Abakada Guro v. Ermita G.R. No.
168056 Bagatsing v Ramirez
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a
petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and
6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions
contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions
have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it,
and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way
in which the legislative process can go forward.
3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
GR No L-41631, December 17, 1976
FACTS:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of
public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for
violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the
ordinance, alleging among others the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the
present petition.
ISSUE:
1. What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City
Charter, which requires publication of the
ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which
only demands publication after
approval?
2. Is the ordinance valid?
RULING:
1. The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the
Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local
governments. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption
that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a
general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule
readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general,
which the general statute treats in particular. The Revised Charter of the City
prescribes a rule for the publication of ordinance in general, while the Local Tax
Code establishes a rule for the publication of ordinance levying or imposing taxes
fees or other charges in particular.
2. The ordinance is valid.
 CIR V PINEDA
FACTS
o Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the
eldest of whom is Atty. Manuel Pineda.
o Estate proceedings were had in Court so that the estate was divided among and
awarded to the heirs.
o Atty Pineda's share amounted to about P2500.00.
o After the estate proceedings were closed, the BIR investigated the income tax
liability of the estate for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 and it found that the
corresponding income tax returns were not filed.
o Thereupon, the representative of the Collector of Internal Revenue filed said returns
for the estate issued an assessment and charged the full amount to the inheritance
due to Atty. Pineda and the latter contested and appealed it to the Court of Tax
Appeals.
o The Court of Tax appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for
the payment corresponding to his share.
o The Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed and proposed to hold Pineda liable
of all the taxes to be due from the estate instead of only for the amount of taxes
corresponding to his share in the estate.
o Pineda opposed on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid income tax due
the estate only up to the extent of and in proportion to any share he received.
ISSUE:
Can BIR collect the full amount of estate taxes from an heir's inheritance.
HELD:
Yes. The Government can require Atty. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging
to the estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is individually answerable for the part of the tax
proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance. His liability, however, cannot
exceed the amount of his share
As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for the tax up to the amount of
the property in his possession.The reason is that the Government has a lien on the P2 500.00
received by him from the estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes for
which said estate is liable. By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the
property in Pineda's possession to satisfy the income tax assessment. After such payment,
Pineda will have a right of contribution from his co-heirs, to achieve an adjustment of the
proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.
The Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question:
One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax
proportionate to the inheritance received. The reason why in case suit is filed against all the
heirs the tax due from the estate is levied proportionately against them is to achieve thereby
two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the
distributed estate as lessened by the tax.
Second, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or
transferee to the payment of the tax due. This second remedy is the very avenue the
Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue should be
given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most
expeditious way to collect the tax as may be envisioned in the particular provision of the Tax
Code above quoted, because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need.
PAL V Edu
Plaintiff - PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
Respondent - ROMEO F. EDU in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner
UBALDO CARBONELL, in his capacity as National Treasurer, defendants-
appellants.
NOTE : Ang name sa respondent based sa case title is ROMEO F. EDU but sa body na
kay ROMEO ELEVATE.

FACTS:
o PAL is engaged in the air transportation business under a legislative franchise.
o Under its franchise, PAL is exempt from the payment of taxes.
o On the strength of an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, PAL was determined to
have not been paying motor vehicle registration fees since 1956.
o The Land Transportation Commissioner required all tax-exempt entities, including
PAL, to pay motor vehicle registration fees. Despite PAL's protestations, the
appellee refused to register the appellant's motor vehicles unless the amounts
imposed were paid.
o The appellant thus paid, under protest, the registration fees of its motor vehicles.
o After paying under protest, PAL demanded Commissioner Edu for the refund of the
amounts paid
o Contention of PAL based on the ruling in Calalang v. Lorenzo, it was held that
motor vehicle registration fees are in reality taxes from the payment of which PAL is
exempt by virtue of its legislative franchise.
o Edu denied the request for refund basing his action on the decision in Republic v.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in which it was held that motor vehicle
registration fees are regulatory exceptional and not revenue measures and, therefore,
do not come within the exemption granted to PAL under its franchise.
o Trial court dismissed PALs complaint
ISSUE:
Are motor vehicle registration fees taxes or regulatory taxes?
RULING:
They are taxes.
The charges prescribed by the Revised Motor Vehicle Law for the registration of motor
vehicles are called "fees". But the appellation is no impediment to their being considered taxes
if taxes they really are. For not the name but the object of the charge determines whether
it is a tax or a fee.
Taxes are for revenue, whereas fees are exceptional for purposes of regulation and inspection
and are for that reason limited in amount to what is necessary to cover the cost of the services
rendered in that connection. Hence, a charge fixed by statute for the service to be person,-
When by an officer, where the charge has no relation to the value of the services performed
and where the amount collected eventually finds its way into the treasury of the branch of the
government whose officer or officers collected the chauffeur, is not a fee but a tax
It is the object of the charge, and not the name, that determines whether a charge is a tax or a
fee. The money collected under the Motor Vehicle Law is not intended for the expenditures of
the Motor Vehicles Office but accrues to the funds for the construction and maintenance of
public roads, streets and bridges.
As the fees are not collected for regulatory purposes as an incident to the enforcement of
regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles on public highways, but to provide
revenue with which the Government is to construct and maintain public highways for
everyones use, they are veritable taxes, not merely fees.
PAL is, thus, exempt from paying such fees, except for the period between June 27, 1968 to
April 9, 1979, where its tax exception in the franchise was repealed.
Chevron Philippines Incvs Bases Conversion Development Authority
Facts:
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development Corporation
(CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and
from the Clark Special Economic Zone. In one of its provisions, it levied royalty fees to
suppliers delivering Coastal fuel from outside sources for Php0.50 per liter for those delivering
fuel to CSEZ locators not sanctioned by CDC and Php1.00 per litter for those bringing-in
petroleum fuel from outside sources. The policy guidelines were implemented effective July
27, 2002.
The petitioner Chevron Philippines Inc (formerly Caltex Philippines Inc) who is a fuel
supplier to Nanox Philippines, a locator inside the CSEZ, received a Statement of Account
from CDC billing them to pay the royalty fees amounting to Php115,000 for its fuel sales from Respondents contended that the purpose of royalty fees is to regulate the flow of fuel to and
Coastal depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1 to September 21, 2002. from the CSEZ and revenue (if any) is just an incidental product. They viewed it as a valid
exercise of police power since it is aimed at promoting the general welfare of public; that
being the CSEZ administrator, they are responsible for the safe distribution of fuel products
inside the CSEZ.
Petitioner, contending that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees based on
a per unit measurement of any commodity sold within the special economic zone, protested
against the CDC and Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). They alleged that
the royalty fees imposed had no reasonable relation to the probably expenses of regulation and Issue:
that the imposition on a per unit measurement of fuel sales was for a revenue generating
purpose, thus, akin to a tax. Whether the act of CDC in imposing royalty fees can be considered as valid exercise of the
police power.

BCDA denied the protest. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal as well for lack of
merit. Held:

Yes. SC held that CDC was within the limits of the police power of the State when it imposed
royalty fees.
Upon appeal, CA dismissed the case. CA held that in imposing the royalty fees, CDC was
exercising its right to regulate the flow of fuel into CSEZ under the vested exclusive right to
distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Subic Bay
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) dated April
purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will
11, 1996. The appellate court also found that royalty fees were assessed on fuel delivered, not
be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other
on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such imposition was petitioners delivery
hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of
receipts to Nanox Philippines. The fact that revenue is incidentally also obtained does not
the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated.
make the imposition a tax as long as the primary purpose of such imposition is regulation.

In this case, SC held that the subject royalty fee was imposed for regulatory purposes and not
When elevated in SC, petitioner argued that: 1) CDC has no power to impose fees on sale of
for generation of income or profits. The Policy Guidelines was issued to ensure the safety,
fuel inside CSEZ on the basis of income generating functions and its right to market and
security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ. The questioned
distribute goods inside the CSEZ as this would amount to tax which they have no power to
royalty fees form part of the regulatory framework to ensure free flow or movement of
impose, and that the imposed fee is not regulatory in nature but rather a revenue generating
petroleum fuel to and from the CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right to
measure; 2) even if the fees are regulatory in nature, it is unreasonable and are grossly in
distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and
excess of regulation costs.
CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied
by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87117 is hereby AFFIRMED.

However, it was erroneous for petitioner to argue that such exclusive right of respondent CDC
to market and distribute fuel inside CSEZ is the sole basis of the royalty fees imposed under
the Policy Guidelines. Being the administrator of CSEZ, the responsibility of ensuring the MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs.
safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the Zone falls on CDC. HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC
Addressing specific concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is
encompassed in the range of services which respondent CDC is expected to provide under G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996
Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 80, in pursuance of its general power of supervision and control over the
movement of all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ.

FACTS:

There can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as it vitally
affects the general welfare. Fuel is a highly combustible product which, if left unchecked,
poses a serious threat to life and property. Also, the reasonable relation between the royalty
fees imposed on a per liter basis and the regulation sought to be attained is that the higher
the volume of fuel entering CSEZ, the greater the extent and frequency of supervision and
inspection required to ensure safety, security, and order within the Zone.
Respondents submit that the increased administrative costs were triggered by security risks
that have recently emerged, such as terrorist strikes. The need for regulation is more evident in
the light of 9/11 tragedy considering that what is being moved from one location to another are
highly combustible fuel products that could cause loss of lives and damage to properties.
Petitioner was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958. Since the time of its creation,
petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However, the Office of the Treasurer of the City of
Cebu demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petition
stating that the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958 creating petitioner had been expressly
repealed by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE:

As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, SC held that no evidence was Whether MCIAA is exempted from payment of realty taxes imposed by the City of Cebu.
adduced by the petitioner to show that the fees imposed are unreasonable. Administrative
issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from the same presumption of validity
and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any RULING:
party assailing governmental regulations. Petitioners plain allegations are simply not enough
to overcome the presumption of validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.
NO. Taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom - the exception. The exemption may thus
be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC
prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the
LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and
the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been
withdrawn.
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CIR
CASE DOCTRINE: The taxpayer must justify his claim for tax exemption or refund by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague
implications."
"Export processing zones (EPZA) are effectively considered as foreign territory for tax
purposes."
FACTS: Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production,
and sale of various mineral products, filed claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT
on its purchases of capital goods and on its zero-rated sales in the taxable quarters of the years
1990 and 1992. BIR did not immediately act on the matter prompting the petitioner to file a
petition for review before the CTA. The latter denied the claims on the grounds that for zero-
rating to apply, 70% of the company's sales must consists of exports, that the same were not
filed within the 2-year prescriptive period (the claim for 1992 quarterly returns were judicially
filed only on April 20, 1994), and that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to
support its claim for refund/credit.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that CTA failed to consider the following: sales
to PASAR and PHILPOS within the EPZA as zero-rated export sales; the 2-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the date of filing of the last adjustment return which was April
15, 1993, and not on every end of the applicable quarters; and that the certification of the
independent CPA attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary of suppliers
invoices or receipts examined, evaluated and audited by said CPA should substantiate its
claims.
ISSUE: Did the petitioner corporation sufficiently establish the factual bases for its
applications for refund/credit of input VAT?
RULING: No. Although the Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year
prescriptive period for the filing of claims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted
from the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales to PASAR and PHILPOS
inside the EPZA are taxed as exports because these export processing zones are to be managed
as a separate customs territory from the rest of the Philippines, and thus, for tax purposes, are
effectively considered as foreign territory, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for
refund of its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and effectively zero-rated sales
during the period claimed for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and
sufficient evidence.
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. It is regarded as in derogation of the
sovereign authority, and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the person or entity
claiming the exemption. The taxpayer who claims for exemption must justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague
implications.
MIAA vs CITY OF PASAY
Facts:
- Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates and administers
the NAIA under E.O. 903 which transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of
land, including runways, airport towers and buildings. The NAIA complex is located
along the border of Pasay City and Paranaque City
- On 2001, the City Treasurer of Pasay, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy for
the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA received the notices and warrants of levy.
Thereafter, the City Mayor of Pasay threatened to sell at public auction the NAIA
Pasay properties if the delinquent real property taxes remain unpaid.
- MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and injunction with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought
to enjoin the City of Pasay from imposing real property taxes on, levying against,
and auctioning for public sale the NAIA Pasay properties.
- On 2002, the CA dismissed the petition and upheld the power of the City of Pasay to
impose and collect realty taxes on the NAIA Pasay properties. MIAA filed a MR,
which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:The issue raised in this petition is whether the NAIA Pasay properties of MIAA are
exempt from real property tax
Ruling:The petition is granted. MIAA is exempted from real property taxes.
The CA denied the petitioners motion by reason that as a government-owned corporation,
MIAAs tax exemption under Section 21 of EO 903 has already been withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code in 1992.
However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 2(13) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock
or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled corporation
under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet
the test of economic viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers and performing essential public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject
to any kind of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code.
The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is
not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code. Such exception applies only if the
beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and
thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State
or the Republic.
A close scrutiny of the definition of "government-owned or controlled corporation" in Section
2(13) will show that MIAA would not fall under such definition. MIAA is a government
"instrumentality" that does not qualify as a "government-owned or controlled
corporation." As explained in the 2006 MIAA case:
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation." MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock
corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares
(A similar case was also decided in 2006 with respect to the same party MIAA, the only
difference is that it was the Paranaque City government who sought the real property taxes
against MIAA)
REYES V ALMANZOR
Petitioners Reyeses are owners of parcels of land situated in Tondo and Sta. Cruz,
which are leased and entirely occupied by tenants. These tenants pay monthly rentals
not exceeding P300.00.
The National Legislature enacted RA 6359 prohibiting for one yr from its effectivity
an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units or of lands, where such rentals do not
exceed P300.00 a month, but allowing an increase in rent by not more than 10%
thereafter.
Said act also suspended par. 1 of Art. 1673 of CC for 2 yrs from its effectivity thereby
disallowing the ejectment of lessees upon expiration of the usual legal period of lease.
Afterward, PD 20 amending RA 6359 made absolute the prohibition to increase
monthly rentals below P300.00 and suspension of aforementioned provision of CC,
excepting leases w definite period.
 The revision entailed an increase in corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to conclusion that these properties were comparable w other residential properties not
file a Memorandum of Disagreement w Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, saying burdened by PD 20.
that the reassessments made were excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory
and unconstitutional considering that the taxes imposed upon them greatly exceeded
the annual income derived from their properties.
BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ vs.ENRICO PALOMAR in his capacity as Postmaster General
They argued that the income approach should have been used in determining the land
values instead of the comparable sales approach w/c the City Assessor adopted.
Board of Tax Assessment Appeals: considered assessments valid; appellants have G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968
failed to submit concrete evidence w/c could overcome the presumptive regularity of
the classification and assessments.
Appeal was made to Central Board of Assessment Appeals: affirmed the previous
decision. FACTS:

ISSUE:
Petitioner mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because this letter,
WON the Board of Tax Assessment Appeals erred in adopting the comparable sales
addressed to a certain Agustin Aquino of did not bear the special anti-TB stamp required by
approach method in fixing the assessed value of appellants properties
the R.A. 1635, it was returned to the former. Petitioner brought a suit for declaratory relief in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as
the implementing administrative orders issued, contending that it violates the equal protection
HELD: YES clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower
court declared the statute and the orders unconstitutional; hence, this appeal by the respondent
Comparable Sales Approach and Income Approach are generally acceptable postal authorities.
methods of appraisal for taxation purposes. The propriety of one against the other
would of course depend on several factors.
Income approach is rejected in the consideration and study of land by values as in
the case of properties affected by Rent Control Law for they do not project the true ISSUES:
market value in the open market.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, the first Fundamental Principle to guide the
appraisal and assessment of real property for taxation purposes is that the property
must be appraised at its current and FMV. Market Value of properties covered by 1) Whether the statute is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
PD 20 cannot be equated with the FMV of properties not so covered. The former has 2) Whether the tax in question is invalid because it is not levied for a public purpose as
naturally a much lesser MV in view of the rental restrictions. no special benefits accrue to mail users as taxpayers and because it violates the rule
In the case at bar, not even the factors determinant of the assessed value of subject of uniformity in taxation.
properties under the comparable sales approach were presented by the Board,
namely:
RULING:
o Sale must represent a bonafide arms length transaction between a willing
seller and willing buyer, and
o Property must be comparable property
It is of judicial notice that for properties covered by PD 20, there were hardly any
willing buyers. There were no takers so that there can be no reasonable basis for the
1) NO. It is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of
taxation and to grant exemptions.The classification is likewise based on
considerations of administrative convenience. For it is now a settled principle of law
that "consideration of practical administrative convenience and cost in the
administration of tax laws afford adequate ground for imposing a tax on a well-
recognized and defined class.In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the
single most important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select
mail users as subjects of the tax is the relative ease and convenience of collecting the
tax through the post offices. The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635,
as amended, is in the nature of an excise tax, laid upon the exercise of a privilege,
namely, the privilege of using the mails.

2) NO.A tax need not be measured by the weight of the mail or the extent of the
service rendered. We have said that considerations of administrative convenience
and cost afford an adequate ground for classification. The same considerations may
induce the legislature to impose a flat tax which in effect is a charge for the
transaction, operating equally on all persons within the class regardless of the
amount involved.