CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
I-E GROUP 4
NOVEMBER 27, 2017
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
CASE DIGESTS & REVIEWER
GROUP 4
Members:
Balagtas, Joseph Christopher C.
Capacite, Mark Adrian T.
Casama, Fritz Paolo V.
Kee, Zyra D.
Kit, Ma. Bianca Ysabelle C.
Ocampo, Justin Bryan I.
Regado, Aleezah Getrude R.
Saguibo, Rudolf Dionne A.
Sy, Marie Antoinette T.
Tsang, Pretzel
Villar, Isabelle Louise J.
November 27, 2017
ARTICLE X
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
Section 4
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.
- The power of general supervision is the power of a superior officer to see to it
that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with the law. It does
not include the power to substitute ones judgment for that of a lower officer.
- The President has general supervision over all local government units, but his
direct supervisory contact is with autonomous regions, provinces, and
independent cities
Province of Negros vs COA
G.R No. 182574||Dec 10,2014||Carpio,J.:
Power of general vs Power of Control
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No.
720-A allocating 4,000,000 of its retained earnings forthe hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits of 1,949 official sand employees of the
province.
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Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care Health
System Incorporated.
Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group Health
Care Agreement involving a total payment of 3,760,000 representing the
insurance premiums of its officials and employees.
Provincial Auditor issued a notice of suspension suspending the premium
payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as
provided under Administrative Order No. 103 and that the premium
payment for health care benefits violated Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law.
President Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the
amount of 100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive and instead
issued a notice of disallowance, which was appealed to COA.
COA affirmed the Provincial Auditors Notice of Disallowance.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of 3,760,000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials
and employees
RULING: Yes
Sections 1 and 2 of AO 103 state:
SECTION 1. All agencies of the National Government including government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations and government financial institutions, and local
government units, are hereby authorized to grant productivity incentive benefit in the
maximum amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (2,000.00) each to their permanent
and full-time temporary and casual employees, including contractual personnel with
employment in the nature of a regular employee, who have rendered at least one (1)
year of service in the Government as of December 31, 1993.
SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including government owned
and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are
hereby enjoined and prohibited from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive
Benefits or any and all forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and
authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth,
anyone found violating any of the mandates in this Order, including all officials/agency
found to have taken part thereof, shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in
accordance with the applicable provisions of existing administrative and penal laws.
From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of
prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies
only to "government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, as well as their respective governing boards." Nowhere is it indicated in
Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior
approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus,
offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive
branch.
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the Presidents general supervision pursuant
to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution.
The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to
see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is
distinguished from the Presidents power of control which is the power to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate
officer. The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts
or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed
but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to
modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the
approval of the President to be valid.
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Section 5
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
SOURCES OF REVENUE
- It is established in Philippine jurisprudence that municipal corporations as no
power to tax.
- Legislature has absolute discretion to expand or contract taxing powers of
municipal corporations.
- Section 5 confers municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and
otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a
statutory grant of these powers.
- In construing the extent of power of local government to levy taxes, it is
important to look into the meaning of two clauses subject to such guidelines
as Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy
- While local governments are authorized to impose taxes on business, they can
do so only if entity being subjected to business tax is a business. (Burden is
upon the local government)
- POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO TAX IS LIBERALLY
INTERPRETED IN ITS FAVOR AGAINST THE STATE, BUT IT IS
STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER.
- Exception in favor of a taxpayer must be clear and unequivocal. (Burden is
upon the taxpayer to prove that he/she/it indeed falls under the exceptions)
LIMITATIONS
1. Must be for public purpose
2. Uniform within a locality
3. Confiscatory
4. Within jurisdiction of local unit to pass
OTHER SOURCES OF REVENUE
1. Internal revenue allotments from national government
2. Lease of public utilities
3. Direct National Aid
4. Miscellaneous sources (like tuition fees)
Section 6
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES
- Another source of revenue for local units.
- Amount is determined by law
- Distinct from taxes which local government units might impose.
- Neither congress nor executive may impose conditions on its release.
- Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national taxes so it enjoins the legislature
not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty.
Alternative Center vs Zamora
G.R. No. 144256||June 8, 2005||CARPIO MORALES, J.
Facts:
President Estrada submitted the 2000 budget to the congress. The President proposed
an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) in the amount of P121,778,000,000 following the
formula provided for in Section 284 of the Local Government Code of 1992. The
provisions states that, Local government units shall have a share in the national
internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year as follows: xxx (c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent
(40%).
The President approved the bill which eventually became the GAA of 2000. The said
bill included a budget of P111,778,000,000 for LGUs. In another part of the GAA,
under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of
P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above,
shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original
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revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a
quarterly assessment by committees which the GAA specifies.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and people organizations, along with three
barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Application for TRO, against Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora assailing the Constitutionality of the mentioned allocations and the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
Petitioners contend that the UNPROGRAMMED FUND is unconstitutional for
violation of Sec. 6 of Art. X which says that the share of local governments in the
national taxes should be automatically released to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the allocation of P10 Billion as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND
is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes, it is unconstitutional because the UNPROGRAMMED FUND violates Sec. 6 of
Art. X of the Constitution.
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that this provision was violated when it was made contingent to the
conditions laid down in the law. Respondents counter argue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence,
the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of
the IRA. Respondent cited the discourse between Commissioners Nolledo and Davide
on the provision.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the
executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the
legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. Even the
executive branch may not withhold the IRA because it must be automatically released.
As the constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the
executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable
by a statute a proposition which is patently absurd.
Automatic release implies that the just share of the local governments determined by
law should be released to them as a matter of course, the GAA provisions, on the other
hand, withhold its release pending an event which is not even certain of occurring. To
rule that the term automatic release contemplates such conditional release would be to
strip the term automatic of all meaning.
Villafuerte vs Robredo
G.R No. 195390||Dec 10,2014||Reyes, J:.
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari was filed b former Governor Villafuerte Jr. and Province
of Camarines Sur, seeking to annul and set aside the following issuances of
late Honorable Robredo in his capacity as Secretary of DILG
a. MC 2010-83 : full disclosure of local budget and finances and bids and public
offerings
b. MC 2010-138: use of 20% component of annual internal revenue allotment
shares
c. MC 011-08 : Strict adherence to Sec 90 of RA 10147 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2011
Petitioners seek nullification on foregoing issuances on ground of
unconstitutionality and or having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
The foregoing circulars also states non-compliance will be meted sanctions in
accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations
Petitioners argue that assailed issuances of respondent interfere with local and
fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the Constitution and Local
Government Code.
They claim that MC No. 138 transgressed their liberties when it restricted
meaning of development and enumerated activities which local government
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must finance from 20% development fund component of IRA and provided
sanctions for local authorities.
They argue that respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of
local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying
development projects that 20% of its IRA should fund.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ASSAILED MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS
VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AND FISCAL AUTONOMY
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
RULING: NO
Constitution has expressly adopted policy in ensuring of the autonomy of
LGUs.
Local autonomy means more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization .
To safeguard state policy on local autonomy, the constitution confines the
power of president over all LGUs to mere supervision.
The power of supervision means to see to it that subordinates perform
functions in accordance with law.
Reading MC No. 2010-138 --shows that it was merely a reiteration of existing
provision in LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGU to faithfully observe
the directive to utilize 20% portion of IRA for development projects
Term development was characterized as the realization of desirable social,
economic, and environmental outcome does not operate to restrict term as to
exclude some other activities that may bring about same result . Such was
only necessary to illustrate among LGU the nature of expenses that are
properly chargeable against development fund.
Issuance did not provide for sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new
set of facts or omissions. It simply stated a reminder to LGU that there are
existing rules to consider in disbursement of 20% development fund and
noncompliance therewith may render the liable for sanctions which are
provided in LGC and other applicable law.
At any rate, LGU must be reminded that local autonomy granted to them does
not completely sever them from national government or turn them into
impenetrable states.
They are still under supervision of President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws. Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline and power to discipline and ensure that laws be faithfully
executed.
Fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs unbridled discretion in disbursement of
public funds. They must remain accountable to their constituency.
Section 7
Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in
the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by
way of direct benefits.
I. Share in proceeds from natural resources.
1. Section 7 gives another source of revenue for Local Governments:
a. Share in the proceeds from the exploitation and development of
natural resources found within the locality.
2. Can take the form of financial benefits coming from a share in fees, charges,
and other incomes coming from development.
3. This can be effected through either national or local laws.
Section 8
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected
The principal function of the council is to recommend to the pres appointees to the
judiciary, from among the nominees the pres appoints judges w/o need for
confirmation by a coa.
The idea is to forestall as much as possible the influence of partisan politics.
The council is composed of 3 ex officio members and 4 regular members.
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The 4 year term allows for staggering of appointments for purposes of continuity. The
requirement that the regular members be appointed with the consent of the coa allows a
political check on the pres appointing authority which otherwise would be the sole
political influence on judicial appointments.
Borja vs COMELEC
G.R No. 133495||September 3, 1998||Mendoza, J:.
Term limit for local elective officials
FACTS:
Respondent Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. In 1989, he became mayor by operation of law upon the death of
incumbent mayor Cesar Borja. In 1992, he was elected mayor until 1995. And in 1995,
he was reelected mayor for another 3 years until 1998. He filed his candidacy again in
1988 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, also a candidate, seek to disqualify Capco
for being a mayor for three consecutive terms, thus, he is ineligible under Article X
Section 8. Comelec ruled in favor of Capco.
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
ISSUE: Whether Capco is still qualified to become the mayor of Pateros?
RULING: Yes.
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation
refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference
to succession to an office to which he was not elected. He succeeded the office by
operation of law and such succession is not counted as one term for purposes of the
computation of the three-term limitation.
Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result
of election.
The first sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars
"such official[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second
sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served
his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected."
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is
not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
ADORMEO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 147927| FEBRUARY 4, 2002| Quisumbing, J.
Winner of recall election
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor of Lucena in May 1992.
2. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998.
3. In the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Tagarao.
a. But in 2000, a recall election was held and Talaga won. He served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until 2001.
4. For the 2001 elections, Adormeo and Tagarao are the only candidates.
5. Adormeo filed a petition to Deny Due Couse to or Cancel the CoC and/or
Disqualify Talaga for having served 3 consecutive years as mayor of Lucena.
a. He cited Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution which provided that
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The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
b. Adormeo contends that the unexpired portion of the term of office he served
after winning a recall election is considered a full term.
6. Talaga on the other hand, argues that when he lost his bid in 1998, and while
Tagarao was the mayor from 1998-2000, he was a private citizen.
7. The COMELEC First Division ruled in favor of Adormeo.
a. Upon appeal, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling and held in favor of
Talaga.
ISSUE:
WoN Talaga is disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he has already served
3 consecutive terms.
HELD: NO.
1. Already discussed in Borja, Jr. v COMELEC
a. Term limit for local officials refer to the right to be elected as well as the
right to serve in the same elective position.
b. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times.
c. Emphasis on full terms.
2. Fr. Bernas comment that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired
term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered 1 term for
computing the number of successive terms allowed.
a. This comment is only to members of the HoR.
b. Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for
members of congress.
3. Neither is this a situation of voluntary renunciation.
a. When Talaga lost in the 1998 elections, he did not voluntarily renounce
He lost.
b. When Talaga served the unexpired term, neither is it a voluntary renunciation
As the recall election was an involuntary legal process, not a voluntary one.
SOCRATES v COMELEC
G.R. No. 154512 | November 12, 2002 | CARPIO, J
Subsequent election
FACTS:
On July 2002, members of the incumbent barangay officials in Puerto Princesa
convened themselves to initiate the recall of Victorino Socrates who was Puerto
Princesas mayor since June 2001. On the same date, the PRA passed a resolution,
stating therein their loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA
requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor. The COMELEC
gave due course to the recall resolution despite Socrates petition to deny due course.
Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
However, Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the
recall election. The petition was based on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified
from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served the
city for 3 full consecutive terms prior to the recall elections. COMELEC dismissed
such petitions for lack of merit and declared that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the
recall election. Hence, this petition. Petitioners argue that COMELEC abused their
discretion when they declared Hagedorn as qualified to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edward Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa.
RULING: YES.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides
that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit

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rule. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.
First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection
after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of service. Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as
long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A
recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Latasa vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154829| December 10, 2003| AZCUNA, J.:
Component City
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao
del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998.
During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component
city, to be known as the City of Digos.
It ended petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under
Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over
capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001
elections. Private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the
said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or For Disqualification against petitioner Latasa.
COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution stating that the petitioners certificate
of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which remained unacted upon until the
day of the elections, May 14, 2001. Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still
proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most number of votes.
Petitioner assumed office as the proclaimed winner. It was only on August 27, 2002
that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position
of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
RULING: NO
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution limits the range of choice of the people, which
provides that The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.
This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor
since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of
the framers when they wrote this exception (3-consecutive term limit). Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
As to who shall be elected as city mayor, respondent insists that he be elected as he
garnered the next highest number of votes. It must be noted, however, that only 13,650
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votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for
petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that
particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession.
ONG V. ALEGRE
G.R. No. 163295 and 163354 | January 23, 2006 | GARCIA, J.
Recall election in the mid-way of the term
Assumption into office and serving the term counts as service of full term. In relation
to the doctrine that: An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running
again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
FACTS:
There were 2 petitions, first was Rule 65 questioning granting of MR by COMELEC
en banc and then the other is an injunction to prevent the implementation of such
MR/Ruling.
Francis Ong and Alegre were candidates for the 2004 elections, running as mayor for
San Vicente, Camarines Norte. Francis was the incumbent mayor.
Alegre wanted to disqualify Francis because of the three consecutive term rule, for
having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty
elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three
(3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The two ran against each other in 1998, Francis won. But in 2001 (after Francis had
served the 1998-2001 full term) COMELEC declared Alegre the winner of the 1998
election.
During the 2004 elections, COMELEC said that the 1998-2001 term shouldnt be
counted because Alegre was the legally elected mayor. On Motion for Reconsideration,
Alegre won. Thus, disqualifying Francis on May 7, 2004. On May 8,, Rommel,
Franciss brother, filed his certificate of candidacy, after the actual deadline, as a
substitute for Francis under the Nacionalista Party. On May 9, Alegre filed another
petition for cancellation against Rommel, which was granted so the canvassers didnt
count Rommels votes. Thus, Alegre won the 2004 elections. Hence the two petitions
ISSUE:
1) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction? - NO
2) Whether Francis served the 1998-2001 term? -YES
HELD:
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already passe,
Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc
Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04W048 AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled that it was Alegre who won in
the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Francis contention that
he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service
for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
In Lonzanida v COMELEC, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and
discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and
filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated
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January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position
vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the
order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to
March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor
of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was
eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his post
before the expiration of the term.
The difference between the case at bar and Lonzanida is apparent. In the case of
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated
reason of failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of
Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the
office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In
fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure of election factor does not obtain in the present case. But
more importantly, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never
unseated during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and
responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period
covering the 1998-2001 term.
DIZON VS COMMISSION ON ELECTION
G.R. No. 182088| January 30, 2009| CARPIO, J.
Involuntary Severance of Office
FACTS:
Marino P. Morales ran for the mayoralty of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Morales served for the term 1995-1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004; 2004-2007. During his
1995-1998 term, he has served the full term notwithstanding the election protest that
was ruled upon by the SC against Morales. However, the ruling upon this was only
promulgated after the term has ended. Also, during Moraless 2004-2007 term, an
election protest for the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy was filed and ruled
upon only in 2007 before the end of the term. On March 28, 2007, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy again for the same position.
Petitioner herein, Roberto Dizon, a taxpayer and resident of Mabalacat Pampanga is
contesting the Certificate of Candidacy of Morales for the 2007-2010 term alleging that
it is violative of the Local Government Code which provides for the three-term limit in
Sec. 43, thereof; therefore, he is now not eligible to run. He further alleges that Morales
was able to serve as mayor through lengthy litigations, thereby, violating the three-year
limit.
On the other hand, Morales is counters alleging that he is still eligible because he was
not elected for the 1998 elections; that the counting of his term should start by 2001;
that the 2004 term was only his 2nd term; hence, he was not disqualified by the three-
term limit.
COMELEC 2nd Division ruled that during the 1998 term, Morales is considered as a
de facto officer and it is a counted term. However, it also ruled that the 2004 term of
Morales was not counted as a term since Morales was disqualified for the position and
the judgement thereto was rendered before the end of the termthat the gap from the
judgement and the end of the term concludes that there was no violation of the three-
year limit and Morales is qualified for the 2007 elections.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the COMELEC En Banc denied it and
affirmed the divisions ruling. It further ruled expressed that the three-year limit is
inapplicable since the Constitution does not require that interruption or hiatus be of a
full term.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales is eligible to run for the mayoralty of Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the 2007 elections.
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RULING: Yes.
Morales is eligible to run for the 2007 elections. In the previous case of Morales
relating to his 2004 term, Morales was disqualified and the votes for his were
considered as stray votes. He didnt finish his the term to be considered a de facto
officer and for his term to be counted as full since the judgement of his disqualification
was rendered in May 9, 2004 and the next day, the vice-mayor was declared as the
Mayor to serve the remaining term from July 2004-June 30 2007. Involuntary
severance from office no matter how short is considered as an interruption of
continuity of service. Although the same thing happened in the 1998 term of Morales,
the Court ruled that since the judgement therein was rendered after Morales has served
the entire term, there was no interruption.
Regarding Dizons allegation that Morales has served his 4th term through
lengthy litigations, the Court held that as they ruled in the case of Lonzanida vs
COMELEC, the delay in resolving election protests cannot be imputed to Morales
because there is no proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his
part. Therefore, Morales is not barred by the three-year limit and is qualified to run for
the 2007 elections.
Bolos vs COMELEC
G.R. 184082| March 17, 2009| Peralta, J.
Abandonment
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicasio Bolos was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biling,
Dauis, Bohol for 3 consecutive terms in the 1994, 1997, and 2002 elections. In 2004,
petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won, leaving his post as Punong
Barangay, and serving his term until 2007. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis in the 2007 Barangay Elections.
Respondent Rey Cinconiegue, the incumbent punong barangay and candidate
for the same office filed a petition for disqualification against the petitioner before the
COMELEC, on the ground that the latter already served the three-term limit, and is no
longer allowed to run for the same position in accordance with Article X Section 8 of
the Constitution, and Section 43(b) of R.A. 7160. Responded contended that petitioner
voluntarily relinquished his Punong Barangay post in 2004 in order to run as municipal
councilor in the 2004 national elections.
Petitioner argued that his assumption of office as a Sangguniang Bayan
member left his term of office as Punong Barangay unserved until 2007. He argues that
his assumption was by operation of law, hence, it must be considered as an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
First Division of COMELEC ruled that petitioners relinquishment of the
Punong Barangay post was a voluntary renunciation of Office as consequence of
assuming his Sangguniang Bayan membership, thus, disqualifying him from being a
Punong Barangay candidate in the 2007 Barangay elections. Comelec En Banc denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition for certiorari was filed
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON there was a voluntary renunciation of the Punong Barangay post by the
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor, so that he is deemed to
have served his third term, warranting his disqualification for running for the same
position?
RATIO: YES.
The court agrees with COMELEC that there is voluntary renunciation of the petitioner
as Punong Barangay. Having completed two consecutive terms of office when he ran
for a third term in the 2002 Barangay Elections, he was not deemed resigned when he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post in the 2004 elections
. All acts show the intent and readiness of the petitioner to give up his post as Punong
Barangay once elected to a higher post as Municipal Councilor, for it is unlikely that he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy, campaigned, and exhorted the municipal to vote for
him and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former post. Thus, he
knew that his election as municipal Councilor entails abandonment of the position he
held, and he intended to let go of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
ALDOVINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836 || December 23,2009 || BRION, J.
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FACTS:
Present petition seeking to annul and set aside COMELEC ruling, stating that
preventive suspension is an effective interruption for it renders the suspended public
official unable to provide complete service for the full term, for having been issued
with GADALEJ.
Respondent Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. In September 2005, he was suspended
by Sandiganbayan for criminal charges he faced.
SC however lifted the suspension, and he resumed performing functions of his office
and finished his term.
Asilo then filed his COC for the same position in 2007, which the petitioners seek to
deny or cancel on the ground that he had been elected and served for three terms; his
candidacy for a fourth term would violate the three-term limit under Sec. 8, Article 10
of the Constitution and Sec. 43(B) of RA 7160.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in Asilos favor in its Resolution, stating that the
three-term limit did not apply as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-
2007 term due to the preventive suspension imposed by Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE/S:
W/N preventive suspension is an interruption of the three-term limit rule -- NO
W/N COMELEC acted in GADALEJ in giving due course to the COC of Asilo -- YES
HOLDING:
Petition GRANTED. COMELEC rulings NULLIFIED.
RATIO:
Sec. 8, Art. 19 of the Constitution fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an
elective officials stay to no more than three consecutive terms. This provision refers to
a term as a period of time -- three years -- during which an official has title to office
and can serve.
Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elected officials
term
COMELEC committed GADALEJ in granting due course to Asilos COC for a
constitutionally prohibited fourth term.
Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an
official who has been administratively or criminally charged, where evidence indicates
likelihood or potential for eventual guilt or liability. Officials under preventive
suspension are barred from performing functions of their office but do not vacate and
lose title to the office. Loss of office only results upon finding of guilt or liability.
Official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as preventive suspension is
lifted. While there is temporary incapacity, no position is vacated, which is exactly
what happened in Asilos case.
A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy
exists.
DATU ABAS KIDDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
FACTS
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled An Act Providing for the
Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted.
The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the
countrys regular national and local elections.
The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers--in--charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice--Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of
ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the
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end of their term on September 30, 2011.
ISSUES:
(a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections
with national and local elections? YES
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to
comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? NO, NO, NO
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional? NO
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? NO
RATIO:
(a.) The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President
down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to
temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this
objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions
of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to
consider that the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized at
the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that
a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is
to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as
ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of
the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed
and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a
dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not
static.
(b.) A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the
first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM
elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or
revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap
left in RA No. 9054.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No. 9054, there
is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment requirements set forth in
Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
Plebiscite requirement in RA No. 9054 overly broad.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.] We interpreted this to
mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-
essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
require ratification through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
For if we were to go by the petitioners interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution that all amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite
requirement before becoming effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical
results hampering the ARMMs progress by impeding Congress from enacting laws
that timely address problems as they arise in the region, as well as weighing down the
ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow the holding of a plebiscite.
(c.) The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within
which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. We have already established
that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the
three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the
Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in
various laws. One significant difference between the present case and these past cases
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is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan
officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice
Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly - whose terms fall
within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative
intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it
clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress,
in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion
when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the
wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how
to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the
legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
(d.) COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM
elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special elections, and this
Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to
shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to synchronize the ARMM
elections with the May 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court
nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment
of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to
three years.
NAVAL vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851 || July 8, 2014 || REYES, J.
FACTS:
Petition seeking to assail the following resolutions of the public respondent
COMELEC:
1. Resolution issued by COMELEC Second Division granting the petition filed by
respondent Nelson Julia to cancel the COC of petitioner Angel Naval as member of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur, who allegedly violated the three-term
limit as provided for in Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43
(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC)
2. En banc Resolution denying Navals MR.
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716 which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur
8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza
and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District
Naval won in the 2010 elections and served until 2013 as member of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the 3rd District. He ran again in 2013 and was re-elected as member of
SP for the same district.
Respondent Julia filed a petition with COMELEC to cancel or deny COC of Naval
invoking Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code stating that Naval had fully served the
entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the
Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit
rule's application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction
COMELEC then cancelled Navals COC on the ground that he had served the full
three terms, and that despite serving in a new 3rd District, said 3rd District is composed
of the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District. The territorial
jurisdiction Naval seeks to serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial
jurisdiction he previously served
In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc
denied Naval's Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that absent the verification
required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval's
motion was instantly dismissible
ISSUE/S:
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W/N COMELEC acted in GADALEJ in holding that Naval had exceeded the three- 1. Determined by law
term limit -- NO 2. Now provided for in the Local Government Code.

HOLDING:
Petition DISMISSED. SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
RATIO: accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
In Naval's case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
is to be created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est units directly affected.
recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers Creation, Division, Merger, Abolition or Substantial Alteration OF Provincial, Cities,
mean what they say. Municipalities, and Barangay Boundaries
The actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the => subject to criteria established by LGC; hence, legislative(criteria not in any other
current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This law but the LGC)
numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the =>subject to approval by a MAJORITY OF VOTES cast in a plebiscite in the political
same as the old Second District. units directly affected
Sanggunian members are elected by district, however it does not alter the fact that the
district which elected Naval for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought Plebiscite for boundary of:
him to office in 2004 and 2007. Barangay => Municipality or city-wide
SC finds the COMELEC's disquisitions to be amply supported by the Constitution, law Municipality or City => Province-wide
and jurisprudence Province (new) => Mother Province
SC finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval, to declare
otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of the
Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after Tan v. Comelec
three consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the GR No. 73155||July 11, 1986||Alampay, J.
Constitutional Commission, no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is Creation, division of boundaries
to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation. Further, sustaining Naval's Facts
arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years. These are Petitioners, who are residents of Negros Occidental filed a petition against COMELEC
the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert. from conducting a plebiscite pursuant to BP. 855, an Act Creating a New Province in
the Island of Negros to be known as Negros del Norte. Section 197 of the Local
Section 9 Government code provides that in order to create a provincial unit, there must be a
Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation as may 1. Territory of at least 3000 square kilometers,
be prescribed by law. 2. A population of at least 500,000,
I. Sectoral Representation 3. An average annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than

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10 million for the last 3 consecutive years and
4. Its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or
provinces at the time said creation to less than the minimum requirements.
5. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
The petitioners contended that the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the
territory of Negros Del Norte. The OSG replied that the law shall be given presumption
of legality. Respondents further stated that the remaining cities of Negros Occidental
do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term unit or units affected under the
Constitution.
Issue: Whether the plebiscite was legal and complied with according to the
Constitution?
Ruling: No.
Article XI, SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
The boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be
substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be
created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte.
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected
because the first political units boundaries would be substantially altered and the other
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The
substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the
adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 176951| February 15, 2011| BERSAMIN, J.
Final Resolution
FACTS:
16 Cityhood Laws were enacted for the purpose of converting the municipality it
pertained to into a component city. LCP claims that the Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional because they violate Art. X, Sections 6&10, and the equal protection
clause. The case is a petition for prohibition which is sought to enjoin the COMELEC
from conducting the plebiscites pursuant of the Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws are violative of Art. X, Sections 10
RULING: (FEB. 15. 2011)
NO, the Cityhood Laws are not violative of Art. X, Sections 10. SECTION 10
provides that No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. LCP
alleges that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10 because they criteria they provide are
not established in the LGC. However, the Court Ruled that the enactment of R.A. 9009,
which increased the income requirement to be a city from 20 million to 100 million,
was an amendment to the LGC and the exemption clauses from the individual
Cityhood Laws were also amendments to the LGC, therefore, they are established
within the LGC, and not contrary to the aforementioned provision.
RULING: (APRIL 12, 2011)
NO, the Cityhood Laws are not violative of Art. X, Sections 10.
(the court, herein, merely reiterated that it was the intent of Congress in the
deliberations for the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the requirements of RA 9009)
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