Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606.
He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials,
in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the
Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a
matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was
shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of
right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter
to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a
special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged
with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a
special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973,
when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused
therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive
to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in
the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that
decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Ledesma v CA; GR No. 161629; 29 Jul 2005; 465 SCRA 437

Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension
of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation
revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner.
Also charged administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board
Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in petitioners division. With respect to
petitioner, the complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative charge and
docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038
(administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of
Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.

The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a)
irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using recycled or photocopied
applications for a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to
validate the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein.
Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the
Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several
aliens whose papers were questionable.

An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the

Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the
administrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not in finding petitioner administratively liable, Ombudsman has encroached into
the power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.
HELD:
NO. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the government, or
any of its subdivisions, agency or instrumentality.
Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of
office

Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to
be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who
may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his
incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other
court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.

Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because
under the Constitution, members of the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The
above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to
allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged
criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from
office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.

The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold
any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases of
impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.

The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled
to immunity from liability. What the court is merely saying is that there is
a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be
determined. A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the
constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either
criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in
appropriate proceedings.

FRANCISCO V. HOUSE SPEAKER

Facts:On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to
the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI
of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Issues:Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar
then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft
cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the
petition issueda Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also
asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the
rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free"
while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small
offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The

Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated
that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only
exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of
the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute

contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others. It is one of the bounded duties of an attorney to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officer (Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).
His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is
that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic
and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the
judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not
to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a
private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms
must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one
where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are
of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of

court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from

the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately.

Laurel v. Desierto GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002

Facts:Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National
Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial
celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one
of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding
contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed
a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public
officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer.
The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement
national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is
clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is
chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO
128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not
receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an
incidence and forms no part of the office.

Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business,
hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged
the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers
premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property wasissued by BIR
commanding one of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and
other personal property of JaimeAncla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and
a delinquenttaxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently
signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to
BIR the property in his possession owned byAncla. Azarcon then volunteered himself to
act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had
made representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property
since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg.
Dir. said that Azarcons failure to comply with the provisions of the warrant did not
relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty
ofimprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to
17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial
which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private
individual designated by BIR as a custodian of distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
 Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified
therein that the only instanceswhen the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a
private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been
charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in
signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take
part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed
authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by directprovision of law nor
by competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for
the distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to
appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act
as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.
Honasan vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ
Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman
(consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation (consti)

Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

Facts:
August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel who occupied
Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a
house located in San Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels
occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their
withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda
(NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of
society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to
hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to
achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government.
They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator
 Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating
pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala,
Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having
a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on
the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood
compact wound.
August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for
Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed
in relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should
be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ
Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:
1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman
should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it
was not published
3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because
the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit:
(1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein
they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to
prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case
may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by
any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement
between the Ombudsman and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of
the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and
employees.
 The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as
the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under
the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been
held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even
a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the
jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary
jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2. No.
In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations
which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning
the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the
office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the
DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does
not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the
present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

CAASI vs. CA
Facts: Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the
local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was
sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder,
hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48
provides:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an

immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a

permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained the
green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He
alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he
voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987
for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional elections
on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the
possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently
establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a

permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify
him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent

residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such
status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which
Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in
Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face,
the green card that was subsequently issued by the USDepartment of
Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in
clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper
portion, the following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt
Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States.

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in

1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or
his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there
permanently as evidenced by hisapplication for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987

and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January
18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the
law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
"waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the

U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he
was disqualified to run for said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he
is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records
of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such
before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18,
1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for
that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for
at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of
the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess.
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent
resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only
three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January
18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are

permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold
elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and
allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast
their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose
of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a
foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and
welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they
must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country
of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents
thereof.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of
an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not
"during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No.
88831 November 8, 1990)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE

BERNARDO
503 SCRA 631 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The Ombudsmans authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce

compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory but mandatory within the
bounds of the law.

FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary
School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of
Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. They were subsequently found guilty of the offense
charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by
the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely
recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials

HELD: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of
the power to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and
employees and ensure compliance therewith.

The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned
issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to
comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee
is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the
bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of
any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in
respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman
"recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the
provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the
order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the
BID.

The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases
"ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory.
It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing
the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

Emilio A. Gonzales III vs. Office of the PresidentG.R. Nos. 196231 & 196232 September 4, 2012
FACTS: Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before the PNP-NCR against
Rolando Mendoza and four others. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. On February 16, 2009, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision finding Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were
assigned for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia,
who released a draft Order on April 5, 2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director
Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April
27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the
Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in
whose office it remained pending for final review and action when Mendozahijacked a bus-load of
foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated
in the police service.In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of
public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused
to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent constitutional body. The IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those
in whom culpability must lie. It recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be
referred to the Office of the President (OP) for further determination of possible administrative offenses
and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings. On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a
Formal Charge against petitioner.Petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed
with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein,
necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President, acting through individual respondents, has
constitutional or valid statutory authority to subject petitioner to an administrative investigation and to
thereafter order his removal as Deputy Ombudsman.

HELD:Yes. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all
government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section
8(2)and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the
person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative Liabilities.
MARCOS V. RP
CORONA v. SENATE

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court,
Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.

On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint
for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a
brief presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and
endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment
court the following day, December 14, 2011.

On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows: rb l r l l lb rr

ARTICLE I

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND
SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.

ARTICLE II

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. rb l r l l lb r r

2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee shall,
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."

2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required
by the Constitution.

2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.

2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets
of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that Respondent has,
among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-
required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his
assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public
disclosure?

ARTICLE III

RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC
TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3)
OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF
PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT
TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING
DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS.
ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS
REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.

ARTICLE IV

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.

ARTICLE V

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.

ARTICLE VI

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE
CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY
REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.

ARTICLE VII

RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER
HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION
AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR
COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.1 rll

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the
impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate.
Citing previous instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner s appointment
as Chief Justice and publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for "derailing his
administration s mandate," petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the handiwork of
President Aquino s party mates and supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster.
As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same but admitted having once served the Offices of
the President and Vice-President during the term of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted
the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner
argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and
otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet
the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the
articles of impeachment.

Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference
revealing evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day,
newspapers carried front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig and Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by
respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties
were not included by petitioner in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not
been made available to the public. Reacting to this media campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors
reminding them that under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not allowed to
make any public disclosure or comment regarding the merits of a pending impeachment case.4 By this time,
five petitions have already been filed with this Court by different individuals seeking to enjoin the
impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack of due process.

On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced
trial proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January
18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the
Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to
2010. Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner s SALNs for the previous years
(Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of Malacaang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of
Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).

In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the
allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld
property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner s alleged failure to disclose to
the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).

On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states: rl

IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules: r l

1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the
Articles of Impeachment;

2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with
respect to which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature of
any property or asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6 rll

In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution s
request for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited
millions in peso and dollar currencies, as follows: r l

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine Island
(BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank
accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as
follows:
rbl r l l l b r r

a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV Building,
6758 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8,
2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for Bank Account no.
1445-8030-61 in the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing the balances of the said
account as of December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December
31, 2009 and December 31, 2010.

b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for the
following bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the
balances of the said accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2010: rb l r l l lbrr

SO ORDERED.8 rl l

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to
enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena
requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true
copies of the opening documents for petitioner salleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render
judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the
said accounts.

On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of
the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for
lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside
from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate
facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is
correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of
evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more
than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on
charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner s right to due process
because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for
impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a
separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation of the Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and
(4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner s alleged bank accounts as requested by the
prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that
those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs: rb l r l l lb r r

(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution
dated 6 February 2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting
documents on petitioner s or his family s bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission
of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment: rbl r l l lbrr

(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;

(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the
Impeachment Complaint;

(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], as
well as any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and cralawlib rary

(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.

chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9 rll

Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the
ground of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they
have been openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10 rll

On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing
the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an
Impeachment Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner s motion
for the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of
any voluntary inhibition from the Justices concerned."

On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is
being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the
coldneutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge
Franklin S. Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further
called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment Court s January 27, 2012 Resolution which
disallowed the introduction of evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority
and continued their presentation of evidence for the prosecution, without fear of objection". In view of the
persistent efforts of President Aquino s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan Ponce
Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President
Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates
the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.

In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General
argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved
only by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents
"without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding
the constitutional and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of

the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment." Citing the case of

Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before
this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an
unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing
the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.

Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents
maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of
impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his
obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of
deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that
the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the
Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions
of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from
the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as
petitioner s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.

The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters
or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of
right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.

Impeachment and Judicial Review

Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as
creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger
that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real
demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in
this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally
entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or
arbitrariness.

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in
Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the
Framers of the US Constitution.

Our own Constitution s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was
impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was
accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the
alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate s sole power
to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these
constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions
of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an
Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the
part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Court s power of expanded judicial review.

In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of
judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court
resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against
petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar
provision.

On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures
from the Court.
Mootness

In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than
the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening
applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice
within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.19
rll

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is
DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.