ENBANC

[G.R.No.129742.September16,1998]

TERESITAG.FABIANpetitioner,vs.HON.ANIANOA.DESIERTO,inhiscapacityas
ombudsman HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
OmbudsmanforLuzonandNESTORV.AGUSTINrespondents.

DECISION
REGALADO,J:

PetitionerhasappealedtousbycertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtfromthe"JointOrder"
issuedbypublicrespondentsonJune18,1997inOMBAdm.CaseNo.0950411whichgrantedthemotion
for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative charges for inter alia grave
misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IVA, Department of Public
WorksandHighways(DPWH).
I

It appears from the statement and counterstatement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G.
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT)whichwasengagedintheconstructionbusiness.PrivaterespondentsNestorV.Agustinwasthe
incumbentDistrictEngineeringDistrict(FMED)whenheallegedlycommittedtheoffensesforwhichhewas
administrativelychargedintheOfficeintheofficeoftheOmbudsman.
PromatparticipatedinthebiddingforgovernmentconstructionprojectincludingthoseundertheFMED,
and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an
amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondents gifted
PROMATwithpublicworkscontractsandintercededforitinproblemsconcerningthesameinhisoffice.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner
tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned
administrativecaseagainsthiminalettercomplaintdatedJuly24,1995.
ThesaidcomplaintsoughtthedismissalofprivaterespondentforviolationofSection19,RepublicAct
No.6770(OmbudsmanActof1989)andSection36ofPresidentialDecreeNo.807(CivilServiceDecree),
withanancillaryprayerforhispreventivesuspension.Forpurposesofthiscase,thechargesreferredtomay
besubsumedunderthecategoryofoppression,misconduct,anddisgracefulorimmoralconduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant
OmbudsmanAbelardoAportaderaoftheiroffice.
HereinrespondentOmbudsman,inanOrderdatedFebruary26,1996,approvedtheaforesaidresolution
with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of
suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent
Ombudsmandiscoveredthattheformer'snewcounselhadbeenhis"classmateandcloseassociate"hencehe
inhibitedhimself.ThecasewastransferredtorespondentDeputyOmbudsmanJesusF.Guerrerowho,inthe
now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent
Ombudsmanandexoneratedprivaterespondentsfromtheadministrativecharges.
II
 Inthepresentappeal,petitionerarguesthatSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770(OmbudsmanActof
1989)[1]pertinentlyprovidesthat

Inalladministrativediciplinarycases,orders,directivesordecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmay
beappealedtotheSupremeCourtbyfilingapetitionforcertiorariwithinten(10)daysfromreceiptofthe
writtennoticeoftheorder,directiveordecisionordenialofthemotionforreconsiderationinaccordance
withRule45oftheRulesofCourt.(Emphasissupplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits
thattheoffice of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaidRules,therightofappealallowedbyRepublicActNo.6770,nortolimitthepowerofreviewof
this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it
"necessarytotakeanalternativerecourseunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt,becauseofthedoubtitcreates
ontheavailabilityofappealsunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is
empoweredbytheConstitutionandthelawtopromulgateitsownrulesofprocedure.Section13(8),Article
XIofthe1987Constitutionprovides,amongothers,thattheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancan"(p)romulgateits
rulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsordutiesasmaybeprovidedby
law."
RepublicActNo.6770dulyimplementstheConstitutionalmandatewiththeserelevantprovisions:

Sec.14.Restrictions.xxxNocourtshallhearanyappealorapplicationforremedyagainstthedecisionor
findingsoftheOmbudsmanexcepttheSupremeCourtonpurequestiononlaw.

xxx

Sec.18.RulesofProcedure.(1)TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallpromulgateitsownrulesofprocedure
fortheeffectiveexerciseorperformanceofitspowers,functions,andduties.

xxx

Sec.23.FormalInvestigation.(1)AdministrativeinvestigationsbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallbe
inaccordancewithitsrulesofprocedureandconsistentwiththedueprocess.xxx

xxx

Sec.27.EffectivityandFinalityofDecisions.AllprovisionaryordersattheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanare
immediatelyeffectiveandexecutory.

Amotionforreconsiderationofanyorder,directiveordecisionoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmustbe
filedwithinfive(5)daysafterreceiptofwrittennoticeshallbeentertainedonlyonanyofthefollowing
grounds:

xxx

FindingsoffactbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwhensupportedbysubstantialevidenceareconclusive.
Anyorder,directiveordecisionimposingthepenaltyofpubliccensureorreprimand,suspensionofnotmore
thanonemonthsalaryshallbefinalandunappealable.

Inalladministrativedisciplinarycases,orders,directivesordecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmay
beappealedtotheSupremeCourtbyfilingapetitionforcertiorariwithinten(10)daysfromreceiptofthe
writtennoticeoftheorder,directiveordecisionordenialofthemotionforreconsiderationinaccordance
withRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

TheaboverulesmaybeamendedormodifiedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanastheinterestofjusticemay
require.
 Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non
avalabilityofappealinadministrativecases.SuchasSection7,RuleIIIofAdministrativeOrderNo.07.
Respondentsalsoquestiontheproprietyofpetitioner'spropositionthat,althoughshedefinitelyprefaced
herpetitionbycategorizingthesameas"anappealbycertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,"she
makestheaforequotedambivalentstatementwhichineffectasksthat,shouldtheremedyunderRule45be
unavailable,herpetitionbetreatedinthealternativeasanoriginalactionforcertiorariunderRule65. The
partiesthereafterengageinadiscussionofthedifferencesbetweenapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunder
Rule45andaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65.
Ultimately,theyalsoattempttoreviewandrationalizethedecisionofthisCourtapplyingSection27of
RepublicActNo.6770visvisSection7,RuleIIIofAdministrativeOrderNo.07.Ascorrectlypointedout
bypublicrespondents,OcampoIVvs.Ombudsman,etal.[3]andYoungvs.OfficeoftheOmbudsman,etal.
[4] were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[5] was
commencedbya petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6]
Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al. vs.
Vasquez,[9]whichwerefor certiorari,prohibitionand/ormandamusunderRule65.Albavs.Nitorreda,etal.
[10] was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon.
OmbudsmanAnianoDesierto,etal.[11]whichwasaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari.
Considering,howevertheviewthatthisCourtnowtakesofthecaseatbarandtheissuesthereinwhich
willshortlybeexplained,itrefrainsfrompreemptivelyresolvingthecontrovertedpointsraisedbytheparties
onthenatureandproprietyofapplicationofthewritofcertiorariwhenusedasamodeofappealorasthe
basisofaspecialoriginalaction,andwhetherornottheymayberesortedtoconcurrentlyoralternatively,
obviousthoughtheanswerstheretoappeartobe.Besides,someseeminglyobiterstatementsinYabutsand
Albacouldbearreexaminationandclarification.Hence,wewillmerelyobserveandlaydowntheruleatthis
juncturethatSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770isinvolvedonlywheneveranappealbycertiorariunder
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
whereanoriginalactionforcertiorariunderRule65isresortedtoasaremedyforjudicialreview,suchas
fromanincidentinacriminalaction.
III

Afterrespondents'separatecommentshadbeenfiled,theCourtwasintriguedbythefact,whichdoes
appeartohavebeenseriouslyconsideredbefore,thattheadministrativeliabilityofapublicofficialcouldfall
under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the
offensesimputedtohereinprivaterespondentwerebasedonbothSection19ofRepublicAct.No.6770and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807.Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative
disciplinarycasesweremadeappealabletotheCourtofAppealseffectiveMarch18,1995,whilethoseof
theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanareappealabletothisCourt.
Itcouldthusbepossiblethatinthesameadministrativecaseinvolvingtworespondents,theproceedings
againstonecouldeventuallyhavebeenelevatedtotheCourtofAppeals,whiletheothermayhavefoundits
waytotheOmbudsmanfromwhichitissoughttobebroughttothisCourt.Yetsystematicandefficientcase
managementwoulddictatetheconsolidationofthosecasesintheCourtofAppeals,bothforexpediencyand
toavoidpossibleconflictingdecisions.
ThenthereistheconsiderationthatSection30,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionprovidesthat"(n)o
lawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellateindictionoftheSupremeCourtasprovidedinthisConstitution
withoutitsadviceandconsent,"andthatRepublicActNo.6770,withitschallengedSection27,tookeffect
on November 17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the
case,neitherofwhomdidsointhiscase,butthatisnotaninflexiblerule,asweshallexplain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the
governmentandthejudgesaresworntosupportitsprovisions,thecourtsarenot atlibertytooverlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute trangresses the
authorityvestedinalegislativebody,itisthedutyofthecourtstodeclarethattheconstitution,andnotthe
statute,governsinacasebeforethemforjudgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the
pleadings,[13]therulehasbeenrecognizedtoadmitofcertainexceptions.Itdoesnotprecludeacourtfrom
inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement that it lacks jurisdiction to enter.If a
statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no
jurisdictionintheproceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily
followsthatitmayinquireintotheconstitutionalityofthestatute.[14]
Constitutionalquestion,notraisedintheregularandorderlyprocedureinthetrialareordinarilyrejected
unlessthejurisdictionofthecourtbeloworthatoftheappellatecourtisinvolvedinwhichcaseitmaybe
raisedatanytimeoronthecourt'sownmotion.[15]TheCourt exmeromotumaytakecognizanceoflackof
jurisdictionatanypointinthecasewherethefactisdeveloped.[16]Thecourthasaclearlyrecognizedright
todetermineitsownjurisdictioninanyproceeding.[17]
Theforegoingauthoritiesnotwithstanding,theCourtbelievedthatthepartiesheretoshouldbefurther
heardonthisconstitutionalquestion.Correspondingly,thefollowingresolutionwasissuedonMay14,1998,
thematerialpartsstatingasfollows:

TheCourtobservesthatthepresentpetition,fromtheveryallegationsthereof,is"anappealbycertiorari
underRule45oftheRulesofCourtfromthe'JointOrder(Re:MotionforReconsideration)'issuedinOMB
Adm.CaseNo.0950411,entitled'TeresitaG.Fabianvs.Engr.NestorV.Agustin,Asst.RegionalDirector,
RegionIVA,EDSA,QuezonCity,'whichabsolvedthelatterfromtheadministrativechargesforgrave
misconduct,amongother."

ItisfurtheraverredthereinthatthepresentappealtothisCourtisallowedunderSection27ofthe
OmbudsmanActof1987(R.A.No.6770)and,pursuantthereto,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanissuedits
RulesofProcedure,Section7whereofisassailedbypetitionerinthisproceeding.Itwillberecalledthat
R.A.No.6770wasenactedonNovember17,1989,withSection27thereofpertinentlyprovidingthatall
administrativediciplinarycases,orders,directivesordecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmaybe
appealedtothisCourtinaccordancewithRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

TheCourtnotes,however,thatneitherthepetitionnorthetwocommentsthereontookintoaccountor
discussedthevalidityoftheaforestatedSection27ofR.A.No.8770inlightoftheprovisionsofSection30,
ArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionthat"(n)olawshallbepassedincreasingtheappellatejurisdictionofthe
SupremeCourtasprovidedinthisConstitutionwithoutitsadviseandconsent."

TheCourtalsoinvitestheattentionofthepartiestoitsrelevantrulinginFirstLepantoCeramics,Inc.vs.
TheCourtofAppeals,etal.(G.R.No.110571,October7,1994,237SCRA519)andtheprovisionsofits
formerCircularNo.195,asnowsubstantiallyreproducedinRule43ofthe1997revisionoftheRulesof
CivilProcedure.

InviewofthefactthattheappellatejurisdictionoftheCourtisinvokedandinvolvedandinthiscase,and
theforegoinglegalconsiderationappeartoimpugntheconstitutionalityandvalidityofthegrantofsaid
appellatejurisdictiontoit,theCourtdeemsitnecessarythatthepartiesbeheardthereonandtheissuebefirst
resolvedbeforeconductingfurtherproceedingsinthisappellatereview.

ACCORDINGLY,theCourtResolvedtorequirethepartiestoSubmittheirpositionandargumentsonthe
mattersubjectofthisresolutionbyfilingtheircorrespondingpleadingswithinten(10)daysfromnotice
hereof.

IV

TherecordsdonotshowthattheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralhascompliedwithsuchrequirement,
hence the Court dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner
espousesthetheorythattheprovisioninSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770whichauthorizesanappealby
certioraritothisCourtoftheaforementionedadjudicationsoftheOmbudsmanisnotviolativeofSection30,
Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the
appellatejurisdictionofthisCourt"asprovidedinthisConstitution,"andsuchappellatejurisdictionincludes
"allcasesinwhichonlyanerrororquestionoflawisinvolved."SinceSection5(2)(e),ArticleVIIIofthe
Constitution authorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the
aforesaidfinaljudgementororders"asthelawortheRulesofCourtmayprovide,"saidSection27doesnot
increasethisCourtmayprovide,"saidsection27doesnotincreasethisCourt'sappellatejurisdictionsince,
by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be
raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court already has
jurisdiction.
Wearenotimpressedbythisdiscourse.Itoverlooksthefactthatbyjurisprudentialdevelopmentsover
theyears,thisCourthasallowedappealsbycertiorariunderRule45inasubstantialnumberofcasesand
instancesevenifquestionsoffactaredirectlyinvolvedandhavetoberesolvedbytheappellatecourt.[18]
Also,theveryprovisioncitedbypetitionerspecifiesthattheappellatejurisdictionofthisCourtcontemplated
thereinistobeexercisedover"finaljudgementsandordersoflowercourts,"thatis,thecourtscomposing
theintegratedjudicialsystem.Itdoesnotincludethequasijudicialbodiesoragencies,hencewheneverthe
legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasijudicial agency shall be reviewable by the
SupremeCourtortheCourtofAppeals,aspecificprovisiontothateffectisincludedinthelawcreatingthat
quasijudicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on appellate
procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are
referredtoandalreadyprovidedforinSection5,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by privaterespondent, the revised Rules of Civil
Procedure[19]precludeappealsfromquasijudicialagenciestotheSupremeCourtviaapetitionforreview
oncertiorariunderRule45.Inthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,Section1Rule45,on"AppealbyCertiorari
totheSupremeCourt,"explicitlystates:

SECTION1.FilingofpetitionwithSupremeCourt.Apersondesiringtoappealbycertiorarifroma
judgementorfinalorderorResolutionoftheCourtofAppeals,theSandiganbayan,theRegionalTrialCourt
orothercourtwheneverauthorizedbylaw,mayfilewiththeSupremeCourtaverifiedpetitionforreviewon
certiorari.Thepetitionshallraiseonlyquestionoflawwhichmustbedistinctlysetforth.(Italicsours).

ThisdiffersfromtheformerRule45ofthe1964RulesofCourtwhichmadementiononlyoftheCourt
ofAppeals,andhadtobeadoptedinstatutescreatingandprovidingforappealsfromcertainadministrative
orquasijudicialagencies,wheneverthepurposewastorestrictthescopeoftheappealtoquestionsoflaw.
Thatintendedlimitationonappellatereview,aswehavejustdiscussed,wasnotfullysubservedbyrecourse
to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasijudicial
agencies.
UnderthepresentRule45,appealsmaybebroughtthroughapetitionforreviewoncertioraributonly
fromjudgmentsandfinalordersofthecourtsenumeratedinSection1thereof.Appealsfromjudgmentsand
final orders of quasijudicial agencies[20] are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulatedandadoptedtoprovideforauniformruleofappellateprocedureforquasijudicialagencies.[21]
Itissuggested,however,thattheprovisionsofRule43shouldapplyonlyto"ordinary"quasijudicial
agencies,butnottotheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwhichisa"highconstitutionalbody."Weseenoreason
forthisdistinctionfor,ifhierarchicalrankshouldbeacriterion,thatpropositiontherebydisregardsthefact
thatRule43evenincludestheOfficeofthePresidentandtheCivilServiceCommission,althoughthelatter
is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a
constitutionallymandatedbutstatutorilycreatedbody.
RegardingthemisgivingthatthereviewofthedecisionoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanbytheCourtof
Appealswouldcoverquestionsoflaw,offactorofboth,wedonotperceivethatasanobjectionablefeature.
After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those
coming from the Civil Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared
than this Court to resolve the same.On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45
sinceitnowappliesonlytoappealsfromtheregularcourts.NeithercanweplaceitunderRule65sincethe
reviewthereinislimitedtojurisdictionalquestions.*
 ThesubmissionthatbecausethisCourthastakencognizanceofcasesinvolvingSection27ofRepublic
ActNo.6770,thatfactmaybeviewedas"acquiescence"or"acceptance"byitoftheappellatejurisdiction
contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not of
acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already
discussedthecasesreferredto,includingtheinaccuraciesofsomestatementstherein,andwehavepointed
out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now
underdiscussion,andwhenthatprovisionwouldnotapplyifitisajudicialreviewunderRule65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional
question,especiallywhenthecasecanbedecidedonothergrounds.Asageneralpropositionthatiscorrect.
Here,however,thereisanactualcasesusceptibleofjudicialdetermination.Also,theconstitutionalquestion,
at the instance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that
because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The
constitutionalquestionwastimelyraised,althoughitcouldevenberaisedanytimelikewisebyreasonofthe
jurisdictionalissueconfrontingtheCourt.Finally,theresolutionoftheconstitutionalissuehereisobviously
necessaryfortheresolutionofthepresentcase.[22]
Itis,however,suggestedthatthiscasecouldalsobedecidedonothergrounds,shortofpassingupon
the constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we must
rejectthesame.Thatprivaterespondentcouldbeabsolvedofthechargebecausethedecisionexonerating
himisfinalandunappealableassumesthatSection7,RuleIIIofAdministrativeOrderNo.07isvalid,but
that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this
administrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply the
validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of some
statementsthereinsomewhatatoddswithsettledrulesandthedecisionsofthisCourtonthesameissues,
hencetoinvokethesamewouldbetobegthequestion.
V

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of
RepublicActNo.6770cannotvalidlyauthorizeanappealtothisCourtfromdecisionsoftheOfficeofthe
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibitionwhich,ascorrectlyexplainedinFirstLepartoCeramics,Inc.vs.TheCourtofAppeals,elal. [23]
was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarilyburdentheCourt[24]
WeperforcehavetolikewiserejectthesupposedinconsistencyoftherulinginFirstLepantoCeramics
andsomestatementsinYabutandAlba,notonlybecauseofthedifferenceinthefactualsettings,butalso
becausethoseisolatedcrypticstatementsinYabutandAlbashouldbestbeclarifiedintheadjudicationon
the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of
competentjurisdiction.
FurthermoreinadditiontoourprecedingdiscussiononwhetherSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770
expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper
correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the
ConferenceCommitteeReportonS.B.No.453andH.B.No.13646,settingforththenewversionofwhat
wouldlaterbeRepublicActNo.6770,wasapprovedonsecondreadingbytheHouseofRepresentatives.[25]
TheSenatewasinformedoftheapprovalofthefinalversionoftheActonOctober2,1989[26]andthesame
wasthereafterenactedintolawbyPresidentAquinoonNovember17,1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the
procedure for appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of
Section30,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution.ItalsorevealsthatSenatorEdgardoAngara,asacoauthorandthe
principalsponsorofS.B.No.543admittedthatthesaidprovisionwillexpandthisCourt'sjurisdiction,and
thattheCommitteeonJusticeandHumanRightshadnotconsultedthisCourtonthematter,thus:
INTERPELLATIONOFSENATORSHAHANI

xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the
SupremeCourtwouldagreetosuchprovisioninthelightofSection30,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionwhich
requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed
that the Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the matter. He agreed that the
provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review,
adding that they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up to its enactment,
RepublicActNo.6770waseverreferredtothisCourtforitsadviceandconsent.[28]
VI

AsaconsequenceofourratiocinationthatSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770shouldbestruckdown
as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasijudicial
agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisionsofRule43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction
which, being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rulemaking power,
especially if it results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however,
where the law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a
proscriptive issue against the exercise of the rulemaking power of this Court. This brings to fore the
questionofwhetherSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770issubstantiveorprocedural.
Itwillbenotedthatnodefinitivelinecanbedrawnbetweenthoserulesorstatuteswhichareprocedural,
hence within the scope of this Court's rulemaking power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is
procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
proceduralandjurisdictionalsystem.
IndeterminingwhetheraruleprescribedbytheSupremeCourt,forthepracticeandprocedureofthe
lowercourts,abridges,enlarges,ormodifiesanysubstantiveright,thetestiswhethertherulereallyregulates
procedure,thatis,thejudicialprocessforenforcingrightsanddutiesrecognizedbysubstantivelawandfor
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes away a
vestedright,itisnotprocedural.Iftherulecreatesarightsuchastherighttoappeal,itmaybeclassifiedasa
substantivematterbutifitoperatesasameansoimplementinganexistingrightthentheruledealsmerely
withprocedure.[32]
Inthesituationunderconsideration,atransferbytheSupremeCourt,intheexerciseofitsrulemaking
power,ofpendingcasesinvolvingareviewofdecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmaninadministrative
disciplinaryactionstotheCourtofAppealswhichshallnowbevestedwithexclusiveappellatejurisdiction
thereover,relatestoprocedureonly.[33]Thisissobecauseitisnottherighttoappealofanaggrievedparty
whichisaffectedbythelaw.Thatrighthasbeenpreserved.Onlytheprocedurebywhichtheappealistobe
made or decided has been changed.The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a particular
remedy,whichmaybechangedbysubstitutionwithoutimpairingvestedrights,hencehecanhavenonein
rulesofprocedurewhichrelatetotheremedy.[34]
Furthermore,itcannotbesaidthattransferofappellatejurisdictiontotheCourtofAppealsinthiscase
isanactofcreatinganewrightofappealbecausesuchpoweroftheSupremeCourttotransferappealsto
subordinateappellatecourtsispurelyaproceduralandnotasubstantivepower.Neithercanweconsidersuch
transferasimpairingavestedrightbecausethepartieshavestillaremedyandstillacompetenttribunalto
administerthatremedy.[35]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court to
another,areproceduralandremedialmerelyandthat,assuch,theyareapplicabletoactionspendingatthe
timethestatutewentintoeffect[36]or,inthecaseatbar,whenitsinvaliditywasdeclared.Accordingly,even
fromthestandpointofjurisdictionexhypothesithevalidityofthetransferofappealsinsaidcasestotheCourt
ofAppealscanbesustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section7,RuleIIIofAdministrativeOrderNo.07(RulesofProcedureoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman),
andanyotherprovisionoflaworissuanceimplementingtheaforesaidActandinsofarastheyprovidefor
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are
herebydeclaredINVALIDandofnofurtherforceandeffect.
TheinstantpetitionisherebyreferredandtransferredtotheCourtofAppealsforfinaldisposition,with
saidpetitiontobeconsideredbytheCourtofAppealsprohacviceasapetitionforreviewunderRule43,
without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and
additionaldocumentsorrecordsasitmaydeemnecessaryandproper.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez,Quisumbing,andPurisimaJJ.,concur.

**Petitionersuggestsasalternativeprocedures,theapplicationofeitherRule65orRule43(Rollo,433).*

[1]EffectiveNovember17,1989.

[2]EffectiveMay1,1990.

[3]G.R.Nos.10344647,August30,1993,225SCRA725.

[4]G.R.No.110736,December27,1993.228SCRA718.

[5]G.R.No.111304,June17,1994,223SCRA310.

[6]G.R.No.107837,June27,1994,233SCRA439.

[7]G.R.No.102420,December20,1995,239SCRA283.

[8]G.R.No.118533,October4,1995,248SCRA700.

[9]G.R.No.111223,October6,1995,249SCRA35,jointlydecidingG.R.No.104604.

[10]G.R.No.120223,March13,1996,254SCRA753.

[11]G.R.No.127457,April13,1998.

[12]See16AmJur2d,ConstitutionalLaw,155156,pp531537.

[13]Op.Cit.,174,p.184.

[14]Mendozavs.SmallClaimsCourtofLosAngelesJ.D.,321P.2d9.

[15]Stateexre.Burgvs.CityofAlbuquerque,etal.249P.242.

[16]Statevs.Huber,40S.E.2d11.

[17]InreThomas,117N.E.2d740.

[18]SeeReyes,etal./vs.CourtofAppeals,etal.,G.R.No.110207,July11,1996,258SCRA651,andthecasesandinstances
thereinenumerated.
[19]EffectiveJuly1,1997.

[20]Atpresent,thesoleexceptionwhichstillsubsistsisajudgmentorfinalorderissuedundertheLaborCodeofthePhilippines
(Sec.2,Rule43),presentlyunderreexamination.
[21]Rule43wassubstantiallytakenfromandreproducestheappellateprocedureprovidedinCircularNo.191oftheSupreme
CourtdatedFebruary27,1991anditssubsequentRevisedAdministrativeCircNo.195whichtookeffectonJune1,1995.
[22] Board of Optometry, etc., et al. vs. Colet, G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 88, and cases therein cited Philippine Constitution
Association,etal.vs.Enriquez,etc.,eta1.,G.R.No.113105,August19,1994,235SCRA506,andcompanioncases.

[23]G.R.No.110571,October7,1994,237SCRA519.

[24]SeeRecordsofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,VoI.II,pp.130132.

[25]CitingtheJournalandRecordoftheHouseofRepresentatives,ThirdRegularSession,198990,Vol.II,p.512.

[26]CitingtheJournaloftheSenate,ThirdRegularSession,198990,Vol.1,pp.618619.

[27]JournaloftheSenate,SecondRegularSession,198889,Vol.1,p.77,August3,1988.

[28]28Ibid.,id.,id.,pp.111112,August9,1988.

[29]8NinthDecennialDigest155.

[30]Peopleexrel.Mijares,etal.vs.Kniss,etal.,357P.2d352.

[31]32Am.Jur.2d,FederalPracticeandProcedure,505,p.936.

[32]Peoplevs.Smith,205P.2d444.

[33]21CJS,Courts,502,p.769.

[34]34ElmParkIowa,Inc.vs.Denniston,etal.,280NW2d262.

[35]35Id.,id.

[36]21CJS,Courts,502,pp.769770,5NR2d1242.