures of Freud, Klein,
or Kohut can all yield coherent, meaningful, and efficacious
interpretations of individuals lives (Schafer, 1980). Indeed,
even within a single analysis, narratives change continually as
new visions of the past are produced in response to changes in
the analysands life and the analytic process. Second, because
they are the product of interpersonal interactions in the analytic
situation, the particular narratives that are produced and ac-
cepted as convincing inevitably reflect the analysts basic as-
sumptions about development. Schafer (1980) noted: The
analysands stories of early childhood, adolescence, and other
critical periods of life get to be retold in a way that both sum-
marizes and justifies what the analyst requires in order to do
the kind of psychoanalytic work that is being done (p. 53).
Third, the validity of such accounts is not determined with
reference to the past, to events in the analysands early life, but
always with reference to the present, to a retelling of the past.
In this view, the essence of the psychoanalytic process is not in
any case establishing what actually occurred in the past; it lies
in an ongoing process, in a search for meaning in the present.
In the end, this conception of the psychoanalytic process led
to the conclusion that traditional developmental accounts, over

DEVELOIhlENTAI. PSYCHOLOGY A N D PSYCHOANALYSIS 937
which psychoanalysts have labored so hard, may now he

seen . . . less as positivistic sets of factual findings about mental
development and more as hermeneutically filled-in narrative
structures (Schafer, 1980, p. 53). At the very least, such her-
meneutic positions raise profound doubts about the capacity of
the psychoanalytic situation to provide a satisfactory scientific
account of the formation of personality.
To be sure, not all of Rapaports heirs abandoned his con-
ception of psychoanalysis as a science. For example, Holt (1981)
and Holzman (1985) have defended that model, contending
that explanations of psychological phenomena in terms of
causes do not necessarily rule out a recognition of reasons,
purposes, and intentions. They have also advanced strong cri-
tiques of conceptions of psychoanalysis that would limit it to a
purely hermeneutic discipline.
Yet in many respects, their defense of psychoanalysis as a
natural science poses almost as many problems for classical
metapsychology as the positions they criticize. For example,
both Holt (1981) and Holzman (1976) have acknowledged the
legitimacy of much of Kleins critique of metapsychology and
made it clear they have little use for many of the specific theories
that make up the body of metapsychology. Holt (1965, 1967)
had much earlier attacked the classical doctrines of psychic en-
ergy and the constancy principle; Holzman (1976,1985) viewed
much of metapsychology as tied to an antiquated 19th-century
physicalist tradition and composed of cryptosomatic theories
that resist revision on the basis of new scientific data in cognate.
disciplines; and both men have welcomed the introduction of
alternative theories derived from contemporary science.
Equally important, support of a model of psychoanalysis
as a natural science did not preclude acceptance of Schafers
contention that clinical psychoanalysis is an interpretive disci-
pline that cannot alone provide a satisfactory scientificapproach
to the study of personality development. For example, endors-
ing Grunbaums (1977, 1979) views, Holzman (1985) has noted
that clinical observations made in the context of psychoanalytic

treatment are irretnediably contaminated epistemologically because

it is impossible, indeed hopeless, to disentangle the analysts
theoretical expectancies and postures from the patients re-
sponses (p. 738). Moreover, patients responses to intcrpre-
tations of events in their past was not seen as a satisfactory
means of validating the historical truth of such interpretations
because analysands may assent to and improve in response to
interpretations based on different theories. For Holzman, psy-
choanalysis could be important in the formulation of scientific
theories, i.e., in the context of discovery, but it had to look
outside of the clinical situation for validation of those theories.
In fact, he deemed it essential that psychoanalysis look beyond
the boundaries of the clinical situation in building and testing
theories if it was to escape the straitjacket heremeneutic ap-
proaches would impose upon it. Insofar as hypotheses about
personality development are central to psychoanalysis, such a
position invites developmental psychology to play a major role
in the construction and validation of basic psychoanalytic the-
ories.
T h e other major source of this crisis, one which undoubt-
edly had a far broader impact on American psychoanalysis, was
the emergence of new theoretical perspectives growing out of
work with patients exhibiting severe personality disorders.
Whereas the seemingly esoteric debates among Rapaports fol-
lowers affected only a limited, albeit influential, segment of the
psychoanalytic community, by the early 1970s the controversies
among Kernberg, self psychologists, and classical analysts were
almost impossible for most psychoanalysts to ignore. Far from
diminishing over the next decade, these controversies contin-
ued unabated and have almost been institutionalized in the
form of regular panels at national meetings of such topics as
models of mind and their influence on various aspects of
psychoanalysis. Moreover, these positions are only three among
many, as there has been a growing interest in the work of British
object-relations theorists and H. S. Sullivan (Greenberg and
Mitchell, 1983; Pulver, 1987; Rothstein, 1985). Hence, as has

been noted, contemporary American psychoanalysis is now

comprised of a host of theoretical systems offering conflicting
conceptions of the nature of personality, development, psycho-
pathology, and treatment. Although an amended version of the
structural model still occupies a position of hegemony among
them, for many analysts it does so more by virtue of uncertainty
about what framework should take its place than a widely shared
conviction about its viability.
To appreciate the role open to developmental psychology
in this situation, one further point should be stressed. While
the two sets of challenges to ego psychology noted above have
been instrumental in creating a state of crisis, at present none
of the alternative paradigms they have generated seems likely
to provide the basis for its resolution.
For example, in repudiating a natural-science model for
psychoanalysis, Schafer (1976) proposed a reconceptualization
of the disciplines basic concepts in terms of a new language
of action. However, as a candidate for a successful revolution,
his work, and other hermeneutic positions, face a number of
problems. For all the boldness of the epistemological reforms
they advocate, the substance of these theories (e.g., the concepts
Schafer clothes in his new language) may appear remarkably
conservative to other contending parties. More important, the
cause of epistemological reform has never been one to win the
hearts and minds of the psychoanalytic community at large.
Thus, while hcrmeneutic positions have received a reasonably
respectful hearing, they have gained relatively few adherents.
Object-relations theories and self psychology would appear
to be more promising candidates for a successful revolution.
For example, Kohut attracted a dedicated group of followers.
Yet after a decade-and-a-half of debate, there is no diminution
in the controversies around his and other positions. To the
contrary, such controversies have underlined that traditional
psychoanalytic methods, notably reliance on case studies, do
not provide a means of resolving disputes among systems with
intelligent, committed proponents. In presenting their views,

940 hlARTIN LEICHThlAN
psychoanalysts always select the cases they discuss and exercise

extraordinary selectivity in condensing hundreds of hours of
treatment into a single paper. Moreover, enormous selectivity
had already been exercised in hoiv patients material was heard
and responded to within those hours and, no doubt, patients
themselves were selective in hoiv they behaved as they came to
know their analysts. As a result, proponents of differing posi-
tions seldom report findings that fail to confirm their positions,
although proponents of opposing positions are able to show
how these findings can be interpreted in quite different
ways-see, for example, Kernberg (1974) and Ornstein (1974).
Although this process serves well to exemplify theories and
clarify differences among them, it is poorly suited to settle those
differences and clearly has not done so.
In this context, the relation between psychoanalysis and
developmental psychology can be seen in a new light. The ep-
istemological critiques and the persistence of competing theo-
retical frameworks at the heart of the crisis have contributed
to widespread doubts not only about all existing theories, but
also about the capacity of traditional methods to deal with the
problems confronting the discipline. These doubts, in turn,
provide a stronger motive than ever before for psychoanalysts
to look outside the boundaries of their discipline for ways of
resolving disputes within it. Since some of the most significant
of these disputes center on the nature of early development
and its impact on personality formation and on methodological
problems in dealing with these issues, it is perhaps inevitable
that psychoanalysts have become increasingly interested in the
implications of developmental research and theory for their
discipline.
Cliaitges in Developmental Psyelmlogy

There is a second set of factors that contributes to this interest
in developmental psychology and affects its capacity to con-
tribute to a revolution in psychoanalysis. At the same time psy-

DEVELOPhlENTAL PSYCHOLOGY A N D PSYCHOANALYSIS 94 1
choanalysts have been struggling to come to terms with changes

in their discipline, there have been profound changes in the
developmental psychology of early childhood.
. One measure of these changes is purely quantitative. There
has been a veritable explosion of research in the field. For
example, as Emde and Robinson (1979) note, whereas there
were 500 references in the review of the literature on the young
infant in the second edition of Carmichaels Manual of Child Psy-
chology in 1954 (Pratt, 1954), by the third edition in 1970 there
were four times that number (Kessen et al., 1970). Since then,
that rate of increase has continued. Earlier the subject of infancy
occupied chapters in handbooks on child psychology; now en-
tire volumes of handbooks are devoted to the area (Mussen,
1983; Osofsky, 1987).
Equally important are qualitative changes in the field.
There has been a shift from a n emphasis on relatively global
theories to increasingly precise and delimited ones, growing
theoretical sophistication in the formulation of questions asked
in research, and the development of new techniques for re-
cording and measuring observations that provide ways of an-
swering those questions. Stern (1985, p. 38) noted: In the last
fifteen years a revolution has occurred in observing and thereby
evaluating infants. One consequence of this revolution is that
it is now possible to demonstrate that even very young infants
have . . capacities that bear on forming a sense of self. . . that
I.
no one imagined to be present so early one or two decades

ago.
Perhaps most important, much of this research now con-
centrates on issues of particular interest to psychoanalysts.
There continues to be heavy emphasis on traditional areas such
as cognitive development. Such research, among other things,
has challenged many aspects of Piagets theory, with which an-
alysts are most familiar (Harris, 1983). However, there is also
now an impressive body of work on attachment theory, early
parent-infant interaction, and emotion (Sroufe, 1979; Campos
et al., 1983; Osofsky, 1987). Hence, far more than in the past,

developmental psychology has come to focus on issues central

to psychoanalytic theory.
Mediating Figtires
I n order to suggest that developmental psychology can con-
tribute to a major transformation in psychoanalytic theory, it
is not enough to argue that the situation in both fields is con-
ducive to such a revolution. It is also necessary to demonstrate
the means by which ideas in one field are brought to bear on
the other.
I n this regard, note should be taken of the participation
of significant numbers of psychoanalysts in conferences ex-
ploring current developmental research and its bearing on the
emergence of early forms of psychopathology. For example,
psychoanalysts have helped organize and been well represented
among participants in the recent World Congresses on Infant
Psychiatry (Call et al., 1983, 1985). More important, there are
now a significant number of individuals with a sophisticated
understanding of both fields who are ready and able to bring
research on early development to bear on psychoanalytic the-
ory. Among this group are Basch (1977), Brazelton and Als
(1979), Brody (1980, 1982), Emde (1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983;
Emde and Buchsbaum, 1980), Greenspan (1979), Lichtenberg
(1981, 1983), Stechler and Kaplan (1980), and Sander (1983).
Thus, potentially revolutionary critiques of psychoanalytic the-
ory based on developmental research such as that 'of Stern
(1985) may be seen as part of a general movement in contem-
porary psychoanalysis.
Coiiclusion
What is here described as the context for a revolution, then,
consists of three conditions: a state of crisis in contemporary
psychoanalysis, major changes in the developmental psychology
of early childhood, and the presence of growing numbers of

DEVELOPhlENTAL PSYCHOLOGY A N D PSYCHOANALYSIS 943
individuals with an intimate knowledge of both fields. Why

these conditions constitute such a context can be appreciated
when they are considered in terms of the issues raised by Hart-
mann and Bowlby.
Trends in psychoanalytic thinking over the last four dec-
ades have reinforced Hartmanns arguments about the impor-
tance of integrating the research and theories of developmental
psychology into psychoanalysis. Current debates about whether
psychoanalysis is a natural science or humanistic discipline am-
plify his concerns about the limitations of psychoanalytic meth-
ods in constructing theories of early development and his stress
on drawing upon developmental psychology to overcome these
limitations. New directions taken by psychoanalytic theories
have emphasized the importance of the earliest phases of de-
velopment, the periods psychoanalytic methods are least suited
to study and about which developmental psychology may have
the most to contribute. Similarly, the ongoing debates in psy-
choanalysis around hermeneutic positions only serve to high-
light the choices outlined in Hartmanns (1950) paper. If
psychoanalysis is to advance claims to being a science, if it is to
define itself as something more than an interpretive discipline
or a delimited method of clinical treatment, it is essential that
it draw on cognate disciplines, and especially on developmental
psychology.
While historical trends generally lend support to Hart-
manns position on these issues, they also undermine his me-
tapsychology and contribute to a situation in which the potentially
revolutionary impact of developmental psychology on psycho-
analysis suggested by Bowlbys work can be realized. The cur-
rent situation in American psychoanalysis resembles that which
Bowlby faced. As was the case in England a generation ago,
contemporary American psychoanalysis has experienced dec-
ades of controversies among competing theories that cannot be
resolved by traditional psychoanalytic methods; critical aspects
of these controversies center on differing views of the nature
of early development; and developmental research offers a way
of coming to terms with these opposing theories. If the current

situation differs from that faced by Bowlby, these differences
lie chiefly in that developmental psychology now has far more
to contribute to answering questions about psychoanalytic the-
ory than it did earlier and that answers of this kind are being
sought by a diverse group of psychoanalysts and researchers
rather than a few individuals.
Whether this situation will, in fact, lead to a revolution
hinges in large measure on what psychoanalysts find as they
examine their theories of development in light of new research.
If they find the views of early development emerging from
observational studies of young children to be consistent with
theories based on reconstruction, or if the results of such com-
parisons are at least equivocal, then one would expect only
revisions, elaborations, and refinements of established psy-
choanalytic theories in the coming years. If, on the other hand,
the picture emerging from contemporary research is found to
be fundamentally different from their reconstructions, the
stage is set for a major reformulation of central aspects of psy-
choanalytic theory.
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Desarrollo y Psicoanalisis

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DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND

PSYCHOANALYSIS: I. THE CONTEXT FOR A

After describing the manner in which (lie integration of psjcho-

S INCE THE hiID-19705. T H E SITUATION I N contemporary Amer-

Chief Psychologist, Childrens Division, The hlenninger Foundation,

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widespread doubts about traditional theories, a blurring of

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atory system capable of finding wide acceptance in the near

Downloaded from apa.sagepub.com at COLORADO COLL on March 23, 2015

This paper will explore the growing influence of devel-

Psjclioanaljsis and Deuelojmental Psyhology in a Period of

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ditions were present in the period from the mid-1940s to the

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science it was essential to make use of observational methods

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ogy, that Hartmann presented the case for the importance of

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development. Yet Hartmann reminded psychoanalysts that

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verbal stage is a testing ground for many of our most general

reach on the basis of analysis with adults have the disadvantage

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concluded his paper with a passionate plea for an integration

Iinplem entation of Hart ma tins Program

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normal science works in approaching problems. Conceived

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centrated on the earliest periods of development-Brody,

demic theorists best known to psychoanalysts (e.g., Piaget and

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research in this period was done by behaviorists whose meth-

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represented by the work of Benjamin, Sander, Spitz, and Wolff.

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genital instincts play a significant role in development by the

Revolutionaty Potential of Develo~meiztalPsjcliology

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a relativcly smooth, evolutionary process. In the late 1950s

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potent conceptual system, psychoanalytic metapsychology pro-

Psychoanalysis and Developmental Ps-cliology in a Period of

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choanalytic theories anticipated by Bowlbys work. Of these

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metapsychology were untenable (e.g., the postulate of psychic

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Schafer (1980) and Spence (1982, 1987) offered as alternatives

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transferences of particular kinds, already involves interpreta-

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tion of an individuals personality; from the standpoint of the

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which psychoanalysts have labored so hard, may now he

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treatment are irretnediably contaminated epistemologically because

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been noted, contemporary American psychoanalysis is now

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psychoanalysts always select the cases they discuss and exercise

Cliaitges in Developmental Psyelmlogy

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choanalysts have been struggling to come to terms with changes