CONCEPCION vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000

Facts:

Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an apartment
leased to them by the owner Florence Bing Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound
where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture. Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo
Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters
apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence.

Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that should something happen to his sick mother; in
case the latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a result of this incident, Nestor
Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his
neighbors. Consequently, he was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil
suit against him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor Nicolas, hence this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to Nestor Nicolas and his spouse.

Ruling:

According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons
who heard the alleged defamatory statement. The Court finds this to be a gratuitous observation, for
the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident
happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence
of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of
Florence, at the terrace of her house. All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for
the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents.

The Court reject petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident
complained of neither falling under Art. 22, 19, nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. Damages therefore are
allowable for actions against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or
abusive language. As stated in the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. There is no question that
private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings
and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting language.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA

G.R. No. 183026, November 14, 2012

Facts:

Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General,
respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice. Prior to
the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassadors residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his
wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division Intelligent
Office of Kenya took picture of Lavinas house with the aid of Lavinashouse helpers. The second raid
again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures were taken.

Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent to Kenya to
inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya,
own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The investigating team
comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence without any search warrant,
court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed cabinet locks,
damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina subsequently filed before the RTC
for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation team.

Issue:

Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavinas right to
privacy.

Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a persons right are disturbed. There is no
doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavinas privacy rights. The act was
defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and
seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestors surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If
it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 125704, August 28, 1998

Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the 2nd, 3rd, and
4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52. In a letter
dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it has
pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of
P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against
the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax claims
are seen to drag their feet needlessly.

Issue:

Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes due by
Philex.

Ruling:

The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-payment of Philex
cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake cannot be a
reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the taxes. The
taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation because taxes cannot be offset
against claims of taxes by the government; the relationship of the government and its taxpayers is not
a debtor-creditor relationship.
G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:

Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the
petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris
Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi
Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company
has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that
of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical
proximity of petitioners office to respondents office, and in view of the fact that some of the
respondents employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with
respondents products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material
and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-made automotive
parts and to the same customers.

Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of
automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing,
center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioners] manufacture of the same automotive parts with
plastic material was taken from respondents idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also,
[petitioner] deliberately copied [respondents] products all of which acts constitute unfair
competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused
[respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the
date of respondents complaint.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

Ruling:

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but
the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to
engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means use dare fair and legitimate.

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted
and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the
attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001

FACTS:

In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George
Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel
Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction hit the driver
side of the car, driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured
while Nicolas died. Trial followed.

The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The
respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower courts judgment. Even if the
accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and
ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his civil liability.

RULING:

The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code
provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be
exempted from paying civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance of evidence.

Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this
contention. The following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third
jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the
case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
 NUGUID vs. NICDAO

G.R. No. 150785, September 15, 2006

Facts:

The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to August thereof, Clarita
Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they could borrow money to
settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid lent the Nicdao spouses money.

Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount reached to
an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good faith in her
part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the loan. The checks are
to be deposited in Nuguids account upon non-payment of the amount within one year.

In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the loan but Nicdao
refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her account
in Chings account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The checks were
all dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to
make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a complaint
was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional Trial Court
Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and suffer
imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed for a
petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.
Issue:

a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the violation
of B.P. 22.

Ruling:

The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao has already
made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the crime was
non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The criminal
and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited upon
non-compliance of the payment of the principal debt Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in
the case. It was one of the reasons why the debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are
applied first to interest. The interest was unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was
not stipulated in writing, the debt remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in
full already as per Article 1956 of the Civil Code.

PEOPLE vs. AGACER

G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013

Facts:

The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in
preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his
brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
Cesario had raised.

Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of the
nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then surrounded
Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the accused started
fire on Cesarios harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops. While Cesario was
trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what was told and pulled
out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the left portion of his chest.
As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on Cesario. The gang of men
then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil liability of the brothers arose upon the final judgment of the Supreme Court
of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed instituted in
the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also Article 20 of
the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened finally by Article 1161
of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by
the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is
the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character; First, as an offense against
the state because of the disturbance of the social order, and second as an offense against the private
person injured by the crime.
 Romero v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 167546, July 17, 2009

Facts:

On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego
Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at
Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going
in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr.,
Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and
his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.

After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated
November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral
damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming that the MTC
erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal.

Issues: Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Romero.

Ruling:the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish
his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of
civil damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.In this
case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner
by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway where the accident
occurred and the short distance between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it
categorically stated that while petitioner may be acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may
nonetheless be held civilly liable.

The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which petitioners civil liability
may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs
of the victims of the collision for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses
they incurred during the wake and interment.

While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance
of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does
not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such
negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.

Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on petitioner
despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been held civilly liable if
his act from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist.

Daluraya v. Oliva

G.R. No.210148, December 08,2014

Facts:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide in connection with the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing
plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her
over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention,she eventually died,
prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.

During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an
eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading
towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate
number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the
civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz),
who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police
Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident
and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not
witness the incident.

Issue: whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death
despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling:

In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that Dalurayas
acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that "the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently
establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against him." Furthermore, when
Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and
firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the
Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no competent evidence on hand
which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of
the case to the court a quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect.Records
disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that
he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed
as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.
 People vs. Go

G.R. No. 168539, March 25,2014

Facts:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense
in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO,
Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the
construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public
Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and decided a question of substance in a manner
not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence in granting the demurrer to evidence and in
dismissing criminal case no. 28090 on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Go.

Ruling:

The Court is not persuaded. It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their
alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In
fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile
for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been
charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.

Calang v. People

G.R. No. 190696, August,3 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Calang was driving a bus owned by Philtranco when its rear left side hit the front left
portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, the jeeps
driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed a bystander who was standing along the
highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters
from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers were instantly killed, while the other
passengers sustained serious physical injuries. The prosecution charged Calang with multiple
homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before
the RTC. RTC found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting [in]
multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the decision of RTC.

Issue: Whether or not Philtranco may be held jointly and severally liable with Calang.
Ruling: No. The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang. He was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in
this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred
in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of
an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply
to civil liability arising from delict.
PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts:

The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused died. The
findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.

The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal
but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas civil liability arising from the
crime. In the Solicitor Generals comment the civil liability hasnt yet expired. The solicitor general
based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-appellant had a
different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil liability shall be
extinguished.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the controlling
statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death extinguishes the
criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil action against the
accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the criminal action.
Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the death dissolves both
civil and criminal liability.

The Solicitor Generals dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was contemplated
in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation other than
delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil liability
arising from delict only.
CANCIO vs. ISIP

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

Facts:

The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as the
Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being
deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the failure of
the prosecution to prosecute the crime.

Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After
failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution
reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the
reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On
December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking
to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of the
criminal case of estafa.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was made
by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a reservation of the
right to file a separate civil action.

In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was the
breach of the respondents breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking
to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the
criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result
of the criminal proceedings.
HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

Facts:

On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus
driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along the North
Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring died.The trial court
ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted
based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the deceased was the one who
acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him
be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows the
extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The
petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue. This was then
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt, which
means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based
on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of
the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that
he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by
certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from
or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme
Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery
of damages of the victims heirs. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the civil
liability of the accused.
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS

G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001

Facts:

Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the
International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H. Costa, the
managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his personal
announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for damages
against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFIs motion to dismiss
for respondents failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pinedas petition which was later
affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action.

Ruling:

IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages
and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued for its
subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an action against the
employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its
subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case
or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFIs
petition for dismissal.
RUIZ vs. UCOL

G.R. No.L-454404 August 7, 1987

Facts:

AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative

charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt, Ilocos
Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by Atty. Ruiz to get
back to her because of a case filed by Ucols husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made
remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said case was dismissed
but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portions of
Ucols answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that
her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the
case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after being
remanded by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action for
damages.

Ruling:

Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial court did not
pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended
party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from the criminal
proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of Ruiz is without
merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit
on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint, (2) Ruiz filed
a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer in the administrative case after the administrative
cases dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal caseactively handling as a
lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was acquitted, Ruiz pursued
his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.
COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

Facts:

Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he entered in

the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races
on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with
the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld on the advice
of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.

The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to give back the
winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in court. The
trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was no writ of
sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not withhold the
winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith did not attend
his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he returned the
principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights to due
process.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32 of the
Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages, in
this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or

whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a
clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the properties of
petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless states that bad
faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under the Article, it is not
necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is enough that there
was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of one's duties.A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that
there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner.
There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a
sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements
of due process.The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013

Facts:

Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures,
office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent Light
Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi , Fully
Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. Ignacio
and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter.
Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was tampered and right
there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has been tampered
with.

Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter. The
respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners are
now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading. The
respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without following
the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the
electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional rights of the
respondent.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the violation of
their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of Republic Act 7832
which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory
Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is tampered and they
have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal
use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto, there
must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the establishment
concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to Permanent
Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property
without due process of law are violated.
BARREDO vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942

Facts:

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage thereby killing
the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved
their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit,
Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the employer of Fontanilla. The suit
was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is
only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and
not him.

Issue:

Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under Article 1903
which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by
the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also
proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had
multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he failed to overcome during
hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been
subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act, but
rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article 1903.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

Facts:

On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to
renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her
residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out
her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline
with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under
the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for
the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also
the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having
four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his
paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed
for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification
of their marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case of concubinage.
Ruling:

The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites
are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will proceed.
In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he
can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final
judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final
judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
MERCED vs. DIEZ

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he married
Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeths relatives.
Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been previously
married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal case on
grounds of prejudicial question.

Issue:

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:

In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must have
all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One
of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties
must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. Since the
validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined
in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless all the elements concur, it is
necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.
DONATO vs. LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner married
Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz Abayan on
September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend on
grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his second marriage is
a prejudicial question.

Issue:

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case of
bigamy.

Ruling:

The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioners guilt or
innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz Abayan, the
second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that
the petitioners consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence or intimidation. Such is
not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution
of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioners second marriage he had been living with
private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only came up with the story that
his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage.
 RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured
by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name
of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected
by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in
the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of
the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Issue: Wheher or not the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial
question that warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case.

Ruling: In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the
Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent
of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages
and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
 PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

FACTS:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE:

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD:

No. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which
punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage

between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
 CITY OF PASIG vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 125646, September 10, 1999

Facts:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from
its mother Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved an ordinance, creating Barangay Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite on the creation of
said barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the Municipality of Cainta filed a
petition on June 19, 1996 to the Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the scheduled
plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangay involve areas included in
the pending case before the RTC Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of boundary dispute, hence the
plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by
the court.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another ordinance, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Again the
Municipality of Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel the plebiscite on
the same ground as for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan.

The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance
until the boundary dispute is settled because it presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the Supreme Court, arguing that
there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not
come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for being moot because the
plebiscite was already held and the creation ratified and approved by the residents. Hence, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should
be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary dispute presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the City of Pasig argues
that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does
not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still in the interest of good order,
the Court can suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely
interrelated or linked to the first.

The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has material bearing to the creation of the
proposed Barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified territorial
jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond
these limits, its acts are ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the expenses
entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the
same until the resolution of the boundary dispute.

In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the petition of the Municipality of
Cainta has been rendered moot and academic because the plebiscite was already held. The issues
raised are still pending and must first be resolved.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance; and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico should be annulled and
set aside, and any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary
dispute.
 Quimiguing v Icao

G.R. No. 26795, July 31,1970

Facts:

Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from
the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with
her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorneys fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguings failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:

W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege
fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:

Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an
independent cause of action for damages.

This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages
for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961

Facts:

Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to which she
had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nitas marriage with plaintiff, she
again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion with the
same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award for
damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the abortions.
He is suing for damages for the unborn child.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.

Ruling:

No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights can take
place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the application
of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear that the
husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.
 Continental Stee Manufacturing Corporation v. Montao

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

Facts:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)

filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature
delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.

Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn
child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to
the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code.Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died
because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental
Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence,
the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the
very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die

2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent

Ruling:

1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that
civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.

2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached
38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for
sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

CATALAN vs. BASA

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

Facts:

Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951 he
donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was declared
incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein
respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian filed an action or declaration of
nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso facto,
the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.
Issue:

Whether or not Felicianos donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.

Ruling:

In order for a donation to be valid, the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation is
existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However the burden of
proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to overcome
the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question. A study of
the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to
his rights.
DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

Facts:

Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her closest
surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale was void
for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale was void.

Ruling:

At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and
senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract
merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However when such age or
infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly , intelligently
and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted
testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated
physically and mentally. She played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances,
there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her
parcels of land.
MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002

Facts:

Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the
inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their ownership to
a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed of sale,
alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale.

Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.

Ruling:

The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state of mind
of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held that a
person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her
from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she considered incapacitated.
Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989
Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.
 Joaquin v. Navarro

G.R. No. L-5426, May 29,1953

FACTS: During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought refuge on
the ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar
(32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--).
The building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to
leave the building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.s wife and neighbor
Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to
avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr.,
Adela, and Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10,
1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and
killed. The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his
mother.

ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.

Ruling: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption was
based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which
civil cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct,
indirect, circumstantial or inferential.
 MARCOS vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private
respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the cancellation and
disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.

Ruling:

Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and
2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a persons intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have different residences
but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in political law to be used
synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it actually means
only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly only had numerous residences, but
maintained her domicile to be in Leyte
.ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

Facts:

Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two children. Jose
died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration of
acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action interposing
that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation has already
prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:

Respondents are establishing their filiation by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the attainment of age of
majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of establishing filiation can
only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot be applied in the case.
Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or prejudiced in the process.
The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested by the filing of complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the Family Code.
BERNABE vs. ALEJO

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:

Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was born on
September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a
complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and such
entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on grounds that the action
has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application and hence, the manner of
proving filiation by open and continuous possession of a status of a legitimate child must have been
brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.

Issue:

Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:

The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code has already
vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On December 1992,
respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On January 1994,
petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation
of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties executed a
compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of nullity of his
marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served the
summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the marriage declared void
and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the marriage void
on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.

Ruling:

Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her, hence the
decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting attorney to
avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that there can be
no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court just did the opposite
as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed to the basic
policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy
that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
motion for a new trial is granted.
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent stands
charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is alleged
that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of a
previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He also
caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.

Ruling:

Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with said
Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery of
the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil contract, but
is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is
dismissed from service.
DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

Facts:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without descendants.
Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her half and
full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermos side, his sisters, nephews and nieces, illegitimate child
and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that Guillermo and
Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings. Josefa was the
daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of marriage.
Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefas
estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from inheriting from Josefa by the
principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and
Ramon.

Ruling:

Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other
evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo
that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage. Guillermo and
Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence presented
sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit from
Josefa.