Thesis Shit

The Role of Foreign Military Intervention as a Key Determinant in State-Building:
A Cross-country Study on Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and East Timor
A Research Proposal by
Altura, Joren Carlo B.
Tan, Paul Milo B.
for
Senior Research in Political Science 2
(THSPOM2)
Submitted to
Dr. Rofolfo A. Tor
Thesis Adviser
Mr. Gerardo V. Eusebio

Thesis Reader
July 28, 2016
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Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................................... 2
I. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 3
a. Background of the Study ........................................................................................................................................... 3
b. Research Questions ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
c. Significance of the Study ........................................................................................................................................... 5
d. Scope and Limitations ................................................................................................................................................ 5
II. Review of Related Literature ................................................................................................................... 6
State-Building .......................................................................................................................................................................... 6
State-building vs. Nation-building .................................................................................................................................... 7
Fragile States and Failure of States ................................................................................................................................ 9
Foreign Military Intervention ......................................................................................................................................... 12
Justifications for Military Intervention ........................................................................................................................ 15
Military Intervention in Iraq ............................................................................................................................................ 19
Military Intervention in Somalia .................................................................................................................................... 21
Military Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina .................................................................................................... 23
Military Intervention in East Timor .............................................................................................................................. 25
III. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 27
IV. Methodology ............................................................................................................................................... 28
a. Research Design ....................................................................................................................................................... 28
b. Data Gathering Procedure .................................................................................................................................... 29
c. Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................................................. 29
V. Data Results, Discussions, and Analysis ............................................................................................... 30
Descriptive Statistics .......................................................................................................................................................... 30
Analysis on Iraq ................................................................................................................................................................... 33
Analysis on Somalia ........................................................................................................................................................... 35
Analysis on Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................................................................................................................... 38
Analysis on East Timor ...................................................................................................................................................... 40
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 42
VII. Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 44
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................................. 45

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Abstract

This research paper is an initial assessment of how foreign intervention from world
powers affect state-building in fragile and failed states. It aims to answer questions as to
why such states continue to experience dilemmas in rebuilding and reinventing
themselves even after receiving foreign aid or assistance and will try to identify the
underlying factors that hinder states from redeveloping themselves. Furthermore, this
paper argues that foreign intervention, particularly the utility of the military or the use of
hard power, may have a conclusive role in understanding state-building. Using
quantitative methods of analysis, it will look into the trends of governance, demography,
and economic development prior and after the occurrence of foreign intervention and
their correlation with the degree or level of intervention that the countries under study
have experienced. With these variables, the research study is limited only to countries
that have experienced military intervention such as Iraq and Somalia and have been long
labeled as failed states as well states that have experienced similar intervention but
experienced a more different outcome, e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor
Keywords: state-building, military intervention, failed states, fragile states
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I. Introduction

a. Background of the Study

Mass media has interchangeably used the word failed states and fragile states.
However the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) of the London School of Economics and
Political Science (2006) have made distinctions between the two concepts. It defined fragile
states as states that are susceptible to crisis and one that is vulnerable to internal and external
shocks and conflicts. Fragile states, on the other hand, are states that are in the condition of
collapse wherein it can no longer provide the necessary public services to ensure the states
stability. Moreover, failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a
result, the states capacity weakens and the social contract that binds its citizens and social
structures is slowly relinquished. And thus, domestic anarchy comes in and the rise of terrorist
groups becomes more likely (Rotberg, 2002).
Different studies have shown that foreign intervention in state-building from prominent
international organizations and former colonial powers plays a definitive role for the success or
failure of the development of nation states. Besides the external factors that affect the state in its
development, several internal factors have made a huge impact in terms of inhibiting the state
from reinventing and redeveloping itself as a nation, which makes them weak or in extreme cases
dubbed as failures. These factors may include demographic diversities, internal conflicts, and
stagnant economy that through its interaction with the external factors have played a huge
decisive role in weakening of the state or its failure. Somalia for so long has been dubbed as a
failed state as a result of political instability, famine and most importantly, the rise of insurgent
groups such as Al-Shabaab (Rotberg, 2003). On the other hand, Iraq, which is also considered as
a failed state, is a country rich in oil deposits. However, factions were formed due to violence
caused by ethnic divisions within the state that created more conflict amongst Iraqis. Iraq has
also engaged in wars that resulted into invasions from foreign powers. In both countries, internal
factors such as armed rebellions, military conflicts, and political instability are present and at
some point they experienced foreign interventions from foreign powers.
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Likewise, following the breakup of Yugoslavia and on the outbreak of the Bosnian War,
the United States and the West, at first, refused to intervene militarily despite the ongoing ethnic
cleansing and communal violence within the new state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Daalder,
1998). Meanwhile, in 1999, due to the ongoing internal civil conflict, the United Nations
sanctioned a humanitarian military intervention in the Republic of Timor-Leste. With Australia
leading the combined coalition force, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was
created to address the humanitarian and security crisis (Dickens, 2001). According to Hermann
and Kegley (as cited in Kisangani & Pickering, 2006, p.363), foreign military intervention has
been considered as one of the most frequent type of military action used. Consequently, as major
wars have declined over the years, it has become an indispensible part of statecraft. Nonetheless,
there has only been limited study or understanding on the impacts of such low-scale type of
force. With this, how effective really is foreign military intervention in state-building?
b. Research Questions

Failed states that are commonly seen in the examples of Iraq and Somalia are both results
of internal factors that are basically in the form of weak governments and political instabilities
and external factors which are commonly attributed to failed foreign military interventions.
However, it is a common public misconception that foreign military intervention would yield
into positive outcomes or at least lessen the internal problems these receiving countries are
experiencing. Then why is it that they still tend to fail despite the continuing aid from foreign
powers?
These led us then to our primary research question that is:

(1) How does foreign military intervention affect state-building?
With sub-questions:
(2) Under what circumstances do a foreign country and/or countries intervene militarily?
(3) Under what conditions does a country become categorized as failed or fragile?
(4) What are the factors that hinder a state from rebuilding and reinventing itself?
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c. Significance of the Study

The purpose of the study is to analyze trends or patterns that exists in the political arena
through which certain nation states are directly or indirectly affected, and deduce why these
certain states continuously remain in its present condition despite the efforts and aids coming
from internal and external factors. This will be done by relying on the data that will be gathered
through different sources and by examining the relationships between different interacting
variables that will help us give a better picture on the impacts of foreign interventions in state-
building. Through this study, we would be able to identify possible linkages on why certain
nation-states remain in its present conditions, why some countries continue to fail despite the
efforts coming from the internal and external factors. With these in mind, it could help future
researchers to have a more simplified explanation on the possibility of a relationship between
foreign interventions in state-building, whether it results in the success or a failure of a state.
d. Scope and Limitations

The study will try to focus on countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and East Timor that have been long dubbed as failed states and/or fragile states and have
experienced foreign intervention. For the purposes of the study, military intervention, that is the
use of troops or forces, shall be distinguished from economic and other nonmilitary forms of
intervention. It will try to focus on the different internal factors that affect nation-states from
redeveloping themselves and to examine whether these factors are generally contributing to its
failure or the possibility thereof.
Furthermore, the research will also include historical accounts such as events or significant
periods that may have determined their failure or fragility. It shall analyze the correlation
between the dependent variable, state-building, and the independent variables, political
legitimacy, military factions, and economic development. External factors, specifically foreign
military intervention will serve as the intervening variable. The variables shall be tested from a
time period of 10 years after the end of intervention However, due to the lack of existing data,
this paper shall analyze data provided by the Fund for Peace from 2005 to 2015. Furthermore,
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this attempts to determine if whether the independent variables has the greatest impact on the
dependent variable.
II. Review of Related Literature

State-Building

According to Barbara (2008), State building refers to the process of constructing or
reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and
economic security. However, in contemporary times, state-building has been mostly associated
with state failure and viewed as a response to fragile states. Ingram supports this claim and stated
that recent studies and principles placed state-building as a central objective in addressing the
fragility of nation-states (n.d., p.5). It meant restoration of basic administrative capacities,
legitimacy and, ensuring peace by establishing transitional government systems to prevent
nation-states from further declining and becoming a failed state. Recent cases of fragile and
failed states have shifted the central definition of state-building from a process of construction
into a process of restoration. According to Ingram (n.d.), there is no settled definition for the
word itself however, she discussed its essential dynamics that referred to state-building not as a
technical process but rather a transactional one and is primarily concerned with how the state
interacts with the society. The relationship between the state and society is often viewed in the
context of the Social Contract that makes it a central stage in the discourse of state-building. It
aims for political settlements which involves agreements and consensus between the governing
body and the people which includes constitution-making processes, proper allocation of
resources and providing collective security which will protect individual interests. These are
things that are further justified in fragile and failed states that experiences lack in some areas in
the aforementioned nature of state.
Moreover, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or

OECD, the degree of resilience of the social contract should shape state-building strategies and
further discussed about its importance and how it has become critical in fragile states. It does
however, involves complexity in the formation processes as well as certain limitations from
external influence thus making it a very complicated challenge to the international community. It
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asserts that state-building is a highly complex and difficult task yet it is a crucial task to complete
which can only be done with the cooperation of the international community and the fragile state
at hand. This will not only benefit the fragile state, but also the international community since it
improves stability (Jones et al, 2008).
Furthermore, Rotberg (2003) argued that when states fail and collapse, the process of
disintegration mutilates institutions and destroys the underlying understandings between the
government and the governed. That is precisely why sustained state building requires time,
massive capacity building, large sums from outside, debt relief, and appropriate measures of
tutelage. Rich nations must promise not to abandon state rebuilding efforts before the tough work
is finished--before a failed or collapsed state has functioned well for several years and has had its
political, economic, and social health restored. The worst enemy of reconstruction is a premature
exit by international organizations and donors, as in Iraq and Somalia.
State-building vs. Nation-building

State-building and nation-building are terms that are most often used interchangeably in a
lot of scholarly works pertaining to topics such as failure of states, military intervention and etc.
to refer to the process by which a nation-state undergoes a of a phase of rebuilding or building
itself. However, these terms are not totally synonymous with each other, bearing distinct set of
ideas and processes through which a certain nation-state would undergo in order to achieve a
legitimate and well recognized sustainable state. To understand the two distinct concepts, one
must understand first the difference between a state and a nation. First and foremost, a state is
totally different from a nation by definition and the set of components and/or elements that
represents them. A state refers to the political and institutional entity united by a clear command
structure and capable of autonomous decision-making that are based on its possession of
sovereignty (Misra, 2008). This is somewhat similar to the Weberian definition of state, i.e., it is
a political organization with a centralized government maintains a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force or violence. In contrast, nation is a social concept used to designate a certain large
group composed of people with similar cultural preferences, historical memories, linguistic
practices, and religious beliefs. However, the state and nation are mutually inclusive concepts.
To put it simply, a nation is composed of a group of people bound by a common language,
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culture & history and sometimes even ethnicity while a state is a self-governing entity
characterized by the four (4) key elements which are territory, population, government and
sovereignty that are present altogether (United States Institute of Peace, n.d.).
According to Bogandy et al. (2005), state-building refers to the establishing and re-
establishing processes and the strengthening of public institutions that has the capacity to deliver
public goods and services to its people and ensure a stable and sustainable environment. The
government which is the authoritative institution responsible for the allocation of resources, the
capacity to provide goods and services, and ensure security to its people plays a very important
role in determining which kind of state a certain country or nation-state inhibits. State-building
does not promote the use of physical force, but, is more primarily concerned in the establishment
of an institution, which has the capacity to exercise power and influence that is well-accepted by
the people and sees it as a source of legitimacy since it usually falls on the hands of the people
nowadays.
Nation-building on the other hand refers to the formation of a collective identity that
paves way to the legitimization of power given to a specific group of people or population.
According to Bogandy et al. (2005), nation-building is essentially an indigenous process through
which people that are bound with common language, history and culture creates a notion of
legitimacy to further justify claims on a specific territory and the establishment sovereignty. In
cases such state experiences failure, failure is not just limited to the structure or the lack of
certain key elements of the state but also reflects on the weakening of the nation itself. Nation
failure occurs in a particular nation-state where the process of nation-building no longer serves as
a source of legitimacy in the establishment of a system but rather, people no longer reach a
consensus on what set of traditions, customs, language and most especially what culture they
would adhere to (Bogandy et al., 2005). Naturally, in a multi-community states, where there is a
group of people sharing common culture and traditions, there are still some notions of belief
systems they do not totally agree with, thus, creating a sense of diversity within themselves and
in the system. Some communities will become more dominant over the others and this is what
becomes harmful in the nation-building process because when they tend to undermine the
interests of the minorities, such conflicts will arise disrupting the natural flow of the process.
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State failure is commonly attributed to failure of institutions to deliver basic goods and
services to the people leaving the whole system and its entire population in jeopardy. The
government is the institution responsible for implementing and enforcing laws to its people in
order to maintain peace and order within their society, thus, when it no longer functions as an
institution or absence of it in the system, the state is on a verge of collapsing that will ultimately
result into a failed state. In a sense, a failed state is a state that lacks one of the key element in
order for it to be considered legitimate and stable which is this case, the government. It still has
its people, territory and sovereignty, however, lacks the most important institution to manage all
the other three (3) elements. A state can be easily destroyed by removing one of its key elements
but its not the same case with a nation. A nation cannot be easily destroyed because these are
people bound by common language, history and most importantly, culture. One way that could
possibly destroy a nation is through colonization because it directly influences and attacks the
essential components of a state, especially culture. Nonetheless, its harder to destroy a nation
than a state because language, history, and culture are embedded in an individuals personality
and identity.
Fragile States and Failure of States

The terms failed state and fragile state are considered general labels that include an
enormous amount of cases. For example, Somalias state apparatus has, for decades, been in a
collapsed state. Whereas states like Sudan, Iraq, and, North Korea are considered fragile but not
entirely collapsed states. The likes of Chad are considered weak due its weak formal institutions.
Some states like Liberia and Sierra Leone have long been plunged by war and conflict, however
fragile states such as Bangladesh and North Korea are not at war (as cited in Brock, Holm,
Srensen, & Stohl, 2012, p.14-15). Generally speaking, the institutional and administrative
structures within fragile states are inefficient and corrupt, i.e., the concept of the rule is based on
State coercion rather than legitimacy and rule of law. As a result, leaders are not accountable
because of the lack of effective mechanisms for holding them responsible, i.e., the capacity to
make people comply with the states laws. However, he also argued that enforcement is not
limited to coercion as a form of state power. It is also based in legitimacy, i.e., power through
society. Mann refers to this as infrastructural power that entails cooperation between the
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government and its citizens (Brock et al., 2012, p.16). The idea of the state itself has two facets,
with one concerning citizenship, i.e., the relationship between the the state and citizens, and what
can be called community of sentiment. As mentioned, well-functioning countries provide basic
political, legal, and socio-economic rights for its citizens and in return, citizens have a number of
obligations. On the other hand, Benedict Anderson (1991) used the term imagined
communities to describe these community sentiments as an extent to where does citizens
consider themselves part of a community with a common language and common cultural and
historical identities. In this case, a sovereign states physical boundaries do not necessarily
correspond to the boundaries of these imagined communities. As a result, ethnic identities
connected to tribal, religious, and similar characteristics continue to dominate what constitutes
the states national identity. Consequently, these fragile states are, therefore, characterized by
circumstances wherein neither the community of citizens, nor the community of sentiment
has become the primary bond that connects a states people at the national level (Brock et al.,
2012, p. 17-18).
Failed states are states whose political and economic system have become so weak that
the government is no longer in control and may suffer a long period of power vacuum. There are
many underlying factors why states fail but the most important factor is that they no longer
deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the
eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate
(Rotberg, 2003). In Max Webers essay Politics as a Vocation (1919), a state could be said to
succeed if it maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. If
the state, however, ceases to use this legitimate power or is broken for example through the
dominant presence of warlords, paramilitary groups, or terrorism, the very existence of the state
becomes dodgy, and the state becomes a failed state. Although there is no clear general
consensus on its definition, the Fund for Peace, a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit
organization, characterized a failed state as having the following characteristics: 1.) loss of
control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein, 2.)
erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, 3.) inability to provide public
services and, 4.) the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international
community.
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The conception of the state is principal to understanding state failure. States who
usually are at risk of conflict and instability; wherein the continued violence causes state
structures and institutions to be feckless or ineffective. Poor governance, corruption, insufficient
public services to its citizens, the lack of effectiveness in the control of legitimate violence or
force and economically unstable can also hamper a states success (Huria, 2008). According to
Edward Newman (2009), the concept of failed states has greatly attracted the attention of many
analysts and for three particular reasons. First, since the beginning of the twenty-first century,
there has been a paradigm change in international politics and weak and failing states has
arguably become the single most important challenge for international order. Second, other
analysts are skeptical of the analytical value of the concept on epistemological grounds, arguing
that it is difficult to objectively define, identify and analyze failed states with methodological
rigour. And finally, there are rejections of the idea of failed states as a politicized, ethnocentric,
hegemonic concept with interventionist connotations. Similar to what Newman has said, the US
National Security Strategy of 2002 has stated that America is now threatened less by
conquering states than we by failing ones...weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a
danger to our national interests as strong states. This assertion stresses that weak or failing
states may pose as a threat to international peace and security because these states may become
sooner or later safe havens for terrorism and centers for the trade of drugs and arms, breeding
grounds for dangerous diseases and other multitude of transnational threats from non-state actors
(Ottaway & Mair, 2004).
Somalia has been constantly dubbed as the most failed state. The rise of the Muslim
paramilitary group such as the Al-Shabaab has become a challenge in the state/nation-building of
Somalia. Iraq on the other hand began to collapse during Saddam Husseins regime. The
invasion of Iraq during the Gulf War and the War on Terror has crippled the countrys stability
as a state and has resulted into internal conflicts between different ethnic groups such as the
Shiite minority and Kurdish forces in the north against the dominant Sunnis. Nguyen (2005)
argues that the government is willing to use the label, state failure, against a particular state
when it intends to intervene or has already intervened. Also, there is no strong correlation
between state failure and some of the worst forms of international criminal activities like for
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instance the different acts of terrorisms that is a crucial problem of human security globally. If
somehow for instance there is a link, state failure is not solely the reason or account to the
activity because there are other factors such as corruption and poor government that exist in both
weak and strong states, which are also important matters to consider. Furthermore, the
government of these failed states is often assumed to be the cause of its own failure due to its
political and economic defiance. Furthermore, he emphasized that such thinking leads to little
room for self-criticisms and justifies intrusive forms of western interventions.
Newman supports the claim that failed states clearly display of pathologies that have a
significant impact on the security of its citizens and the international community as well.
However, the study has been open to the idea of the extent to which potential interveners should
intervene in the political discourses and the attention given to them reflects the subjective
(Western) construction of international security threats. State failure is reinforced by the apparent
decline in inter-state conflicts and it is emblematic in of a transition to the Post-Westphalian
world (Newman, 2009). In this way, the idea of failed states is in constant challenge to the
idealized Westphalian system which in turn, undermines the constitutive order of the
international system. The paper argues that mainstream approaches needs to become more
nuanced and improvements in the factors to consider a state to be a failed state in order to
develop a more reliable and less biased empirical standards of the said phenomenon.
Foreign Military Intervention

Overtime, internal conflicts within states have occasionally attracted foreign powers to
intervene, and most of the time, through the use of military force. However, according to Pearson
(1974), internal conflicts can also deter foreign powers from intervening. He said that the co-
occurrences of foreign military intervention and internal disputes are still difficult to discern, as
it is hard to predict the probability of intervention and even rein in the varying degree of its
occurrence. Furthermore, he outlined several major weaknesses cited by Sullivan, Rosenau and
Young with the relationship between domestic conflict and foreign military intervention (as cited
in Pearson, 1974, p.260-261):
1) Treatment of intervention as a single phenomenon without specification of various types
of domestic conflict;
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2) Failure to specify plausible rival hypotheses about the relations of domestic conflict and
foreign intervention;
3) Inaccurate measurement of intervention and of interventions relations to domestic conflicts,
due to faulty data collection and methods of inappropriate to those data; and
4) Aggregation of interventions and domestic conflicts over five or more years, so that time
sequences in the occurrence of those phenomena blurred.
There has been many literary and scholarly works that says it is simply through
conventional wisdom that military intervention has an impact on the duration of civil conflicts.
Similar to Pearsons findings, Gent says that there is little evidence to support that there is a
correlation between the two variables. According to Collier et al. however (as cited in Gent,
2008, p.713), there seems to be one positive relationship between the two, i.e., they found that
rebel-biased military interventions tend to decrease the duration of civil conflicts whereas;
government-biased interventions have no considerable effect. Primarily, the effect of military
intervention is instead on the outcome of the civil conflict. As common sense dictates, whomever
the third party assists, will get additional military support thereby shifting the balance of power
in favor of the side they support. It should also be noted that third parties do not randomly
intervene on internal conflicts as they are more likely to intervene if the conflict produces a more
preferred outcome (Gent, 2008, p.714).
According to de Waal and Omaar (1994), foreign military intervention is neither clean
nor quick and cannot definitely solve humanitarian crises as it can only alter them. The concept
of humanitarian intervention has been used on several occasions for the purposes of
protecting human life from government repression or famine or civil breakdown. This
justification was discussed on issues regarding Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Zaire,
Sudan and Haiti, and can be seen at the present in conflicts concerning Iraq and Somalia.
Likewise according to Sahin (2015, p.21-22), fragile and conflict-affected states that are in
the condition of facing exceptional and developmental challenges justifies the intrusive and long-
term action by foreign actors in the institutional processes and domestic policies of mentioned
states. The intentions of foreign actors to prevent emergencies or crisis situations is argued to
strengthen the sovereignty of states as opposed to being a threat to their political independence
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and territorial integrity. However, some scholars and experts question the chief legal and
political aspect of military intervention, as it constitutes a violation of the receiving states
national sovereignty. Nonetheless, the said justification, i.e., to intervene on humanitarian
grounds, has been customary in international law. Seybolt (2008, p.25) on the other hand, put
forward the importance of three principles of the just war theory as factors in determining the
implementation of foreign military intervention. First, right authority is essential as an approach
to control illegitimate utilization humanitarian rhetoric to cover an intervention that does not
serve the purposes of humanitarian ends. This principle is best manifested through the United
Nations Security Council, as well as other regional organizations such as the African Union
(AU) and the European Union (EU) that can act as sanctioning bodies. Second, military
intervention should be used for the just cause, i.e., without a humanitarian reason for the use of
force, military intervention cannot be viewed as humanitarian. However, this principle posits a
problem, as it is difficult to determine what constitutes a just cause and how many lives should
be endangered or threatened to justify such intervention. Walzer (as cited in Seybolt, 2008, p.25),
stressed that there should be humanitarian intervention, and can be justifiable, when there is
reasonable expectations of success to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind. And
the third principle is the right intention. Many critics argue that if the interveners motive was
due to political reasons, then it cannot be considered legitimate in a humanitarian point of view.
Throughout history since the Cold War, there have been many foreign military
interventions conducted for and by foreign powers, e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, these military interventions were not on humanitarian grounds. Mainly, according to
Falk (2014), these are designed to impose limits on the exercise of the right to self-
determination. This has been seen in the interventions done by the Soviet Union in Hungary in
1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The United States on one hand was inclined more into
using covert interventions such as in the cases of Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954. The
U.S. National Security Act Sec. 503 (e), defines covert actions as those activities [involving the
U.S. government that aims to influence, the political, economic, or military conditions abroad.
The main difference between covert action and conventional military operations is that the U.S.
government could possibly deny any involvement (as cited in Peritz and Rosenbach, 2009). In
the 21 Century, the U.S. led ground invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, U.S.-led airstrikes in Libya
st
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and the military annexation of the Crimean region in Ukraine by Russia in 2014 are just some of
the few foreign military interventions. In the case of Libya, even though it was limited to
airstrikes, was sanctioned by the a United Nations Security Council to be led by the United
States in an effort to to save lives of peaceful, pro-democracy protesters who found themselves
the target of crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi (Kuperman, 2015).
Furthermore, Kuperman emphasized that Libya has become a breeding ground for terrorist
groups as an unintended result of the intervention. Radical Islamist groups, who were suppressed
under Gadaffis rule, emerged during the NATO airstrikes. Likewise, Russias annexation of
Crimea was later justified by the Kremlin as safeguarding ethnic Russians worried by
lawlessness spreading east from the capital. Russias actions are nonetheless illegal and
uncalled for as it impinges on Ukraines territorial sovereignty under international law and
specified in the nonintervention provisions of the United Nations Charter.
Justifications for Military Intervention

According to Hoag (n.d.), proponents of humanitarian intervention even suggest very
limited circumstances which argues that the use of military forces are properly justified and
clearly supported De Waal and Omaars notion that military intervention should be the last resort
in providing solutions to the large scale of human rights violations. Military interventions draw
its attentions to the violation of basic human rights whereas the present government institutions
no longer have the capacity to provide societal welfare such as food, shelter, home, and other
basic necessities that ensures the survival of the people. Such interventions in the past are often
more focused on providing security from human rights violation in the form of large scale loss of
life often directed to mass murders and genocides from numerous ethnic cleansing. Amelandu
Misra (2008) has highlighted primarily four key objectives for the justification of foreign
intervention. First, due to the mark of gross violation of human rights and human lives, it appears
that there exists a sufficient a priori legal and moral condition for a foreign country or an
external actor to intervene on behalf of the international community. Murphy (1996) has argued
that such interventions are invoked for the primary purpose of of protecting those living in that
target state from further widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights.
Hence, human rights and sanctity of human life supersedes the notion of state sovereignty and
thus, intervention would appear to have both moral and a legal mandate (as cited in Misra, 2008,
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p. 63). Second, foreign intervention relates to the degree to which an area of local anarchy affects
the interests of those surrounding it. Should this threaten the life, liberty, and interest of those
living in the zones, it warrants a response from the international community of diplomatic,
humanitarian, or military intervention or all at once. Hence, the prima facie of the legitimate
introduction of violence is assumed in order to achieve the central normative goal, i.e., peace.
Third, besides the arguments for defending sanctity of human lives and overall peace, the
economic argument should also be considered. The contagion effect of civil conflicts within
states can also result to the economic depression within the vicinity of that war-torn state. Lastly,
the guiding principle that says it all rests on the self-obligation of states to prevent civil wars and
intrastate conflicts around the world. The rationale behind this is that it revolves on the idea that
states are confronted by horrors of genocides and other moral failings of the international
community to prevent such atrocities.
However, as Hoag (n.d) argues, the degree of threshold conditions a certain nation-state
experiences often varies from one another because people have ranked certain priorities over
another, which is why there is an increasing support for such interventions in targeting large
scale violation of positive rights which includes basic goods and services the present government
no longer has the capacity to provide and ensure survivability, over negative rights which
involves protection from torture, rape and not being killed or lack of security. Government
failure could then be largely attributed with the lack of capacity intended to support the basic
necessities of its people and the security and protection it fails to provide, all of which pertains to
sustaining life and ensuring survival for the entire population. Military forces which are then
used in such humanitarian intervention no longer are portrayed as a political unit, rather, it now
acts as a tool in providing assistance and support to the immense violation of human rights.
There are contemporary basis for unilateral as well as multilateral intervention, most of
which are deeply-rooted from two high-profile international doctrines. The Chicago Doctrine of
1999 is the first of these two. One of its key proponents was former British Prime Minister Tony
Blair who argued that there are occasions when nations must be prepared to intervene in the
affairs of other nations when they feel that there is an emergency civil war situation. For the
world simply cannot stand by idly when such conflicts present themselves. This, of course, has
16

become a rationale for multilateral intervention. Whereas the second doctrine, entitled as The
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) of the United Nations in the year 2000, has provided a firm
ground rules for intervention. It stated that the international community, in the face of the gravest
human rights violations some countries commit, should respond to these humanitarian crises
through intervention while respecting their sovereignty on justifiable grounds that it is an act to
responsibly protect, prevent and rebuild and not merely to intervene. According to the UN
Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, sovereignty no longer exclusively
protects State from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds States
accountable for the welfare of their people. With these, the international community is
warranted the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means, and
must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations in accordance with the UN
Charter. The willingness to use force is additionally unavoidably impacted not just by the
urgency of the influenced populace but as well as by geopolitical variables, including the
importance of the nation to the world community, regional stability, and the attitudes of other
major players (Bajoria, 2013).
Similarly, Rashid (2012) highlights the important role of the United Nations in
humanitarian intervention in protecting civilians across the globe under international law. Just
like Hoag had suggested, the UN has limited the justification for humanitarian interventions
under which human rights violations have instituted. Several nation-states that are experiencing
complex crises under violations of human rights have referred to the resolutions of the 1991 UN
General Assembly, one of which that talks about the UN Security Council making the necessary
recommendations and deciding on what measures shall be taken into action in order to resolve
such threats to the peace. These acts are consequently interpreted as one that involves large
scale violations of human rights. The said general assembly also emphasized on the consent from
the affected countries which basically states that such humanitarian interventions can only take
place only upon the affected countries approval and provided that certain preconditions are met
(e.g. immense human rights violation, failure to provide human security and etc.) in order to
restore peace and security within the international community. According to Rashid (2012), the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) provides a framework
for United Nations that is primarily used to address questions related to humanitarian
17

intervention which carries the basic notion that states have the primary duties and responsibilities
in ensuring their citizens are well protected and that if they fail to provide this security, then the
secondary responsibility now falls on the hands of the international community with the
permission to rebuild failed states. However, there are also certain challenges to the established
norms and laws which are also highlighted in the said charters and resolutions. One of which
involves the notion that it does not totally prohibit the use of military forces but applications
should only be aimed for a countrys independence from another state.
Consequently, the UN has been also involved with series of peacekeeping operations
which primarily consists of a general assembly made up of representatives from all member
states (Little, 2015). According to Little (2015), UN Peacekeeping operations are generally
intended to support a ceasefire and peace agreements, all relates to the institutions peacemaking
efforts. Now, the present role of these special political missions or operations are not directed
towards conducting peace agreements, rather, it is now centered on conflict prevention,
something which more directed towards targeting the root problem. One common conflict
prevention measure that is being used is the establishment of good offices which act as a
mediator between parties which aims to reduce tensions through consultations and peaceful
confrontations with a common goal, which is to come up with an agreement beneficial for all
those who are involved which ultimately resolves disputes preventing more conflicts to arise.
However, going back to the humanitarian intervention issue, there are still on-going debates on
whether it delivers more success than failure not only in the aggregate level.
18

Table 1.1 A typology of humanitarian military intervention, cases of Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and East Timor
Source: Seybolt, T. (2008). Humanitarian military intervention: The conditions for success and failure.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press
Military Intervention in Iraq

According to Seybolt (2008), the state oppression of the Kurds from Northern Iraq was
one of the most dramatic humanitarian disaster in history. The two groups inside Iraq, namely
the Shia Arabs and the Kurds started a rebellion against the government under Saddam Hussein,
however, failed in their attempt to overthrow the existing government. The Kurds who lived in
the northern part of the region retreated back to their respective territories while the same goes
with the Shia Arabs who are then living in the southern areas. The rebellion was initially
encouraged by the United States however, the Shia Arabs received no assistance at all during and
after the said uprising (Seybolt, 2008). The Kurds who have retreated back to their territories on
the northern part of the region experienced a tremendous pounding from the Iraqi military which
killed almost 20,000 civilian Kurds and displacing almost hundred thousands of people away
19

from their respective homes and injuring almost the entire population in the onset of the military
factions. Out of fear, people fled their homes and sought refuge from Turkish and Iran borders,
while Iran accepted millions of refugees into their country, nothing is much like the same with
Turkey. Kurds who initially fled to Turkey were left out stranded on the borders leaving almost
400,000 people freezing along the mountain passes out of their refusal to accept these refugees in
their country. The conditions of Kurds living along the borders got worse each day passes for
there were no adequate supply of food, water and shelter which would basically ensure their
survival. Death rate rose up to 400 deaths per day and as much as 7,000 Kurds were estimated to
have died while camping out along these borders. The extreme conditions experienced by the
Kurds forced Turkey, UK, US and France to launch the first humanitarian intervention under the
UN Security Council Resolution 688 which aimed to provide assistance to the displaced people
along the Turkish-Iraqi border (Seybolt, 2008).
Table 1.1 The Impact of Intervention in Northern Iraq, 1991-96
The Operation Provide Comfort was successful and save almost 7,000 refugees out of the
400,000 Kurds while others continued to die due to immense health conditions and lack of basic
necessities. Military forces provided clean water, temporary shelter and food which helped a lot
of people suffering from malnutrition and different kinds of diseases and improved their health
conditions. After restoring health conditions of refugees back to normal, the next challenge is to
bring these people back to their respective homes and troops as large as 15,000 of them made
Iraqi military retreat away from the Kurdish territory. According to Seybolt (2008), the idea was
that Kurds were better off living in the safe zones the military forces had provided rather than
being torn out between the two borders, however, these so-called safe zones only covered one
20

half of the entire Kurdish population that were stranded along the mountains. However, the
autonomy that the Operation Provide Comfort had given to the Kurds gave false hopes to the
people because there was no sense of legitimacy. Despite the absence of threat from the Iraqi
forces, the Kurds werent able to maintain peace and order within the region and sooner or later,
they see themselves again fighting for their territories. As the Iraqi forces set to reclaim the
temporary sovereignty given to the Kurds the issue again with legitimacy left the Kurdish region
being oppressed and forced out despite the presence of UN guards which eventually fled because
they only have limited powers and capacities to sustain violent attacks from the Iraqi military.
According to Seybolt (2008), the Operation Provide Comfort did nothing to resolve the political
status of the Kurds especially in providing them with legitimacy and to remove Saddam Hussein
from power which were actually the roots of the problem and showed that the military
intervention was indeed successful and effective in the short term but gave a different
perspective in the aggregate level which actually saw the impacts of the said intervention in the
long run.
Military Intervention in Somalia

Under the dictatorship of Mohammed Siyad Barre in Somalia, the economy collapsed
mainly because his power became increasingly dependent on the rivalries between clans that
actually defined the countrys social and political structure (Seybolt, 2008). He wasnt able to
control the insurgencies which resulted into a civil war and to add up to the on-going political
crisis, the country also suffered a severe drought which significantly affected the lives of
thousands of Somalis and their basic necessities. The rebel United Somali Congress took over
the region however were split into two clans namely the Somali National Alliance which were
inherently the stronger one and the Somali Salvation Alliance. Violence broke out and deaths
rose to almost 40,000 people in a span of a year while adding to the number of deaths would be
those who were greatly affected by famine brought about by the severe drought and violence of
wars which is estimated to be around 150,000 people. Very few aid and operations were given to
the people and nation because organizations feared its extremely dangerous environment due to
the clan wars. However, due to the pressure from other humanitarian aid organizations and UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the UN Security Council was forced to authorize a the first
mission to Somalia or the United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the first of the four
21

interventions in Somalia. The action was also due to the fact that nations were accused of racism
because of providing aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina while paying little attention on Somalias
case (Seybolt, 2008). Challenges to the UNOSOM I were directly towards the proportion of food
supply people receive because of the size and reach of aid. Operation Provide Relief was the
only source of food for the country that basically provided assistance before the famine subsided.
On the other hand, the United Task Force (UNITAF) or the Operation Restore Hope
focused more on the logistical assistance which provided security and improved many
infrastructures and certain industries that basically helped solve the countrys economic crisis
and government capacity. According to Seybolt (2008), the impact of UNITAFs effort has been
continuously debated, however, it is to the United States concern that the UNITAF and
UNOSOM II had significantly saved many lives and evidences show that the intervention indeed
was a huge success in maintaining mortality rates at a normal level. Death through violence
decreased when UN negotiated ceasefire as well as the death caused by hunger, disease and
dehydration had also decrease because famine has already subsided. Military operations also
helped in the rehabilitation and aimed towards achieving long term political stability, however,
leaders of the said intervention failed in the peacebuilding process which sought to explain that
the UNs military abilities were limited to restoring stability by addressing the basic needs of the
society which would ensure survival of the many.
Table 1.2 The Impact of Intervention in Somalia, 1991-95
22

Military Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six socialist republics the formed the Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia along with Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The
former Yugoslav state was ethnically diverse that was comprised of Croats, Serbs, Bosnians,
Slovenes, Albanians, and Montenegrins among others. It then collapsed and dissolved due to
successive civil wars. According to Radeljic (n.d.), the cause for the collapse of the Yugoslav
state focuses on three arguments: nationalism, ancient hatreds, and cultural diversities. Anderson
(1995) argued that the crisis in Yugoslavia centers itself mainly on the deteriorating relationship
between the Serbs and the Croats, the two biggest ethnic groups in the country, i.e., the need for
Croatia to secede from the Yugoslav state that was dominated by Serbs was steadily gaining
momentum. The differing ideas on what the Yugoslav state should be was also a key aspect of
the aforementioned relationship. The Serbs aimed for a unitarist goal that further asserted
Serbian nationalism stimulated by President Slobodan Milosevic. Whereas for the Croats, they
have seen Yugoslavia as a mere stepping stone towards its independence that saw President
Franjo Tudjmans obsessive nationalism. Tudjmans unchecked nationalism eventually paved the
way for the harsh treatment of the Serb minority in Croatia and was further seen in his decision
to secede from Yugoslavia without considering the needs and fears of the Serbs. Despite the
divide between the two main ethnic lines, the leaders of the factions did agree on carving up
Bosnia at the expense of Muslim Bosnians. Bosnia and Herzegovina, at all cost, wanted to avoid
war as much as possible. However, the rejection of the supposed agreement in the Lisbon
Conference of its leaders further derailed negotiations of a Muslim-Serb-Croat power sharing
and eventually escalated the situation further (Anderson, 1995).
23

Table 1.3.1
According to Seybolt (2008), the Bosnian war was highly complex due to the sheer
number of factions and fronts, extensive international diplomatic and military involvement, and
mass ethnic displacement. The war eventually caught the attention of Western Europe and other
major powers due in part because both sides committed crimes against humanity such as mass
executions, erection of concentration camps, and has, on more than a dozen occasions, actively
targeted civilian populations (Fuchs, 2011). Because of the conflicts close proximity to Western
Europe, it has drawn two distinct international organizational responses, first was the United
Nations peacekeeping force and the constant bombing raid of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Under the UN Security Council Resolution 742, it established the United
Nations Protection Force (UPROFOR), the humanitarian and peacekeeping arm of the UN in the
conflict. Meanwhile, NATO had led a more aggressive use of force through a series of air
campaigns and imposed a strict no-fly zone to weaken the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). Clearly in
1995, the uncooperative Bosnian Serbs were finally pressured to sit down on the negotiation
table again due to the added military intervention force present in the country. And thus, on the
14th of December of 1995, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina or the Dayton Accords was signed that had officially signaled the end of the
conflict (Pauwels, n.d.).
24

Under the Dayton Accords, it invites foreign forces (NATO or non-NATO forces) to act
as the Implementation Force (IFOR) in order to ensure the compliance with the provisions stated
in the Agreement. Approximately 60,000-strong multinational force was formed to fill up the
IFOR under the authority and direction of NATO. On December of 1996, the mandate of the
IFOR ended, and the forces under it that remained in the country were transferred to the
Stabilization Force (SFOR). At the time of the transition, the SFOR was composed of 32, 000
soldiers and was tasked to a more direct responsibility in the maintenance of law and order, to
pursuit and capture accused war criminals, and to assist in the establishment of of democratic and
legitimately indigenous armed forces. After which, the European Union took over the
peacekeeping operations from NATO and formed the European Union Force Althea (EUFOR
Althea). Basically, it was just a mere change of name and commanders as 80 percent of the
troops the composed the SFOR were transferred to EUFOR (Dutch Ministry of Defense, 2009).
Table 1.3.2 The Impact of Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-95
Military Intervention in East Timor

In November 28, 1975, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente
Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN) announced the independence of the
Democratic Republic of East Timor from Portugal. However, a civil war broke out that same
year between those who want an independent East Timor and those who want to integrate with
Indonesia (Lawless, 1976). Indonesia first intervened in 1974 in order restrain the growing
influence of left-leaning independence movements. In the succeeding year of December 1976,
25

Indonesia finally and formally incorporated the territory as its own (Dickens, 2001). However,
despite this, the United Nations General Assembly did not recognize its sovereignty over East
Timor and guerilla independence movements continued their fighting with Indonesian
government losing between 10,000 and 250,000 lives in the process. For the next 22 years, the
Suharto government would continue to repress any attempts for independence in East Timor
which constituted widespread human rights violations and mass executions (Seybolt, 2008).
Upon the ascension to power by B.J. Habibie in the presidency, he quickly pursued to change the
constitutional status of East Timor. A referendum was held in 1999 wherein the Indonesian
government agreed that the UN supervise the process on whether should East Timor remain but
an autonomous part of Indonesia or to be fully independent. The agreement between Indonesia
and the UN eventually gave birth to three foreign military interventions: (1) the United Nations
Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), (2) International Force for East Timor
(INTERFET), and (3) the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
All of the aforementioned interventions would play a pivotal role in East Timors independence,
particularly the INTERFET who addressed the humanitarian crises in light of the fragile political
transition. However according to Seybolt (2008), despite the strong independence movement,
attempts to derail the referendum were significantly present. Consequently, militias against the
referendum clashed with the UN coalition force. Ultimately, it was up to the Indonesian
government and the UN Secretary-General to address the problem as the UNAMET was
powerless to resolve the new crisis. According to the report by the UN Commission for
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), it was roughly estimated that about
102,8000 (+/-20,000) died during the duration of the occupation, many of which have either been
killed or disappeared. In addition, an estimated 84,000 (+/-11,000) have died from hunger or
illness in excess of what is expected of peacetime mortality.
Under intense international pressure, particularly from the United States and Indonesias
ASEAN neighbors, the Habibie government finally consented to a military intervention in order
to curb the growing violence. With an international consensus finally in place, the UN Security
Council quickly move by invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized an
international multilateral force in order to restore peace and security in East Timor and to take
all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate. INTERFET was finally given a go signal to
26

intervene in the situation to be led by Australia with the Indonesian government promising the
coalition cooperation and any necessary assistance it could give (Dickens, 2001). Accordingly on
the 20th of May, 2002 after winning 78.5 percent of the vote on the independence referendum,
East Timor finally gained full independence from Indonesia. Seybolt (2008) had argued that the
intervention by the INTERFET reflects the notion it was both humanitarian and political in
nature rather than just humanitarian in lieu of political action. Furthermore, its is important to
take note the different trajectories of the outcomes of intervention in the cases of Somalia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there was no official consent and lasting constraint of their
respective military forces, compared to the case of East Timor.
Table 1.4 The Impact of Intervention in East Timor, 1999-2000
III. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

In order to analyze and integrate the given literature, this research will be using Charles
T. Calls approach of the three interdependent gaps of statehood or what is commonly known
as the Gap framework. The theory focuses on the three (3) gaps that a state is unable to provide
when it is on the verge of failure. It indicates that when the states institutions lack the capacity
to provide basic goods and services to the people, when it is unable to provide security to its
population from different internal and external threats (e.g. armed rebellions, ethnic wars, etc.),
and when the state starts to lose its legitimacy where the society begins to reject regulating
policies, then the interplay among these three (3) factors or what Call refers to as the gaps will
eventually lead the state to its failure. In accordance to the theory has been presented, this
27

research will try to focus on the independent variables: Political Instability, Military Factions,
and Economic Standing which are closely associated with the three (3) interdependent gaps of
statehood and its relation to the dependent variable which is State-building. Furthermore, the
main focus of this study and also serves as the intervening variable is Foreign Military
Interventions. This research will try to analyze the intervening variable and relate it to state-
building and see how it affects the 3 interdependent gaps that is mentioned in the given theory.
IV. Methodology

a. Research Design

This research aims to deduce the impacts of military intervention in the state-building
process by subsequently looking at the historical context of countries, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and East Timor in order to generate and extract relevant information that will be
utilized in order to establish a correlation among the present variables. This research attempts to
explain how and in what certain conditions does a foreign country intervenes military. The data
that will be generated from the Fund for Peace and previous studies shall help in determining
28

whether military intervention as a key determinant in the state building process actually
translates to the success of the state or actually contributes more to its demise by looking at the
trends over the years. The research shall be qualitative in nature, however, it will make use of
quantitative data in order to support the facts and evidences that will be presented.
b. Data Gathering Procedure

This research paper will make use of data provided by the Fund for Peace, a Washington,
D.C. based independent and nonpartisan research and educational institution that works to
prevent further violent conflicts and promote sustainable security. As a leader in conflict
assessment and early warning field, it focuses on problems of weak and failing states. By
working at both the grassroots level with the civil society sectors and at policy levels with key
decision makers, it is able to holistically approach the issues that stem out from weak and failing
states. The institution publishes the Fragile States Index since 2005, an annual ranking of 177
countries using 12 primary political, economic, and social indicators. A ten-year time frame shall
be the scope of the research, beginning from the year 2005 up to 2015.
c. Data Analysis

Given the cases of Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and East Timor which have
similar set of control variables but different outcomes in terms of dealing with foreign military
interventions, the research paper intends to use the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as its
comparative level of analysis by examining the control variables of the countries by taking into
account the dependent variable (state-building) linking it with the independent variables
(specifically military factions, political instability and economic standing) and with foreign
military intervention as the intervening variable. Data generated from Fund for Peaces Fragile
States Index will also serve as a tool that will help the researchers exhibit the trends of the set of
independent variables (indicators) over the years which will be essential for the analyzing the
impacts of military intervention, whether it actually led to more success or failure.

29

V. Data Results, Discussions, and Analysis

This research made use of the total score garnered by the countries under study Bosnia
and Herzegovina, East Timor, Somalia, and Iraq, provided by the Fragile States Index of the
Fund for Peace (FFP) . The total score is measured by the 12 primary social, economic, and
political indicators from the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an FFP-developed
methodological tool assessing the vulnerability of states to collapse. The range of measurement
of countries scores are as follows: 110 and above are marked as very high alert; 100 109.9 as
high alert; 90 99.9 as alert; 80 89.9 as high warning; 70 79.9 as elevated warning; 60
69.9 as warning; 50 59.9 as stable; 40 49.9 as more stable; 30 39.9 as very stable; 20 29.9
as sustainable; and those with 19.9 and below as very sustainable.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 Summary of Statistics
Country Observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum

Deviation
Bosnia and 11 82.38182 5.431541 75.9 93.5

Herzegovina
East Timor 9 93.97778 2.707294 90.6 98.2
Somalia 11 111.9364 4.09665 102.3 114.9
Iraq 11 106.3455 3.157963 102.2 111.4
The minimum rate for Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Fragile States Index was on the
year 2014 which was recorded at a score of 75.9. 2014 saw numerous protest and civil unrest for
the country as not only as it tries to form a more cohesive political structure, but reforming itself
for a possible European integration. Despite the fact that there has been limited progress in
addressing the countrys problems, there has been no tangible development in establishing
functional and sustainable institutions. Nevertheless, it has seen little reform in its judicial
system as it tries to reduce corruption, which continues to affect the public sector and is seen as
the most acute in areas of service delivery and access to unemployment. Furthermore, it has also
seen progress in becoming a functioning market economy as the countrys economic growth has
30

modestly resumed, and its account deficit has narrowed despite external imbalances (European
Commission, 2014). On one hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina had gain the maximum rate of 93.5
on 2005. This is attributed to the fact that it has not been able to complete and implement the
legal and administrative framework in ensuring that all ethnicities and religious sects are
protected. In addition, the socio-economic situation of that time had an adverse effect on the
protection of economic and social rights. Its social security system has failed to address the needs
of the most economically deprived, i.e., around 40 percent of the country is unemployed, and 20
percent and with a further 30 percent were close to living below the poverty line (European
Commission, 2005).
The minimum rate for East Timor was recorded at 90.6 on the year 2015. This is partly
due to its improving civil liberties and becoming an increasingly robust country. Freedom House
report of 2015, the countrys internal security situation continued to improved since 2014 due to
the reconciliation of the ruling government and opposition groups, as well as the neutralization
of armed, ex-guerilla groups that had helped reinforce political stability. Furthermore, the Global
Finance magazine has cited that East Timor has been ranked as the 87th highest GDP per capita
in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) and is ranked as the fifth in Southeast Asia after
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand. (Genser, 2015). On the other hand, East Timor has
received the maximum rating of 98.2 in 2010. This has been attributed to the widespread
poverty, unemployment, corruption, and an array of human rights challenges. Still, East Timor is
considered to be as one of the most poorest countries in the world, with about half of its 1.2
million citizens living in poverty. In addition, high inflation, unemployment, and the heavy
reliance on gas revenues has continuously plagued the country. Primarily, this poor economic
development has been due to the protracted conflict the country had with Indonesia since its
independence in 2002 (Genser, 2015). Moreover, despite the the decision of the United Nations
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) to reduce their policing role in the country, the
Freedom House report of 2010 has said, political polarization and the prevailing culture of
impunity surrounding both past abuses and ongoing high-level corruption pose a significant
threat to the countrys economic and democratic development. As such, East Timor remains a
fragile state that will need considerable international support for some time to come.
31

The minimum rate of Somalia on the Fragile States Index in 2005 was recorded at 102.3.
Since the mid-1990s, Somalia has been without a stable and functioning central government.
With a few exceptions, armed conflict and violence has become localized after the United
Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) formally ended its operations in March of 2005,
leaving it under the state of violence of anarchy. Despite this, local polities such as Sharia courts
or municipalities have provided occasional and variable levels of law and order. And thus, this
has somehow reduced armed conflicts on the basis of mitigating any forms of retaliation as a
form of social justice. Moreover, there had been attempts to reestablish a central government
through the 275-member parliament, the Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA), and the new
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This was made possible through the mediation of a
grouping of seven Horn of Africa nations. Nevertheless, Somalias attempt of realizing its goal to
peace has been constantly blocked and/or hindered by intermittent clashes between various
factions (World Bank, 2005). This continued violence and polarization has ensued up to the
present and Somalia has received the maximum rating of 114.9 back in 2012. On the said year,
the Islamist extreme group Al-Shabaab has lost control of key strategic towns and areas such as
Beletweyne, Baidoa, and Kismayo. However, the group continued to terrorized and carry out
attacks against innocent civilians, particularly in the capital Mogadishu. In a report by the
Human Rights Watch released in 2013, it said that both Al-Shabaab and government forces,
including those with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), had carried out
indiscriminate attacks and committed abuses against the civilian populace. Despite the initial
failure of armed militants to oust the Transitional Federal Institutions and the newly elected and
formed government that followed it, the security situation in Somalia was still characterized as
unstable, constantly plagued by violent conflicts, piracy, and other terrorist activities.
Lastly, the minimum rate of Iraq is recorded at 102.2 during the year 2014. It was a time
when the Iraqi government was under Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki. At that time, the
government has been trying to recuperate after the withdrawal of the US-led coalition from the
country. It was able to conduct a competitive election on the April of that year, with al-Malakis
coalition emerging victorious by gaining the plurality of seats in parliament. However, the
elections where overshadowed by the atmosphere of discontent among the Sunni minority in the
the provincial areas, and thus further dividing the country. Furthermore, the year has seen the rise
32

of the Islamic militant group called the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL) or Daesh
who slowly took Mosul, one of Iraqs most populous cities as one of their bases of operation. As
such, this has drawn the battle lines that would plunge Iraq into another civil war between the
Iraqi government, Sunnis, Kurdish rebels, and the Islamic State (Freedom House & Human
Rights Watch, 2015). On the other hand, Iraq had garnered the maximum rate of 111.4 during
2007. This was marked by the surge of more than 20,000 US troops presence in Iraq by George
W. Bush in order to provide security in the areas of Baghdad and the Al Anbar Province. The
augmenting of the number of troops has significantly reduced civilian causalities. However
terrorist violence continued, apparently due to the Iraqi governments incompetence to
independently provide security and other basic services because of being dysfunctional and
fragmented (Freedom House, 2008). Furthermore, the US Department of Defense reported that,
security, political, and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain
fragile, reversible, and uneven. Despite this, human rights conditions in the country
continuously deteriorated as a result of sectarian violence (Ahmed, Cochrane, Hamilton, Kagan,
Morgan & So, 2008).
Analysis on Iraq
Table 2.2 Failed States Index Score Trend of Iraq
33

The Iraqi War was a subsequent result of the 2003 invasion in Iraq led by the United
States that aimed to topple the late dictator Saddam Hussein and contain the possession of
weapons of mass destruction. The invasion regime was successful however, little did it nothing
to prevent the rise of insurgency groups aimed to oppose the occupying forces of the new Iraqi
government which then resulted to widespread violence between the Shia and Sunni Muslims. In
order to reduce the violence within the region, the United States planned a recourse of action
which involved sending of more troops in the country to basically contain the insurgency groups.
2007 was a very significant year for Iraq since it was the year that the Bush administration
ordered the increase in number of American troops in order to provide security from the violent
attacks of insurgency groups. Initially, this was often labeled in the mainstream media as the
surge. Although the main objective of the surge was to provide security from insurgency groups,
data shows that there is a significant increase in Iraqs Fragile State Index score because violence
had increased for the first few months of military intervention (see table 2.2). Moreover, data
shows that right from the very first military intervention, which occurred in the 2003 invasion in
Iraq, up to the year 2007 which registered to be the highest score Iraq recorded in the fragile state
index, there is a steady increase in the total score before it significantly decreased right after the
withdrawal of troops in the same year. However, given the years US troops are present in the
country, data shows that it actually prompted even more violence before they actually secured
the region.
The withdrawal of troops from Iraq started in December of 2007 and was completed in
2011 which ultimately ended the Iraqi war. In 2010, Iraqi parliamentary election was held and
even in the Election Day itself, insurgency groups threatened people who are going to participate
in the elections. Attacks and bombings killed an estimate of 40 people during the elections
injuring hundreds of other more. The existing electoral law in Iraq prior to the elections were
considered as unconstitutional and the new government made changes in the electoral system
(Chon, 2009). Data shows that there is a significant decrease in the total score of Iraq in the
failed state index because of the improvements in the scores particularly in the state legitimacy
indicator (see table 2.2). However, the withdrawal of troops within the region prompted the Iraqi
Crisis which then resulted to violent conflicts between insurgency groups and the present
34

government. Widespread violence between the Shia and Sunni Muslims continued and in 2014,
the world witnessed the rise of the rebel group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that
launched a military offensive and posed a threat towards the international community. This
prompted the United States under the Obama administration and its allies to respond with yet
again another military intervention in Iraq. Although the response was basically to contain the
threats posed by the ISIL, the U.S. government also provided humanitarian aid, primarily the
distribution of food and medicines to the citizens.
After the rise of ISIL and another military intervention in Iraq 2014, data shows that there
is a sudden dramatic increase in the total scores of Iraq in the succeeding year which will
probably further increase as the years go by. Although Iraq has experienced a period of
improvement in terms of total scores in the fragile state index, it doesnt mean that the country
has already been improved and is no longer considered as fragile. The scores reflected in the
graph shows that Iraq, although there were improvements on certain fragile state index
indicators, is still on the category of high alert which means that they are still considered as
either a failed state by many or a state that is on the brink of failure.
Analysis on Somalia
Table 2.3 Failed States Index Score Trend of Somalia
35

Somalia, during the 1970s, was under the regime of major general Mohammed Siad
Barre. Siad Barre gained control of Somali government by staging a bloodless coup detat. He
then formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) (Center for Justice and Accountability,
2014). With the new government under his rule, Barre attempted to reform the country by
solving its issues such as tribalism and corruption. To do this, he tried to implement scientific
socialism, an ideology that fuses Marxist theory and Muslim traditions (Center for Justice and
Accountability, 2014). Despite this, Barre relied on his clan and appointed members of his
family to supplant his government. By 1980, the Barre regime faced opposition from numerous
clans. To suppress the opposition, Barre used brutal tactics that violated human rights which only
served to increase the opposition against his dictatorship. Members of his own clan, the Ogaden
clan, broke away from his government and formed group and afters, the Hawiye clan also
formed another opposition group; by 1987, the regime had lost most of the country. Due to the
attacks by the insurgency groups, the regime launched a counter-attack by bombing civilian
settlements and shooting civilians. In 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) seized the
northwestern Somalia and declared its independence from Barres regime. However, the ouster
of the Barre regime did not actually translate to a smooth transition into a new government but
rather, was even succeeded by more violence within the country (Marchal, 2000). Clan-based
militias began to sieze control of different towns which subsequently became their self-
proclaimed territory. While the violence on the country keeps on increasing due to the onset of
clan wars, the government slowly lost its control over the lands and its legitimacy.
Judging from Somalias history, even before foreign intervention, Somalia was already
under the brink of becoming a failed state since foreign powers only intervened during the civil
war in the 1990s when factions were rising up. Before that, there was already instability brewing
when some clans rose up against the Barre regime. Minimal state-building was supposed to
occur during the Barre regime when Siad Barre promised to end corruption and tribalism through
his Scientific Socialism but proved to be ineffective since it wasnt properly implemented. As
stated before, the new government of Somalia is currently rebuilding and is getting help from
foreign powers but there is still a civil war.
36

The extreme violent conditions and the collapse of the central government prompted the
U.N. to intervene in Somalia as a part of their fundamental goal which is to provided food, clean
water, and medicines to the civilians fleeing their neighborhoods. The United Nations Operation
in Somalia (UNSOM) also sent troops in order to contain the violence and armed conflicts being
caused by the clan-based militias which initially succeeded. However, the UNSOMs mandate
which is to rebuild Somalia failed due to the resistance of different clan leaders which had gained
control of different territories within the region. Many lives were lost during the operation which
ultimately put an end to the UN state-building efforts, following the October 3 Black Hawk
Down, leaving the country still in the state of anarchy. Although armed conflicts between clans
remained to be an issue for the next succeeding years, it has then became less violent and
disastrous but still leaves Somalia without a functional central government. In the years 200-
2003, efforts were made to revive a functional government however manipulated parliamentary
elections which was held in 2005 still did not actually translate into improvement in the
legitimacy of the state. Since then, transition governments in the next succeeding years were
largely affected by threats posed by the oppositions since political leaders tend to manipulate
clans into serving their own selfish interest that would then lead to civil wars in the country. Data
shows that from the year 2005, total score of Somalia in the fragile state index significantly
increase due to the lack of state legitimacy (See table 2.3). Despite the many attempts to bring
back a functional government to Somalia, the lack of effective electoral rules made it possible for
manipulation and thus resulting to several uprisings and dissatisfaction towards the present
government. These conditions were the reasons why Somalia over the years still has a steady
increasing score in the failed state index, largely due to the high scores on legitimacy of the state
indicator and the conflicts between clans also contributes to the violence within the state causing
wars and armed rebellions towards the existing governments.
Although UN intervention were subsequently launched in the country, its agenda was no
longer focused on rebuilding Somalia largely but rather providing aid and temporary security to
the displaced citizens, also followed by intense drought and famine, the country has been
worsening each and every year. Data shows an up-down trend from the years 2010- 2015 due to
the civil wars happening in the country, while efforts in aiding the affected citizens (e.g. military
37

interventions) also contributes little in providing basic necessities and security from violence and
threats
Analysis on Bosnia and Herzegovina

Table 2.4 Failed States Index Score of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Dayton Accords made it possible to end the three and a half year violent hostilities
and conflict between the Muslim Bosnians, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In lieu with the peace agreement, NATO was tasked to provide peace and security
until its mandate expired on December of 2004 when it officially handed over the responsibility
to the EUFOR through UN Security Council Resolution 1575. The transfer has been initially
seen as an emphasis for the need of the EU to have full operational control and autonomous
decision-making over the mission. However, NATO still retained the authority for apprehending
war criminals. Whereas on all civilian matters, the Office of the High Representative was created
to oversee the implementation of the peace settlement on the civilian populace. It, however, had
no authority over the IFOR or EUFOR but instead chairs the Joint Civilian Commission
comprised of senior political representatives, the IFOR/EUFOR Commander, and other civilian
organizations. On November of 2006, the UN Security Council yet again passed another
resolution, Resolution 1722, to extend EUFORs and NATOs mandates in the country until
38

November of 2007. This is due to the escalating conflict in neighboring Serbia as Kosovo was
seen as a potential threat to peace and security in the region. And thus, EU defense and foreign
ministers have agreed upon postponing the EUFORs troop reduction in consideration of the
recent events (Kim, 2016).
As the data suggests, the apparent withdrawal of large numbers of NATO military
soldiers and personnel, transition of the peacekeeping mission to the EU, and implementation of
the Dayton Accords had a generally positive effect on the countrys reconstruction and
development. Since 2005 of having been marked as an alert-designated status on the Fragile
States Index, it had improved over the years and had received an elevated warning status while
receiving its minimum rating during 2014. Despite the improvement of its rating since 2006, the
country has slid by 1.5 points from 2014 to 2015 due to antigovernment protests marked by the
heavy flooding. Moreover, the government has been keen on improving the political structure of
the government, making it more accountable and inclusive towards the citizens. However, there
are still major obstacles such as the need for cooperation and coordination among all levels of
government (Bosnia and Herzegovina has a complex government structure) and the lack of
widespread support. The fractional process of delivering public goods and services has made it
even more difficult to carry out institutional and legislative reforms. Moreover, authorities in the
country has apparently failed to address ethnic and religious discrimination. In 2004, the
European Court of Human Rights has ruled to affirm that even the constitutional provisions of
the ethnic and/or racial make-up of the countrys legislative assembly is a breach to the European
Convention on Human Rights. It is important to take note that the Bosnian conflict stemmed out
from the apparent ethnic divide and discrimination within the country (European Commission,
2015).
While it is true that NATO was able to provide long-lasting peace in the country, much of
the promises brought about by the Dayton Accords has yet to be fulfilled. The economic and
political costs of division are too high relative to the countrys socio-economic atmosphere.
Nonetheless, the assistance from its European partners and allies, and the possible EU integration
of the country has help it improve in some sectors of the society. As the latest figures shows, it
reflects the existing challenge for the country to improve its capacity to reconstruct itself, meet
39

the demands of international community, and upgrade its elevated warning status into a stable
one, on par with its European partners.
Analysis on East Timor
Table 2.5 Failed States Index of East Timor
The subsequent independence of East Timor from Indonesia on 2002 did not entirely
mean the end of the UN-led intervention in the country. Instead, its independence even became
the rationale for keeping and maintaining a peacekeeping force stationed in the country. As a
relatively young country, East Timor still had many challenges ahead of it, such as the challenge
of insurrections, widespread poverty, poor infrastructure and basic social services, and the like.
As such, UNTAET was dissolved and replaced with the United Nations Mission to Support to
East Timor (UNMISET) through UN Security Council resolution 1410. Under the resolution, it
mandated the new peacekeeping force to assist core administrative structures and institutions that
are fundamental to the viability and political stability of the country. Furthermore, it was charged
in maintaining both internal and external security, in addition to its role as the interim police
force of the country. During the duration of the missions deployment, only a handful of isolated
violent incidents occurred and no large-scale conflict took place. Moreover, the UNMISET and
UNTAETs role has been generally viewed positively in terms of humanitarian aid, population
40

resettlement, electoral assistance, and rehabilitation. However, neither missions were viewed
successful in trying to build a stronger and robust security and defense structure in the country.
After expiring its 12 month mandate and extension period of 2 years, the UNMISET was
replaced by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) through UN Security Council Resolution
1599. UNOTIL almost had a similar mandate to that of UNMISET, i.e., to support critical State
institutions, maintain security, and provide assistance in observing democratic governance and
human rights. However, due to UNOTILs failure to quell unrest and breakdown of security
forces that had prompted the Prime Minister to resign despite the UN Security Councils decision
to prolong its mandate for a year, ultimately led to the establishment of a new mission, the UN
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). In order to return the stability of the country
during the 2006 East Timor Crisis, the former countries that comprised the INTERFRET came to
provide peacekeeping, led by Australia under the name Operation Astute (Brady & Timberman,
2006).
Since 2007, East Timor has been designated by the Fragile State Index with the alert-
status, fluctuating in the years 2007 to 2010. Despite the upgrade in the Fragile State Index from
2007 to 2008, the 2006 East Timor Crisis had severe ramifications and resulted into the
heightening number of fault lines and tensions. As the data suggests, the years 2008 to 2010 saw
the largest increase of points, receiving its maximum rating from the Index. This significant
increase can be attributed to the widespread insecurity as a result of the collapse of law and order
along with the disintegration of the national police. Furthermore, the capital Dili has remained
highly polarized and physically segregated and the disruption of flow of people and goods had
led to sever shortages and staggering inflation. In 2011, UNMIT had transferred all policing
responsibilities to the national police while many criticized the slow withdrawal of the
international peacekeeping force from the country. Ultimately, UNMITs mandate expired on
December 2012 and from then on, as the data suggests, East Timors score had gradually
improved. According to Maier and Pushkina (2012), despite the improvement, the UN Missions
could hardly be considered responsible for the improvement despite showing sufficient
capabilities in funding, cooperation, and coordination. UNTAET and UNMITs failure to link
international institutions with local context had made it more difficult to legitimize the presence
of the UN in the country. In addition, the peacekeeping missions had also failed in connecting
41

local structures with central state building activities and thus, has undermined the legitimacy and
effectiveness of the national government.
Table 2.6 Failed States Index Score Comparison of Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and East Timor
VI. Conclusion

The issue with regards to the role of foreign military intervention as a key determinant in
state building can be regarded as both a positive and a negative kind of relationship. Before the
intervention, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have already been experiencing internal
conflicts due to the abusive power of their political leaders under a dictatorial rule. All three
countries had problems after ousting these dictators, and the power vacuum translated into far
more violence and conflict due to the different opposing forces vying to run the country. In
addition, all three had an ethnically-diverse makeup which made it even more difficult for their
respective leaders to consolidate power and authority. On the other hand, East Timor was
invaded by another country and has resulted into an internal conflict. Thus, the collapse of the
state and the subsequent absence of a legitimate functional government prompted foreign powers
such as the United States and international organizations like the United Nations to intervene
42

primarily to provide security to the citizens of the country and to quell the threats of insurgency
groups and/or armed militias from different sectors of the society. However, providing security
would mean sending troops to the country, and while opposing forces were initially contained,
sooner or later rebel groups would act in retaliation with brute force causing more violence than
before that would did not only impose as a threat to the civilian populace but as well as to the
intervening forces. Case in point, the data from Iraqs Fragile State Index total score, the years
where military intervention actually took place is also the same years where it displayed an
increasing trend of the total score of the country. However, by carefully analyzing the indicators
and what actually transpired within those years, we can see that the increase in total score was a
reflection of increase in more conflict, violence, and political instability, since it was an initial
response to the military troops that were being sent to the country.
The rebuilding process becomes the complicated part since it involves reinstating peace
and order, sending people back to their respective homes while combating certain rebel groups.
As a result, many lives were lost during the entire process which shifts the focus of the
intervention from rebuilding into providing humanitarian aid to extreme conditions the citizens
are facing. The withdrawal of troops followed by rebellions towards the established government
becomes one of the reasons why these states fail to reinvent themselves. The lack of legitimacy
of the government has resulted into a never ending conflict. Foreign military intervention affects
state-building in the sense that it provides an avenue for a transition into a new regime. However,
efforts on legitimizing the present government becomes undermined which is why after the
rebuilding, they actually experience the same process all over again. The irony is that
intervention actually helps a lot in the collapse of a nation-state but at the same time, their
presence actually results into more violence which, in the long run, would also lessen given the
amount of period they were in the country. In the study, despite the similar circumstances and
conditions the four countries were in, their respective foreign military intervention had resulted
into different trajectories. In the cases of Iraq and Somalia, both continued to be in a state of
collapse, i.e., neither the apparatus of the state clearly does not have monopoly of legitimate
violence nor does it have the capacity to provide basic services. On the other hand, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and East Timor both improved in terms providing stability and economic
development despite being marked as elevated warning and alert designation statuses
43

respectively. Consequently, the difference in trajectories between the two sets of interventions
was influenced by the institutions that influence the economic and political incentives of society
placed by the foreign intervener. Fundamentally, foreign military intervention does determine a
country in collapses state-building capacity.
VII. Recommendations

One of the gaps and weaknesses of this research paper is the lack of quantitative data on the
indicators used for the countries under study, particularly on years just right after the subsequent
withdrawal of foreign military presence. The years after the withdrawal would have provided
much needed data to support the apparent causal relationship between foreign military
intervention and state-building as it is usually seen that in these years, critical junctures take
place. That would, in more ways than one, affect the trajectory of state-building. Furthermore, it
is advisable for future researchers to examine other countries as well in order for the study not be
construed only to the four samples. This is to further aid the research in terms of maximizing
existing and/or similar cases in reference to the variables used.
44

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The Role of Foreign Military Intervention as a Key Determinant in State-Building:

Mr. Gerardo V. Eusebio

July 28, 2016

Keywords: state-building, military intervention, failed states, fragile states

These led us then to our primary research question that is:

d. Scope and Limitations

II. Review of Related Literature

Moreover, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development or

State-building vs. Nation-building

Fragile States and Failure of States

Foreign Military Intervention

Justifications for Military Intervention

Military Intervention in Iraq

Table 1.1 The Impact of Intervention in Northern Iraq, 1991-96

Military Intervention in Somalia

Table 1.2 The Impact of Intervention in Somalia, 1991-95

Military Intervention in East Timor

Table 1.4 The Impact of Intervention in East Timor, 1999-2000

III. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

b. Data Gathering Procedure

Table 2.1 Summary of Statistics

Country Observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum

Bosnia and 11 82.38182 5.431541 75.9 93.5

East Timor 9 93.97778 2.707294 90.6 98.2

Somalia 11 111.9364 4.09665 102.3 114.9

Iraq 11 106.3455 3.157963 102.2 111.4

Table 2.2 Failed States Index Score Trend of Iraq

Analysis on Bosnia and Herzegovina

Analysis on East Timor

Table 2.5 Failed States Index of East Timor

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