EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864. December 16, 2004]

Atty. ANTONIO D. SELUDO, complainant, vs. Judge ANTONIO J. FINEZA,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Caloocan City, respondent.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must

exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety [1] and self-
restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. [2] A judge
should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant.
Sadly, respondent judge failed to live up to such standards of judicial conduct.

In a complaint[3] dated July 24, 2003 filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation of Canon
2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo alleged inter alia that on June 28,
2003, respondent judge filed with the same court (Branch 128), a complaint for
revocation of notarial commission against him (complainant), docketed as
Revocation of Commission No. C-001-(2003).

During the hearing on July 8, 2003, respondent judge uttered vulgar and
insulting words against complainant, thus:
Court:

Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo?

Atty. Seludo:

Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under what authority is the complainant appearing in
this case, Your Honor? Is he going to prosecute this case?

Court:
He is appearing for himself as petitioner.

Atty. Seludo:

Under what authority, Your Honor?

Judge Fineza:

If the respondent knows how to read English, he would find in the petition itself that under
the rule, we are obligated to bring to the court any anomaly or dishonesty or dereliction in
the performance of a duty of a Court Officer. And may I point out and make it on record
that this time, despite the fact of respondents answer, last paragraph of page 1 states
and I quote; I think page 2, and I read: That the undersigned has taken steps to prevent
a recurrence of the lapses in the notarial registry. An informal inquiry made by this Judge
this afternoon from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the reply was that the
respondent has not filed any notarial report for the year 2003, x x x.

Court:

You want to put that on record?

Judge Fineza:

Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy calls that when someone is speaking, a courtesy
should require. May I ask the Judge to remind him . . .

Court:

Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.

Atty. Seludo:

Yes, Your Honor.

Judge Fineza: (continuation)

Before the Executive Judge or Investigating Judge finally inhibits himself, he should order the
Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a certification to the effect that for the year 2003, no
notarial report has been made by the respondent which is a ground for cancellation of his
notarial commission. Thats why I raised this, so that while the case is pending, he should
be suspended from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that he be declared in contempt
for laughing?

Court:

Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.

Judge Fineza: (to respondent)

Putang-ina mo eh!
Court:

Please be just civil with each other, Judge Fineza.

Judge Fineza:

Why is he laughing? Let it be put on record that he has a moronic attitude. Thats why he
was laughing.

Court:

Judge Fineza, are you making an additional manifestation or additional charge against the
respondent because of the information that you got now from the Office of the Clerk of
Court?

Judge Fineza:

No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my petition, that during the pendency of this case,
the respondent should be suspended.

Court:

He should be suspended because of the non-compliance?

Judge Fineza:

Yes, Your Honor. He promised in his answer, that he has remedied the situation.

xxx
Atty. Seludo:

Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the manifestations of the complainant be put on record,
Your Honor.

Judge Fineza:

If Your Honor please, I dont know if this guy is really stupid. This is a court proceeding and
everything that is being taken is recorded. If you want to use that for libel, you cannot.
This is a Court proceeding, we should have privileged communication.

Court:

Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from calling the other person, who is a brother in
profession?

Judge Fineza:

Im just telling the truth, Your Honor.

Court:
But I would like to ask you to use temperate words. You are brother lawyers. If you have
nothing more to say, I would like to adjourn this preliminary conference. I will indorse all
the records to the 1st Vice Executive Judge who will notify you of the schedule for the
continuation of the investigation.

continuation . . .

We will prepare the minutes and we will let you sign, Judge Fineza.

Judge Fineza:

Where is the minutes? This is not the prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Okay.

Court:

I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I hope you will be more civil to everybody here just
like anybody who is civil with you.

Judge Fineza:

Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor.

Court:

Accepted.

Judge Fineza:

And now you adjourn?

Court:

You are requesting for that? I will give you copy so that you can be satisfied. What do you
say, Atty. Basa? You are the collaborating counsel. Probably, you are being more civil
with us.

Atty. Basa:

May we just ask for the adjournment of the session, Your Honor.

Judge Fineza:

You will give me the minutes now?

Court:

We will provide you including with the copy of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself.[4]
 In his comment[5] dated September 8, 2003, respondent judge admitted that
he uttered derogatory words during the proceeding held on July 8, 2003. He,
however, explained that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes
since November, 2002, causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must be
the reason why he could not control his outburst. Besides, the incident was
precipitated by the conduct of the complainant and the Executive Judge.
Complainant was unkind and impolite to him. He kept on interrupting him. In
fact, after his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him.
Moreover, when he (respondent) asked the Executive Judge to cite complainant
in contempt of court, the latter stood up with clenched fists and acted in a
menacing manner.

Respondent further admitted in his answer that he is aware that there is no

justification for his use of improper language, and for this, he is sincerely contrite
and penitent. But as a member of the bench for over twenty years, he expected
the complainant to respect him, to treat him with politeness, dignity and
courtesy, and to give him his due as a magistrate.

On January 9, 2004, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint [6] on

the ground that he is no longer interested in pursuing the case since respondent
has retired from the judiciary.[7]

In his Report and Recommendation, [8] Court Administrator Presbitero

Velasco made the following evaluation:
EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the issue of desistance of complainant to pursue
instant complaint. The settled rule is that the complainants withdrawal of his complaint,
or desistance from pursuing the same, does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the
administrative case. The outcome of an administrative action cannot depend on the will
or pleasure of the complainant who, for reasons of his own, may condone what may be
detestable. Certainly, complainants desistance cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction,
under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate and decide complaints
against erring employees of the judiciary. Otherwise stated, such unilateral act does not
bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.
As to the fact that respondent has already retired from the service, the Court has pointed
out in several cases that the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service
does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find ourselves in accord with complainants
observation that respondent has indeed consciously ignored to heed the Courts
advice and warning when he was admonished for using intemperate language in
A.M. No. P-01-1522. A careful scrutiny of the transcripts taken on that unfateful
day reveals that respondent has precisely uttered the following vitriolic language
against complainant:
a) Putang ina mo!
b) If respondent knows how to read English.
c) Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude.
d) If Your Honor plese, I dont know if this guy is really stupid.
As shown by the records, respondents attention was called several times by the
Investigating Executive Judge to stay calm and be civil. In fact, his attitude was
generally antagonistic not only to complainant but also to the Executive Judge who
dared to question his motives/oppose his view. Such, is a glaring display of
haughtiness and arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful behavior reflected
adversely on the good image of the judiciary and fell short of the standards expected of a
magistrate of the law. His justifications of provocation (which we found none),
discourtesy of complainant and the various illnesses he professed to be suffering should
not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a member of the bench he should have
adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don the judicial robe. His
choice of words, aside from being inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack of
judicial decorum. The respect and dignity of the court has to be upheld hence,
respondent should not have acted with anger and shouted at complainant who must have
suffered embarrassment in front of many people. He should have maintained his
composure for patience and courtesy are marks of culture and good-breeding.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of official duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. The Code dictates that a
judge must behave with propriety at all times.
Because respondent has already retired from the service, dismissal or suspension is no
longer feasible as a penalty for the present charges. Therefore, we opine that a fine is
appropriate under the circumstances. Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty of
which is either dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6 months without salary and benefits or a
fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. Considering that this is
not the first offense of similar nature committed by respondent, we believe a penalty
of P20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts complained of, which amount should be
taken from his retirement benefits.

Court Administrator Velasco recommended that (1) the instant administrative

case be re-docketed as an administrative matter; and that (2) respondent judge
be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

In our Resolution[9] dated June 21, 2004, we required the parties to manifest
whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
and records filed.

On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a Manifestation [10] requesting a

formal hearing of this case. In our Resolution dated September 20, 2004, [11] we
denied his request for lack of merit.

For his part, complainant, in his Manifestation dated August 12, 2004,
[12] stated that he is submitting the matter to our sound discretion.

Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provide:
Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xxx
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIES
xxx
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge
should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made
for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.

In ascribing the words "moronic attitude," "stupid", "if he knows how to

read English" and putang ina mo to complainant during the proceeding before
the Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming of a
magistrate. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That
respondent was suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He
could have asked the assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the
case. As correctly observed by the Court Administrator, his disgraceful behavior
tainted the good image of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.
 We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires
that they must at all times be temperate in their language, [13] refraining from
inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[14] or from resorting "to the language of
vilification."[15] In the same vein, in Fidel vs. Caraos,[16] we held that although,
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech
in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient
and courteous both in conduct and in language.

Respondent judges behavior is incompatible with judicial temperament

expected of him. He was discourteous, not only to complainant, but also to the
trial judge. His actuation constitutes palpable violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01,
and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

This is not respondent's first offense. In A.M. No. P-01-1522,[17] we

reprimanded him for failing to exercise prudence and restraint in his language.
Obviously, he has not reformed.

We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting

violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, this administrative offense is considered serious,
[18] punishable under Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph A(3),

thus:
Sec. 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No.
3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court
in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
x x x.
Sec.11. Sanctions.- A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY

of gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE
of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., on leave.
Garcia, J., no part.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-39516-17 January 28, 1975

ROSARIO CASTILLO and SONIA VILLASANTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE CELESTINO JUAN, respondent.
Castillo and Morales Law Offices for petitioners.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:
In this certiorari proceedings, petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in two rape cases, assail
the actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification on the ground of bias and prejudice. What was done by
him, according to their strongly-worded petition, was in disregard of the highly-prized ideal in adjudication, likewise a
due process requirement, that a litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge."1 Briefly, on two separate occasions on August 15 and 27, 1974, in the secrecy of his chambers he informed
petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and
impressed upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have
such accused indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the embarrassment
occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future. These conversations took place even before the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. Respondent Judge
could not very well deny that he did invite them to confer with him, but he would impress on this Court that their
version should not be let credence and that he was prompted to act thus from the best of motives, "as an act of charity"
and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice." 2 With the problem thus laid bare and the essentials exposed to view, it is
obvious that the petitions are impressed with merit. Respect for a number of decisions, most of them recent in
character, yields no other conclusion.
Petitioners are entitled to the remedy sought. Respondent Judge must be disqualified from further hearing the cases.
1. In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the
appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching
hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to
feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be
obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear
both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not
necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What
is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartially. What has been said is not
merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. As set forth in Mateo Jr. v.
Villaluz:3 "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does
not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in
fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge."" 4 The above excerpt is from the leading case
of Gutierrez v. Santos.5 The Villaluz decision is only one of a number of cases where Gutierrez was cited with
approval.6 In Geotina v. Gonzales,7 a judge, according to Justice Castro, the ponente, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 8
It is in line with the above due process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for disqualification of judge 9 outside
of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection, or his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review. 10 The 1964 amendment contains this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above." 11 An excerpt from the Villaluz opinion is again relevant: "Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside
of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity,
thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such
should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated." 12 What is more, in
the event that a judge may be unable to discern for himself his inability to meet the test of the cold neutrality required of him, this Court has seen to it that he should disqualify
himself. 13 From what has been set forth, this certainly is another one of such cases.

2. This is not to discount in its entirety the submission of respondent Judge, who argued on his own behalf, that his
final decision would be dependent on the evidence that could be presented by petitioners. What cannot be denied,
however, is that after such conferences, they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even before
they had been fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They could very well conclude then that there
was a prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did because any monetary settlement would
benefit petitioners, considering their straitened financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that,
according to his best lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said
to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The administration of justice
would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for disqualification.
3. It is to be made clear, moreover, that nothing said in this opinion has reference to the merits of the two prosecutions
for rape. That is not a matter before us. The controversy passed upon is whether respondent Judge should continue to
preside at such trial. The decision reached goes no further than that he should not. That accomplished, the hearings
should continue, with the outcome dependent on an appraisal, according to law, of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution and the defense. .
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and respondent Judge is ordered to desist from further
conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape, Criminal Cases Nos. 733 and 734 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, respectively entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa and People of the
Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J, is on leave.

EN BANC
 [A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004]

JORDAN P. OKTUBRE, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON P. VELASCO,

Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern Leyte, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, Oppression,

and Gross Ignorance of the Law filed by Jordan P. Oktubre (complainant)
against Judge Ramon P. Velasco (respondent Judge) of the Municipal Trial
Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte (MTC Maasin).

Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise DArcy vda. De Paler

(DArcy), a non-resident American. DArcy is the widow of Abraham Paler
(Abraham), a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondent Judge is
Abrahams nephew.

During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey commercial and residential

building (Paler building) in Maasin City on a lot he owned in common with his
siblings. After Abraham died, none of his heirs petitioned for the settlement of his
estate. DArcy, through complainant, administered the Paler building. At the time
material to this case, three tenants [1] occupied the Paler building with some
rooms reserved for Abrahams relatives. While he had a room in the Paler
building, complainant rarely used it as he stayed most of the time in Javier,
Sogod, Southern Leyte. The tenants pay their rent to complainant.

Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998, respondent
Judge, with DArcys permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days. He
sought an extension of his stay but DArcy turned down his request since during
her next visit to the country she would use the room respondent Judge then
occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to continue staying in the
Paler building by transferring to a room reserved for a sister of Abraham.

Complainant alleges that DArcys refusal to grant extension to respondent

Judges stay triggered the following series of events narrated in his Complaint:
6. In April 2000[,] Judge Velasco in a surprise move sent letters xxx to the tenants of the
building in which he passed himself off as the administrator of the estate of Gaspar Paler
[Abrahams father] and co-heir of Abraham Paler, and directed said tenants to deposit
their monthly rentals to his office at [the] Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maasin City
despite the fact that no action has been filed yet for that matter in court;
xxx
10. In August 2000[,] Judge Velasco sent a strongly worded letter to Dr. [DArcy] with
the very obvious purpose of intimidating the latter. The letter contains categorical
declarations that he is taking over possession of the building, misrepresentation among
others of Judge Velasco that he did it in collaboration with his other relatives, legal
arguments, and mostly intimidating words coming from a Judge-Lawyer. Worse, he used
his offices (MTC) letterhead [for] this personal but threatening 5-page letter xxx;
xxx
12. [On September 9, 2000], Judge Velasco without my knowledge and permission
moved out from the garage [of the Paler building] the service jeep owned by Dr.
[DArcy] and put it outside of the building causing it to be exposed to the sun and rain;
xxx
14. Worried about the vehicle, Dr. [DArcy] right away instructed me to return the
vehicle (jeep) to the garage and to do something in such a way that it could not anymore
be removed by Judge Velasco;
15. On September 15, 2000, I proceeded to Maasin City with the sole intention of having
the vehicle returned to its rightful place. Upon arrival, I was thankful that Judge Velasco
was then at Cebu City so that I could be able to return the jeep without fear of opposition
by or confrontation with him. With the assistance of xxx two [others], I returned the
vehicle to the garage and removed one of its wheels and placed it inside the computer
room of the building;
xxx
17. On September 22, 2000, Judge Velasco destroyed the padlock of my room and
changed it with another one including the second floor entrance padlock to the third
floor with the precise purpose of controlling the ingress and egress of the said building;[2]

On 28 September 2000, complainant filed a complaint against respondent

Judge with the Punong Barangay of Abgao, Maasin City. Complainant charged
respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room and of the door leading to
the third floor of the Paler building.Complainant also charged respondent Judge
for taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building. On 2 October 2000,
complainant and respondent Judge met at the Office of Punong Barangay of
Abgao for mediation but there was no settlement as respondent Judge
questioned complainants residency in Abgao. Complainant described what
transpired after the meeting thus:
20. xxx After the hearing, a police officer approached and informed me that the chief of
Police of Maasin City wanted to talk to me. As expected [of] every law-abiding citizen, I
went with them [to] the Police Station. Thereat, the Chief of Police confronted me with a
warrant of [a]rrest. The warrant and the supporting documents show[ed] that I was
charged with Robbery in relation to the wheel I removed [from the jeep] and it was
issued/signed by Judge Velasco. While still [in a] state of shock because of this
malicious prosecution, the police authorities placed me behind bars;
21. That upon further examination of the complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 5485
of [the MTC Maasin] as well as the attached document thereto, it was found out to the
surprise of everyone that the complaint of Robbery filed by the Chief of Police was
supported by the sole affidavit dated September 29, 2000 of a witness in the person of
no other than Judge Ramon Velasco himself, xxx;
22. That I was locked up in jail for about six (6) hours before I was able to put up a cash
bond of P24,000.00 before the RTC, Br. 25, Maasin City. As I was about to be released
in the afternoon of the same day, a subpoena was served at me in the City Jail which
required me to file my counter-affidavit to the complaint [for Robbery] xxx;
23. That on October 16, 2000, I received another Order dated October 4, 2000 issued by
the respondent [J]udge directing me to submit [a] counter-affidavit in another case [for]
Malicious Mischief docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5486 of [MTC Maasin]. The
Complaint xxx was supported by the same and only affidavit of Judge Velasco
dated September 29, 2000 which he used in the aforecited criminal Complaint of
Robbery xxx;
24. That about the first week of November 2000, I received another subpoena
dated October 23, 2000 issued by Judge Velasco. This time a Criminal Case of
Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents was filed against
Dr. [DArcy], my principal. The Complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 5493 of
[MTC Maasin], was supported by xxx yet [another] xxx affidavit of Judge Velasco xxx
dated October 18, 2000 xxx;[3]

Complainant sought to annul the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485
by filing a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
25, Maasin City. The RTC granted the petition and annulled the warrant in its
Order of 7 December 2000.[4]

Because of these events, complainant filed this complaint on 18 January

2001. Complainant prays that the Court discipline respondent Judge for using
his salas letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own criminal
complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No.
5485.
 In his Comment dated 18 April 2001, respondent Judge admitted doing the
acts complainant recounted about the Paler building, its tenants, and DArcys
jeep. Respondent Judge claimed, however, that he merely acted to protect his
maternal co-heirs interest in the Paler building and in the other properties
claimed by DArcy. Respondent Judge also stated the following qualifications: (1)
he changed the padlock of the grill door leading to the third floor as this was
already worn-out; (2) he had to open forcibly complainants room to clean it as it
was already stinking; (3) he temporarily transferred the jeep out of the Paler
building because the garage had to be cleaned; and (4) he sent the demand
letters to the Paler buildings tenants based on Rule 73 [5] of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge added that complainant illegally destroyed the lock of the
garage gate when he returned the jeep. [6]

On his filing and taking cognizance of his own complaints for Robbery,
Malicious Mischief, and Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents,
respondent Judge alleges:
P-LVIII
That construing the actuation of the complainant [in filing the complaints before the
Barangay Captain] to be deliberate in defiance of my order and utmost disrespect of my
person and my official capacity [sic] and to vindicate my name, honor and reputation,
and evident infractions of our penal laws, I filed the criminal complaint for ROBBERY
against the private complainant Jordan Oktubre and docketed as Crim. Case No. 5485
and another criminal complaint for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF docketed as Crim. Case
No. R-5486 xxx;
P-LIX
That the xxx institution of the criminal complaint for Robbery was not a malicious suit
as it was anchored on facts as conveyed and attested by [witnesses] and the corpus
delicti of the crime of Robbery and Malicious Mischief are established as shown by the
destroyed garage padlock and the fact of loss of the right wheel rim and tire of the jeep;
P-LX
It is further qualified admitted [sic] that the institution of the suit against the private
complainant Jordan Oktubre was by way of protecting the interest of my co-heirs and to
enforce the law as my judicial mandate dictates;
P-LXI
That it is likewise admitted that another criminal case for FALSIFICATION OF
DOCUMENT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT
was filed against the principal of Jordan P. Oktubre in the person of Dr. Peggy DArcy
Paler and docketed as Crim. Case No. R-5493 on the basis of the unearthed evidently
fraudulent and deliberate act of falsification by non-disclosure of a material fact relative
to her citizenship, she being an American citizen, on her Affidavit of Sole Adjudication
xxx;
P-LXII
That after proper evaluation of the Complaint for Robbery against complainant Jordan P.
Oktubre and referral to jurisprudence on this matter, particularly the cited cases of PP.
vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373, Webb vs. De Leon, et al., GR 121234, 63 SCAD 196, in
utmost good faith, with the end in view of dispensation of justice expeditiously [sic] and
not to frustrate the ends of justice and finding probable cause thereof for the issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest, [I] verily issued the Warrant of Arrest against complainant Jordan
Oktubre;
P-LXIII
That it is further admitted that the Court [in the complaint for Robbery] issued a subpoena to the
complainant to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences pursuant to Rule 112,
Sec. 3, Rules of Court xxx;[7]

Respondent Judge inhibited himself from the three criminal cases in his
Orders of 4, 6, and 25 October 2000.

In its Report (Report) dated 13 March 2002, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10,000 for
Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
The Report reads:
The records of this case show that complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested and
detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest xxx and a Commitment Order xxx issued by the
respondent [J]udge, the basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery supported
by an affidavit executed by the respondent Judge Ramon Velasco. Also, in Criminal
Case No. 5486 for Malicious Mischief, records show that the complaint is supported by
[the] lone affidavit of Judge Ramon Velasco xxx and in an Order marked Annex I,
accused Jordan Oktubre was directed to submit his counter-affidavit by the respondent.
Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent [J]udge [of the warrant of arres], herein
complainant elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Maasin, Southern Leyte via Certiorari and/or Prohibition with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC in its Order
dated December 7, 2000 xxx ruled that respondent [J]udge in issuing a warrant of arrest
violative of [Rule 112, Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court] may not only be committing
grave abuse of discretion but gross ignorance of the law xxx. Consequently, the warrant
of arrest was declared null and void.
Considering that respondent [J]udge is the complainant o[f] the cases, his issuance of the
warrant of arrest is in violation of Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 37 of
the Judiciary Act of 1980. Having resorted to such act, he acted as the private
complainant, xxx judge and executioner.
It was also noted that in [the] letters xxx sent to the tenants of the Paler Building and to
Dr. [DArcy], respondent [Judge] used the letter head of his Office Municipal Trial Court
of Maasin, Southern Leyte and signed the same as its Presiding Judge. This to our mind,
constitutes undue influence.[8]

The OCAs recommendation finding respondent Judge guilty of Grave

Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority is well-
taken. However, the Court finds the recommended penalty disproportionate to
respondent Judges offenses and instead imposes on him the penalty of
dismissal from service.

Respondent Judge is Liable for Grave

Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority

Canon 2, Rule 2.03 (Rule 2.03) of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code)
provides:
A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Rule 3.12 of the Code (Rule 3.12), which is substantially similar to Rule 137,
Section 1 (Rule 137, Section 1) of the 1964 Rules of Court, [9] mandates that
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matters in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows that the judges spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition. (Emphasis
added)

For inappropriately using his Offices letterhead and for acting on his own
criminal complaints against complainant and DArcy, respondent Judge violated
these rules. Thus, he is liable for grave misconduct [10] and grave abuse of
authority.

On Respondent Judges Use of

His Offices Letterhead

Respondent Judge does not deny sending several letters bearing his salas
letterhead on matters involving an apparent dispute in the administration of the
estates of two relatives. His excuse for doing so is that he wanted to protect the
interest of his maternal co-heirs in the Paler building and other disputed
properties. This explanation is flimsy. Even if he is the administrator of the
estates of Abraham and Gaspar Paler (Gaspar), Abrahams father, and
representative of his maternal co-heirs,[11] respondent Judge has no business
using his salas letterhead for private matters. Respondent Judge should know
that a courts letterhead should be used only for official correspondence.
Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he
further required them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then
staying at the Paler building. By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the
words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended to use the prestige of his judicial office to
advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs.

On Respondent Judges Failure

To Recuse Himself from His
Criminal Complaints

As we noted in Perez v. Suller,[12] the rule on disqualification of judges under

Rule 3.12 and Rule 137, Section 1
[S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case
in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is
intended to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently

construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his
impartiality.[13] Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of
partiality is proscribed.[14]

Here, although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints,

respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even
issued a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting in the arrest and
detention of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12
and, by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary stages
of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case does not fall under
any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision
itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d)
prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to
counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
respectively. Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in
cases where he is a party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his
own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that such was no longer
included in the enumeration in Rule 3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.

Respondent Judges subsequent inhibition from the three cases does not
detract from his culpability for he should not have taken cognizance of the cases
in the first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the
denial of a party of his right to due process. This became fait accompli when
respondent Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging was the
effect of respondent Judges conduct on the image of the judiciary, which without
a doubt, immeasurably suffered from it. It is well to remind respondent Judge
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law xxx. If judges, who swore to obey and uphold
the constitution, would conduct themselves xxx in wanton disregard and violation of the
rights of complainant, then the people, especially those with whom they come in direct
contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary
itself, not to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which the judiciary is
founded.[15]
 Respondent Judge is
Liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent Judge does not deny that he did not conduct a preliminary
investigation on the complaint for Robbery in Criminal Case No. 5485 where he
issued the warrant of arrest against complainant. As justification, he claims that
he acted in good faith based on pertinent jurisprudence. This explanation
deserves scant consideration. Section 3 of Rule 112 sets out in detail the
procedure for conducting preliminary investigation, thus:
Procedure. Except as provided for in Sec. 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting
documents in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The said affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any fiscal or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and
other supporting documents.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent
shall also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies
thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant. Within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents.
He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during
which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the
investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within the (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced,
the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold
the respondent for trial.[16]

Criminal Case No. 5485 involves Robbery punishable either with prision
mayor (six years and one day to 12 years) or prision mayor in its minimum
period (six years and one day to eight years), depending on the value of the
property taken.[17] In either case, the offense falls under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts for which Section 1 of Rule 112 mandates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.[18] As one of the officers authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation under Section 2 [19] of Rule 112, respondent Judge is
duty-bound to know and strictly follow the procedure and requirements in Rule
112.

Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when he proceeded to issue the

warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides:
When warrant of arrest may issue. x x x (b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the
municipal trial court judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

This is the same procedure prescribed in Section 2, [21] Article III of the
Constitution and in Section 5, Rule 126 [22] of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying with
such mandatory procedure[23] is liable for gross ignorance of the law.
[24] In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[25] we ruled:

We have held, in a number of cases before this Court, that the procedure described in
Section 6 of Rule 112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same would amount to
a denial of due process. With respect to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of
arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable cause exists: 1) through an
examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses, which
examination should be 2) in the form of searching questions and answers. This rule is
not merely a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the most
sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the due process requirement. (Emphasis supplied)

The only instance where the judge may dispense with such procedure is
when the application for the warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial
Court judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the report of the
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause. [26]Criminal Case No. 5485 does not
fall under such exception.

The Penalty Appropriate to the Case

The OCA recommends the imposition of P10,000 fine on respondent Judge.

As earlier stated, the Court finds this penalty disproportionate to the gravity of
respondent Judges offenses. In several cases, [27] we have imposed the penalty
of dismissal against judges for grave misconduct alone. In OCA v. Judge Bara-
acal,[28] we dismissed a lower court judge for grave misconduct. Considering that
respondent Judges grave misconduct is compounded by his other offenses of
grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, his dismissal from
service is more than justified.[29]

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Ramon P. Velasco, Presiding Judge of

the Municipal Trial Court, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Grave Abuse of Authority for
violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled
corporations. However, he shall receive any accrued leaves due him as of this
date.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

JUDGE MONA LISA T. TABORA, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26, Present:
Complainant,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
 NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA, and
- versus - ABAD, JJ.

(Ret.) JUDGE ANTONIO A.

CARBONELL, former Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando Promulgated:
City, La Union, Branch 27,
Respondent. June 18, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 filed
by Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora (Judge Tabora),
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26,
and Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr. (Lacsamana), Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court
(OIC-BCOC) of the same court. Tabisula charged Judge Tabora with (1) violation of
Section 3(e)[1] of Republic Act No. 3019[2] (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1, Canon 3[3] and Section 2, Canon 5[4] of A.M.
No. 03-05-01-SC[5] or the New Code of Judicial Conduct; (3) violation of Republic Act
No. 6713[6] (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees; and (4) gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
oppression, serious neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Further, Tabisula charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections 3(e)[7] and
(f)[8] of RA 3019; (2) violation of Articles 226[9] and 315(3)(c)[10] of Act No.
3815[11] or the Revised Penal Code; and (3) violation of Sections 5(a),[12] (d),[13] and
(e)[14] of RA 6713.
 The Facts

In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6840
entitled Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank, Inc. for specific performance with
accounting and damages. This case was raffled to the RTC of San Fernando City, La
Union, Branch 26 presided by Judge Tabora. Tabisula narrated that due to the prolonged
absence of Judge Tabora caused by a serious illness, Judge Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge
Carbonell), now retired but then pairing/vice-executive judge of the RTC of San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, took over and heard the case from the beginning
up to its termination.

Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by Judge Carbonell
so she requested from Lacsamana a copy of the decision. However, despite several
requests, Lacsamana allegedly refused to furnish Tabisula with a copy of the decision
upon the instruction of Judge Tabora, who at that time had already reported back to
work. Tabisula sent a Letter-Request dated 24 August 2006 addressed to the RTC asking
Judge Tabora to direct Lacsamana to give a copy of the decision rendered by Judge
Carbonell. However, instead of granting the request, Judge Tabora issued an Order dated
30 August 2006, informing Tabisula that an Order dated 8 August 2006 was issued by
the RTC requiring the parties to submit their respective memorandum within 15 days
from receipt of the Order. Also, Judge Tabora informed Tabisula that even if the pairing
judge was the one who heard the case from beginning to end, the prerogative of
rendering the decision still rests entirely on the presiding judge.

On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse to

Tabisula. Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October 2006 to Judge Carbonell
requesting for a copy of his decision. On 9 October 2006, Judge Carbonell replied to
Tabisulas letter and attached a copy of his decision which favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and deliberately
changing, altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a court of equal and
concurrent jurisdiction. Tabisula added that this has caused her undue injury since the
defendant in Civil Case No. 6840, Rang-Ay Rural Bank Inc., represented by its
President, Ives Q. Nisce, was allegedly a relative of Judge Taboras husband.

Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and
gross inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a copy of the decision rendered by
Judge Carbonell despite several verbal and written demands.
In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified that his official
designation is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-BCOC by Judge Tabora on
1 August 2006. Lacsamana explained that Judge Carbonell handed him a copy of his
decision in Civil Case No. 6840 on 11 August 2006. However, that day being a Friday,
Lacsamana was able to submit the decision to Judge Tabora only on the next working
day, 14 August 2006. Judge Tabora informed him to just leave a copy of the decision at
her table. From then on, Lacsamana had no more knowledge of what happened to the
decision.

Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisulas Letter dated 24 August
2006 addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana reasoned that he was not the person in
charge of releasing decisions, orders, and other documents relative to a pending case and
it was not within his functions to release a decision without the presiding judges
authority.

Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with the OCA. Judge
Tabora indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May 2006 and was later diagnosed
with a serious illness. Prior to her surgery, she conducted a hearing in Civil Case No.
6840 on 21 April 2006. However, the same had been reset due to the absence of
Tabisulas counsel.

On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear Civil Case No.
6840 on the basis of Judge Taboras absence. On 26 May 2006, while Judge Tabora was
on leave, Judge Carbonell proceeded to hear the testimony of the lone witness for the
defendant in the case without first issuing an order granting the motion filed by Tabisula.

On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on 19 June 2006,
Judge Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by the defendants and issued
an Order submitting the case for resolution.

On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records, Judge Tabora noticed
that Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for decision on 19 June 2006 by Judge
Carbonell. Since the 90-day period for rendering a decision was soon to expire, she
immediately issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 directing the parties to submit their
respective memorandum.

Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil Case No. 6840 a
decision which was received by Lacsamana. On 14 August 2006, Lacsamana turned over
a copy of the decision to Judge Tabora.

After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to Judge Carbonell and
informed him that she issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 requiring the parties to
submit their respective memorandum. Judge Carbonell immediately cut her off and told
her to just recall her earlier order.

Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found out that
Judge Carbonells decision was not in accordance with the facts of the case and the
applicable law and appeared to have unjustly favored Tabisula.

Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the unpromulgated decision
of Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonells decision was never officially released to any of the
parties and did not form part of the records of the case.

Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly furnished Tabisula
with a copy of his decision a month after the decision of Judge Tabora had already been
released to the parties. Also, Tabisulas insistence for the release of Judge Carbonells
decision made her determined to exercise her judicial independence since such decision
would result in a miscarriage of justice.

Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840 was a bank, a
corporate entity with a distinct personality. She was not disqualified from sitting in the
case since under Section 1, Rule 137[15] of the Rules of Court her husbands relation
with the banks representative was remote or way beyond the 6th degree. Thus, the
relationship has absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the case. Judge Tabora prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no sufficient and factual legal
basis to hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana liable for any of the charges filed by
Tabisula. The OCA stated that Judge Tabora, in rendering her own decision in Civil Case
No. 6840, was well within her power to decide the case since she had full authority over
all cases pending in her official station. As for Lacsamana, the OCA found that he could
not be faulted for his failure to comply with Tabisulas request since he was only obeying
the lawful order of Judge Tabora, his superior. Also, Judge Carbonells decision in Civil
Case No. 6840 was not even promulgated and did not form part of the official records of
the case. Thus, there was no prior existing valid decision.

The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of Judge Carbonell
since he overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge for Branch 26 and has
shown unusual interest in the disposition of Civil Case No. 6840.

The OCA recommended that:

(1) that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as against respondents Judge

Mona Lisa T. Tabora and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo V. Lacsamana
for lack of merit;

(2) that the COMMENT of respondent Judge be considered as a

complaint against Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, and that Judge Carbonell be
 furnished with a copy of such comment and, be in turn REQUIRED to
COMMENT thereon.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1) dismiss the
administrative complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana for lack of merit; and (2)
consider the Comment dated 26 February 2007 of Judge Tabora as a complaint against
Judge Carbonell and require Judge Carbonell to file his Comment within 10 days from
notice.

In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted the facts of the case
as stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26 February 2007 from the time he
took over Civil Case No. 6840 until he submitted his decision to OIC-BCOC
Lacsamana. However, he disagreed with Judge Taboras contention that the decision he
rendered in Civil Case No. 6840 was not validly promulgated and released to the
parties. Judge Carbonell maintained that the act of filing the decision with the clerk of
court already constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation and not its
pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.

Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently transpired after he
turned over the records of the case but admitted that after receipt of the letter-request of
Tabisula asking for a copy of his decision, he immediately responded by furnishing
Tabisula with a copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter does not involve
him. The dispute was originally between Tabisula against Judge Tabora and
Lacsamana. The only issue between him and Judge Tabora was a divergence of legal
opinion.

Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 on the
Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula stated that the Court erred in
dismissing the complaint she filed against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana.
In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of
San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote the OCA and narrated their negative
experience toward a co-employee, Olympia Elena O. Dacanay-Queddeng (Queddeng),
Legal Researcher II of the same court. In the same letter, they also gave their support in
an unrelated administrative complaint filed by Judge Tabora against Queddeng.

In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge Carbonell guilty of
simple misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The OCA reiterated that Judge Carbonell overstepped the bounds of his
authority as pairing judge of Branch 26 when he prepared the decision in Civil Case No.
6840 and furnished Tabisula with a copy of such decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell
created the impression that he had taken a special interest in the case.
The OCA recommended that:

(1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 27, 2007 of Mrs.
Caridad S. Tabisula on the Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be DENIED
for lack of merit;

(2) this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter

and Judge Antonio A. Carbonell be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from the retirement benefits that he may
receive; and

(3) the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr.,

Court Sheriff, and seven (7) other employees of RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando City, La Union, against Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal
Researcher, same court, be DETACHED from the records of this
administrative matter and the same be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union).

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.

The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another branch in case
the presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars issued by the Court: (1)
Circular No. 7[16] effective 23 September 1974 and (2) Circular No. 19-98[17]effective
18 February 1998.
Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26, assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840 upon Judge Taboras leave of
absence in May 2006 due to a serious illness. Judge Carbonell fulfilled his duties by
conducting hearings in the said case from May until June 2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge
Tabora reported back to work as presiding judge of Branch 26. However, even though
Judge Carbonell knew that Judge Tabora had already re-assumed her duties, he still
issued an Order submitting the case for resolution on 19 June 2006 and even submitted a
written decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana on 11 August 2006.

Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in Section 2, Canon
3[18] of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It

applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which
the decision is made.

xxxx

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. (Emphasis
supplied)

Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the peoples faith in the
judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the
grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the
courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the
appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to them.[19]

As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the conformity
of Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a matter of judicial courtesy
and respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by reasoning that the act of filing a
decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or
promulgation. We find this explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority
to render a decision on the subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98,
the pairing judge shall take cognizance of all cases until the assumption to duty of the
regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and performing her functions in
court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge.

Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference in referring the
letter of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch 26 for appropriate
action. Instead, Judge Carbonell directly furnished Tabisula with a copy knowing fully
well that she was the plaintiff in the subject case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded
the functions of the clerk of court as custodian of court records but also undermined the
integrity and confidentiality of the court.

For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, we find Judge
Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public
officers.[20] We adhere to the OCAs recommendation of a fine of P10,000.00 to be
deducted from Judge Carbonells retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant
to the Courts Resolution dated 24 September 2008, which granted the payment of his
disability retirement benefits subject to the withholding of P200,000.00 pending final
resolution of the administrative cases against him.

Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its Report dated 18
September 2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27
November 2007 filed by Tabisula on this Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. We
also direct the OCA to detach from the records of this administrative matter the Letter
dated 5 March 2008 of Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same
court. The Letter is to be included in A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled Office of the Court
Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC,
Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union.

WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007

filed by Caridad S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find respondent Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 27, GUILTY of simple misconduct and FINE him P10,000.00, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution
dated 24 September 2008.

We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to detach from the records of this
administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. and
seven other employees of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26, against Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court
and include the Letter in A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled Office of the Court Administrator
v. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163155 July 21, 2006
ALFREDO HILADO, MANUEL LACSON, JOSE MA. TUVILLA, JOAQUIN LIMJAP LOPEZ SUGAR
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE AMOR A. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 21
and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition.
Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed on
May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 00-
97505, "Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto" (the case), before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The
case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes (public respondent).
Private respondent was, by Order1 of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto (the estate),
and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor.
Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar Corporation and
First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City RTC two
complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No.
111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.2
In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on January 18, 2001 3 in the case before the
Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of the above-said
Bacolod RTC cases as follows:
LIST OF LIABILITIES

DESCRIPTION AMOUNT
 xxxx

A claim of several sugar planters which is presently the P136,045,772.50

subject of Civil Case No. 95-9137 entitled Lacson et al. v. [at P50.00 per US
R.S. Benedicto et al., pending before Branch 44 of the $1.00]
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City

A claim filed by various sugar planters which is presently P35,198,697.40

the subject of Civil Case No. 11178 entitled Lopez Sugar [at P50.00 per US
Corporation et al. v. R.S. Benedicto, et al., pending before $1.00]
Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City.4

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed
petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and to
secure certified true copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners' counsel, was denied access to
the last folder-record of the case which, according to the court's clerical staff, could not be located and was probably
inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.5
Petitioners' counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter 6 of January 15, 2004, to allow Atty. Paredes
to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of Branch 21
advised petitioners' counsel in writing that "per instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with
authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending in this Court," and that they
may be "allowed to go over the records of the above-entitled case upon presentation of written authority from the
[administratrix]."7
On February 2, 2004, petitioners' counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on February 13,
2004.8Petitioners' counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for Inhibition9 of
public respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest partiality towards the
administratrix. Public respondent, noting that an error was committed in the service to petitioners of the notice of
hearing, ignored the motion of petitioners' counsel.10
Intending to compare the list of properties in the estate's inventory all of which properties were appraised at a fair
value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been ceded in 1990 to the decedent under
his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on Good Government, 11 petitioners' counsel sent the
Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter 12 requesting to be furnished with certified true copies
of the "updated inventory."
By still another letter,13 petitioners' counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the order issued by
the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon.14
By Order15 of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had no standing to file the Motion for
Inhibition as well as to request for certified true copies of the above-indicated documents. Read the Order of March 2,
2004:
Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to act on their motion despite the denial of
their Omnibus Motion to Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with the Court of Appeals.
As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed by persons/entities who have no legal
standing in the above-entitled case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court, much more for this Court
to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed.
For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17 and 27, 2004 addressed to Atty. Maria
Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the Branch Clerk of Courtasking that he be furnished with certified true copies of
 the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on February 13, 2004 hearing as well as the
corresponding transcript of stenographic notes within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letters.
Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the proceedings per order of this Court dated
January 2, 2002, copies of all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may only be secured from the
[Administratrix] and/or counsel.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel
public respondent to allow them to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the
records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further presiding thereover.
In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the right to
access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, 17 recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality through her
blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her denial of their right to
access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case; 18 and public respondent's incompetence, malice,
bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for more than three years the requirement of the
Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic
accounting of her administration.19
By Comment20 filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is fatally defective since
petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping that they had earlier instituted an
administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the same reliefs 21 for the disqualification of
public respondent from presiding over the case and for the court docket to be opened for examination.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since petitioners are not parties
to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for inhibition.22
As to the alleged denial of petitioners' right to examine court records and participate in the proceedings, private
respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of the inventory of the
assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair value of the estate and their counsel was
present during the February 13, 2004 hearing.23
For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present petition is fatally defective for failure of
petitioners to disclose in the certificate of non-forum shopping that they had priorly instituted an administrative
complaint against public respondent which prays for the same reliefs; (2) whether a writ of mandamus may issue to
compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine and obtain copies of any or all documents forming part of
the records of the case; and (3) whether a writ of prohibition will issue in favor of petitioners, who are not parties to
the case, to inhibit public respondent from presiding over the case.
As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition, filed an administrative complaint before
this Court against public respondent, "Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding
Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21," docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-05-
1910.
Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental 24 and a second supplemental administrative complaint 25 praying for 1)
the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions against public respondent for, among other things, denying them
their right to access the docket of the case, and 2) the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the
case, which latter prayer was, however, subsequently withdrawn in a motion 26 filed on April 30, 2004, the same day
that the present petition was filed.
Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it "exists only where the elements of litis
pendencia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other."27
It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the
exercise of administrative powers.28
The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an administrative complaint
before the exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of a judge in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other measures, an
administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. So Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis29 teaches:
x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against
error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic
exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons
of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available
judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to
an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
x x x Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof" Indeed,
since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should
not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and
dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; x x x 30 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been judicially resolved with finality that the
door to an inquiry into his or her administrative liability may be said to have opened.
Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15, 2005, the Second Division of this Court
rendered a decision31 on the above-said administrative complaint filed by petitioners against public respondent.
On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right the right to information on matters of "public
concern" and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to "official records" and the like. The right to information on
"matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access
to public documents.32
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term "judicial record" or "court
record" is in order.
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It
comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and
returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony 33 which took place during the trial and which are in
the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has
also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video
recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic
form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and
includes all evidence it has received in a case.34
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or
affect the public.35
It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of justice, to
the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-
finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine
Publishing Co.,36 this Court held:
x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact that the
public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or would be interesting, or
would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know whether a public officer is
properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the public to be informed of the proceedings in
court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know about the doing of others, but in
the necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty. x x x
The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to the questions presented for our decision in
the case at bar that we cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x
x x x "The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than
counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such
proceedings." x x x
"The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to be
intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration
of justice. x x x It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not
because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the
highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public
responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the
mode in which a public duty is performed."
From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the supreme court of Massachusetts to lay down
the proposition that simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public office it becomes public
property that any individual, whether interested or not, had the right to publish its contents, or that any
newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations contained therein to the four corners of the country. The
right of the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis of the privilege, which is, as we have said, the
right to determine by its own senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his duties according to law . x x
x37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized
expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with
knowledge.38 Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would
be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. 39 Thus,
in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas,40 this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private
complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."
Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be
matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court
may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests.
In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties
filed them is to be considered.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their right to a share of
the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor before the
disposition of the estate.
Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which his private
estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the public has an
interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to
personal financial information may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an
interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a
citizen's constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right of access to official
records, including judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause. How "good
cause" can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company v. Appeals
Court teaches:41
The public's right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders,
maybe restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." "To determine whether good cause is shown, a
judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case." In so doing, the
judge "must take into account all relevant factors, 'including, but not limited to, the nature of the parties and
the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community
interest, and the reason for the request.'"42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court over its own records
and files.43
The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to exercise supervisory powers over materials
surrendered into its care, held:
It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is to be made of
them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate undertakings and
assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests. x x x
In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, the court may regulate the use
made of it. In an application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent and accommodate public
interest in access. x x x In an application of this nature the court must protect the respondent and
accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done in terms of the actual purpose, and in the
face of obvious prejudice and the absence of a specific purpose, the order for unrestricted access and
reproduction should not have been made.44 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion45 and subject to the supervisory and protective
powers of the court,46 after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and
the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant:
"whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper
purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important to
public health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency,
whether party benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or official, and whether case involves issues
important to the public."47
By the administratrix-private respondent's own information, petitioners are the plaintiffs in two complaints (against
Roberto Benedicto et al.) for damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 11178, filed
before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however, that "if the motion to dismiss [these RTC Bacolod cases is]
granted, . . . petitioners would have absolutely no interest of any kind [over] the [e]state of the [d]eceased Roberto S.
Benedicto."48
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing
the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory
and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting 49 appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the
settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. x x x x The records of every court of justice shall
be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business
hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special
case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency. (Underscoring supplied),
entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other records which are relevant to their claims against Benedicto.
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court
fees,50 a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this Court held in Beegan v. Borja,51precautionary
measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be observed:
 We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or xeroxing of
portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the rules to be reproduced.
The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the Clerk of Court has been sought and as long as
a duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of the reproduction within the court premises if
warranted or if not, the said court representative must bring along the case records where reproduction takes
place and return the same intact to the Clerk of Court.52
In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being "interested persons" who have a
legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case.
Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern disqualification of judges provide:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with
the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial,
or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His
decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay
shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment
in the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public respondent's inhibition, whether under the first
paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds for mandatory disqualification, or under the second
paragraph of the same section on voluntary disqualification.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent is ORDERED to allow petitioners to
access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the records of Special Proceeding No. 00-97505
bearing on
the inventory of assets and liabilities of the estate and the hearing conducted by the trial court on February 13, 2004,
subject to precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration thereof.
The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2127

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2697-RTJ)

Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JUDGE ERNESTO P. NACHURA, and
PAGAYATAN, Executive Judge, REYES, JJ.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 25, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

R E S O LU T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Cita Borromeo-Garcia (complainant) filed a Complaint before the Court dated June 14, 2007
charging Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan (respondent), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro with falsification, partiality, dishonesty, gross
incompetence, evident bad faith, immorality and grave misconduct.

Complainant avers: Respondent committed falsification when, serving as Register of Deeds

(RD) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, he cooperated with Soledad Ulayao (Ulayao) and
Soledad Ortega Olano (Olano) in transferring 165 titles from the name of her father's
mistress Blandina Garcia (Blandina) to her father Salvador S. Borromeo, Sr. (Borromeo, Sr.),
even though respondent was fully aware that the signature appearing thereon was falsified. As
payment for their services, Borromeo, Sr. gave Ulayao, Olano and respondent, 20 of the 165
titles which Ulayao kept until a judge from another branch, pursuant to another case, ordered to
have said titles kept in custodia legis.[1]

Complainant further claims that: respondent was guilty of falsification and perjury when he
granted the petition of her half-brother, Salvador G. Borromeo, Jr. (Borromeo, Jr.) for the
issuance of owner's duplicate copies of 62 Transfer Certificate of Title (TCTs) knowing
that Borromeo, Jr., illegitimate son of Borromeo, Sr. with Blandina, was not the owner of the
same; respondent hastily ruled for a commissioner's hearing, decided for the issuance of new
owner's certificates of titles, without requiring the production of certified true copies of all the
titles being petitioned or requiring the Officer in Charge (OIC) Registrar to produce the book of
titles; respondent also keeps a mistress, Elsa Aguirre (Elsa), Borromeo, Jr.'s former wife, which
could explain the swift decision in favor of Borromeo, Jr.; Elsa wielded power in the RTC, as
acting clerk of court and sheriff, even though she is not a lawyer; Elsa together with Asst.
Prosecutor Luduvico Salcedo, also acted as respondent's bagman.[2]

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the Complaint to respondent for his
Comment in a 1st Indorsement dated June 29, 2007.[3]

In his Comment[4] dated July 30, 2007, respondent denied the charges against him, claiming the
same to be unfounded, hearsay and malicious. He avers that: he does not know complainant and
that the latter is not a resident of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; at the time the first falsification
allegedly took place, respondent was an Asst. Provincial Prosecutor who acted as an Ex-Officio
Registrar of Deeds, putting in extra hours to perform his added assignment; the documents
allegedly falsified were sales leading to the registration and transfer
of TCTs from Blandina to Borromeo, Sr.; he affixed his signatures to the TCTs after all
pertinent documents were evaluated by Land Examiner Ulayao and were found to be complete
and in order; if indeed signatures were falsified, respondent had nothing to do with the
falsification or had any knowledge of the same; respondent never conspired
with Olano and Ulayao and there was no agreement for them to split the 20 titles among
themselves; as to the second charge of falsification, he rendered the decision on the petition
of Borromeo, Jr. after due notice and hearing and all jurisdictional requirements were complied
with; contrary to complainant's assertion, certified true copies of the 62 TCTs to be reconstituted
were attached to the petition; Borromeo, Jr. also submitted a certification from the RD stating
that the original copies of the TCTs were intact in said office; there was also no opposition
during the hearing, hence, it was subject to an ex-parte hearing before the Clerk of Court as
commissioner; he did not declare Borromeo, Jr. to be the owner of the properties but merely
quoted Borromeo, Jr.'stestimony; moreover, the reconstituted titles are still in the name
of Borromeo, Sr.; the allegation that Elsa is his mistress is false; whatever dealings he has with
Elsa, who is the Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, is strictly related to their respective official
duties; it is also not true that Elsa and Prosecutor Salcedo are respondent's bagmen; in all his
years as prosecutor and later as judge, respondent never asked anyone to be his bagman and
neither has he resolved or decided any case for any consideration; he has no unexplained or
hidden wealth and is living a simple and modest life.[5]

Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court in the Resolution dated January 23, 2008 referred
the instant case to Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, for
investigation, report and recommendation.[6]

Hearings were conducted and in his Report dated July 31, 2008, Investigating Justice Reyes
found that complainant failed to substantiate her allegations. As stated in his Report:

x x x [T]he investigating justice finds that aside from bare assertion complainant
failed to present any evidence to substantiate her charges. She even admitted
during her testimony that she had no direct knowledge of the facts constituting her
allegations but that she derived her knowledge from other persons, that is, she had
no direct knowledge of the facts constituting the alleged irregularities.

xxxx

As to the charges of immorality and grave misconduct which stemmed from the
alleged illicit affair of respondent judge with Ms. Aguirre, the undersigned finds
that complainant's own testimony showed that she based her allegation on what
someone else had told her.

xxxx

The charges of partiality, dishonesty, and gross incompetence are all tied up to the
petition for re-issuance of owner's duplicate certificate of titles filed by Salvador,
Jr. From the same petition arose the allegation of falsification. Complainant
claimed that respondent judge was partial, dishonest and had acted in bad faith
because he granted Salvador, Jr.'s petition knowing that he was not the registered
owner. She also claimed that this decision showed that respondent judge was
grossly incompetent because the decision was not supported by facts and the
law. By the same token she claimed that respondent judge was guilty of
falsification.

xxxx

[Based on Sec. 109 of Pres. Dec. No. 1529] it is clear that not only the registered
owner but any person in interest may file a petition for re-issuance of the owner's
 duplicate title. In the present case, petitioner Salvador, Jr. is admittedly the
illegitimate son of the deceased Salvador, Sr. and as such is an heir. As explained
by respondent judge he believed that an heir has the right to file the petition. Other
than the fact that the case was granted, complainant failed to adduce any concrete
evidence of partiality, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of the respondent judge. It
should be remembered that good faith is always presumed and complainant's bare
testimony failed to rebut this presumption.

As to the charge of falsification, complainant herself admitted that the

misrepresentation was done by Salvador, Jr. and not by the respondent judge. He
cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be held responsible for such
falsification.

The only remaining charge against respondent judge is the falsification regarding
the twenty (20) TCTs held by Ms. Ulayao and now in custodia legis in Branch 45
of the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Again, the undersigned finds that
aside from complainant's bare testimony that she was informed by Ms. Ulayao of
the falsification she utterly failed to present any evidence to buttress her assertion.
She does not even have a copy of the alleged forged deed of sale allegedly used to
transfer said titles in the name of Salvador, Sr.[7]

While Justice Reyes found the complaint to be without merit, he still found respondent liable
however for failing to prevent any appearance of impartiality on his part. Justice Reyes held in
his report:

x x x the investigating justice finds it necessary to deal on another matter which

the respondent judge himself testified on. The reception of evidence for Spec.
Proc. No. R-936 was performed by Ms. Aguirre. Although the fact that Ms.
Aguirre was the former wife of the petitioner, this fact alone should be
considered unprocedural.However, what the investigating justice finds disturbing
is that Ms. Aguirre was not the OIC Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 46 but rather
she was the OIC Clerk of Court. Respondent judge explained that his OIC Branch
Clerk of Court Asuncion Pabellano was busy, hence, unable to conduct the ex-
parte reception of evidence.Under the circumstances what respondent judge
should have done was to dispense with the ex-parte reception of evidence and to
conduct the hearing himself instead of appointing the OIC Clerk of Court. This
would have avoided any appearance of partiality. However, the undersigned does
not find this infraction grave enough to warrant a severe penalty. Considering that
respondent had already filed his application for optional retirement and only to
stress that all judges should at all times be circumspect especially in their official
 functions, the investigating justice deems it appropriate to recommend the
imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge.[8]

Justice Reyes then recommended that:

x x x the complaint against respondent Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan be

DISMISSED. However, in view of the finding that Judge Pagayatan failed to
prevent any appearance of impartiality on his part, it is recommended that he be
FINED in the amount of P5,000.00.[9]

The Court agrees with the report of the Investigating Justice but finds that the recommended fine
should be modified.

Administrative complaints leveled against judges must always be examined with a

discriminating eye for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that
respondents stand to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment.[10] While the Court will
not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, neither will it hesitate
to shield them from unfounded suits that disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration
of justice.[11] When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions and fails to
substantiate her claim, such as in the case at bar, the administrative complaint against the judge
must be dismissed for lack of merit.[12]

In this case, complainant charged respondent with two acts of falsification. First, for allegedly
authorizing the transfer of titles from the name of Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. based on
forged signatures, when respondent was still Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro; and
second, for granting Borromeo, Jr.'s petition for issuance of owner's duplicate copy of 62 TCTs,
knowing that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner thereof. She also charged respondent with having
an illicit relationship with Elsa, Acting Clerk of Court and ex-wife of Borromeo, Jr., allowing her
to exert influence over the decisions of the court, and for keeping Elsa and Prosecutor Salcedo as
respondent's 'bagmen.'

Complainant however was not able present proof of her allegations. As to the first charge of
falsification, she claims that it was Ulayao, former OIC Registrar of Deeds of
Occidental Mindoro, who told her about the circumstances surrounding the transfer of titles from
the name of Blandina to that of Borromeo, Sr. and the supposed agreement among Borromeo,
Sr., Ulayao, Olano and respondent regarding the said transfer.[13] Ulayao however died on July
31, 2007[14] and could neither refute nor corroborate complainant's story. When asked by the
Investigating Justice, complainant also could not present copies of the alleged falsified deeds of
sale which, according to her, were the basis for the issuance of the titles in favor of Borromeo, Sr.
[15]
Anent the second charge of falsification, complainant claims that respondent
granted Borromeo, Jr.'s petition even though he knew that Borromeo, Jr. was not the owner of
the subject properties. She agreed however, before the Investigating Justice, that respondent's
decision in S.P. No. R-936 did not order that new owner's copies of the 62 titles be registered in
the name of Borromeo, Jr., and that the same were in fact still in the name of Borromeo, Sr.[16]

As to the charge that respondent was having an immoral relationship with Elsa, complainant
admits that she has no personal knowledge about the same, and that her basis for alleging such
offense is the fact that it is known to everyone in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
[17]Complainant failed to present any witness, however, to support her charge of immorality.
[18] She also failed to present any evidence to substantiate her charge that
Prosecutor Salcedo and Elsa were receiving money as bagmen of respondent.

The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.[19] It is
settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint with substantial evidence, and in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the presumption is that respondent has regularly performed his duties.[20] Indeed, in
the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions.[21] As the charges herein being hurled by
complainant against respondent are grave in nature, in order for him to be disciplined therefor,
the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.[22] With the
failure of complainant to substantiate her claims, the complaint against respondent should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
The dismissal of the charges of complainant against respondent, notwithstanding, respondent
should still be disciplined for failure to avoid the appearance of partiality, which offense the
Investigating Justice correctly appreciated.
When asked during the investigation why Elsa, who is the ex-wife of the petitioner
therein, Borromeo, Jr., was designated to receive evidence ex-parte in SP No. R-936, when she
was not the acting Branch Clerk of Court, but the acting Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk
of Court (OCC), respondent only answered that it had been their practice to refer ex-
parte proceedings to the acting clerk of court of the OCC and not to the acting branch clerk of
court, because such proceedings were simple; and the branch clerk of court had too much work,
while those in the OCC had lesser load.[23] Respondent also said that he didn't see any conflict
with the fact that Elsa was the ex-wife of petitioner in S.P. No. R-936, Borromeo, Jr.[24]

The Court has held that a judge must at all times not only be impartial, but maintain the
appearance of impartiality. Thus, it is provided in Canons 3 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Judiciary, which took effect on June 1, 2004, that:

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

xxxx

Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.

For indeed, the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.[25]

Lower court judges, such as respondent, play a pivotal role in the promotion of the people's faith
in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots
level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts.Thus, the
admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is
more sternly applied to them.[26]

Respondent was previously imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law
in Domingo v. Pagayatan.[27] In the present case, the Court finds that for his failure to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, a penalty of P10,000.00 is proper.[28] Such fine is to be deducted
from his retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court's Resolution in
A.M. No. 12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as
amended by R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, dated July 7, 2008 which approved respondent's application for optional
retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 and Presidential
Decree No. 1438 effective at the close of office hours of December 31, 2007 with the proviso
that the payment of his retirement benefits shall be held in abeyance pending final resolution of
the administrative complaint in AM No. RTJ-07-2089, AM No. RTJ-07-2058, OCA IPI No. 07-
2697-RTJ, 07-2698-RTJ and 08-2482-RTJ. The Court, in the same resolution, also granted
Judge Pagayatan's request for payment of his terminal leave pay subject to the availability of
funds and the usual clearance requirements.
WHEREFORE, the charges filed by Cita Borromeo-Garcia are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of competent evidence. However, the Court finds Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, former Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, GUILTY of
violating Canon 3, Section 2 and Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Judiciary for which he is FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Court's Resolution in A.M. No.
12967-Ret. entitled Re: Application for Optional Retirement under R.A. 910, as amended by
R.A. 5095 and P.D. 1438, of Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, RTC, Br. 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, dated July 7, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
VICTORIANO SY, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189 (FormerlyA.M.
Complainant, OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ)

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, MENDOZA, and
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, SERENO, JJ.
Koronadal City,
Respondent. Promulgated:

January 18, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008,[1] filed by
Victoriano Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 24, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the
Judiciary and for Gross Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24,
entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled
Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

The Antecedents Facts

The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009,[2] of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.

The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good
faith and for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City.
The mortgagors were Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts,
Inc. and/or Sps. Victoriano Sy and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia
Mandanas.

Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the
mortgage agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged parcels
of land were sold to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate
of sale which was registered on September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South
Cotabato. The mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption
period.

Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto
Parts, Inc. filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge
Dinopol, a complaint against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage, Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale,
with Damages and Attorneys Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 1403-
24.

On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the
case[3] on the ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer
of the Philippine Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an
earlier call (July 2003) from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the
plaintiffs. He claimed he wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way he
acted on the case.
On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed
mortgage against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc.,
and/or Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas,
docketed as Misc. Case No. 1440-24,[4] and assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, presided by Judge Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition,[5] and issued the
writ of possession on July 21, 2006.[6]

Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed
with the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for
the Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan, docketed as Corp. Case No. 1585-06.[7]

On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order[8] staying the
enforcement of all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily
liable with the debtor. The same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.

In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay
order issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06.[9]

Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation
plan by the Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and
partiality on the part of Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order
dated February 11, 2008, and directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-
implement the writ of execution of July 31, 2006.[10]

Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint[11]charging Judge

Dinopol of gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the
judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law

Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife
sought the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was
pending before Judge Dinopols sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the
case. This notwithstanding, and to Sys surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case
No. 1440-24, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a
matter closely intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol then issued an
order granting Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed properties.[12]

Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay
order[13] and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of
Metrobanks petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in
Cagayan De Oro City (CA G.R. SP No. 01824) assailing the validity of the stay order,
Judge Dinopol ordered that the writ of possession be implemented.[14]

Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in
Judge Dinopols sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of
construction materials to be used in the construction of the judges house. The
transaction was evidenced by delivery receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),[15] and
charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005) for P16,000.00,[16] no. 9826 (March 9, 2005)
for P850.00,[17] and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005) for P780.00.[18]

Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash
loans from him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the
total amount of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-
cab and returned it after the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented
disbursement vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim.
[19]
 Judge Dinopols Comment

In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008,[20] the OCA required Judge Dinopol to
comment on the complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.[21]

Judge Dinopol denied Sys accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from Civil
Case No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then; nobody
intervened and pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed.
He was not aware nor had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before
the CA (CA G.R. SP No. 01824), nor did he receive any order from the appellate
tribunal enjoining him to desist from performing or acting on the incidents pending in
Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained
that Sy did not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to
Sy, and that he had acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the
requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his
handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house
was under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity
loans from Sy in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case
No. 1403-24; he did so on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24
was filed only on September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his sala on September 22,
2005. He denied that he received from Sy cash loans in the amount of P121,000.00. He
also denied borrowing Sys Suzuki Multi-cab and claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva
who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed
deceit and cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sys complaint and
Judge Dinopols answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative
matter; and (3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report
dated May 25, 2009,[22] which found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law on
the part of Judge Dinopol, but found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.

The Courts Ruling

The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance
of the law and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment
and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and
Loreta Sy against Metrobank, as he inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling
of Misc. Case No. 1440-24 (Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by
Metrobank against Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the essential nature of the
proceeding itself.

In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was
returned unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance
with the rules and jurisprudence on the matter.

As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc.,[23] the
proceeding in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary
in nature. It is brought for the benefit of one party only and may be granted even without
notice to the mortgagor, in this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to
grant a writ of possession is a ministerial function. The court does not exercise its
official discretion or judgment.[24] Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession was filed, had no discretion on whether to issue the writ
of possession or not. It cannot be said, therefore, that Judge Dinopol exposed himself or
exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank when he issued the writ of possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage
or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without
prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of
possession is issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without
delay.[25]

From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and
properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed, and those
whose titles have already passed on to the winning bidder are no longer considered
properties of the debtor.[26] In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial
court to grant a possessory writ over the foreclosed properties.[27]

Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in
directing the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.

On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sys charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latters denial of having committed the acts
complained of flies in the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence
that he obtained commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the
construction of his house in Koronadal City. There was also Sys claim of cash loans to
Judge Dinopol on various occasions, between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006,
amounting to P121,000.00, as well as the loan of Sys Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.

The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts[28] indicating delivery of construction

materials to Judge Dinopols residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered by
disbursement vouchers,[29] and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an
acknowledgement[30] from Judge Dinopols driver Rogelio Villanueva.

There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans
from Sy. The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the
purchase of materials for his house which was then under construction, although he
claimed that it was his wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to
deliver the materials to his residence.[31] Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding
the commodity loans or even the cash loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding
the construction materials occurred when there was no case pending in his sala where Sy
was a party.

The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a

serious impropriety in his or his familys financial or business dealings with Sy.

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judges impartiality

provides, inter alia, as follows:

Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and the judiciary.

Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.

Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from
Sy for the building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He
compromised his position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family had
business dealings with Sy there was no pending case involving the businessman, he
should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The sphere of
Sys business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, it
is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court with complainant
as a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and financial dealings with
complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case
and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the court.[32]

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official
duties, thus:
 SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of
their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the
law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.

Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its
appearance in his public office:
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several occasions
to discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.[33] Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least
two instances, requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession.[34] Judge
Dinopols actions no doubt created the inference that at some point, he acceded to Sys
requests to delay the proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by Judge
Dinopols knowledge that the counsel for Metrobank was instructed to immediately
secure the order for the issuance of the writ of possession.[35] Regardless of the
representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge Dinopol should have immediately
issued the writ of possession in Metrobanks favor.

From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only his
impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and integrity
as a judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as
a judge. His actions gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be
influenced by extraneous factors - other than the legal arguments and the court evidence
in discharging his judicial functions.

In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants
outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that
these conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the
opposing counsel. In Agustin v. Mercado,[36] we declared that employees of the court
have no business meeting with litigants or their representatives under any
circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N. Calabines,[37] the Court minced no words
in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes a brazen and outrageous betrayal of
public trust.[38] The Court further declared in the said case:

x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of
all those who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x

The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal and
official conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial
personnel have the sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.

All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and

efficiency. As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties
with due care and utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the
faith of the people in the judiciary will not be condoned.[39]
Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the position of
a judge. Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct
themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the
judicial system.[40] The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary.[41] These standards apply not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.[42]

Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to
be sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard, is far
from exemplary. He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where
we penalized him for questionable conduct:

First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was fined P20,000.00. [43]

Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined P20,000.00. [44]

Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of
A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC, and was fined P11,000.00.[45]

Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was strongly
admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint against the
judge for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion.[46]

And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge
Dinopol had been reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court
premises.[47]
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the
same Rule, the respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the
following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public
office;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical
conduct demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a
judge. We impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.[48]
Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:

[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the [J]udiciary. A magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of
the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.[49]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 24, Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or
service of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 ARTURO D. BRION
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No part. Acted on the matter as OIC, OCA

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

EDITHA O. CATBAGAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE FELIXBERTO P. BARTE,

Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Tobias Fornier, Antique, respondent.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint[1] dated September 17, 2001 addressed to the

Honorable Chief Justice, through the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
complainant Editha O. Catbagan charged respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte
of the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Tobias Fornier, Antique with
grave and serious misconduct.[2]

In the first week of May 1999, complainant received information that the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Church) was interested in
buying land in the Province of Antique. She immediately approached respondent
judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective transaction. Together
with a certain Abraham Pedria, the three agreed that in case they succeeded in
brokering the sale of the properties to the Church, their commission would be
divided in this manner:
x x x the three of us agreed in the house of Judge Barte that for every sale transaction if
the purchase price exceed One Million Pesos, the two of us will receive a commission of
P100,000.00 each while the remaining amount or net gain be retained by Judge Barte as
his commission based on his agreement with the vendors.[3]

When requested to put their agreement in writing, respondent judge allegedly

answered: A municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is
the closest in reach to the public he serves and he must accordingly act at all
times with great constancy and utmost probity. Complainant did not insist on her
request after hearing this.

The three of them subsequently conferred with Bobby J. Villalobos, the

district president of the Church. They offered the parcels of land owned by
Bitoon Cezar and Aurea Clarin in Sibalom, Antique. [4]

Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, the Church agreed to purchase lots 336-A
and 336-B owned by Bitoon Cezar for P1,120,300.[5]

Lot 334 owned by Aurea Clarin was also sold for P2,199,000 on February
19, 2001.[6]

Meanwhile, lot 5555 located in Hamtic, Antique owned by Eleanor M. Checa-

Santos was sold on February 12, 2001 for P2,300,000.[7]

For the first two sales, complainant claimed she was entitled to a P300,000
commission.

Since the Church transacted with respondent only, it paid the price of the
properties to him. Respondent then delivered the amount due to the vendors.
 When complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her
commission from respondent. However, respondent offered her only P25,000 for
the two transactions, excluding the one in Hamtic.

Complainant later learned that respondent received a P435,226.55

commission from the Aurea Clarin transaction alone. [8]

Complainant reminded respondent of their agreement but respondent

challenged complainant to go to court. Instead of pursuing her claim in a civil
suit, however, complainant opted to file the present administrative case against
respondent on September 17, 2001.

In a 1st Indorsement[9] dated October 18, 2001, Court Administrator

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. referred the complaint to respondent for his comment
on the charge of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

In his comment,[10] respondent denied the charge against him and asked for
the dismissal of the administrative case on the following grounds:

First, there was ambiguity in the charge of grave and serious misconduct in
the complaint and conduct unbecoming of a judge in the OCA indorsement.
Because of this confusion, he was deprived of his right to be informed of the
real charge against him. Consequently, he was not able to properly prepare
his defense.

Second, complainants allegations were baseless and designed merely to

harass and dishonor respondent. According to him, complainant and Pedria
went to his house and told him about the intention of the Church to buy land
in Antique. Subsequently, he informed the chapter president of the Church
that there were several parcels of land in the Municipality of Sibalom that
met their requirements. For two years, he spent after-office hours and
weekends to consummate the transaction. He labored hard because the
transaction could augment his meager income and enable him to send his
three children to good colleges in Iloilo City. He admitted that Pedria
assisted him but maintained that complainant had no involvement in the
transaction other than attending the initial meeting with the chapter
president. He claimed that it was he, not the complainant, who looked for the
land to be sold to the Church. He submitted the sworn affidavit [11] of the
vendors lawyer, Atty. Francisco Javier, who never met the complainant nor
transacted with her. Respondent also claimed that the agreement was for
him to shoulder all the expenses relative to the transaction, including its
documentation. Pedrias affidavit supported respondents claim that they
 never agreed on a commission scheme, contrary to complainants assertion.
If ever respondent gave money for any information or assistance in the
transaction, the amount depended entirely on his discretion.

In a report and recommendation[12] dated June 13, 2002, the OCA found
respondent not guilty of the charges against him but recommended a fine
of P5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 [13] of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It
also warned respondent against directly engaging in any private business even
outside office hours, otherwise a more severe penalty would be imposed upon
him. The OCA further noted that another administrative case, entitled Jose Berin
and Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,[14] had been filed against
respondent. It involved a transaction similar to the one in this complaint.

Initially, we will discuss respondents assertion that this administrative case

should be dismissed for being ambiguous. According to respondent, the
confusion denied him the opportunity to properly defend himself.

Despite the apparent confusion brought about by the charge of (1) grave and
serious misconduct in the complaint and (2) conduct unbecoming of a judge in
the OCA indorsement, the dismissal of the complaint is not warranted. The
records show that respondent refuted both charges in his comment and
manifestation.[15] The OCA could not be faulted for describing the charge as
conduct unbecoming of a judge (instead of grave and serious misconduct)
because the allegations pointed to none other but that offense. Noticeably, in
complainants reply[16] and letter-request[17] for early resolution, she consistently
described her charge against respondent as conduct unbecoming of a judge.
We therefore cannot dismiss outright the administrative case on this ground
alone, considering that respondent knew fully well what he was being charged
with. In fact, he defended himself against the charges.

In a long line of cases, we have held that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. [18]

The question of whether complainant was or was not entitled to a

commission for her efforts in the sale of the parcels of land to the Church should
be threshed out in a proper civil case.

What is therefore left for us to thresh out is respondents administrative

liability for his admitted financial and business dealings.

We note the OCAs observation that this is not the first time an administrative
case of the same nature has been filed against respondent. In Jose Berin and
Merly Alorro v. Judge Felixberto P. Barte,[19] respondent judge was also charged
with grave and serious misconduct for refusing to give the complainants therein
their respective commissions in the sale of land to the Manila Mission of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. The Court, in that case, found
respondent guilty of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property, respondent judge
has increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the
event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that
the parties to the sale might plead before his court is not remote and his business
dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his
ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality and also as to the judges integrity.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that [a] judge shall refrain from
financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A
judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to
minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. [20]

Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics also cautions a judge from x x x

making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court x x x.

As observed by the OCA, respondent judge should have refrained from

participating in the transaction. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale
of the properties, respondent increased the possibility of his disqualification in
the event that a dispute involving the said contracts of sale arose. Moreover, the
possibility that the parties in the sale might have appeared before his court was
not remote and his business dealings with them would have then created a
doubt about his fairness and impartiality.

Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of the 1 st MCTC covers the

Municipalities of Tobias Fornier, Hamtic and Aniniy. The 2 nd MCTC, on the other
hand, covers Sibalom, San Remigio and Belison. Hence, since the parties and
subject matter involved in the controversy were not within the jurisdiction of the
1st MCTC, his judicial authority could have never been invoked had a case
arisen from the transaction.

We find, however, that his claim is not exactly correct. Respondent himself
emphasized to this Court in his manifestation [21] dated February 23, 2004 that,
aside from his duties in the 1st MCTC, he was also designated as Acting
Presiding Judge of the 5th MCTC and in several cases in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Jose, Antique. Considering this, the likelihood that he could
have also been designated in the 2 nd MCTC (with jurisdiction over Sibalom)
was neither remote nor impossible. Had any of the parties in the subject
transaction filed suit, his inhibition would have been called for because of his
aforecited business dealings.

Given these circumstances, respondent judge ought perhaps to seriously

consider leaving the judiciary and becoming a full-time real estate broker
instead. The latter calling appears to have a special appeal to him.

Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts

greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in
such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.
[22]

We acknowledge that respondent has been in judicial service since 1990 up

to the present. We find his declaration that no criminal or civil case has ever
been filed against him to be true. However, the present administrative case and
an earlier decided case with similar facts are too glaring to ignore. In that case,
we reminded him that judges must not only be good judges but must also
appear to be good persons. [23] In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a
cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.[24]

In Poso v. Mijares,[25] we held that public interest in an adept and honest

judiciary dictates that notice of future harsher penalties should not be followed
by another forewarning of the same kind, ad infinitum, but by discipline through
appropriate penalties.

As already mentioned, respondent was previously sanctioned for an identical

infraction involving the sale of land to the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter
Day Saints, Inc. We ordered him to pay a fine of P2,000, admonished him to be
more discreet and prudent in his private dealings and warned him that a similar
infraction would be sanctioned more severely. [26] This second administrative
case therefore reveals a certain kind of avarice on the part of respondent.
Hence, we are constrained to impose upon him a heavier penalty than the OCA-
recommended fine.
 WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Felixberto P. Barte is hereby found guilty
of violating Canon 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering that this is
his second offense, he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months. He is hereby
warned that another complaint of this kind will merit a penalty beyond mere
suspension from public office.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA, JR., A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736

Complainant, [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2034-MTJ]

Present:

- versus - CARPIO,* J.,

VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN,MENDOZA, JJ.
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City. Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 25, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint[1] filed by complainant Atty. Conrado B.

Gandeza, Jr. against Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City, for Gross Misconduct and Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant alleged that on November 20, 2007, around 9 o'clock in the evening, a
Mitsubishi Galant with plate number UJB 799 driven along Marcos Highway, Baguio
City by Guimba Digermo (Digermo), collided head on with a Ssangyong Musso Pick-
Up with plate number XMW 135 driven by Marion Derez. The Mitsubishi Galant is
owned by complainant and his wife, Atty. April B. Gandeza, while the Ssangyong
Musso Pick-Up is owned by respondent Judge's nephew, Paul N. Casuga.
Complainant recalled that when he arrived at the accident site, he saw respondent Judge
conferring with the police investigator. He claimed that respondent Judge approached
him and in a harsh tone accused his driver to be the one at fault and was under the
influence of liquor. Respondent also kept on reminding the police investigator to put in
his report the alleged drunken condition of his driver despite complainant's request to
respondent judge not to prejudge the situation.
Complainant claimed that at the hospital, while both drivers were being subjected to
physical examination, respondent Judge, instead of accompanying her nephew's driver,
opted to stand closely beside complainant's driver and kept on suggesting to the
examining doctor that his driver was under the influence of liquor. He added that when
respondent Judge came to know the negative result of the alcoholic breath examination
of his driver, she protested and demanded another examination on his driver. Despite his
protests and his driver's refusal to undergo a re-examination, respondent Judge's request
prevailed. Later on, complainant alleged that a new medical certificate showing his
driver was under the influence of liquor was issued upon respondent's insistence.

Complainant argued that respondent Judge has no personality to interfere with the police
investigation and only the police investigator has the right to request for re-examination.
Complainant likewise suspected that respondent Judge may have also facilitated the
filing of the criminal complaint in court against his driver, since the complaint was filed
in court barely a week after the collision. The investigating prosecutor even
recommended an exorbitant sum of P30,000.00 for complainant's driver's
liberty. Complainant believed that the processes have been railroaded to accommodate
respondent Judge.
Moreover, complainant averred that his wife, a practicing lawyer in Baguio City, at one
time saw an employee of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 2, carrying
outside of the court premises, the folder of the criminal case filed against their driver.
When asked as to why said staff was carrying the case record outside the court's
premises, said employee informed her that she will bring it to the sala of respondent
Judge as the latter requested for it.
In another incident, complainant added that when his wife went to the Philippine
Mediation Center (PMC), Baguio City, to move for the postponement of the scheduled
mediation of the subject criminal case, she was informed by the clerk that respondent
Judge went there and inquired about the supposed mediation.
Complainant insisted that respondent's actions showed her interest in the criminal case
without regard to proper decorum. She, in effect, abused her judicial position.

On July 11, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Tabin to
submit her comment on the complaint against him.[2]

In her Comment[3] dated September 9, 2008, Judge Tabin denied that she exerted undue
influence in the conduct of the investigation. While she admitted that she did request the
police officer that complainant's driver should be subjected to an alcoholic breath test as
done earlier to her nephew, she, however, insisted that she did not influence PO3
Jackson U. Pabillo and the doctor of the Baguio General Hospital into doing the same.
[4] Judge Tabin also pointed out that she never made public the fact that she is a judge,
albeit, she admitted that complainant and PO3 Pabillo knew her as such.[5]

Respondent Judge also disputed that she used her position in borrowing the records of
the criminal case against Digermo. She explained that at that time, her sister did not
have a lawyer, thus, she asked one of her staff to borrow the records of the criminal case
as there may be developments in the case that her sister might not be aware of.
Respondent added that she opted to borrow the case records instead, since she did not
want to create the wrong impression that she was exerting her influence on the conduct
of the criminal proceeding. Likewise, she explained her presence at the PMC by
claiming that she merely accompanied her sister there as the latter did not know PMC's
location.

Likewise, Judge Tabin denied that she had a hand in the filing of the case against
Digermo. She disputed that she recommended the amount of P30,000.00 as bond for his
provisional liberty, considering that the Prosecutor's Office is an independent office.

In a Memorandum[6] dated February 5, 2009, due to conflicting statements of the

parties, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be referred to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On March 11, 2009, the Court directed the redocketing of the instant complaint as a
regular administrative matter and referred the case to Executive Judge Edilberto T.
Claravall of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.[7]
During the investigation conducted by the Investigating Judge, complainant failed to
appear.[8] Later on, it appeared that the criminal case against complainant's driver was
dismissed after the complainant settled his differences with respondent Judge.

On November 3, 2009, in his Report,[9] Judge Claravall recommended the dismissal of

the complaint against Judge Tabin due to insufficient evidence to prove her guilty of
gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge.

Judge Claravall pointed out that the charges of Gross Misconduct and Conduct
Unbecoming a Judge are penal in nature; thus, the same must be proven by convincing
proof. The Investigating Judge observed that the act of Judge Tabin in borrowing the
records of the criminal case was an exercise of her right to information. He is convinced
that the actions of Judge Tabin were just normal reactions of any person who comes in
defense and aide of a relative.

On March 26, 2010, the OCA, however, found Judge Tabin guilty of violation of Canon
4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA reasoned that there was
sufficient evidence showing that respondent Judge is liable for impropriety. Records
show that Judge Tabin did not merely look after the safety of her nephew after the
vehicular accident, but she likewise ascertained that the conduct of the investigation was
in her nephew's favor.[10]

RULING

While we agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent Judge
cannot be held liable for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judge due to
lack of evidence of malice on the part of respondent Judge, we, however, agree with the
findings of the OCA that Judge Tabin is guilty of impropriety.

As found by the OCA, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct that a second
test be conducted on complainant's driver when the first test resulted in a negative.
Respondent judge cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation. Inevitably, as a
result of her interference, complainant suspected that she was influencing the outcome
of the investigation as evidenced by complainant's alleged statement: Itong ospital na
ito, pwede palang impluwensyahan ng huwes.
Even assuming that respondent Judge did not make public her position as a judge to the
examining doctor or the investigating policeman, the fact that she knew that said police
officer and the complainant had knowledge of her being a judge should have refrained
her from further interfering in the investigation. She cannot act oblivious as to how and
what the public will view her actions. She should have kept herself free from any
appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance herself from any act liable to
create an impression of indecorum.
Likewise, respondents act of borrowing court records and accompanying her sister at the
PMC under the guise of extending assistance to her sister manifested not only lack of
maturity as a judge, but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial
dispenser of justice. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but
sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to
unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical examination
as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while respondent Judge's concern over the safety of her nephew and the
outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded the
rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern
for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a
judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of
preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of
impropriety in all activities.[11]

To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion
and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion
that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions
and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be
prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in
and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.[12]

In a number of cases,[13] following the case of Rosauro v. Kallos,[14] we ruled

that impropriety constitutes a light charge. Section 11 (C), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court provides the following sanctions if the respondent is found guilty of a light
charge:

C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following

sanctions shall be imposed:

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not

exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct

and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in
the discharge of their official duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the Judiciary. The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the Judiciary is to
maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. The Court condemns and
would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved
in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability or
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, as in the case at bar.[15]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Clarita C. Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Baguio City, GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and is
hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 EN BANC

ASSISTANT SPECIAL A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J

PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA
J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ, Present:
Complainant,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
-versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, MENDOZA, and
JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and SERENO, JJ.
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN. Promulgated:
Respondents. August 24, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the

Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this administrative matter by
filing an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 to charge Sandiganbayan Justices
Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with Justice Ong as Chairman, at the time material to
the complaint, with (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public documents; (3)
improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of
the law.[1]

Before anything more, the Court clarifies that this decision is limited to the
determination of the administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and does not
extend to the ascertainment of whatever might be the effects of any irregularity they
committed as members of the Fourth Division on the trial proceedings. This clarification
stresses that the proceedings, if procedurally infirm, resulted from the acts of the
Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as individual Justices. The
remedy against any procedural infirmity is not administrative but judicial.

Details of the Charges

A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases
originating from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the region of origin,
except only when the greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or
other compelling considerations require
the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006, the
Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice
in Davao City.

Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the complainant sent
a memorandum to Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio) to invite his attention to the irregular arrangement being adopted by the Fourth
Division in conducting its provincial hearings.[3] The memorandum reads as follows:

The Prosecution Bureau IV is due to leave for Davao City on April 23,
2006 for their scheduled hearing which will be held on April 24 to 28,
2006. In conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth Division has
adopted a different procedure. They do not sit as collegial body, instead
they divide the division into two. In such a manner, the Chairman will
 hear some of the cases alone and the other members will hear other
cases, conducting hearing separately and simultaneously.

We find this procedure to be advantageous to the Prosecution and also

commendable on the part of the Justices. While there are no objections
manifested by the defense lawyers, we are apprehensive of the
consequences, considering that this constitutes procedural lapses. In a
case decided by the Supreme Court, the conviction of the accused by the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was invalidated by the court when it was
shown that the members of the court who heard his case were constantly
changing. The Petitioner assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in its
capacity as a trial court.

In one of her hearings, the undersigned has already called the attention
of the Hon. Chairman and expresses (sic) her concern on the matter,
and even opined that they might be charged of falsification, by issuing
orders that they heard the cases as a collegial body, when in fact only
the Chairman was present during the trial and the other members are
hearing cases in the other chamber.

The Chairman, however, welcomes any question on the procedure they are
presently adopting.

We do not want to take chances. In cases where conviction are issued,

the accused would surely assail this procedure.

For your information and appropriate action.[4]

The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio

responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the other Prosecutors to object to
the arrangement and to place their objections on record.

During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial body.
Instead, Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada heard the other cases together. Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacios instructions, the complainant objected to the arrangement, but her objections
were brushed aside.[5]
The complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections incurred for her
the ire of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out of her desire to
avoid any procedural defects, she decided to forego the presentation of NBI Investigator
Atty. Roel Plando as her witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People
of the Philippines v. Payakan Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead,
she requested another Prosecutor to inform the Fourth Division that she was then
suffering from migraine, and to request the cancellation of the hearing.

The complainant was surprised to learn later on that the Fourth Division had issued a
warrant for the arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the hearing.

On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,[6] in which he
explained that he had arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006 in order to
appear in court, and had called up the complainant, who had told him that she would not
be presenting him as a witness due to lack of time for the necessary conference; and that
she had also told him about her having migraine on that morning.

On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the complainant to comment on Atty.
Plandos motion. In her comment dated May 24, 2006,[7] the complainant averred that
she had decided not to proceed with the presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006
due to her apprehension that the Honorable Court might again conduct the hearing in
division; and that incurring the ire of the Justices by her continuing objections to the
hearing procedure had been a stressful situation that had induced her migraine.

Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the
order dated May 26, 2006,[8] the Fourth Division directed the complainant in the
same order to answer questions from the court itself on June 6, 2006 relative to
statements made in [her] Comment dated May 24, 2006.

For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was accompanied by Acting Director
Elvira Chua of Bureau IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer Yolanda Pineda.
According to the complainant, Justice Hernandez berated her for bringing her own
stenographer. The Fourth Division then directed Stenographer Pineda to show cause why
she should not be cited in contempt for taking notes without prior leave of court.[9]

Complying with the directive to show cause, Pineda submitted

an explanation/compliance,[10] explaining that Director Chua had asked her to attend
the hearing on June 6, 2006, and to take stenographic notes of the proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pinedas explanation in her own manifestation and
explanation,[11] stating that the complainant had requested that a stenographer from the
Office of the Special Prosecutor be tasked to take notes at the hearing; and that on 27
April 2006 when Prosecutor Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present her NBI
Agent witness in Davao City, she left Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said date so
that it would be physically impossible for her to be in court at 8:30 in the morning.

The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20, 2006,[12] directing the complainant to
comment on Director Chuas manifestation and explanation, and to explain why she
should not be cited in contempt of court for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness
on April 26 and 27, 2006. She complied by submitting her compliance on July 10, 2006.
[13] The incident has remained unresolved by the Fourth Division.

The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent Justices
not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed acts of
falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it appear that they had all been
present during the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.

B.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial
Authority and Grave Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and
discriminatory utterances during hearings.

Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the complainant during
the hearing held in Cebu City in September 2006 the following:
 We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated,
and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied
and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater.
The complainant opined that the query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the
San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law,
that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools.

Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice
Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then
observing trial from the gallery: You are better than Director Somido? Are you better
than Director Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for
one prosecutor who is doing nothing.

Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean
Raul Pangalangan, thus:

Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you
are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of
their (sic) mother.

C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferradas Gross Ignorance of the Law
Amounting to Manifest Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No.
25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited the Fourth
Divisions resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Punos demurrer to evidence in
Criminal Case No. 25801, and dismissing the case upon a finding that the assailed
contracts had never been perfected,[14] which finding was contrary to the evidence of the
Prosecution.

The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been
perfected was based on a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which
the Fourth Division appreciated in the guise of taking judicial notice.She contended that
taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was
highly erroneous, and constituted gross ignorance of the law.

Comments of Respondents

Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed
their joint comment.[15] Although admitting having tried cases in the provinces by
apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among themselves, they
emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the outset that: first, there was a
quorum, i.e., all the three members of the Division were present in the same courtroom
or venue, thereby preserving the collegial nature of the Division as required by law,
specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were within
hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily confer
with each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases separately
being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus
could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based
on the equitable principle of estoppel.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in
the best interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the disposition of
their cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of
the litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile
discontinued the arrangement after it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace
than the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that even
assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject
of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a
mere procedural lapse.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainants allegation on their use of
intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of stenographic
notes to prove that there was no record of the intemperate and discriminatory utterances
on the date specified by the complainant.[16] Justice Ong dared the complainant to
produce a copy of the order that contained his following alleged utterance:

We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal,
by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before
them about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had done so
casually and conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices
teasing each other from time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually made
in jest, and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom
setting.

Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded

the possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of
government funds, because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any
of the scheduled cases.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to
the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action
by dismissing the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through
the resolution issued in G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]

Justice Ponferradas separate comment[18] echoed his co-respondents assertions in

their joint comment.
Report of the Court Administrator
In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,[19] we noted the comments of respondent
Justices, and referred the matter to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In his report dated October 6, 2009,[20] then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a
Member of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit,
because:
Viewed in the foregoing light, the charge of grave misconduct cannot
stand. It is understood that grave misconduct is such which affects a public
officers performance of his duties as such officer and not only that which
affects his character as a private individual and requires reliable evidence
showing that the judicial act complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law. Our perusal of the record shows that
respondents adoption of the assailed practice was not motivated by
corruption and/or an illegal purpose. Indeed, the best interest of the service
was clearly aimed at. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the
law requires that the error or mistake if there be such must be gross or
patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.

For the very same reasons, respondents cannot likewise be held liable for
falsification of public documents arising out of the alleged falsity of the
collegiality reflected in the minutes and/or stenographic notes taken during
the proceedings in which the assailed practice was adopted. For liability to
be assessed for the offense of falsification of official documents thru
untruthful narration of the facts, the rule is settled that the following
elements should concur, viz: (a) the offender makes in a document an
untruthful statement in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth
in the narration of facts was made with wrongful intent to injure a third
person. The absence of the enumerated elements clearly discounts
respondents liability for said offense.

Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, it is a fundamental

evidentiary rule that the party who alleges a fact must prove the same. For
all of complainants imputations against respondents, the record is bereft of
any showing that the latter are guilty of oppressive conduct and/or grave
misconduct, particularly with reference to the comment the former was
required to file regarding the motion to lift bench warrant filed by the
witness Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos. 28103-104. Given the variance
between the allegations in said motion and the reasons complainant
initially advanced for the non-presentation of said witness at the April 27,
2006 hearing in said cases, respondents were clearly acting within their
prerogative when they decided to clarify the matter from the former and
her colleague, Prosecutor Almira Abella-Orfanel. Although subsequently
required to explain why she should not be cited for contempt in the June
20, 2006 order issued in the case, the record is, more importantly, bereft of
any showing that complainant was, in fact, declared in contempt of court
or actually fined in the sum of P18,000.00 as purportedly threatened by
respondents.

Squarely refuted in the affidavits executed by her colleagues, namely,

Prosecutors Cornelio Somido, Almira Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and
Rabenranath Uy, complainants bare allegations clearly deserve scant
consideration insofar as they impute such further irregularities against
respondents as threatening or humiliating her during the hearing/s
conducted in the aforesaid cases and/or causing disrespect to Special
Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio or otherwise allowing interference in the
latters handling of a case. Because administrative proceedings like the one
at bench are governed by the substantial evidence rule, the same may be
said of the disparaging comments respondents are supposed to have made
regarding the barong and/or intelligence of practitioners appearing before
them which are, on the whole, devoid of any bases in the record outside of
complainants averments and the affidavit belatedly executed by Assistant
Special Prosecutor Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By substantial evidence
is meant such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and does not mean just any evidence in
the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting
in basis. The test is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the
relevant evidence in the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact
as adequate.

As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant has

not discharged the onus of proof by substantial evidence. The intemperate
and immoderate statements attributed to respondents are, to repeat, without
sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not equivalent to
impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about their
respective alma maters, the intention being to break the usual monotony
and seriousness of the courtroom setting or to put practitioners appearing
before them at ease. It cannot be said that public confidence in the
 Judiciary was eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards
either the parties or to each other.

As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the demurrer
in Criminal Case No. 25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that members of
the bench like respondents are presumed to have acted regularly and in the
manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance
of a judges function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice and undue
interest cannot be presumed lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial
to a party is, consequently, not enough; there should be adequate evidence
to prove the charge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil,
criminal or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter
how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. These principles find
resonance in the case at bench where, in addition to the total dearth of
evidence to prove the charge of manifest partiality, it appears that
respondents grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 was
affirmed in the following wise in the June 5, 2006 resolution issued by the
Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 171116, to wit:

G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

REYNALDO PUNO). xx xx On the basis thereof, the Court
resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari dated 2
March 2006 assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan for
petitioners failure to submit a valid affidavit of service of copies of
the petition on respondent and the Sandiganbayan in accordance
with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in relation
to Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules, there being no jurat and
signature of the affiant in the attached affidavit of service of the
petition.

In any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to

sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x
x x. (emphasis supplied)

Ruling of the Court

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court Administrator.
 A.
Respondents Violation of the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan

Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division
despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them
were in the same venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of
one another.
The contention is not well-taken.

Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:

Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit

in three divisions of three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at
the same time.

Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division;

Provided, that when the required quorum for the particular division cannot
be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice
or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an
Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the
basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said
division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said
division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto,
unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case
the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice,
designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily
therein.
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, viz:

Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in

five (5) Divisions of three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding
Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit separately at the same time. Each of
the five (5) most senior Associate Justices including the Presiding Justice,
shall be the Chairman of a Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices
next in rank shall be the Senior Member of a Division; and each of the last
five (5) Associate Justices shall be the Junior Member of a Division.
Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial is
defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is an
executive body with each member having approximately equal power and authority.
[22]In a collegial court, therefore, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority
rule. Thus, PD 1606, as amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual presence of the three Justices composing the
Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business and to hold trial proceedings.
Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division from the conduct of
its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence of a quorum and
precludes collegiality.

As if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and in
attendance during sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-

xxx when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be
had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice
or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate
an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on
the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member
of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular
member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced
thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the
Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals
to sit temporarily therein.

Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit
together as members of the Fourth Division in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto. The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division
would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings.
This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of
the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at
the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.

Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became
impossible when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The
internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility.Section 2,
Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires
that rulings on oral motions made or objections raised in the course of the trial
proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the
rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the
hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other respondents
properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before
him.

Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose

of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three
Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees
triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division
of three Justices (not one or two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than
those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single
judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader
circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in part to
the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the
discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court,
which eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of
cases (whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately
reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).

In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the
nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its
head, done without the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the
collegial body itself. There, the question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon
Kintanar, as chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could
alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other
commissioners as members. The Court ruled:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a

majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to
validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of
the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a
majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications

Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The
NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a
case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the
NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into
the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which
organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under
Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the
NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when
it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent
Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice
or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As
responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability
of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.

We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings
was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure
arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the
integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very essence
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.

Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.
[24] They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. [25] For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of
the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a
lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to
be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The
respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the transgression of
some established or definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence,[26] or the corrupt or persistent
violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal rules[27] considering that the
explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not refute, revealed
that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings within
sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of
the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of
was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent
disregard of well-known legal rules;[28] on the contrary, none of these circumstances
was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had
not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in
adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite
their disposition of cases in the provinces.

Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings
accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they
adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a
sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated
their adoption of the procedure. They could have seen that their procedure was flawed,
and that the flaw would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by
precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the irregularity. They
knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit recommended, was not the
chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in State Prosecutors
v. Muro,[29] viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a
speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed is not the chief
objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice is more important than a race to end the
trial.A genuine respect for the rights of all parties, thoughtful
consideration before ruling on important questions, and a zealous
regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a
good trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for hasty
disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent
judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as
they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges
perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinate to the primordial necessity of order in the
social life.

Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders issued
during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they
thereby made it appear that they had all been physically present when the truth was
different. Such act merely ensued from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as
a separate offense.

B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had
uttered the improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.

A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the
offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the
complainants charge. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must
accept such transcripts as the faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they
bear the certification of correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared
them.

Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging
during the hearings in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They
thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite
humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit.
We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which
no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance
of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of
each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to
ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave
with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.

Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary clearly enjoins that:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings

before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in
an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.
We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in
and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their
bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for
Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members
of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.

Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their

judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards
any person or group on irrelevant grounds.[30] It is very essential that they should live
up to the high standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this
regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial
colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.

In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming
conduct, which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct applies to a
broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical
practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.[31]
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already
mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No.
171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such
dismissal to have failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for
rendering an unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some
other similar motive.[32]

D.
Penalties

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC,
classifies the offense of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:

Section 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:

xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.

Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on
judges and justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:

Section 11. Sanctions. xxx

xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P 20,000.00.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, thus:

Section 10. Light Charges. Light charges include:

 1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
xxx xxx xxx

and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not
less than P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or censure, reprimand, or
admonition with warning.

Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, in an instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the
penalty is that corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest of the charges are
considered as aggravating circumstances.

That respondent Justices responsibilities as members of a Division were different

compels us to differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong

Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules of the
Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers of
supervision, direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings coming before
the Division.

In exercising his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and
steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed
to guarantee that his Divisions proceedings came within the bounds of substantive and
procedural rules. We cannot, of course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar
with the pertinent law and correct procedure, considering his already long tenure and
experience as of then as a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, having risen from Associate
Justice to Chairman of his Division.
We hold that the condign and commensurate penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine
of P15,000.00, after taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this
administrative offense was his first and the aggravating circumstance of the light charge
of unbecoming conduct. The penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar of such offenses shall be dealt with more severely.

2.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada

As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had
no direction and control of how the proceedings of the Division were conducted.
Direction and control was vested in Justice Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez
and Justice Ponferrada simply relied without malice on the soundness and wisdom of
Justice Ongs discretion as their Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them
into traveling the path of reluctance to halt Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We
hold that their liabilities ought to be much diminished by their lack of malice.

In addition, the fact that this is the first case for Justice Hernandez and Justice
Ponferrada is a mitigating circumstance in their favor.

Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less serious charge of simple misconduct,
aggravated by a light charge but appreciating his reliance without malice and the
mitigating circumstance of this offense being his first, the Court admonishes him with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more
severely.

The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less serious charge of simple misconduct,
without any aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance without malice and
the mitigating circumstance of its being a first offense. However, he is warned to
be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

Final Note
It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable, competent and independent Judiciary
exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government and the well-
being of the people.[34] We warn, therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the part
of anyone involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public
accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be
countenanced.[35] Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority
and integrity of the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society;
hence, it is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to respect and honor the
judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the
judicial system.[36]

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine

of P15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall
be dealt with more severely;

2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning

that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and

3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more

cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
CONCERNED TRIAL LAWYERS A. M. No. RTJ-05-1920
OF MANILA, (formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1141-RTJ)
Complainant,
-versus-

JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION,

Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 47,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x

OFFICE OF THE COURT A. M. No. RTJ-99-1432[1]

ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,

-versus

JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION,

Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 47,
Respondent.

x-------------------------x

OFFICE OF THE COURT A. M. No. RTJ-01-1623

ADMINISTRATOR, (formerly A.M. No. 01-2-46-
RTC) Complainant,
- v e r s u s-

JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION,

and Branch Clerk of Court ROGELIO
M. LINATOC[2],
Respondents.

x-------------------------x
ANGELINE Y. CUEVILLAS, OCA I.P.I No. 02-1418- RTJ[3]
VIRGILIO TINAPAN, ADELA A.
ACEBO and HERMINI0 A.
ASTORGA,
Complainants,

-versus

JUDGE LORENZO B. VENERACION,

ATTY. ROGELIO M. LINATOC and
TERESITA C. VASQUEZ, Presiding
Judge, Branch Clerk of Court and
Court Stenographer, respectively,
all of RTC, Branch 47, Manila,
Respondents.

x-------------------------x

Re: Application for Optional A. M. No. 10425-Ret.[4]

Retirement under RA 910 of
Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,*
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated :

April 26, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Before us are consolidated administrative cases

against retired Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, then presiding judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5]

In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, a letter[6] dated February 8, 1999 was

referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by the
Ombudsman.[7] It contained allegations of misconduct and tardiness
against respondent Judge Veneracion by the Concerned Trial Lawyers of
Manila[8].
Complainants assailed the apparent reluctance of Judge Veneracion to
grant petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage despite their
alleged merit. Instead, he would lecture litigants in open court that the
declaration of nullity of marriage was not the proper remedy. Lawyers
were often embarrassed by his emphasis on legal technicalities allegedly
designed to prevent them from presenting evidence in favor of their
clients. Complainants were often harassed whenever respondent would
force them to read and interpret verses from the Bible. There were
occasions when he would castigate them for their failure to give the
interpretation he wanted. The fact that a number of cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage assigned to respondent judges sala
were later withdrawn allegedly proved complainants claim.
Complainants further assailed respondent judges habitual tardiness
which caused the delay in the disposition of cases assigned to him.
In a 1st Indorsement[9] dated September 20, 1999, the anonymous
letter-complaint was referred by the OCA to Executive Judge Rebecca de
Guia Salvador of the Manila RTC for discreet investigation. Judge
Salvador required Judge Veneracion to comment on the complaint. She
believed that a discreet investigation was unnecessary since it was well-
known that respondent judge encouraged litigants, particularly in cases
of nullity of marriage, to read verses from the Bible. She likewise verified
if there were cases withdrawn from respondents sala. She found out
that 27 cases for declaration of nullity of marriage were indeed
withdrawn, all of which were handled by a certain Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo.[10]
In his comment[11] dated October 21, 1999, Judge Veneracion
vehemently denied the allegation that he was against the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage despite their merit. He
alleged that from the time he was designated as presiding judge of
Branch 47, RTC Manila, not more than two such cases filed in his sala
were dismissed for lack of merit.
He denied the allegation that he harassed parties during hearings. On
the contrary, the letters[12] he received from previous litigants showed
how much they appreciated the way he shared the words of the Lord
with them and how this practice greatly improved their lives.
Judge Veneracion maintained that the person who sent the letter-
complaint did not represent the concerned trial lawyers of Manila. He
only represented himself. The docket books of his sala revealed that only
Atty. Simbillo had consistently withdrawn cases for declaration of nullity
of marriage every time these were raffled to his sala.[13] Atty. Simbillo
had once been enjoined by respondent judge to amend his petition for
annulment of marriage to his wife.[14] Apparently, this was not well
taken by the said lawyer as the latter had since then moved for the
withdrawal of similar petitions before his sala.
In A. M. No. RTJ-01-1623, a report[15] on the judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases conducted in Branch 47, Manila RTC,
from June 19 to 26, 2000, challenged the efficiency of respondent Judge
Veneracion and his Clerk of Court, Rogelio M. Linatoc[16].

As summarized by Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock in

his memorandum[17] dated September 5, 2002, the audit report
showed:

1) Regional Trial Court, Branch

[47], Manila has not been submitting the required monthly
report of cases. The latest monthly report submitted by said
Branch [was] for the month of February 2000;

2) Out of the 60 cases submitted for

decision (7 criminal and 53 civil), 41 cases (6 criminal and 35
civil) were beyond the [90-day] reglementary period, although
there were draft decisions in several of these cases. These
cases were submitted for decision upon certification from the
Branch Clerk of Court that all stenographic notes have been
transcribed;
3) Out of the 41 cases undecided beyond the 90-day period, 7
were appealed and 33 cases were fully tried by Judge
Veneracion and submitted before him for decision;
4) There were cases with motions or incidents pending
resolution for an unreasonable length of time, although there
[were] draft orders in most of them;
5) There were 14 criminal cases and 28 civil cases found with
no further action or proceeding or with no further setting of
trial for a considerable length of time;

6) There were two (2) records of cases, Crim. Cases Nos. 95-
144694 and 95-144695 [Falsification of Public Documents],
found in Branch 45, which were supposedly transmitted to the
[Office of the Clerk of Court] RTC Pasay City pursuant to the
order issued by respondent judge dated March 14, 1996[;]

7) In three (3) criminal cases, Nos. 00-18138, 00-182163 and

00-181414, no warrants of arrest were issued since the filing
of the information; and in two (2) criminal cases, Nos. 98-
169423 and 99-174851, no setting for arraignment despite the
arrest of the accused and posting of bail bond;

8) In Civil Cases Nos. 00-96423, 00-96254, 00-97156, 00-

97298, 99-95304, 99-95126, 00-97329, 00-97176, no action
was taken on the complaint such as issuance of summons to
defendants since the filing thereof; while in Civil Cases Nos.
99-95466, appealed on 31 October 1999, and 99-96749
appealed on 13 March 2000, no action was likewise taken;
and in Civil Cases Nos. 99-93433, 00-96666, 00-96744, the
same were not set for pre-trial despite receipt of the
defendants answer;
9) The record of an appealed case, Civil Case No. 95-74880,
[unlawful detainer], which was decided on 14 December 1995
was ordered by respondent Judge Veneracion returned to the
court of origin for execution only on June 21, 2000, after the
lapse of almost five (5) years;

10) There were cases which have not been acted upon for
failure of the parties to comply with the order requiring
compliance;

11) There were 44 civil cases with pending summonses which

can be archived pursuant to Adm. Order No. 7-A-92 since six
(6) months have [lapsed] without the summons being served
[to the defendants] thru no fault of the plaintiff; and there were
192 out of the 321 criminal cases with warrants of arrest
issued, which can be archived because accused [have not
been] apprehended for more than six (6) months from date of
 issuance of the warrants, some of which were issued as early
as 1996;

12) There were cases dismissed for alleged failure of the

plaintiff or petitioner to pursue the case despite the fact that
the court has not taken any action on the complaint or petition
since the filing thereof several years ago; that is, no
summonses were issued or that the cases were not set for
trial;

13) There were cases where alleged summonses were issued

but were returned unserved, which were dismissed without
prejudice, instead of archiving the same pursuant to Adm.
Circular No. 7-A-92;

14) The entries in the separate criminal and docket books

were not updated; the Semestral Docket Inventory Reports
were erroneous because the 1st and 2nd semester of 1999
inventory included only cases filed in 1999 but not those filed
in the previous years yet still pending trial and/or for decision;
and the cases found to be submitted for decision for several
years already were not reflected in the monthly report of
February 2000.

In respondent judges explanation[18], he averred that Branch 47 was

one of the five branches in the Manila RTC originally designated to
handle and try family relations cases. It was also designated as a special
tax court in Manila as well as a special criminal court to handle heinous
crimes and drug cases.

When the Family Code was amended, all cases involving youth offenders
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila were transferred
to the special Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts in Manila, which
included Branch 47.
Despite these special assignments and designations, additional
personnel were not assigned to Branch 47. The docket clerks had a hard
time managing the records, some of which may have been misfiled due
to lack of space and filing cabinets.

On March 4, 1993, he suffered a mild stroke which affected his

handwriting. He could no longer take notes on the
proceedings/testimonies in court. He had to rely on the stenographic
notes for the preparation of his resolutions and decisions. Hence, until
the branch clerk of court certified that the stenographic notes had
been transcribed, cases were not deemed submitted for decision.

Respondent judge declared that he had already dictated his decisions in

several cases reported unresolved but the stenographers had not yet
transcribed them. Some of the reported cases[19] were not Branch 47s
but were assigned to other branches. There were also cases included in
the report of pending cases which had already been decided. Other
cases already had drafts but were not yet signed.

Respondent judge did not deny that he read verses from the Bible
during hearings of annulment, adoption and criminal cases. This was
meant to share the word of God with those who came before his court
and who were in a quandary about their purpose in life. He only wished
to remind litigants in these cases that God had given them a manual to
serve as a guide in conducting their lives. In his comment, he begged us
to allow him to avail of optional retirement in case we found that his
actuation violated his responsibilities as a judge.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[20] provides:

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom

of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner
as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary. (emphasis ours)

In this canon, judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as
long as it does not interfere with their judicial functions. Respondent
judges practice of reading verses from the Bible during hearings was an
exercise of his religious freedom. We would have preferred that he
refrained from such practice. Nevertheless, we hesitate to castigate him
lest we trample on this right.

As DCA Lock stressed in his memorandum[21] dated September 5,

2002:

xxx The respondent judges act of reading verses from the

[Bible] and relating them to petitioners lives may well be
considered merely as a guide for petitioners in declaration of
nullity cases. It could not be said that by reason of the
respondents act of reading verses from the [Bible], he frowns
upon cases of such nature. As argued, from the time the
respondent was designated as presiding judge of [Branch 47], there
were no more than one or two such nullity cases, which were
dismissed for lack of merit. xxx (emphasis ours)
The position which a judge holds opens him to much criticism and
cynicism. He cannot please everyone who has business in his court. In
this case, both Executive Judge de Guia and DCA Lock found that the
complainant in this case was not the purported association of trial
lawyers of Manila but only a certain Atty. Simbillo. Apparently, Atty.
Simbillo was displeased when he was asked by respondent judge if he
read the Bible. He was embarrassed and from then on, he withdrew all
his annulment cases whenever they were raffled to respondent judges
sala.

Contrary to complainants various allegations of harassment, we find

that respondent judge observed Section 1 of Canon 5:

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in

society and differences arising from various sources, including but
not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and
economic status and other like causes. (emphasis ours)

The letters from a number of litigants, attached to the records of this

case, belie the claim that respondent judge inappropriately expressed
his beliefs and convictions to the point of harassing or embarrassing
litigants and counsels in his court. We cannot ignore the sincere words
of appreciation in the numerous letters that have been sent to
respondent judge, all alluding to his practice of reading verses from the
Bible. The outpouring of kind words cannot be mere exaggeration. They
were sincerely extended by persons previously lost but who had since
found their way in life through respondent judges guidance.
Aside from that, there was no compulsion involved whenever respondent
judge questioned litigants as to whether they read the Bible or not. He
did not impose his religious convictions on them but merely suggested
the benefits of reading the Bible.

Surely, this practice alone was not sufficient to hold respondent judge
guilty of misconduct. His judicial functions, duties and responsibilities
were not impaired by his religious beliefs and convictions.

Nevertheless, this is a most opportune time to remind judges that their

actions in court should always be seen by the public as guided by the
law and not by thier personal or religious beliefs. This is the only way to
prevent the public from seeing a display of religiosity as an
encroachment on or an interference with our system of justice.

As to respondent judges alleged tardiness, complainant failed to adduce

evidence in support thereof. We cannot therefore impute the delay in the
disposition of his cases to his unconfirmed tardiness. Besides,
respondent judge adequately explained the reasons for the delay in A.M.
No. RTJ-01-1623.

With respect to the charge of gross inefficiency, we find that respondent

judge failed to decide certain cases within the three-month period
mandated by Section 15(1)[22], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the prescribed
periods.[23] Any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the
peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary.

It is for this reason that Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct[24] mandates that:

Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of

reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness.

No less than the 1987 Constitution requires that cases at the trial court
level be resolved within three months from the date they are submitted
for decision. Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the
clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.[25] Failure
to decide/resolve cases within the period prescribed by law constitutes
gross inefficiency which is a ground for an administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge.[26]

The Code of Judicial Conduct further provides:

RULE 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court

personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business
and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
The fact that no additional personnel were assigned to Branch 47
despite its additional assignments does not justify misfiling of case
records. A judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision
or resolution. Respondent judge was expected to keep his own record of
cases so that he could act thereon without undue delay. He ought to
have devised an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that
no disorderliness could affect the flow of cases and their speedy
disposition.Proper and efficient court management was his
responsibility. He was the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.[27]

DCA Lock was correct when he mentioned in his memorandum[28] that:

While serious illness may justify the inability of the respondent judge
to perform his official duties and functions, nevertheless, it is
incumbent upon him to request the Honorable Court, thru this Office
for additional time within which to decide/resolve cases which he
could not seasonably act upon. Further, a heavy caseload may
excuse the respondent judges failure to decide/resolve cases within
the reglementary period, but not his failure to request for extension
of time within which to decide/resolve the same. xxx

It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in

meritorious cases, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to
decide cases beyond the three-month period. All that a judge should do,
in cases of great difficulty, is to request an extension of time. To this,
the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic.[29] Respondent
judge fell short of expectations in this regard.
Although Judge Veneracion retired from the service on September 23,
2000,[30] his retirement did not render these administrative complaints
moot and academic. In the Office of the Court Administrator v.
Fernandez,[31] we held:

Cessation from office of respondent judge because of death or

retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service or render
the said administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction
that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by mere fact that the respondent public
official had ceased in office during the pendency of his
case. Indeed, the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from
the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he shall still be answerable.

Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies as a less serious charge
the undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the
records of a case.[32] The penalty for such infraction is suspension from
office for not less than one nor more than three months or a fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[33]

Considering that respondent judge has already retired after suffering a

stroke, we impose upon him a fine of P11,000, to be deducted from the
amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) DISMISSING for lack of merit the charge of misconduct and
tardiness against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion in A.M. No. RTJ-05-
1920; and
2) Finding Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion LIABLE for gross inefficiency in
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 for which he is hereby FINED P11,000 to be
deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(on leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC
STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH
[SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA
SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE
OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES
OF THE JUDICIARY.

x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA
RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE
CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE Present:
JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE CARPIO,
2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, VELASCO, JR.,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
[SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA BRION,
SHEETS OF THE COURT OF PERALTA,
APPEALS JUSTICES. BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
June 13, 2012
x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTI ON

MENDOZA, J.:

In a letter,[1] dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008.
She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum
Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of
information on government officials.

In her Letter,[2] dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the
PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose.

The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009.[3] On the
same day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the
policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend
appropriate action on such requests.[4]

On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario submitted its Memorandum[5] dated November 18, 2009 and its
Resolution[6] dated November 16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on
Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN,
and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.

Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of
the Justices of this Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. In particular,
these requests include the:

(1) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM,[7] dated September 10, 2009, issued by

Atty. E. H. Amat, Acting Director, General Investigation Bureau-B of the
Office of the Ombudsman, directing the Office of Administrative Services,
Supreme Court to submit two (2) copies of the SALN of Associate Justice
Roland B. Jurado of the Sandiganbayan for the years 1997-2008, his latest
PDS, his Oath of Office, appointment papers, and service records.

(2) LETTER,[8] dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency
Reporting Project, asking permission to be able to access and copy the
SALN of officials and employees of the lower courts.
(3) LETTER,[9] filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim, seeking copies of
the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices Antonio T.
Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D.
Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo,
Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C.
Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

(4) LETTER,[10] dated August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo, Reporter,

GMA News and Public Affairs also requesting for copies of the SALN of
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio,
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion,
Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto
A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C. Mendoza,
and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, for purposes of producing a story on
transparency and governance, and updating their database.

(5) LETTER,[11] dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo, requesting for
a copy of the 2010 SALN of any Justice of the Supreme Court as well as a
copy of the Judiciary Development Fund, for purposes of her securing a
huge percentage in final examination in Constitutional Law I at the San
Beda College Alabang School of Law and for her study on the state of the
Philippine Judiciary, particularly the manner, nature and disposition of the
resources under the JDF and how these have evolved through the years.

(6) LETTERS, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh, Lead
Convenor of Kaya Natin! Movement for Good Governance and Ethical
Leadership, addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,[12] Associate
Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,[13] Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,
[14] Arturo D. Brion,[15] Diosdado M. Peralta,[16] Mariano C. Del Castillo,
[17] Jose Portugal Perez,[18] and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,
[19] requesting for copies of their SALN and seeking permission to post the
same on their website for the general public.

(7) LETTER,[20] dated December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria, Executive

Director, Newsbreak, seeking copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court
Justices covering various years, for the purpose of the stories they intend to
put on their website regarding the Supreme Court and the Judiciary.

(8) LETTERS, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe Manalang of Unlimited

Productions, Inc., addressed to Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
[21] Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,[22] Mariano C. Del Castillo[23] and Jose
Portugal Perez,[24] and Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court[25] requesting for copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court
Justices for the years 2010 and 2011.

(9) LETTER,[26] dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas, Executive

Director, PCIJ, requesting for copies of the SALN, PDS or CVs of the
Justices of the Supreme Court from the year they were appointed to the
present.

(10) SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM,[27] issued

on January 17, 2012, by the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, in
connection with Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, requiring the Clerk of Court, among others, to bring with
her the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for the years 2002 to 2011.

(11) LETTER,[28] dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo Ka Nilo H. Baculo, Sr.,
requesting copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for the years
2008 to 2011, for his use as a media practitioner.

(12) LETTER,[29] dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre of

GMA News, requesting for copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court
Justices for the networks story on the political dynamics and process of
decision-making in the Supreme Court.

(13) LETTER,[30] dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana, Head,
News Operations, News 5, requesting for copies of the 2010-2011 SALN of
the Supreme Court Justices for use as reference materials for stories that will
be aired in the newscasts of their television network.

(14) LETTER,[31] dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo,

Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Malacaang, addressed to Atty.
Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court, seeking her
comments and recommendation on House Bill No. 5694,[32] to aid in their
determination of whether the measure should be certified as urgent.

(15) Undated LETTER[33] of Benise P. Balaoing, Intern of Rappler.com, a

news website, seeking copies of the 2010 SALN of the Justices of the Court
and the CA for the purpose of completing its database in preparation for its
coverage of the 2013 elections.
 (16) LETTER,[34] dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa, Chief Executive
Officer and Executive Officer and Executive Editor of Rappler, Inc.,
requesting for copies of the current SALN of all the Justices of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan also for the purpose of
completing its database in preparation for its coverage of the 2013 elections.

(17) LETTER,[35] dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A. Seir, Junior

Researcher, News Research Section, GMA News and Public Affairs,
requesting for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for the calendar year 2011 for
the networks use in their public affairs programs.

(18) LETTER,[36] dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor
of Solar Network, Inc., requesting for copies of the 2011 SALN of all the
Justices of the Supreme Court.

(19) LETTER,[37] dated May 30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor,
TV5 requesting for copies of the SALN of the Justices of the Court for the
last three (3) years for the purpose of a special report it would produce as a
result of the impeachment and subsequent conviction of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona.

(20) LETTER,[38] dated May 31, 2012, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon,

Assistant Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office, Office of the
Ombudsman, requesting for 1] certified copies of the SALN of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona for the years 2002-2011, as well as 2] a certificate
of his yearly compensation, allowances, and bonuses, also for the years
2002-2011.

(21) LETTER,[39] dated June 8, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, requesting a

copy of the SALN of any present Supreme Court Justice, for the purpose of
completing her grade in Legal Philosophy at the San Beda College of Law.

Pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,[40] the Court, upon
recommendation of the OCA, issued its Resolution[41] dated October 13, 2009, denying
the subpoena duces tecum for the SALNs and personal documents of Justice Roland B.
Jurado of the SB. The resolution also directed the Ombudsman to forward to the Court
any complaint and/or derogatory report against Justice Roland B. Jurado, in consonance
with the doctrine laid down in Caiobes v. Ombudsman.[42] Upon compliance by the
Ombudsman, the Court, in its Resolution[43] dated February 2, 2010, docketed this
matter as a regular administrative complaint.[44]

Also, considering the development in Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, the Court, on January 24, 2012, resolved to consider moot
the Subpoena Ad Testificandum Et Duces Tecum issued by the Senate impeachment
court.[45]

In resolving the remaining pending incidents, the Court, on January 17, 2012 required
the CA, the SB, the CTA, the Philippine Judges Association, the Metropolitan and City
Judges Association of the Philippines, the Philippine Trial Judges League, and the
Philippine Women Judges Association (PWJA), to file their respective comments.

In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the
various judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people
to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the
independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition to the disclosure of
SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the
said magistrates and the various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in
accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that would not
undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

After a review of the matters at hand, it is apparent that the matter raised for
consideration of the Court is not a novel one. As early as 1989, the Court had the
opportunity to rule on the matter of SALN disclosure in Re: Request of Jose M.
Alejandrino,[46] where the Court denied the request of Atty. Alejandrino for the SALNs
of the Justices of the Court due to a plainly discernible improper motive. Aggrieved by
an adverse decision of the Court, he accused the Justices of patent partiality and alluded
that they enjoyed an early Christmas as a result of the decision promulgated by the
Court. Atty. Alejandrino even singled out the Justices who took part in the decision and
conspicuously excluded the others who, for one reason or another, abstained from voting
therein. While the Court expressed its willingness to have the Clerk of Court furnish
copies of the SALN of any of its members, it however, noted that requests for SALNs
must be made under circumstances that must not endanger, diminish or destroy the
independence, and objectivity of the members of the Judiciary in the performance of
their judicial functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions, kidnapping,
extortion, blackmail or other untoward incidents. Thus, in order to give meaning to the
constitutional right of the people to have access to information on matters of public
concern, the Court laid down the guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus:

1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any

Justice or Judge shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8
[A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the purpose of the request.

2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important

as the right to information which is subject to the limitations
provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and
just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of
deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely
available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a
litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the
court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter
will come before it under circumstances from which it may, also
reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good faith
and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and, with
the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn
the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment,
the request may be denied.

3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the

person making the request and the request for information appears
to be a fishing expedition intended to harass or get back at the
Judge, the request may be denied.

4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or

where the nature of their work exposes Judges to assaults against
their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should
be immediately reported to the military.

5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.

In the 1992 case of Re: Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth,[47] the request was denied because the Court found
that the purpose of the request was to fish for information against certain members of the
Judiciary. In the same case, the Court resolved to authorize the Court Administrator to
act on all requests for copies of SALN, as well as other papers on file with the 201
Personnel Records of lower court judges and personnel, provided that there was a court
subpoena duly signed by the Presiding Judge in a pending criminal case against a judge
or personnel of the Judiciary. The Court added that for requests made by the Office of
the Ombudsman, the same must be personally signed by the Ombudsman himself.
Essentially, the Court resolved that, in all instances, requests must conform to the
guidelines set in the Alejandrino case and that the documents or papers requested for
must be relevant and material to the case being tried by the court or under investigation
by the Ombudsman.

In 1993, the Court, in Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth of former Judge Luis D. Dictado,[48] ruled that the
OCA may extend its granted authority to retired members of the Judiciary.

With respect to investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal

case against a judge, the Court, in Maceda v. Vasquez,[49] upheld its constitutional duty
to exercise supervision over all inferior courts and ruled that an investigation by the
Office of the Ombudsman without prior referral of the criminal case to the Court was an
encroachment of a constitutional duty that ran afoul to the doctrine of separation of
powers. This pronouncement was further amplified in the abovementioned case
of Caiobes. Thus:

x x x Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the

Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
 administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject
of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the
Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know
of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect
for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case
of Maceda v. Vasquez (221 SCRA 464[1993]).

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that the case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which
impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of

administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is

relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public
officials, viz:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision, the
Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated on the import of
the right to information in this wise:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is

delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied x x x.

x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the

constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
government.(Emphases supplied)

In Baldoza v. Dimaano,[51] the importance of the said right was pragmatically

explicated:

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of

the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if
they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining
the flow of such information depends on protection for both its
acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, while public concern like public interest eludes exact definition and has been said
to embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because such matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,[52] the Constitution itself, under Section 17,
Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public
concern and interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to
know. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a
permission. Hence, the duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their
SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of

office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. [Emphasis
supplied]

This Constitutional duty is echoed and particularized in a statutory creation of Congress:

Republic Act No. 6713, also known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees":[53]

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and

employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including
those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. -
All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall
file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value
and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks,
stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to file
the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30) days
from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority
in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate
government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and
also their business interests and financial connections in previous
years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any
office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may
file the required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be
filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national
office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of
the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy
Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks,
with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
 (5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of
every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best
of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in
the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion
right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that
right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples right to know is limited to matters
of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Jurisprudence[54] has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national
security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions;
(3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or
classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of
their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and
the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

In this regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and
prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and
employees, viz:

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed

under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable
hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or
reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed
as required by law.
 (3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to
pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of
such statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public
for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After
such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an
ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or
use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general public.
Moreover, the following provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 6713 provide:

Rule IV

Transparency of Transactions and Access to Information

xxxx

Section 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official

information, records or documents to any requesting public, except
if:

(a) such information, record or document must be kept

secret in the interest of national defense or security or
the conduct of foreign affairs;

(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of an

individual in imminent danger;

(c) the information, record or document sought falls

within the concepts of established privilege or recognized
exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or
jurisprudence;

(d) such information, record or document compromises

drafts or decisions, orders, rulings, policy, decisions,
memoranda, etc;
(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature
where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy;

(f) it would disclose investigatory records complied for

law enforcement purposes, or information which if
written would be contained in such records or
information would (i) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (ii) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial
or an impartial adjudication, (iii) disclose the identity of
a confidential source and, in the case of a record
compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the
course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by
the confidential source, or (iv) unjustifiably disclose
investigative techniques and procedures; or

(g) it would disclose information the premature

disclosure of which would (i) in the case of a department,
office or agency which agency regulates currencies,
securities, commodities, of financial institutions, be
likely to lead to significant financial speculation in
currencies, securities, or commodities or significantly
endanger the stability of any financial institution, or (ii)
in the case of any department, office or agency be likely
or significantly to frustrate implementation of a
proposed official action, except that subparagraph (f) (ii)
shall not apply in any instance where the department,
office or agency has already disclosed to the public the
content or nature of its proposed action, or where the
department, office or agency is required by law to make
such disclosure on its own initiative prior to taking final
official action on such proposal.

xxxx

Rule VI

Duties of Public Officials and Employees

 Section 6. All public documents must be made accessible to, and
readily available for inspection by, the public during working hours,
except those provided in Section 3, Rule IV.

The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the
inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its
very office to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other
employees may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make
inspection may be insured.[55]

In this connection, Section 11 of the same law provides for the penalties in case there
should be a misuse of the SALN and the information contained therein, viz:
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless
of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual,
temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any
violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one
(1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due
notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the
violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he
shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7,
8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative
proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a
public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories, with public officials or employees, in
violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as
the public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against
any person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited
by Section 8 (d) of this Act. The Court in which such action is
brought may assess against such person a penalty in any amount not
to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (25,000.00). If another
 sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall
apply.

Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis--vis the various requests made, the Court
finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the
Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and
regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.

The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit
motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and
their publication. However, custodians of public documents must notconcern themselves
with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The
moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the
law.[56] While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to
prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records.[57] After all, public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests contained in the (1) Letter,
dated July 30, 2009, of Rowena C. Paraan; (2) Letter, dated August 13, 2009, of Karol
M. Ilagan; (3) Letter, dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency
Reporting Project; (4) Letter, filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim; (5) Letter, dated
August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo; (6) Letter, dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S.
Tamayo; (7) Letters, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh; (8) Letter, dated
December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria; (9) Letters, all dated January 3, 2012, of
Phillipe Manalang; (10) Letter, dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas; (11)
Letter, dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo Ka Nilo H. Baculo; (12) Letter, dated January 25,
2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre; (13) Letter, dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude
Sta. Ana; (14) Letter, dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo; (15) undated
Letter of Benise P. Balaoing; (16) Letter, dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa; (17)
Letter, dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A. Seir; (18) Letter, dated May 4, 2012,
of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor of Solar Network, Inc.; (19) Letter, dated May 30,
2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5; (20) Letter, dated May 31, 2002, of Atty.
Joselito P. Fangon of the Office of the Ombudsman; and (21) Letter, dated June 7, 2012,
of Thea Marie S. Pias, insofar as copies of the 2011 SALN, PDS, and CV of the Justices
of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax
Appeals; Judges of lower courts; and other members of the Judiciary, are concerned,
subject to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing
rules and regulations, and the following guidelines:

1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court
of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court
Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of
offices.

2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV
of the members, officials and employees of the Judiciary, and may cover
only previous records if so specifically requested and considered as
justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under
the terms of these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.

3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the

Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the Court En
Banc.
 4. Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific purpose
and their individual interests sought to be served; shall state the
commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and
shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the
SC website. The use of the information secured shall only be for the
stated purpose.

5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the

media, their interests should go beyond pure or mere curiosity.

6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall

additionally be supported by proof under oath of their media affiliation
and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their respective
organizations as legitimate media practitioners.

7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the

media, must have no derogatory record of having misused any requested
information previously furnished to them.
The requesting parties shall complete their requests in accordance with these
guidelines. The custodians of these documents[59] (the respective Clerks of Court of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals for the
Justices; and the Court Administrator for the Judges of various trial courts) shall
preliminarily determine if the requests are not covered by the limitations and
prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713 and its implementing rules and regulations, and
in accordance with the aforecited guidelines. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall refer
the matter pertaining to Justices to the Court En Banc for final determination.

SO ORDERED.
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice

(On official leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA
M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City;
CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer,
MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18,
Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S.
ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC,
Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City. Respondents.
*PERLAS-BERNABE

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It
requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service." 1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization
of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Cebu City.3 Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. 4
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. 5 A female and male lawyer of the
audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed
by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be
recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school
classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage
application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the
female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes
available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (3,000) only. 6
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a
formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. 7 The Court also suspended the judges
pending resolution of the cases against them.8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao submitted its
Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates
were examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 12 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a
higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts custody. 14 There is also
an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. 16 The
town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two
(2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the
following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their
documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards; 19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants"
who would go over the couples documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also
narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were
solemnized by Judge Tormis;20
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the
payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and
the judge, was paid to the latter. 21 She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (4,000) for facilitating the
irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang
Boy";22
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the
judge received five hundred pesos (500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to
have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (1,500) for gasoline
expenses if the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;23
5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales.
However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and
28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute
marriage solemnization;24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil
Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of
cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope
containing money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates; 25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang
bayad."26 The excess of three hundred pesos (300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a
certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted
to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for
ten pesos (10);28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2,
Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario.29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. 30 The respondent judge then inquired
about their ages and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; 31 and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage
applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office
because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. 33 She also added that while couples still need to submit
a certificate of attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the
application for marriage license.34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of
Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc wanted to set a marriage date. 35 Her younger
sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy
on the phone, the wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth
certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos
(1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary,
the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that
time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her
fianc.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she
and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance,
they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (1,500). The guard also
offered to become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through
with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R.
Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu
City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days
from notice; b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c)
requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this
administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C.
Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of
Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9,
Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying
that Branch 9s court personnel received an amount in excess of the 300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose
marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund".36
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental
Report,37 the respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by
contracting parties.38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even
before he became a judge.39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of
an impediment to marry.40 He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the
contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution. 41 The judge also denies knowledge of the
payment of solemnization fees in batches. 42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of
recording marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages
monthly.43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether
the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. 44 The judge believes that it is
not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the
presumption of regularity of public documents. 45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages
which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the
affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a
foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce
papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation
and interviews the children of the parties, if any.46
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team
during the investigation an "entrapment".47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on
the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a
place where neither of the parties resided. 48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot
be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts. 49 The affidavits also
enjoy the presumption of regularity.50 Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. 51 The
respondent said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they
affirmed the veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. 52 The
judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks. 53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. 54 He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. 55 It is only
when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal
impediment to marry.56 As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact
that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the
affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He
surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the
missing document might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar.
As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not
before because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of
collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court. 57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a
judicial duty.58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution,
Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. 59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the
suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered. 60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or
Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. 61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion
and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other
economic benefits from 9 July 2007.62
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, 63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some
court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents,
to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit
of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties
were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry
in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of
the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or
explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving
false information for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration
for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. 64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the
most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURTS RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on
record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of
keeping the faith of the public.65 In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This
Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges
and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of
justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales
are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper
procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA
listed down aspects of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss
the individual liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis the evidence presented by the OCA
against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually
examined by the judicial audit team. 68 Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a
marriage license while one hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79
marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu.
This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period
of years.69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such
missing as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as marriage
licenses.71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage license. 72 The documents invited suspicion
because of erasures and superimpositions in the entries of residence. 73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of
legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. 74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting
parties were also apparent in the documents.75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages
appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-
year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City. 77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but the
corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. 78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were
solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. 79 However, the logbook showed
that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he
solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized
seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-
year period.81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers
found in his custody.82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of
the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation. 83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004
the marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. 84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu
City.85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign partys required certificate of legal capacity to
marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge
officiated.87
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five
(305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. 89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage
license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 91 In several instances, only
affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry. 92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions
on entries with regard to the parties place of residence. 94
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28
December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON"
and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given
address of the parties.96 These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza
Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio
Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage
certificate showing that Secuyas address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City." 97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the
marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team. 98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the
same period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the
Family Code.100 Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of Barili,
Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. 102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were
from other local civil registrars.103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage license,
certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132)
marriages, with no corresponding marriage certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver,
an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. 105 No copy of the required certificate of legal
capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents such as the
certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages
under questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of
the certificate of legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in
the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued. 108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of 300 was
paid.109 On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late. 110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties place of residence. 111These included indistinguishable
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage
license.112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, 113the Court held
that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court,
in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him
and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that
corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing 115 or payment by batches was made for
marriages performed on different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off
the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who
did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were
mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required
under Article 21 of the Family Code 117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been
diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been
prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of
the Family Code119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. 120 The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there
were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere
submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. 121 These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge
himself or herself.122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no
marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on
the same day the marriage was solemnized.123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the
marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a
marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled
the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, 125 that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the
marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from the embassy
of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in
reviewing the parties documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates
coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license
issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. 126 Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. 127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not
be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year
period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence
of the marriage contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and
not only at the time of the marriage.129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides the
requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. 130 The actions of the judges have
raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, 131the
Court said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license
cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too
much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.132
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal
employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services. 133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also
stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house
when she found out about the judicial audit. 134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the
solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business. 135 The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months
in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of
her comment. She was also fined the amount of five thousand pesos (5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-
374 RTC.136 She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. 137 Finally, in the
very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from
service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence,
integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a
mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of
lack of integrity."140 In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon
assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law
and more importantly of justice.141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave
misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and the
requirements on the same day of the lawyers visit.142
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of 3,000. Section 2, Canon I of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the usual
practice143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information
for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." 144Sec. 52, Rule IV of
the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from
the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and
confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions placed
doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of
gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted 4,000
from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by
the OCA and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by
instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. 147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces
who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when
the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. 148 When Borces told
Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another
marriage certificate.149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, merits a grave penalty.150 Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family
Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire
the said affidavit which according to Alesna costs 10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the
transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are
making money out of judicial transactions.152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo 153 that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18,
RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team
that they received food from couples they assisted.154 This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting
or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As
recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of
minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the
first time is an extenuating circumstance.155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya
admitted initially that she received 5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary
documents.156 The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the
couple. However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment. 157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as
unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the
benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez. Cabaez was only
implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain
"Meloy" 1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabaez. 158Cabaez denies
that she was the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant
of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabaez herself but from Baguio-
Maneras younger sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain
confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabaez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive
identification of Cabaez and finds merit in her denial.160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged
sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it
proven that Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she
not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing
Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer
III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED
with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City;
Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela
Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings
against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated
14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez,
Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of
marriage licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARVIC M. V. F. LEONEN
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation 1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, 2referring the complaint
filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch
13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was
a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge
Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant
of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one
session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of
Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted addict. 4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid
humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother
was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge
Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be
reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother. She
averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita
Guioguio, docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, 6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio
case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge
Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations,
he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him;
that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis involvement in the marriage
scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked
Judge Tormis dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all
the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate
such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where
remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to
investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to
the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge
Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary;
and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of
Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be
appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in
the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail
bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the
approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed
executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary
receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash
bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official
receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon
of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be
the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of
the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere
because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by
Judge Paredes frequent discussions in class of her mothers administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one
of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the
case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge
Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis,
as a drug addict.

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the
marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in
many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting
allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record
then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown investigation should be
conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint
to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt of the records.11 chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the
appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the
respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing Judge Tormis cases in class where she
was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and
abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted
that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of what was just
and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage scam involving
Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case
relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge
of the MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive
judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of
his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial
Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He
added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of
the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon;
that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened
in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a
criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an
abuse, but was meant for the protection of the Judiciary. 14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She
opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class,
tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge
Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She
quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.16 chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held administratively liable for his
comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond
reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and
everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed
the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She cited, as
basis for Judge Paredes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of
any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge
Paredes explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC when he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140
of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a
Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition with warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out
with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.18

The Courts Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established
by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as
an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others.19 chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were
made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as misconduct. They are simply not
related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for
misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
 any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21 The rationale for the rule
was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from
every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. 23 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation
relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the
Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent
any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the
judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that
Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage
scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of
the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the
issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to rub salt to the wound, 25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by
Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all
times. Canon 4 instructs: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not
descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.26 chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use
temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct
unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances,
as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it
strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely
justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however,
is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the
exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to
freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He
should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more
circumspect in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with
self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his
negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the
ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional
and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for
he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judges
official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirt ualLawlibrary

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be
regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as
the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge
Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section
14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on
Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule
also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt
of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge
Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of
receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either
with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest,
or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized
to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of
their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely
exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge
 available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment for cash bail bond was
made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then
pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond.
Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on
Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by
sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, , and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

FIRST DIVISION
ATTY. RODERICK M. SANTOS A.M. No. MTJ-07-1670
and ALEXANDER ANDRES, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-1822-MTJ)
Complainants,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

JUDGE LAURO BERNARDO,

Municipal Trial Court, Bocaue,
Bulacan,
Respondent. Promulgated:

July 23, 2008

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
 DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent MTC Judge Lauro Bernardo for
his alleged impropriety, manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of discretion, and gross
ignorance of the law/procedure relative to Criminal Case No. 06-004 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Atty. Roderick M. Santos and Boyet Andres.

On February 9, 2006, Atty. Roderick M. Santos and Alexander Andres filed a

verified Affidavit-Complaint charging respondent of:

Impropriety

Respondent is using government resources in the discharge of his functions for his
personal pleasure and convenience. Specifically, he allows his girlfriend, a
certain Boots, to stay and use as her lounge the judges chamber in violation of his duty
under Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain proper decorum. On many
occasions, even when there is a hearing, his girlfriend stays in the chamber, hindering
the full performance of respondents duties as he has to attend to her whims and caprices,
plus the fact that his girlfriend is just cooling herself in the air-conditioned room while
litigants have to bear the cramped hot space of the courtroom. This act also invites
suspicion since her mere presence therein is an indication of who to talk to regarding a
case. Following the case of Presado v. Genova,[1] the act of respondent constitutes
serious misconduct.

Manifest Bias and Partiality

Respondent committed manifest bias and partiality when he allowed the filing of
Criminal Case No. 06-004 for Grave Coercion against the complainants because it was
his chance to get back at Atty. Santos against whom he is harboring a grudge after the
latter moved for his inhibition in Criminal Case Nos. 04-430 and 04-572.

Instead of conducting a preliminary investigation after the filing of the complaint

to find probable cause to hold complainants herein for trial, respondent immediately
signed the criminal complaint upon its filing and ordered that the case be set for
preliminary hearing on January 12, 2006. His own branch clerk certified that the
complainant and her witnesses only subscribed their statement before the presiding
judge. Worse, respondent allowed the criminal case to be filed even if it is based on
hearsay evidence, as the complainant therein, one Dr. Elida D. Yanga, was not in the
place at the time the alleged offense happened. From the documents gathered, the undue
haste by which respondent acted is very evident because the complaint-affidavit, the
criminal complaint, and the subpoena have the common date of January 4, 2006. More
so, the subpoena was immediately served on complainants on January 5, 2006.
Grave Abuse of Discretion and Unfaithfulness to the Law

Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he did not conduct a

preliminary investigation in Crim. Case No. 06-004. Under paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules),[2] preliminary investigation is
required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for offenses
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day. The
maximum imposable penalty for Grave Coercion is six years imprisonment; hence,
complainants should have been accorded the right to preliminary investigation whereby
they could have demonstrated that the complaint is worthless. Respondent, however,
chose to be ignorant of the basic provisions of the Rules in order to exact revenge and
cause them to unduly stand trial. Despite the Motion to Quash Complaint with Prayer for
Voluntary Inhibition filed by complainants to give him a chance to correct his error by at
least referring the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for the
conduct of the requisite preliminary investigation, he remained adamant by issuing an
order referring the case instead to the Executive Judge of Bulacan for its raffle to another
MTC judge. This act showed respondents deliberate intent to make the complainants
accused persons in a criminal case.
 By allowing the immediate filing of a patently unmeritorious case, respondent
tainted Atty. Santos good reputation: he is a law practitioner with companies in Makati,
Pasig and Manila as clients; he is a businessman and was also a former chairman of the
board and current board director of St. Martin of Tours Credit and Development
Cooperative, the largest credit cooperative in Region III; and he is a frequent traveler,
going abroad at least once a year. With the worthless criminal case filed against him,
respondent puts a sore obstacle to Atty. Santos way of life that is truly an undeserved
inconvenience.

On April 11, 2006, respondent filed his Comment arguing in the main that the
charges against him are hearsay, without factual and legal basis, and are a malicious
imputation upon his person; and that the acts stated in the complaint were based solely
on the bare allegations of the complainants as no corroborative statements of witnesses
were presented to prove the same. In contradicting complainants representation, he
stated thus:

As to the charge of Impropriety:

Boots (whose maiden name was Ma. Rosario M. Layuga) is now respondents
lawful wife, as proven by a marriage certificate showing their civil union before a
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge on March 14, 2006. There was no
occasion or intention on his part to make the judges chamber a residential or dwelling
place. Instead, his wifes presence is actually dictated by a moral duty in the exercise of
marital responsibility since he has been allergic to some foods, particularly fish and
some beans. In fact, last October 2005, after eating fish, respondent nearly lost his life
due to a severe allergy had it not been for the timely medical intervention administered
at a nearby hospital. Aside from this, he is suffering from irregular heartbeat which
causes constant rise of his blood pressure and uric acid. Also, his wife is not merely
present in the chamber since, while in there, she is also attending to some
activities. Being self-employed and with extensive exposure to trading, she administers
the family property consisting of leased premises and landholdings in Pandi, Bulacan.
 Respondents relation to his wife is serious, open and known to the public and that
the atmosphere prevailing in the courts chamber even in the alleged presence of his wife
is an atmosphere of friendship, respect and decency. He related that he and his wife are
regular participants of Marriage Encounter prayer meetings as well as in the prayer
assemblies conducted by the Couples for Christ. Respondent is an active member of the
Rotary Club of Sta. Maria and Knights of Columbus, Marian Council of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan while his wife is a member of the Inner Wheel Club of the Philippines. As
members, they are active participants in the clubs community projects and other civic
activities. On top of these, respondent judge presented Resolution No. 06-03-025, dated
20 March 2006, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bocaue, Bulacan signifying its unilateral
decree of support and commendation to [respondent] in recognition of his long years of
commendable and meritorious service in the dispensation of justice and the Certificate
of Commendation, dated 30 March 2006, issued by the Mayor of the Municipality of
Bocaue.

As to the charge of Manifest Bias and Partiality:

Complainants interpreted that when respondent signed the criminal complaint as

well as subscribed the affidavits of the witnesses under oath he already made a finding
of probable cause. This is not correct because his signature was only for the purpose of
administering an oath, as evidenced by the certification issued by the clerk of court. The
fact is that the criminal case did not reach the stage of preliminary investigation since
complainants filed a Motion for Inhibition which was readily granted.Respondent
conducted the court proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Rules,
particularly Sections 3 (a) and 8 (b) of Rule 112.[3]

As to the charge of Grave Abuse of Discretion and Unfaithfulness to the Law:

Admittedly, preliminary investigation must be conducted before the filing of a

complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least
four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. In the case of Grave
Coercion, however, there is no need for a preliminary investigation since prision
correccional (six months and one day to six years), which is the imposable penalty for
said crime, does not fall within the required penalty of prision correccional maximum
(four years, two months and one day). The criminal case against complainants should
proceed in accordance with Section 8 (b) of Rule 112.

When respondent issued a subpoena setting the case for preliminary hearing it
was taken as a measure of damage control. Knowing that a member of the Bar is being
charged before the court, it might have afforded the parties the chance to thresh out their
differences and possibly settle amicably. Likewise, his order to forward the case to the
Office of the Executive Judge was but a result of his voluntary inhibition from the case,
which he had chosen to definitely rule upon instead of further quashing the criminal
complaint since the Motion filed by complainants prayed respondent to resolve two
judiciously irreconcilable issues.

As a background, the enmity between respondent and Atty. Santos started

in Criminal Case Nos. 04-430 and 04-572 wherein the latter appeared as private
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 04-430 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage
to Property. The accused in said case later on filed a similar case (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 04-572) against Atty. Santos client. Respondent found probable cause in both
cases. Atty. Santos questioned this ruling but, on appeal, the RTC sustained the
findings. Atty. Santos did not elevate the matter to the appellate court until the decision
became final.

In order for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision
or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but most importantly it must be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty or some other like motive. In this case, respondent has nothing to gain,
material or otherwise, from the outcome of the criminal action; he met the parties only
during the proceedings in court, not before its filing, and he inhibited himself promptly
from the case. Atty. Santos instead is the one who has animosity to respondent; he must
realize and understand that what he (respondent) had done is just all in a days work and
nothing personal about it.

In their Reply, the complainants argued that aside from converting the judges
chamber into a nursing home or convalescent center what is more troubling is
respondents own admission that his wifes activities therein are not limited to the [care]
for the sick but also to her involvement in trading, which is highly irregular and
improper since they are being conducted within the courts premises. As regards the
commendations received by respondent, the complainants stated that it is most likely
that everybody working in the Municipal Government of Bocaue got an award because
it was given during its 400th foundation day; that the pro-forma certificates do not show
whether he deserves it or not; and in any event, these awards are totally irrelevant to the
case. Incidentally, complainants also mentioned that court sessions in Bocaue usually
start late almost at 2:00 p.m. or later, instead of 1:30 p.m.

Likewise, complainants commented on the disturbing procedure followed by

respondent, which is, allowing the criminal complaint to be immediately entered in the
criminal docket (thus, converting it to a criminal case by a mere stroke of the clerk of
courts pen) and signing the criminal complaint aside from the affidavit-complaint
without first finding probable case. This, according to them, is contrary to the provision
of Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112 of the Rules which states that only the affidavits must be
subscribed and sworn to, a rule that respondent must follow when he is to conduct his
investigatory functions under Sec. 3 or Sec. 9 (b), Rule 112.[4] Complainants also
dismissed respondents reasoning that his actuation was based on Sec. 3 (a) and Sec. 9
(b), Rule 112 because, as proven by the absence of any transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN), the latter did not conduct searching questions and answers to Dr. Yanga and her
witnesses. He has to explain, therefore, why he admitted a complaint based on hearsay
evidence since the person who was not the object of the alleged coercive acts is the one
who is the offended party in the criminal case.
Complainants insisted that since the maximum penalty imposable for the offense
of Grave Coercion is six years, a preliminary investigation should have been
held. Moreover, they maintained that Rule 112 is a complete procedure in itself; hence,
as stated in Sec. 9 (b), it is the duty of respondent to dismiss the complaint or find
probable cause within ten (10) days from its filing and not to call for a preliminary
hearing, which is a non-existent procedure in the Rules.

Lastly, Atty. Santos denied that he was the one who has hard feelings against
respondent. Instead, he claimed that it is a matter of record, in the Order resolving the
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition in Crim. Case Nos. 04-430 and 04-572, that the latter
branded him as somebody he could not co-exist with in the quest for a just and equitable
administration of justice. Atty. Santos alleged that respondent even furnished the
Executive Judge of Bulacan with a copy of the Order to broadcast that he is a difficult
lawyer to deal with. He emphasized that this administrative complaint is not about his
client in Crim. Case No. 04-572 but is concerned with the injustice committed by
respondent when he willingly and deliberately violated established rules and legal
doctrines just so complainants would suffer undue injury by being tried for a fabricated
case of Grave Coercion.

Parrying the supplementary allegations, on the other hand, respondent countered

in his Rejoinder that it is unfair for complainants to conclude, much more insinuate, that
his wife has something to do with any impropriety by her mere presence in the
chamber. He reiterated that her company is necessitated by his health condition and that,
anyway, she also has her own business to attend to that of managing the family
inheritance of leased premises in the nearby town of Pandi, Bulacan, and actively
engaging herself in an independent business concern, held not in MTC-Bocaue, which is
the large-scale trading of electric transformers, metal scraps and heavy equipment
entrusted to her by her uncles and close relatives.
As to the charge of frequent delay of court sessions, respondent stated that he has
been always present and ready to begin the proceedings but it is the desire of most
lawyers to start at 2:00 p.m., more or less, because most of them, including the public
prosecutor and the PAO lawyer, come from RTC hearings and even all the way from
Malolos City. To compensate for the lost time, however, he averred that court sessions
adjourn even up to 6:30 p.m. so that all cases may be accommodated.
 Respondent clarified that when he signed the affidavits of Dr. Yanga and her
witnesses it was only for the purpose of administering the oath of the person filing the
criminal complaint. He posited that the proper rule that must be applied is not Sec. 3 (a),
Rule 112, which refers to the procedure in preliminary investigation, but Sec. 3, Rule
110[5] on the institution of criminal actions providing that the complaint must be
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with
the enforcement of the law violated. Further, while respondent conceded that there was
really no TSN available because no hearing was held he asserted that under Sec. 9 (b) of
Rule 112 a judge is authorized to just personally evaluate the evidence before him to
find probable cause instead of personally examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Finally,
respondent firmly held on to his position that Grave Coercion is not one of the crimes
requiring preliminary investigation since the minimum penalty imposable for said
offense is six months and one day.

On February 20, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, and recommended the
imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000 considering this is his first time to be
sanctioned for a serious charge. In its Report, the OCA stated:

Whether of not there is a need for preliminary investigation under Section 1 in

relation to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends
upon the maximum imposable penalty for the crime charged in the complaint filed with
the City Prosecutors Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to
have been committed by respondent.

In San Agustin v. People, the Court held:

However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
there was no need for the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation since the crime charged under the Information filed with the
MeTC was arbitrary detention under Article 124, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four
months and one day to two years and four months. Whether or not there
is a need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation
to Section 9 [now Section 8] of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable penalty for the
 crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial
Prosecutors Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime
found to have been committed by the respondent after a preliminary
investigation. In this case, the crime charged in the complaint of the NBI
filed in the Department of Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal
detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.

The maximum imposable penalty for grave coercion is six years imprisonment and such
entitled the accused to their right to a preliminary investigation to save them from the
rigors of trials in case no probable cause exists to warrant the filing of the criminal
complaint or information against them.

Respondent Judge should have remanded the case to the public prosecutor for the
purposes of preliminary investigation. [The Supreme] Court in a catena of cases held:

The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the

courts jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective, but if there were no
preliminary investigation and the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the
fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that
preliminary investigation may be conducted.
The issue raised by complainant does not pertain to an error of judgment or to one
pertaining to the exercise of sound discretion by respondent. Rather, the issue is whether
respondent complied with the procedural rules so elementary that to digress from them
amounts to ignorance of the law. Since the rules on preliminary investigation are basic
and clearly expressed in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondents actuation
in denying the same is deemed to have been attended by gross ignorance of the law and
procedure.

[The Supreme] Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal principles
sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate
of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in
the interpretation of our laws.

Respondent clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he grossly misapplied the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Citations omitted)

As regards the other charges, the OCA dismissed them for complainants failure to
adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the allegations.

The Report and Recommendation of the OCA are sustained.

 There is no merit in respondents supposition that Grave Coercion is an offense not
subject to preliminary investigation because the minimum penalty imposable for the said
offense, which is six months and one day, falls short of the minimum penalty of four
years, two months and one day required by the Rules. The OCA correctly applied San
Agustin v. People.[6] Certainly, the need for a preliminary investigation under Sec. 1 in
relation to Sec. 8 of Rule 112 of the Rules depends upon the imposable penalty for the
crime charged in the complaint or information filed and not upon the imposable
penalty for the offense which may be found to have been committed by the accused after
a preliminary investigation. In the case of Grave Coercion, the Revised Penal Code
provides a penalty of prision correccional or anywhere between six months and one day
to six years; thus, a preliminary investigation must still be held since there is a
possibility that the complainants would stand to suffer the maximum penalty imposable
for the offense. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to protect the innocent
from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, from an unnecessary open and public
accusation of a crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a trial. It also
protects the State from a useless and expensive litigation. Above all, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play.[7]

Notably, however, by the time the criminal complaint of Dr. Yanga against herein
complainants was filed on January 3, 2006, respondent was already without authority to
conduct preliminary investigation since effective October 3, 2005, judges of Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts are no longer authorized to conduct the
same, pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC (Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts).[8] The appropriate action of
respondent, therefore, should have been to immediately refer the complaint to the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan so that a preliminary investigation could proceed
with reasonable dispatch. His issuance of a subpoena directing complainants to appear
before the court on January 12, 2006 for a preliminary hearing, although the hearing did
not materialize after his voluntary inhibition from the case on January 10, 2006, was
definitely out of order. At this point, it is clear that respondent committed gross
ignorance of an existing procedure which is basic and elementary.
 Meanwhile, as to the impropriety purportedly committed by respondent in his
own chamber, the OCA rightly found that complainants failed to provide specific details
that would validate any misuse or abuse of government funds and/or
facilities.Nonetheless, it is opportune to remind respondent as well as other trial court
judges, who are the front-liners in the promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary, of
the directives embodied in the following administrative circulars:

1. Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 3-92 (Prohibition against Use of

Halls of Justice for Residential or Commercial Purposes)[9] All judges and
court personnel are reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for
purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of
justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential
quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade
or profession. Attention is drawn to this Courts ruling in A.M. No. RTJ-89-
327 (Nellie Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra) whereby we declared that
the use of the courts premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of
the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.

2. A.C. No. 01-99 (Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples of Justice

and Promoting Respect for their Official and Employees)[10] Considering
the courts as temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times,
be preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system,
court officials and employees are directed, among others, never to use their
offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court or judicial
functions.

3. A.C. No. 09-99 (Banning Smoking and Selling of Goods within Court
Houses and Offices)[11] Conformably with A.C. No. 01-99,
this circular disallowed, among others, within court houses and, more
specifically, session halls and offices of court officials and personnel, the
 selling of goods of any kind, especially by persons who are not court
employees.

In fine, as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

Judiciary[12] mandates, judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities. They should not use or lend the prestige of the
judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or
of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.[13]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge LAURO BERNARDO, MTC, Bocaue,

Bulacan, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and basic rules of procedure
and is hereby FINED in the amount of P20,000, with a STERN WARNINGthat a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personnel record of respondent in

the Office of the Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, A.M. No. P-09-2622
Complainant, (A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2814-P)

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ELMER P. MAPE, Legal

Researcher III, Regional TrialPromulgated:
Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte
April 7, 2009
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the present administrative matter, which involves charges and

countercharges between two members of the staff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte.

The Factual Background

In a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 8, 2006,
Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer III of the RTC, Branch 17,
Palompon, Leyte, accused Elmer P. Mape (respondent), Legal Researcher III of the same
court, of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence relative to Special Proceeding
Case No. 0239-PN, entitled Maria Mae Tordillo v. Nah Kok Sun.[1] The complainant
faulted the respondent for issuing an entry of judgment and a certificate of finality
certifying that the decision in Special Proceeding Case No. 0239-PN became final and
executory on the very same day the decision was rendered. For this reason, the
complainant prayed that the permanent appointment of respondent as Legal Researcher
III be denied.
Additionally, the complainant objected (through her letter of December 6, 2006)[2] to
the change of status of the respondent's appointment from probationary to permanent on
the following grounds:

1. Falsification of daily time record (DTR) the respondent made it appear in

his DTR that he was present on October 30, 2006, when he was actually
in Cebu City on that day.
2. Grave threats On November 7, 2006 at around 3:30 in the afternoon, the
respondent threatened to kill the complainant and her family, taking out his .45
caliber gun and pointing it upwards. The incident happened in the place of Ms.
Asuncion (Shioney) Codilla-Sabondo at San Francisco St., Palompon, Leyte.
3. Grave misconduct the respondent is always seen in court with a .45
caliber gun, creating fear among the court employees.

The OCA referred the December 6, 2006 letter of complaint[3] to the respondent and
required him to comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the indorsement.[4] The
respondent submitted his comment on July 25, 2007, disputing the charges against him.
[5] At the same time, he accused the complainant of dishonesty and malversation of
court funds. He claimed that the complainant's grievances against him stemmed from his
discovery of the shortage she incurred in the collection of Judiciary Development Fund
and Special Allowance for the Judiciary for September 2006.

In a Report dated April 22, 2008, the OCA recommended that the charge against
respondent and the countercharge against complainant be referred to Executive Judge
Celso L. Mantua, RTC, Palompon, Leyte for investigation, report and recommendation
to the Court.[6]

On June 23, 2005, the Second Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the
matter to Judge Mantua for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90)
days from receipt of the record.[7]
 The Investigation Report

On February 11, 2009, Judge Mantua submitted his Report and Recommendation,
together with the complete records of the case.[8] The findings of Judge Mantua may be
summarized as follows:

On the Charges

1. On the charge of falsification of daily time record, Judge Mantua noted that the
complainant submitted copies of the respondent's DTR for October 2006[9] showing
the time-in and time-out entries on October 30, 2006, when he was supposed to be in
Cebu City. The respondent admitted that he was in Cebu City on that day, visiting the
grave of his father. He explained that he was on leave for the day, thereby making it
impossible for him to be in the office; he surmised that somebody with an ill motive
had punched in his DTR for the day; he inadvertently overlooked the entry for
October 30, 2006, when he signed his DTR because it was hard to notice in view of
the lack of supply of ribbon for the bundy clock. He presented his application for
leave which he filed on October 18, 2006. This application was duly approved and
signed by Judge Mantua. The judge found that the application for leave of
absence had negated any suspicion of malice on the part of respondent.
2. On the charges of grave threats and grave misconduct against the respondent,
Judge Mantua also found no evidence that respondent committed the acts attributed
to him by the complainant. The Judge noted that the complainant's allegations were
not corroborated by any witness to the incident she had narrated.
3. On the charges of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, Judge Mantua
likewise found no reason to hold the respondent liable. Judge Mantua declared that
the immediate issuance by the respondent of the entry of judgment and certificate of
finality in SP Case No. 0239-PN was completely proper; the decision of the court
(RTC, Br. 17, Palompon, Leyte) itself ruled that the case was governed by the
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Code; and that pursuant to Article 247
of the Code, the judgment in the case was immediately final and executory, aside
from the fact that the court also ordered the entry of the judgment in the Book of
 Entry of Judgment. Judge Mantua recommends the dismissal of all the charges
against the respondent for lack of merit.

On the Countercharges

On the respondents countercharge, Judge Mantua opined that complainant's

unauthorized act must be discouraged, as he found it violative of the rule on the
confidentiality of court documents under Sections 1 to 3, Canon II of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel. The judge found the complainants act of furnishing court
documents to an adverse party (the Office of the Solicitor General) grave and
contemptuous, and recommended that the complainant be suspended from the service
for six (6) months.

Judge Mantua found no sufficient evidence to hold the complainant liable for
malversation of court funds.

The Court's Ruling

We support and adopt Judge Mantuas recommendations, except for the recommendation
to penalize the complainant under Sections 1 to 3, Canon II of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel.

On the charge of falsification of DTR, Judge Mantua concluded that there was no such
falsification, the incident having been the product of inadvertence. We find the
conclusion to be supported by the records of the case. First, the respondent was in Cebu
on October 30 as he claimed, and returned to Palompon, Leyte only in the evening of the
same day[10] as Passenger No. 23 on board the M/V Tagbilaran Ferry operated by Roly
Shipping Lines, Inc.[11] If he was in Cebu on October 30, he could not have punched in
his DTR on that day. Somebody else did. Second, he signed the DTR for the month of
October without noticing the October 30 entry because it was difficult to see; it was
almost illegible.[12] We find this explanation reasonable.Third, the respondent filed
on October 18, 2006, a leave of absence for October 30, 2006, and Judge Mantua
himself approved it.

We, likewise, concur with Judge Mantua's finding that there was no evidence other than
complainant's bare allegation, showing that the respondent committed the imputed acts
of grave threats and grave misconduct.

Finally, we find no error in the investigating judge's conclusion that no basis exists to
hold the respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law in immediately issuing an entry
of judgment and certificate of finality in Sp. Proc. Case No. 0239-PN. As the record
shows, RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, declared that the petition was governed by
the Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, whose Article 247 recognizes
that judgment in the case is immediately final and executory;[13] the court also ordered
that the judgment immediately be entered in the Book of Entry of Judgment.[14]

On the countercharge against complainant, Judge Mantua found insufficient evidence to

support the charge of malversation against her, but found her liable for violation of the
confidentiality rule under Canon II, Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. The violation occurred, according to the Judge, when the complainant, not
being a party to SP Proc. Case No. 0239-PN, or one authorized to do so, secured copies
of the decision, entry of judgment, and certificate of finality, and furnished these copies
to the Office of the Solicitor General.

We do not agree with the investigating judges findings and recommendations on this
point. In the first place, the information the complainant disclosed does not qualify as
confidential information, as the term is defined under Section I, Canon II of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel;[15] Confidential information means information not
yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not
yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases,
including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda,
records of internal deliberations, and similar papers. As the records indicate, the
decision adverted to has already become final; in fact, a certificate of finality has already
been issued, and an entry of judgment had already been made.

Even if the documents were to be considered as classified, the complainant still cannot
be held liable for unauthorized disclosure of classified information under the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52, B(23)
which provides:[16]

Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by

reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests
or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interests.

We do not see from the records any indication that the complainant made the
disclosure to further (his) private interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to
prejudice the public interests. The Office of the Solicitor General, too, to which the
copies were sent, represented a party to the case and, hence, has the right to access these
records.

At best, the complainant was only guilty of releasing information without observance of
the internal procedures of the court, and for undertaking the dissemination of the copies
of the documents disclosed without being the staff member authorized to do so. These
infractions may have been the reasons for Judge Mantuas strong reaction to the release
of documents by the complainant. To be sure, the complainants action must be
discouraged. We cannot accept, however, that her act was grave or contemptuous, and
that it should be classified as a less grave offense under Rule IV, Section 52, B(23) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The
complainants lapse should merit only the warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense in the future shall not go unpunished.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint against ELMER P. MAPE, Legal

Researcher III, RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. MS. DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Court Stenographer III of the same
Court is ADMONISHED for her non-observance of internal rules of the court, with
the WARNING that any similar act shall not go unpunished.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-93-944 July 20, 1994

RIZALIA CAPUNO AND THELMA VILLANUEVA, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-959 July 20, 1994

PSM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND CELIA PAMPLONA,
vs.
JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.
Salonga & Associates for complainants in AM RTJ-93-944.
Nelson A. Loyola for complainants in AM RTJ -93-959.
Manuel Singson for respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 30, San Pablo City, is charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to the administration of
justice.
Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was referred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera
of the Court of Appeals,1 and Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez,2 for investigation, report and recommendation. In the meantime, we directed respondent judge to go on
leave. 3 On 27 October 1993, we ordered the consolidation of the complaints. 4
Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo
L. Suarez submitted their reports. We shall deal with respondent's administrative liability on the basis of the
investigators' findings and recommendations. 5
I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944
The complaint in this case was initiated by a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia
Capuno and Thelma Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus
(1) Na si Pedro Calara, Jr. ay nagdemanda ng "writ of possession" laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala
ni Judge Ausberto Jaramillo ng RTC-San Pablo City.
(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng "writ of possession" si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia
Capuno sa nasabing kaso, ay nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi
kay Rizalia na gusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.
(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang anak na si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa
sala ni Judge Jaramillo, mga alas 10:00 ng umaga at pinapasok sila sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo.
(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung gustong hindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay
magbigay ng halagang P200,000 cash na kung maa-ari ay puro dadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng
P150,000 na postdated 30 days.
(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo
kay Thelma na subukan na maghanap ng nasabing halaga at bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.
(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si Thelma at si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge
Jaramillo pagkatapos ng dalawang araw, at sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang
maibibigay na halagang takda ni Judge. Sabi ni Judge na kung hindi kaya ni Thelma ang P200,000
cash ay kahit na P150,000 na cash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng P150,000 na postdated 60 days,
pero dapat ang mga ito ay maibigay ni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng hapon noong araw na iyon
din.
(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi
ni Judge Jaramillo na kung ganoon ay wala na siyang magagawa.
(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay Pedro Calara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang pagkabenta
at pagka-ilit ng kanyang lupa ay bumagsak din sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, kaya siya ay nakikiusap
kay Judge Jaramillo na ilipat ang nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman. 6
Required to comment, respondent judge denies the charges against him. He maintains that this complaint was filed out
of pure harassment. 7
On 19 November 1993, after due investigation of the case, Justice Ibay-Somera submitted her report the pertinent
portions of which follow
During the testimony of complaint Thelma Villanueva, she only identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay
she executed with her mother Rizalia Capuno, and affirmed the truth of the contents thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
On cross-examination, complainant Thelma Villanueva admitted that her mother, complainant Rizalia
Capuno borrowed the amount of P15,000.00 sometime in 1987 from one Pedro Calara, Jr., for which
the questioned property consisting of 85 sq. m. and originally covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-
1260, was mortgaged as a security thereof (pp. 9 & 12, tsn, July 28, 1993). It was also shown that
despite partial payments on said loan (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-6), the mortgaged property was
extrajudicially foreclosed on August 21, 1990 and a certificate of sale was issued by the respondent
judge on the same date of August 21, 1990, and registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on
October 12, 1990 (Tsn p. 16, July 28, 1993; Exh. 6), and that the buyer of said property was Pedro
Calara, Jr., in the amount of P47,021.00 (Exh. 2-A, p. 17, tsn, July 28, 1993). Subsequently, an
affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of sale were made and executed by Pedro Calara,
Jr., and were registered with the Register of Deeds on December 9, 1991, which caused the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 541260 and a new one was issued, Tax Declaration No. 34-2753,
in the name of Pedro Calara, Jr. (Exh. 6). A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by
said Pedro Calara, Jr., on February 24, 1992 was assigned to the Branch of respondent Judge (p. 25,
tsn, July 28, 1993), who issued the corresponding Decision on May 15, 1992 granting the said
petition (Exh. 11), and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession and was
implemented by Sheriff Aranguren (Exh. "15"). Said complainant met the respondent Judge for the
first time sometime in March 1992, "to know how much more" the complainants were to pay Pedro
Calara, Jr. (TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 2 & 15), upon advice of the Sheriff Ho (tsn, p. 9, July 29, 1993).
Complainants, together with one Gregorio Capistrano, went to see the respondent Judge sometime in
May or June 1992 for the second time, who, in one of those meetings, asked whether said
complainants "could pay P350,000.00", P200,000.00 of which should be in cash, all in P100-bills, to
be displayed on his table "so that Pedro Calara's eyes will bulge and I will take care of everything",
and P150,000.00 in postdated check (pp. 16-17, tsn, July 29, 1993). Complainant Thelma Villanueva
informed the Judge that she could not afford the amount, thus the Judge reduced the proposal to
P150,000.00 in postdated check, which amount should be brought to him at 2:00 p.m., and that they
(complainants) "should not talk to anybody" (p. 20, tsn, July 29, 1993). Because the complainant
failed to comply with the demand, complainant Rizalia Capuno was evicted from the questioned
premises and her house was demolished. The testimony of the other witness for the complainants,
Gregorio Capistrano, was just corroborative of the testimony of Thelma Villanueva, that he met the
respondent Judge on those two (2) occasions when Thelma Villanueva went to see the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., testified that he has been the Presiding Judge of Branch
30, Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, since January 30, 1987; that he came to know Thelma
Villanueva when she testified in Sp. Proc. Case No. 852 in a prayer for issuance of a writ of
possession over a parcel of land filed by one Pedro Calara, Jr.; that he issued the writ prayed for.
Respondent Judge further testified that he, in his effort to settle the parties' differences, as per request
of Deputy Sheriff Leonardo Ho, tried to mediate in order to help them settle for the purchase price
(tsn, p. 5, Aug. 30, 1993). He likewise testified that it was complainant Thelma Villanueva who
voluntarily offered to pay Pedro Calara the amount of P200,000.00 cash and to pay the balance in
P150,000.00 in postdated checks (tsn, p. 6, Aug. 30, 1993). Another case was filed by the
complainant against Pedro Calara, Jr., before the Branch of respondent Judge, where the complainant
moved for respondent's inhibition, which motion he granted. Respondent Judge vehemently denied
that he demanded money from the complainants.
xxx xxx xxx
From the testimonies and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, and considering their (sic)
demeanor of the parties during the hearings, this Court concludes that there was indeed a color of
 truth in the complaint. The complainants are simple and ordinary people, who prefer to live a simple
life than engage themselves in complicated and perplexed lives. And should they become part of
complexed court battles, it is not of their own choosing but because of circumstances. It may not be
amiss to stress that "the courts exist to promote justice; and thus to aid in securing the contentment
and happiness of the people. Their administration should be speedy and careful. Every judge should
at all times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of his court so far as he can, to
make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling into the
attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants." (Adm.
Order No. 162, Canons of Judicial Ethics). The complainants failed to get the justice they are
requesting from the respondent Judge for their failure to deliver the amount asked of them.
Hence, the complainants' allegation that the respondent Judge demanded from them money when
they were trying to seek his assistance in amicably settling their case and which demand, when not
met by them resulted to their eviction from the premises, is meritorious and credible. It is well-settled
rule that "acts of the respondent judge of demanding . . . money from a party-litigant before his court
constitute serious misconduct in office" (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA
508). Likewise, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, "a judge's official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
Finding respondent judge guilty of the charge, the Investigating Justice recommended his suspension for one (1)
month without pay with admonition and reprimand. 8
The Investigating Justice is correct in finding respondent judge guilty of the charge. As judge, respondent knows fully
well that he should avoid such actions as would subject him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court. Yet, he threw
all caution to the winds, so to speak, and left nothing but telltale evidence of his guilt.
The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852 allegedly to settle the differences between
complainants and Pedro Calara, Jr., was highly questionable. Firstly, the mediation was initiated not by the parties
themselves nor their lawyers but by respondent's sheriffs, Leonardo Ho and Regalado Aranguren, whose words were
heavily relied upon by respondent. 9 Secondly, the meetings were unrecorded and unattended by counsel of the
parties. 10 Respondent's excuse that "in the (p)rovince, we mediate the differences of the parties, especially at that
particular time the parties have (sic) no counsel," is faulty and unacceptable practice. Unless a judge is conducting a
pre-trial under Rules 20 and 118, his role in the administration of justice is to decide contentious cases with finality. In
the absence of their lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in issues confronting the parties even on the pretext of
settling their cases. For to do so would compromise the integrity of his office which he is mandated to uphold. 11 Once
more, judges are strongly reminded that the office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is a public trust. 12 A
judicial office demands that the incumbent should conduct himself in such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence
and confidence of the people. 13
Respondent's defense that the parties have no lawyers fails to convince us. We gather from his testimonies that the
intended to see the parties, alone, thus
Justice Somera:
Q During the first meeting you said the parties were not represented by counsel then
there was a request for a first meeting with you by the parties.
A They have no more lawyers at that time, Your Honor.
Q But they were represented by a lawyer during the hearing?
A During the hearing.
Q Why did you not require Calara to bring with him his counsel?
A Because I do not have time to talk to Calara, Your Honor.
Q When Villanueva and Capuno appeared before you during the hearing of the
petition for issuance of the writ of possession, were they also represented by
counsel?
A Yes, Your Honor.
 Q During this first meeting, why did you not require the lawyers to appear before
you for the arrangement?
A The lawyer of the Capunos withdrew as counsel, Your Honor.
Q Why did you not advise them to get another counsel?
A According to my Sheriff, I told my sheriff "I want their counsels to be present" my
lawyer (sheriff) told me "ayaw na ho wala na raw silang abogado dahil wala na
daw silang pambayad."
Q Who was always in contact with Capuno and Villanueva?
A My Sheriff, Your Honor. 14
Yet, respondent in his earlier testimony revealed that complainant had a lawyer
Justice Somera:
Q After they (complainants) left, did you have any occasion to meet them either
Calara or Rizalia Capuno and her daughter, Thelma Villanueva, altogether?
A There was a hearing of a motion to dismiss that is the time I realized a new case
was filed by the complainants mother and daughter. In that hearing, the Calaras were
absent, Rizalia Capuno was absent but Thelma Villanueva was present.
Q Before whom?
A Before me, Your Honor. I talk(ed) to Thelma asking her was it not that you are the
same person who failed to meet the other party? She answered in the affirmative, I
ask(ed) her what is your pleasure now? Shall we wait for the Calaras because she
has a motion to dismiss and to talk it over with the spouses and she reply (sic)
that she will just consult her lawyer and ask for time to file
opposition.15
Significantly, the rendezvous between respondent and complainants took place in his chambers without the attendance
of his staff. Considering that there was still the question as to whether complainants could come up with the
repurchase price of the lot, the meetings conducted inside the chambers of respondent were uncalled for. We have
cautioned judges to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe
prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety but are also
perceived to be impartial and proper. 16
Further, respondent judge insists on his good intention to help the parties agree on the repurchase price of the lot. But,
we find that his meetings were always with complainants and not once did Pedro Calara, Jr., participate therein. Such
situation gives us the impression that Pedro Calara, Jr., did not have any notion at all of these conferences. This
suspicion is bolstered by (a) respondent's testimony 17 that ". . . I likewise told them (complainants) that according to
may sheriff they have been promising cash to Calara and further told them that if they have cash they have to bring
it during an arranged meeting to Calara and show the money to Calara so that they will know they are negotiating in
good faith." His statement clearly signified that he had not as yet set up an appointment with Calara, Jr., and, (b) the
contradictory stand among respondent judge and his witnesses regarding the presence of Pedro Calara, Jr., in the
alleged conferences of the parties.
In his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 16 February 1993, Sheriff Regalado M. Aranguren confirmed the presence of
Calara, Jr., in all the conferences. 18 He stated that "(n)a sa lahat ng beses ng conferencia ay palaging dumarating si
Pedro Calara, Jr., at laging naghihintay kay Thelma Capuno." For his part, Sheriff Leonardo L. Ho, in his
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 15 February
1993, 19 declared that "(a)t nang malaman ng mga naghabla ang kahilingan ng mga Capunos tungkol sa pagbaba ng
presyo ng bilihan, ako ay pinakiusapan ng mga naghahabla na sabihin sa mga Capunos na sila ay magkita sa
hukuman para sa isang conferencia upang mapagusapan ang tungkol sa presyo ng bilihang mabibiling muli; (n)a,
hindi nakatupad ang mga Capunos sa una nilang tipanan kung kaya ang conferencia ay nakansela," thus implying
that Calara, Jr., was present during the first meeting. However, respondent judge rebutted these statements when he
testified that nobody appeared in both meetings except complainants who came two days after the appointed date of
the second meeting. 20
Admittedly, the amount of P350,000.00 was the subject of conversation between respondent judge and the
complainant Thelma Villanueva. Respondent judge denies that he demanded such sum but that complainant
volunteered the information that she had a checking account and that she was ready to pay P200,000.00 in cash and
the balance of P150,000.00 in postdated checks. 21 He asserts that he could not have demanded money from
complainants as they did not strike him as moneyed. 22
We note with interest that respondent then had a contrary opinion about the economic condition of complainants. He
unwittingly disclosed in his comment that "[f]or whatever it is worth, according to reliable sources, Thelma
Villanueva was given by her sister abroad to pay the repurchase price of the Calaras; that Thelma Villanueva used the
money instead in constructing her own house . . . " 23 The reliable sources referred to were none other than his sheriff
and the latter's wife. According to Sheriff Aranguren, "[h]abang ang kaso ay nabibinbin pa sa hukuman hanggang sa
ito ay natapos na, si Thelma Capuno (Villanueva) ay palagi pa ring pumupunta sa aking upisina upang siya ay
bigyan pa ng kaunting panahon dahilan sa iniintay pa lang niya ang perang padala ng kanyang kapatid na nasa
America. Sinabi pa rin niya na may hinihintay pa ring pera siya galing sa kanyang asawa na sabi niya ay hindi
nagtatrabaho sa San Pablo." 24 Concepcion L. Aranguren, utility worker assigned to respondent's court, supported her
husband's statement by saying that ". . . Siya (Thelma Villanueva) ay umiiyak habang nakikipagusap na kung maari
daw ay bigyan siya ng palugit dahil may dadating daw siyang pera galing sa kanyang kapatid sa Amerika ." 25 With
such information, it is not farfetched for respondent judge to demand money from complainant. Evidently, he was led
by his sources to believe that complainant had the money to buy back the property from the Calaras.
Verily, the act of respondent in meeting with complainants without the presence of counsel and warning them not to
tell anyone, and demanding money under the guise of forging peace between her and Pedro Calara, Jr., constitutes
grave misconduct. Additionally, his failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary has undoubtedly diminished the
faith of our people in the administration of justice. Given these serious indiscretions, a more severe penalty than one
(1) month suspension without pay should be imposed. A judge who established a common fund purportedly for his
low income employees and who himself together with his employees solicited contributions from litigants and visitors
for such fund was dismissed from the service. 26 We can do no less in this case.
II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959
This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge to disciplinary action or to dismissal from office for
violation of: (1) Sec. 3, pars. (b), (c) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars. (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3)
Arts. 206 and 210 of The Revised Penal Code.
Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM Development Corporation and the duly designated and appointed
Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that on 6 April 1992, a decision was rendered by
respondent judge dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92), "IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S.
MARINO," for lack of merit; that during the pendency of the case, respondent ordered Jesus Azores, nephew of Pastor
S. Marino, to surrender, among other properties, a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that after the car
had been surrendered to the court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation to issue a
resolution to have the luxury car at his disposal during weekends and to use it as he pleased; that the corporation
appropriated the sum of P10,000.00 to pay for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up of the engine of the car; that
respondent had the custody of the car from April 1992 to 5 May 1993; that he also demanded and received food,
money, valuable properties (jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the later Pastor S. Marino; that further,
respondent judge requested favors from complainant in securing an exemption from the Gun Ban during the election
period; that, in this regard, respondent called up complainant using the name "E. Pilapil" and further extorted money;
that, upon the death of Pastor S. Marino, complainant filed a "Petition for the Probate of the Will of the Late Pastor S.
Marino," docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 859(92); that the petition was raffled to the respondent's sala; that one of the basic
issues raised in the petition was the mental capacity and the sound disposition of the testator; that this issue was
already passed upon by respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 849(92); that during the pendency of the probate
proceeding, respondent judge called the parties to a conference at Roo's Place, a public restaurant in San Pablo City;
that the meeting started at eight o'clock in the evening and lasted until midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was
to discuss possible settlement of the probate case; that shares and other properties were discussed except the car; that
respondent intentionally omitted to include the car in the list of properties which he himself prepared so he could still
make use of the car; that despite the fact the complainant was named executrix in the will, respondent appointed
Rosevelinda Calingasan and Antonio Azcarate as joint special administrators; that such order was issued without
notice and hearing; that her motion for reconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly after, respondent judge
ordered complainant to produce stock certificates in the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books of the
corporation, and other papers; that she moved for reconsideration of this order but the same was denied; that the joint
special administrators filed a motion to cite complainant in contempt for her refusal to obey the order of respondent;
that in view of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing the probate proceedings, complainant moved for
the inhibition of respondent judge; that respondent threatened to cite complainant in contempt because of her
statement that respondent had custody, possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of the corporation; that he set the
hearing for the contempt proceeding on 29 January 1993 at eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as a result,
complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid cause of action against him. He explains that the car
was in the possession of the court, although on few occasions, he drove it merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the
battery. The car also needed minor repairs and the expenses were paid for by the corporation which appropriated
P10,000.00 for the purpose. However, he insists, there was not instance that he demanded money, food for valuables
from complainant.
With regard to the telephone call using the name "E. Pilapil," respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with his
calls. 27 He only wanted to get the names of the two (2) persons whom complainant mentioned earlier who could help
him secure exemption from the Gun Ban. He never called up complainant to extort money. He got the exemption on
his own efforts. Besides, complainant also used "E. Pilapil" when she called him up at his residence.
Lastly, respondent contends that his orders in the probate proceedings were just and properly issued without bias. He
admits that he set the pre-trial conference of the probate proceedings at Roo's Place because it was the site selected
by the parties.
On 8 July 1993, after due investigation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his report
The complaint is an aftermath of the adverse Orders dated November 27, 1992, December 22, 1992
and January 25, 1993 issued by respondent Judge against Celia Pampolina relative to SP 859(92) In
the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Pastor S. Marino, appointing Antonio Azcarate and
Rosevelinda Calingasan as Joint Special Administrators instead of the named executrix in the will
which (sic) is the complainant herein.
Most of the issued raised by complainant in this administrative complaint are the very errors assigned
by complainant in her petition filed before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30073
entitled "PSM Corporation and Celia Pampolina vs. Hon. Judge Ausberto Jaramillo (in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, San Pablo City). (Rollo, p. 35-57) Thus, the undersigned cannot properly
rule on complainant's assertions that respondent herein knowingly rendered an unjust interlocutory
order because of the case being sub judice on appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
However, in A.M. No. RTJ-92-859 (Natividad Calauan Uy, et al. vs. Judge Florentino M. Alumbre,
Assisting Judge, RTC, Las Pias, Metro Manila), respondent Judge Alumbre was imposed a FINE of
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for appointing a special administrator without a hearing.
Admittedly, however, there were mistakes or omissions in the acts of respondent Judge in his
handling of some incidents in the case. One mistake he made was conducting a pre-trial conference
of SP 859(92) at the Roo's place, a public place (Restaurant), rather than inside his chambers and/or
the Courtroom. While the Rules of Court does not specifically provide for the venue of pre-trial
conferences, propriety demands that it should be confined within the four (4) walls of his sala to
avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all his activities (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Judge
Geronilla, July 25, 1981 and Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Strangely, likewise, is (sic) the actuations of respondent in the matter of the custody of the Super
Saloon Car. He has demeaned himself and compromised his position as a Judge when he obligated
upon himself the recharging of its batteries and the inflating of its tires.
Thus, it is difficult to conceive how a Judge would willingly go out of his way to recharge the
batteries and inflate the tires of a vehicle in custodia legis by driving the car himself to the battery
shop unless there is that intent on his part to use the car.
 Against the testimonies of his witnesses, there is no doubt that indeed he used the car if not on all
occasions that he went home to Paraaque where he resides coming from his Court in San Pablo but
at least on some occasions.
The appearance in the glove compartment of the car receipt of a beauty parlor located within the
vicinity of their house admittedly patronized by the wife of the respondent is a glaring proof that the
car must have been used and operated by the respondent.
Regardless of whether the same was used in his official capacity, his motive could still be
misinterpreted; and, in the course of events, his actuations would come in conflict with the impartial
performance of his official duties. In Adm. Matter No. 690-CFI entitled "Benito B. Nate vs. Hon.
Enrique A. Agana, Sr., et. al." (91 SCRA 1) the Honorable Court there ruled that it is misconduct for
a judge to use a car that it levied in execution by virtue of an order issued by him and was censured
and admonished. In his separate opinion, however, then Justice Claudio Teehankee recommended
that the commensurate penalty should be six (6) months suspension considering the great
responsibility and trust vested in respondent. Justice Herrera, on her part, recommended three months
suspension. However, in the case of Nate, the judge intended to acquire ownership of the car. This
does not appear to be the case here.
Likewise, another aspect which is highly questionable is the use of respondent Judge of an alias "E.
Pilapil". If indeed there were no shady deals/transactions between complainant and respondent, why
was there a necessity to use an alias in their telephone conversations and/or why would there be a
need for a Judge to talk over the phone to a party who had a pending case before him.
The charges of bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, despite the vehemence
of complainant's language, have not been proven satisfactorily, there is no clear showing and/or proof
that indeed respondent Judge demanded and/or received money, jewelries and food from the
complainant.
The claim of complainant that respondent Judge demanded and received money and jewelries from
her is not supported by independent testimonies and documents. In an apparent effort to mislead this
Office into believing her theory, complainant resorted to annexing various documents, which if taken
separately will definitely lead into a different conclusion. One concrete example is here diary in
which she allegedly recorded all her transactions such as appointments, telephone calls, withdrawals
from the bank, collections and every minute details that transpired in her life, yet the demand for Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was never recorded nor was the delivery of the advance two hundred
fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) likewise recorded. When confronted on the matter, she merely
gave the excuse that the demand was almost everyday, hence, there was no need to record the same.
Likewise, the alleged delivery of the jewelries was made on April 26, 1992 but the unofficial receipt .
. . was issued only on July 20, 1992 or only after three (3) months.
Administrative charge against a judge is highly penal in nature. Such charge must therefore be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise, the charge will be dismissed (Adm. Case No. 270-J, Enriquez
vs. Araulla, in re: Horellano, 43 Phil. 212). 28
On the basis of his foregoing findings, Deputy Court Administrator Suarez recommends that: (1) the charge for
knowingly rendering an unjust order/decision be DISMISSED for having been prematurely filed; (2) the charge for
bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act be likewise DISMISSED for lack of factual evidence;
and, (3) respondent judge be found guilty for the use of the car while in custodia legis and for the issuance of an order
appointing Special Administrators without notice to the parties, submitting the appropriate penalty however to the
discretion of the Court.
We do not fully subscribe to the foregoing recommendations. Respondent judge cannot be made administratively
liable for issuing the order appointing the special administrators. On 13 July 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing complainant's petition for certiorari but at the same time granting her plea for the inhibition of
respondent judge from hearing the probate case. We agree that while there was no notice of the hearing for the
appointment of the special administrators, petitioner (complainant) was nevertheless heard on her motion for
reconsideration of the appointment of the special administrators; and, that what the law prohibits is not the absence of
notice but absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that
considering that respondent judge admitted using the car, he should have immediately inhibited himself once his
objectivity and impartiality were put in question by petitioner (complainant) in line with Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. 29
While respondent judge may not necessarily be held administratively liable for issuing the orders complained of, he
certainly is accountable for violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of committing a corrupt
practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713.
The records sufficiently establish that during the guardianship proceedings, respondent judge had no qualms in taking
advantage of the authority granted by complainant and the Board of Directors of PSM Development Corporation for
him to use the Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon on weekends or as he pleased. 30 This fact alone would have already
raised valid speculations about his objectivity in acting on the guardianship proceedings. Yet, he did nothing to apprise
complainant and the Board about the impropriety of accepting the favor. 31 Nor did he require them to forthwith
withdraw the authority granted him. 32 Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the pendency of the
guardianship proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice under Sec 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, 33 i.e.,
acceptance by a public officer of a favor from any person in the course of his official duty.
Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In fact, by
his own admission, he drove it several times. In the conference held at Roo's Place, respondent judge purposely
omitted the car in the list of properties belonging to the estate of Pastor S. Marino. We are not persuaded by his
argument that the car was not part of the decedent's estate. His later testimony revealed that the parties then desired to
include all properties even those which supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the corporation. 34 The car
was one such property, but respondent never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying that the car
was not mentioned in the discussion. Understandably, no one dared to do so as they were fully aware that respondent
was in possession and enjoying the use of the car. Besides, he should have been the one to call the attention of the
parties about the existence of the vehicle as belonging to the estate. Obviously, he did not want to part with the
vehicle.
Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of the car beyond what the duties of his office would
call for. He had the scratches of the car repainted, the tires inflated and the battery recharged six (6) times. All the
expenses for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up, repainting and battery recharging were charged against the
P10,000.00 appropriated by the Board of Directors of PSM Development Corporation. 35 The records do not however
disclose who kept the P10,000.00. Neither was there any accounting of the expenses nor any statement made on the
amount left of the P10,000.00. Considering the extra pains taken by respondent in the upkeep of the car, the possibility
that the P10,000.00 was in his possession is not remote. Respondent's conduct in this regard cannot be any different
from that of a judge who was removed from office because of manifest interest in a vehicle in custodia legis by
spending for its repairs and thereafter using it for her benefit and convenience. 36
Another reprehensible conduct of respondent which distresses us was his availment of the battery recharging service
of Cortes Battery Shop free of charge. 37 In so doing, respondent compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears
repeating that integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue; it is a necessity. We dismissed a judge who not only
had the seats of his "Lite Ace" van repaired but also received new seat covers both for free from a litigant. 38 Likewise,
we terminated the services of a judge upon finding that he accepted the benefit of riding regularly in Sarkies Tour
Buses free of charge. 39
Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As the
visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance
the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. They are particularly mandated not only to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their
actions. 40 For judges sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse where all other
institutions have failed. 41 Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial norms. Worse, his
acceptance of the Galant Super Saloon for his personal use and convenience as well as his evident personal interest in
it have defiled the "public trust" character of the judicial office. These serious transgressions cannot be countenanced.
By his actions, respondent has clearly demonstrated his difficulty and inability to keep up with the conduct required of
judges. Consequently, he should not be permitted to stay a minute longer in office. We have repeatedly held that there
is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. 42
WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-
93-944, and his violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent JUDGE AUSBERTO JARAMILLO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San
Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, if
any. This dismissal shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149 March 9, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ)
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, Complainant,
vs.
Judge VENANCIO J. AMILA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint1 dated November 29, 2007 filed by complainant Lydia A. Benancillo (Lydia)
charging respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila (Judge Amila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Tagbilaran
City with Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust
Judgment or Order, Partiality and Impropriety relative to Civil Case No. 7268 entitled "Lydia A. Benancillo v. Paul
John Belot," a Petition for Temporary Protection Order and Permanent Protection Order under Republic Act No. 9262.
The facts as culled from the Report2 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) are as follow:
1. VERIFIED COMPLAINT
xxxx
The complainant, the petitioner in Sp. Civil Case No. 7268, avers that Branch 1 of RTC Tagbilaran City, acting as then
Family Court in Tagbilaran City, issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner, Paul John
Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal effects, including properties in their
diving business called the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. (Underworld). Belot sought the reconsideration of the
issuance of the TPO. Meanwhile, their business partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion
for intervention with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an opposition to the motion for
intervention with prayer for preliminary injunction.
The complainant alleges that when Branch 2 of RTC Tagbilaran City, presided by the respondent judge, was
designated as the new Family Court in Tagbilaran City, Sp. Civil Case No. 7268 was transferred to the said court.
Acting on the pending incidents, the respondent judge denied both Belots motion for reconsideration and the
intervenors motion for intervention in an Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the
resolution a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking possession of the properties of Underworld.
The complainant further alleges that the respondent judge reiterated his Order of July 16, 2007 in an Order dated
August 14, 2007. Subsequently, the respondent judge denied the intervenors motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated October 2, 2007.
The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor as he consistently held that the
intervenors had no legal personality in the case. However, the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called her and her counsel to a meeting in his
chambers on October 9, 2007. They agreed to the meeting but they did not proceed when they learned that the
intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the respondent judges meeting with the intervenors, he issued an Order
dated October 18, 2007 which rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007. Then, in an Order dated October 25, 2007, he
denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.
According to the complainant, the respondent judges conduct smacks of impropriety and partiality. She further
charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross ignorance of the law and procedure and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment/order for issuing the questioned Orders of October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his Order of October 2, 2007, without any
motion being filed by any of the parties. Moreover, the Order of October 18, 2007 was based on an inexistent ground
as the respondent judge mentioned in this Order a petition for certiorari supposedly filed by Belot which had not yet
been x x x filed with the Court of Appeals.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judges Order of October 25, 2007 ruling on the complainants motion for
reconsideration of the Order of October 18, 2007 introduced a new issue on the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of Belot. The respondent judge also ruled on maintaining the status quo, a position inconsistent with the
preliminary injunction he had previously issued.
2. COMMENT of Judge Venancio J. Amila dated February 8, 2008 wherein he denies the charges against him.
The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her "insatiable greed to have exclusive control
and possession pending trial of the case [of] all the properties of the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent
Paul John Belot." x x x [H]e added that the "complainant . . . is only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific
address who was branded repeatedly by Belot as a prostitute and one only after his money."
According to the respondent judge, he rescinded his Order of October 2, 2007 because the complainant had no right to
her alleged shares in the corporation being merely a dummy owner of Belots shares. He was "fearful of the
consequence in the event that complainant would stealthily dispose of or abscond [with] the properties. . . because of
the illegitimate status of their relationship, more so, with their present feud caused by the arrival of Belots son and the
alleged coming of the legitimate wife."
The respondent judge averred that the complainant "masterminded all [the] legal manipulations [and] moved heaven
and earth x x x to get possession of all the properties of Belot to the extent of filing the instant administrative charge
and a petition for certiorari lately with the Court of Appeals, dated December 21, 2007 using the same offensive and
disrespectful language in her arguments.
The respondent asserted he had the authority to motu proprio rectify an error to restore things to their status quo
during the pendency of the case in order to avoid damage or loss. x x x [T]he complainant refused to attend the
meeting he called with the intervenor in chambers to explain the Order. 1avvphi1

Respondent Judge Amila incorporated in his submission his comment to a similar administrative complaint filed
earlier by the complainant. x x x [H]e alleged that he set aside his Order of October 2, 2007 because the Petition for
Certiorari filed by Belot before the Court of Appeals had placed the jurisdiction of the court under question.
3. REPLY-AFFIDAVIT dated February 29, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional violence as the respondent judge echoed
Belots verbal and psychological abuse against her that she was "only a live-in partner" "in an illegitimate relation"
and a "prostitute." The respondent judges remarks revealed his prejudice and lack of gender sensitivity and this was
unbecoming of a family court judge. His remarks also manifested his lack of knowledge and/or utter disregard of the
law on the equal protection to women-victims in intimate relationships under the anti- VAWC law which he was
mandated to uphold as a family court judge.
The complainant averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO under the Anti-VAWC law because of
his prejudiced view that she would abscond with the contested properties due to the "illegitimate status" of their
"relationship." His personal bias against the complainant reflects his utter lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
The complainant denied the respondent judges accusation that she and her counsel "masterminded all these legal
manipulations." She added that the accusation implies that the respondent judge was not in control of the proceedings
and that he could be manipulated by the parties.
The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to implement the TPO despite the dismissal of
Belots petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court
for the annulment of the Orders dated October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
The complainant asserted that while the respondent judge can change his mind, he could no longer do so when the
Order already became final and executory and was not questioned anymore by the parties. Moreover, there was no
reason for the respondent judge to call for a meeting with the intervenors because he already ruled that intervention
was not allowed in the case.
4. AFFIDAVIT-MANIFESTATION dated May 27, 2008 of the complainant.
The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu City already dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed
by Belot which petition the respondent Judge cited as reason for rescinding his Order dated [October] 2, 2007, the
petition being a prohibited pleading under Section 22 of RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC). 3
In its Report4 dated September 11, 2008, the OCA found that Judge Amila acted inappropriately in calling the
intervenors to a meeting in his chambers. It was also noted that he used derogatory and irreverent language in
presenting complainant in his Comment as an opportunist, a mistress in an illegitimate relationship and that she was
motivated by insatiable greed. As regards the charge for gross ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that the same is
premature considering that complainant filed before this Court a petition assailing the October 18 and 25, 2007 Orders
of respondent Judge.5
The OCA thus recommended:
xxxx
1. That the case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. That the charges of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure and Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order relative to the issuance of the Order[s] dated October 18, 2007 and
October 25, 2007 be DISMISSED for being premature;
3. [That r]espondent Judge Venancio J. Amila, Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Tagbilaran City, be found
guilty of impropriety for the use of intemperate language and unbecoming conduct and be FINED in the
amount of 10,000.00 with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense x x x shall be dealt
with more severely.6
We adopt the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the
discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times.
Judge Amila should be reminded of Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.7
CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxxx

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts which have the
appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se improper can nevertheless be
perceived by the larger community as such. "Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and
ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not [vested] with public trust." 8
In this case, the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the intervenors to a meeting
inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said meeting to advice the parties that he will rescind his
October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. Why would a judge give the parties advance notice that he is going to issue
an Order, more so rescind his previous Order? Worse, why would he call on the intervenors whom he had earlier ruled
as not having any legal personality in this case? This act of respondent judge would logically create an impression to
complainant that the meeting of the judge with the intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a
revocation of the October 2, 2007 Order.
In his Comment, respondent judge used degoratory and irreverent language in relation to complainant. The former in
effect maliciously besmirched the character of complainant by calling her as "only a live-in partner of Belot" and
presenting her as an opportunist and a mistress in an illegitimate relationship. The judge also called her a prostitute.
The judges accusations that complainant was motivated by insatiable greed and would abscond with the contested
property are unfair and unwarranted. His depiction of complainant is also inconsistent with the Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) he issued in her favor as a victim of domestic violence. Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more
circumspect in his language.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken,
with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.9
Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In
particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, 10 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It
is penalized under Section 11C11 thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than 1,000.00 but not
exceeding 10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
In as much as Judge Amila was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in connection with his Decision
in Criminal Case Nos. 14988 and 14989 which was docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-07-2071 where he was ordered to pay a
fine of 20,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, the
penalty of fine of 21,000.00 is deemed appropriate in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Venancio J. Amila GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE him
21,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

[A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999]

LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE,

Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba,
Laguna, respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the

Court[1] praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due
to gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession. [2] Attached to her
letter was a sworn statement, reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how respondent
allegedly molested her sexually.
SWORN STATEMENT
I, LUWALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan
Road, Pamana Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to
law, hereby depose and state:
1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P.
22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to
approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment.

2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12)
informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua,
charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the
informations are hereto attached for reference.

3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
by Judge Paterno Lustre.

4. After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment were
(sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused.

5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came,
Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994.

6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to
inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been
arraigned. At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in
January and February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of
the accused. He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing
on December 15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber.

7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty.
Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled
hearing. Judge Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995.

8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I went
to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for the
accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I will
give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me
he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched my
shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that he
acceded to my request.Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and Fridays
 as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the hearing on
January 17, 1995.

9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17,
1995 because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me.

10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the
case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he cancelled hearings on all dates as per
request of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and
March 7, 1995.

11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb.
28, 1995.

12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case,
granting postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case
was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we
needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the
accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre.

13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked him
why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to him
as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I must
obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will decide
our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him
outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he
brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed
my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are
with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set
hearings for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in
May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office on
March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings.

14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at
around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his
chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on
the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered
me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from
his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my
lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with
him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is
on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn
in Sucat since his house is near the area.

15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see
Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was
set for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995.

16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new
cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday,
I went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any
rate, there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he
 was early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did
not come. He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit."

17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the
accused's lawyer.

18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office
because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous
settings. I requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told
me that he would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already
touching my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was
then told to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me.

19. I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba
Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota
car and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna. I could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at
Riverview, he told me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed
himself and ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our
blood money is at stake. It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for
my family. Perhaps I was too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt helpless. He ordered me
to perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I
also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs.Before we left, he told me to see
him again on July 10 in his office.

20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge
Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to
perform "fellatio" on him.

21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as
requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following
day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he
told me not to fool him.

22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized
before I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could
not take it anymore.

23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and
instead hearing was set in November, 1995.

24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of the
specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me. I
could not refuse for fear of retaliation.

25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our
cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen from the transcript of the
hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous
setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he
is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was
testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous.
 26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil
doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who
are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain
because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened
by disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to
give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre.

27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who is
supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who
are not learned in law as his victims.

28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for my
better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I did it
for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his money
for our future.[3]

Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11
photographs showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were
allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt
issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she
had with respondent.[4]

Respondents defense is anchored on denial. In a 2nd Indorsement[5] he sent to the Court,

by way of answer to the complaint, he strongly denie(d) [6] the charges leveled against him
and dismissed them as the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind.
[7] According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges
against him when he refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant
demands to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short
period of time[8] the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainants
husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondents
refusal to accept complainants offer to reward him with five percent of the P3.5 million her
husband seeks to recover.

Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the
morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten minutes
before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked -- thus, the
impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines -- since the only
comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use it may enter
his room freely.

Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, (s)ex is
beyond (his) physical capacity.[9] He said he is no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest
(he) die in the attempt.[10] He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against him.

In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1)
affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually
arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2)affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo,
Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondents fine work ethics and
moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that respondent is
being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus. [11]

In response to respondents averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their
meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work
that early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his office, which
must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for respondents health condition, complainant pointed
out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only engaged in foreplay
and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have diminished
respondents sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same. [12]

In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge
Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for
investigation, report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed to
inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by complainants husband.

On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from
hearing the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with respondent.
[13] The Court, however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed
him to resolve the case with dispatch. [14]

In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the
complaint against respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Judge Geraldez observed that:

In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never
assured that he could recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual
demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of
this. Consequently, it is surprising why the complainant, no matter how
desperate she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra
allowed it.
The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the courts decision would
be so vital, that the judge can demand his price.
There is a rather large disparity in the value of the B.P. 22 cases vis-a-vis the
seriousness and mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanags allegations are
beyond comprehension. It borders on the very credibility of the sexual
allegations. This is specially true with respect to the allegations of oral sex with
its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more than once. If indeed
there were blood secretions the first time, the claim of a second time is beyond
relief (sic).
Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and
touched her. But human nature would demand another oral sex as they had
done before. Moreover, in her complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms.
Liwanag failed to advance any reason why they stopped at oral sex. [15]
Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not
credible in itself.
Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the
photographs showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not
establish the acts complained of. Despite having the opportunity to do so,
according to the report, complainant failed to testify to substantiate her claims,
thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-examine her.
Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly
opposite that of Judge Geraldez.
The OCA noted that:
xxx we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against
respondent which the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His
investigative work and his subsequent report reveal a perfunctory treatment and
analysis of the submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant herein,
and an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence.
xxx
We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her
narration bears the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts
complained of are so finely etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild
imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage,
revulsion and disgust: xxx
The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative
complaint and that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and -controlled corporations.

Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire
controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to
judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be.

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in

deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, [16] as clearly provided for
under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:[17]
Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently
establish complainants case against respondent.

The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in
various places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andoks Litson Manok,
another shows respondents car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car
is seen leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the
driveway of what appears to be one of a row of rooms. On top of this rooms doorway is the
letter "D". Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming out of
the room together and heading towards respondents parked car. [18]

Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna.

In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing

indecent is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or
grave misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room
together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the resort
did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort.

Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. [19] On the basis of his
own pictures, he concluded that complainants photographs could not have been taken at that resort. When he
testified on his behalf, he said:

" when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there
because I personally went there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign
boards were not there, sir."[20]
A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant's pictures, was missing in
respondents pictures.

Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint -- which
she has denied -- is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an outrageous
demand[21] for P3.5 million to settle the case.

We are not convinced, however, that respondents conduct in this case is entirely
blameless, nor that complainants alleged intent would excuse respondents wrongdoing.

It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in
any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such
acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is
only the narration of the parties involved.
 Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the
resort himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of
complainants.

We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with
complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for
the photograph,[22] but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion
almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as October
1995 in his comment to complainants charges.

If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was
respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for
complainant and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the
photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and
under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he
failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible
explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private
room.

Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainants
vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to
undue speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated
postponements of the hearing of her cases?

Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable
delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with
sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and
therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with
respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself
and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise, save
the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process.

As for complainants failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no

moment. Complainants affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even
had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part
of complainants evidence.[23]

Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not
cross-examined by respondent is not her fault but respondents.

As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrators
assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and
to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well. [24] All to the grave
prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed.

The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every
level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and
trust in the judiciary. Respondents disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has
already retired as of November 1, 1998. [25] For the serious misconduct of respondent, the
penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed.[26]

We are not in accord with the OCAs recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture
of all retirement benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while
directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are
dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the
circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross

misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed
nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any employment in
all branches of the government including government-owned and -controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Yares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891. July 28, 2005]

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE EDMUNDO T. ACUA,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 123.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On November 21, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
a Letter[1] dated November 3, 2003 from Concerned citizens of the lower court
reporting the alleged practices of Judge Edmundo T. Acua, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 123. According to the letter, the respondent Judge
conducted trials, signed orders and even sentenced accused while on official
leave from August 15, 2001 to September 15, 2001. Among the decided cases
were as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. C-63250 People v. Alex Sabayan;
2. Crim. Case No. C-63261-62 People v. Renato Simo;
3. Crim. Case No. C-61323 People v. Elizabeth Canaberal;
4. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Narciso Asistio, et al.; and
5. Crim. Case No. C-63238 People v. Marlon Duritan.
 The letter went on to question whether the respondent had authority to
impose such sentences, issue orders and conduct hearings. Aside from listing
the respondents dialogues, his favorite expressions were likewise listed, as
follows:
1. Putris
2. Anak ng pating
3. Putang Ina
4. Pogi, beauty
5. Tulungan nyo naman ako, hirap na hirap na ko.
6. Mali ka na naman.

According to the unknown complainants, the respondent Judge also spends

much of his energy talking and loves to berate and embarrass people, not caring
whether he speaks in open court, as long as he has an audience. The
complainants further stated that the respondents decisions usually take about
seven to ten drafts, as he changes his mind so many times. It was further
alleged that the respondent loves to glorify himself, and that his behavior was
weird.

In his comment, the respondent averred that the writers of the letter were
actuated by improper motive, and sent the letter with no other purpose than to
harass him. Furthermore, the allegations in the letter were fabricated,
exaggerated, or misquoted.

Anent the allegation that he conducted trials, signed orders and issued
sentences while he was on official leave, the respondent alleged that he was
issued an Authority to Travel[2] dated August 14, 2001 duly approved and signed
by then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida Elepao allowing him to travel to
Toronto, Canada to visit his brother, who unfortunately passed away before he
could leave. As evidenced by the entries in the daily time records/logbook, [3] he
was not yet on leave from August 15, 2001 to August 21, 2001. As such, he had
the right and duty to come to court and conduct trials, sign orders and issue
sentences. His application[4] for a thirty-day leave was from August 21, 2001 to
September 21, 2001, duly approved by Deputy Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez.

On the allegation that he exhibited weird behavior, he explained that he was

still mourning the loss of his eldest son who died of a fatal aneurism last
December 21, 2002. His son, who was at the prime of his life, had just taken the
2002 bar examinations and was employed at a law firm. The respondent Judge
surmised that the unknown complainants may have seen and observed him at
the second phase of his recovery, a time when he was depressed and angry.

As to the alleged humiliating statements that he made, the respondent Judge

admitted having made some of them while he was discussing the performance
ratings of his staff. He insisted, however, that he had been misquoted, and
dismissed as mere fabrication some of the statements attributed to him. He
admitted, however, that putris, putang-ina, beauty and pogi were among his
favorite expressions, but clarified that he did not use them often, certainly not in
open court.

In its Report dated September 17, 2004, the OCA recommended that the
instant administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter,
and that the respondent be reprimanded for ignorance of a policy on leave of
absence expressed through the ruling of the Court in Paz v. Tiong,[5] where it
was held that a judge on leave of absence would have absolutely no authority to
discharge his duties or exercise the powers of a judge. The OCA made the
following evaluation:
Official records culled from the OCA Office of Administrative Services indicate that
Judge Acua had an approved application for leave covering the period from 21 August
2001 to 21 September 2001. This application for leave of absence was approved on 3
August 2001. In view of this approved application for leave, it was a natural expectation
that Judge Acua would cease from exercising his functions during the said period.
However, per verification with the clerk-in-charge at RTC Branch 123, Caloocan City,
respondent Judge Acua presided over the following cases on 21 August 2001:
1. Criminal Case No. C-63250 entitled People v. Alex Sibayan;
2. Criminal Case No. 63261-62 entitled People v. Renato Simo; and
3. Criminal Case No. 61323 entitled People v. Canaberal.
In his Comment dated 19 January 2004, the respondent judge admitted reporting for
work on 21 August 2001 and presiding over two (2) criminal cases. He even took pride
in the fact that he did not go on leave that day, pointing to the courts logbook as proof of
his attendance.
The admission by Judge Acua confirms the allegation in the anonymous letter that he
performed his functions on a day when he was already on leave of absence. The
reference made by the respondent judge to the logbook only serves to establish that he
indeed performed his duties on 21 August 2001 the first day of his official leave. We
state that not even his overzealousness to work can shield him from administrative
liability for ignorance of the consequences of his approved application for leave of
absence.[6]
 In a Resolution[7] dated December 8, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the
matter to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zearosa for
investigation, report and recommendation. The respondent manifested that he
was going to file an extended comment, which the Investigating Justice allowed.

In his supplemental comment, the respondent alleged that he decided to

defer his leave for another week as his siblings who would be going with him to
Canada had not yet secured their visas. The respondent alleged that he was
even uncertain if this could be done by amending his travel authority. Jenny
Rivera-Baliton, the clerk in charge of criminal cases in the respondents sala,
informed him that this would take another week or so. Ms. Rivera-Baliton
executed an affidavit attesting to the veracity of the respondents claim. Thus, the
respondent decided not to defer his leave anymore, and no longer reported for
work beginning August 22, 2001. On the issue of hearing cases on August 21,
2001 despite his approved travel authority and approved leave, the respondent
claimed, thus:
I was not actuated by any evil or improper motive. Neither was I motivated by any
monetary consideration or otherwise except by my desire to discharge my sworn duty to
administer justice expeditiously. I acted in good faith and in the honest belief that I had
the right to defer the effectivity of my leave chargeable against the 30-day forfeitable
leave benefit. I wish to reiterate at this juncture what I stated in my original comment
that the leave I applied for in 2001 was my first full availment of the 30-day forfeitable
leave. Previously, and even after 2001, I went on forfeitable leave only for several days
and never consumed the complete 30 days leave accorded to judges. In hearing cases on
August 21, 2001, I did not receive any extra remuneration for it. The public service was
not prejudiced thereby. I had in mind only the interest of the accused who were in
detention. I had no intention of violating any rule, nor was it ever my intention to
prejudice anybody. On that day, as in the past, I had a heavy case load, involving
detention prisoners as I [my court is] a Drugs Court. (My court is also a commercial
[law] and [Intellectual Property Law] Court, the only branch in Caloocan City which is
that). Had I not heard the cases of the accused who pleaded guilty on that day, they
would have waited for my return after 30 days.
If I committed any infraction of the rules on leave, in all sincerity, to reiterate, there was
no intention at all on my part to so disregard the rules. If I committed any infraction, I
plead for the leniency of this Court with a promise that I will not commit a repetition
thereof anymore.[8]

The Investigating Justice thereafter submitted her Report, recommending

that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. She ratiocinated that while the
respondent Judge admitted having performed his functions on August 21, 2001,
the date of the commencement of his approved leave, there was nothing
repulsive in deferring the date of his leave. Moreover, there was no showing that
the respondent was actuated by any ulterior motive other than to lessen his
workload. According to the Investigating Justice, the respondents decision to
report for work that day appears to have been motivated by his honest belief
that he could defer his leave and make the necessary adjustments later; he had
no clear intent to deliberately ignore the rules regarding vacation leaves. The
Investigating Justice further pointed out that nobody was prejudiced by the
respondents appearance during that day, and went on to state:
However, respondent should bear in mind that approved leaves are filed through official
documents and in the future, such act may obliterate the validity of the issuances he
made while on official leave when his orders, decisions and other promulgations reflect
a date when he is already supposed to be on leave. Thus, he should exercise utmost
caution regarding these matters.
Therefore, in our consideration, the act of respondent does not constitute such a gross
ignorance of the rules that will warrant an administrative liability. In view of the lack of
malice and improper motive in reporting for work and discharging his functions and
taking into account his desire to dispense justice promptly, respondent cannot be said to
have been grossly ignorant of the rules as to be deemed administratively liable.[9]

As to the use of humiliating and insensitive expressions, the Investigating

Justice agreed with the OCA that the use of putris and putang ina were unfit
expressions for men of the robe. It did not matter that they were not directed to
any person in particular, as they give the impression of a persons ill manners.
Considering that the respondent is not an ordinary citizen, such intemperate
language detracts from how a judge should conduct himself. The Investigating
Justice made the following conclusion:
In sum, we find that the allegations in the anonymous complaint, some of which were
admitted with qualifications by the respondent, are not sufficient to warrant a penalty
other than to remind him of the rules regarding official leaves and of proper conduct of
judges.
As a final note, respondent is reminded that as a judge, it is paramount that a judges
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in
his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This includes following simple rules as
well as conducting himself in the most respectable and honorable manner possible. Only
through such kind of demeanor of the members of the judiciary that the institution earns
the respect and faith of our people in the administration of justice.[10]

The Court agrees with the Investigating Justices observation that the
respondents use of such expletives is improper for the extolled office of a
magistrate of the law. By virtue of the very office he holds, the public expects
more of the respondent as he undeniably occupies an exalted yet delicate niche
in the administration of justice. Those who don the judicial robe and wield the
judicial gavel ought to impress in their consciousness that appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. [11] Thus, the respondents claim that his
favorite expressions were not directed at anyone in particular is unacceptable.

Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in

conduct and in language.[12] Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
[13] Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge. [14] We recognize, of course, that judges are also
human beings, with their own burdens and private affairs. However, having
accepted the esteemed position of judge, the respondent ought to have known
that more is expected of him than an ordinary citizen. As subjects of constant
public scrutiny, personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen should be freely and willingly accepted by a judge. In particular,
he or she must exhibit conduct consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
[15] Indeed, a judges personal behavior, not only while in the performance of
official duties, must be beyond reproach, being the visible personification of law
and of justice.[16]

Thus, while we commiserate with the respondent Judge for the loss of his
brother and son, we cannot spare him from the consequences of his
unacceptable behavior.

In Ignacio v. Valenzuela,[17] a judge who heard a motion while he was on

vacation was held guilty of impropriety and was meted a fine of one months
salary. To reiterate, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.[18] Thus, in conducting hearings and promulgation of
decisions on the day when his official leave of absence was to commence, the
respondent Judge was guilty of impropriety. Considering, however, that no bad
faith or ill motive can be attributed to the respondent, the Court deems it proper
to reprimand him for his actuations.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edmundo T. Acua is found GUILTY of

impropriety and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is STERNLY WARNED that the
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802

represented by its President, Richard L.
King, Present:
Complainant,
DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
JUDGE AGAPITO L.HONTANOSAS, TINGA, and
JR., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 16,
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.,
Cebu City,
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 21, 2004

x----------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc., represented by

its President, Richard L. King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Cebu City (RTC for brevity).
 Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with
Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-27870,[1] pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment
upon applicants filing of a bond in the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent motion to
discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the
respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the
writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans proper
notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that the
bonding companys Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net
retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in
his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00
so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for
reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondents favorite hang-out is
the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he
uses said facilities gratis et amore.

In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his
Comment, dated August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from
the King brothers. He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which
cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to
Civil Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial
discretion in accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record, and with
the dictates of justice and equity.

Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to
squarely meet the issues of the administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was
actually no hearing on the motion to lift the writ of attachment allegedly conducted on
July 5, 2002.

Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment alleging that complainant has also

filed a complaint against him with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), attaching his
counter-affidavit thereto. He further claims that it is clear that Richard King and Atty.
Renecio Espiritu sought another forum to further expose him to public ridicule thru the
print media and air waves thereby eroding public trust and confidence of the people in
the judiciary.

The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), had forwarded to this Court the
complete records of King vs. Hontanosas, pursuant to Section 23(2) of Republic Act No.
6670.
 On September 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the herein
administrative matter to Associate Justice Jose Reyes, Jr., Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Justice conducted hearings where complainant presented the

testimonies of witnesses, Richard L. King, Rafael L. King, and the waiters at
complainants karaoke bar, namely: Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes.

Richard King testified that he is the president of complainant corporation. He

adopted the joint affidavit executed by him together with Rafael King as part of his
direct examination. In said joint affidavit, Richard states as follows: He and Rafael are
the President and Treasurer, respectively, of J. King and Sons Co., Inc., the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending before herein respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants in the
aforementioned case for specific performance. Thereafter, respondent approved the
counter-bond despite knowledge of the fact that the clearance was valid only until June
28, 2002, the maximum net retention of the bonding company was only P13,432,136.31,
thus, causing a deficiency of P22,541,436.69. On July 5, 2002, respondent lifted the writ
of preliminary attachment without notice and hearing in violation of Rule 13 and 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The calendar of cases of the court showed that the
motion to lift attachment filed by defendants in the subject case was not scheduled for
hearing on said date of July 5, 2002. The minutes presented by respondent showing that
there was a hearing held after 11 oclock and before 12 oclock of July 5, 2002, could be
easily manufactured. Previous to the aforementioned incidents, respondent had been a
frequent visitor of the corporations music lounge where respondent would entertain
himself, his guests and friends for free; Rafael King would entertain respondent when he
visited said music lounge; on July 5, 2002, Rafael received a telephone call from
respondent, telling him to see him (respondent) at his residence. Richard and Rafael
King obliged but they were shocked when respondent asked them to equal the
defendants offer of P250,000.00 so he would reconsider his order lifting the
attachment. The King brothers told respondent they could not comply with said demand
since they are suffering a financial crisis. Thus, respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc.[2] Richard King further testified
that they filed a motion to inhibit respondent from further hearing the subject case and
when said motion was granted, the case was re-raffled to a new judge who then
reinstated the writ of attachment against the defendants in the subject case.

On cross-examination, Richard testified: Respondent and his brother, Rafael, are

friends. At the behest of respondent, he and his brother went to the house of respondent
at around 7 or 8 oclock in the evening. Due to the fact that Rafael and respondent were
friends, respondent frankly told Rafael that he (respondent) needed money and if Rafael
could match the offer of the opposing party and come up with P250,000.00, respondent
would reverse his order lifting the attachment upon complainants filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Their conversation lasted no more than twenty minutes and because
Richard and Rafael were shocked by respondents actuation, they immediately left
respondents house. Richard King further pointed out that he is a very busy businessman
and by the filing of the present administrative case against respondent, he has nothing to
gain. [3]

Witness Rafael King likewise adopted the joint affidavit he executed with his
brother, Richard King, as part of his direct testimony. Rafael further stated that
respondent had been his friend for 3 to 4 years and in that span of time, he had never
asked for any favors from respondent regarding cases of complainant corporation
pending before the sala of respondent. Respondent did not ask for money from him for
the granting of the writ of attachment. However, after the order lifting the attachment
had been issued on July 5, 2002, at around 2 or 3 oclock in the afternoon, respondent
called him up on the phone and asked him to go to his (respondents) house. Since this
was the first time that Rafael would go to respondents house, it was even respondent
who gave him (Rafael) directions on how to reach said house. Rafael denied respondents
claim that he was the one who called respondents son, Butch, to ask for a meeting with
him. Rafael admitted that he knows the wife of respondent since she often uses the
music lounge owned by complainant corporation. Before July 5, 2002, respondent had
often called Rafael on the phone to tell the latter that he and his family will use said
music lounge. Upon the Investigating Justices questioning, Rafael stated that they filed
the present administrative case against respondent because it was an injustice for
respondent to demand money from them.[4]

Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes, corroborated each others testimonies. They
testified that: they work as waiters at the karaoke bar owned by complainant and they
often saw respondent and his wife, sometimes also with some of their friends, at said
bar; respondent and his wife did not have to pay for the use of the facilities of said bar,
per instruction of the bars management; however, for record purposes, they would still
give the bill or order slips to respondent for his signature, but it was respondents wife
who signed the same in their presence.

Respondent, on the other hand, testified as follows: A hearing on the defendants

motion to lift the preliminary attachment was actually held on July 5, 2002 between
eleven oclock in the morning and twelve oclock noon as shown by the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during said hearing. He held the hearing because the motion
was urgent in nature, and he did it in the spirit of equity and justice. Furthermore, he
asked from counsel for defendants whether counsel for complainant had been notified of
the hearing and the former assured respondent that counsel for complainant had been
notified of the hearing. With regard to the claim that he demanded P250,000.00 from the
Kings, he denied ever calling Rafael King or demand any money from the Kings;
instead, it was Rafael King who called up his (respondents) son Butch and asked that
they be allowed to meet with him at his residence. While the Kings were at his house,
the Kings tried to bully him into reconsidering his Order dated July 5, 2002, but he told
them to just file a motion for reconsideration. Complainant filed the motion for
reconsideration but after hearing the same, he denied the motion in his Order dated July
17, 2002. He pointed out that at the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
defendants were able to present a Certification from the Supreme Court that the
authority of the bonding company was up to August 3, and so he denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. With regard to the claim that he frequently used
complainants karaoke bar without paying for said facilities, respondent insisted that his
wife offered to pay but the bars management would not allow her to pay.[5]

On June 14, 2004, the Investigating Justice submitted his Investigation Report
together with his recommendation which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:

The complaint may be divided into four (4) issues. First, would be the
alleged demand for P250,000.0 in exchange for a favorable action
regarding complainants motion for reconsideration. The second, the use of
complainants karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel by respondent and his
family for free. The third, the alleged impropriety regarding the issuance of
the Order of July 5, 2002, and lastly, the sufficiency of the counterbond.

A. AS TO THE ALLEGED DEMAND FOR P250,000.00

The investigating justice finds that the same had not been sufficiently
substantiated. Other than the bare assertion of Rafael and Richard King
there was no other evidence presented. Although the visit of the King
brothers to the house of respondent in the evening of July 5, 2002 is
admitted, this by itself would not prove that a demand for money was made.

However, the investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for

respondent to have entertained a litigant in his home particularly when the
case is still pending before his sala. As held in De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison (355
SCRA 69 [2001]) patronizing with litigants tarnishes the appearance of
propriety, to wit:

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be

impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the
judge must, at all times, maintain the appearance of fairness
and impartiality. His language, both written and spoken, must
be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued. A judges conduct must be above reproach. Like
 Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. A judges private as well as official conduct must at
all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be
beyond reproach.

Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was,

thus, held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with
the accused without the presence of the complainant. (at 89-
90)

B. AS TO THE USE OF COMPLAINANTS KARAOKE BAR AT

THE METROPOLIS HOTEL

The investigating justice notes that this was not denied by respondent but
interposes the defense that during the time he used the bar, his friends
would pay the bill (See: TSN, April 27, 2004, p. 29). He also claimed that
at one time the owners of the karaoke bar would not allow his wife to
pay. He testified, thus:

Atty. Cortez:
Mr. Respondent, the complainant thru its witnesses
Richard King and Rafael King have accused you of
taking advantage of the amenities in their karaoke joint
and according to them you were not charged, what can
you say to this? Did you abuse?

Witness:
I did not. Because that is an open place. I went there
together with my wife to entertain some judge friends
and then my wife was suppose to pay and the
management did not allow my wife to pay. (TSN, April
27, 2004, p. 20)

Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used the

facilities free of charge, the investigating justice nevertheless finds that
respondent judge should have not frequented the place to prevent any
appearance of impropriety considering that, as admitted by respondent,
there are at least three (3) cases filed by complainant which are pending
before his court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Thus, it has been held time and again that the judges must avoid all
appearances of impropriety. In Calilung v. Suriaga (339 SCRA 340 [2000]),
it was held:

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY

AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.

It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality

and the appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches
that judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a
judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he
has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in
the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper
conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It
is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any
impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of
the judiciary.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,

metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have
direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should remain free from any appearance of
impropriety and should be beyond reproach.

Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the

Court does not hesitate to conclude that respondent Judge
tainted the image of the judiciary to which he owes fealty and
the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and worthy of the
peoples trust. A judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner which would reasonably merit the respect and
confidence of the people for he is the visible representation of
the law. (at 361-362)
 C. AS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY REGARDING THE
ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF JULY 5, 2002

For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction are reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002 defendants filed an
urgent motion to lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same day an
order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

...

Respondent on the other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted

the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that
it was the most equitable thing to do . . .

The investigating justice is not persuaded by respondents explanation. As

held in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals (199
SCRA 882 [1991]) before a writ of attachment may be lifted, a hearing and
an opportunity to oppose the motion should be given to the attaching
creditor, to wit:

Now, it is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged

for having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a
hearing with the burden of proof to sustain the writ of being on
the attaching creditor. That hearing embraces not only the right
to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know
the claims of the opposing parties and meet them. The right to
submit arguments implies that opportunity, otherwise the right
would be a barren one. It means a fair and open hearing. And,
as provided by the aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57, the
attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application
for the discharge of the attachment by counter-affidavit or
other evidence, in addition to that on which the attachment was
made. (at 890)

In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant

to even oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade
the investigating justice of the alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the
writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for granting the motion
without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said that the July 5, 2002 Order
may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a copy of the said
motion was mailed only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit 5). Hence, as argued by
complainant, the motion could not have been set for hearing earlier than
July 6, 2002 without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.

The respondent judge, having ignored settled jurisprudence, is GUILTY of

gross ignorance of law.

As held in Gozum v. Liangco (339 SCRA 253 [2001]):

When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or

observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (at 259)

There could be nothing more basic under Philippine Law than

the aforementioned 3-day notice rule:

D. AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTER-BOND

In this regard, complainant alleged that:

That there is no better evidence of the insufficiency of the

counter-bond submitted and lack of clearance from the
Supreme Court on the date the counter-bond was approved on
July 4, 2002 than the Certification of the Clerk of Court VII,
Joeffrey S. Joaquino, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City,
that the said counter-bond its (sic) Supreme Court Clearance
was valid up to June 28, 2002. That its maximum net retention
is only P13,432,136.31, but was issuing a counter-bond
worth P35,973,600.00 to answer for damages to
petitioner. What is material was the date the counter-bond was
approved not any other date thereafter. (Rollo, pp. 15-16)

Respondent, upon the other hand, testified that he did not notice that the
clearance had already expired and that the bond was over the legal retention
...

On this matter, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge was
negligent. The Indorsement issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Cebu dated July 5, 2002 contained the following Information (Exhibit F).

a) The signature of the bonding officer is genuine as

compared to his specimen signature on file.
b) The companys Supreme Court Clearance is valid until
June 28, 2002.
 c) The companys Maximum Net Retention Per Subject
of Insurance is only THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY SIX & 31/100 PESOS
(P13,432,136.13), per its OIC Form No. 1 on file with this
Office.

Had respondent carefully examined the aforesaid Indorsement it would

have been immediately apparent to him that the insurance companys
clearance had already expired and that the bond issued exceeded its net
retention. Because of this negligence, damage resulted to the litigant in the
case. The position of a judge is a sensitive one, he should have been more
circumspect and careful in his actions, granting that his actions may have
been motivated with the desire to act equitably.

To recapitulate, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge

is GUILTY of:

a). IMPROPER CONDUCT when he entertained the litigant in his

residence as well as when he used complainants karaoke bar;

b). GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW when he failed to hold a hearing

regarding the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment as mandated
in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (supra) as well as when he heard the motion to lift the writ of
preliminary attachment in violation of the 3-day notice rule; and

c). NEGLIGENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY when

he approved the patently defective counter-bond.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended

that respondent judge be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay
and be issued a warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed in case
of another infraction.[6]

We do not fully agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Investigating
Justice.

On the alleged demand for P250,000.00.

The Investigating Justice finds that the charges of extortion had not been
sufficiently substantiated because other than the bare assertions of Rafael and Richard
King there was no other evidence presented. The following questions come to mind.May
we, considering that we are not a trier of facts, review the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses? Should the testimonies of both Rafael and Richard King be automatically
disregarded simply because there is no other evidence presented by complainant? May
the testimonies of such witnesses suffice to establish the guilt of respondent?

It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial judges, in this case, the investigating
justices findings of facts and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded
finality. However, such rule is not without exceptions. Such findings may be reviewed if
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court
may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case.[7] Among the circumstances which had
been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the trial court or appellate
courts findings of facts are, when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial
court or appellate court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.[8]

In the present case, we find that such circumstances exist to make this case come
under those aforementioned exceptions. A re-assessment of the Investigating Justices
ruling on the sufficiency of evidence against respondent is warranted. We find that the
Investigating Justices inference that the evidence on record is insufficient to hold
respondent liable is erroneous, a patent mistake. The Investigating Justice seriously
overlooked the fact that to require the King brothers to present evidence other than their
corroborating testimonies that respondent made such a demand would be
unrealistic. Human experience tells us that extortion would be done in utmost secrecy,
minimizing possible witnesses. Hence, respondent required the King brothers to meet
him at his house, where everything would be under his control. In this case, complainant
is quite fortunate to even have two witnesses to corroborate each other. Verily, to require
that there be any documentary evidence or a paper trail of the commission of extortion
would be quite absurd for, naturally, respondent would not allow such incriminating
evidence to exist. In Velez vs. Flores,[9] we observed that being a trial judge, respondent
is not expected to be careless enough to document his extortion activities on
paper. Therefore, the King brothers testimonies cannot be automatically disregarded
simply because there is no additional evidence presented by complainant.

It should be noted that the Investigating Justice did not categorically state that the
King brothers are not credible witnesses or that their testimonies are not worthy of
belief. Thus, we closely examined the testimonies of Richard and Rafael King and found
the same to be very candid, forthright, unwavering, and bereft of any material or
significant inconsistencies. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King, they
actually have nothing to gain from the filing of the present administrative case. If
anything, their having to appear at the hearings of this case was even a burden, as they
had to squeeze in such hearings into their already busy schedules. They even had to
travel from Cebu City, where they reside, to Manila just to give their testimonies before
the Investigating Justice. Moreover, respondent failed to present evidence that Richard
and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave accusations of extortion
against him. Furthermore, respondents admission that he did entertain the King brothers
at his home bolsters the credibility of their averment that he demanded P250,000.00
from them for a favorable ruling on the motion for reconsideration that they would
file. Thus, we find the King brothers testimonies to be entitled to full faith and credit and
sufficient proof that respondent demanded P250,000.00 in exchange for a ruling in their
favor.

In Avancena vs. Liwanag,[10] we considered the mere testimony of complainant

that respondent judge therein was demanding P1,000,000.00 for a favorable judgment in
her favor and the testimony of an NBI agent that they tried to entrap respondent therein
but their operation was unsuccessful, as sufficient evidence to find respondent therein
guilty of extortion. Imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent therein, we held
that:
. . . in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for
serious misconduct or malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The quantum of proof required to establish respondents misconduct in the
administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but
substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Again, in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante,[11] we emphasized that:

. . . in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conviction, is required. Evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as the standard of integrity
demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows
one to escape the penalties of criminal law.

In Villaros vs. Orpiano,[12] we found the testimony of complainant therein and

his mother that respondent Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 32, had solicited P1,500.00 from them, as
sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of improper solicitation, and held thus:
 The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper
solicitation and thus imposes the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and
jurisprudence, which is dismissal from service on the first offense.

Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all
employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from
judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and
decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for
and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct
themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.

The respondents act of demanding money from the complainant hardly

meets the foregoing standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave
offense that carries an equally grave penalty.

In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the King
brothers meet the required quantum of evidence which justifies our conclusion that
respondent indeed demanded P250,000.00 from them. Such conduct is a violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct, which
provide that:
Canon 1 A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary

Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence,

integrity, and independence.

Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all activities

Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

On the Investigating Justices finding of gross

ignorance of the law for not holding a full-
blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment
and for violating the three-day notice rule.

We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift
attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.
 Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - . . .

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the

hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

A perusal of the motion to lift attachment shows that a copy of the same was
mailed to plaintiffs counsel only on July 3, 2002. The courts receiving stamp showed
that said motion was filed in court only at 11:02 in the morning of July 5, 2002, despite
the fact that the notice of hearing for said motion stated that said motion would be set for
hearing at 8:30 in the morning of July 5, 2002. The proximity of the date of mailing of
the copy of the motion to the other party and the hearing date indicated in the notice of
hearing clearly shows that it is impossible for the other party to receive said motion at
least three days before the date of hearing. Evidently, the party filing the motion to lift
attachment had already violated the three-day notice rule. Such circumstances should
have already warned respondent that plaintiff in the subject case had not yet been
apprised of the filing of such a motion, much less the holding of a hearing for said
motion. Yet, despite said patent defects in the motion, respondent consented to hold a
hearing on the motion at 11:20 of the very same morning of July 5, 2002. Although
Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court, for good
cause, may set the hearing on shorter notice, the rule is explicit that notice of the hearing
cannot be altogether dispensed with. In this case, common knowledge dictates that it
would be impossible for a copy of the motion, mailed only on July 3, 2002, to be
delivered by registered mail to counsel for the plaintiff on or before July 5,
2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no notice whatsoever of the filing of the
motion and the hearing date for the same.

Section 12, Rule 57[13] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides that
the court shall, after due notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if
the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-bond executed to the attaching party
with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to that
fixed by the court in the order of attachment. Although it is true that respondent was able
to present a transcript of stenographic notes[14] to prove that a hearing on the motion to
lift attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002, the same only highlighted the fact that
respondent failed to give herein complainant, the plaintiff and attaching party in subject
case, due notice and the opportunity to be heard, as mandated by the aforementioned
rule. The transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in fact shows that respondent
already had strong suspicions that the plaintiff had not yet been notified of the filing of
the motion when he propounded the following questions to the counsel of defendants in
the subject case, to wit:
COURT:
Where is the proof that the counsel for the plaintiff received this?

ATTY. SENO:
It was mailed, Your Honor. Our basis that he received this is the
registry receipt which is the proof of mailing, and there is an explanation
why no personal service could be made because of time constrained (sic),
Your Honor. As we can recall, we filed our Answer last July 3, Your Honor,
and it was about that time that we received the summons and it was also
about that time that we filed this motion, Your Honor. At any rate, this is
only a counterbond which is a mere ministerial procedure. It is just a matter
of paying the surety of the counterbond and to submit it to the Honorable
Court to prove that there is already a bond which may answer for any loss
that the plaintiffs may suffer.

COURT:
But are you sure that Atty. Navarro was aware of that?

ATTY. SENO:
Yes, because we met him, Your Honor. He had a case here and we
met at the hallway. Before he left, I told him that I filed a motion and he
was furnished a copy through mail, Your Honor.

COURT:
You should have let him signed (sic) this pleading here as a copy
furnished, since you were already talking to him at that time.

ATTY. SENO:
Yes, Your Honor, precisely there is an explanation why no personal
service could be had. Under the rules, if no personal service could be had,
then it should be mailed by registered mail. But there is already an
explanation why no personal service could be made and we believe that is
already sufficient, Your Honor.

COURT:
Because this is a very urgent motion and considering that the counsel
for the plaintiffs was around, you should have furnished him a copy and let
him sign to prove that he received a copy. At that time, was he willing to
receive the copy? Perhaps, he was not willing to receive a copy.

ATTY. SENO:
 No, no, we had a talk, Your Honor. He may not be willing to receive
the copy at that time, but we have mailed to him already a copy and we
believe that it is already suffice (sic), Your Honor.

COURT:
But it was easy for you to serve him a copy personally. Why do you
have to mail it, when you could have serve (sic) it to him personally?

ATTY. SENO:
No, because my office, Your Honor, is in Mandaue City. The office
of Atty. Navarro is in Capitol and its so hard to travel from Mandaue to
Capitol in just a matter of 30 minutes especially during school days, Your
Honor. As a matter of fact, we can even file an ex-parte motion, Your
Honor.

COURT:
Anyway, the incident is now considered submitted for resolution.

Despite such misgivings on the lack of due notice on counsel for plaintiff in subject
case, respondent still conducted an ex-parte hearing on the motion and hastily
considered the same submitted for resolution and on the very same day of July 5, 2002,
respondent approved the counter-bond. Complainant is not quite accurate in stating that
respondent approved said counter-bond on July 4, 2002. The stamp of approval of the
bond was affixed onto the bond without any date thereof. The date of execution by the
President of the bonding company was July 4, 2002; but this does not mean that
respondent also approved said counter-bond on the same date of July 4, 2002. The
Indorsement of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City was dated
July 5, 2002, thus, respondent could not have received subject counter-bond any earlier
than the date of said indorsement.
Just the same, respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a
hearing on the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in
considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day of July 5,
2002, without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter. We agree
with the Investigating Justice that respondents defense that he immediately heard the
motion even in the absence of counsel for the other party because of the urgency of the
lifting of the attachment, is not persuasive. The transcripts of stenographic notes for the
hearing on July 5, 2002 shows that counsel for defendants in subject case presented no
argument whatsoever showing the urgency of the motion.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by
him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[15]However, it
has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action.[16] The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondents inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this
case, we believe that respondents actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we find
respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule
and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the
matter as mandated by Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On respondents negligence
in the performance of his duty

As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to

exercise due care in examining the supporting papers therefor. The respondent should
know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond such as
counter-bond. In Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court enumerated the
requirements for accepting a surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are closely
analogous to judicial bonds and counter-bonds required for the issuance of writs of
attachment or the lifting thereof, the respondent should know that the requirements for
acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the same for all other bonds such as acceptance
bonds or counter-bonds except the requirement for photographs of the accused. Said
requirements are: (1) affidavit of justification, including a statement that the company
has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any amount to the
Government or any of its agencies as of the last day of the month preceding the date the
bond is issued or posted; (2) Clearance from the Supreme Court, valid only for thirty
days from the date of issuance; (3) Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner; (4) Authority of the agent in case the bond is
issued through a branch office or through an agent; and (5) current certificate of
authority issued by the Insurance Commission with the financial statement showing the
maximum underwriting capacity of the company.[18] The Court imposed these
requirements for very good reason, and that is, to ensure that the bonding company has
the capacity to pay whatever liability it may have under the bond it issued. The bonding
companys ability to pay is all too important in this case where the counter-bond it issued
is supposed to answer for whatever amount may ultimately be adjudged in favor of the
party who applied for the writ of attachment. It is, therefore, indispensable for a judge to
review these documents before he approves the bond.

Notably, among the requisites for the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the
Supreme Court and the current certificate of authority showing the maximum
underwriting capacity of the company.
The Clerk of Courts Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding
companys Supreme Court Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its
Maximum Net Retention is only P13,432,136.31. A simple perusal thereof would have
alerted respondent that at the time the counter-bond was submitted to him for approval
on July 5, 2002, the bonding company did not have enough properties to answer for the
counter-bond it issued in the amount of P35,973,600.00. Thus, we agree with the
Investigating Justice that respondent acted negligently in approving the counter-bond.

On respondents improper conduct in

entertaining litigants at his home and using
litigants karaoke bar for free.

It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home
and to frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for
free. Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his
court.Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of
the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at
said bar are quite clear that respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no payment
was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted on paying,
especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his
court. Nothing on record shows that respondent even exerted any effort to so insist.He
appeared only too ready and willing to enjoy the facilities of complainants karaoke for
free. In Caeda vs. Alaan,[19] we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground
for reproach.

[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept
himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
.........

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has
to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely
venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach. (Emphasis supplied),
By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant,
respondent miserably failed to live up to the standards of judicial conduct.

A judge must assiduously protect the image of his exalted office as we have previously
emphasized in Spouses Makadaya Sadik and Usodan Sadik vs. Judge Abdallah Casar,
[20] to wit:

It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote

justice. However, the reality of justice depends, above all, on the
intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men and women who are
called to serve as our judges. In a piece written by Rosenberg, this point
was emphasized, thus:

Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as

Roscoe Pound remarked, men count more than machinery.
Assume the clearest rules, the most enlightened procedures,
the most sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still
the judge. In the long run, There is no guarantee of justice
except the personality of the judge. The reason the judge
makes or breaks the system of justice is that rules are not self-
declaring or self-applying. Even in a government of laws, men
make the decisions.

In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E.

Arceo, the Court emphasized the importance of the role played by judges in
the judicial system, thus:

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the

fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the
perception and confidence of the community that the people
who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict
manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but
may not necessarily create confidence among the people that
justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to create such
confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly
judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity,
and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and
private lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the
 wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity,
thus creating confidence in the judicial system.

Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable

qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal profession
of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the legal order by
judicial corruption. The rationale for this was succinctly put by Jones, thus:

If a physician or a professor or a businessman is

discovered to be a thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure
will not put medicine, higher education, or business into
general disrepute. But judges are different and more
representative; revelations of judicial corruption create
suspicion and loss of confidence in legal processes generally
and endanger public respect for law.

Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of

exceptional integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring these
qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the judge acts directly upon
the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge
must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted
office.[21]

Finally, it cannot be said that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a

criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas). We held in Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge Buenconsejo[22] that:

. . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently

of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the
latter charges. As the disciplining arm of the judiciary, it is the Courts duty
to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints
against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.

In sum, we find respondent guilty of the serious charges of two counts of Gross
Misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct under Section 8(3) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, for demanding P250,000.00 from complainant and
using complainants karaoke bar and entertaining litigants at his home. Respondent is
likewise guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure under Section 8(9) Rule 140
of the same Rules for failing to accord complainant the due notice and hearing it was
entitled to under the rules. Lastly, respondent is guilty of the less serious charge of
Simple Misconduct under Section 9(7), also under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, for his negligence in approving the subject counter-bond.

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be
penalized as follows:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

while Section 11(B) of said Rule, dealing with sanctions that may be imposed on the
respondent found guilty of less serious charges, provide thus:

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the

following sanctions shall be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) or more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Consequently, we find the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that

respondent be suspended for only three (3) months without pay to be inappropriate.

We note further that respondent had been previously administratively sanctioned

in City Government of Tagbilaran vs. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.[23] for violating Circular
No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980, enjoining judges of inferior courts from playing in or
being present in gambling casinos. Thus, the fact that respondent is guilty of three
counts of serious offenses, i.e., two counts of Gross Misconduct and one count Gross
Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and also of one count of Simple Misconduct, further
aggravated by the finding of guilt in a previous administrative case against him, justifies
the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is hereby

found GUILTY of two counts of Gross Misconduct, one count of Gross Ignorance of
the Law or Procedure, and, Simple Misconduct. He is DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave credits and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to

cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this
Decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personnel records of respondent.

Further, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
respondent is required to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not
be disbarred from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

EN BANC

HEIRS OF THE LATE REV. FR. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055

JOSE O. ASPIRAS,
Complainants, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
JUDGE CLIFTON U. GANAY, ABAD, and
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 31, AGOO, LA UNION, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 17, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The instant administrative case stemmed from an unsigned letter-
complaint[1] dated June 6, 2005, filed by the heirs of the late Reverend Father Jose O.
Aspiras addressed to the Court Administrator, requesting that an investigation be
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the alleged abuse of
authority of respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 31, Agoo, La Union in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026,
entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras.

In the letter, the heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras state the following:

That the judge in the above mentioned case has been abusing his authority as observed by the
Heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras as he previously ordered to withdraw the amount of
P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras on December
17, 2004 for him to purchase law books. As per his order, he alleged that, In the spirit of this
Yuletide season and considering the efforts of the Judge of this Court, the guardians in the above
entitled case deemed it best to give him fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of law books to
aid him in his work as a judge. The truth of the matter is that this has been the idea of Judge
Ganay, himself, and was never consented by the guardians. For your reference, attached is a
photocopy of this order.

There are still other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain amounts
from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras in his favor without the written
consent of the guardians. Unfortunately, photocopies of these orders cannot be attached for your
reference as no copies of these orders were sent to the guardians. The copies can be found in the
records of the case being kept by the said court.

The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the records of SP Case
No. A-1026 from August 30 to September 2, 2005. The investigating team selected
pertinent documents relative to the anonymous complaint in order to verify the
irregularities allegedly committed by respondent Judge Ganay.

From the documents gathered, the investigating team found that the Order[2] dated
December 17, 2004 was indeed issued by respondent Judge Ganay. For the money
received from the said order, respondent Judge Ganay even issued an Acknowledgement
Receipt[3] dated December 22, 2004. The team also discovered that on several
occasions, respondent Judge Ganay issued numerous orders[4] directing the manager of
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Agoo, La Union Branch, to draw checks from the
account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras amounting to several thousands of pesos in the name
of the Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao (OIC-Clerk of
Court Eslao) for the purpose of purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards. The said cards
were received by respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao as evidenced
by acknowledgement receipts[5] signed by them on several dates.

The investigating team also discovered two other orders[6] issued by respondent Judge
Ganay directing the manager of PNB, Agoo, La Union Branch to draw from the account
of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras checks in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
each for the purpose of purchasing three (3) cellular phones. Thereafter, OIC-Clerk of
Court Eslao submitted a Report on Expenses[7] dated March 1, 2005 enumerating in
detail how the money was spent for buying three (3) cellular phones.

In a Resolution[8] dated January 17, 2006, this Court resolved to:

(a) DIRECT Judge Clifton S. Ganay and Officer-in-Charge/Branch Clerk of Court Precilla
Olympia P. Eslao, both of RTC, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, to submit their respective
comments on the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O.
Aspiras and the report dated September 22, 2005 of Attys. Reynan M. Dollison and Kenneth P.
Fulton, Legal Office, OCA, and to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(b) AUTHORIZE the Office of the Court Administrator to secure the complete records of
Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose
O. Aspiras; and

(c) DIRECT Executive Judge Samuel R. Martires, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, to
safekeep immediately the case records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of
three (3) volumes, and thereafter, surrender the same to a duly authorized representative of the
Office of the Court Administrator.

Respondent Judge Ganay sent a letter[9] dated March 3, 2006 to the Clerk of Court
stating that he had yet to receive a copy of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 of the
heirs of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras against him and the report dated September 22,
2005 made by the OCA lawyers who conducted a surprise inspection and examination of
the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He further stated that he should be
given a medal for effecting a speedy settlement of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras
among his heirs. Respondent Judge Ganay maintained that all his actions merely
implemented the orders of the two (2) property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras.

Respondent Judge Ganay, together with OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, subsequently filed a
Motion to Furnish Copies dated March 13, 2006 reiterating his earlier manifestation that
he had not yet received copies of the documents that he was directed to comment on
through the Resolution dated January 17, 2006. Respondent Judge Ganay again moved
that they be furnished copies of the said documents so that they could properly and
intelligently comment thereon.

And again on March 22, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay filed a Manifestation[10] dated
March 21, 2006, submitting an Advance Comment[11] dated March 21, 2006, despite
the fact that he had not yet received copies of the documents that he was directed to
comment on. According to respondent Judge Ganay, he was submitting his Advance
Comment to show to the Supreme Court that its foot soldier of Branch 31, RTC, AGOO,
La Union deserves a MEDAL, not a disciplinary action.

In his Advance Comment dated March 21, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay explained that
the cellular phones were purchased upon the orders of the two (2) property guardians of
the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras. He further explained that the communication devices were for
the fast networking of information for the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras who was then the ward of
the court. Respondent Judge Ganay also narrated that the property guardians persistently
asked him to take a vacation in the United States, which he declined. According to him,
they kept on asking him what they could do to help the court. He, in reply, mentioned
that lawbooks would enhance the appearance of his office and make it look scholarly
and presentable. They then appropriated fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the
purchase of books.

Respondent Judge Ganay expounded on the system of checks and balances that he
devised for the handling of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras funds, thus:
 I am just the implementor of the orders of the guardians. In the case of
the property guardians, I only implement if the order is unanimous, i.e., if
both property guardians assent.

Why? Because in order to safeguard Reverend Aspiras[] wealth, one

property guardian not taking advantage of the other, it was arranged that I
would be the implementor of their orders. And so if the guardian over the
wards person says that the ward should have a wheelchair and the property
guardians say okay, I issue an order directed to the bank manager where the
wards moneys are to release the stated amount (after a choice of wheel-
chair was made by the guardian over the wards person). The bank issues a
check and have it delivered to the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court, from which
the guardian over the person retrieves. That way there will be no lamangan,
no gulangan between the two (2) property guardians belonging to opposite
camps.

In a Resolution[12] dated April 18, 2006, this Court granted respondent Judge Ganays
motion that he be furnished with copies of the letter-complaint dated June 6, 2005 and
the report dated September 22, 2005.

In another Manifestation[13] dated May 16, 2006, respondent Judge Ganay again stated
that he and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao had not yet received copies of the documents they
were required to comment on. This prompted the Court to issue another
Resolution[14] dated July 11, 2006, directing the Office of the Clerk of Court to furnish
respondent Judge Ganay and OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao copies of the said documents.

OIC Clerk of Court Eslao submitted her Comment[15] dated August 22, 2006 and
explained, thus:

The prepaid cell cards were purchased upon the knowledge and approval of
the property guardians.

There were 7 cellphones which were regularly fed with prepaid cell
cards. These were automatic expenses on a regular basis. The regularity
was every 2 months because the lifetime of a prepaid card is 60
days. Hence, the amount of regular expenses for prepaid cards was
 something like P21,000.00 annually. For 2 years, the regular amount was
something like P42,000.00.

The 3 cellphones mentioned in the Memorandum (November 2004) were

the replacement cellphones of the 3 guardians.

My position as OIC-Branch Clerk of Court functioned as the clearinghouse

so that there could be monitoring of the activities regarding the ward in this
special proceeding.

There was nothing irregular in all these purchases because they were upon
the written orders of Judge Ganay, who, in turn, was himself requested-
ordered by the property guardians.

BESIDES, the parties had long ago buried the hatchet as of August 22,
2005 even before the 2 OCA lawyers came to this Court (August 31, 2005).

This is a case of a false alarm.

Respondent Judge Ganay again submitted an Extended Comment[16] dated August 22,
2006 and narrated the peculiar circumstances in connection with Special Proceeding
Case No. A-1026, entitled In the Matter of the Guardianship of Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras,
to wit:

When Father Aspiras suffered a stroke sometime in September of 2001,

paralyzing a portion of his body, his sister Gloria Aspiras Mamaril filed a
petition for guardianship asking the Court that she be appointed guardian
primarily because she is a sister. This was opposed by Helen Grace Canlas,
a daughter of Alejandro Aspiras (brother of Father Aspiras). After several
hearings that established the legal incompetency of Father Aspiras, the heirs
including those with stakes to protect (numbering more than 25 in all)
agreed that the personal guardian should be, as she was appointed by the
Court eventually, HELEN GRACE CANLAS. The property guardians who
were appointed were the living brother and sister of Father Aspiras, namely
Gloria Aspiras Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras. Both Gloria Aspiras
Mamaril and Alejandro Aspiras are retired public servants, Gloria, being a
retired DEPed elementary school teacher while Alejandro, a retired Navy
man. After 2 years or so as one of the property guardians, because he could
no longer come up to the third floor where Branch 31 RTC holds office,
Alejandro Aspiras begged off, to be substituted by one of his learned
daughters, Professor Mercedita A. Mabutas. She was appointed later in lieu
of her father. She is a Professor of Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State
University (DMMMSU) based in AGOO, La Union.

Normally, a ward of a Court has only one guardian. But the ward of this
Court, Father Jose Aspiras, had three (3) guardians. This is because I had to
accommodate both warring camps to avert a continuing war that would not
redound to the benefit of the ward of the Court.

xxx

It was agreed that no withdrawals from the bank account of Father Aspiras
shall be allowed without a written order from me.

In order that not one of the 3 guardians could act independently of the
other, a system was developed whereby the judge (and thats me) only could
order the manager of the bank to issue a check in such amount that will
cover and answer for a certain need (see, also pages 8-9, ADVANCE
COMMENT, March 21, 2006).

In other words, I and I alone, by agreement with the guardians, held the key
to the bank vault.

While I held the key to the bank, the property guardians were the ones who
could request-order me to instruct the manager of the bank to draw or issue
a check.

xxx

Contrary to what the writer of that Letter-Complaint dated June 6, 2005,

every order for the withdrawal of moneys have been all highly
REGULAR. There was nothing that was irregular.

Thats why after the heirs have chosen to peacefully settle among
themselves in the last week of July 2005, I was prevailed upon by the heirs
to stay a little longer so that I can make orders to the bank manager for the
eventual, which was a certainty, distribution of the moneys for the heirs. On
August 22, 2005, after the filing of the inventory of properties by the
property guardians, on the same date (August 22, 2005), the heirs executed
an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND ARRANGEMENT OF
ESTATE, which wrote finis to the squabble among the heirs and the sub-
heirs.Eventually their shares in money were distributed. I was hailed as a
hero, savior, Santa Claus, godfather. Some of the heirs adopted me a
 member of their family. All of them gave balatos one way or another all due
to the fast distribution of their shares. Those who came from Australia,
Tarlac and outlying areas beyond the Province of La Union were most
grateful.

Respondent Judge Ganay also addressed the allegation that he and his cohorts were
attempting to withdraw at least the amount of about FOUR MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,400.00.00) (sic) from the bank account of the late Rev. Fr.
Aspiras. According to him, he could do it since he held the key to the bank, but he could
not and would not do it for the following reasons:

xxx First, I fear God and the Supreme Court. Second, I was not raised that
way by my poor but dignified parents (mother: retired DEPed public school
principal; father: deceased, municipal employee). Third, I am satisfied with
my present earning. Fourth, I have no need for that kind of sum.Fifth, I
have a name to protect, being the recipient of many awards. And sixth, I am
an automatic applicant to the Court of Appeals by virtue of R.A. 6713.

In a Resolution[17] dated August 29, 2006, this Court referred the instant case to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In its Report[18] dated March 12, 2007, the OCA rejected the explanations of
respondent Judge Ganay and found him guilty of violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
recommended the following actions:

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of

the Honorable Court are our recommendations that:

a) the instant administrative case be REDOCKETED;

b) Judge Clifton U. Ganay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 31, Agoo, La Union, be FINED the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00);
 c) Likewise, OIC-Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P[.] Eslao,
be FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); [and]

d) The records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026,

consisting of three (3) volumes, under the custody of the Office of the
Court Administrator, (per resolution dated January 17, 2006) shall be
returned back to the Regional Trial Court of Branch 31, Agoo, La Union.

After a judicious review of the record of this administrative matter, we find that
respondent Judge Ganay has indeed violated Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15,
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.[19] The aforesaid
provisions on Propriety state:

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to
their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted
to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure,
judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the
occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit
might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Lower court judges, such as respondent Judge Ganay, play an
important role in the promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. They are front-
liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the
admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of
impropriety is more sternly applied to them.[20]
In Dulay v. Lelina, Jr.,[21] the Court held:

Although every office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts

greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of law must comport himself at all
times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public. The New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only
is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are
mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The
Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking
for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with
the performance of judicial duties.

Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks
worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards
from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the
court, constitute impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganays
act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to draw
checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras
creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of irregularities
in the conduct of the proceedings.

This Court finds unsatisfactory the explanations propounded by respondent Judge Ganay
for his actuations in connection with Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026. He tried
justifying his act of receiving cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards
from the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the networking
of information about the ward of the court. He likewise rationalized his acceptance of
the lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos from the property guardians as his way of
showing them that he appreciate[d] their show of appreciation of [his] judicial work for
the ward and to all other cases. Respondent Judge Ganay explained that he did not want
the property guardians to feel resentful (tampo), frustrated or shamed (mapahiya) if [he]
would refuse their generosity.

This Court has always stressed that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all activities, and that he should perform his duties
honestly and with impartiality and diligence. Also, a judge should so behave at all times
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
[22] Since respondent Judge Ganay occupied an exalted position in the administration of
justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; and his official, as
well as his private, conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety[23].

As held in Edao v. Asdala:[24]

As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the
respondent, are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would
enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and
impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just
in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor
of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to
the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically
mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is
of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality
have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these
must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as
to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be
circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the
dispensation of justice. xxx
With regard to the recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) Pesos on OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao, this Court finds the same to be without
basis. In her Comment dated August 22, 2006, OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao sufficiently
explained that she merely followed the official orders of respondent Judge Ganay in
issuing the Acknowledgment Receipts for the prepaid cards for the cellular
phones. Moreover, nowhere in the OCA Report dated March 12, 2007 is a discussion
regarding OIC-Clerk of Court Eslaos participation in the alleged irregularities in Special
Proceeding Case No. A-1026.

WHEREFORE, for violating Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay is
FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a stern warning that
a repetition of similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely.

Let the records of Special Proceeding Case No. A-1026, consisting of three (3) volumes,
under the custody of the Office of the Court Administrator (per resolution dated January
17, 2006), be returned to Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
 Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

MICHAEL B. BELEN, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139

Complainant,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,N

ACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. Promulgated:

BELEN, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba City, Branch 36,
Respondent. August 9, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and conduct

unbecoming a judge filed by Michael B. Belen against Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36.

The Facts

Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a
judge. According to complainant,[1] sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a
case for Estafa against complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed
for lack of probable cause by Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in
a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For
Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication]) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City, alleging, inter alia, that Sunega-Lagman was always absent during the
hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa case. Respondent judge likewise
filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD Case No. 06-
1700. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman,
complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-
Lagman as evidence in the CBD case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the allegations
of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman were false; that Sunega-Lagman was
present during the preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004,
and that she was absent only once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity
leave; and that it was respondent judge who was absent during the hearings.[2]

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant

with the filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the
morning, complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his
piggery, informing him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the
piggery. Complainant rushed to the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the
Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting
complainants piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government
authorities and employees, requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry
business; advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National
Building Code and certain environmental laws; and reminding the local government
authorities of their duty to forestall the issuance of municipal clearance and license to
complainants business establishment. We enumerate these letters below.[3]

1. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to the Municipal

Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting confirmation of the issuance by
said office of construction, building and occupancy permits to Michael B.
Belens Piggery and Poultry in Brgy. IV and House in Sta. Rosa, and stating
that non-compliance with, or violation of the National Building Code is a
criminal offense;[4]

2. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to the

Municipal Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, referring to respondent judges
previous letter dated 15 January 2007; citing provisions of the National
Building Code on Building Use Affecting Health and Safety (Sec. 1.01.05),
Building Permits (Sec. 1.02.03), and Inspection and Certificates of
Occupancy (Sec. 1.02.05); and stating: These statutory provisions are
mandatory and any violation thereof is subject to appropriate legal
sanctions. Thus, in accordance with the National Building Code and Code
of Conduct of Public Officers that mandates action and reply to any
 complaint within 15 days from receipt, may I know your official action and
reply on the matter;[5]

3. Letter dated 15 January 2007, addressed to Mayor Samuel

Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, expressing his appreciation of the immediate
action taken by the mayor in relation to the inspection of the piggery and
poultry business establishment of complainant; enumerating the
environmental laws violated by the complainant, i.e., Sec. 8 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 984, Section 3 of PD 953, Section 48 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9003, Section 49 of PD 1152, and Section 27 of Resolution No.
33, Series of 1996; stating that With the violations of the owner and his
farm workers, appropriate criminal actions shall be instituted against them;
and reminding the mayor that municipal officers are mandated by
environmental laws not to issue municipal clearance and permits, and to
close business enterprises within its jurisdiction, specifically complainants
piggery and poultry, violating environmental laws;[6]

4. A follow-up letter dated 23 January 2007, addressed to Mayor

Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, inquiring on the official action taken
by the mayor in relation to respondent judges earlier letters and
complainants alleged violation of environmental laws, and emphasizing the
responsibility of the mayor to withhold clearances and permits from
business establishments violating environmental laws;[7]

5. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to Ms. Gladys D.

Apostol, the Municipal Agriculturist of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting a
copy of the Inspection report dated 11 January 2007;[8] and

6. Letter dated 13 February 2007, addressed to the Municipal

Engineer of Alaminos, Laguna, requesting for prompt action on respondent
judges previous letters dated 15 and 23 January 2007, with a warning that
the failure of the said office to reply to respondent judges inquiries will
compel the latter to file administrative and criminal complaints before the
Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Section 5 of RA 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.[9]

All of the letters enumerated above bore a letterhead indicating respondent judges
official government position, viz:

From the Chamber of:

 Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 36
4th Judicial region, Calamba City

Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953,
docketed as I.S. No. 07-246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna.[10]

In his Comment,[11] respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a
judge; that as a landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the
right to file criminal complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the
environment; and that he had the right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6173, to secure public information from government offices, especially about the
complainant who was violating numerous laws. Respondent judge also claimed that he
did not use the courts official stationery or letterhead in his correspondence with
government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He emphasized that the
courts official letterhead should appear as:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
4TH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 36
CALAMBA CITY

Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed
the same in his private, not judicial, capacity.

The OCAs Report and Recommendation

On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report[12] finding respondent judge guilty of
violating Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. The OCA stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the courts
official letterhead but his own personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the
presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba City, and even stated that his letters were from
the chambers of the presiding judge. It is apparent from the acts ofrespondent judge that
he intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to promote his personal interest.
The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel
Arnaldo B. Belen be fined in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.[13]

In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-
docket the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative
matter.[14] Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Courts Resolution,
[15] designated Court of Appeals Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating
justice of the administrative case.

The Findings and Recommendation

of the Investigating Justice

Investigating Justice Ramon R. Garcia found respondent judge to have violated Section
4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary when he used a letterhead indicating his position as the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36. According to Justice Garcia, while the
computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge is not the official letterhead of the RTC
of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects respondent judges designation
and position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came from the chambers of the
presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the
prestige of his judicial office for his own personal interest.
Justice Garcia agreed with the OCA in recommending the imposition of the
administrative penalty of fine in the amount of P11,000 with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

The Courts Ruling

The findings and recommendations of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA are
well-taken.

Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure

public information regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform
addressees of the laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the
addressees of their duties as government officials or employees and warn them of the
possible legal effects of neglect of public duties. In writing these letters, respondent
judges use of his personal stationery with letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding
Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and stating that the letter was from [his]
chambers, clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of his
office to influence said government officials and employees, and to achieve with prompt
and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words, respondent
judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative of Section 4
of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below:

CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE

xxx

SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to

influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
 CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance

of all the activities of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

In Oktubre v. Velasco,[16] this Court held that respondent judges act of sending several
letters bearing his salas letterhead, in connection with an apparent dispute in the
administration of the estates of his relatives, clearly showed the judges intent to use the
prestige of his judicial office, and hence, violative of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.[17] The Court considered respondent Judge Velascos excuse for using his salas
letterhead, i.e., that he wanted to protect the interest of his maternal co-heirs in the
subject properties, as flimsy, and emphasized that respondent judge had no business
using his salas letterhead for private matters, as the same should be used only for official
correspondence.[18]

Similarly, in Rosauro v. Kallos,[19] it was held that respondent judges use of his salas
official stationery in his private correspondence with complainant and his counsel
constitutes violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court concluded
that: By using his salas stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge
evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero (and himself) in violation of
Rule 2.03 of the Code.[20]

In Ladignon v. Garong,[21] respondent judges act of using the official letterhead of his
court and signing the same using the word judge in his letter-complaint to the First
United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court held,
thus:
We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that Judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities. (Canon 4, Section 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct) Indeed,
members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their
conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the
discharge of their official duties as well as in their personal behavior and
everyday life. No position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness
and uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. x x x

xxx

x x x As the Report stated, [repondent judges] use of the letterhead and his
designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute gave the
appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of the court to his
cause. This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the respondent
Judges use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the
respondent Judges transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead,
but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the
circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.

xxx

x x x the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the

surrounding circumstances of the use - the underlying reason that marks the
use with the element of impropriety or appearance of impropriety. In the
present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of propriety when he
used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of
church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with
the letter addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have
conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported
violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the
title of Judge or Justice in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary.
While the use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that
an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the
circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for
social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to
use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office
be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
 influence the judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct)
To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.[22]

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of

Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC,[23] provides that violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less-serious charge
punishable by any of the following sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating justice and the OCA that
respondent judge, for his transgression, be meted a penalty of fine amounting
to P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of
Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, and FINE him P11,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

EN BANC

SHERLITA O. TAN, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982

Complainant, (Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)

- versus -
JUDGE REXEL M.
PACURIBOT, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, GingoogCity,
Respondent.
x---------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, (Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
Complainant,
Present:
- versus - PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
JUDGE REXEL M. YNARES-SANTIAGO,
PACURIBOT, Regional Trial SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Court, Branch 27, GingoogCity, CARPIO,
Respondent. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
x---------------------x CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
ANONYMOUS LETTER- AZCUNA,
WRITERS, TINGA,
Complainant, CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
JUDGE REXEL M. REYES, and
PACURIBOT, Regional Trial LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Court, Branch 27, GingoogCity,
Respondent. Promulgated:

December 14, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

Per Curiam:

These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge

Pacuribot) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the
following:
1. Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated 4 December 2005 filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan),
Court Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27, Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint[2] dated
20 December 2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms. Villafranca), Clerk II, Gingoog
City Parole and Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;

2. Letter[3] dated 4 April 2005 from concerned citizens, asking for the relief of Judge
Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the
employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City; and

3. An undated letter[4] from concerned citizens also asking the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to investigate the illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a
certain Sheryl Gamulo. They informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore two
acknowledged children of Judge Pacuribot, the eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot
was born on 15 October 2004, and the second child was born on 2 September 2005, both
at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.

On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a Memorandum[5] recommending that:

1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the

Committee on Decorum and Investigation of
the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;

2. the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed as a

regular administrative matter

3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of

Ms. Villafranca; and

4. Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further

orders from this Court.[6]

On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-

13-SC, approving all the other recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge
Pacuribot, thus:
 With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding
them to be in accord with existing laws, the same are hereby APPROVED.
In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until
further notice from this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on
the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within ten days. The
complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular
administrative matter to be consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M.
Villafrancas for proper disposition in line with the foregoing discussions.[7]

On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores
of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City Station, for investigation, report and
recommendation within 90 days from notice thereof.

On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores submitted her Report[8] with
the following findings:

Tans story

Ms. Tans nightmare as an underling of respondent judge started on 20

October 2004 a Wednesday. Having officially filed a half-day leave, she
went to Cagayan de Oro City to attend a wedding ceremony at six oclock in
the evening at Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the principal sponsors
to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and Thomas Elliot. At around 8:00
oclock in the evening, while relishing the gala portion during the wedding
reception (when the newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their
attire), she received from [Judge Pacuribot] a call through her mobile
phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She said she intends
to go back right after the wedding reception. [Judge Pacuribot] offered to
bring her to Agora Bus Terminal but she politely refused the offer saying
that she will just take a taxi in going there. Taking her answer as declining
his offer, he ordered her to come out, displaying short temper, saying he
was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at urgency, he told her that he
just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting he was attending and will
immediately return to it right after he will have shuttled her there. Aware
that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in public when he is angry, she
decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and comply.
xxxx

Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw respondent judge
[Judge Pacuribot] inside his car, alone. When she came near, he opened the
car door for her and she took her seat. Then, angrily he asked: What took
you so long? She kept mum. She saw in between their seats his clutch bag
with his short firearm. That sight frightened her although she was consoled
by the thought that she would soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce
Plaza Hotel to the bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride,
traffic considered.

Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the way to the bus
terminal, he drove in to what looked like a compound. She unexpectedly
saw that his car entered a small garage, and when it stopped, the roll down
shutter quickly locked up from behind. She was brought not to the bus
terminal but to a motel whose name she came to recognize only after the
incident as the City Lodge Motel in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt
deceived. Knowing the implications, she protested: Why did you bring me
here, sir? Didnt I tell you that I will just take a taxicab to the Agora
Terminal? He rudely told her: Shut up! As if you are still a virgin!
Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the
car. Timorously, she obeyed. As soon as she went down his car, she looked
for a possible exit and found none. All she saw was a door which
opened. He ushered her into the room, walking closely from behind her. He
locked the door.

Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room, where she
pretended to relieve herself. There, she again looked for a possible
exit. Again, she found none. After a short while, she heard [Judge
Pacuribot] asking: What are you doing there? Whats taking you so
long? Remembering, that he has a gun, she came out of the comfort
room. To her dismay, she found him nude in bed and fear overcame her
more.

[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her reluctance made her
move slowly. He let out more impatience asking: Whats taking you so long
to undress? Excite me! She refused at first, but he became furious. At that
moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to her was headboard of the
bed. Frightened, she undressed, retaining her bra and panty. He asked her to
kiss him and she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck, he
expressed dissatisfaction by asking: You dont know how to kiss! How do
you do it with Ramon? Get into sex right away without any
preliminaries? Ramon is her husband. She was quiet.

[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She yielded out of
fear. He pulled her bra and panty, kissed her neck and lips, and sucked her
tongue and breasts. Minutes after, he inserted his penis to her vagina. While
he did a push and pull motion, she was complaining: You are so rude, Sir!
We work in the same office yet you disgrace me! He told her angrily: Shut
up! Concentrate! See! Its softening.... She recalled that he tried several
times to stiffen his penis but he seemingly has some erection problem. At
his attempt for coitus, she felt the penetration was just slight. Later, he was
getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He would rest each time he
failed to have full enjoyment. While he rested, she would ask him to let her
go, but angrily he refused. Instead, he would forcibly ride on top of her
again and make more attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to
her: It wont stiffen because I have been forbidden to eat many kinds of food
such as meat which gives energy.

After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from bed, took his
gun, and peeped through the window of the motel. This time, she once
again implored him, Sir, Ill just take a taxi to Agora. He answered: Ill bring
you there. At the time, she was so confused that she cannot recall whether
he made payment in the motel. She could not concentrate anymore.

The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of conducting her to the
bus terminal, again [Judge Pacuribot] brought Ms. Tan to another place . . .
this time to Discovery Hotel adjacent to Limketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro
City. When she protested, he told her that it would be safer for her to sleep
there instead of traveling alone. It was around 10 oclock in the
evening. Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. Tan calls shock, or rattled,
she failed to ask for help, nor did she think of escaping. She was not even
able to call her husband. She was even wondering whether anyone will help
her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially settled the rooms
bill, he warned her not to leave until his return the following morning
saying he was returning to the Masonic Conference. After he left, she asked
a bellboy if she could leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first
settle the hotel bill before she can check out. Unfortunately, she had no
money enough to pay the balance of the hotel bill. Meantime, through his
cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in
the office if she would disobey. She was crying in the hotel. She was
terrified of what he will do to her and her family, and what reaction her
husband would make once he learns of what happened to her. She was
scared that her husband might kill [Judge Pacuribot] and her husband would
be harmed in turn.

At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot] arrived. He

came panting and rested in bed while Ms. Tan just stood by. She saw him
put his gun near the bed. She recounted the events that happened after,
as follows:

Q: What did he do, if any?

A: He ordered me again saying: Make Love to me!

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I refused.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily shouted at me: My goodness! Why are you so
slow? As if you are a virgin!

Q: What did you feel, if any?

A: I was terrified of him.

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I] stopped.

Q: Why did you stop?

A: I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily told me: You dont know how to make love! How do
you do it with Ramon? You simply have sex without
foreplay? Kayati ba sab?

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I felt helpless and kept quiet.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He ordered me saying: Suck it!

Q: What did he want you to suck on him?

A: His penis.

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: I refused.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his penis
saying: suck it! Let it in till deep your throat! Let my penis reach
your throat!
Q: What did you do, if any?
A: I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his penis
entered my mouth.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his penis
afraid that he might break my neck.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran to the
bathroom and vomited.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not feeling
well.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and I
obeyed.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis into my
vagina.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: His penis could hardly stiffen.

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: He got angry saying: It cant enter! Your vaginas too small.

Q: What did he do next, if any?

A: He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert his penis
but it did not stiffen.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I told him: Dont pull my hair, sir! Its very painful! What a sadist
you are!

Q: What was his reaction, if any?

 A: He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and mashed my
breast by saying: This is the breast of a lustful woman while
continuing to suck my neck and breast.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He said: Im going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people
know that you passed through my hands.

Q: What was he referring to as here?

A: My neck.

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

A: I cried.

Q: What happened after that, if any?

A: He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my body
then dressed up.

Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go. This time, [Judge
Pacuribot] assented, but he offered to bring her to the bus terminal.
Traumatized, she refused the offer. She told him that she will just take a taxi
and will have breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to shuttle her there.
Thus, at about past 8:00 oclock in the morning, he left her at Ororama
Cogon, Cagayan de Oro City.

Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that was 22
October 2004 a Friday. She absented herself from her work because she still
had noticeable number of kiss marks on her neck. She only reported on
Monday and covered her kiss marks with her hair. At the office, [Judge
Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21,
2004 while bragging, Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako? (It is me, who
will prevail against me?)

Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried on as if nothing
happened. But from then on, [Judge Pacuribots] advances on her went on
unabated even in the office. Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at
times, he would grab her blouse, mash her breast, and kiss her neck saying
that she smells so sweet. At times, he would touch the crotch of her pants or
pull the string of her panty. On 13 October 2005, he did the same
indignities to her in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and
the latter just pretended to see nothing by turning his back. Every time she
would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he would shame her before
her officemates at a later time. He also told her to send him text messages
of endearment. She was warned that her failure to comply, or to receive his
call, or reply to his text messages will have an adverse effect on her
performance rating.

The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [ Judge
Pacuribot] indicated his interest in renting a room in her house which she
used as her home office. Ms. Tans house is near the Police Station and the
courthouse. Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is not for
rent. She even refused him in the presence of her officemates who cannot
comprehend why she should not allow him to rent the room considering
that it would be an additional income for her. At that time, they were
unaware what she was going through.

Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It has her
picture. Having seen it, [Judge Pacuribot], in the presence of Ms. Tan,
instructed Placido Abellana, the court aide, to mount her calendar at the
door of his chamber, saying: Whoever removes the calendar would take a
scolding from me. Dont remove Shirleys calendar. I like that hot
babes. Then, pointing to her picture, he added: Thats my idol, the hot babes
Kikay! As he was still trying to persuade her then to let him rent a room in
her house, he said in jest to Placido Abellana: If I rent the room, I will call
Shirly she will massage me and step on my back and I will feel good
because Shirley is sexy.

With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms. Tan eventually
yielded, but she erected a wall between his rented room and her house, and
provided for him a separate ingress and egress. Nonetheless, when her
husband is not around, she would find him knocking on her window and
ordering her to go to his room.

Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her
because she resists, he would scold her in his chamber and would also
humiliate her in the presence of her officemates. She would also receive
threats from him as regards her performance rating. In fact, her Very
Satisfactory rating in the previous years of her service went down to
Satisfactory for the period of January to June 2005, the first and only time
that she was given such a rating.

Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan

eventually suffered from what doctors call chronic fatigue syndrome and
was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr. Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital
of Gingoog City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of a
patient could lead to chronic fatigue syndrome.

Ms. Tans helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge
was gnawing on her. She found it revolting. She finally mustered enough
courage to come out in the open to free herself. She executed an Affidavit
Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of Cagayan de Oro City
on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila and went to the Supreme Court
on 08 December 2005 to file her administrative case against her superior. In
February 2006, she filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness
and sexual harassments against [Judge Pacuribot] before the City
Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer in Gingoog City would
even want to accept her case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de
Oro City. They were also dismissed.

Villafrancas Story

Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] sometime in

November 2004 at the lobby near the Probation Office at the Hall of Justice
of Gingoog City where she holds office. When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by,
she was then talking to a certain Dondi Palugna, her childhood friend who
at that time was [Judge Pacuribots] driver. Short introductions followed.

On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call through her cell

phone from [Judge Pacuribot]. To Ms. Villafranca, the call was
unexpected. After their talk, he asked her if he could call again for
chitchat. She answered Ok lang. She asked him how he got her mobile
number. He said he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to receive
text messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the
mini skirt suited her, etc. She courteously acknowledged his praises and
said thank you to him. Then, he started inviting her for dinner. Knowing
him to be married and the fact that she is married, she declined these
invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is her evening teaching
sessions at Bukidnon State College, Gingoog City. But she found him
persistent. One time, he took offense at her refusal, saying Why dont you
come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why should you refuse me? Why do you
go with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE? At another instance,
he even asked her why she goes with Dondi Pallugna, a drug addict, and
not him a judge. Although scared of his outbursts, which by reputation he
was known, she politely explained to him that his driver Dondi Pallugna
was her childhood friend. Still, she had to dodge his persistence.
In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to Probation Office,
Cagayan de Oro City. This was in February 2005. She was asked to make a
written request which she failed to file due to heavy work load. At that
time, the Regional Office of the Probation Office for Region X was about to
hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the Conference
was Gingoog City and so the host office for that conference was the
Gingoog City Parole Office where Ms. Villafranca works. She was assigned
to take charge of the hotel accommodations of participants in the
conference. For that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task
that she failed to prepare the written request. Accordingly, nothing
materialized out of her intended transfer.

Although calls of [Judge Pacuribots] were unwanted, but Ms. Villafranca

wanted to be polite to him for two (2) reasons: his status as a judge and his
reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as terror which caused most people to fear
him. So, she took his calls politely, gave him respect, and when she had to
turn down his call, she had to do it courteously like: Ok, sir, I still have
work to do, I cannot talk long.

In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge
Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because she refused his dinner
invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It was scheduled on 22 February
2005 which turned out to be her worst nightmare.

February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms. Villafranca to choose
a restaurant. She singled out The Mansion in Gingoog City for good
reasons. The Mansion is owned by her relative. On that account, she
thought that in the place she will be safe. She planned to invite one of her
relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By arrangement, she was to be
picked up at 7 p.m. at the school gate.

A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge Pacuribot],

driving his car, fetched Ms. Villafranca. He opened the car door to her and
she took her seat. While she was talking to him, she saw him brought out
his clutch bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between
them.Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced out her fears of
guns. He quickly replied that guns are for the safety of judges who are
prone to ambushes.

Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the opposite direction
of The Mansion, she told him they are driving the wrong way. But she was
told that they are going to Butuan City as he knew a great dining place
there. While driving with his left hand, [Judge Pacuribot] would hold his
gun with his right hand and put it down every now and then when he had to
change gear. This scared her even more and she started shaking in fear. She
observed that he was over speeding and would honk his horn furiously so
the other drivers would allow him to overtake. She started having
frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists and be left
along the road. She feared for her life, and of her children.

After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge Pacuribot] turned
right from the national highway, and a little farther, he honked his horn,
entered a garage which then immediately closed as soon as his car
entered. It was late for her to realize that he brought her to a motel
in Butuan City. She became numbed with fear. He alighted from the car
carrying his gun, and opened the door on her side. She asked him: Why are
you taking me here? You told me we were going to a restaurant. He ignored
her. He told her to get out of the car. Sensing she was uncooperative
because she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She tried to
resist but she was numbed with fear. She wanted to get away but she could
not seem to move. He pushed her in the room. She attempted to go out of
the room but he locked the door and blocked it with his body. She pleaded
to him to let her go because her children and family are looking for
her. Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her shoulders and
tried to kiss her. She evaded by backing out from him and turning her face
away. As she continued to back away from him, she fell on the bed while he
immediately laid on top of her. She felt his hands groping all over her body,
as he tried to kiss her. She kept on pleading to him to let her go; that she
wants to go home because her kids are looking for her. He lifted her blouse,
unbuttoned and unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away. But
he was too strong and big for her. She tried to get up when he took off his
pants and brief, but he was fast and was soon on top of her. As he pinned
her down on the bed, she could hardly move and found him too heavy. All
along she was trembling in fear and was crying while pleading to him for
mercy. But he could not be dissuaded. On cross examination, [Judge
Pacuribots] counsel asked her some details on this incident, as follows:

Atty. Kho:

Q: You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do you

remember the name of the motel?
A: No, I dont.
 Q: Could you remember the size of the room that you were in on that
day which you claim on February 22, 2004?
A: Im sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred during that
time. All I could really remember was asking him to take me home
because it was not agreed that I go with him in a motel but in a
restaurant at Mansion by the sea at Gingoog City.

Q: So you dont remember really anything else?

A: I remember what happened to me.

Q: Why, what happened to you?

A: When he forced himself to me.

Q: When you say he forced himself to you, what do you mean?

A: When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I can feel
and I can remember how heavily he was breathing in my face and he
was kissing me all over and he was trying to position himself inside
of me. Those are what I can remember and I kept on telling him:
No! I want to go home to my children. I wanted to go home because
my family will be looking for me. What? Did he listen to me? No, he
kept on telling me I am emancipated. Nobody will look for me.

Q: What were you wearing at that time on February 22?

A: I was wearing pants and a blouse.

Q: Were you undressed at that time?

A: I am sorry?

Q: Were you undressed?

A: Undressed? He undressed me.

Q: He undressed you?
A: Yes.

Q: Nothing left?
(No reply).

Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge Pacuribot]
tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but she could sense he had difficulty
with erection. She felt penetration was slight. She recalled that he tried
penetration more than three times, but was unsuccessful. She felt his heavy
breathing while he planted vile kisses on her neck and chest. Her repeated
pleas for mercy had not done her any good. Not long after, he rolled over
with her and she found herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and
pushed down her face to his penis, and forced her to do oral sex on him
instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it was what he wanted,
otherwise she would be put to harm. She took it to mean that he will kill her
if she refuses him. Scared, she relented and had oral sex on him. She felt
shamed as she sucked his limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with
herself and the very act itself. Still not having an erection, he released his
grip on her. While she was physically and emotionally exhausted, she
continued crying for mercy, but [Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody
in his right mind would refuse his demands as he could easily cause damage
to anybodys honor if he wanted to.

Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and pants. [Judge
Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell phone. She pulled the sheets to
cover herself because her blouse was on the opposite side of the
bed. However, he pulled the sheets from her and pushed her to the bed half
naked. She braced herself with her arms so that the she would not be pinned
down on the bed again. But to her surprise, he took a picture of her, using
his cell phone. She was petrified. He then looked at the picture commenting
that it was no good because she was not smiling, so he ordered her to smile
as he will take another picture of her. Although she defied him, yet he did
take another picture of her. She the hurriedly put on her blouse while he
dressed up, fixed himself and tucked his shirt and his gun.

After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the room. Ms.
Villafranca shrugged him off. At the garage, she was ushered to the front
seat of the car. She was dying to go home. He drove back to Gingoog City.
On their way back, she turned her back on him, closed her eyes, covered
her face with hand, and pretended to be asleep. Later, he informed her of
their approach to Gingoog City. She asked him to drop her off at the old
Caltex gasoline station along the national highway. From there, she hailed a
motorela, went home, took a long bath to wash his marks of her. At
about 11 p.m., she fetched her children from her fathers house. When asked
where she had been, she gave her father a lame excuse that she went out
with her friends.

Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had been some phone
calls in their office. Like any other office, whoever has the convenience to
answer at the time would pick up the phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called
twice their office already and when her officemates answer the phone, he
would just hang the line. When the phone rung again, she picked it up. It
was [Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After recognizing her voice, he
belittled her yelling: Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why dont you pick up the
phone? She was consumed with fear, and meekly told him that she was just
busy.Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the publication of her
half naked picture. She tried to pacify him sensing that he could make real
his threats. Being married to an overseas worker with two kids, she was so
scared of figuring in a scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He
would send her text messages telling her of sweet nothings, but every time
she would ignore them, he would burst in anger and would renew his
threats. At times, she made excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he
would insist that she should secure a load, otherwise he would shame
her. He was far too wise to accept excuses. Her constant fear made her
succumb to his blackmails.

[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca send him text
messages and letters expressing nonsense, a matter she could not
understand then. She thought it was only to feed his ego. On cross
examination, [Judge Pacuribots] counsel asked why she complied with
these orders. She answered:

Atty. Kho:

Q: In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the respondent

is forcing you to send to him text messages?
A: Yes.

Q: And you complied with the sending of these text messages?

A: Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he called me and
he screamed at me over the phone and then he said: Burikat, animal
ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat dili ko nimo i-ignore. This will be the last
time na imo ko i-ignore sa text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will
pay for it.

Atty. Ignes translating:

You whore, you devil, you animal, dont you dare! This will be the
last time you will ignore me in my call, otherwise you will pay for it.

Atty. Kho:

Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?

A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture,
he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he will destroy me
and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.
 Q: Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is the
mayor. Did you not report it to her?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.

Q: And?
A: And what? How would I explain to them that I was there? How he
took my picture? How am I going to? I dont know. I just wanted to
protect my family from any shame, from any scandal. And he knew
that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very
careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
threatening me with such same arguments, you know. Ikaw and
madaot ani. Imo ning kuan tana.

Atty. Ignes:

You will be destroyed because of this.

Atty. Kho:

Q: So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?
A: I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that there
were text messages and forced notes written for him.

[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with amorous
messages. On these, she was also grilled on cross examination. It went as
follows:

Atty. Kho:

Q: You mean you often wrote some notes?

A: Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even edited it.

Q: What kind of notes were they?

A: Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter to my
mother-in-law which the very next day I was posting myself at the
Post Office awaiting for that letter to come so that I could intercept it.

xxxx

Q: Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some notes

already marked as Annex 9. Could you go over some of these notes
and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes 9 and 9B.
 A: I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were under his
supervision just like the ones he made to my mother-in-law and to
my husband.

Q: You mean to say you were writing the letters?

A: Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say.

xxxx

Q: So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down his

dictation?
A: I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his
dictation. But I acted like a victim who is under threat by some

Q: The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say all of
these are his words, the respondent?
A: As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his
supervision. Do you know what is this?

Atty. Kho:

No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do that.

Witness (continuing)

While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were so tired. I felt
so heavy writing those letters.

Atty. Kho:

Q: So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters that the
ones Ive presented you?
A: I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision, yes.

Q: All of the letters that you sent were all under his supervision?
A: As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times that he
would even call me to his chamber to have some cards signed.

Q: So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards?

A: Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do so.

xxxx
Justice Flores:
 Q: When you said that the judge would even call you to his chamber
to sign cards, what kinds of cards?
A: Greeting cards, Your Honor.

Atty. Kho:

Q: Hallmark?
A: I dont recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he wanted
and then after he is done touching me I would ask myself to leave.

Q: So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards?

A: I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.

Q: I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one of the
cards that you said you signed? Im going to give this to you. For
submission.
A: Yes.

Q: This is one of the cards that you signed?

A: One of those cards that I signed.

xxxx

Q: Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as Exhibit

6, on the second line of the handwriting are the words Love you, Bi.
Could you tell us what is the meaning of the word Bi, if you know?
A: It has no significance with me because your client dictated it to
me.

Q: So, it was dictated only.

A: As I said, he dictated words to me.

Ms. Villafrancas resistance would always be met with a threat to divulge

the incident in the motel. Although she yielded to these promptings of
sending him text messages or cards or notes, she never understood why
[Judge Pacuribot] behaved so. It was late in the day when enlightenment
came to her that all his orders to her to send him amorous text messages,
letters and cards were not to feed his ego but to prepare for his defense even
while she was as submissive as a lamb. In his Comment to the
administrative charge against him, he cited the text messages, letters and
cards he induced her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape and
unprofessional conduct and prove them untrue. He cited them in his
Comment as her manifestation of fatal attraction to him.
xxxx

There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot] summoned Ms.

Villfranca to his chambers on the pretext of discussing probation matters,
but once inside his chamber, he would lock the door, grab her, kiss her, put
kiss marks on her neck and chest. He would pull her hair and push her
down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral sex on him. Her
overpowering fear of him and the scandal he can inflict on her family made
her yield to him. When she would disobey him he would call her cell phone
with lots of insults like calling her burikat or with his threats.

Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca which the
latter had to bring to his room in Ms. Tans house. Her fear of dire
consequences of her resistance absorbed her. When demanded to bring
food, she would comply out of fear. In her words, Yes, I went because he
would put me under pressure and under fire. She went not only because of
his constant threat of making public his cell phone picture of her, half
naked, but also because of his added threat that he is going to tell my
mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy me; that I am nobody; that my
family is no good and he would call me burikat, burikat (whore). He would
call me that name yawa ka, animal ka. Sumunod ka nako. She was angst-
ridden with the set up. She was fearful that somebody might see her in his
rented room or on her way to it or back. She was made to go there about
eight (8) times. All these instances, she saw him display his gun. She found
him too selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food, she
brought him only pansit and lumpia which was no longer
crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously stabbed his plate with fork, breaking it
and carped that she served him food which is not fit for a judge, and suited
only to her seaman husband. He also made her eat with him on occasions
which she abhorred so much because according to her he ate like a pig
eating fast with shoulders hunched, elbows on the table, mouth noisily
chewing the food.

When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following exchanges between
[Judge Pacuribots] counsel and Ms. Villafranca took place:

Atty. Kho:

Q: In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not care to
offer any resistance?
A: I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client would
make it a point that I should not refuse him.
 Q: You tried to resist?
A: I had evaded him many times, many times but he would always
point out that I should not refuse him, otherwise he will destroy me
and he did eventually when I finally had the courage to put up with
him, you know.

(The witness is crying at the witness stand)

Q: During those 8 times which you said you went to the room of
respondent at Sherlita Tans place which is near the police station and
the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?
A: I could not shout, Im scared.

Q: You were scared of what?

A: Scared of your client.

Q: Of the person?
A: Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he could be.

After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her clothes; then,
[Judge Pacuribot] would lay on top of her for his sexual pleasures. But
penetration would be slight because, as usual, he had difficulty with
erection. As a consequence, he would push her down to his organ and order
her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of putting kiss marks on
her neck and chest which he intentionally used so that, as he told her,
people would know that he owned her. At times, she left his rented room
wearing a hooded jacket in order o hide her face fearful that certain people
might recognize her along the way. There were times she also left his room
without underwear because he would not give it to her. She hated his sexual
abuses, but she was more afraid of causing scandal to her family.

In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his rented
room, Ms. Villafranca was pulled by her hair and was asked, [w]ho owns
you now? She answered in fear you. He looked very pleased. Then, he told
her to leave her husband and promised to help her file a marriage
annulment complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a word. He went on
top of her and pulled her hair demanding for an answer. Terrified, she
said opo. Then, she was forced to have sex with him.

[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms. Villafranca has

with her husband and his family. He forced her to write a letter, asking for a
break up of marriage from her husband which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He
also ordered her to write to her mother-in-law with whom she had some
difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she wanted a marriage break-
up. She told him she does not need to write letters to her mother-in-law.
What for? But he insisted. Her hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took
her three drafts to write as shown in Exhibits B, C and D of Ms.
Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the last from her,
edited it, and told her he will mail it to her mother-in-law. Thinking he will
make good of his threat, the following day she posted herself outside the
Gingoog City Post Office for a long time and waited for the mailing of said
letter so that she can intercept it. No one came. She instructed the postal
clerk that if there is a letter intended for her mother-in-law, she should not
give it to her mother-in-law but to her instead.

Meantime, Ms. Villafrancas morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot], his threat to

mire her and her family in scandal and her guilt toward her family had been
sucking her into a vortex of emotional and physical collapse. She bore the
immense pain of yielding to him. She seemingly could not withstand the
humiliation for being involved in forced sordid incidents with [Judge
Pacuribot] whom she detested.

On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated frustrations for

not being able to see her way out of her predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent
a text message to her husband who was then working aboard a foreign
vessel. Her text message went this way: Whatever will happen to me, you
take care of the kids. He asked: Whats wrong? She answered: I cannot fully
disclose to you everything but in due time I will. Whatever happens to me,
just take care of the kids and that I love them. Her disturbing message
constrained her husband to pre-terminate his employment contract and
rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005. She then personally told
[Judge Pacuribot] to stop calling her or asking for food, but he grabbed her
hair, twisted her head and planted a kiss mark on her neck, telling her that it
would send a message to her husband that he, not her husband, owned
her. Still, she was not prepared to make her revelations to her husband.

In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was persistently instigated
by [Judge Pacuribot] to file an annulment case against her husband. Later,
he asked her to sign what Ms. Villafranca calls a ridiculous document he
drafted wherein it purported to show that she and her husband agreed that
each of them may freely cohabit with a third person. She signed it in the
face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same
document.
On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca
was summoned to [Judge Pacuribots] chamber. Once inside, he slapped her
for not filing her petition for annulment of marriage and hit her head with
clenched fist. Then, he planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he
wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when her husband found her with kiss
marks, she suffered from her husbands beating.

Citing her husbands beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge

Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered with an unusual suggestion
File a rape case against him. When she refused, the threat of the dire
consequences of her refusal came again. She still kept from her husband
what she was going through.

But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her more. On 15

June 2005, he reported in writing to the superiors of Ms. Villafranca
superiors in local office and superiors in Manila alleging her negligence
allegedly committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off the air-con unit
in their Probation Office. Her local superior in the Probation Office referred
to her the letter of [Judge Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which
her local superior used as letter to the judge. Thinking that because she
authored that letter, the explanation there covered already her side, she did
not write nor see the judge anymore. This further infuriated him.

xxxx

In July 2006, Ms. Villafrancas request for transfer was granted and she
started working in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006. The transfer of
assignment resulted in her constant separation from her nine (9) year old
son and four (4) year old daughter, plus the great inconvenience of a 2
hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and transportation
expenses. She would usually go home to Gingoog City to be with her
family and children on weekends, or every now and then, and sometimes
late at night.

After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro City on 17

July 2006, Ms. Villafranca was able to tell her husband what she went
through. Before that, she just could not find the courage to tell him because
she was scared. When she was twitted on cross examination on how so long
that she was scared, she said:

Atty. Kho:

Q: So, what you told him at that time was that you were scared?
 A: Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and even up to
now when I came home I am walking in fear. I dont know if Im
safe. I dont know if the next day I will be dead. I dont know. Those
were the times when I asked my husband to accompany me because
Im always scared all the time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my
husband to accompany me.

(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)

Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative charge. She
subscribed her Affidavit-Complaint before State Prosecutor Roberto A.
Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms. Villafrancas Complaint she prayed
that [Judge Pacuribot] be found guilty of gross violation of the Judicial
Code Of Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial Conduct) for being
totally unfit to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that he be ordered
immediately dismissed from service. She also prayed that [Judge Pacuribot]
be immediately ordered to cease and desist from causing any further assault
on her person, in her personal and professional capacity.

On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-Complaint to the

Office of the Court Administrator. [Judge Pacuribot] filed his
Comment. Among others, he cited that Ms. Villafranca was fatally attracted
to him and that he refused to reciprocate because he is a judge and happily
married, and for the reason that Ms. Villafrancas misdirected adoration is
atrociously immoral. Ms. Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by
point the defenses of [Judge Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms.
Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and revolting because in the
Hall of Justice, female personnel invariably veer away from his path in
trepidation. She asserts that [Judge Pacuribots] extramarital indiscretions
are well known, if not well documented, in Gingoog City, that it is common
knowledge that his mistress Sheryl Gamulo, whom [Judge Pacuribot]
housed in Motomull St., Gingoog City, gave birth to two (2) children by
[Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004 and 02 September 2005 at the
Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized
in Opol, Misamis Oriental with Atty. Wilfredo Bibera, his clerk of Court,
and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal sponsors. Ms. Villafranca
claims therein that respondent judge is also known to have sired a daughter
in Ozamiz City now about ten (10) years old whose picture has been
circulated in the Hall of Justice and that [Judge Pacuribots] immorality
most probably inflicted on victimized women is a sick source of scandal
and gossip in the city.
 To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied
for leave of absence with their office to work abroad knowing that [Judge
Pacuribots] order in People v. Anude and his letter to her superiors have
effectively made her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she left the
country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE to work and forget her past
even if her leave of absence in their office was not yet approved. On 18
March 2007, she returned to testify in this case after struggling against
employment restrictions and financial constraints, she not having been half
a year yet abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked on the witness stand
when she will leave again for Dubai, she said: I want to leave the country as
much as possible and stay out of here. I dont want to be reminded of what
happened to me. At the time she testified in March 2007 in this case, her
leave of absence in the Probation Office was not yet granted.

In his Comment,[9] Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for
lack of factual and legal bases; and opposed the allegations on the ground that the same
were motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and sinister plan to drive
him out of service.

Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tans charges against him and claimed that the
alleged incidents on 20 and 21 October 2004 were big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and
deception. He insisted that he could not have committed the acts complained of by Ms.
Tan because in his first five months in office, he was busy planning what to do and how
to quickly dispose of the almost 500 cases he inherited, including the new ones raffled to
him.

In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004
in Cagayan de Oro City, and interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in
faraway Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away from Cagayan de Oro City. He
stated that on Mondays, he reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to
Cagayan de Oro City only on Fridays. He maintained that on 20 October 2004, a
Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went out of his chambers with his court aide Placido
Abellana, Jr., and his security officer SPO1 Ronald Espejon. They proceeded to Garahe
Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his
boarding house. Abellana left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon went home at about 11:00
p.m.

Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21 October 2004, a Thursday,
because the scheduled settings were all cancelled that day which cancellation was made
a week before. He averred that on the same day, he was writing decisions in his
chambers. In the evening, he asked Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with
Espejon. Abellana left him about 8:00 p.m. while Espejon left at about 10:00 p.m.

He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21
October 2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof
existed to show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the
presumption of his continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive
period alluded to ran in his favor.

Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tans allegations
unbelievable:

1. Ms. Tans behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately
report the incident to the authorities. As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer nave and
having assisted as stenographer in countless rape cases, she should know how important
it is to immediately report the incident.
2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tans admission that she did not put up a struggle
when he allegedly brought her to City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she
wanted to catch the attention of employees, she could have done so. He also stressed that
what Ms. Tan called a headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was
merely less than one inch in width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.

3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited
all her officemates, including him, to her birthday party held at her home, where she
sang and danced. She displayed her dancing skills then. She even taught him how to
dance the swing. Again, during the Courts Christmas Party in December 2004, she
socialized with her fellow workers, including him, and even performed the kikay dance
during the program.

4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot, including Ms. Tan, attended
his birthday party at his house in Cagayan de Oro City, where she merrily danced with
dance instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribots wife.

5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative charge against Judge
Pacuribot, Ms. Tan joined the Search for Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the
candidates and she paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while attired in an elegant
gown.

6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband were publicly known to be
putting up a faade that all was well with them, although they constantly quarreled and
had been sleeping in separate rooms already.

Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tans version of how he became the lessee of a room at
Ms. Tans house. He claimed that in January 2005, she came to know that he was looking
for a new boarding house and she offered two small rooms at her house available for
rent. He chose the one facing the Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed to be
only about five meters more or less from the room he rented. He paid an advance rental
of P5,000.00.

Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In refuting her claim that he
sexually harassed her in his chambers, he countered that this could not have happened as
his court aide, Placido Abellana, was always in his chamber with him. If Abellana was
out on an errand, his security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took
over. There had never been any moment in his chambers that he was without
companion. There was always either his court aide or his security officer with him.Even
when he had visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to maintain transparency
and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while, his branch clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo
Bibera, Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases. Sometimes,
too, his security officer Espejon would take his blood pressure in his chambers. Under
these circumstances, Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could have
occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms. Tans affidavit and testimony
presented the dates of the alleged sexual harassments as follows:
27 October 2004 06 January 2005
03 November 2004 08 August 2005
25 November 2004 03 October 2005
08 December 2004 04 October 2005
09 December 2004 11 October 2005
05 January 2005 13 October 2005[10]

The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on 8 August 2005, thus,
belying Ms. Tans claim that the sexual harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tans
allegation that he sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was incredible, because
on that date she was on her birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was
going to serve them during her party. He emphasized that the criminal complaints for
rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with
the City Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and Cagayan de Oro City were all
dismissed.

Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against
him by Tan and Villafranca were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie
Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed that Waniwan was
then facing four counts of libel in his sala. The City Prosecutor
recommended P50,000.00 bail for each. When Waniwan filed a motion to reduce bail
bond, respondent denied it for several reasons, i.e., (1) there was a previous conviction,
(2) he was not from Gingoog City, and (3) when a warrant for his arrest was issued, he
went into hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed a motion for respondent to
inhibit himself, which the latter denied. As a consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days in
jail for failure to put up a bail bond. Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had
contacted the NPA for Judge Pacuribots liquidation as revealed in the affidavits of two
captured NPA sparrow unit members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan
and Villafranca plotted and conspired to destroy him after his personal talk with other
media men including Jonas Bustamante, Jerry Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.

Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the egging of Waniwan to jump the
gun on him. Ms. Tan knew that her job was in danger because of her growing
inefficiency, a subject of his several warnings, since her inefficiency would essentially
affect the performance of his court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a
consistent performer in the disposal of cases during his days as labor arbiter. In fact, he
considered Ms. Tan the most inefficient among the four stenographers he had. She was
allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language, and flawed in spelling, which
hampered her effectiveness in preparing transcriptions. Worse, due to her moonlighting
as manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Caf, she would usually go home during office
hours to catch some sleep. He believed that his good relationship with her soured when
he asked Ms. Tan to be more focused on the job; that he was going to move to a new
house; and when he did not let her borrow P200,000.00, or at least be a guarantor of her
loan.

Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all
material allegations therein for being untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape
incident on 22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he never went out alone at
night in Gingoog City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP
confirmed to him that he was in the list of those slated for liquidation by the
NPA. Hence, he insisted that he neither invited Ms. Villafranca for dinner, nor did he
travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City during night time.

Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00 oclock more or less in the
afternoon, he asked a certain Fil Sumaylo to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of
small octopus because they would have dinner at the latters house. At about 6:30 p.m.,
respondent went with his security officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to Sumaylos
house. His branch clerk of court, Atty. Bibera, was also there. After dinner, Espejon and
Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house at about 11:00 p.m. Abellana left
ahead, while Espejon left at about 11:30 p.m.
Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would not venture at all to go
to Butuan City alone. He said he was security conscious, considering that he handled
drug cases and other high-profile cases. He had also received NPA threats on his life. He
claimed that Butuan City was about 80 kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not
go there and risk his life for a woman he barely knew.

In denying Ms. Villafrancas allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness,

Judge Pacuribot pointed out that the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in
his chambers could not have happened as his court aide, Abellana, who is the uncle of
Ms. Villafranca, was always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his
chamber was just beside the room of the staff.

Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafrancas charges were improbable. He assessed
her to be a very intelligent woman with a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well
connected, because she is a recognized illegitimate daughter of a certain Polkem
Motomull, a one-time member of the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and nephew
of Mrs. Ruthie Guingona, incumbent City Mayor of Gingoog City. A sister of her father
is the Assistant City Auditor of Gingoog City, while Judge Pacuribotspredecessor, Judge
Potenciano de los Reyes, is her fathers first cousin-in-law. RTC Judge Downey
Valdevilla of Cagayan de Oro City is also her uncle; and even Judge Pacuribots court
aide, Abellana, is her fathers first cousin. Considering the big family of Ms. Villafranca,
anyone will think, not just twice, but several times, before doing anything against
her. Ms. Villafranca will not just allow herself to be raped and beaten by a stranger like
him in Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in the police blotter
of Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca reported that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky
Lee Villfranca, her husband, who carted away important belongings at about 2:00
a.m. of 26 May 2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca could report her husband to the
police for said offense, then she should have reported him also to the police if her
allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it
was she who was calling him. She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages
including seductive notes and poems. He claimed that being a happily married man, he
ignored the flirtatious and seductive advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her consternation
and bewilderment. He claimed that her adulation of him came to an abrupt end and
metamorphosed into an intense hatred and dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005 Order
in Criminal Case No. 2004-2879 entitled, People v. Anunde pointing out her
incompetence, inexperience and unprofessional attitude toward her work. He opined that
the charges of Ms. Villafranca are typical under the adage, Hell hath no fury than a
woman scorned.

Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca would follow up cases of her
relatives in his sala.

After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-
Liacco Flores found:

FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN

On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribots] illegitimate

fatherhood, the Investigator finds the claim unsupported by any
documentary evidence. Although the certification of the hospitals
administrative officer proves correct the claim in the anonymous letter as to
(1) the hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the number of children
delivered; and (4) the date of birth of the two children, but it did not shed
light on the identity of the childrens father. In this case, the certificates of
birth of the two (2) children mentioned in the anonymous letter showing
[Judge Pacuribots] fatherhood would be the best evidence adequate to
prove the claim. With no-record-of-birth-certifications issued by the local
civil city registrar and the office of the Civil Registrar General, no finding
of guilt can be made.

RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND

REASONBLE DOUBT
Ms. Villafrancas story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is
credible. [Judge Pacuribots] defense of denial and alibi failed to overcome
complainants evidence.

On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists on the

improbability of his presence at the scene of the crime because he alleges
that he does not go out at night in Gingoog City without company for two
(2) reasons that he is security conscious and that there is an NPA threat on
his person.

Firstly, [Judge Pacuribots] being security conscious is no proof of

improbability in going to Butuan City. So many criminals are security
conscious yet they go out alone at night to commit a crime. Hence, his
being security conscious could not have deterred him to go out.

Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is suspect. He claims

that he learned he was marked for NPA liquidation when he was given a
copy of the affidavits of two (2) captured NPAs named Marvin Lumod and
Rico Roselem marked as Exhibits 22 and 23 respectively.Unfortunately,
these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge Pacuribot]. Marvin E. Lumods
Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A. Roselems Affidavit is dated
19 June 2006. The incident in Butuan City occurred on 22 February
2005. The reason, therefore, in not wanting to go out at night without
company on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge Pacuribots] alibi that
he was in Gingoog City on 22 February 2005 is backed up by the
testimonies of SPO1 Ronald Espejon and Placido Abellana. But these two
are his loyals aside from the fact that Abellana, as his court aide, is also one
whose employment is under control and supervision of [Judge
Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be taken with grain
of salt. Their testimony cannot discredit the straightforward testimony of
Ms. Villafranca on how [Judge Pacuribot] deceived her twice on the
purpose and on the place. He invited her for dinner but ravished her
instead. They agreed on The Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner, yet
drove her to a Butuan City motel.

[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to the
authorities that he sexually assaulted her, if true, when she even reported to
the police that her husband raped her on 26 May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot],
to prove that Ms. Villafranca reported to the Police, presented Annex 3, a
certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of Gingoog City. [Judge
Pacuribot] should have noted that in that certified copy, it is shown that it
was his security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who
had the report entered in the police blotter. The certification did not say that
Ms. Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the incident
blottered. All that Ms. Villafranca did was to ask Espejon for assistance
because he was beaten by her husband.

[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms. Villafrancas

reprisal against him. He claims that Ms. Villafranca appears to be fatally
attracted to him and that he remains steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he
atrociously immoral and misdirected adoration to him. He claims the
administrative charge is proof of the fury of a woman scorned. On the fatal
attraction [Judge Pacuribot] cited the text messages, notes and cards he
claims Ms. Villfranca sent him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has
always demanded of her to send him those, the reason for which she could
not fathom then. He would even have cards in his chamber and then
summon her to sign them. When she resists, he would let out a barge of
insults and threats. [Judge Pacuribots] possession of those letters, cards, and
text messages was adequately explained by Ms. Villafranca.

[Judge Pacuribots] theory of Ms. Villafrancas fatal attraction and

misdirected adoration of him is funny. He never disputed the testimony of
the two (2) complainants that [Judge Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of
Justice as terror, that he is fond of humiliating people in public, using
excoriating language on his victim, that female employees avoid him and
veer away from him when they meet in the Hall of Justice. He also failed to
specifically deny the claim of Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress,
Sheryl Gamulo, in Motomul St., Gingoog City. He also failed to
specifically deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old daughter in
Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of his character publicly known, hardly
would a twenty-nine (29) year-old, very pretty married woman who [Judge
Pacuribot] claims is very intelligent fall for such character. Thus, [Judge
Pacuribots] claim of Ms. Villafrancas fatal attraction and misdirected
adoration of him becomes incredible.

[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself to be raped
and victimized over a prolonged period of time when there were people
capable of helping or protecting her considering her illustrious, although
illegitimate, lineage? Further, if he committed sexual abuses on Ms.
Villafranca at his rented room which was very near the police station, why
did she not shout or report to the police?

The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog City was
actually not a boon but a bane. It was on that account that she wanted to
protect at all costs their family from any scandal. [Judge Pacuribot]
capitalized on it with his constant threat that he will bring scandal to them
by making public her half naked picture taken in the motel. Her wanting to
protect her family from shame cowed her into silence and submission. Her
testimony demonstrates that. It reads:

Atty. Kho:
Q: A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?
A: No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my mother-in-law, that he is going
to destroy me, that I am nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call
me burikat, burikat. He would call me that name. Yawa ka. Animal ka. Sumunod ka
nako.

(Atty. Ignes Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)

Burikat means a whore. You lewd devil, and you have to follow me.
xxxx

Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?

A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture,
he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he will destroy me
and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.

Q: Is it not that you are well-connected?

A: My husband is not around, Attorney.

Q: And?
A: And what? How could I explain to them that I was there? How he
took my picture? How am I going to? I dont know. I just wanted to
protect my family from my shame, from any scandal. And he knew
that it would be his hold to me. And he knew that I would be very
careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
threatening me with such same argument, you know: Ikaw and
madaot ani. Ino ning huan tanan.

(Atty. Ignes:)

You will be destroyed because of this.

Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribots] person and how
intimidating he could be and how evil he could be. She feared him because
when she resists him he would tell her madaot ka ani. (You will be
destroyed because of this.) So she had to yield to him because she knew he
could do what he threatens to do to destroy her. She points to the Order
dated 6 June 2005 in People v. Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.

[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated Memorandum

that Ms. Villafranca is a very intelligent girl and with strong personality,
reasons why it is improbable to make her a victim of rape and sexual
harassments. And yet, when he issued the Anude Order, he made her look
like she is an irredeemable incompetent who cannot spell, who uses high
falutin words in her Post Sentence Investigation Report which she herself
may not have understood, whose sentence construction is horrendous, her
proper noun is written with small letter and that her adjectives or adverbs
do not fit the things or persons described. [Judge Pacuribot] engages in
double talk.

In the three paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to show that Ms.
Villafrancas incompetence is toxically mixed with acute haughtiness
because Ms. Villafranca refuses to consult the judge or see him or refused
to come to him even when summoned repeatedly. [Judge Pacuribot] should
not gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his chamber on 25 May
2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not filing her petition
for annulment of marriage and her head with his clenched fist. He planted
on her neck kiss marks which he said he wanted her husband to see.When
Ms. Villafrancas husband saw them later, he beat her. At 2:00 am of 26 May
2005, SPO1 Ronald Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca called him for
assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafrancas growing defiance to [Judge
Pacuribot], a fact that roiled him to point of issuing the Anude Ordereleven
(11) days later.

[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in said Order by

referring to here as MERE Clerk II/understudy Johanna M. Villafranca of
Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office, calling her visibly
inexperienced mere clerk, very raw, and that her report was atrocious. He
ordered her Post Sentence Investigation Report returned OFFICIALLY to
the superior of Ms. Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge Pacuribot]
stated therein that Ms. Villafranca cannot be located in her office as she is
always absent per information in her office. He stated that she should not be
allowed to practice making post sentence investigation in preparation for a
desired promotion.

The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafrancas disobedience
to [Judge Pacuribot] ended up in her destruction Madaut ka ani. The Order
destroyed her person and her career. Therein, he has beaten Ms.
Villafrancas career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms. Villafranca who will read
the Anude Order will block any desire of Ms. Villafranca for promotion
which the latter was aiming for at the time. She rued with tears how
the Anude Order displaced her from her job.

[Judge Pacuribots] repeated harping in said Order about Ms. Villafrancas

failure to consult him and to come to him even when summoned, rendered
more believable Ms. Villafrancas claim that [Judge Pacuribot] would
summon her to his chamber on the pretext of official matters and thereafter
subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.

[Judge Pacuribots] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms. Waniwans
conspiracy was unproven. All the Sun Star pictures of Ms. Tans filing of the
criminal complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not show at any
instance the face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it clear in her
testimony that sometime in February 2006, when Ms. Tan filed her criminal
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor, two other media men
called her up to see if they can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But
she refused to prevent the public from knowing what she went through.

Indubitably, Ms. Villafrancas testimony and the anguish that came with it
can only come from a very sad experience. Even on the very delicate
matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had stripped her mercilessly of her dignity
and womanhood, Ms. Villafranca was frank and straightforward, proof of
how outraged she was when [Judge Pacuribot] had raped her and had
sexually harassed her repeatedly.

Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination questions, the anguish

she revealed in court, her very natural and coherent way of telling how she
was ravished and abused repeatedly as an underling leaves no room to
doubt her testimony and the things she said under oath in her Affidavit
Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn Statement. Her tears could only
be the clues to her righteous indignation against the indignities she suffered
from [Judge Pacuribot]. Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must have
been so strong that she had to come back to the country hurdling
employment restrictions and the difficulty of not having saved enough yet
for her trip back just to testify in this case.

[Judge Pacuribots] claim that her administrative charge is a fabrication is

unacceptable against the avalanche of Ms. Villafrancas evidence. The
Investigator cannot find any valid reason to sustain [Judge Pacuribots]
denial and alibi as a defense.
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape
in Butuan City and guilty of multiple sexual harassment committed inside
respondent judges chamber and in his rented room in Gingoog City. His
claim that Ms. Villafrancas charge is a fabrication is unacceptable
considering the avalanche of evidence against him.

While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms. Villafranca on

25 May 2005 when after summoning her to his chamber, he slapped her for
not filing the petition to annul her marriage and hit her head with his
clenched fist, the same is deemed absorbed by the offense of sexual
harassment considering that brute force and intimidation had always been
used by [Judge Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.

On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal knowledge of
Ms. Villafranca in his rented room while [Judge Pacuribots] gun was
always displayed on the table, implying the commission of rape, the same
are treated as sexual harassments only for Ms. Villafrancas failure to state
when they were committed and to provide details on those occasions.

Ms. Tans agony started with [Judge Pacuribots] deception. He made her
believe he will bring her in his car to the bus terminal from Pryce Plaza
Hotel, only to surprise her after riding with him by bringing her to the City
Lodge Motel to ravish her. Again, while about to leave City Lodge Motel,
he deceived her again by telling her that he will bring her now to the bus
terminal, only to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so that he can ravish her
some more later. Aside from deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses
extravagantly another tool intimidation. Immediately after Ms. Tan settled
herself on the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he
immediately had his bag between them, the bag Ms. Tan knows contains
[Judge Pacuribots] gun. Also, he used on her an uncouth language in a loud
voice, an irrational temper, a fake message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and
make her jump to obedience without thinking. By the time Ms. Tan realized
[Judge Pacuribots] repulsive intentions, it was too late to fight back because
she had been trapped in the motel.

His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could harm her if
she disobeys were indeed proven true. On 24 November 2004, Ms. Tan was
severely and publicly scolded before her office mates, a fact that was
affirmed by Atty. Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance rating from Very
Satisfactory slipped down to Satisfactory in 2005.
[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless victims. When he
ordered her to do oral sex on him and she refused, he pulled her hair and
pushed her face to his penis with an order: Suck it. Let it in till deep your
throat. Let my penis reach your throat. He tightened his hold on her that she
was frightened he might break her neck. In pain, she had to plead: Dont pull
my hair, sir. Its very painful. What a sadist you are. While he was sucking
her nipple and mashing her breasts, he was telling her: This is the breast of
a lustful woman. While he was planting vile kisses on her neck to
produce chiquinini on her, he told her: I am going to plant lots of kiss marks
here to let the people know that you passed through my hands. Upon
hearing it, Ms. Tan cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a sadist beyond
description capable of declaring his unconcealed intention to parade her to
the public as his victim.

At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings towards her
family or when it would recall [Judge Pacuribots] cruelty that crushed her
respectability or the delicateness of her womanhood, she would invariably
sob on the witness stand. The way he ravished her and sexually harassed
her showed how irrationally lewd or unbearably cruel he was.

Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that he is her
superior had never been lost to her. Ms. Tan has always addressed him Sir.

Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didnt I tell you I will just take a taxi to
Agora Terminal?

Dont pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you are.

You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you disgrace me.

Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora.

[Judge Pacuribots] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an undeniable

factor to her blind submission to his depravity.

[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tans inefficiency, her not being a happily
married woman, that her husband is a wife beater and a violent man, that
she is in financial straits who even run to him for help. It is precisely these
weaknesses, personal problems, and economic difficulties which added to
Ms. Tans inability to fight back and made her so submissive. She was the
ideal prey. As she was made to admit during her cross examination, she is
the lone breadwinner in the family with two (2) children to support.
[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tans claim of rape and repeated sexual
harassments by arguing, to wit:

Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he allegedly fetch her
at Pryce Plaza Hotel on 20 October 2004 and instead go voluntarily with
him?

At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there all by herself,
why did she not escape or call for help and instead wait for respondent to
arrive the next morning? So that he can sexually assault her again? Or why
did she fail to ask for help from any of the hotel staff or from anybody
while in the Discovery Hotel?

If she immediately reported to the police authorities the maltreatment of her

son by her husband, why did she not complain of the alleged incidents of
sexual harassments and acts of lasciviousness she experienced from the
respondent?

Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual harassment and
acts of lasciviousness, why did she gleefully socialize with respondent
during their Christmas party and respondents birthday celebration?

Ms. Tan had only two (2) options

Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot]; or

Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.

Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his influence. When she
was looking for a lawyer to help her file the administrative charge, no
lawyer in Gingoog City would like to accept her case. She had to look for
one in Cagayan de Oro City. She was thus correct to wonder while she was
in Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would come her aid if [Judge
Pacuribot] will start harming her.

Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as other rape victims
where the offender holds no control on the victims survival and has no
moral ascendancy over her. Fighting back immediately against the offender
is a rational move. In the case at bench, [Judge Pacuribots] moral
ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It was that together with his
flair to humiliate people and his blackmails which made her succumb to his
sexual abuses. Ms. Tan values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track
of her performance ratings. An underling who believes that her immediate
superior wields control over her continued employment or sudden
separation from service will cower in fear to the point of tolerating the
indignities committed on her. As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed on her,
looking for a new job at her age is not easy.

At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of Ms. Tan, [Judge
Pacuribots] proverbial explosives temper and short fuse were being put to
good use to terrorize her with remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his
character which has been brought up front in other peoples consciousness in
the months following his arrival in the Hall of Justice as a terror is enough
intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to submit now and complain later is a good, albeit
temporary, shelter against immediate public humiliation or job
separation. Thus, Ms. Tans failure to report to the police is understandable.

Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on how to exploit

his victims weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a stenographer, a position she has
difficulty coping with because as [Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her
grammar and her knowledge of the English language are not at par with the
demands of her job. He has warned her of her inefficiency and of staying
late in the evening as manager of the internet caf. He pointed to her joining
without prior SC permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a
packaged tour for stenographers in Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, with such
faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of losing a source of
livelihood has made her behave submissive to him.

[Judge Pacuribots] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he was

in Gingoog City and it was impossible for him to be in Cagayan de Oro
City on those days does not impress. It fails to establish the impossibility of
his presence at the scene of the crime. With the convenience of his car,
[Judge Pacuribot] could travel and be in different places, one after another
in a short time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004 were all
beyond office hours.

To support [Judge Pacuribots] claim that he was present on those days

in Gingoog City, he presented his Certificate of Service for the month
which shows that he was only on leave on October 4 to 7, 2004.

Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she met [Judge
Pacuribot] on Monday in their office after the rape incident, the latter told
her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21, 2004 and
bragging, Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako? (It is me, who will prevail
against me). If he can forego the filing of application for leave for his
subordinates, much more is there reason for him not to submit an
application for leave for his own absence reason why his Certificate of
Service for the month of October is not reliable.

On 21 October 2004 a Thursday, all schedule of hearing were cancelled and

[Judge Pacuribot] said that they were cancelled the week before. Was the
cancellation the week before due to the fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received
the notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled on October 20 in
Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot] who informed Ms. Tan of
that Masonic Conference that evening of October 20. Ms. Tan could not just
have invented that idea of a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why
the cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts doubt on [Judge Pacuribots]
alibi.

Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere
denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical
testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the
former is generally held to prevail.

[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tans merry behavior during the Christmas Party
and his Birthday Party in Cagayan de Oro City as hardly the behavior of a
rape victim or a victim or repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a
victim is expected to behave with animosity and grievance toward the
offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to display such animosity
and grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his
demands when he victimizes her, shouldnt her economic realities prompt
her to win her war with friendship? [Judge Pacuribot] should be reminded
that in sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an offense is
committed regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the subject of said act.

Ms. Tans testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-
cut account of how respondent judge had been deceitful and intimidating in
his dealings with her that evening has inspired belief. And throughout her
testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot] took full
advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as his underling, destroying
whatever resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and
insulting her to reduce her to submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not
every victim of rape can be expected to act in conformity with the
expectations of anyone who has not been subjected to the same danger at
any time. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently.

Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the charges of rape committed on October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan
de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent
judges chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog Cityagainst
Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.

One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge
Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He used deceit on Ms. Tan. He
used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he
used it on Ms. Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial blackmail against
both.

In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to

instruct us on the effects of intimidation, thus:

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and

intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to her attackers
because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.Rape
victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a
weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation,
and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into
submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant
the burden of proving resistance.

[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as

interval from the time Ms. Villafranca claimed she was raped on 22
February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she filed the complaint. Ms. Tan
also filed her administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of being his
superiors prey. Did delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of their claim?

In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay
in the filing of the complaint for rape, the Supreme Court said:

As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to

say, that complainants failure to promptly report the incident does not
sufficiently detract from her credibility and cannot be taken against her. It
has been held that a rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime
does not destroy the truth of the complaint and is not an indication of deceit
as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her aggressor
and lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually
abused.

In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed
about one and a half years from commission of the offense, the Supreme
Court said:

x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a

fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders
making good on his threats. This is understandable, considering the inbred
modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters
affecting their honor.

Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the
credibility of witnesses.

The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of
reprisal, social humiliation, familial considerations and economic
reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor is her superior who
constantly dangles his influence and power over her and her job. As regards
Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her familys good
name was ever present; thus, haunting her emotionally and
psychologically. The delay in reporting the rape cases committed by [Judge
Pacuribot] has been justified.

On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on

the persons of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge
Pacuribot], the latter deems them improbable because of the situation in his
chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is the staff room and there
is a glassed window that divides them. Ms. Villafranca cited the incident on
13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside
the chamber in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the
latters just turned his back and pretended to see nothing.

In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was
impossible due to the presence of the victims son on her side. The Supreme
Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the
presence of Nonilunas sons by her side. This Court has repeatedly declared
that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even
in places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the
school premises, inside the house where there are several occupants and
even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x
x.

[Judge Pacuribots] defense of improbability cannot, therefore, be accepted.

[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are complainants
tools of revenge against him. He cites his Order in People v. Anude and his
letter reporting Ms. Villafrancas negligence as reasons from Ms.
Villafrancas anger and resentment. Against Ms. Tan, he cites his warning
against her inefficiency as stenographer, her moonlighting in her internet
cafhis refusal to grant her a loan of P200,000.00 or being her guarantor.

In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the

testimony of the complainant saying:

The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondents imputation of

ill motive on the part of complainant. No married woman would cry
sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and
humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a
falsehood.

Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story

that would not only expose herself to a lifetime of dishonor, but destry her
family as well. Besides, there is no sufficient evidence of any ill-motive
imputable to Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate anything other than
their respective desire to tell the truth and seek redress for the wrong
inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has
in the Hall of Justice and by his behavior where he projects himself as full
of influence and power, these two women will be the last to even cross the
path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the presumption applies
that, one will not act and prevaricate and cause damnation to one who
brought him no harm or injury.

[Judge Pacuribots] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan
to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at the instigation of Ms. Waniwan is
far fetched.
On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her complaint, there
was no Mr. Waniwan to speak of. Mr. Waniwan only materialized in
February 2006 when she filed the same charges against [Judge Pacuribot]
before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the slightest clue
of a scoop hound without let up those who could be sources of
information. When the media men became nosey, it was already in
February 2006 when Ms. Tan filed the case in the Prosecutors Office. By
then, the filing of the administrative charge of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
was fait accompli. In the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is
patently absurd. Two media men were eager in February 2006 to take hold
of Ms. Villafrancas affidavit but she refused them staunchly. It is incredible
that two (2) married women would prevaricate against a person who has
power and control over their jobs at the mere urging of Mr. Waniwan is
irrelevant. In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through now
Chief Justice Renato Puno, appositely said:

No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation

to foist a false charge of rape. Neither would she take the risk of being
alienated from her husband and her family. The fact that the victim resolved
to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would
have kept secret evinces that she did so to obtain justice. Her willingness
and courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical
examination are mute but eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve.

Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial discrepancies in Ms. Tans
testimony, but they neither impair the integrity of the victims evidence as a
whole nor reflect negatively on the witness honesty. Such inconsistencies,
which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even
tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility of the witness, for
they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the

charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982 and RTJ-06-1983.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean soundness or moral

principle and character. It is said to be synonymous with probity, honesty,
and uprightness. The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge
Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in dealing with his two subordinates
herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standard expected
of a member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality
expected of every person.
[Judge Pacuribots] offenses in raping his victims and sexually harassing
them were committed with aggravation. He knew they were married but
instead of helping strengthen or protect their marriage, he tried his best to
destroy their marital bonds.

Indeed, [Judge Pacuribots] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct,

and immorality the depravity of which is quite rare. They undoubtedly
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They are classified as severe charges
under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed if the respondent is guilty of a serious charge:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more that
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for his sexual

advances on one of his female subordinates which consisted of grabbing
her, kissing her all over her face, embracing her and touching her right
breast was preventively suspended for the duration of the investigation until
further notice AND was subsequently dismissed from service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except leave credits and with prejudice
to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.

Herein [Judge Pacuribots] conduct is far worse that those of Judge

Esteban. [Judge Pacuribots] acts indubitably went far beyond the bounds of
decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly sexually assaulted, not only
one, but two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate his
victims womanhood and their dignities as persons but he aimed to weaken,
then eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot]
disgraced his noble office, as well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the
public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.
 When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down and their
copious tears dried in the numerous hankies that absorbed them what
emerges is a figure that unmistakably exudes the abominable torpedo of
marital bonds, a practicing deceiver and a merciless pervert whose face is
unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial robe that helps conceal his
dark side. His family, wife and children may have all been innocently kept
away from knowing this dark side and to spare them from the afflictive and
crushing humiliation of having a husband and father of such a character,
may the foregoing description be a for your eyes only to the members of the
highest court and the court administrator.

Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:

This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court
ruling on quantum of evidence required in the cases at bench. In the 7
August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al., the Supreme Court
pronounced that:

x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden

of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on the
complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily
suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different
where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave
offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by
nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the
rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish
the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus
be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:

Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge

connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would
entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof
required should be more than substantial.

It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in

criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the
possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.The evidence adduced here overwhelmingly established
 moral certainty that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed
complainant Mesdames Tan and Villafranca on separate and repeated
occasions.

xxxx

Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

offenses of rape and repeated sexual harassments, the penalty of dismissal
from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits is hereby recommended.[11]

We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby satisfied that the
findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in truth adequately
supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles. We
therefore resolve to adopt such findings and recommendations relative to the
administrative liability of the respondent judge for grave misconduct and immorality.

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that
the people who run the system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner by
which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to
create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and
justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the
law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only
then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.

With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of
Judicial Conduct has the following provisions:
 Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves

as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties
but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are
mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and set
forth the exacting standards of morality and decency, which every member of the
judiciary must observe.[12] A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also
by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized.[13] He
should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity
for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.

We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess impeccable moral integrity,
thus:

The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be
beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the
public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who
dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public
decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the
judiciary.[14]

We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.[15] that:

 The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently
explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached or separated
from his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest
public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.

Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He

behaved in a manner unbecoming a judge and model of moral uprightness. He betrayed
the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the
Judiciary in general.

It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.[16] In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca were able to adequately substantiate their allegations.

We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the

complainants, both his subordinates, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of
lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual favors from
Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made their working conditions so
unbearable that Ms. Tan was eventually forced to transfer to another office and Ms.
Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit sexual
favors from any court employee, even from a woman of loose morals.[17] Judge
Pacuribots conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and immorality. Not only
do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they
stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His
severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably
constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily x x x result in an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s].[18]

We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts committed by Judge
Pacuribot in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The
narration of the Investigating Justice was sufficiently thorough and complete. The
audacity under which the sexual violation of the complainants were committed and the
seeming impunity with which they were perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our sense
of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave
in a manner that will promote confidence in the Judiciary. His actuations, if condoned,
would damage the integrity of the Judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his
acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction -- dismissal from the
service.

On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings
and bad motives to Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.

Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the
relative weight and probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a
weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with no evidentiary
value. Like the defense of alibi, denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations.
[19] Denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is
utter lack of basis to sustain the purported ill motives attributed by Judge Pacuribot to
the complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge
Pacuribotsimputation. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and
her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to
perpetrate a falsehood.[20] The only plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that
the charges against respondent are true.
Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the
complainants.

Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over
complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. His
actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom
he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of
his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of
acting in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, he was even the one who preyed
on them, taking advantage of his superior position.[21]

In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able
to muster the requisite quantum of evidence to prove their charges against Judge
Pacuribot. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his
subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and completely
failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of members
of the Judiciary.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without any hesitation, that Judge
Pacuribot be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the
service for the charges of sexual harassment against him.

We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter Writers without
merit. Beyond the bare allegations that Judge Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship
with a certain Sheryl Gamulo and fathered two children with her, there is nothing in the
records that would indicate that he, indeed, committed the crime charged. We have
stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[22] The letter dated 4 April
2005 from concerned citizens asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds
that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the employees has been rendered
moot by the disposition of these cases.

All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the
exhortation that [T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to
the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked
upon as the embodiments of all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons
against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself
transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not
come to pass.[23]

WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the

service for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits. Respondent judge
is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or
decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW
CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for appropriate
action.

This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the Court Administrator

shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R T I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. GRACE M. VELOSO A.M.

No. RTJ- 01-1655
AND MA. JOEYLYNN B. QUIONES, (Formerly OCA IPI 91-1174- RTJ)
Complainants,
Present :
VITUG, J., Chairman,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA and
CARPIO MORALES, JJ.

JUDGE ANACLETO M. CAMINADE,

RTC, Branch 6, Cebu City,
Respondent. Promulgated
July 8, 2004
x - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for sexual harassment

separately filed by Atty. Grace Veloso and Ma. Joeylynn Quiones against
Judge Anacleto M. Caminade of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 6.
Atty. Veloso, a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) assigned to
the RTC branch presided by Judge Caminade, alleged in her affidavit
that, on March 9, 2001, she went to the court to check on her work
schedule for the following week.Judge Caminade was then having a
conversation with two men at the lawyers table. She was about to leave
when Judge Caminade asked her to join them. She acceded to
respondents request as she considered him as her superior. After a few
minutes, the two men and Atty. Veloso rose to leave but the judge told
her to stay behind because they needed to discuss a case. Judge
Caminade then ushered her to his chambers. She was made to sit on
the visitors chair which was just a foot away from where the judge sat.

While discussing the case, she was stunned when Judge Caminade
suddenly placed his hand on her right thigh and squeezed it. He then
took her hand and kissed it. She immediately stood up and headed
towards the door leading to the staff room.He, however, caught up with
her and placed his hand on her shoulder. Before she could open the
door, Judge Caminade told her Kiss ko bi (Let me kiss you). Atty. Veloso,
who was so shocked, retorted Kalo-od nimo Judge uy (You are so
disgusting, Judge). She then opened the door and went out of his
chambers.
At the staff room, respondent judge, acting as if nothing happened,
ordered his researcher to show her certain court records. Although she
was trembling, she pretended to look at the records then ran out of the
staff room and cried.
On March 12, 2001, Atty. Veloso sent a letter to Judge Caminade
informing him of her decision not to appear in his court again as
resident PAO lawyer. She was thereafter assigned to another branch of
the court.
In his comment dated April 25, 2001, respondent judge averred that,
after the court session on March 9, 2001, Atty. Veloso entered his
chambers to discuss a case she was handling. Inside the chambers were
Atty. Myrna Valderrama-Limbaga, branch clerk of court, and Mr.
Othello Capangpangan, a court employee. After discussing her case, she
allegedly reminded respondent judge of the motion filed by her father,
Atty. Eustacio Veloso, pertaining to a case pending before his sala. The
judge told her to convey to her father that he could not act on the
motion yet since he needed more time to review the voluminous records
of the case. She promised to relay the message to her
father. Purportedly as a gesture of appreciation, Judge Caminade
spontaneously placed his hand on her thigh and pressed it while saying
Thank you to her. He then playfully took her hand and kissed it. She
allegedly did nothing to protest such action because she knew that he
was just teasing her. He also opined that the complaint was filed by
Atty. Veloso in order to erase any doubt about her moral values,
knowing that Atty. Limbaga and Mr. Capangpangan were present when
he kissed her hand.

Further, Judge Caminade explained that he had a tendency to tease and

play pranks on his friends, both male and female, because of his
congenial nature. In fact, even before his appointment to the judiciary, it
had been his natural way of complimenting women for their physical
attributes but he never had any malice or lustful designs in his
actuations.
On the other hand, Joeylynn Quiones, Clerk III in the office of Judge
Caminade, claimed that respondent judge squeezed her hand on three
different occasions in February 2001. She noticed that the judge would
squeeze her hand whenever she gave him the case records. Although
offended by his actions, Joeylynn opted to remain silent out of deference
to or fear of respondent judge.
Then, on February 14, 2001, Judge Caminade asked her to open a jar of
sugar; he was unable to do so due to his disability of having only one
hand. Joeylynn entered the judges chambers and handed him the
jar. Once inside, he greeted her Happy Valentines Day and asked Asa
mo gabii? (Where did you go last night?). She replied Sa balay (At
home). To Joeylynns surprise, he suddenly grabbed her right hand and
kissed her on the cheek. She was so shocked that she could not
react. Thereafter, Joeylynn left the chambers and cried.

From then on, Joeylynn avoided entering respondents chambers, asking

the court aide or legal researcher instead to bring in the case records
even when respondent called for her. On March 23, 2001, upon her
request, Joeylynn was detailed to Branch 16 of RTC Cebu City and
eventually to the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Judge Caminade filed his comment on May 18, 2001 and reiterated his
earlier defense that he was just being friendly to his staff. He admitted
pressing Joeylynns hand on several occasions but insisted that they
were innocent gestures. On February 14, 2001, he merely greeted
Joeylynn and kissed her on the cheek as it was Valentines Day. He
asserted that Joeylynn merely misinterpreted his actions towards her.

The two administrative complaints were consolidated and referred to

then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales[1] of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her report received by this Court on September 5, 2002, Justice

Morales found Judge Caminade guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and recommended that respondent be suspended for six
months without pay.

After carefully evaluating the records of this case, we find the

conclusions and recommendation of the investigating justice to be
adequately supported by the evidence and based on applicable law and
jurisprudence.
Those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must
not only know the law but must also possess the highest degree of
integrity and probity, and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in
their public and private lives.[2]

In this particular case, we are principally concerned with the moral fiber
of Judge Caminade. His penchant for teasing and showing unwelcome
affection to women indicates a certain moral depravity and lack of
respect towards his female employees. They were his subordinates and
he should have treated them like his own children. Instead, he took
advantage of his superior position.

We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the government

service is a public trust, no position exacts greater moral righteousness
than a seat in the judiciary.[3] Performing as he does an exalted role in
the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the
honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can
weather the most exacting scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice.[4]
Canons 3[5] and 4[6] of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate,
respectively, that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of the
reasonable observer and that judges shall avoid improprieties and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. These very stringent
standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees of
the courts.
Judge Caminades behavior must be sanctioned. We are neither amused
by his claims of innocent playfulness nor impressed by his excessive
display of congeniality. He acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality
and propriety. He failed to meet the standard of conduct embodied in
the Code of Judicial Conduct. His abusive and distasteful acts
unmistakably constituted sexual harassment because they resulted in
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for his female
subordinates.

Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, considers a

violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. A
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted the penalty
of: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in
no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding
six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.
We find it proper to adopt Justice Morales recommendation to suspend
respondent judge for six months without pay.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of violating Canons 3

and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct by committing sexual
harassment and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six
months without pay effective immediately, with the warning that a
repetition of the same offense shall be punished with dismissal from the
service.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WECONCUR:

JOSE C. VITUG
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

(No Part)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417 July 22, 2015
[Formerly known as OCA IPI No. 10-3466-RTJ]
ELADIO D. PERFECTO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO D. ESIDERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative Complaint 1 against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera
of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar for falsification of public document and
dishonesty.
Eladio Perfecto (Perfecto) alleged that Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera (Judge Desales-Esidera) was first
married to Richard Tang Tepace on May 7, 1987 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.2
On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato Verano Esidera at Capitol Medical
Center in Quezon City.3 Her marriage to Richard Tang Tepace was later declared void on January 27, 1992.4
Based on her certification of marriage records dated February 21, 2009, Judge Desales-Esidera married Renato Verano
Esidera on June 3, 1992.5
Perfecto further alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her daughters birth certificate to make it appear that she
and Renato Verano Esidera were married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child. 6No
marriage took place on that date based on a certification of no marriage issued by the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Paranaque City.7 Judge Desales-Esidera did not take any step to rectify the error on her daughters birth
certificate.8
Perfecto prays for Judge Desales-Esideras dismissal from office for her alleged dishonesty. 9 Judge Desales-Esidera
filed her Comment with Motion to Dismiss on December 30, 2010. 10 She argued that Perfecto did not comply with the
requirement of personal knowledge under Rule 140, Section 1. 11 He should have supported his Complaint "with
affidavits of persons who knew her personally or with authenticated copies of documents that supported his
allegations."12 Otherwise, Perfectos allegations were nothing more than "tsismis" or hearsay. 13Perfecto perjured
himself when he subscribed to facts that were not based on his personal knowledge. 14
Judge Desales-Esidera brought this courts attention to the allegedly malicious means by which Perfecto obtained the
documents supporting his allegations.15 According to her, the documents were secured in connivance with persons
involved in or were related to parties in other administrative cases. Perfecto also connived with court employees who
violated either the law or Supreme Court circulars by bringing court records outside the court without the judges
knowledge or consent.16 Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that this affects Perfectos credibility and integrity.17
Moreover, Judge Desales-Esidera claimed that the persons involved in obtaining the documents "desperately want[ed]
[her] out of the judiciary so that they could continue their illegal activities in the office[,] like temporary borrowing of
funds in the Office of the Clerk of Court . . . and the abuse of the accreditation of [Perfecto][,] whose newspaper [was]
not printed and circulated generally and regularly in Northern Samar."18
Judge Desales-Esidera further argued that the charges against her were personal and not judicial. 19 She did not
participate in the accomplishment of the birth certificate.20 She had planned to correct her daughters birth certificate,
but she and her husband decided against it for the best interest of her daughter. 21
On the question of integrity, honesty, and morality, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that everything she did was legal
and in accordance with her religious beliefs. She was, indeed, married to her second husband on March 18, 1990, but
only under recognized Catholic rites.22 The priest who officiated their marriage had no authority to solemnize
marriages under the civil law.
Further, Judge Desales-Esidera argued that while her religious marriage was done before the declaration of nullity of
her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at that time was that "there was no need for a judicial decree to
establish the invalidity of void marriage."23 She described her state of mind and motivations for her acts as follows:
When I got married the first time, it was not our intention to live together as husband and wife. It was a secret
marriage solemnized by a judge. We planned of a church wedding supposedly on my birthday of the same year.
However, Richard reasoned out that he was still confused because his mother was sick while his father, a Chinese,
would not agree because it was the Year of the Dragon. As established by the evidence in the annulment case
(Decision, page 4 onwards, Annex C of Complaint), I continued living with my parents and using my paternal name.
Never for a moment did we live together as husband and wife. For some reasons we cooled off and finally called it
quits. When I met my second husband, I found it very much unfair to be bound in a marriage that was never
consummated. I wanted the marriage annulled. But the annulment process was long and I was not getting any
younger. Then, I got pregnant. I knew it was against my values but I had no choice. I heard that getting pregnant
beyond thirty was more risky.
Renato and I are both religious. We both wanted to correct what we have started wrongly. I consulted at least two
priests who were knowledgeable on Canon Law, a certain Fr. Albarico from San Sebastian Church and Rev. Fr. David
J. Tither, C.SS.R of the Redemptorist Church in Baclaran. I also made my own research on Catholic annulment and
got a copy of the deliberations on "psychological incapacity" as a ground for annulment under the Family Code. I
need not over emphasize that in view of the separation of the Church and the State, civil marriages are not recognized
by the Catholic Church. Couples who are civilly married are considered living in state of sin, and may be ex-
communicated. They cannot receive the sacraments. Thus, my marriage to Richard Tang was not recognized by the
Catholic Church. Moreover, in my research I found this digest in Vol. 1, Civil Code Annotated, Ambrosio Padilla, p.
454, 1975 edition:
"People vs. Whipkey, (CA) 69, O.G. 9678. Pursuant to Art. 66 of the Civil Code, before a marriage license can be
obtained by a citizen or subject of a foreign country, he must first present a certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage to be issued by the diplomatic or consular official of his own country. The law stresses the mandatory
character of this requirement by the use of the word "necessary", so that marriage license secured in violation of
Article 66 of the Civil Code is a void license."
I need not go into details. But anybody knows that a marriage solemnized with a void license is no marriage at all. My
marriage to Richard Tang, a Chinese, was void ab initio. If I am not mistaken, at that time, the jurisprudence was that
there was no need for a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of void marriage. (People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033,
cited on page 470 of the same book).
The logical conclusion, therefore, was that there was no impediment for Renato and I to get married although we still
need the court order to cancel the registration. But we both can receive the sacrament. Our primary purpose in availing
of the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony was to continue living in a state of grace while waiting for the result of the
annulment case which came two years later. So after consultations and a little catechesis with Fr. David Tither, he
finally officiated the sacramental marriage rite in one of the confessional rooms in the parish office of Baclaran
Church with two other priests. Rev. Fr. Patrick J. Deane, C.SS.R and Rev. Fr. Desmond de Souza, C.SS.R., as
witnesses. Our second marriage on June 3, 1992 was again in a religious ceremony but with all the formalities
required by law.
That pregnancy was very complicated. In fact, it was diagnosed as ectopic pregnancy. After two sessions with Fr.
David Tither, also a known healer and exorcist, the fetus finally went down from the fallopian tube to the womb but
was born prematurely. It was also difficult and painful giving birth to her. So, my husband Renato took charge of
everything, including the preparation for the registration of the baby.
Complainant accuses me of falsifying the birth certificate of my daughter, Mary Joyce. However, her certificate of live
birth form was accomplished by her father in his own handwriting and signed by him. My husband Renato is not a
lawyer. To him, what matters is that our union is blessed by God and that before the eyes of the Almighty, our
daughter is legitimate.
The date of marriage which my husband supplied in the birth certificate of our daughter, Mary Joyce, is the date we
received the Sacrament of Holy Matrimony on March 18, 1990. Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage
from the National Archives or from the civil government. . . . It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal
effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoa de conciencia". All
he could give us was a blank certificate of marriage but signed by him and the two priest witnesses, a certification and
a covering letter (Annex E, F and G). The need referred to in the covering letter did not arrive because our second
marriage (June 3, 1992) came before Mary Joyce attended the pre-school, so the form remained blank up to this date.
If I were as scheming as my accusers, I should have filled it up a long time ago. But I am too honest and honorable to
do that. According to the Order to comment, I am also accused of immorality. The basis of morality is generally the
dos and donts set by the Church of whatever religion. As Catholics, we have the Ten Commandments. I have sinned
against one but I took advantage of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and the Sacrament of Matrimony. I did not, and
do not live with anybody not my husband as defined by my Catholic faith. Chastity is a virtue. Even if one is civilly
married but if there is no religious ratification, in the eyes of my God, the spouses are living in sin and cannot take the
Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist.
From the day I saw the certified copy of the birth certificate of our daughter, I already planned to correct it. But, being
married, anything that would affect our family must be a conjugal decision. We decided against it, not because I am a
lawbreaker, dishonest or immoral, but because not to disturb her birth record will serve her best interest and welfare. It
will save her the embarrassment of being different in some way from her sisters; and the repercussion of being
branded an "illegitimate" by her teachers and peers. As a mother, I have to protect her from everything detrimental to
her well-being. More than a judge, I am a mother and a wife. As a lawyer, I agreed because it can always be corrected
when the time or need comes. This case has already affected my daughter emotionally, especially when she learned
that somebody secured her birth certificate and pretended to be "Mary Joyce." She could not understand why she
should be dragged in this controversy using her birth certificate which is supposed to be confidential. Neither do I. If
the Xerox copies appended to the Complaint were perused carefully, my children, especially Mary Joyce, would have
been saved from emotional shock and trauma. Being appointed to the Judiciary is not a license to pry on our personal
life before I became a judge and criticize our wisdom.
Finally, my life and the status of our firstborn could not have escaped the scrutiny of all those involved in the selection
process in the appointment to the Judiciary, including those who conducted the background investigation. It is
personal and has nothing to do with my professional life then, and now, with my judicial life. My love story is the best
proof of my morality and my honesty. I never kept it a secret; but I cannot allow it also to be publicized unnecessarily.
The first civil marriage was never consummated because of our agreement to have a church wedding first. The second
marriage was purely a sacramental rite in obedience to the Law of God, so that my husband and I would continue
living together without offending our God until the annulment process was finalized. The third marriage was made to
finally formalize our status in the eyes of the law of man.
The reason for these administrative cases is that I cannot be like my accusers. I cannot join them because I value my
dignity and my peace of mind.
We all have our stories to tell. Nobodys perfect. What is important is we learn from our mistakes, amend our lives
and avoid further wrongdoings. If the Honorable Court Administrator, through the Legal Office, would only conduct
discreet investigation on the life of my accusers and their lifestyles, the Office would realize who among us is leading
an immoral life.24 (Emphasis in the original)
On September 29, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Desales-Esidera be found
guilty of disgraceful, immoral, or dishonest conduct and that she be suspended from judicial service for 15 days with
the warning that a repetition of a similar offense would be dealt with more severely.25
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Desales-Esidera condoned the misrepresentation made on her
childs birth certificate.26
The Office of the Court Administrator also found that Judge Desales-Esidera engaged in an "illicit affair" and
contracted a second marriage while another marriage subsisted. 27 She contracted the second marriage knowing that
there were legal impediments to that marriage. 28 Judge Desales-Esidera "did not comport herself according to her
Roman Catholic faith."29
We find that Judge Desales-Esideras omission to correct her childs birth certificate is not sufficient to render her
administratively liable under the circumstances. The error in the birth certificate cannot be attributed to her. She did
not participate in filling in the required details in the document. The birth certificate shows that it was her husband
who signed it as informant.30 Judge Desales-Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, 31 this court described
morality as "how we ought to live and why."32
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or
the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 33 is "a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator." 34 A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is
carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right
at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense
shared as humans.
The non-establishment clause35 bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according to
a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious
beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must
be based on a secular purpose.36
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit
the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should
be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding
constitutionally guaranteed rights.37
There is the danger of "compelled religion" 38 and, therefore, of negating the very idea of freedom of belief and non-
establishment of religion when religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As explained
in Estrada v. Escritor:39
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs,
it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 40
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent judge guilty of immoral conduct based
on, among others, her alleged affair and her failure to comport herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have jurisdiction over
and is not the proper authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over
matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to
their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyers conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the publics confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is
not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this courts
supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.
Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judges acts of contracting a second marriage during the
subsistence of her alleged first marriage and having an alleged "illicit" affair are "immoral" based on her Catholic
faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality.
We also do not find that respondent judges acts constitute immorality for purposes of administrative liability. Under
the circumstances, respondent judges second marriage and her alleged affair with her second husband were not of
such depravity as to reduce confidence in the Rule of Law. Respondent judge and her first husband never really lived
together as husband and wife. She claimed that her first husband did not want to have a church wedding. She and her
husband did not have a child. She claimed that this marriage was not recognized by her church. Eventually, their
marriage was declared void,41 and she was wed civilly to her second husband, with whom respondent judge allegedly
had an affair.
Moreover, respondent judges acts were not intrinsically harmful. When respondent judge married her second
husband, no harm was inflicted upon any one, not even the complainant. There was no evidence on the records that
the first husband, who was the most interested person in the issue, even objected to the second marriage.
While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for immorality, we can determine if she is
administratively liable for possible misconduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the
laws and promote respect for the law.42
We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability, respondent judge disobeyed the law
against bigamy when she and her second husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.
Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental marriage entered into only to comply with the
requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal effect.
Their solemnizing officer was not licensed to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil
government.43
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent marriage before the legal dissolution of a first
marriage:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage entered into under the law.
Article 1 of the Family Code defines marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life[.]"
Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the first marriage, is considered one of the
elements of the crime of bigamy. The elements of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent judges act of participating in the marriage ceremony as governed only by the rules of her religion is not
inconsistent with our law against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting marriage
per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting
marriage. Under our law, respondent judges marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officers lack of
authority.
Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include marriages recognized in certain religions.
Religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed by our laws only if they conform to legal requirements.
Religious marriages that lack some or all the requirements under the law are invalid. 45 They are not considered to have
been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and incidents of marriage provided under the law.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judges marriage in 1990 renders such marriage
invalid. It is not recognized in our law. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against respondent judge while her
first marriage subsisted.
However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prohibits knowingly contracting marriages against the provisions of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or
that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her husbands marriage in 1990 had no civil
authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she and her husbands only consideration for their
1990 marriage was the recognition from the Roman Catholic Church. She stated that:
Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National Archives or from the civil government.
Hence, he was not under obligation to register our marriage. It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without legal
effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. It is called "matrimoa de conciencia." 46
However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to religious exercise and expression insofar as
it prescribes upon individuals and religious communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious
ceremonies. It puts a burden47 upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing marriages performed in accordance with
those beliefs, but lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage under the law. These requirements include not
only age and consent, but also formal requisites such as marriage license and civil authority of the solemnizing officer
even though violence, fraud, or intimidation was not present under the circumstances. It may, therefore, limit religious
exercise and expression to the formalities of law.
Thus, unless respondent judges act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs violates
other peoples rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the society, 48 we cannot rule that respondent judge is
administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage ceremony. 49
In Estrada,50 this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under
the test of benevolent neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state interest:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time
strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.51 (Emphasis in the original)
We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent judges right to participate in religious and
merely ceremonial acts that are non-violative of other peoples rights and with no legally binding effect. The
institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate respondent judges freedom to participate in such
ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts under our laws.
In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and her husband be given the same rights as civilly married partners
before their civil wedding in 1992. She does not ask that our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as valid.
Respondent judge also does not seem to be against civil marriages. She and her husband were even civilly wed after
her marriage with her first spouse was declared void.
However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge from liability for
misconduct under our laws. Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first husband. She
knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage was
subsisting.
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with another person during the subsistence of a
marriage is an exercise of her religious expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to any person who
chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how civil marriages are treated in that persons religion.
Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide by the law. Her conduct
affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in finding respondent judge administratively liable for a
violation of her marriage obligations under our laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering
justice. In the words of Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada:
Court employees, from the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are expected to abide scrupulously with the
law. They are held to a higher standard since they are part of the judicial machinery that dispenses justice. . . . [T]here
1wphi1

exists a compelling state interest to hold Escritor to the same standards required of every court employee. If
unsanctioned, Escritors unlawful conduct would certainly impair the integrity and credibility of the judiciary. 52
Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as citizens of their faiths are beyond this
courts power to judge. Lawyers, however, are officers of court. They are expected to care about and sustain the law.
This courts jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law.
Our state has secular interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to condone misconduct done knowingly on
account of religious freedom or expression.
Finally, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Administrators of lower courts should look into the motives of
persons who file complaints against our judges and officers of court when allegations point to possible administrative
violations. This is not to say that complainants motives are relevant to their causes of actions. However, complainants
who come to court with unclean hands should not be spared from liability just because they were the first to submit
their accusations.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1)
month with a warning that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She is STERNLY
WARNED that repetition of the same violations in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to conduct an investigation regarding respondent's claims of
illegal court activities.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
---

EN BANC

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA

JUSTICE CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP Present:
NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete, et al.
v. Securities and Exchange PUNO, C.J.,
Commission, et al.] QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 9, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is
vested by the Constitution with the power to settle disputes between parties and to
determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which form
part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic
resolution of conflicts, our courts must be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial,
independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that members
of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the
strictest code of ethics and the highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is
unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest courts, the Court of Appeals, should
be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to
determine the culpability or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the
said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed to conform to the
canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence
and propriety in the performance of official functions.

The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of
Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring
to this Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges of
impropriety among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 entitled Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.

To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated
August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person panel (the Panel of Investigators) composed
of retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as
Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
as Members. The Panel of Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged
improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or
solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de
Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows:
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the
Ninth Division of the CA, filed an application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5,
2008.[1]

In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle
Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice
Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice
Mendoza was authorized to act on all cases submitted to the Ninth Division for final
resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5,
2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty. The said office order likewise applied
to the other Division(s) where Justice Reyes had participated or took part as regular
member or in an acting capacity.[2]
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P.
Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L. Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers,
directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be
collectively referred to as Meralco), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B.
Guevarra, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). [3] Aside from the
application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and show cause orders issued by the SEC
through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA at 10:49
a.m. on May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a
special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez granted the motion in a handwritten note on the
face of the urgent motion,[4] and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas (Justice Roxas).[5] At 3:10 p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received
a letter from Atty. Estrella C. Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the
GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case in the presence of the parties in the interest
of transparency and fairness.[6] At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-
parte motion to defer action on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of
their motion for the re-raffle of the case.[7]

Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office,
personally filed the urgent motion to defer action on the petition pending the resolution
of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of Appeals
could not assure them that the motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals
Division, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas for
the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy of the motion.[8] They initially
talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them
that it was not possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice
Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the motion to the staff but no
one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.[9]

On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave
until June 6, 2008.[10] In the meantime, Justice Mendoza, who had been designated to
replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence, informed Justice Roxas through a letter
that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be
a lawyer of the Meralco.[11] Hence, in an Emergency Request for Raffle, Justice Roxas
informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition.[12]

Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth
Division by raffle, in lieu of Justice Mendoza.[13] At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of emergency
deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently
sent by Justice Roxas, stating that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were
indispensable on account of the national interest involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
[14]
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo received a telephone call from somebody who did not
identify herself but (who) said that she had important information regarding the Meralco
case. The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that a TRO was already being prepared
and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas. The caller
warned Atty. Elamparo against Justice Roxas who had administrative cases and was very
notorious, but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more details.[15]

At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his
chambers from his older brother, Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[16] Chairman Sabio informed
his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the third member of the division to
which the MERALCO-GSIS case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he
had not yet been officially informed about the matter. Chairman Sabio likewise informed
him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio
of the rightness of the stand of the GSIS and the SEC, and asked his brother to help the
GSIS, which represents the interest of the poor people. Justice Sabio told his brother that
he would vote according to [his] conscience and that the most that he could do was to
have the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments, at
which the respondents must be able to convince him that the TRO indeed had no legal
basis.

In his signed testimony,[17] which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman
Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears
to have been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To
quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:

Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene,
waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to Manila. xxx xxx xxx.

As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member

of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We had known each other and had
become friends since before Martial Law because as Chief Counsel of the
Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various
cases in Bulacan.
 Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and
MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals; and, that as a matter of fact,
my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the case had
been assigned. Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I
readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him. There was no
mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle because the
lawyers are notified thereof and are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney
Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek
assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in
seeking my assistance.

I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In

essence this was in fact a controversy between the long suffering public and
the mighty financially and politically controlling owners of MERALCO.
MERALCO is not only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately,
GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering public, who are at the
mercy of MERALCO.

x x x x x x x x x.

Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could
not hear him. So I waited until we would arrive in Manila.

As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio.
After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the Division to which the petition
of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the character and
essence of the controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation
permitted. He said he would decide according to his conscience. I said: of
course.

x x x x x x x x x.
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice
Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP 103692.[18] The Special Cases Section of the Court of
Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m.[19]

Claiming that the TRO was issued to pre-empt the hearing scheduled in the afternoon of
that day before the SEC, the GSIS Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr.,
set forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:
 3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable
ponente has been in contact with certain lawyers of MERALCO and has in
fact already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording
respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per
information, immediately transmitted to the Honorable ponente upon his
instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it
learned that there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against
the Honorable ponente, both of which involve allegations of bias and
prejudice.

It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially
notified by the Raffle Committee that the case was raffled to him.[20] Moreover,
contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had
no hand in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the Division chaired by Justice
Mariano del Castillo with the use of a fool-proof Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto
machine.[21]

Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO
which he had prepared, already signed by himself and Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that
the case will be set for oral arguments.

Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008,[22] the Special Ninth Division composed of
Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal, issued the Resolution granting the TRO
prayed for by the petitioners and directing the respondents to file their respective
comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from notice, with the
petitioners given five days from receipt of that comment within which to file their
reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same
Resolution, parties were directed to file their respective memorandum of authorities in
connection with the application for a writ of preliminary injunction together with their
comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be
considered submitted for resolution forty five (45) days from promulgation of this
Resolution. The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day.[23]

For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for
inhibition filed against him. There was no need to put in writing the action on the motion
for inhibition.[24]

At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent
Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance
filed by the GSIS.[25] Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did
not consider it meritorious.[26]

On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De
Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost contact with for almost a year already.
[27] Mr. De Borja greeted him with: Mabuhay ka, Justice. When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked
Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was
happy with his having signed the TRO, to which Justice Sabio retorted, I voted
according to my conscience.

On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court
of Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 in
the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness, as the case had
been raffled in accordance with the procedure under the IRCA.[28]

On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work.[29]

On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,[30] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing
for the SEC, filed a manifestation and motion praying for the admission of the comment
(to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies of the
memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,[31] as well as its memorandum of authorities.

On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio),
delivered to Justice Reyes the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a
hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had been scheduled at
10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.[32] However, on the same day, the Division Clerk
of Court came back to retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice
Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked the Division Clerk of
Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio demanded that it be returned
back to him. Personally affronted by the domineering and superior stance of Justice
Sabio, Justice Reyes read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) & 5, Rule VI (Process of
Adjudication) until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the
Meralco case.[33]

On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could study the case before the hearing.
[34] Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the
hearing. Justice Sabio explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should
preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to send
the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice
Sabio that the rollo was with Justice Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted
to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether the rollo should be with
Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.

On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June
23, 2008 within which to file their consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to
the comment of the SEC.[35]

On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply
to the comment of the GSIS.[36] Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio
to report on what transpired between her and Justice Sabio when she returned
the cartilla. Teary-eyed, Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report.[37]

Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice to avoid an ugly confrontation
with the Justices on the highly politicized case involving giants of the Philippine
society. He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the relevant IRCA
rules and the actual practice in similar situations in the past. The Presiding Justice
promised to talk with Justice Sabio and, for the sake of transparency and future
reference, Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the matter.[38]

On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter[39] calling the
attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz), Chairperson of the Committee on
Rules, to the dilemma as to who between him and Justice Sabio should receive CA-G.R.
SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the
Special 9th Division and who participated in the initial Resolution of the
case?

Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as
Chairman?

For Justice Reyes, the dilemma was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule
VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions
or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2) granting writ of
preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution
pending appeal have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to
whom the case is assigned for study and report and the Justices who
participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the
same station.

The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for
June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes considered it necessary that the issues be resolved
before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the Presiding Justice would
give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before the hearing.[40]

On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to
Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, noting some urgency involved as
the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008.[41]

On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter[42] quoting Section 2 (d),
Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the [i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances
where the Justices who participated in the case shall remain therein. Hence, Justice Cruz
opined that [n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary
injunction), the case reverted to the regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth
Division upon his return. Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz in
the afternoon of that day.[43]

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He
opined that the motion to lift the TRO is not a motion for reconsideration because Rule
52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with
respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an
interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on
the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the
hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to
lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the
general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a rule strictly
against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23,
2008 was a passport to participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the
IRCA.[44]

Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to
Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that a temporary restraining order is part of the
injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the
Division. [45] In his office after that consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice
Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court had given him a copy of the cartilla just in
case he would preside over the hearing. In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up
Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio insisted that he would preside over the
hearing of the case, and that the opinion of Justice Cruz, who was junior to Justice Sabio
was no better than his own opinion.[46]

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told
the Presiding Justice by telephone that he disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz
because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee, but
in his personal capacity and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio was as good as his, as in
fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even more senior than he.[47] Justice Sabio told the
Presiding Justice that he smelled something fishy about the move to transfer the case to
the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite
the fact that they were seated together on three occasions.

Justice Sabio smelled something fishy because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a
Chairpersons meeting regarding the leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice
Reyes as Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The meeting was
called because prior to the promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party
already filed a motion for the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio
information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato but by a member
of the Division.[48]

The Presiding Justice did not do anything anymore to prevent an unpalatable situation at
the scheduled June 23, 2008 hearing, notwithstanding the conflicting opinions of
Justices Reyes and Sabio. The personal view of the Presiding Justice was at the time
with Justice Cruz but Justice Sabio had a different interpretation. Neither did the
Presiding Justice suggest that the Rules Committee be convened because the Committee
then had only two members. He felt that it would be better if Justices Reyes and Sabio
could settle it between themselves. The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices
practically everyday because he did not want these things to blow up. However, neither
did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that the hearing on June 23 could be
reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have
changed his position that it should be the Sabio group.[49]

Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point
presentation during the hearing.[50] Likewise the SEC, through the OSG prayed that it
be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008
hearings.[51] Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.

On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice
Reyes that would handle the case on account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.[52]

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama,
Jr. (Justice Villarama) who advised him, in no uncertain terms, that his stand was correct
and that he should remain in the case.[53] Justice Villarama said that the case should
remain with the Special Ninth Division regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the
Eighth Division because of the pending motion to lift TRO, which the Special Ninth
Division should resolve following the general rule that when a decision or resolution is
rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all
the Members of that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the
rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of death, retirement or resignation
of such Member.[54]

That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former
that since there was a motion to lift the TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the
motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there might be
a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama
that he would follow his suggestion.[55]

Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his strong
conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d),
Rule VI when the case shall remain with those Justices who participated in the case
regardless of their transfer to other division(s). Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that
per his understanding and interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain
with the Special Ninth Division.[56]

At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform
him that the parties and their counsels were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes
informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had apparently hardened
his position and he wanted to avoid an ugly spectacle. His name plate was displayed in
the hearing room but Justice Sabio moved to another hearing room.[57] Allegedly, the
removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of Appeals for
weeks.[58]

Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco.
[59] At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in
attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single question.[60]Not one of the
Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against
Justice Roxas.[61] In open court, the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to
submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for by
the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed
submitted for resolution.[62]

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram
with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama
about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should resolve
the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. [63]

The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the
Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz as the Chairperson, with Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members.
[64] The Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments to the IRCA on or
before August 15, 2008 for submission and adoption of the Court en banc. (The office
order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to
include as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-
Liacco Flores.[65]) The Rules Committee used to be composed of only three members,
namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as members,
with Justice Cruz as chairperson.[66]

It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-
08-CMV stating that, in view of the retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito
N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of Justices
Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new
composition effective July 4, 2008.[67] Under that office order, Justice Sabio became
the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a member. Justice
Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario
D. Bruselas, Jr. (Justice Bruselas) as members.

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class
airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in
January 2008. He was still on official leave when the reorganization of the Court of
Appeals took place on July 4, 2008.[68]

On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to
Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1, 2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium
because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at
that time the parties had not yet submitted their memoranda.[69]

That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with
him for an important matter. Because Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at
the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for long because
his wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the Office of
the Chief Justice,[70] would be waiting for him.[71] According to Justice Sabio, the
conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:

17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already
waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the 3rd Floor of
the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo Justice kung
sino ang kasama ko sa kotse? Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong
tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong Mabuhay ka Justice, si Manolo Lopez ang
katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito
para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso na ito is a matter of life and
death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them,
which is being done now by the Arroyos.

At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice

Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam naming may problema
kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an
internal matter of the Court of Appeals which only happened fairly
recently and many associate justices of the CA were not even aware
of this. Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not
relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong
Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya lang, mayroon namang
nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-
recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win
situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give
way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin
hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for
me. He was treating me like there was a price on my person. I could
not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi
ko rin magawang bastusin siya because I had known him since 1993
and this was the first time that he had ever treated me like this, or
shown that he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga
papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei. Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not
stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer daughter were waiting.
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I
left were: Just think about it, Justice.[72]
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a sealed brown paper bag, which he was
handling as if something important was inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if
the bag contained P10 million.[73]
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr.
De Borja for Meralco.[74]

In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself
as a businessman, a deal maker, and project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice
Sabio for dinner to touch base and for chismis about the MERALCO-GSIS case. As the
latter would have evening classes at the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter
would be waiting in their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at the lobby-
lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the MERALCO case allegedly
came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a confirmed
free-enterpriser. Moreover, De Borja thought that there was [n]othing like hearing things
directly from the horses mouth.[75]

When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying
a bag, not an expensive looking luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell
basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he passed
by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he
liked. He bought the T-shirt, which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in the
grey Kenneth Cole Reaction bag. The photographs of the bag and the T-shirt costing
P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits A-De Borja and A-1-De Borja and attached to
the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the
Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit A-2-De Borja, shows that the purchase was
made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.

Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the
hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him
on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of
the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle about 2/3 (of the Kenneth
Cole bag) in size. Justice Sabio was told by the Panel that it could be the subject of
rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.

According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO
whose wife was a member of Marthas Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also
an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not ask him
(Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez,
Mr. De Borja informed him that he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say
anything.

Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed
that Justice Sabio informed him that the government has offered him (Justice Sabio)
money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja asked
what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the governments offer, Justice Sabio
allegedly replied: Fifty Million.[76] He alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up
after that July 1, 2008 meeting to feel his reaction to the P50 million solicitation. Justice
Sabio asked him: O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari.

Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as
a balato because he came to value the friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while
the latter was helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja earned
more than P25 million although he received only P3 million as down payment out of the
sale of 100 hectares of the Roa property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to
Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since the Roas had a
lot of legal problems, Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he
was an RTC judge in Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court
of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would see each other at get-
togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the
house of Mr. De Borjas mother.[77]

On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice
Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco
case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to
Justice Villarama who was both shocked and amused. Justice Sabio. did not tell them
who the offeror was. However, a day or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De
Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also shocked that
Mr. De Borja had the gall to ask her to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe.[78]

Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a
Justice was, in the words of Justice Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a
Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he could not advise a
fellow Justice on what to do the Justice would know what he should do. Neither did he
think of consulting Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.
[79]

On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text
messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice
tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-
isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi
kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10
million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice Sabio
said No. Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept saying No, Justice
Sabio explained to him: If I accept that, my conscience will bother me forever. How can
I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a Numerary member of
Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and
Judicial Conduct Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar
reviewer of the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial Ethics? Mr. De Borja
retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he added: You
know Justice, after two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman
diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I dont know about them, but I
am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to
look for other ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In
parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what, saludo talaga ako sa iyo.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above
conversation with Justice Sabio.

On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and
brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went
to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship
of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was
received by the Court of Appeals at 2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C.
Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice his
apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face
administrative liability for nonfeasance or dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice
suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the Urgent Motion
in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to
allow the new Division of Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render
moot and academic the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and told the Presiding Justice
that he would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could
place a note thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the case
did not reach the Presiding Justice.[80]

For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case
followed him as its ponente to the Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio
was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth Division, as the
reorganization did not spare any Justice.[81] Moreover, the IRCA does not require that
the Justices that issued a TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision.
[82] This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of the IRCA.
Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to
the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the CA.[83] He believes the IRCA does not require
that the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a court of
record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes.[84] And so, once
the three Justices have signed the decision, the ponente has the pressing duty to
promulgate the decision.[85]
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted on all the ponencias of Justices
Reyes and Roxas, just as they had acted on his ponencias.[86]

On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum.

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty.
Jose Midas Marquez (Atty. Marquez) regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez
advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about the incident, detailing not
only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue.
Atty. Silvia Sabio immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice.
Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a handwritten letter for her to
deliver to the Chief Justice.[87] The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission
for Justice Sabio to unburden himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case.[88]

At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between
them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was as follows:
As soon as he came in, I said: Why did you stab me behind my
back? He said, Why, what did I do? I asked him Why is it that you have to
resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal
capacity, when we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on
different occasions only recently and he never mentioned to me about the
plan to oust me.
He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you
have to do these things behind my back and not discuss the matter with me
face to face?
Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was
afraid Meralco would take action against him for nonfeasance for not doing
his job.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to
give way to you?
I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the
Meralco emissary able to know that there was an impasse between you and
me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?
If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you
of the 10Million offer, what will I think of you?
 Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of
this whole scheme or shenanigan?
Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to
convince me of their offer, now they will use you to oust me? Is it
because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain with
mine?
And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine
years in this court, I have never seen such an animal as this. This is a
cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid motion is also stupid.
Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a
motion for me to inhibit or recuse myself.
Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the
23rd and never raised any question on the alleged irregularity of my
having presided over the hearing?
Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that
several days after the issuance of the TRO, respondents filed a motion
for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who
then had the right to resolve such motion?
Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko
ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those
pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions were never resolved.) He
also said, wala talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge
ng non-feasance for failing to do my duty.
I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I
taught the subject for many years and this is not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter. Bahala ka na.
Then I stood up to show him to the door. He was silent after that and before
he left, he put his arm around me.

For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest
kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.

Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal the final
decision on the MERALCO case bearing his signature, which he gave to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal for concurrence/dissent. According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal,
Justice Roxas explained to her the rationale for his conclusion. Justice Roxas went out
for a while and returned with an expensive looking travelling bag from where he pulled
out the purported final decision. Before the close of office hours, Justice Roxas returned
to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his
decision. When she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it
up the next day.[89]

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the
Court of Appeals had been reorganized because she believed that the Special Ninth
Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO.[90] She also
concurred with the portion of the decision recommending administrative sanctions
against the GSIS lawyers because she believed the OSG or the OGCC should have
appeared for the GSIS.[91]

Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes
to lay off the case and allow Justice Sabio to continue and to resolve the urgent motion
for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled that Justice
Reyes repeatedly said: Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito.

After a careful and judicious study of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas,
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it. True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up
the decision that day purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman, Justice Sabio,
who was then on leave of absence until July 11, 200.[92] Notwithstanding the fact that
the parties had not submitted their respective memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
signed the convincing ponencia, including three copies of the signature page, because
Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the
impending lapse of the TRO on July 29, 2008.[93] Justice Sabio thought otherwise.[94]

However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal
was the final decision. He denied that he gave it to her for her signature. He said it was
only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as
everything was unofficial there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an
envelope, and it did not have the special seal of Justice Roxas. It allegedly was thrown in
the garbage can.
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.

On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the
chairmanship of the Division,[95] alleging the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the
parties were first directed to one of the Hearing Rooms of the Court of
Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice Reyes was already
placed on the table for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression
that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and that he would be
presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the
Honorable Court.

6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of

the Court of Appeals for the oral arguments in the instant case, petitioners
saw that the name plates on the table for the justices included that of Justice
Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal.
Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the oral arguments as Chairman of
the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus,
of the impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice
Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.

7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice

Reyes has already returned from his temporary leave of absence and has
resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable
Court.

8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr.
should now refrain from acting as the chairman of the Division hearing the
instant case as he is already disqualified from acting as such upon the return
of Justice Reyes.

8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden
judicial responsibility of performing his duties and functions as
Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case can remain with the justices
who participated therein only when any of the following actions have
been taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of
preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or (d) granting of
execution pending appeal:
x x x x x x x x x.
 9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s
continuing hold on the case. Although Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the
Justices who issued the temporary restraining order in favour of the
petitioners in the instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds
as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may remain in the
Division.

10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a

temporary restraining order but rather the grant of a writ of preliminary
injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the Division. Thus, the
continued participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering
the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only irregular but may lead
one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.

On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia.[96]

On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a
meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio told him that he needed ample time to read the
memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the
memoranda immediately.[97]

At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of
Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.

On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas
to meet with him as he had by then read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas
initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had another
matter to attend to; neither was he available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become
scarce. Justice Sabio learned that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice
Roxas.[98]

Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and
informed Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them.
The resolution he prepared never saw light.[99]
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No.
103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter that he and Justice Bruselas would be
coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated
on the case.[100] After a cursory examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the
decision had been signed by Justices Roxas and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for
more time to study the case.[101]

A transcript of the Final Deliberation on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of
Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on
page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he
who prepared the transcript from memory to lend credence to the certification of Justice
Reyes at the end of the decision pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution.
[102] Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its transcription. Justice
Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a
transcript was being taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of them,
Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the deliberation. Neither was there a
recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript from memory.[103]

The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were previous
deliberations were really meetings, which they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes,
according to Justice Roxas.[104]

On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that
she handed her fathers letter to the Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms.
Jasmin Mateo.[105] A few days later, however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told Justice
Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had
apprised the Chief Justice about the matter.[106]

According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice
informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting for him in his office. As soon as Justice
Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio berated him and accused him of orchestrating matters.
Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to
drop off the case, hence, he asked that if he was offered that much, how much could
have been offered to the principals?[107]

On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and
informed him of the episode in the office of Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice
Villarama for his opinion as to who was the rightful claimant to the chairmanship of the
Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that
they were both correct.

On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had
a brief chat with Justice Bruselas. The former told the latter that both Justices Sabio and
Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can properly assume
chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002
IRCA depending on the final disposition of the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to
the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI.[108]

On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice[109] an
Interpleader Petition[110] praying that Presiding Justice Vasquez decide which division
Chairman (Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes
8th Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or Decision.[111] Justice Roxas
averred that [t]he impasse between two Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved
much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of the TRO
issued by the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente
Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal). He opined that the two
Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation to Section 5
of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals (IRCA).[112] His stand was that the IRCA should be strictly applied because
[w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for interpretation.

Justice Roxas endorsed his Interpleader Petition to Justice Reyes for his signature or
dissent to the finalized MERALCO Decision, which had been in Justice Reyes
possession since July 14, 2008.[113] He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice Reyes.
[114]
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had
no authority to rule on the Interpleader Petition, which is not an administrative concern
over which the Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further
discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter.[115]

On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on what was
discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at around 3:30 p.m.[116] Apparently the
Presiding Justice had suggested to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth Division
direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the petitioners Urgent
Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L. REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the
Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008.

Justice Reyes expressed doubts that the suggestion was most prudent, as the dispute
revolves around the correct interpretation of the IRCA. He believed that since the
question was purely internal, the CA should not seek enlightenment from the litigants for
it would only be construed against its competence. He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas
interpretation of the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter;
otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his best lights and act accordingly.

On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No.
103692 so he could properly submit the requested opinion. It was then that he came
across the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the pending
urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding
Justice considered the latter as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the
TRO.[117]

Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received any reaction from
the Presiding Justice, he signed the decision as well as the Certification. It was
promulgated on the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on
whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth Division that should decide the case. Justice
Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to answer or resolve the matter
anyway.

On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and
Justice Roxas Interpleader-Petition. The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on
whether he possessed the authority to decide the subject conflict simply because under
the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and supervision only over administrative
affairs of the Court. The controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but
Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding Justice has the authority
to act on any matter not covered by the Rules although such action should be reported to
the Court en banc.

The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that the (Special Ninth) Division
that issued the temporary restraining order should continue resolving the injunctive
prayer in the petition because it was the Division that issued the Resolution granting the
TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, aside from the fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice
Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had reported back to
work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO have a
bearing on the application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because
Section 7 (b) of Rule VI[118] points to the retention of the case by the Special Ninth
Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to
resolve the pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas
did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008. He did not believe that Justice Reyes
would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The
Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be laid to rest and
that whoever would be dissatisfied with its outcome may elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had
been promulgated in the Meralco case the previous day. The Presiding Justice was
surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the
Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision had
indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on July 23, 2008.[119]

It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice
Sabio, informing her that Meralco had offered him a bribe of P10 million in exchange
for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give way to Justice B.
L. Reyes, and that the decision in the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth
Division.[120] Shocked that Justice Roxas did not inform her as a matter of judicial
courtesy of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8, 2008, Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008,
[121] bringing to his attention the apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, and complaining about Justice Roxas lack of judicial courtesy
in discarding for reasons she would not know, his purported final Decision that he had
asked her to sign and which she signed after a judicious study of the records
and rollo thereof. Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had to incorporate therein
some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision.

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed surprise and consternation when she learned on even
date that a Decision in the case had been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth
Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as members. She
said:
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed
final draft of the Decision in the instant case which bears the signature of
the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at
least, of the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This
inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the following questions:
under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and
why is it that neither the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice
SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and, foremost,
what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting
 her precious time and effort in carefully and laboriously examining the
voluminous records and rollo of the case?

Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation

of the provision of Canon 5 particularly Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-
05-01-SC).

On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter,[122] which was
prompted by a disturbing telephone call he received from Justice Sabio in the morning
of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, after the injunction
hearing on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 Million to either favor them or yield
the chair to Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the
Presiding Justice of the bribery incident and that he was disgusted over the turn of
events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the
TRO on the case. Justice Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that
he heard of the matter and that he had participated in the deliberation on the case and
concurred with the ponencia of Justice Roxas without such information ever being taken
up. Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter as it is because
he would bring it up in the open, to media, etc. Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that
if P10M was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the others.

Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After
that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice Reyes who
confirmed that he had heard about the bribe offer but that he did not reveal the same to
Justice Bruselas as it escaped his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas to get in touch
with Justice Roxas proved futile.

Allegedly prompted by the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how
the decision was promulgated, and that unless an immediate and thorough investigation
thereon be undertaken by the Court of Appeals, both the individual and institutional
integrity of the justices and of the Court of Appeals would undoubtedly be tarnished,
Justice Sabio wrote on July 26, 2008 a letter[123] to the Presiding Justice, which
precipitated the present investigation.

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer carried an account of the letter of Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Justice, without her knowing how her confidential
letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out.[124]

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy
of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through a telephone call, reiterated his full agreement
with his desired investigation.

The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an emergency en banc session
at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and
on the possible effect on the decision rendered. The session was also called in order that
the predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 could be deliberated upon by
the Committee on Rules with a view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the
Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro, Justices Antonio
L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en
banc session to report to the other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session,
and to collect the personal reaction, comment or view of the Justices on the matter.[125]

In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, after a torrid discussion of all the
issues, the Court of Appeals decided, as follows:
(1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the
Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator;

(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the
above-entitled case to the parties for them to take whatever legal steps they
may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and

(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the
Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in order to prevent the
recurrence of a similar situation.[126]
After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the
Presiding Justice[127] her strong reaction to the paper of Justice Roxas falsely imputing
to her grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-recourse instead of just
filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court, and taking exception to the
equally outrageous, revolting and baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging to the
case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice
the impropriety done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case that resulted in her
having been eased out of the case notwithstanding that she carefully and judiciously
examined the ponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her precious time to
such study, and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her
prayer for an investigation of the matter.

Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the
businessman referred to by Justice Sabio, Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez.
Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned from the news that Justice Sabio was one
of the justices in the case arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued
in favor of the MERALCO management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him
about the blandishments coming from the government side, that he was being offered a
promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja
asked Justice Sabio, Jr., What would it take for you to resist the governments offer? and
that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was Fifty Million.

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the
next day on account of the publicized affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice
told Justice Sabio that this is a matter of self-defense on his part, hence, the Presiding
Justice cannot stop him from doing so.

Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an initial response to the affidavit of Mr. De
Borja, vehemently denying that Mr. De Borja asked him what it would take for him to
inhibit from the case, and that he never asked for money from him.[128]
On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement
entitled My Reaction to Mr. Francis De Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the
Meralco-SEC Case.

Expressing anger at the filthy lie of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate
almost word for word his conversations with Mr. De Borja.

In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano[129] executed

in Davao City, she stated that -

Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice

Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he was very close to the Lopezes
of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding his possible inhibition in a
certain Meralco case, wherein he was designated as a substitute member of
the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave by reason of
sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with
whom the Lopezes are more comfortable, to sit in the division.

So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio,
Jr. through business card.

x x x x x x x x x.

On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to

investigate (1) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the
alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose
Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.

The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits
were submitted to the Panel to serve as the parties direct testimonies upon which
they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.

On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even

date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties
committed by the Court of Appeals Justices in connection with the MERALCO case,
CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper administration of justice
and damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and public respect for the
Judiciary.[130]

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice

Vicente Q. Roxas

Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of

motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the
Decision.

As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon
by Justice Roxas. These were enumerated in the Report as follows:

(a) The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any

Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle filed by
GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date
(Rollo, pp. 185-186).

b) GSIS Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit Justice Roxas, which was

filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion raised a prejudicial
question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the
TRO sought by Meralco, but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).

(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30,
2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)

(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to
use Power point at the hearing on June 23, 2008 . On June 20, 2008,
the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by
Justice Roxas (Rollo, pp. 593-621,)

(e) Meralcos Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated

Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to Repondent SECs
Comment filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralcos Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L.
Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case,
 which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).
[131] (emphasis supplied)

We agree with the Panel of Investigators that by ignoring or refusing to act on the
motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of
the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with copies
furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle
Committee, and the Division Clerk of Court. The pertinent portion of the said provision
states:

Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. x x x

xxx
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him
alone in writing, copy furnished the other members of the Division, the
Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.

This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO
constitutes an implied denial of the motion to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of
the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.

Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that Justice Roxas failure to
act on the other motions of the parties violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of
Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.

Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that [j]udges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness. Thus, it has become well-settled in jurisprudence
that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the
reglamentary period fixed by law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.
[132] With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the failure of
Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for
failure to resolve pending incidents in cases assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M.
Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice Roxas
for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and
sternly warned him that future commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with
more severely.

Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.

Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case,
the Panel of Investigators found that he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to
the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:

2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.

(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the Transcript of Final Decision, which is
supposed to be a transcript of the deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the
Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true
transcript of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a transcript from
memory because no notes were taken, no stenographer was present, and no
tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed from my
recollection to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that
minutes of the meeting, i.e., deliberation, shall be kept. The so-called
transcript is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been
compliance when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the
IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation among the members of the
Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the transcript that it was a recap from our previous
deliberations was another falsehood because there had been no previous
deliberations.

(c) The reference in the transcript to a Final Report of Justice Roxas was
also false for Justice Roxas admittedly did not submit a report as ponente,
as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth
Division on July 14, 2008. The Final Report which he submitted was
admittedly the decision itself which he and Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already
signed. The Final Report was merely the title of the page that served as the
 cover of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing
statement in the transcript that -- We have covered every angle of the Final
Report of Justice Roxas extensively is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes
testified at the investigation that he had not seen the transcript until the
copy in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr. during his cross-
examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008, it was only a draft for her to read,
because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely
false. This testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and
she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not ask to borrow the
decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to
her office for her to sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After
poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three (3) additional
signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the
decision.[133]

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel
in explanation/justification of his questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated
that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a magistrate and a
member of the appellate court.

Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that
may warrant the penalty of dismissal from the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is likewise
considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first
offense. In the past, the Court has had the occasion to rule that:
dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the
penalty of dismissal from service upon the commission of the first
offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such
extreme punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
 except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-
employment in the government service. Dishonesty has no place in the
judiciary.[134]

Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for

his colleagues in the Court of Appeals.

The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady
at that, when he unceremoniously discarded, shredded, and burned the
decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly
forgot that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been
reorganized out of the Special Ninth Division as of July 4, 2008, hence, out
of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision
which she had signed.

The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice
Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide the Meralco case, may have
been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he
brought his decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature.
However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while Justice
Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was
persuaded to bring his decision to the Eighth Division (to which he and
Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the
Court), it may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special
Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent, requiring the Presiding
Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should
fail to obtain a majority of the Division on his side, he would lose
his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps Justice
Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and
Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter concurred with his decision) because he
was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his
companions in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr.
-- with whom he and Meralco were comfortable.

(g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose

ruling on his Interpleader Petition he sought on July 21, 2008, but he
promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008,
 without waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out
on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the Interpleader Petition was
filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in
writing his request for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the
same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice
Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and
Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for his position as head of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and
justices are expected to treat litigants, counsels and subordinates with respect and
fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow magistrates
the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected
to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such
as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such
duties.

This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his
apparent haste to promulgate his decision in the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in
the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high
office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.

Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco

case demonstrates his undue interest therein.

In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began
drafting his decision even prior to the submission of the parties memoranda. As
discussed in the Report:

xxx xxx xxx

 (d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23,
2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to simultaneously submit their memoranda and
memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
On July 7, 2008 GSISs 39 page- memorandum
On July 9, 2008 SECs 62 page-memorandum
On July 10, 2008 MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger)
with memorandum of authorities

Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their
memoranda in the case and submitted it to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her
signature on July 8, 2008. His rush to judgment was indicative of undue
interest and unseemly haste, according to J.Romero.

He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they
invested in the preparation of their ponderous memoranda which, as it
turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division
bothered to read before signing his decision. He made a mockery of his
own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
compliance a futile exercise.
xxx xxx xxx
(underscoring supplied)

We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the rush to judgment (even
before the filing of the parties memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue
interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other circumstances.
This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice
Roxas failure to resolve the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to
deciding the case on the merits; his rushing of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal into signing his
draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed
with the CA; his precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation
of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of the Special Ninth Division
who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship
dispute between Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even
submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a few days before the
promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are
expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence
of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence,
integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies not
only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.
[135] This Court will not hesitate to sanction with the highest penalty magistrates who
exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases.[136]
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code
of Judicial Conduct constitute grave misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue
interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant his
DISMISSAL from the service.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice

Jose L. Sabio, Jr.

In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in
relation to the Meralco case.

The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman

Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice
Sabio failed to uphold the standard of independence and
propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the
appellate court.

In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio
on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a resquest for help from a member of
the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called
to relay to Justice Sabio the rightness of the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS and
that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his
conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
 A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.

As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the
brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the
Panel observed in its Report:

Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to
influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because both
believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation,
even if the purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does
not agree to do something illegal.[137]

For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which provide that
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x
free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to

influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.

Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections

with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of
government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable
observer.

In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco
contrary to his brothers advice, Justice Sabios unusual interest in holding on to the
Meralco case, seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his
brother to help GSIS. In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following
circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly refused to yield the chairmanship of the
Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to
duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a
resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V. Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and
the SEC to comment on Meralcos Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the
Chairmanship of the 9th Division, which he probably intended to delay the decision on
the preliminary injunction beyond the life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and
the advantage of the GSIS.

Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been
influenced by his brother by speculating that he would have favored GSIS had he been a
part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However, we do
find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth
Division the despite the return of Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation as
acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of absence. We
likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the
IRCA and hostile, dismissive attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his
colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the part of Justice
Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice
Reyes but rather fanned the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of
behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.

Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were

improper and indiscreet.

On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:

Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have
been wary of the former. He should have foreseen that De Borja had the
Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De
Borja mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for
having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.

But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja.
A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had presided at the hearing of
Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case
was ripening for decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice
Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to chit chat about the Meralco
case.

Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about
the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed to meet De Borja in the lobby-
lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in
said school.

Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was
highly inappropriate and indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the
second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the
shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in
order to preserve and protect the integrity and independence of the Court
itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: Judges shall exhibit
and promote high standards of judicial conduct (and discretion) in
order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is
fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo
Law School, that De Borja allegedly offered him P10 million, in behalf of
Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to
assume the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco
was not comfortable with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.). He rejected the bribe
offer because he could not in conscience accept it.

Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would
think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be bribed or bought. The Panel is,
however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability,
Justice Sabio, Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to
tell De Borja to stop pestering him with his calls. The Panel is nonplussed
because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see,
much less speak again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could
have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De Borja denied that he
reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that
even if the case should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose,
hence, saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak
mo. He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was deadma or
indifference. Justice Sabio, Jr. blamed that call of his to a lapse in judgment
on his part.
 Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio,
Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco,
than De Borjas denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel
believe him, and not De Borja?

First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to
CA Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. the next day a fact admitted
by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.

Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offerors
name in both his verbal and written reports to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.,
De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.

Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not
P10 million, is not believable, for, if Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as
his price, he would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to
Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralcos reply to
his counter-offer.[138]
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of
Justice Sabio is not credible. Nevertheless, the continued communications between
Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery attempt is highly
inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have
acted in preservation of the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he
belongs.

Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and
imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco case with his brother and Mr. De Borja
and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant
the penalty of two (2) months suspension without pay.

Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice

Bienvenido L. Reyes.

As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter

dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his (Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice
render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals the Eighth Division with him
as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the
Meralco case. This was in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the
same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that the Presiding Justice
informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and
Justice Roxas, together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco
case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas did not withdraw their request
for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their
intention to proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding
Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute on July 24, 2008, he was unaware
of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice
Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was
completely taken aback when he learned about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he
issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus
oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him.

It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, judges are mandated to show the appropriate consideration and respect for
their colleagues in the Judiciary.

Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of
simple misconduct, which is mitigated by the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding
Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the
IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of
the subject case without awaiting the ruling of the Presiding Justice.

Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna

Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself
to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the Meralco decision on July 8, 2008,
without reading the parties memoranda and without the deliberation among
 members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO
would not expire until July 30, 2008 some three (3) weeks away from July
8, 2008 yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation
that signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain
dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in violation of the
IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.[139]

The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this
regard:

SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the

basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from

judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to
make independently.

Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes
conduct unbecoming a justice for which Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.

Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice

Conrado M. Vasquez

It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to
provide the leadership expected of him as head of the Court of Appeals. The following
quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding
Justice:

Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with
the turmoil arising from the Meralco case.
He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice
Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the chairmanship of the Division that
should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the
reported bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his
leadership of the Court even when the parties repeatedly urged him to lay
 down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has
relatives two daughters employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a
consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not aware then, or
did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is
in fact authorized to act on any matter involving the Court and its
members? That Rule provides:

Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is
authorized to act on any matter not covered by these Rules.
Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.

He should have convened the Court en banc as soon as the alleged bribery
attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported to him, for it was an attempt to
corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the protection and preservation
of the integrity of the judicial processes of the Court, hence, an
administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule I
of the IRCA, provides:

Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en

banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) xxx
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures,
and policies for the protection and preservation of the integrity of
the judicial processes, x x x.

Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his lapses in judgment.[140]

In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that
much of the trouble now being faced by the Court of Appeals could have been averted
by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly,
this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as
Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed upon him what is required of him as leader of
the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is hereby
severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as
required of him by the IRCA.

Findings regarding other personalities involved in the

Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this
Court the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned in the Meralco case,
we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation
that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.

With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the
Bar and his attempt to influence a member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be
referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.

With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to
believe that Mr. De Borja may be criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate
of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department of Justice for
appropriate action.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was
reached after deliberation of the Court en banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3)
members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two
members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the
Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices voted for the dismissal from service of
Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service
for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service
without pay of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension,
one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a whistle blower and one
(1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate
Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1)
month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the
canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and is DISMISSED from the
service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with
prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including
government-owned and controlled corporations;

(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2)
months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will warrant a more severe penalty;

(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his
failure to act promptly and decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the
image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with
mitigating circumstance and is REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;

(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a

Justice of the Court of Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
discharge of her judicial duties.

(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the
Judiciary in a pending case is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate
action;

(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted
bribery of a member of the Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for
appropriate action.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION

CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 C E RT I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

EN BANC

ASSISTANT SPECIAL A. M. No. 08-19-SB-J

PROSECUTOR III
ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI- Present:
RODRIGUEZ,
Complainant, CORONA, Chief Justice,
CARPIO
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, VILLARAMA, JR.,
JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and PEREZ,
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA, MENDOZA,
SANDIGANBAYAN, SERENO, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
April 12, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 R E S O LUTIO N

BERSAMIN, J.:

We resolve: (a) the Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 filed by
respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong) and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and (b) the Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1 September) dated
September 15, 2010 of the complainant.
Both motions seek the reconsideration of the Decision rendered on August 24, 2010,
albeit on different grounds.

Through the Decision, we found and held Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez liable for
simple misconduct, and disposed against them and Associate Justice Rodolfo A.
Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), as follows:

1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of

15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;

2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a

warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with
more severely; and

3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be

more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before
his court.[1]

A brief account of the factual antecedents is first given.

The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated October 23, 2008 charging Justice Ong,
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct
grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases
as a collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao
City on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice
Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having
unreasonably flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b)
falsification of public documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the
hearings in Davao City, signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them
had been present during the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth
they were not); (c) improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of
judicial authority and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandezs making the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the
hearings of their Division in Cebu City sometime in September 2006), to wit:

(a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your
contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if
you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme
Court.[2];

(b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director
Chua? Are you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds
for one prosecutor who is doing nothing.[3];

(c) Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang,
you are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows
that of their (sic) mother[4]; and

(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had
graduated, and frequently inquired whether the law school in which
Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he had graduated was
better than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater.

and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact
that Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer
to evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the
criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the
dismissal order being signed by all three respondents).

In the Decision of August 24, 2010, we explained as follows:

 A.
Respondents Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan

xxx xxx xxx

We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their
provincial hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended,
the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of
a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the
affected litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and
efficacy of their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a
hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the
very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.

Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and
time forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. For this reason alone,
respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed
as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but
should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from
either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. The respondent
Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as the transgression of
some established or definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence, or the corrupt or
persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal
rules considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the
complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their
collegiality by holding their separate hearings within sight and hearing
distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the
law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act
complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules; on the
contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the
respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-
motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in
adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby
expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces.

Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their
proceedings accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their
insistence that they adopted the procedure in order to expedite the hearing
of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate them,
even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure.
They could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw
would prevent, not promote, the expeditious disposition of the cases by
precluding their valid adjudication due to the nullifying taint of the
irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit
recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court
has reminded judges in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding
implies a speedy trial, it should be borne in mind that speed
is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice is more
important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect for
the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before
ruling on important questions, and a zealous regard for the
just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good
trial judge, which are more important than a reputation for
hasty disposal of cases.

xxx xxx xxx

What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An

independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve
specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit
and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit
limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are
substantive and procedural rules of law.

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is

not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy,
disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial
necessity of order in the social life.

Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders

issued during the flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or
dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear that they had all been
physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued
from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.

B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez

The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation

that no evidence supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez had uttered the improper and intemperate statements
attributed to them.

A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in

which the offensive statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed
to substantiate the complainants charge. In the absence of a clear showing
to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful and
true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of
correctness executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.

Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the
counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had
graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation
about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their
professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility
demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-
conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack of judicial temperament
and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid
especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not
exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial
proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension,
as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave
with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their
court.

Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all

proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
 require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.

We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of

having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how
prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct
was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members
of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.

Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In

performing their judicial duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice
by word or conduct towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds. It is
very essential that they should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and
measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section
3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court
staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of
unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules
not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method.
C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the
assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the
petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to
have failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez make it
clear that they:

[A]ccept with all humility, and therefore, will no longer contest the
Honorable Courts finding that the proceedings they had adopted in their
provincial hearings fell short of what the provisions of the law and rules
require. For such shortcoming, respondents Ong and Hernandez can only
express their regret and apology.

Nonetheless, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez pray for exoneration, contending that
they are not liable for simple misconduct despite the irregularity of their conduct for the
simple reason that, as the Decision has indicated, they have not been ill-motivated or
inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rules in adopting the erroneous
procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in
the provinces; their actions were not willful in character or motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose; or even if their actions might be irregular, wrongful, or
improper, such could not be characterized as simple misconduct necessitating
administrative sanction.

Also, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez posit that they cannot be made accountable for
unbecoming conduct because they admittedly posed questions on the law schools of
origin of the counsel appearing before them; that their propounding the queries, per se,
did not justify a finding of unbecoming conduct on their part considering that they
thereby never derided any law school or belittled the capabilities of lawyers on the basis
of their school affiliations, nor exhibited bias for or against any lawyer based on
their alma mater.

In the alternative, Justice Ong prays that the sanction imposed upon him be made equal
to that meted on Justice Hernandez. He implores the Honorable Court to re-examine the
propriety of imposing a different and heavier penalty against him and take into due
consideration its own pronouncement in its decision that the Sandiganbayan is a
collegial court, and in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or
majority rule.
For her part, the complainant insists that respondent Justices be found guilty of all
administrative charges made against them; and that the penalties or chastisement be
increased to be commensurate to their infractions.

Ruling

Finding the arguments of the complainant to be matters that the Court fully dealt with
and discussed in the Decision, and there being no other substantial matters raised by her,
we deny her Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision Dated 1
September).

We deny the plea of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez for complete exoneration,
considering what we held in the Decision, which we reiterate hereunder, as follows:

Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of
them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division in
the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto. The
information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any
decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be
made directly available to each and every one of its members during the
proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation
of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were
within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings
in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.

Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial

body became impossible when not all of the members sat together during
the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the Sandiganbayan spotlight an
instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions
made or objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings
are be made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be
complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing
of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong
in the hearings before him.

Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the

very purpose of trying criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before
a Division of all three Justices. Although there are criminal cases involving
public officials and employees triable before single-judge courts, PD 1606,
as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or
two) to try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of
the accused in such cases holding higher rank or office than those charged
in the former cases. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single
judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply
broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter
standard is due in part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated
to the Supreme Court generally via the discretionary mode of petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which eliminates issues
of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases
(whereby the convictions still undergo intermediate review before
ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, if at all).

In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., the Court

delved on the nature of a collegial body, and how the act of a single
member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the
others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the
question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as
chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could
alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given that the NTC had two other
commissioners as members. The Court ruled:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial

body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of
the commission in order to validly decide a case or any
incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman
of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from
the rest of the membership of the commission to at least
arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National

Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for
and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man
 body, and the three members of the commission each has one
vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any
incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the
NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC
evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive
Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man
commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum
circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under
Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical
conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial
body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man
regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of
respondent Justices as members of the Fourth Division. It is of no
consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent
Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial
officers, they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of
collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings.

As to the argument of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez against this Courts finding of
unbecoming conduct on their part, the matter has been fully addressed in the Decision of
August 24, 2010.
We hold to be not well taken the urging of Justice Ong that the penalty imposed upon
him be similar to that meted upon Justice Hernandez.

The variance in the responsibilities of respondent Justices as Members of their Division

compel the differentiation of their individual liabilities. Justice Ong, as the Chairperson,
was the head of the Division under the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, being the
most senior Member, and, as such, he possessed and wielded powers of supervision,
direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings of the Division. This
circumstance alone provided sufficient justification to treat Justice Ong differently from
the other respondents.
Moreover, we have noted in the Decision that in the exercise of his
powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and
steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to
guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of
substantive and procedural rules. To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
did not direct and control how the proceedings of the Division were to be conducted.
Their not being responsible for the direction and control of the running of theDivision
and their having relied without malice on the Justice Ongs direction and control should
not be reproved as much as Justice Ongs misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and
liability as Members of the Division were properly diminished.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration (of the Honorable Courts Decision
Dated 1 September) dated September 15, 2010 of complainant Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez; and the Joint Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 14, 2010 of Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong and
Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
I maintain my original dissent
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I maintain my dissenting vote

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No part. Acted on matter as Court Adm. I maintain my earlier vote

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-89-406 July 18, 1991

ENRIQUETA GARGAR DE JULIO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Enriqueta Gargar de Julio filed a complaint on June 15, 1989 charging Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega (formerly of the
City Court of Olongapo City, now of the Regional Trial Court in Manila) with conduct unbecoming a judge ("hindi
karapat-dapat gawain ng isang na nanunungkulan huwes, na nagbibigay ng walang pagtitiwala at deskumpiyansa sa
mamamayan"). (p. 1, Rollo.)
The records show that in 1977 Judge Benjamin Vega and his wife, Carmelita Vega, leased for a monthly rental of
P500, the complainant's building at No. 2706-A Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City, where they operated a bake shop and
hot pandesal business on the premises. The lessees used to pay the rent regularly but defaulted beginning July 16,
1977. The owner made verbal demands for payment but the lessees did not heed them. On November 25, 1977, a
demand letter was sent by the complainant, through counsel, to the lessees. As the Vegas failed to comply with the
lessors' demands, the latter filed an ejectment complaint on January 23, 1978 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Olongapo City (Civil Case No. 1690, entitled: "Enrique A. Gargar and Juan de Julio, plaintiffs vs. Carmelita
Vega, joined by her husband, Benjamin Vega, defendants").
Answering the ejectment complaint, the defendants alleged that no rents were due after July 15, 1977 for they stopped
the operation of their bake shop on that date after Judge Vega was promoted to the Court of First Instance of Palawan.
The trial lasted ten (10) years on account of Judge Vega's dilatory tactics compounded by his over-extended testimony
(he took the witness stand seven times) while a succession of four different judges took turns presiding over the court.
Judgment was rendered by Municipal Judge Emet B. Manalo on February 18, 1987, the dispositive part of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Two
Thousand Five Hundred (P2,5000.00) Pesos representing payment of rentals for five (5) months at the rate of
P500.00 a month, from December 5, 1977 (the date when plaintiffs' demand letter was received by the
defendants) up to April 5, 1978 the date more or less when the defendants actually vacated the leased
premises, plus interest computed at legal rate reckoned from the dates they became due, plus attorney's fee in
the amount of P500.00. (p. 12, MTC, Judgment.)
The amount due on the judgment, including legal rate of interest (over a period of ten years) and attorney's fees, was
only P4,500, but respondent would not give his lessors the satisfaction of recovering what was due them. He appealed
the decision to the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City which affirmed it. From the Regional Trial Court, he took
the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed his petition for review.
Even after the judgment had become final, its execution was delayed because Judge Vega questioned the computation
of the amount due (P4,500). When the writ of execution was presented to him in his office at Malolos, Bulacan (from
Palawan, he was transferred to the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan), he advised the sheriff to serve it at his
house in Quezon City. Neither the original nor the alias writ of execution was satisfied. It was only after the
complainant filed this administrative case against him on June 15, 1989 that Judge Vega paid through the Assistant
Clerk of Court on July 21, 1989 the sum of P4,500 on the judgment in Civil Case No. 1690 (Annex 1).
The facts of this case limn an unflattering picture of a judge who, by abuse of his legal expertise and through dilatory
maneuvers, managed to evade and delay the payment of a just debt.
Willful failure to pay a just debt is a serious offense under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the
resolution of this Court dated July 25, 1974. The amount involved (P4,500) is not big. He could easily have paid it,
but it appears that he was bent on frustrating the complainant's best efforts to obtain satisfaction of her lawful claim,
apparently for no other reason than to annoy and oppress her for having haled him and his wife into court. While an
ejectment case is supposed to be summary in nature, respondent Judge, through dilatory tactics, stretched the trial over
a period of ten (10) years, and dragged the case all the way from the municipal court to the Court of Appeals. After the
decision had become final, he delayed payment for two more years. He came across only after the complainant, in
exasperation, had filed this administrative charge against him.1wphi1

There is no doubt in the mind of this Court that respondent judge's conduct toward the complainant was oppressive
and unbecoming a member of the judiciary. He used his position and his legal knowledge to welsh on just debt and to
harrass his creditor. His example erodes public faith in the capacity of courts to administer justice. He violated Rule
2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires that "a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega guilty of oppressive conduct and willful delay
in paying a just debt (Section 5, Rule 140, Rules of Court as amended). He is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and is hereby warned that a repetition of this misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion in its finding that respondent Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega is guilty of oppressive
conduct (in promoting his own personal interest) and of wilful delay in paying a just debt. However, I disagree as to
the penalty it imposes on the respondent. I believe that the conduct of respondent Judge, a public official tasked with
upholding the law, but who used his legal knowledge and expertise to delay and avoid the payment of a relatively
measly sum of Four Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P4,550,00) which, in the first place, was his just debt, to
the prejudice of another, is a dastardly act which deserves the extreme penalty of expulsion or dismissal from the
Bench, not just a mere fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Judiciary is one of the three (3) main pillars of our government. It is the last bastion where one seeking justice
should find fulfillment. Its members must possess courage, character and conviction in order to inspire public
confidence in the courts. In the words of former Chief Justice Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice,1 "there is no
surer guarantee of judicial independence than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench."
The office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is, as the Constitution in no uncertain terms speaks, a public
trust. This is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.2
Mr. Justice Malcolm identified good judges with "men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge
their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside
influence, and who are independent self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the two
other departments of government."3
Judge Vega's conduct, as described in the majority opinion, is, to say the least, reprehensible for he used his legal
knowledge to unduly perpetuate his selfish material interest. He lost all awareness that "a judge must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the
1wphi1

slightest infraction of the law."4 "A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice."5 Respondent judge, by his oppressive conduct, has clearly demonstrated his unfitness to
dispense justice without fear or favor, as he would not hesitate to cause injury to others to promote his own misplaced
personal interest.
Our Judiciary has undergone two (2) reorganizations, namely: the first, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in 1980, and
the second, by force of "people power" in 1986. These reorganizations had one underlying purpose, i.e., to weed out
the bad from the good, so that what might emerge is a Judiciary truly deserving to be called the last bulwark of
democracy.
There should be no reason or is there? for yet another reorganization to weed out the unfit and undeserving. In
this case, we are faced with a judge who had the audacity to use the very same legal tools intended to serve the ends of
justice, to create injustice. He should not be able to get away with just a fine or what may be likened to a mere slap on
the hand. He deserves to be expelled from such an exalted position, for to let him remain will greatly undermine the
dignity and credibility of the Judiciary. The felt necessities of time, to borrow a phrase from Holmes, dictate that there
should be no more delay for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it will not be too much to say that the
people's faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. 6
I vote for respondent Judge's dismissal from the Judiciary.