MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs ATTY.

GENERAL, 20 Phil 523

TOPIC: JURISDICTION
Facts: In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his
complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is
authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and
it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is
brought. The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a
thorough search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands sought to be
condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff
alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac.
On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of
October a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land
sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of
Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial
court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said
judgment of dismissal.
Issue:
1. The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First
Instance of Tarlac to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of
real estate located in another province.
2. Whether or not Sec. 377[1] of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are applicable and
therefore the CFI has no jurisdiction.
Held:
1. Yes, CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real estate
located in another province.
Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete
jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate in the Philippine Islands. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province,
regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action
arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of
the province to which it may at the time be assigned.
Furthermore, in terms of jurisdiction over person of the plaintiff, the procedure does not alter or
change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly
exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply
that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction
between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can
change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On
the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend
on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over
the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an
objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.
2. No. Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is
clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the
action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. The prohibition is not a limitation on the
power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the court
and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial.
It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where
his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient
trial.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to
condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be
laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose
lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court,
require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where
their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue
in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and
ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that
opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the
defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not
only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that
jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court with direction to
proceed with the action according to law.