Lanot v.

COMELEC
GR No. 164858 November 16, 2006

FACTS: Henry Lanot, Vener Obispo, Roberto Peralta, Reynaldo dela Paz,
Edilberto Yamat and Ram Alan Cruz, filed a petition for disqualification against
Vicente Eusebio before the COMELEC. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio
engaged in various forms on various occasions premature campaigning.
Regional Director Ladra recommended to the COMELEC the disqualification of
Eusebio. The COMELEC Fist Division adopted the findings and recommendation
of the Regional Director and ordered the disqualification of Eusebio. The
resolution is immediately executory unless restrained by the Commission en
banc.

On May 9, 2004, Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration. On election day

itself, Chairman Abalos enjoined Director Ladra from implementing the resolution
of the COMELEC First Division due to the motion for reconsideration filed by
Eusebio. On May 11, 2004, the day after the elections, petitioners filed before the
COMELEC en banc a motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of votes.
The COMELEC en banc partially denied the motion. It ordered the suspension,
until further orders of the Commission, the proclamation of Eusebio in the event
he receives the winning number of votes. On May 21, 2004, the Commission en
banc lifted and set aside the suspension of proclamation. Eusebio was
proclaimed City Mayor of Pasig. The Commission also annulled the order of the
COMELEC First Division.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lanot can be proclaimed and allowed to sit as
mayor-elect in case of disqualification of Eusebio.

RULING: No. The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office
vacated. Votes cast in favor of the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he is qualified.
However, there is an exception which rests on two assumptions: that the one
who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified and that the voters
nonetheless voted for him despite knowing that he is disqualified. The petitioners
failed to prove the applicability of the exception to this case. The rule on
succession shall apply. The Vice Mayor shall be the Mayor.
ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and
7166 and other election laws. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections assails the COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic
Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile
places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that
it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of
the COMELEC providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized
posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID.
The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free
speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.
The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying
it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the
resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they
include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be
violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part
of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this
case.

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated
that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Chavez v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were
set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said establishments.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator. On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which
contained Section 32: Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers
or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television
station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio
station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature
campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the
COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to
how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the
COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the
billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia
for premature campaigning under the rules. The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or
cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking
that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the Court to
declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the
non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post
facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Issue: Is Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 unconstitutional?

Held: Fair Elections Act - petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act.
According to him, under this law, billboards are already permitted as lawful election propaganda.
He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use of billboards as a form
of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners
argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does
not prohibit billboards as lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent
premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by
preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity
on account of their resources and popularity. Moreover, by regulating the use of such election
propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law.

Overbreadth - A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The provision in question is limited in its operation
both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a persons propaganda
materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of
the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During
the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and
incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality
of opportunities among all candidates. The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of
overbreadth.