The Path To Salvation, Religious Violence From The Crusades To Jihad PDF

THE PATH TO
SALVATION
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THE PATH TO
SALVATION
Religious Violence from the Crusades to Jihad
Heather Selma Gregg
Potomac Books
An imprint of the University of Nebraska Press
2014 by Heather Selma Gregg
All rights reserved. Potomac Books is an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gregg, Heather S.
The path to salvation: religious violence from the crusades
to jihad / Heather Selma Gregg.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-1-61234-660-1 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Violence
Religious aspectsHistory. I. Title.
bl65.v55g74 2014
201'76332 dc23
2013026585
Set in Sabon Next by Hannah Gokie.

Designed by J. Vadnais.
For my parents and for Paul,
with gratitude.
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations viii
Introduction 1
1. Religion: Love, Peace, and the Two Salvations 8
2. The Causes of Religious Violence: From Social Movements to
Hastening the Apocalypse 19
3. The Christian Crusades: From Pilgrims to Holy Warriors 32
4. Ayodhya: The Hindu Nationalist Battle for Hindutva 52
5. Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka: Defending the Dhammadipa 73
6. Defending the Dar al Islam: Jihads in the Nineteenth Century and Today 92
7. Zion: The Battle to Dene the Jewish Nation and State 118
8. How Religious Violence Ends: Spiritualizing the Battle 138
Notes 155
Bibliography 179
Index 199
Illustrations
Figures
1. Spectrum of religion and violence 25
Tables
1. Variables of religiously motivated violence 31
2. Christian Crusades to the Holy Land 47
3. Jihads of the nineteenth century 99
4. Major jihads of the twentieth and twenty-rst centuries 109
THE PATH TO
SALVATION
introduction
It has been over a decade since the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington dc. In that time the United States launched a major war in Afghan-
istan aimed at denying Al Qaeda safe haven. The United States also captured or
killed numerous Al Qaeda operatives, including Khaled Sheikh Mohammed,
the mastermind of the September 11th attacks; the American-born Anwar Al-
Awlaki; and Osama bin Laden, the movements leader. Most agree that these
military actions and covert operations have degraded Al Qaeda as an organiza-
tion and limited its capabilities to carry out sophisticated attacks.
But despite these successes in attacking Al Qaeda as an organization, the con-
ditions that led to the emergence of Al Qaeda and specically the role that reli-
gion has played in shaping its ideology and motivations are still hotly debated.
Most would agree that religion has played some role in the Al Qaeda phenom-
enon. Bin Ladens statements and communiques are laden with verses from the
Quran and references to Islamic doctrine. For example, bin Ladens 1998 fatwa
proclaims,
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies civilians and militaryis
an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which
it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque [Jerusalem]
and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies
to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah: And ght
the pagans all together as they ght you all together, and ght them until
there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith
in Allah [Quranic passage].
Bin Ladens statements, and the emergence of numerous militant groups using
Islam to justify their actions, suggest that there is something about Islam that
makes it bloodier and more prone to violence than other religions. An October
2001 New York Times article claims, From the assassination of Anwar Sadat to
the fatwa against Salman Rushdie to the decade-long campaign of bin Laden to
the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues and the hideous persecution of
women and homosexuals by the Taliban to the World Trade Center massacre,
there is a single line. That line is a fundamentalist, religious one. And it is an
Islamic one. That same article further proclaims, Most interpreters of the Koran
nd no arguments in it for murder of innocents. But it would be nave to ignore
in Islam a deep thread of intolerance towards unbelievers, especially if those
unbelievers are believed to be a threat to the Islamic world.1
Furthermore, much attention has been paid to the doctrine of jihad as the
source of Islams bellicosity.2 Scholars and journalists have also pointed to Islams
belief in martyrdom as another source of violence in the faith, particularly sui-
cide terrorism.3 Still others have suggested that Islam is incapable of adapting
to modernity, as evidenced by women dressed in veils and the degree of social,
economic, and political chaos in countries that are predominantly Muslim; Sep-
tember 11th was an act of frustration against the premier country of modernity,
the United States.4
This book aims to investigate the conditions under which religion becomes
entangled in violent conict. It examines, specically, cases of violence motivated
by Islam, including the current wave of jihads directed against the United States,
secular Muslim regimes, and Muslims believed to be apostates. The book also
looks at other examples of religiously motivated violenceincluding the Chris-
tian Crusades, Buddhist-motivated violence in Sri Lanka, violence caused by
religious Zionism and catastrophic messianism in Judaism, and Hindu-inspired
violence surrounding the sacred site of Ayodhya in northern Indiawith the
goal of looking across time and space to better understand its common and
unique causes. This approach demonstrates that religions other than Islam have
a history of violence surprisingly similar in behavior, rationale, and motives to
violent acts committed in the name of Islam today.
This book also confronts the conventional wisdom that religions, at their core,
are about love and nonviolence and, therefore, that religiously motivated viol-
2 Introduction
lence is fundamentally incompatible with religious tenets. While most religions
propagate love, peace, and ethical conduct, this is not the core purpose of reli-
gions. Rather, this book argues that religions are systems of beliefs organized
around the concept of salvation or redeeming humanity and the earth from a
fallen state, either in this world or the hereafter. To understand religiously moti-
vated violence, it is necessary to understand the concept of salvation, particularly
the belief that dying in defense of a religion procures eternal salvation. Just as
important, however, are the earthly goals of religiously motivated violence, such
as the defense of sacred space, the creation of a religious government, and the
cleansing of society from threats to the faith; these are forms of salvation that
focus on saving the world from its fallen state. The path to salvation can require
any number of actions, includingin moments of urgency and fearacts of
violence.
Furthermore, the book challenges the assumption that religious violence is
the product of doctrine and scripture, such as the doctrine of jihad and the
Sword verse in Islam (Sura 9:5): Then, when the sacred months have passed,
slay the idolaters wherever ye may nd them, and take them (captive), and pre-
pare for them each ambush. But if they repent, and establish worship and pay
the poor-due [zakat], then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.
The cases show that while such passages and doctrines have existed for centu-
ries, adherents have called for violence in the name of their faith and taken up
arms at some points in time, but not at others. In other words, scripture and
doctrine alone do not determine the violent nature of a religion; other variables
are at play.
Building on this comparative approach, this book argues that religiously moti-
vated violence is the result of specic interpretations of a religions beliefs and
scriptures rather than the mere presence of specic passages in a traditions holy
books and doctrine. While most religions scriptures and beliefs were established
early in the faith and have remained xed from that point forward, interpreta-
tions of these beliefs and scriptures vary across time and place and provide
insights into the conditions under which religious groups turn to violence.
Therefore, it is important to look at specic interpretations of a religions scrip-
tures and doctrine when considering the rise of religiously motivated violence,
and not just the texts and beliefs themselves.
Interpretations, moreover, are the products of individuals, and individuals are
the products of their social, political, and cultural circumstances. To understand
the conditions under which violent interpretations of a religion are generated,
Introduction 3
therefore, it is useful to ask the following questions: Who is interpreting the
faith, and by what authority? What are the social and political circumstances
under which these interpretations are being generated? Why are adherents to
the faith embracing these interpretations as true? And what resources are neces-
sary for interpretations to become a violent reality?
Building on various bodies of academic literature, this book proposes that
religiously motivated violence is largely reactive and that violent interpretations
of a faith are usually in response to perceived or real threats to religious groups,
their identity, and their faith. The cases show that religiously motivated violence
is often a reaction to radical changes to society and political order, drastic changes
that compel religious groups to take defensive action.
Furthermore, religiously motivated violence is not aimless killing for killings
sake. Rather, it is usually undertaken with specic goals in mind. Religious groups
ght to defend a particular interpretation of the faith that they believe to be
correct. They ght governments that they believe to be impious and corrupt.
They ght radical changes to society brought about by new political ideologies,
war, and occupation. And at their most extreme, religious groups ght to hasten
the apocalypsethe end of timeand usher in the promise of the millennium,
a time marked by peace and prosperity.
In some cases, religion acts as a unique resource that provides tools of mobi-
lization and motivation for furthering goals. In other, more extreme cases, vio-
lence becomes a sacred duty to be undertaken in defense of the faith. In some
conicts religions involvement is salient; if religion were removed from that
particular equation, the means and goals for which the groups were ghting and
even the violence itself would be very different. It is these instances of religiously
motivated violence that this book explores.
The goals of religiously motivated violence outlined in this book do not cover
every aim for which religious groups become involved in war and violent con-
icts; however, they represent the most prominent examples of religiously moti-
vated violence in history and in modern times. The cases examined here were
chosen because they tend to be the most well-known examples of religious war:
the Crusades, Hindu-Muslim riots, Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka, battles over
Jerusalem, and the current declaration of jihad against the United States. These
seemingly disparate cases of religiously motivated violence are compared to
investigate possible common causes of religious violence. Finally, these cases
cover ve religious traditionsHinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Chris-
tianitydemonstrating the spread of religiously motivated violence and war
4 Introduction
across traditions in addition to within religious traditions and even among core-
ligionists across time and space.
Chapter 1 builds on academic debates about the nature of religion to argue
that religions are systems of beliefs organized around the concept of salvation,
or redeeming humanity and the earth from a fallen state, either in this world or
the hereafter. Under certain circumstances the drive for earthly and eternal sal-
vation becomes an important motivator of violence, particularly actions aimed
at protecting the faith from perceived threats, defending sacred spaces, restoring
religion to the center of social and political life, cleansing society from believed
impurities that threaten the faith, and obtaining personal and group salvation
in the next life.
Chapter 2 begins by discussing the different ways that religion can inuence
violence, presenting a spectrum ranging from religions obligation to peace at
one extreme, to violence as a sacred duty at the other. It examines religiously
motivated violence both in terms of Mark Juergensmeyers concept of cosmic
war and in terms of real-world goals, such as defense of the faith and bringing
about changes in political and social order. Chapter 2 also proposes a general
causal argument for religiously motivated violence, focusing on the conditions
under which interpretations of a faith are generated that call for violence and
the social and political contexts under which these interpretations are embraced
by adherents.
Chapter 3 considers perhaps the bloodiest example of religiously motivated
violence in history, the Christian Crusades. The chapter considers the causes that
led up to crusadingthe act of carrying the cross and sword into battle on behalf
of God with the aim of defending Christendom and liberating Jerusalemand
why a phenomenon, which spanned for centuries, has become almost unthink-
able for most Christians today.
Chapter 4 studies the rise of Hindu nationalism and the conditions under
which the city of Ayodhya became the site where an estimated three hundred
thousand Hindu activists stormed a 350-year-old mosque and demolished it with
axes and their bare hands, sparking deadly riots throughout India. The chapter
looks at the emergence of Hindu nationalist organizations and their aims of
making India Hindutvawhat they believe to be the true essence of India
prior to the arrival of the Muslim Mughal Empire and British colonialistsand
the social, political, and religious tensions this agenda has fueled.
Chapter 5 investigates the roots of Sinhalese nationalism and how interpreta-
tions of Theravada Buddhism inuenced the bid to make modern-day Sri Lanka
Introduction 5
the Dhammadipa, a land and people chosen to make Buddhism shine in glory
and to give the faith preferential treatment by Sri Lankas government. Policies
that favored the Sinhalese and Buddhism plunged the country into civil war
and, at its most extreme, spawned a Buddhist revolutionary movement that
aimed to overthrow the government and install a Buddhist theocracy in its place.
Chapter 6 traces and compares the rise of two major waves of jihad in his-
torya surge of jihads in the nineteenth century and the current rise of jihads
around the globeand argues that both waves are in response to perceived cor-
rupt Muslim political and religious leadership, social decay, and threats posed
by foreign, non-Muslim inuences. The current wave of jihads has prospered
from the resources available to various groups, including information technol-
ogy, nances, and training. These resources have allowed jihadis to network and
spread their ideas in a way that the previous generation could not.
Chapter 7 investigates the birth of modern-day Zionism, specically the rise
of religious Zionists and their messianic vision for the state of Israel. The cre-
ation of Israel has brought together a spectrum of interpretations on what it
means to be Jewish and what the Jewish state should be, ranging from a religious
government that upholds the Torah to a secular state for those with Jewish lin-
eage to the Ultra Orthodox understanding of Israel as an abomination that is
attempting to take Gods timing into human hands. Following Israels stunning
victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, these debates took on a more violent tone as
religious Zionists have worked to implement their messianic vision for Israel,
which includes acquiring all the land of eretz Yisrael and imposing their inter-
pretation of what it means to be Jewish on the Jewish nation. At its most extreme,
the religious Zionist agenda inspired the 1995 assassination of Israels prime
minister Yitzak Rabin and several attempts to blow up the Muslim Dome of the
Rock in an effort to unleash catastrophic messianism, conditions that are
believed to hasten the coming of the Messiah.
Chapter 8 summarizes the ndings of the book. The case studies reveal that
drastic political and social changessuch as the transformations brought on by
colonialism in the nineteenth century, war, military occupation, and new forms
of governmenthave threatened the structure and order of traditional societ-
ies, often producing a religious backlash. The chapters also show that interpre-
tations, once generated, persist and reemerge in the future. Preexisting interpre-
tations that call for religiously motivated violence are an important source for
justifying new calls for holy wars. To get at the heart of religious violence, there-
fore, the ideology itself needs to be challenged. But challenging the ideology
6 Introduction
demands more than just discrediting leaders or attempting to undermine a
groups resources; it requires offering alternative interpretations of historical
and contemporary events, interpretations that do not describe the religion as
under attack or that do not call for violence as a necessary means of defending
the faith.
Finally, it is worth remembering that the terrorist attacks of September 11th
in which nineteen hijackers seized four planes and drove three into U.S. build-
ingsis not the rst example of religiously motivated terrorism of this kind. In
World War II Japanese kamikaze pilots, the wind of God, drove their planes
into nearly two hundred U.S. warships on religiously inspired military missions.
In these cases, the inspiration was belligerent interpretations of Shintoism and
Buddhism, religions most commonly associated with peaceful and nonviolent
norms. Kamikaze manuals, not unlike the instructions penned by a September
11th hijacker, encouraged their pilots to transcend life and death and promised
that after the crash they will become like gods (kami)that they will meet their
friends and joke with them in their god-like state.5 The religious threat today
comes from a belligerent interpretation of Islam, but it has not always been that
way, nor will it likely always be so.
Introduction 7
1
religion
Love, Peace, and the Two Salvations
September 11th has ushered in a new era in geopolitics, one in which the United
States has named as one of its foreign policy priorities the reduction of violent
extremism posed by groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban around the globe,
including a transnational terrorist threat that involvesto some extentIslam.1
Countering violent extremism requires not only understanding Al Qaedas lead-
ers and organization but also comprehending the factors that led to the emer-
gence of these extremist groups and how religion has inuenced their goals and
fueled their actions.
To understand the rise of Islam-motivated violenceand violence done in
the name of faith more broadlyit is important to rst understand religion and
its purpose in human history. This chapter begins by arguing that the United
States faces several challenges to understanding the role that religion plays in
motivating and shaping violent behavior, including a lack of knowledge of world
religions and the United States particular relationship with religion and poli-
tics. The chapter then proposes a denition of religion useful for investigating
religiously motivated violence that includes beliefs, practices, and assets that
religions tend to possess. The chapter concludes by arguing that, rather than
primarily about love and peace, religions are beliefs organized around the con-
cept of salvation, or redeeming humanity and the earth from a fallen state, either
in this world or the hereafter. Taken together, earthly and eternal salvation help
explain the underlying motives of most religious violence.
Challenges to Understanding Religiously Motivated Violence
In the years following September 11th, the Pew Foundation conducted a series
of polls in the United States that attempted to measure the populations under-
standing of Islam. It found that in 2003 only 42 percent could name Islams holy
book (the Quran) and 48 percent could correctly identify Allah as the Arabic
word for God. In 2005 Pew conducted the same poll again and found that 51
percent surveyed could name the Quran as Islams holy book and that there
was no change in those that could correctly identify Allah as the Arabic word
for God; in other words, the publics basic knowledge of Islam had not changed.
The Pew polls suggest that the United States faces a challenge when trying to
understanding how Islam is inuencing the actions and goals of Islamic mili-
tants such as Al Qaeda, namely that it does not have foundational knowledge
on Islams basic tenets and beliefs and therefore cannot adequately understand
how Islam is motivating these groups actions and goals. A 2006 New York Times
article further punctuates this problem. The author asked several members of
U.S. Congress to explain the difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and
nearly no one could do it.2
Americas lack of knowledge on Islam and other world religions is likely due
to the fact that these subjects are rarely taught in U.S. public schools and are
largely absent from university curricula. Mark Juergensmeyer, a professor of reli-
gion and sociology, notes that survey courses in world religions are difficult to
offer because they require a broad range of knowledge on history and numer-
ous religious traditions, but that, nevertheless, this is perhaps one of the most
important courses to teach as part of a liberal arts education because it is infor-
mation that students would not get elsewhere.3
Similarly, the social sciences, which consider causes of political violence, ter-
rorism, and war, have also come up short with literature that seriously investi-
gates the role of religion as a force in modern politics and society.4 Prior to Sep-
tember 11th few international relations scholars had either the interest or the
foundational knowledge necessary for studying religion more broadly and reli-
gious violence in particular. International relations scholar Robert Jervis argues
that terrorism grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social
science, which has paid little attention to religion, perhaps because most social
scientists nd this subject uninteresting if not embarrassing.5
The notable exception to this trend is Samuel Huntingtons book The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. He argues that the postCold
War world will be marked by violent conicts between civilizations, which, at
Religion 9
their roots, are dened by religion.6 Huntingtons hypothesiswhile appearing
to come true in light of September 11thstill leaves unanswered important ques-
tions: What are the conditions under which religions, as civilizations, rise up
and engage in violent conict? Are civilizations truly rising up en masse against
the West and the United States or are groups also rising up and ghting within
a civilization? Why do some groups within a religious tradition take up arms,
while others do not? If civilizations are indeed the threat to U.S. security and
interests, what policies should the United States enact to counter this threat?
Huntingtons argument alone does not prepare the United States for action; the
conditions under which religions engage in violence demand further investiga-
tion. To do this, scholars, policy analysts, the government, and the media need
to understand how religion functions in society, politics, and individuals lives.
We cannot understand religious violence without rst understanding religion.
Furthermore, the United States and the West more broadly have a particular
relationship between religion, society, and politics that affects understanding
religiously motivated violence. One of the founding principles of the United
States, enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights, is the institu-
tional separation between religion and government, where the government
ensures freedom of religion by not supporting or sanctioning any one faith. The
result is that religion is most often understood as a phenomenon completely
separate from and relatively uninuential to political thought and action.
The separation of church and state, however, fails to capture the different ways
in which religion operates in political life, both in the United States and other
parts of the world. While there may be institutional separation between religion
and the government in the West, religion still operates in the political lives of
these countries, particularly in the United States. For example, debates over legal-
ized abortion and federally funded stem cell research are two political issues
that have involved religion. In these cases religion enters into the debate in the
form of religiously based ethics and morals concerning the sanctity of life.7 Reli-
gious inuence is also present in policies for war and violent conict. Immedi-
ately following the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, George W. Bush described the war against Osama bin Laden and his
followers as a Crusade, a term harkening back to the Christian offensive against
the Muslim world in the Middle Ages. Separation of church and state, therefore,
does not mean that religion is completely uninuential in the policies of the
state. Rather, in most cases it means that political and religious leaders are struc-
turally separate.
10 Religion
It is also important to note that the West has not always had an institutional
separation between religion and the government. Prior to the sixteenth century,
religion and the polity were intertwined. This is visible in the form of religiously
based monarchies, the relationship between the papacy and heads of state in medi-
eval Europe, and kings and queens as the heads of Protestant churches, as was the
case in Prussia and the Scandinavian countries and is still true in Great Britain.
Moreover, the current-day institutional separation between religion and gov-
ernment in the West is not representative of the whole world. Religious monar-
chies still exist in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Fur-
thermore, religious political parties are present in Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Israel,
Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. Therefore, religion still
plays a role in modern-day political life. To understand how religion operates
in the political life of a state, it is useful to think of religion and the government
as a spectrum, not as distinct binary categories.
As with politics, religion also plays a vital role in society, to differing degrees.
One common research approach for understanding the role of religion in soci-
ety is to measure religiosity, which is the degree to which members in a society
practice a religion. This approach, however, presents problems for understand-
ing the ways in which specic religions function in society, namely that it is dif-
cult to consistently measure religiosity across religious traditions. For example,
Christians, Jews, and Muslims attend weekly worship services as part of their
religious practices. One could estimate a societys religiosity, therefore, by what
percentage of Christians, Muslims, and Jews attend worship services on a regu-
lar basis. However, other traditions such as Buddhism and Hinduism are not
organized around regular worship services. Measuring the religiosity of Bud-
dhists and Hindus, therefore, cannot be assessed by the same methods. Further-
more, attempts at measuring current religiosity in societies and religiosity across
time require thorough and reliable data, which often is not available.8 Statisti-
cally attempting to measure religious adherence, therefore, is difficult and favors
traditions organized around regular worship services.
Perhaps more important, religiosity measures only one form of religions
impact on society and therefore does not tell the whole story of how religions
can function for individuals and groups. Societies can still respond to religious
rhetoric and imagery regardless of how often individuals attend religious services.
In this case religion operates more subtly as one dimension of a groups history
and culture; it is part of the worldview of a given group or society.9 For example,
in the West, days of rest and public holidays are still centered around the Chris-
Religion 11
tian days of worship and its liturgical year, regardless of whether these days are
spent in worship or not. Furthermore, religious rhetoric can resonate with non-
adherents to a particular faith. President Bushs use of the term Crusade and his
reference to bin Laden as evil are examples of religious rhetoric that have reso-
nated throughout the United States, irrespective of religious affiliation or prac-
tice. Religion, therefore, still informs much about a societys worldviewits orga-
nization, history, and cultureregardless of the religiosity of its members.
What Is Religion?
Religion, like most complex human phenomena, does not have an agreed-on
denition of what religion is or its purpose in humanity. Several scholarly dis-
cussionsspecically those offered by Emile Durkheim, Clifford Geertz, and
Max Weberare useful for constructing a denition of religion that helps explain
the different ways in which religion can fuel violent behavior.
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life sociologist Emile Durkheim offers a
denition of religion that stresses its corporate nature. Durkheim denes reli-
gion by dividing human phenomenon into two opposing realms, the sacred and
profane. Religious beliefs and rituals are concerned with relating to and main-
taining the sacred. Durkheim duly notes that the realm of sacred is not xed;
rather, anything can be sacred, and the circle of sacred objects cannot be deter-
mined once and for all. Furthermore, for Durkheim, religion is at its core a
social phenomenon: The really religious beliefs are always common to a deter-
mined group. . . . They are not merely received individually by all the members
of this group; they are something belonging to this group, and they make its
unity. The individuals which [sic] compose it feel themselves united to each other
by the simple fact that they have a common faith. Durkheim contends that
commonly held beliefs toward the sacred create practices, expressed in the cor-
porate form of a church, which he denes by stating, Sometimes the church
is strictly national; sometimes it passes the frontiers; sometimes it embraces an
entire people . . . sometimes it is directed by a corps of priests; sometimes it is
almost completely devoid of an official directing body. But wherever we observe
the religious life, we nd that it has a denite group at its foundation.10 There-
fore, Durkheim denes religion as an eminently collective thing formed by
beliefs and practices relating to the realm of the sacred, which is ever-changing.
Durkheims denition of religion is important for understanding the causes
of religious violence, because he believes religions are, at their root, corporate.
Religion, therefore, is not merely about beliefs and rituals but shared beliefs and
12 Religion
rituals that unite a group of people into a community. His denition suggests
that the corporate nature of religion needs to be taken seriously to understand
religious violence. In other words, religious violence is seldom the product of
lone individuals and their beliefs; rather, religious violence is the reection of a
group or community and the circumstances in which they live.
Anthropologist Clifford Geertzs often-cited denition of religion argues that
religion is: 1) a system of symbols which acts to 2) establish powerful, pervasive
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by 3) formulating concep-
tions of a general order of existence and 4) clothing these conceptions with such
an aura of factuality that 5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realis-
tic.11 Geertzs denition of religion is useful for understand religious violence
because his denition argues that religion creates a general order of existence;
in other words, religion helps dene human purpose on earth. Geertzs deni-
tion also acknowledges that a religions system of symbols is a powerful moti-
vator of human behavior; Geertz therefore recognizes that religion is an impor-
tant force in human history.
Both of these scholars, while offering unique denitions, fail to address a key
component of religion, namely the role of human agency in shaping and main-
taining religious beliefs and systems. Neither Durkheim nor Geertz considers
who maintains these systems; their denitions suggest that religious beliefs and
practices simply evolve of their own accord. Durkheim claims that churches
are the core manifestation of religious beliefs, but he does not delve into the role
of individualsnamely religious leadersin maintaining beliefs and rituals sur-
rounding the sacred. Geertz makes no mention at all of agency in his denition.
Sociologist Max Weber adds the critical component of agency to his deni-
tion of religion in The Sociology of Religion. Weber acknowledges the importance
of symbols, rituals, and beliefs, stating that religion is the relationship of men
[sic] to supernatural forces which takes the forms of prayer, sacrice and wor-
ship. In addition, Weber includes two interconnected elements to this deni-
tion. First, he observes that religions tend to change and develop in complexity
over time. Second, as religions develop into more complex systems of beliefs
and rituals, the role of religious leaderswhat Weber calls prieststakes on
increasing importance in maintaining the religion. Religious leaders, according
to Weber, are dened by three elements: they make up an organized and perma-
nent structure, they are connected with some type of social organization such
as a congregation or a class, and they are trained both in specialized knowledge
or doctrine and vocational skills.12 Priests, therefore, are tasked with studying
Religion 13
religious beliefs and practices with the purpose of maintaining the tradition and
leading communities of practitioners.
The denitions of Durkheim, Geertz, and Weber lack, however, two additional
elements: material assets common to most religions and the role of religion in
forming group identity. Religious scholar Ninian Smart adds the dimension of
material resources to his denition of religion.13 Most religions contain material
resources such as houses of worship and sacred sites, which one would expect to
nd in a religion. However, most religions also possess resources such as build-
ings, schools, hospitals, printing presses, and money, resources not commonly
identied with religion. Furthermore, religions tend to have social resources, such
as trained leaders, organizations, and networks that inform and connect their
congregants.14 Therefore, a religions resources can be vast and numerous. With
this wider inclusion of resources, religions have the power to educate, inform,
mobilize, and organize people. Assets, therefore, are a particularly important
resource when considering the ability of religions to motivate violent behavior.
Second, religion often plays a key role in forming group identity. Identity is
different from other aspects of religion because it is both endogenous and exog-
enous to a religion. Identity is endogenous when adherents to a tradition choose
to dene their identity, in part or whole, by their inclusion to a particular religion.
Religious identity, however, can also be exogenous, specically when identity is
assigned by others who associate individuals and groups with a given religion.
Combining these various discussions on religion renders the following de-
nition: an organization recognized as holyrelating to the divine or supernat-
uralconsisting of beliefs, texts, leaders, a community, resources, and group
identity. Religion, therefore, is more than abstract ideology or a system of beliefs
and symbols. A working denition of religion needs to capture nonmaterial ele-
ments, such as beliefs, but also resources such as buildings, land, and money.
Furthermore, most religions are composed of leaders that interpret scriptures,
maintain religious traditions, and lead a community of practitioners. Lastly, reli-
gion, as a corporate phenomenon, also serves as one form of identity to those
who associate with or are associated with a religious group.
Religions unique contribution to war and violent conict is its combina-
tion of these six elements. Independently, these elements are typical causes of
war. For example, nonmaterial motivators for war can be found outside of reli-
gion, most notably nationalism, which has fueled belligerent behavior since
the nineteenth century, particularly World War I. Material resources are most
commonly connected to a states ability to cause war; they are a major calculus
14 Religion
in the balance of power theories aimed at explaining war and peace among
nations. Likewise, social resources such as leaders and members occur in a sec-
ular context, such as the state. And identity can be informed by any number of
traits such as race, ethnicity, and regionalism, which can be a cause of war and
violent conict.
Religion, as a combination of all six of these elements, is uniquely situated
for inspiring and mobilizing the masses, including for violence. States usually
contain all these elements but states, by denition, are conned to tangible bor-
ders. Religions, on the other hand, can cross borders. Nations, as a collection
of people that perceive themselves as unied by a shared history, can cross bor-
ders; but cross-border nations almost never come with a readymade organiza-
tion of leaders, buildings, and other resources essential for mobilization.15 Reli-
gions unique contribution to war and violent conict, therefore, is that all these
elements are contained within one entity.
Applying this denition to examples of religion in practice requires two fur-
ther renements. First, although religionssuch as Christianity, Buddhism, and
Islamexist in theory, in practice these religions do not exist as singular units;
rather, there is much diversity within religions across time and space. In other
words, there is no one Christianity or Judaism in historical context but rather
many Christianities, Judaisms, and so on. This is true of all religions. Second,
religions in practice are not static but change over time according to historical
context. Religions respond to political, social, and cultural circumstances, mak-
ing them different across time and space.
It is also important to assert that, while religions are not true in the sense
that religious beliefs can be scientically proven, religions are real; religions are
real in the minds and lives of those who participate in the religion in ques-
tion.16 Moreover, religion is a powerful force capable of motivating and mobi-
lizing nations, societies, and individuals; religious violence needs to be under-
stood as one manifestation of this powerful force.
Love, Peace, and the Two Salvations

One commonly held belief about religion is that at its core, religion is about
love and peace. Attributing love and peace to religion has merit; all religions
contain scripture and practices that are committed to these principles. Most reli-
gions also contain codes of moral and ethical conduct, outlining right behavior
toward others in their community and the wider world based on the faiths
beliefs and scriptures. Undoubtedly, love and peace are central to most religions.
Religion 15
But if religions were only about love and peace, then comprehending religiously
motivated violence and war would be very difficult.
Religion has another pursuit, salvation, which is critical for understanding
religiously motivated violence. Most religions have a set of beliefs and practices
organized around the goal of salvation, of which there is more than one under-
standing.17 For example, the monotheistic traditions of Christianity, Islam, Juda-
ism, Sikhism, and the Bahai faith all focus on a relationship with God through
faith, obedience, prayer, and praise.18 God is understood as the proprietor of sal-
vation; religion is the means through which to enter into a relationship with
the divine aimed at salvation. Buddhism and Hinduism have the concept of
reincarnation, the belief that the accumulation of past actions, karma, forms
present states of being. The religious goal is release from the cycle of life, death,
and rebirth into nirvana, a perfect state of being.19
This is not to say that all religions have salvation as their goal. In The Sociol-
ogy of Religion, Weber divides religions between those that are concerned with
an ethic of salvation and those that are not. Confucianism, Shintoism, and
naturist-centered religions are not organized around the concept of salvation.20
However, most religions have as a central theme the notion of salvation, and this
is particularly true of the worlds major religious traditions.
The term salvation is most commonly associated with the concept of eter-
nal salvation, or with what comes after this life. Attaining eternal salvation usu-
ally involves some action on the part of individuals or groups in the here and
now; it could be the act of believing, of becoming enlightened, of obedience,
or of praise and devotion. Salvation, therefore, usually involves a process, a path,
a transformation on earth that takes one into the hereafter. In the monotheistic
traditions eternal salvationoften dened as paradise or heavenis most typ-
ically attained through faith or belief in God, obedience to Gods laws and com-
mandments, and worship or praise of God. In Buddhism and Hinduism eternal
salvation is dened by the release from the cycle of life, death, and rebirth into
a state that transcends life and death, which is nirvana. This state is possible
through knowledge, enlightenment, and praise. In Buddhism salvation is attained
by following the dharma, or the way to enlightenment revealed by the Bud-
dha.21 In Hinduism liberation from the life cycle is attained through adherence
to the Veda rituals and practices maintained by Hindu priests, through the prac-
tice of yoga as directed by a guru, or through praise and devotion to a deity,
which is bhakti.22
The path to eternal salvation is important for understanding religiously moti-
16 Religion
vated violence and war because all major traditions have historical or contem-
porary examples of the belief that dying in the name of a religion will procure
eternal salvation. For example, it is well known that current-day militant Islamic
groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizbollah, and Al Qaeda
promise eternal paradise to those who die in the line of jihad, or holy war, to
defend the faith.23 But very similar doctrines exist in other traditions as well.
Buddhist-inspired Bushido warrior ethics promise that, through death on the
battleeld, the solider could, like the gods themselves, attain seishi no choetsu, a
state transcending both life and death.24 Christian crusader knights were granted
remission of all their sins, securing their eternal salvation.25 In addition, Juda-
ism, Sikhism, and Hinduism have similar examples of holy warriors. Martyr-
dom, therefore, is not unique to Islam.
There is, however, another type of salvation that is perhaps less commonly
associated with the term yet is as important for understanding religiously moti-
vated violence; it is a salvation concerned with saving the world in the here and
now. This type of salvation, which will be called earthly salvation, contends
that the earthparticularly individuals, societies, and nations but also animals
and the environmentis in a state of decline and needs to be restored to a par-
ticular order. The mandate to restore the world to its intended state of harmony
and justice is true of religious movements vying for the creation of religiously
run states, which includes groups within Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hindu-
ism, Buddhism, and Sikhism. This is also true of other movements not usually
associated with religions, such as Marxism and some environmentalist move-
ments.
Earthly salvation is important for understanding religiously motivated con-
ict and war, because violence could be a means for achieving these saving ends.
For example, participants in the Iranian Revolution used violence to overthrow
a corrupt, secular regime and put in its place a religious government, one believed
to create a more just and pious society. Islamic studies scholar John Esposito and
Michael Watson argue, The key issue is what Islam could do for Muslims in the
modern worldrescue them from decline, purify society, combat external forces
of corruption. For radicals (or fundamentalists) the triumphant moment was
the Iranian Revolution, unifying political and religious authority to enforce the
Sharia law as the law of the land, to pursue social justice and roll back Western
economic and cultural inuence.26 As the case studies show, other religious
groups have similar goals of transforming governments and societies. Hindu
nationalism and Sinhalese Buddhism, for example, are both groups that have
Religion 17
sought to reinvigorate religion in society and create governments that uphold
specic interpretations of the faith.
These two salvations are not mutually exclusive; in some cases they work
together. For example, some militant Muslim groups, such as the Palestinian
Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah, have social and political branches in addi-
tion to a wing devoted to violent operations.27 These organizations aim to save
both in the here and now in addition to promoting salvation through death in
the struggle against earthly foes. Likewise, Christian and Jewish extremists agi-
tating for the destruction of the Dome of the Rock and the construction of the
Third Temple in Jerusalem believe that changing the here and now will hasten
the second coming of the Messiah, which will usher in a new world.28 Therefore,
while some movements are focused primarily on one form of salvation or another,
there are religious movements that simultaneously combine both earthly and
eternal goals in their paths toward salvation.
This book seeks to understand the conditions under which religious groups
come to believe that violence is a necessary means of attaining salvation, either
in this world or the next, and that salvation is more important than upholding
the moral and ethical imperative of love and peace. In other words, religious
violence is believed to be not only permissible but, under certain conditions,
the path to salvation. The following chapter continues with this investigation,
proposing a causal argument for religiously motivated violence.
18 Religion
2
the causes of religious violence
From Social Movements to Hastening the Apocalypse
Religiously motivated violence did not begin with September 11th. The Chris-
tian Crusades, the Iranian Revolution, the civil wars in the Balkans, various ter-
rorist organizations in the Middle East, and Hindu-Muslim riots in India are all
violent conicts that have been correlated with religion. Although there are
many examples of violent conicts that involve religion, there are few causal
arguments that explain under what conditions religiously motivated conicts
arise, the resources religion brings to violence, and how best to counter this
threat.
The previous chapter offers a denition of religion, stressing that it is more
than just scripture and beliefs; it also contains material assets, informs identity,
and has leaders and a community of practitioners. The previous chapter also
proposes that at its core religions are a system of beliefs organized around the
concept of salvation, or redeeming humanity and the earth from a fallen state,
either in this world or the hereafter. Salvation is an important aspect of religion
that explains several different motivations for violence in the name of faith.
This chapter aims to build on this discussion of religion to offer a causal argu-
ment for religiously motivated violence. It proposes that specic passages in reli-
gious scripturessuch as the Sword verse in the Quran or the Ban in Hebrew
scripturesare, by themselves, not sufficient for explaining religiously motivated
violence, because scriptures have existed for centuries, yet violence done in the
name of faith occurs some times but not others. Rather, it is not scriptures that
cause religious violence but the interpretations of scripture and doctrine that fuel
religious violence. Interpretations of scriptures, beliefs, and doctrine are the prod-
uct of individualsreligious leadersand the social and political circumstances
in which they live. The rst step in understanding the rise of religiously motivated
violence, therefore, is to investigate the conditions under which interpretations
that call for violence in the name of the faith are generated and the goals for
which groups are ghting. For religious violence to occur, followers must accept
the authority of individuals speaking on behalf of the faith and obey their calls
for action. Finally, resources are critical for determining the scope and longevity
of religious violence. Thus, to understand the conditions under which interpre-
tations of a religion calling for violence are generated, it is useful to ask the fol-
lowing questions: Who is interpreting the faith, and by what authority? What are
the social and political circumstances under which these interpretations are being
generated? Why are adherents to the faith embracing these interpretations as true?
What resources are necessary for interpretations to become a violent reality?
Religiously Motivated Violence Before and After September 11th

Academia has produced a rich array of studies on religion and violence that
spans across a number of themes and elds of study. This chapter highlights six
bodies of literature in particular: religions ethical role in the use of force, reli-
gion and social movement theory, religions involvement in ethnic conict, fun-
damentalism, religious nationalism, and religiously motivated terrorism, par-
ticularly postSeptember 11th studies on Islamic terrorism and Al Qaeda.
Overall, this literature demonstrates that religion inuences violence in a range
of different ways. Religiously motivated violence, therefore, is best understood
as a spectrum ranging from the sacred duty for nonviolence to violence in which
religious adherents believe that they are locked in a battle of good versus evil,
where the survival of the faith is at stake.
Perhaps the largest body of literature on religion and violence involves the
role of religious-based ethics in declaring and ghting wars, specically the
Christian Just War Doctrine. There is an extensive amount of literature on the
origins and application of the Just War Doctrine, developed by Augustine of
Hippo in the fourth century ce and later codied by Aquinas, Grotious, Gratian,
Anselm, and St. Bernard. In addition to the Christian Just War Doctrine, there
are also works that consider the role of religion in justifying the use of force and
battle ethics in Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.1 These works are
20 The Causes of Religious Violence

important for understanding religions role in legitimating the use of force for
rulersincluding those of modern-day statesand their subjects or citizens.
Religious ethics in the use of force typically delineate limits both for the right
use of force and for conduct in war. Just war, therefore, does not explain the con-
ditions under which religious leaders and their practitioners come to believe
that violence, often without ethical limits, is a sacred act for the faith and even
the fulllment of religious duty, such as suicide terrorism. In other words, there
is a category of religious violencewhich the world is witnessing through groups
such as Al Qaedathat is marked by the absence of ethical constraint; the Just
War Doctrine does not explain these groups actions.
A second body of literature that has correlated religion to violence is social
movement theory. Initially developed in the 1950s, this theory investigates the
conditions under which groups form, articulate goals, and mobilize people and
resources to challenge the social or political status quo. It has been used to explain
movements ranging from civil rights in the United States to Solidarity in Poland.
Social movements are not necessarily violent, but they are not exclusively peace-
ful either; for many groups violence has been one of many useful tools employed
as part of a rational, incremental plan to change the status quo. More recent
scholarship has looked specically at the role that religion plays in social move-
ment theory and the assets it brings to groups seeking to challenge the existing
political and social order.2 In particular, religion is a tool of mobilization, reli-
gious assets can help further the cause, and religion can even help determine
the goals of a movement. As with its nonreligious counterpart, religious social
movement theory can use violence or be peaceful.
Literature describing the rise of ethnic conict in the 1990s also correlates
religion to violence. For example, anthropologist Petra Ramets Balkan Babble:
Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia describes the role of religion in distin-
guishing identity in the former Yugoslavia.3 In this case, despite the presence of
religious symbols and rhetoric in the conict, the violence in the former Yugo-
slavia is primarily about perceived ethnic entitlements to land based on inter-
pretations of history. In cases like this, religion is one of several key elements
that dene and distinguish groups and fuel violent behavior. For the most part
groups are not interested in creating religious governments or bringing mem-
bers of a community back to one interpretation of the faith. Thus the goals in
such conicts are not uniquely religious; they usually involve seizing control of
a government or establishing a new state, not the creation of a religious govern-
ment or imposing a particular interpretation of the faith on a group of people.
The Causes of Religious Violence 21

Also in the postCold War era, much attention has been paid to the phenom-
enon called fundamentalism. The most comprehensive body of literature on
fundamentalism is Martin Marty and R. Scott Applebys ve-volume Fundamen-
talists Project, which provides a thorough look at fundamentalist movements
across religions, cultures, and contexts.4 They dene fundamentalism by arguing
that religious fundamentalism has appeared in the 20th century as a tendency,
a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically
embodied in certain representative individuals and movements, which mani-
fests itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt
to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Gabriel Almond, R.
Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan add to this denition by arguing, This
defensive nature of religion is the sine qua non of fundamentalism; without it, a
movement may not properly be labeled fundamentalist.5 Fundamentalism,
therefore, is dened by its goal, to protect a groups faith, which it perceives to
be under threat.
Fundamentalismwhile often employing violence in reaction to perceived
or actual threats to the faithis not always violent. For example, the Haredi, the
Ultra Orthodox Jews in Europe, reacted to the Enlightenment and Jewish inte-
gration in nineteenth-century Europe by closing off their communities to assim-
ilation and zealously keeping Jewish laws, beliefs, and customs; these means of
preservation were nonviolent.6 In contrast, there are Jewish fundamentalist groups
that have resorted to violence as a means of defending their faith against per-
ceived threats. The Jewish Defense League and its offshoot, Kach, along with the
settler movement Gush Emunim have resorted to bombings, assassinations, and
other forms of terrorist activities to defend what they perceive to be threats to
eretz Yisrael, greater Israel, and Judaism in general.7 Fundamentalism, there-
fore, can have both nonviolent and violent manifestations.
Literature on fundamentalism is useful for a discussion on causes of religious
violence in that it provides a valuable body of comparative case studies on move-
ments across religions and contexts. But these works tend to consider movements
in the modern era only; they do not address religious violence prior to the twen-
tieth century. Therefore, potentially valuable comparisons with historical exam-
ples are not made. This literature also does not answer why some groups choose
violence as a means of defense and others do not; more research is needed to
answer these important questions.
Building on the discussion on fundamentalism, religious nationalism involves
the quest of modern-day political leaders to nd an authentic ideology for a

state. Mark Juergensmeyers The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts
the Secular State considers the rise of religious nationalism as a political ideol-
ogy in the postcolonial and postCold War era.8 He argues that former colonies
attempts to embrace secular nationalism as a governing ideology have largely
failed and that many countries in the developing world are turning to religion
as an alternative political ideology, one that they believe is more authentic to
their nations history and culture. Religious nationalism differs from religions
role in ethnic conict in that groups are seeking to employ religion in the polit-
ical realm as a form of ideology, not just as identity or an interpretation of his-
tory. Religious nationalists also differ from fundamentalists in that they want to
control the state, whereas the primary goal of fundamentalists is to preserve the
faith, through either political or nonpolitical means.
Religious nationalism can take many forms, ranging from religion as a cul-
tural attribute that informs political practices and prioritiessuch as the con-
cept of Hindutva or Hinduness as the dening ideology of religious national-
ists in Indiato religion mandating the legal and political practices of the state,
such as politics in Iran after the 1979 revolution. In democracies religious nation-
alists can take the form of political parties that seek to work through the elec-
toral process to realize their religious agenda. Religious nationalists can also seek
to overthrow the political system through revolution.
Religious nationalism, while not necessarily violent, is almost always exclu-
sionary and produces conict between those who embrace the vision and those
who do not or cannot because they are not practitioners of the faith. In theory
religious nationalism could create a tolerant political ideology that embraces
difference, but the examples we have seen so far, such as in India, Israel, Leba-
non, Iran, and Iraq, have not realized this possibility.9
In light of September 11th a urry of literature has been generated on reli-
giously motivated terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism. Much of this litera-
ture has focused on bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Literature on suicide terrorism
has also grown exponentially, focusing primarilyalthough not exclusively
on Islamic groups that use this particular tactic.10 Research on Al Qaeda and
other Islamic militant movements is of particular importance to current ques-
tions regarding religiously motivated violence toward the United States and
possible counterterrorism measures in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. How-
ever, these works tend not to compare contemporary religiously motivated ter-
rorism with examples of religious terrorism in the past, missing an opportunity
to analyze causes and solutions of historical cases.11 Furthermore, this literature

has yet to make rigorous comparisons between religious groups and other groups
that use terrorismsuch as Marxists or anarchiststo understand the unique
contributions that religious ideology brings to terrorist movements.12
Much literature exists on the role of religion as a cause of peace and religions
obligation to promote peace in times of violent conict, including works within
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism.13 It also includes the works of
various think tanks and non-governmental organizations committed to religions
promotion of peace, such as the U.S. Institute of Peaces Religion and Peacemak-
ing Initiative. While important, these works cannot be fully understood without
also considering the dark side of religionits ability to cause war and violent
conict.
Figure 1 depicts a spectrum of the different ways that religion inuences vio-
lence, ranging from the sacred duty for nonviolence to violence in which reli-
gious adherents believe that they are locked in a battle for the very survival of
the faith.
Theories of Religiously Motivated Violence

Although a varied and rich body of literature exists that describes the different
ways in which religion correlates with violent conicts, there are surprisingly
few theories that attempt to explain the causes of religiously motivated violence.
Perhaps one of the earliest theories on religious violence comes from the French
scholar Rene Girard. In Violence and the Sacred Girard develops a theory that cor-
relates sacricewhich he claims is the central component of religionto
human violence. Girard posits, in accord with Sigmund Freud, that sacrice is
a means of venting human aggression.14 Religious sacrice, therefore, offers a
channel through which humans can release violent desires, diverting those hos-
tile intentions from one another. Girard claims that human violence occurs
when symbolic sacrices are no longer believable or satisfying to a given society.
This is what he calls a sacricial crisis, which in turn leads to violence. Girards
theory, while offering a valuable discussion on the connection between rituals
and human behavior, presents three problems for explaining religiously moti-
vated violence and war. First, sacrice is not a central component to all religions.
Buddhism, for example, does not have sacrice as one of its tenets. Second,
Girards theory explains subconscious human desire and the actions that these
thoughts produce. His theory, although tested by several scholars of religious
studies for its explanatory power, does not consider conscious decision making
of religious elites and their communities to engage in violence and wars.15 And

Figure 1. Spectrum of religion and violence
Religious nationalism
Religious groups impose
their denition of the
Ethnic conict faith on the state.
Just War Doctrine Religion is used as one Groups discriminate
Religious-based ethics form of ethnic identity to against those outside the
limit the conditions for distinguish groups. faith.
going to war and the groups ght for nonreli- Groups persecute dissent-
conduct in war. gious goals. ing coreligionists.
Nonviolence as Violence as a
a sacred duty sacred duty
Religious social movements Fundamentalism Cosmic war
Religion is activated to Groups react to secularism Groups view war as the
change the social or politi- or marginalization of the ultimate battle between
cal status quo. faith. good and evil.
Religious resources are Groups seek to reassert Groups perpetrate an us
used for mobilization. religion. versus them mentality.
Goals are not necessarily Groups react by Violence is considered a
religious. retreating or remaining sacred duty necessary to
in isolation; defend the faith.
conducting social and/or No ethical limits are
political activism; and imposed.
perpetrating violence.
third, Girards theory does not adequately explain the conditions under which
ritual sacrice fails and a sacricial crisis emerges.
In response to Girards theory, Mark Juergensmeyer offers his own theory for
religiously motivated violence. In Sacrice and Cosmic War, Juergensmeyer
argues that religions primary purpose is to establish ultimate order and that
this process involves conquering the ultimate disorder, which is death.16 Sacri-
ce and divine battles between godspresent in most scriptures or beliefsare
symbolic representations of a religious system battling with and attempting to
conquer evil, which is death and disorder.17 In times of threat and calamity
such as war, occupation, corruption, lawlessness, and natural disastercosmic
and earthly violence become conated; the celestial war between good and evil
is understood to be occurring in the here and now. When conated, earthly bat-
tles become spiritual battles. Juergensmeyers theory posits that holy battles for
the conquest of good over evil know no specic enemy or denitive goal; rather,
the battle is against amorphous disorder. As such, cosmic war does not know
incremental goals or compromise.
Juergensmeyers theory is useful in that, rst, it touches on a very important
component of religionthe struggle of good over evil. As argued in chapter 1,
most religions are concerned with the path to salvation: the struggle of good
over evil, both in the here and now and the hereafter. Juergensmeyers theory
corresponds with the argument that salvation is a core concept of religion. Sec-
ond, he notes that earthly circumstances, especially threat and calamity, bring
the struggle for salvation to the here and now. His theory, therefore, provides an
explanation for why religious groups may become involved in violence and war
at some times while not at others. However, Juergensmeyers assertion that reli-
giously motivated violence is irrational and knows no goals may describe only
the most extreme forms of religiously motivated violence. The case studies show
that some religious groups that use violence are rational, both in their goals and
means for achieving them. Such groups may be open to negotiation and com-
promise. Cosmic war, in other words, is not the only cause of religiously moti-
vated violence.
The third theory on religiously motivated violence and war is inferred from
literature on fundamentalism; it is not proposed by any one source but rather
is implicit in the writings of many scholars on this topic. The theory posits that
religious fundamentalism is largely reactionary; it is in response to perceived or
actual threats to the faith. Religious studies scholar David Little and Islamic
studies scholar John Esposito assert that religious fundamentalism is a reaction

to colonialism. Religious historian Karen Armstrong and religious studies scholar
Bruce Lawrence posit that religious fundamentalism is a reaction to the forces
of modernity, such as cultural, economic, and political globalization. Almond,
Appleby, Sivan, and Juergensmeyer argue that it is a reaction to secularization
and the marginalization of religious from society and political life.18 These
authors agree that various perceived or actual threats to religious groups and
their faith spark a reaction, either violent or nonviolent, with the goal of pre-
serving the groups religious practices, identity, and way of life.
These observations suggest two causes of religious fundamentalism that are
useful for identifying the underlying conditions under which religiously moti-
vated violence occurs. First, they suggest that fundamentalism is largely reac-
tionary, not preemptive; it is a response to perceived or actual threats. Therefore,
by studying different examples of religious fundamentalism, it may be possible
to identify common threats that spark a religious reaction. Second, these obser-
vations suggest that the social, political, and economic circumstances of a given
group explain why some groups turn toward a fundamentalist reaction and oth-
ers do not. This is in contrast to those who argue that there is something within
a religionsuch as its scriptures or doctrinethat makes it prone toward vio-
lence. However, this theory does not explain why some fundamentalist groups
choose violence as a means of defense and others do not.
The Causes of Religious Violence

The literature discussed in this chapter suggests several variables that produce
religiously motivated violence. The interplay of four variables in particular deserve
further investigation: the social and political circumstance that generate inter-
pretations calling for violence in the name of faith, the leaders generating these
interpretations, the conditions under which religious adherents believe these
interpretations and take up arms, and the resources that allow religious violence
to grow and persist.
First, investigating social and political circumstances of specic groups that
engage in violence is necessary to understand why religiously motivated violence
occurs at some times and not at others. Can we identify common social or polit-
ical circumstances that precipitate violence done in the name of faith? To answer
this question, it is important to look at not only social and political circum-
stances during incidents of religiously motivated violence but also the circum-
stances that precede the violence and, in historical examples, the conditions that
helped bring about an end to the violence.

Drawing from literature on fundamentalism, this book looks at the role that
specic types of threats play in shaping a leaders interpretations of the faith.
The case studies show that religious leaders (self-proclaimed or bona de) react,
in particular, to events and policies that radically alter the order of society. Rad-
ical social transformation comes from several different sources, including wars,
occupation, new ideologies, and new political systems, but it also comes from
seemingly benign policies like mass education or census taking. For example,
nineteenth-century European colonial powers radically transformed the social
fabric of the regions they occupied. They introduced land reform, new educa-
tional systems, new political structures, new religions and worldviews, and new
ways of thinking about identity. These transformations produced reactions in
Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, as described in several of the following chap-
ters. Likewise, in the postcolonial period, the efforts of several governments to
implement secular nationalist agendascomplete with social, economic, and
political reformsproduced religious backlashes. This is true in India, Egypt,
Palestine, Israel, Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The current rise of globalizationan economic force that carries with it cul-
tural baggagehas also threatened religious groups and nations around the
world, producing a reaction that is often violent. Finally, recent U.S. efforts to
spread democracy to the Muslim worldalso containing cultural and ideolog-
ical baggagehave produced a religious backlash. Therefore, the threat of rapid
social and political transformation often provokes a religious reaction, which
can be violent. The tragedy of this dynamic is that many of these efforts to trans-
form societies are often meant to helpto improve the lives of individuals and
groups within a countrybut are interpreted as threatening a groups sense of
values and identity and its way of life.
Generally speaking, the majority of interpretations calling for religiously moti-
vated violence come from perceived or actual threats, not as an opportunity to
gain resources or adherents to the faith. This is not to claim that all religiously
motivated violence is threat driven. There are historical examples of wars called
to expand territory, most notably the seventh-century jihads to expand the dar
al Islam, the territory of Islam. However, the majority of religious wars are fought
for defensive ends.
Second, the rise of religiously motivated violence cannot be understood with-
out considering religious leadership and its role in generating interpretations
of the faith, including those calling for violence. Different religions have differ-
ent types of leaders. For example, in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, religious

authorities lead worship services and perform rites of the faith. Judaism and
Islam also have religious leaders responsible for interpreting religious law. In
Theravada Buddhism religious leadership comes from monastic orders, or the
Sangha. Hinduism has a variety of leaders, ranging from trained brahmins to
pandits to swamis and gurus. In addition to differences in leaders between reli-
gions, leadership varies within religious traditions as well. Catholic priests, for
example, have very different qualications from Pentecostal ministers, whose
authority is derived from their charismatic connection to the Holy Spirit. These
differences between and within religious leadership are true of all religions but,
regardless of this diversity, it is still possible to identify religious leaders within
and across traditions.
In modern times one of the growing trends in religiously motivated violence
is that leaders have come from outside the trained clergy and often critique their
leadership. This is true across religious traditions. For example, K. B. Hedgewar,
who was educated as a medical doctor, built off of the writings of Vinayak Damo-
dar Savarkar to produce militant interpretations of Hindu culturecalling
broadly on religious symbols and ritualswhich formed the basis for the rss
(Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) in India in the 1930s. Likewise, the Sinhalese
leader Anagarika Dharmapala was not part of the Buddhist monastic order but
drew from their texts to create a list of practices and customs that all Sinhalese
Buddhists should follow to strengthen society. Similarly, more recent interpre-
tations calling for violence in defense of Islam have come from leaders outside
the ulama, or trained religious scholars. Bin Laden received training in business
administration, Dr. Abdul Rantisi of Hamas was educated in medicine, and Dr.
Ayman al-Zawahirithe second in command in Al Qaedawas also trained as
medical doctor. Militant Judaism is the one exception to this trend. Key leaders,
including Rabbi Meir Kahane and Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were trained rabbis
and the militant strain of religious Zionism comes from Rabbi Abraham Isaac
Kooks Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and subsidiary schools. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to investigate why the religious interpretations of individuals outside the
clergywho are not bona de religious leadersare believed and followed by
adherents to the faith.
But interpretations of a religion calling for violence alone do not produce
religiously motivated violence. For these interpretations to result in bloodshed,
adherents to the faith need to accept these interpretations as true and take up
the call to arms. This is no small task. Therefore, it is important to consider not
just leaders and their interpretations but also the role of believers. For all reli-

gions interpretations that call for violence override ethical components of the
faith that stress peace, love, and tolerance. In addition to surpassing ethical norms,
religiously motivated violence comes at enormous personal and group expense.
In extreme casessuch as suicide terrorismindividuals sacrice their very lives
for the cause. Therefore, the reasons for religiously motivated violence have to
be compelling, even urgent.
The believability of interpretations of a faith calling for violence cannot be
understood without considering the worldview of practitioners, and the world-
view cannot be understood without investigating both the religious imaginings
of adherents and the social and political context of a given group. The world-
view of specic groups explains why some answer the call to arms while others
do not. Real-life calamitiessuch as war, occupation, and social and political
oppressionprovide the context in which interpretations calling for religiously
motivated violence enter into the here and now. These interpretations call indi-
viduals to respond, to be proactive and participate in the ultimate trialthe
ght for salvation in this world and the next. In other words, calls for violence
in defense of the faith are answered by those who see the same degree of threat
and urgency articulated in the call to arms. There are, perhaps, always individu-
als who are in a state of personal crisis and for whom spiritual war is a daily,
real-life struggle. But for groups to take up arms suggests a much more pervasive
atmosphere of urgency, one brought on by social and political crises.
Furthermore, it is not possible to understand those who take up the call for
violence in the name of faith without taking religion seriously as a force that
matters deeply to individuals and as a belief system integral to humanity. Reli-
gion has been a driving force of humanity throughout history and despite
advancements of modernity and secularism, it will continue to be a factor in
human society and the lives of individuals. It is not possible to understand the
worldview of adherents without rst understanding the importance of religion.
The worldview of practitioners as a necessary condition for religiously moti-
vated violence may also explain why those outside the worldview fail to under-
stand the rise of religiously motivated violence. For those not in a sense of per-
sonal or collective threat and crisis, religiously motivated violence appears
irrational and contradictory to the faith. Following September 11th, the United
States has struggled, with only limited success, to come to terms with the ideol-
ogy of Al Qaeda and its resonance with some Muslims. This is due, in large part,
to the inability of the U.S. government, media, and average citizens to get inside
the worldview of specic Muslim communities around the globe and adequately

Table 1. Variables of religiously motivated violence
Context Leaders Followers Resources
What social and Who is Why do followers Which resources

political contexts interpreting the believe interpretations matter for the
produce a faith and by and answer the call persistence and
religious reaction? what authority? to ght in defense spread of
of the faith? religious violence?
understand their social and political circumstances and the sense of threat they
feel about their faith.
Finally, in light of Al Qaeda, a transnational movement calling for religiously
motivated violence to defend the faith, it is important to consider the role of
resources in spreading interpretations of the faith and mobilizing adherents.
Specically, three sets of resources are considered: material resources, which
include money, property, buildings (such as schools and clinics), and military
equipment; social resources, which include networks and organizations; and
technological resources, which include transportation and communications
technology. The case studies reveal that of these three types of resources, social
resourcesparticularly well-structured organizationsare important for explain-
ing the ability of religious groups to assert their demands through the use of
force. Material and technological resources allow groups to increase the scope
of their call to violence, but these resources alone do not produce religiously
motivated violence. Table 1 depicts the variables that cause religiously motivated
violence.
As the case studies show, violence done in the name of faith is largely reactive
and in response to perceived or real threats to religious groups, their identity,
and the faith itself. When threatened, religious groups ght for the defense of
land and people that they believe are essential to the preservation of the faith;
the return to a believed golden age, when the religion was at its most pure state;
and the creation of a religious government that will uphold a particular inter-
pretation of the faith. These three goals reect the desire for salvation in this
world and the next.

3
the christian crusades
From Pilgrims to Holy Warriors
Crusadingthe act of carrying the cross and sword into battle on behalf of
Godis perhaps one of the bloodiest examples of religious violence in history,
yet the thought of engaging in battle to liberate Jerusalem and attain salvation
is almost unthinkable for Christians today. What were the conditions that led
up to the Crusades and Pope Urban IIs 1095 call for Christians to take up cross
and sword to liberate Jerusalem? How has crusading, which spanned for centu-
ries, become a religious practice of the past?
The rise of crusading cannot be understood without rst considering the reli-
gious and political milieu of medieval Europe. Christianity in the Middle Ages
was considerably different than it is today; it was not focused on scriptures but
beliefs and practices of the time, including particularly the healing properties
of relics and pilgrimages for attaining salvation. All these practiced helped fuel
crusading fervor and the desire to take back the most important relic of Chris-
tianityJerusalem. While these practices and beliefs still exist within some forms
of Christianity, armed struggle to liberate Jerusalem does not. Crusading as a
popular concept died out when Christianity underwent drastic changes to the
practices and beliefs of the faith, introduced by the Renaissance, the Reforma-
tion, and the Enlightenment, and when Europe became embroiled in its own
interreligious struggle to dene the faith.
This chapter is divided into ve sections. The rst section outlines medieval
Christianitys beliefs and practices, emphasizing the importance of relics and pil-
grimages for European Christians. The second section investigates the rise of cru-
sading and the conditions that fueled the popular response to Pope Urban IIs
1095 call. The third section describes the counter-Crusades led by Saladin and the
reconquest of land from the crusaders. The fourth section traces the expansion
of crusading in Europe to include attacks against believed heretics, schismatics,
and enemies of the church. And the fth section posits the conditions that led
to the decline of crusading, stressing political, social, intellectual, and religious
changes brought on by the Renaissance and the protestant Reformation.
Medieval Christianity
Christianity in medieval Europe looked considerably different than it does today.
Scriptures were not the central focus of the religion because the average elev-
enth-century European could not read, and copies of the Bible in vernacular
languages did not exist prior to the Reformation and the advent of the printing
press in the sixteenth century. Rather, Christianity was almost wholly focused
on the sacraments, sacred rites in which it was believed that God came into con-
tact with humans. Clergy were the intermediaries between the population and
the divine, administering the sacraments and interpreting scriptures through
sermons.1
In this religious milieu Christianity focused on objects and practices that were
believed to bring the faithful into contact with the divine and that would help
grant salvation. Encountering God was a literal and physical experience. For
example, medieval Christians believed that God spoke through natural phenom-
ena, such as oods, droughts, and eclipses. These events became increasingly
important as the Christian millennium drew near and the belief that they were
signs of the apocalypse and the Second Coming of Jesus became more popular.
Interpreting natural occurrences in this way persisted in the decades leading up
to the First Crusade and particularly in 1095, when Urban II called for a holy
war. Numerous natural wonders occurred, including solar and lunar eclipses,
auras in the sky, meteor showers, and mysterious red glowing horizons. The
belief that God was speaking through nature was compounded by a drought
throughout France, which clerics and peasants understood as Gods disfavor and
which ended the year the holy war was proclaimed.2
In addition to interpreting natural phenomena as signs from God, people
believed that relicsartifacts thought to be authentically connected with Christ
and his ministryhad supernatural powers; they became important tools that
The Christian Crusades 33

allowed practitioners to come into contact with the divine. Religious historian
Karen Armstrong argues, Relics were the most important element in the reli-
gious experience of Europe during the early Middle Ages. Of particular impor-
tance were relics of the True Cross, found by Constantines mother in the fourth
century, and the Lance of Christ, the sword believed to have pierced Jesuss side
while he hung on the cross. Armstrong tells of a legend surrounding the impor-
tance of a relic from the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Christs tomb) and the
construction of a church in the Loire Valley in France: It was built by Count
Fulke of Anjou, who had made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1009. When he
had knelt to kiss the tomb of Christ, he was said to have miraculously bitten off
a chunk of stone. He had thus captured some of the holiness of Jerusalem for
Europe, which he enshrined in his new Church of the Holy Suplchre [sic] back
home. Relics continued to be an important part of Christianity throughout the
early Middle Ages. Crusaders later carried these relics into battle and believed
that they would grant imminent victory.3
Saints were also an important aspect of the faith. Saints and their tombs were
venerated because they were believed to have the power to intercede in heaven
on behalf of people on earth. Saints bones, in particular, became their own form
of relic. Legends emerged of Jesuss disciples journeying to European cities and
dying in these cities, imparting a special connection between the local inhabit-
ants and the divine. For example, Mary Magdalene was believed to have lived
and died in France, and Saint Jamesthe brother of Christwas said to have
sojourned to Spain and died in Compostela.4
Religious and political events in the century leading up to the call for the
First Crusade are also important for understanding popular crusading fervor.
Beginning in the eleventh century Benedictine monks at the abbey in Cluney,
France, began a campaign to reinvigorate Christianity within Europe. The Clu-
naic monks initiated a massive construction initiative aimed at building churches
across the land.5 These churches loomed above villages and cities, and their
architecture and sculptures explained Gods nature. Armstrong describes the
importance of these new places of worship: Inside these churches, the people
heard Mass and were instructed in the faith. They learned important lessons in
the Romanesque sculptures that depicted demons struggling with the soldiers
of God. Life seemed to consist of an endless battle with the forces of evil.6
Clunaic monks also advocated pilgrimagesparticularly to Jerusalemas a
means of discovering ones new Christian self.7 It was an opportunity to be like
the monks, proclaiming vows of celibacy and poverty and taking up the cross of
34 The Christian Crusades

Jesus. Christian pilgrims, although not part of the clergy, held a special status in
the eyes of the church. Most notably, they took vows to the church to perform
and complete pilgrimages, making them separate from ordinary citizens and like
clergy for the duration of their trip.8 Pilgrims were also promised spiritual rewards
for performing pilgrimages. It was considered an act of penance that could pro-
cure salvation not only for the sojourner but also for family members, dead and
alive.9 The Clunaic monks inspired a popular religious zealaided by the mil-
lenniumvisible in increased participation in pilgrimages.
Pilgrimages to Jerusalem became the ultimate sojourn, linking European
Christians to its most important relicthe land of Jesuss birth, life, death, and
resurrectionand the pilgrims, once they returned, linked those still in Europe
with the Holy Land through stories of heroism and miracles. Armstrong writes,
During the eleventh century, there was a new passionate enthusiasm for Jeru-
salem and the Holy Land, which was seen by the lay people as holiest relic of
all because of its physical link with the son of God. The very soil of the land was
believed to be pregnant with divine power, because Jesus had walked on it dur-
ing his life. Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith concurs that the attitude of elev-
enth-century Christians towards Jerusalem and the Holy Land was obsessive.
Jerusalem was the center of the world, the spot on which God Himself had
focused when he chose to redeem mankind by intervening in history.10 The
importance of Jerusalem not only as a pilgrimage site but also as a sacred relic
became a cornerstone of the call for the First Crusade and the popular response
the call generated.
The Rise of Crusading

Most scholars agree that the Crusades had their roots in the rise of European
pilgrimages to the Holy Land, which began as early as the fourth century and
took on increasing importance as the rst Christian millennium drew near.11
European pilgrims aimed to travelusually on land by foot or horsebackto
the cities in the Holy Land connected with the life, ministry, crucixion, and
resurrection of Jesus Christ. These sites included Bethlehem (Jesuss birthplace),
Nazareth (the city where he grew up), the Galilee (where he performed his min-
istry and miracles), and, most important, Jerusalem, where he died, was buried,
and rose from the dead.
The early crusaders were similar in many ways to pilgrims, and prior to the
thirteenth century, the two groups were virtually indistinguishable. Like pil-
grims, the early crusaders took religious vows that bound them to the perfor-

mance and completion of their task. They were given special status in the eyes
of the church and their local rulers. Crusaders were accompanied by members
of the clergy, as were the pilgrims, and both kept similar liturgical practices and
religious rites. Likewise, the crusaders followed the same routes to the Holy Land
used by pilgrims. Many early crusaders also brought their families on the jour-
ney, not unlike pilgrims. Pilgrims, forbidden to take up arms, hired knights as
protection on their journey, making them appear like crusading forces that
moved through Asia Minor.12
Crusaders also resembled military forces of their times. Prior to 1095 several
popes had assembled bands of knights with the aim of defending the church
and its interests. For example, in 1049 Pope Leo IX employed a militia to ght
Normans in southern Italy. From 1059 to 1073 Popes Nicholas II and Alexander
II also employed militias to defend papal land and interests, including an offense
against advancing Muslim forces in Spain.
Crusaders differed from pilgrims and papal forces in that, rst, the forces
called and sent out by the pope in 1095 had the goal of liberating Jerusalem and
claiming territory believed to be inherently Christian. Pilgrims, by contrast,
sought merely to visit Jerusalem and its holy sites, not occupy them. Second, the
pope was the person responsible for calling Crusades and also had the author-
ity to grant indulgences, which were believed to forgive sins, for those who par-
ticipated. Pilgrimages, on the other hand, were organized by local religious and
secular leaders, such as lords. Third, after the mid-twelfth century, crusaders had
their own unique vow that was distinct from a pilgrims vow. Moreover, crusad-
ers also wore a unique cross on their clothes and armor; the word Crusade in
fact comes from the Latin word for cross, cruci. Lastly, crusaders also formed their
own unique military ordersTemplars and Hospitalersassociated with main-
taining crusader kingdoms in the Holy Land. Crusaders, therefore, eventually
became a distinct force of the church and had their own vows, their own mili-
tary orders, and the unique goal of liberating Christian land in defense of the
faith.13
Prior to the call for the holy war to liberate Jerusalem in 1095, domestic and
international political circumstances created the conditions under which the
church began to sanction violence for religious ends. Following the end of the
Carolingian wars in the tenth century, France suffered from protracted insecu-
rity caused by pillaging knights. Gradually, emerging local lords, castellans, hired
these freelance knights to defend their interests, which often included bishops,
monasteries, and religious land. In 1031, at the Council of Limoges, the church

reinforced a recent call for the Peace of God, which attempted to restore order
to the region by compelling knights to swear an oath to respect the peace. Along-
side this oath the church began to employ knights as defensive forces aimed at
keeping the peace.14 Therefore, the church soon possessed a force of knights who
were bound by oath to defend the churchs interests and keep the peace.
In addition to these domestic concerns, the era leading up to the First Cru-
sade also had several important international developments, particularly vis--
vis Muslim empires. In the mid-eleventh century, the Seljuk Sultans of the Abba-
sid Empire began to push north and west through Asia Minor. In 1071 the Seljuks
defeated the Byzantine Empire in the Battle of Manzikert, placing most of region
under Muslim control. The empires loss was compounded by the Seljuks cap-
ture of Antioch in 1084, which was a Christian-majority city. Despite the schism
between Rome and the Byzantine Empire in 1054, Pope Gregory VII proposed
raising an army that would push east to liberate Greek Christians and free the
Tomb of Christ from Muslim rule.15 This proposal, however, was not heeded
until Gregorys successor, Urban II, officially called for a holy war in 1095.
Also around this time Muslim Almoravids moved into North Africa and the
Iberian Peninsula. The Almoravids imposed a strict interpretation of Muslim
law and practices, threatening Christians in the region.16 In response, Gregory
VII dispatched troops to the region in 1078 with the aim of pushing back this
new Muslim force. Papal troops took Toledo in 1085, followed by the capture of
Tarragona. In these military expeditions, knights were granted papal indulgences,
and those that died in battle were called martyrs.17
In light of these domestic and international security concerns, Pope Gregory
VII called on scholars to delineate the religious and legal conditions under which
the church could use force. The scholar Anselm drew from the works of fourth-
century bishop Saint Augustine of Hippo to distinguish between two types of
holy wars: those commanded by God and those approved by God. Anselm dif-
ferentiated his denition of the holy war from Augustines concept of the just
war, which, although containing similarities, requires the sanction of force by a
king, not the pope. The thirteenth-century scholar Thomas of Aquinas further
dened the conditions under which the church could sanction military action
and the limits of force against non-Christians.18
Under these conditions Pope Urban II called for a holy pilgrimage at the
Council of Claremont in November 1095, to begin on the feast of the assump-
tion of Saint Mary, on August 15, 1096. He called for armed action to liberate
Byzantium from advancing Muslim forces:

From the connes of Jerusalem and from the city of Constantinople a griev-
ous report has gone forth and has repeatedly been brought to our ears;
namely, that a race from the kingdom of the Persians, an accursed race, a
race wholly alienated from God, a generation that set not their heart aright
and whose spirit was not steadfast with God violently invaded the lands
of those Christians and has depopulated them by pillage and re. . . . On
whom, therefore, is the labor of avenging these wrongs and of recovering
this territory incumbent, if not upon you, you upon whom, above all other
nations, God has conferred remarkable glory in arms, great courage, bodily
activity, and strength to humble the heads of those who resist you?
Urban II also called for the liberation of Jerusalem:
Jerusalem is the center of the earth; the land is fruitful above all others, like
another paradise of delights. This spot the Redeemer of mankind has made
illustrious by his advent, has beautied by his sojourn, has consecrated by
his passion, has redeemed by his death, has gloried by his burial. This royal
city, however, situated at the center of the earth, is now held captive by the
enemies of Christ and is subjected, by those who do not know God, to the
worship of the heathen. She seeks, therefore, and desires to be liberated and
ceases not to implore you to come to her aid.19
Urban II proclaimed a holy war as the pope, speaking on Christs behalf, nam-
ing it the Via Dei, the Way of God, and declaring that God wills it.20 He called
specically on young, able-bodied men to vow to defend the church and don
crosses on their clothes and armor as a sign of their holy mission. Urban II for-
bade monks from participating, however, claiming that it violated their vows to
renounce the world and to not take up arms.21 Finally, Urban II promised salva-
tion to those who undertook the mission: Accordingly, undertake this journey
eagerly for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the reward of imper-
ishable glory in the kingdom of heaven.22
Although Pope Urban II called for specic people to embark on the Crusade,
the popular response to the popes declaration was overwhelming. One layper-
son in particular, Peter the Hermit, zealously proclaimed the need for a holy
war, calling on all Christiansold, young, male, and femaleto embark on
the expedition.23 His message stressed the need to liberate Jerusalem from Mus-
lim oppression, reecting the importance of the Holy City to current-day Chris-
tians.

Peter gathered a following so whipped up by the proclaimed threat to Chris-
tianity that a mob stormed through the Rhineland, on Easter Holy Week, in
March 1096, slaughtering Jews in what became known as the rst holocaust.24
An eyewitness records the event:
They killed the women, also, and with their swords pierced tender children
of whatever age and sex. The Jews, seeing that their Christian enemies were
attacking them and their children, and that they were sparing no age, like-
wise fell upon one another, brother, children, wives, and sisters, and thus
they perished at each others hands. Horrible to say, mothers cut the throats
of nursing children with knives and stabbed others, preferring them to per-
ish thus by their own hands rather than to be killed by the weapons of the
uncircumcised.25
Following the slaughter, a force of around sixty thousand Christians left for the
east via the traditional pilgrimage routes to the Holy Land, ve months before
Urban IIs start date. This mass is often referred to as the Peasants or the Peo-
ples Crusade. Without planning and proper provisions, most of these armed
pilgrims starved en route, were killed in battle against Seljuk forces in August
of that same year, or converted to Islam. Peter the Hermit miraculously survived,
missing the battle altogether.26
The official Crusade set off on August 15, as scheduled. The force consisted of
ve armies of around forty thousand, including castellans and their families,
professional knights, lay knights, and other men sworn to protect the church
and its interests. Unlike the rst wave that left in the spring, this group was bet-
ter prepared for the long journey ahead. Participants had solicited funds, sold
property, and received donations from congregations to nance the trip.27
Several scholars note that the early crusaders had several motives for engag-
ing in a holy war. Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith argues that the primarily
motivation for most was religious piety. But some went in search of adventure
and glory, others went as a means of performing penances for crimes commit-
ted, and perhaps a few went in search of fortune, although there is virtually no
evidence that crusaders returned wealthy from the expedition.28
The official crusaders reached Constantinople in the spring of 1097. In exchange
for transport across the Bosporus, the crusading lords swore an oath to the king
that they would return all Byzantine land recaptured on the road to Jerusalem.
Once ferried across the straight, crusaders defeated the Seljuks in a pitched bat-
tle in April 1097. From there, the force took the city of Nicaea, and established

a principality in Edessa. The lords did not, however, return the land to Byzan-
tium as promised.29
The road to Jerusalem was arduous. Beginning in October 1097, the crusaders
fought to regain the city of Antioch from the Seljuks. Throughout that winter
in Antioch, one in seven knights died of starvation, and half of the force
deserted.30 Remaining troops were forced to forage for food, and it was reported
that many slaughtered their horses for survival and some even resorted to can-
nibalism, eating enemies bodies.31 Peter the Hermit, now part of the official
Crusade, tried unsuccessfully to escape and return home. The crusaders nally
took the fortress in June 1098 and then became victims of a countersiege. Under
these difficult circumstances crusaders saw a meteor and found what they believed
to be the True Lance of Christ, both interpreted as signs of Gods favor.32 On
June 28 the crusading forces and the Turks engaged in a pitched battle. Encour-
aged by miraculous signs, the crusaders defeated the Turks and claimed the city,
establishing a second principality.
On January 13, 1099, Raymond of Aguiles set off from Antioch to Jerusalem
with a small force, including knights, foot soldiers, and citizens. He was reported
to have been barefoot and dressed as a pilgrim. On June 6 the force took Beth-
lehem. That night crusaders reported seeing a lunar eclipse, again interpreting
this as a sign of Gods favor. On June 7, 1099, the band reached the ramparts and
began their siege on the city. Reinforcements from Genoese and English ships
miraculously reached Jaffna in time to give the force necessary siege equipment
to take the city. Historian Thomas Madden describes the evening before the siege
began: On July 8, the Muslim defenders on the walls of Jerusalem watched with
astonishment as the army of the Franks became a barefoot, unarmed pilgrim-
age. Singing prayers and bearing relics, most prominently the Holy Lance, the
army of the First Crusades walked around the walls of Jerusalem, coming at last
to the Mount of Olives. There Peter the Hermit delivered a sermon, inspiring
the assembled thousands, just as he had done on the plains of France so long
ago.33 The siege began on June 13 and ended on June 15, with the crusaders tak-
ing the city.
Once in the city the crusaders indiscriminately slaughtered an estimate twenty
thousand to thirty thousand of its inhabitants. Raymond of Aguiles wrote in his
journal that piles of heads, hands and feet were to be seen. He further detailed,
If I tell the truth it will exceed your powers of belief. So let it suffice to say this
much, at least, that in the Temple and the Porch of Solomon, men rode in blood
up to their knees and bridle reins. Indeed it was a just and splendid judgment

of God that this place should be lled with the blood of unbelievers since it had
suffered so long from their blasphemies.34 The capture of the Holy City and the
creation of a crusader principality were deemed a miracle, both by the forces
that took the city and by those who heard the news of the victory back in Europe,
particularly after crusaders began to return home in 1100.
The miraculous success of the First Crusade spawned a series of future Cru-
sades aimed at capturing or recapturing the Holy Land. Returning pilgrims
brought with them heroic tales of their journey to Christs home that were
spread through legends, songs, and poems.35 The crusading lords kept accounts
of their journeys, which circulated around Europe after their return. William of
Tyre, who was actually born in Jerusalem in 1130, also chronicled the crusader
kingdoms and created lasting documents that spread throughout Europe.
Perhaps more important, legends of crusaders were spun that depicted crusad-
ers as ideal Christians and almost supernatural heroes. Richard the Lionhearted,
who fought the Muslims in the Third Crusade, became an icon of the era and is
still the subject of novels and movies. The mythical Robin Hood also began as a
crusader. Other epic poems that fed crusader imaginings include The Song of Roland,
believed to have been written in the eleventh century, which depicts Charlemagnes
victory against Spanish Muslims.36 The epic is a medieval example of chivalry, a
code of ethics for knights. Jerusalem Delivereda twenty-chapter Italian poem
penned in the sixteenth centurydepicts the victory of the First Crusade:
The sacred armies, and the godly knight,

That the great sepulchre of Christ did free,
I sing; much wrought his valor and foresight,
And in that glorious war much suffered he;
In vain gainst him did Hell oppose her might,
In vain the Turks and Morians armed be:
His soldiers wild, to brawls and mutinies prest,
Reduced he to peace, so Heaven him blest.
These epics and poems romanticized the Crusades, allowing them to live on in
the minds of Europeans long after these campaigns were militarily or politically
feasible.37
Another way in which the Crusades were romanticized in medieval Europe
was through sermons that called on parishioners to take up the cross. Individu-
als were encouraged to go on Crusades at points in the liturgical year, in accord
with events happening in the Holy Land. These sermons were later compiled

into volumes to serve as models for priests calling for Crusades. One volume,
compiled by James of Vitry, describes the benets of crusading:
Those crusaders who prepare themselves for the service of God, truly con-
fessed and contrite, are considered true martyrs while they are in the ser-
vice of Christ, freed from venial and also mortal sins, from all the penitence
enjoined upon them, absolved from the punishment for their sins in this
world and the punishment of purgatory in the next, safe from the torture
of hell, in the glory and honour of being crowned in eternal beatitude. The
spouses and children are included in these benets in as much as they con-
tribute to expenses. But [crusaders] can also greatly help their deceased
parents who have left their goods to them, if [the crusaders] take the cross
with the intention of helping their parents.38
Therefore, not only were crusaders celebrated as heroes in this life, but they were
also promised salvation for themselves and their families in the next.
The idea of crusading was also kept alive through the emergence of Hospital-
ers and Templars, knights that took up the sword to defend and, eventually,
expand the crusader kingdom. Prior to the First Crusade, Hospitalers organized
places to care for sick and dying pilgrims that had reached Jerusalem. After cru-
saders succeeded in taking the city, soldiers and knights joined these hostels,
took a monastic vow of poverty, and swore to defend Jerusalem and the Holy
Land. One order, the Knights of the Hospitalers of Saint John, became particu-
larly powerful and wealthy from charitable donations by pious Christians in
Europe.39 They grew to not only offer care for dying pilgrims but also to ght
on behalf of the crusader kingdom. Alongside the Hospitalers, a group of knights
known as the Poor Fellow Soldiers of Jesus Christ offered their services to the
King of Jerusalem. This group became known as the Knights of the Temple, or
Templars, because they swore to defend the Temple Mount and all of Jerusalem
against Muslim advances. Templars answered directly to the pope and, like Hos-
pitalers, took vows of poverty and obedience.
Hospitalers and Templars, which eventually evolved into rival orders, became
important military forces for the defense of the crusader kingdom and its expan-
sion. They captured or built castles on the kingdoms frontiers to engage the
enemy. Armstrong describes these forces as solider monks and argues, These
monks were pushing aggressively against the frontiers of Islam and were in the
front line of the holy war. One day the new chosen people would conquer Islam
in Asia and Africa. Hospitalers and Templars became powerful orders in the

church and important symbols of the crusader kingdoms. Templar churches
were built throughout Europe, reminding Christians there that the whole of
Christendom was mobilized for a holy war in defense of Jerusalem.40 Despite
the popular enthusiasm surrounding crusading in Europe, crusaders were able
to hold Jerusalem only until 1187, when it was lost to Muslim forces headed by
Saladin, in what became known as the counter-Crusades.
The Counter-Crusades
Political dynamics in the Near and Middle East at the end of the eleventh cen-
tury directly contributed to the success of the First Crusade. The region was
divided between two main Muslim empires that were ghting each other for
control of the region: the Abbasids, which were Sunni and controlled largely
by the Turkish Seljuk sultans, and the Fatimid Dynasty, which was Shia.41 Both
the Seljuks and the Fatimids were trying to create a unied Muslim polity with
their respective branches of the faith predominating. These ambitions propelled
both forces into confrontation, beginning around 1070. Seljuk inuences
increased after their defeat of Byzantine forces at Manzikert in 1071 and Antioch
in 1084. Fatimid power, however, began to decline in the mid-eleventh century,
particularly under the reign of al-Hakim, who most likely suffered from some
form of mental illness.42 In 1071 the Fatimids lost Sicily to the Franks and Tripoli
to an internal rebellion. The Seljuk and Fatimid Empires continued to ght each
other throughout the rest of the century, in addition to combating the rising
threat of Mongols in the north and advancing Christian forces from the west.43
During this time Jerusalem changed hands between several leaders. The Fati-
mids gained control of the city at the end of the tenth century. Under the lead-
ership of al-Hakim, from 996 to his disappearance in 1021, the citys non-Muslim
holy sites were desecrated or destroyed, including synagogues and the Anastasis,
the church that housed the tomb of Christ. Muslims sites also suffered under
his rule, particularly the Dome of the Rock shrine, which partially collapsed in
1017.44 Then in 1071 a Sunni Turk general captured Jerusalem from the Fatimids
and drove out all of the Shias, but the Fatimids recovered the city in 1098, the
year before crusading forces arrived.45
Amid these confrontations between Muslim empires, crusaders moved into
Asia Minor, taking Edessa, Nicaea, and Antioch from the Seljuks before moving
down into the eastern Mediterranean and seizing Ramlethe Fatimid capital
in Palestinefollowed by Bethlehem and Jerusalem.46 Turkish troops were dis-
patched during the siege of Antioch but failed to push back the offense. Jerusa-

lem fell without reinforcements being issued from the Fatimids in Cairo.47 Cru-
sading forces continued to capture cities in the following decades, taking
Caesarrea in 1101, Acre in 1104, Tripoli in 1109, and Beirut and Sidon in 1110.48
The rst call for jihad against the Christian presence in the region came from
religious scholars and judges. In 1105 the scholar Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami in
Damascus argued in his book Kitab al-Jihad (Book on Holy War) that the cru-
saders were not part of Byzantium but rather represented a new Christian offense
aimed at taking Jerusalem from Muslim hands. Moreover, he interpreted their
miraculous success as divine punishment for Sunni moral and political decay.
Al-Sulamis argument was echoed by the Damascus scholar Abdu al-Rahim, who
cited previous treaties and writings on jihad to encourage the Seljuks to call for
a holy war to defend the Muslim world against the new Christian threat.49
The rst political authority to call for jihad was the Turkish tribal leader Najm
al-Din Il-Ghuzi Ilghazi, who swore an oath to ght a holy war in defense of
Allepo against the new crusader kingdom of Antioch. He led Muslim forces in
a major victory against the crusaders in 1119, in a battle called The Field of Blood.
The second Muslim leader to call for jihad was Imad al-Din Zangi, who created
a semiautonomous principality in northern Iraq and Syria in the twelfth cen-
tury. Through the aid of religious scholars, he called for jihad not only against
Christians but also against immoral and corrupt Muslim leadership in the region.
He encouraged Muslims to return to more orthodox practices and welcomed
volunteers to ght in his armies against indels. This proclamation prompted
an alliance between his Muslim rival in Damascus, Muin al-Din Unur, and the
crusader kingdom in Jerusalem.50 Despite this Christian-Muslim alliance, Zangi
still succeeded in capturing the crusader kingdom of Edessa in 1144. After his
assassination in 1146, his son Nur ad-Din succeeded him as leader in Allepo.
Nur ad-Din took Damascus in 1154, aided by projihad factions in the area and
an uncoordinated Christian attack on the city led by Norman, German, and
Flemish crusaders.51 To commemorate the victory, he commissioned the con-
struction of a minbar, a Muslim pulpit, to be placed in Jerusalems al-Aqsa mosque
after the citys planned recapture by Muslim forces. However, Nur ad-Din was
forced to commit the bulk of his troops to push back crusader ambitions in
Egypt, blocking his goal of liberating Jerusalem. The troops succeeded in thwart-
ing the crusaders, and one of its generals, a Kurd later known by the name Salah
ed-Din (Saladin), took charge of Cairo.
Saladin converted Cairo from a Shia capital to a center of Orthodox Sunni
Islam. He founded Sunni madrasas, religious schools that teach theology and

Islamic jurisprudence, and he supported Sunni Sus. Following the death of
Nur ad-Din in 1174, Saladin took control of Damascus and deposed ad-Dins son,
effectively uniting the two centers of Muslim power in the region. After con-
solidating his authority in the neighboring cities of Allepo, Mayyafariqin, and
Mosul, he responded to the pressures of his religious scholars and focused his
resources on a jihad against the crusader presence in the region.52
Saladin had highly trained, strongly led, and well-equipped armies that suc-
ceeded in outmaneuvering crusader forces in the region. Saladins armies were
composed of Turkish and Kurdish professional soldiers along with mamluks
(slaves), mercenaries, and volunteers mobilized for jihad.53 Saladins troops made
use of sieges, raids, and ambushes, tactics that crusader forces were not accustomed
to encountering.54 Saladin also commissioned at least three military manuals
aimed at making his large forces more efficient through organization and tactics.55
In contrast, crusader forces were small, often poorly trained, and dispersed among
several strong points. They were no match to Saladins forces, which numbered
in the tens of thousands, unied in one mass that moved from city to city.
In June 1187 Saladin led a force of around thirty thousand troops into battle
against the crusader kingdoms.56 He took the crusader stronghold in Tiberias
along the Sea of Galilee in the Battle of Hattin, followed by the capture of Ascalon
in September and the capitulation of Jerusalem in October of that same year.57
Unlike crusading forces a century earlier, Saladin negotiated the peaceful sur-
render of the city, allowing most of its inhabitants to leave with their possessions
after paying a fee.58
Once in Jerusalem Saladin is reported to have immediately set about clean-
ing the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and restoring the Dome of the Rock,
which had been converted into a church, and the al-Aqsa mosque. The pulpit
commissioned by Nur ad-Din was brought from Damascus and installed in the
al-Aqsa mosque, and Friday prayers resumed. Saladin gave the Greek Christians
control of the Christian sites in the city, punishing the western Latin Christians
for their treatment of Muslim people and holy sites during the Crusades. In
addition, Saladin allowed Jews back into the city and welcomed those eeing
Christian persecution in Spain and France.59
Saladins capture of Jerusalem sparked the call for another Crusade back in
Europe. During his offensive in 1187, Saladin did not take the port city of Tyre,
which allowed the crusaders to keep a foothold in the region.60 In 1190 Richard
the Lionheart of England and Philip II of France set off on what would become
the Third Crusade. In 1191 Richard captured Cyprus, establishing the island as a

base for western naval operations, followed by the reconquest of Acre in that same
year. From October 1191 throughout 1192, crusading forces attempted to retake
Jerusalem, but without success. However, later that year, after a lengthy eld battle
that drained Saladins nancial and material resources, Richard succeeded in forc-
ing a truce after the Battle of Jaffa.61 Saladin died in 1193, at which time his king-
dom was divided among regional rulers. In 1229 crusaders negotiated a deal for
Jerusalem, but it was later captured by Turks in 1244. With Jerusalems recapture
and the defeat of crusader forces, the call for jihad over Jerusalem came to an end.
European Crusades
Although the First Crusade had the goal of liberating Greeks from Muslim occu-
pation and capturing Jerusalem, the concept of crusading later expanded to
include holy wars within Europe. Riley-Smith argues that the Crusades can be
divided into ve broad categories. First, Crusades were taken against Muslims
to liberate land and, to a lesser extent, people believed to be the property of
Christianity. This category includes the First Crusade and subsequent ones taken
to defend and recapture crusader kingdoms established by the First Crusade,
particularly to defend Jerusalem.62 Future Crusades in the fourteenth and f-
teenth centuries, undertaken by French and Hungarian forces to push back Otto-
man advances into the Balkans, could also be included in this category. Second,
Reconquista Crusades were fought to liberate Spain from Muslim occupation,
particularly the thirteenth-century battles in Cordoba, Valencia, and Seville.63
Third, Crusades were fought in northeastern Europe with the aim of ridding
the continent of paganism. This type of crusading includes the twelfth-century
proclamations of Saint Bernard of Germany, who encouraged the pope to sanc-
tion Crusades against pagan Slavs. His request produced the papal bull Divina
Dispensatione, which sanctioned the use of force for conversion, justifying the
Livonian Crusade in 1199 and a joint German and Danish Crusade in 1209.
Fourth, popes called for Crusades to battle kings believed to be a threat to the
church. This category includes Crusades against Henry VI, a 1240 attack against
Frederick II, and a 1265 offensive against the English monarchy.64
Fifth, Crusades were taken to subvert heretics and schismatics within the
Christian world. This form of crusading was called in the twelfth century by the
scholar Johannes Gratian and the Third Lateran Council.65 It includes military
action against the Greeks in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the Albi-
gensian Crusade against a pocket of Catharisman ancient deviation of Chris-
tianity that claimed a special form of baptism could make people sinfree Per-

Table 2. Christian Crusades to the Holy Land
Crusade Date Opponent Goal(s) Result
Peasant Crusade, Muslims Liberate Jerusalem Ambushed and defeated by

109697 Turks in 1097
First Crusade, Muslims Liberate Greek Created principalities;
10961109 Christians; liberate captured Jerusalem in 1099
Jerusalem
Crusade of 1100 Muslims Expand crusader lands Defeated in Asia Minor
Venetian Crusade Byzantines, Take Corfu; expand Defeated Fatimid armada;
of 1122 Muslims crusader kingdoms took Tyre in 1124
Second Crusade, Byzantines, Take back Edessa; free Helped capture Lisbon;
114548 Muslims Iberian Peninsula; defeated in Asia Minor and
defeat Byzantines in battle over Damascus
Third Crusade, Muslims Take back Jerusalem Did not capture Jersalem;
118792 called three-year truce;
captured Cyprus
Fourth Crusade, Muslims, Depose Byzantine king, Sacked Zara and
1198 Greeks take back Jerusalem Constantinople
Childrens Muslims Retake Jerusalem Defeated and ridiculed
Crusade, 1212
Fifth Crusade, Egypt Take back Jerusalem Besieged and captured
121321 via Egypt Damietta in 1219;
lost it again in 1221
Sixth Crusade, Egypt Retake Damietta Took Damietta;
124950 marched to Mansurah;
faced blockade;
lost battle
Crusade of 1261 Muslims Retake Jerusalem Captured Tunis;
made it to Acre;
returned home
fectsin southern France.66 Emperor Frederick II called for the death penalty
for those found guilty of heresy, and under Pope Gregory IX new codes were
added to papal canon law to allow for heretics to be executed by means of hang-
ing, burning, or drowning.67
In the thirteenth century Pope Gregory IX created the office of the Inquisi-
tion to specically combat heresy in Europe.68 In 1478 a papal bull founded the
Holy Office in Spain, which became known as the Spanish Inquisition, an insti-
tution that lasted until 1834.69 The inquisition focused on weeding out what the
church believed to be heretics to the faith, of which convertsmostly Jews but

also some Muslimswere the primary target. Jewish converts suspected of secretly
continuing Jewish practices were called marranos, or pigs, and put to death; one
estimate claims that more than three hundred thousand were burned at the stake
after being declared heretics. Moreover, Jewish communities in general were
often accused of blasphemy against Christ, which provided legal grounds for
destroying religious property such as copies of the Torah or the Talmud and
compelling their emigration from Europe.70 The inquisition spread to Portugal
and to Spains and Portugals colonies. In total four distinct inquisitions were
established, the medieval, the Roman, the Spanish, and the Portuguese. Crusad-
ing to stamp out heresy within Europe became a bloody enterprise that may
have cost hundreds of thousands of lives and forced the expulsion of Jews and
Muslims in Spain and Portugal.
In addition to the ve categories of crusading identied by Riley-Smith, sev-
eral popular crusades occurred in and around Europe. These Crusades were
unique in that they were not sanctioned by the pope but rather called by lay-
people believed to have a special connection to the divine. Peter the Hermit and
the Peoples Crusade is perhaps the rst example of this type of crusading. In
1212 a young man named Nicolas of Cologne stirred up a force of thousands
with a vision of Christian masses walking through the sea to liberate Jerusalem.
This offense became known as the Childrens Crusade, despite the presence of
men and women in its ranks.71 Stephen of Cloyes, a layperson connected with
the pilgrimage center of Chatres in France, had a vision of Christ that called for
him to organize a mass to deliver divine letters calling for the liberation of Jeru-
salem to Philip Augustus, king of France. Finally, a mass of poor believed to be
mostly shepherds rose up in support of Louis IXs Crusade against Egypt, which
became known as the Shepherds Crusade.72
These different types of Crusades reveal that several motives inspired the call
to holy war. Religious and political leaders viewed Muslim advances toward
Europe as a serious threat to stability. But these leaders also viewed heresy and
paganism as threats to the faith, by some counts an even bigger threat than the
advance of Islam.73 Likewise, disagreements between kings and popes also posed
a threat to the church. Therefore, although actions taken by crusaders resulted
in conquest and expansion, their perception was one of defense, recapture, and
liberation of land and people believed to be Christian. Crusades were rst called
by popes but also unofficially called by charismatic laypeople who succeeded
in gathering large, destructive forces. The concept of crusading, and the fervor
it ignited in average Europeans, could not be controlled by the church. Chris-

tian holy wars largely died out after Jerusalem and the other crusader kingdoms
were lost to Muslim forces in the thirteenth century.
The Decline of Crusading

Although crusading expanded to include campaigns aimed at ghting pagans
and wayward Christians in Europe, and some of these campaigns persisted as
late as the eighteenth century, crusading as a popular religious undertaking
largely died out by the sixteenth century, and it is virtually unthinkable as a reli-
gious practice within Christianity today. How did a concept that red imagina-
tion into average people and inspired bloodletting on behalf of Christ become
a romanticized tale of the past?
Certainly political circumstances within Europe and the Near East played a
critical role in the decline of crusading. The rise of Saladin and consolidation of
Muslim forces in the Near East made the crusader kingdoms unviable and dif-
cult to defend. Circumstances in Europe also inuenced the decline of crusad-
ing, particularly inghting among European kings and between kings and popes.
But political circumstances alone do not explain the twilight of crusading as
a religious practice in the minds of average Europeans. Evidence suggests that
crusading lingered as a popular practice, particularly through campaigns such
as the Childrens and Shepherds Crusades, and through persisting legends of
crusaders and their miraculous and heroic journeys to the Holy Land. The end
of crusading as a popularly held belief involved more than just the political fea-
sibility of crusading; something within Christianity itself made this literal battle
of good versus evil a thing of the past.
Perhaps the strongest explanation for the end of crusading comes from the
radical transformation that European Christianity underwent, beginning with
the Renaissance in the fourteenth century and then the Reformation in the six-
teenth century. Despite efforts to keep Christians loyal to the pope, and Chris-
tianity unied in beliefs and practices, the solidarity of Christendom began to
unravel. The Renaissance introduced a new era of reasoning and thought based
on the revival of classical literature and art from Greek and Roman antiquity.
The renewal of the classics reinvigorated ways of thinking about human destiny
and divinity.74 Alongside the Renaissance, and perhaps in reaction to it, new
interpretations of the faith began to emerge that challenged traditional think-
ing of the church. Schismatic movements had always existed in Christianity, but
the ability of the church to put these movements down grew more difficult as
religious, social, and technological circumstances converged in Europe.

In the early 1500s Martin Luthera lawyer turned monk and professorchal-
lenged several practices of the church as having no basis in Christian scriptures.
As a scholar Luther had access to scriptures and could read the texts for himself.
A critical part of his reformation of Christianity, therefore, involved translating
the Bible into vernacular languages so that people could read scriptures for
themselves. Luthers agenda for bringing people back to scriptures was aided by
the advent of the printing press, which allowed for these new translations of the
Bibleand commentaries on the scripturesto spread throughout Europe and
to shape the way Christians thought about their practices and beliefs.
Luther called for a renewed emphasis on scriptures and faith, not practices,
as the path to salvation. Luther drew on the book of Romans to argue that Chris-
tians are saved by their faith, which is a gift from God, and not by actions. Luther
claimed that sola de and sola scripturafaith alone and scripture aloneare
the means of salvation; this statement later became known as the Doctrine of
Justication by Faith.75 Although attempting to reform Christian beliefs, Luther
perpetuated a schism in Christendom that could not be reconciled, and his
interpretations began what became known as Protestant Christianity.
Protestantism, along with the Renaissance and later the Enlightenment, intro-
duced new ways of practicing Christianity. Protestantism became largely a cere-
bral exercise, emphasizing the importance of reading scriptures, prayer, and faith
as the path to salvation. Protestantism focused on sin, the force of evil in the
world, and not sins, acts of wrongdoing that required specic acts of penance.
Saints and relics became superstitious practices of the past for most Protestant
denominations.76 Even the sacraments changed, with the Eucharistin most
casesbecoming less important than in Catholicism, and baptism taking on
heightened importance in many denominations.77
The spiritualization of Protestant Christianity also changed the enemies of
Christ and the understanding of the battle. The enemies of Christ were no lon-
ger literal foes but spiritual onesthe daily struggle to live a Christlike life and
to overcome temptation and resist the force of sin. Some Protestant denomina-
tions speak of spiritual warfare, which is the internal struggle of good over evil.
These gradual changes in Christianity have made the idea of crusading a curi-
ous and romantic episode of the past.
Alongside the transformation of Christianity brought about by Protestantism,
political changes in Europe made crusading an infeasible concept. In 1533, amid
the turmoil caused by Luther, Pope Clement VII excommunicated King Henry
VIII, following his divorce from Catherine of Aragon and marriage to Anne

Boleyn. Henry VIII established the Anglican Church, which although essentially
Catholic in its practices, maintained administrative autonomy from the Vatican.
The year following Englands spilt with the church, Pope Paul III called the
Council of Trent, which reaffirmed the tenets of the church and refused to nego-
tiate with Protestant calls for reform. The church promised to clamp down on
mystical movements, schismatics, and heretics. For the next hundred years Europe
was embroiled in internal wars between Protestants and Catholics over control
of Christendom. In 1555 the Peace of Augsburg stipulated that cuius regio, eius
religio, the rulers religion is the religion of his land, meaning that sovereigns
could not interfere in other sovereigns religions. Prior to the Peace of Augsburg,
it is estimated that Germany lost almost two-thirds of its population to ghting
and the plague.78
Although crusading died as a practice within Christianity, the legacy of the
Crusades continues to affect Christian-Muslim relations today. Several scholars
note that at the time Muslims did not record the First Crusade to the Holy Land
as a religious attack on Islam; the event was either understood as another pil-
grimage or as a military invasion by the Franj, the Arabic word for Franks.79 In
the modern era, however, crusading has become a politicized example of Chris-
tian brutality against Muslims. In 1998, for example, Osama bin Laden called for
Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, hearkening back to the eleventh century and
coding current U.S. foreign policy as a continuation of Western efforts to destroy
Islam.80 Thus, while crusading is dead in the Christian world, the perception of
the Crusades and their intentions are still very much alive in the Muslim world
and continue to impact relations between the West and Islam.

4
Ayodhya
The Hindu Nationalist Battle for Hindutva
On December 6, 1992, an estimated 300,000 Hindu activists gathered in the

northern Indian town of Ayodhya, stormed a 350-year-old mosque, and demol-
ished it with shovels, axes, and their bare hands.1 In its place they assembled a
makeshift temple to the avatar Ram on the site where they believed he was born.
The incident sparked the worst riots in India since Partition, in addition to
touching off violence in Pakistan and Bangladesh. An estimated 1,700 to 3,000
died in the riots, with more than 5,500 injured.2 Again, in February 2002, Hindu
activists traveling on a train from Ayodhya through the state of Gujarat were
attacked by an angry mob; their train was set on re and all 57 passengers killed.
The attack ignited riots in Gujarat, where at least 2,000 died, mostly Muslims.3
Why did Ayodhyaa site shared by Hindus and Muslims for hundreds of years
become the ashpoint for religious violence in South Asia and the epicenter of
a much larger battle for the identity of India?
This chapter investigates three waves of Hindu and Muslim violence over
sacred space in Ayodhya: Sunni Muslim attempts to seize a Hindu temple in
185355, the rst recorded violence at the site; the appearance of Hindu idols in
Ayodhyas Babri Mosque in 1949 and the riots it produced; and a federal courts
decision to open the mosque to the public in 1986, which provoked two major
incidents of violence: in 1992, when Hindu activists destroyed the temple, and
in 2002.
Historical and contemporary battles over Ayodhya reveal an interesting trans-
formation in what the site represents to religious adherents. The rst battles over
Ayodhya were limited to one groups bid for control over access to the site. But
in the 1980s the battle for Ayodhya became about much more than just access
to the sacred site. Ayodhya became the symbol of Hindu victimhood and pol-
lution by Indias foreign occupiers; reclaiming the site became the symbolic
source of Hindu redemption. This transformation from periodic, localized skir-
mishes to a symbol of the Hindu nation is the result of mobilization through
Hindu cultural, religious, and political organizations. These organizations seized
on the controversy over Ayodhya and have interpreted the Ramayanawhich
details the birth of Ram in Ayodhya, the capture of his wife by demons, and her
heroic rescueas the need for mass mobilization to recapture the lost essence
of India and drive out the modern-day foreign demons of Islam and Christian-
ity. Religious and political leaders alike have used Ayodhya to mobilize the masses
for political and social ends, namely for elections and the bid to make India into
a Hindu nation based on Hindu beliefs and culture.
Ayodhya and the Ramayana

Hinduism is one of the oldest existing religions known to humanity. The tradi-
tion has a multitude of practices and texts that focus on liberation from life,
death, and rebirth (samsara) and drawing closer to the Absolute. Of particular
importance to a discussion on Ayodhya is the practice of devotion to a deity, or
bhakti, which involves acts such as going on tirthas, or pilgrimage, to sites related
to deities and giving offerings, puja, of owers, incense, and other gifts in the
home or at temples to dieties. Most Hindus today practice bhakti in one form
or another.4
Alongside bhakti practices are religious epics, legendary tales of gods and
their avatars as they aid humans in their time on earth. The Mahabharata, which
contains the Bhagavad Gita, depicts the story of Prince Arjans ethical dilemmas
when confronted in battle by his own relatives, and the council of Krishna, ava-
tar of Vishnu, who is the preserver of life in the Hindu pantheon.5 Another epic,
the Ramayana, tells the story of Ram, seventh avatar of Vishnu. The Ramayana
chronicles Rams birth in Ayodhya, his childhood, and his marriage to Sita, who
is the avatar of Lakshmi, Vishnus partner. The epic depicts that while Ram is
preparing to be crowned king of Ayodhya, the demon king of Lanka, Ravana,
captures Sita and carries her off to his kingdom. Ram joins forces with Hanu-
man, a monkey god, who helps Ram locate Sita. After nding Sita, Rams army
Ayodhya 53
confronts Ravana, destroys his forces, and takes her back. Ram and Sita return
to Ayodhya, where they have two children, Lava and Kusha, who eventually suc-
ceed Ram as ruler of the kingdom.6
Although primarily a Hindu text, the Ramayana also exists within Buddhism,
and the story has spread throughout South and Southeast Asia. The poems
depictions of duty, honor, virtue, and heroism, as well as love, delity, and devo-
tion, are themes that give the tale transcendence across time and space. These
religious epics are also well known by Hindus, and as one source argues, The
epics help to bind together the many peoples of India, transcending caste, dis-
tance and language.7
Hindu nationalists use of the Ramayana has been wildly successful mobilizing
Hindus not only within India but around the world. Its depiction of foreign inva-
sion, theft of purity, and heroic duty to recover what was lost has become power-
ful themes for Hindu nationalist ideology. Furthermore, Ayodhya, as the celebrated
birthplace of the avatar Ram, is a popular pilgrimage site in the practice of bhakti.
These practices of pilgrimage and devotion to deities have become powerful tools
to mobilize the masses for the Hindu nationalist agenda, including for electoral
success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), the Hindu nationalist party.
Historical Overview of Ayodhya and the Rise of Hindu Nationalism

There is little disagreement that the Sunni Muslim emperor Babur, the second
ruler of the Mughal Empire, commissioned the building of a mosque in Ayod-
hya in 1528 and that he chose Ayodhya because of its reputation as a holy city.
Prior to the construction of the mosqueknown as the Babri Masjid, or Baburs
Mosquearchaeological and ethnographic evidence shows that not only was
Ayodhya a city sacred to Hindus but that it also had Jain and Buddhist temples,
the latter extending back to around the fth century bce.8 For Hindus the city
is celebrated as the birthplace of Ram, an earthly avatar of the deity Vishnu. The
city hosts several holy sites, including the Hanumangarhi, the temple-fortress of
the monkey god Hanuman; the Kanakbhavan, the palace of Ram and his wife,
Sita; and the celebrated birthplace of Ram, which is believed to be near or on
the same site as the Babri Mosque.
During the time of the mosques construction, and for three hundred years
that followed, there is no evidence to suggest that violence between Hindus and
Muslims in the city or the region occurred as a result of the presence of the
mosque in Ayodhya. The reigns of Sunni Mughal emperor Babur (152630)
but particularly those of Akbar (15561605), Jahanjir (160527), and Sha Jahan
54 Ayodhya
(162757)are recorded as periods of religious cohabitation and cultural pros-
perity on the subcontinent. It was during this time that poetry, music, architec-
ture, and art ourished in India, drawing from both Islamic and Hindu motifs.
In this era Islamic and Hindu religious feasts were cocelebrated, Muslim Su
saints tombs were visited by Muslims and Hindus alike, the emperors upheld
Hindu tenets such as the ban on cow slaughter, and the rulers employed numer-
ous Hindu elites in their courts. Moreover, these emperors chose to abolish reli-
gious taxes on non-Muslims, the jizya tax, and relaxed the scope of Sharia law
to family and personal matters, fostering a more peaceful coexistence between
Hindus and Muslims.9
Despite this era of cohabitation between Muslims and Hindus, there were a
few groups that criticized this religious collaboration. In particular, certain Mus-
lim religious clerics, the ulama, called for the stricter imposition of Sharia law
and more orthodox Islamic practices. The Naqshbandiyah Su order, formed in
the beginning of the sixteenth century, also opposed shared rituals and tomb
patronage by Muslims.10 Overall, however, the time was marked by religious
accommodation and coexistence between Hindus and Muslims.
This era of religious cohabitation and cooperation came to an end with the
ascendancy of Aurangzeb (16571707) to the Mughal throne. Aurangzebwho
rose to power by killing two of his brothers and imprisoning his father, Shah
Jahan, until his deathformed an alliance with the ulama to consolidate power.
Together they sought to restore their interpretation of Orthodox Islam to the
empire. Aurangzeb reimposed the jizya tax on non-Muslims, reinstated Sharia
penal laws, and encouraged conversion to Islam.11 He executed the Sikh leader
Guru Govind Singh, which in turned fueled the creation of a religious warrior
order in Sikhism, the Khalsa.12 Aurangzeb also embarked on numerous unsuc-
cessful military campaigns that drained the nancial and military power of the
empire. Aurangzebs battles against the Hindu Marathasa confederacy of lower
caste tribes consolidated by the ruler Shivaji in 1674were particularly destruc-
tive to the empire. These battles became the inspiration for stories of Hindu
warrior monks who defeated the Mughal armies, tales that would reemerge in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Hindu nationalist rhetoric as examples of
Hindu power and strength.13 The weakened state of the empire led to an inter-
nal power struggle for succession after Aurangzebs death and allowed for other
rulers to take regions that the empire could no longer defend.
The decline of the Mughal Empire sparked several Islamic revivalist move-
ments on the subcontinent aimed at explaining the cause of the empires decline
Ayodhya 55
and the path to its redemption. Two Islamic revivalist leaders are especially
important for understanding the milieu in which Sunni Muslims of Ayodhya
rose to challenge the Hindu presence in the city. Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702
62) argued that the Mughal Empire had fallen into decline because its leaders
had turned away from the true path of Islam.14 Restoration lay in reviving their
interpretation of pure Islam, modeled after the example of the Prophet and his
companions. Specically, reviving Islam required a return to Sharia law, formu-
lated by freshly applying the words and deeds of the Prophet as recorded in the
Sunnah.15 As a member of the Naqshbandiyah Su order, he argued that revival
also required reforming Su practices to exclude the worship of saints tombs
and rituals that incorporated Hindu elements. Wali Allah further stressed the
importance of an elected caliphate for governing the umma, the worldwide Mus-
lim community, in opposition to Shia practices of leadership through bloodline
from the Prophet Mohammed. Wali Allah called for jihad against threats to the
faith, encouraging Muslims to take up arms against innovative practices.16
Wali Allahs agenda paved the way for the creation of a jihadi movement of
Sunni Muslims under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly (17861831).17
Like Wali Allah, Sayyid Ahmad was a member of the Naqshbandiyah order, in
addition to two other prominent Su orders, the Chisti and Qadiri. Prior to
forming his jihad movement, Sayyid Ahmad was a trooper under the Pindari
chieftain Ahir Khan, which the British defeated in 1818.18 In that same year, he
founded a revivalist movement called the Path of Muhammad and asserted
that true Muslims should retreat from the current social and political milieu of
their surroundings and create a new polity.19 In 1826, after organizing a band of
mujahideen, he declared war against Sikhs in the North-West Frontier (in pres-
ent-day Pakistan), with the aim of capturing their land and establishing a Mus-
lim stronghold; this offensive, however, ended in failure. In 1830 Sayyid Ahmad
defeated the Shia ruler of neighboring Peshawar, Yar Muhammad Khan, and
declared himself the new Muslim caliph. In 1831, with an army of around six
hundred, Sayyid Ahmad tried again to push the Sikhs out of Hazara and Kash-
mir but was killed in battle. Surviving members of the Path of Muhammad con-
tinued to hide out in the northwestern territories and fought against the British
in the Frontier Wars of 189798, before nally being subdued.20
In 1722 NawabsShia Muslim kingssucceeded the Mughal rule of Awadh,
a region that included the cities of Ayodhya, Faizabad, and Lucknow. The Naw-
abs rule maintained political cooperation with various Hindu elites, and Hindu
and Muslim leaders visited each others sacred sites. It was during this time that
56 Ayodhya
the presence of different Hindu monastic orders ourished, and from the eigh-
teenth century onward Ayodhya became an important pilgrimage site for Hin-
dus.21
The rst recorded violence between Hindus and Muslims over Ayodhya
occurred between 1853 and 1855. The Kingdom of Awadh was under the rule of
Shia Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, who reigned from 1847 until British annexation of
the site in 1856. In 1853 a band of Sunni Muslims in the region, headed by Ghulam
Hussain, rose up against the Shia ruler and marched on Ayodhya, claiming that
Hindus had destroyed a mosque to build the Hindu Hanumangarhi Temple. An
order of Naga Sadhus, Hindu warrior monks, defeated the Sunnis and around
seventy Muslims were killed and buried in the graveyard next to the Babri
Mosque. Following hostilities, the Shia Nawab king, together with the British,
attempted to resolve the dispute by investigating Muslim claims that Hindus
had destroyed a mosque; they concluded that there had not been a mosque on
that site prior to the construction of the Babri Mosque.22
The British investigation, however, did not placate the Sunni leader Maulvi
Amir-ud-din, also known as Amir Ali, who called for jihad against the Hindus
of Ayodhya in 1855 and mobilized a band of 2,000 Muslims. A combined force
of British, Nawab, and Hindu troops stopped the group en route, killing a
reported 120 to 700 before nally defeating Amir Alis troops. Amir Ali was
assassinated shortly after the attack; his head was given as a gift to the Nawab
king, and his body was buried in the graveyard next to the Babri Mosque. The
British officially annexed Awadh shortly after this uprising, erected a fence around
the mosque, and allowed Hindus to worship on a platform outside the fence.23
Shortly after the uprising in Ayodhya, Muslim and Hindu Sepoysindige-
nous forces organized by the Britishattempted an insurrection against British
rule in 1857. Other discontented elements of society joined the rebellion, includ-
ing the last emperor of the Mughals, Bahadur Shah Zafar. British forces, with
the aid of Sikh troops and some Hindu princely states, suppressed the uprising
a little over a year after its beginning. Britain dissolved the East India Company
and consolidated its control over the subcontinent.24
British rule of India changed society, religion, and group consciousness in
entirely new and, to some extent, accidental ways. Perhaps most signicant was
the emergence of communalism in Indiaindividual and group identity based
on religious affiliation. Most scholars agree that communalism is a modern phe-
nomenon, largely the product of British inuence on the subcontinent. Histo-
rian Aditya Mukherjee identies six conditions that led to the formation of
Ayodhya 57
communal identities: the uneven development between Hindu and Muslim
middle and upper classes; the British administrations decision to replace the
language used by the Mughal Empire, Persian, with English as the language of
the government; uneven opportunities for English language and higher educa-
tion favoring Hindus; British suppression of Muslim elites due to the 1857 upris-
ing; overall economic stagnation; and the emergence of competition between
Hindu and Muslim elites for government posts in the British administration.25
Communal identity further sharpened with British census taking in India,
which began in 1871. The census measured populations according to religious
affiliation, thus strengthening emerging communal consciousness. Censuses
demonstrated to both Hindus and Muslims their relative numbers in certain
regions. For example, Muslims became painfully aware of their minority status
in the north, where they used to rule over most of the subcontinent.26 Likewise,
Hindus in Punjab became aware of their declining numbers relative to Muslims,
fueling a sense of threat among Hindus, particularly elites in this region.27 The
emergence of communalism, therefore, divided Hindus and Muslims along reli-
gious lines, reorganizing society in a way that would affect relations between
the two groups and the struggle over Ayodhya.
Growing communal awareness prompted the creation of professional asso-
ciations and societies, usually with the aim of strengthening identity and society
within religiously dened groups, not across groups. One of the earliest societies
formed along communal lines was the Brahmo Samaj, the society of Brahma,
which began among Hindu elites in Calcutta. This society, which aimed to cre-
ate Hindu identity based on the authority of the Vedic scriptures, lasted only
briey, then dissolved over ideological disputes.28
In 1875 Hindu religious leaders in Punjab formed the Arya Samaj.29 This group
focused on protective measures around a commonly held Hindu beliefthe
sacredness of the cow. Their efforts to impose policies aimed at preventing cow
slaughter cut along communal lines. Specically, Muslims were accustomed to
slaughtering cows on the feast of Bakr-Id, the day commemorating Isaacs willing-
ness to slaughter his son Ishmael in obedience to God.30 Dayananda, the head of
the Arya Samaj, formed the Gaurakhshini Sabha in 1882, or the Society for the Pro-
tection of the Cow. The following year, cow-related riots occurred in Lahore, the
Aballa District, Firuzpur, and Delhi. Cow-related rioting occurred again in 1886,
1889, 1912, and 1932, the last of which included Ayodhya in addition to other cities.31
In 1923 Vinayak Damodar Savarkarthe celebrated father of Hindu nation-
alismwrote Hindutva, which he composed while imprisoned for anti-British
58 Ayodhya
rhetoric. Savarkar argued that the Indian subcontinent, which he called Bharat,
gave birth to a great nation that included numerous religions, a rich culture, and
a glorious history. The subcontinent, therefore, was dened by its Hinduness,
what he dubbed Hindutva. He further argued that the inuences of the Brit-
ish, and the Mughals before them, had polluted the Hindu nation, and therefore
all elements of these rulers should be resisted.32
Inspired by Savarkars writings, K. B. Hedgewara physician by training
formed the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (rss) in 1925. Hedgewar founded the
rss as neither a religious organization nor a political party but rather as a Hindu
cultural movement designed to provide discipline and revitalization to its
members.33 Building off of Savarkar, Hedgewar argued that Hindus had fallen
into a state of personal and national weakness, allowing their land and people
to be occupied by foreign forces, rst by Muslims for 1,200 years and then by
the British. Hindu weakness, therefore, had to be overcome to assert Hindu inde-
pendence. The rss lionized Hindu warrior monks of the early eighteenth cen-
tury, who defended the community against the Mughal emperor Aurengzeb and
his forces, as examples of the Hindu might necessary for transforming the nation.
Hedgewar argued that actions, not beliefs, are what makes one a Hindu. The
movements practices, therefore, stressed physical training, strength, and disci-
pline. As a fraternity, it targeted boys between the ages of eleven to fteen.34
Although Hedgewar rejected Hindu texts as the basis for national identity, the
rss drew heavily on religious festivals, beliefs, and symbols for mobilization.35
Furthermore, building off of Savarkars work, the rss was formed not as an orga-
nization exclusive to Hindus; rather, he made a distinction between indigenous
religions of IndiaHinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhismand foreign
religions such as Islam, Christianity (the religions of Indias occupiers), and Juda-
ism. The rss advocated that Indians who practiced these religions were the prod-
uct of foreign occupation; they therefore needed to return to their true religious
beliefs, most likely Hinduism, to be bona de Indians. Thus, although a cultural
organization, their identity boundaries were drawn by religious distinctions. To
spread their ideas, the rss founded the periodical the Organiser, which contin-
ues to have a wide circulation today. The rss has become one of the most impor-
tant societies connected to the rise of Hindu nationalism and has played a major
role in events relating to the violent contestation over Ayodhya.
Muslims also formed institutions and societies around this time. In 1867 Mus-
lim elites founded the Deobandi College with the aim of educating Indian Mus-
lims in orthodox practices of Islam. Proponents of this path were relatively few,
Ayodhya 59
but some still exist on the subcontinent today, particularly in Pakistan.36 A larger
camp of Muslim intellectuals headed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khanperhaps the
most prominent Muslim elite of this eraaimed to gain resources for Muslims
by working within the British system. In 1875 Khan founded Aligarh University,
a school of higher learning for Muslims that taught skills, such as English, impor-
tant for attaining governmental jobs.37 In 1877 another prominent Muslim, Saiyd
Amir Ali, created the National Mahommedan Association to help promote Mus-
lims in government posts. In 1888 Khan founded the Muhammadan Educational
Conference to push for greater British resources for Muslim education. In 1906
this conference became the All-India Muslim League, which aimed to establish
greater Muslims representation in the political sphere. Their efforts helped to
create Muslim quotas within the government in 1909. Alongside the formation
of societies, Muslims also founded newspapers and other forms of print media
aimed at informing and strengthening identity within their groups. Khan began
the Tahzib al-Akhlaq in 1872, followed by similar publications in Lucknow and
Lahore, including the Pioneer, which was widely circulated among Muslim elites.38
Also during this time Hindus and Muslims attempted to gain greater politi-
cal power through the creation of a unied movement. In 1885 Hindu elites in
Bombay called the rst meeting of the Indian National Congress. The organiza-
tion sought to unify all elites of India, not just Hindus, with the aim of ending
British rule; this bid, however, was soon rejected by Amir Ali and the National
Mahommedan Association, which believed that British rule could not be dis-
lodged from the subcontinent and therefore Muslims should work toward
improving their status and resources within the British system. Although there
were Muslim elites who participated in Indian National Congress meetings, it
suffered without the support of Amir Ali and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.39
Again in 1920, under the leadership of Gandhi, the Indian National Congress
attempted to unify Hindus and Muslims and oppose British rule through acts
of civil disobedience in the Noncooperation Movement. Gandhi joined forces
with the Khalifat movementa pan-Muslim effort to preserve the office of the
caliphate and protect Muslim religious sitesto mobilize the masses across the
Hindu-Muslim divide.40 Gandhi, however, drew heavily on Hindu sources
symbols, texts, and practiceswhich alienated Muslims from the movement.
The Noncooperation Movement therefore, while enjoying initial success, lasted
only briey and dissolved by 1925.41
In 1941, keeping with the Deobandi tradition, Mawlana Mawdudi founded
the Jamaat-i-Islami Party, largely in reaction to the secular agenda of the Muslim
60 Ayodhya
League and its leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who argued for the creation of
an independent state in South Asia. He wanted a place in which Muslims, as an
ethnic category, would be the majority, thus ensuring their survival. Mawdudi
argued that the creation of a state was not enough; the government and its peo-
ple needed to affirm and uphold the tenets of Islam, particularly Sharia law, to
ensure the survival of what he considered true Muslims.42 However, from the
1937 elections in India until the time of Partition, the majority of Muslims backed
the agenda of the Muslim League, not Jamaat-i-Islami.43
Partition was the critical event that changed the political and religious status
quo in India and provided the opportunity for Hindu action against the Babri
Mosque. The partition of the subcontinent into the Muslim state of Pakistan
and India, which was overwhelmingly Hindu, institutionalized the communal-
ist divide. Most of the Muslim groups formed prior to Partition moved to Paki-
stan, including Jinnahs Muslim League, which created the rst government in
Pakistan, and Mawdudis Jamaat-i-Islami party. The migration of Muslim orga-
nizations to Pakistan left Muslims within the borders of India vulnerable in
issues concerning political representation, minority protection, and the status
of sacred sites such as Ayodhya.
The next major conict over the status of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya came
just after independence and Partition, in 1949. On the night of December 22,
idols of Ram and his wife Sita appeared inside the Babri Mosque. Many Hindus
believed this to be a miracle, while Muslims and the federal courts declared it
to be the work of Hindu activists bent on claiming the sacred site for themselves.
The federal courts ordered that the idols be removed, but the local courts refused
to comply.44 In 1950 the federal courts locked the mosque without removing the
idols and placed guards around the building. Both Hindus and Muslims formed
their own action committees to assert their claims over the site. Hindus formed
the Ram Janmabhoomi Seva Committee (Committee for the Care of the Ram
Birthplace) and the Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yajna Samiti (Committee for the
Ram Birthplace Liberation Ritual). Muslims founded the Babri Masjid Coordi-
nation Committee and the All-India Babri Masjid Action Committee.45
The Hindu and Muslim bloodshed during Partition demanded a new social
order in independent India. Nationalism, which began under Gandhi and which
stressed Indian unity in the face of British occupation, became the dominant
ideology under Jawaharlal Nehrus government. Nehru stressed industrializa-
tion and economic reform in his agenda for India, arguing that social classes
brought on by developmentwould supplant communalism. He further argued
Ayodhya 61
that popular participation in the democratic process, together with liberal insti-
tutions and education, would erode religious and ethnic identities. In its place
would emerge a new Indian identity, one based on the democratic and economic
values of the country, not on religion.46
Nehrus vision, however, did not fully materialize. Instead of the democratic
process supplanting religious, regional, and caste identities, voting blocs emerged
along these cleavages, reinforcing communalism. Moreover, organizations and
political parties formed in opposition to Nehrus secular India, stressing the
centrality of Hindu culture and values. Religious-nationalist political parties
remained on the fringe of political life until the advent of Indira Gandhis Emer-
gency Rule of 197577. During Emergency Rule, the rss played a critical role as
a moral opposition to Indiras actions. Key rss leaders, including Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani, were imprisoned and the organization
banned.47
When Emergency Rule was lifted, several parties, including a Hindu nation-
alist party, joined forces to form the Janata Party and challenge the Congress
Party. In the 1977 elections the Janata Party won seats in the legislative assembly
and received cabinet posts, bringing the Hindu nationalist agenda into the main-
stream.48 From this time Hindu nationalism has grown in India, paving the way
for Hindu activist support within the government.
The Hindu nationalists use of Ayodhya as a rally point for Hindu unity and
political mobilization is primarily the result of the formation of the rss, which
predates Partition; the creation of Hindu nationalist political parties, the
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (bjs) and its successor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp); and
the founding of an organization by Hindu religious leaders, the Vishva Hindu
Parishad (vhp).
The rss is perhaps the most important Hindu nationalist organization to sur-
vive Partition. Although banned from February 1948 until July 1949, under sus-
picion of inspiring Gandhis assassin, the rss has endured and ourished. The
rss has aided the Hindu nationalist bid in two important ways. First, it has
exposed large numbers of Indians to its ideology and agenda. The organization
runs camps, athletic events, and after-school programs, targeting boys between
the ages of eleven to fteen. Attrition is high but many pass through the orga-
nization and are exposed to their worldview.49
The goals and ideology of the rssthe need for Hindu unity to overcome
foreign threats and to return Indian society to its preinvasion gloryis broad
enough to support a family of affiliate organizations, called the Sangh Parivar.
62 Ayodhya
This family includes groups run by individuals who have been affiliated with
the rss at some point and those that the rss has created, such as the Rashtra
Sevika Samiti, a womens group; university groups; and labor unions. The rss
has also fostered international ties with Hindus in the diaspora. These ties have
helped to spread Hindu nationalism across the worldwide Hindu population.50
The rss has further inuenced the Hindu nationalist agenda by throwing its
support behind political parties sympathetic to its goals. The rss stresses that it
is not a political party, but it also asserts that it participates in the political pro-
cess and encourages its ranks to vote. In 1984 the Congress Party, under Rajiv
Gandhi, claimed to support rss goals, earning the groups backing and subse-
quent success in that years elections.51 In 1991 the rss threw its weight behind
the bjp, the Hindu Nationalist Party. The bjp did exceedingly well, winning 119
seats in national elections and nearly 20 percent of the vote. In addition, the bjp
won state elections in Uttar Pradesh, Indias most populated state and the loca-
tion of Ayodhya, along with Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajastan.52
Thus, although not a political party, the rss has demonstrated its ability to mobi-
lize its supporters to affect the electoral process.
The bjp and the bjs are critical for understanding the rise of Hindu national-
ism. The bjs was founded on October 21, 1951, by Dr. Prashad Mookerjee, a for-
mer member of the Hindu Mahasabha Party.53 The party argued that Nehrus
government favored minorities, particularly Muslims, and that this was detri-
mental to the Hindu majority; a party was needed, therefore, to counter this
trend. After creating the bjs, Mookerjee sought the backing of the rss to provide
the party with mass support. In 1952 the bjs received 3.06 percent of the vote for
the Lok Sabha (the lower house). By 1967 it had received 9.41 percent of the
vote.54 In the face of rising corruption in the Congress Party during the 1970s,
the bjs stressed value based politics, rallying anti-Congress, anticorruption
groups throughout the country. Following the end of Emergency Rule in 1977,
the bjs joined the Janata Party, which enjoyed initial success in the 1977 elections,
but then broke away after weak election results in 1980 to form the Bharatiya
Janata Party (bjp), with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its founding president.55
The bjp has followed on the rhetoric of the bjs to stress value-based politics,
arguing that the crises facing India are due to moral decay. The party uses Gan-
dhis philosophy as the cornerstone of its new political ideology, stressing the
importance of Hindu culture and spirituality for creating a just society and gov-
ernment, what the party calls humanistic liberalism.56 The bjp argues that sec-
ularism, as expressed by the Congress Party, is both alien and corrupt to the true
Ayodhya 63
nature of India and Indian people. Building on Savarkar and the rss, the bjp
capitalizes on the terms Hindutva and Bharat, which they cite as the ancient
name for India. The bjps platform calls for India to return to its preconquered,
organic state and to base its government on justice inspired by Hindu culture
and spirituality.
Although organizationally distinct, the majority of key members in the bjp
have ties to the rss. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the bjps rst president and former
prime minister of India, was a regional leader in the rss. Lal Krishna Advani,
who has been president of the bjp since 1986, was a journalist for the rss publi-
cation the Organiser. In addition to their ties with the rss, most members of the
bjp are highly educated (many hold postgraduate degrees) and come from the
upper or middle castes; more than 60 percent of current members fathers were
active in the bjs.57 The rss has also been critical for bjp electoral success, endors-
ing their campaigns in 1989 and 1991. The bjp proted from an alliance with the
Shiv Sena (Shivas army), a political organization formed in 1966 to defend Maha-
rashtra Hindus in the Mumbai area, but then later joined the wider Hindu
nationalist agenda. Shiv Sena members created networks of gangs that have used
intimidation tactics and violence to drive out immigrants from the city. The Shiv
Sena formed an alliance government with the bjp from 1998 to 2004.
The third organization, the vhp, is perhaps the most important organization
for explaining why Ayodhya has become the epicenter of Hindu nationalism
and the target of Hindu violence. The vhp was created at a conference of 150
Hindu religious leaders on August 29, 1964, in Bombay, on the birthday of the
avatar Krishna. The overall goal of the vhp is to unify Hinduism.58 The vhp aims
to make this unied version of Hinduism the national religion and dening ele-
ment of India. The vhp has sought to implement this goal by shoring up differ-
ences between the Vaishnava and Shaiva strains within Hinduism and to mini-
mize competition within orders. The vhp also has worked within tribal areas to
bring them formally into the fold of Hinduism and to end caste discrimination.
Moreover, the vhp has sought to incorporate Hindus around the globe into its
movement, opening chapters in countries such as Trinidad, the United States,
and Canada.59 In this last aim, the vhp has also encouraged Hindus in the dias-
pora to fund projects in India and abroad, which is believed to be a considerable
source of revenue for the movement.60
Furthermore, the vhp has sought to reduce conversion of Hindus to Islam
and Christianity and to welcome back Hindus that have converted to these
faiths. The vhp website claims that conversions create social tensions and that
64 Ayodhya
Swami Vivekanand has . . . said that a convert from Hinduism is not only one
Hindu less, but an enemy more.61 A rss supporter claims that Muslims have
drifted away from the Motherland. Only one percent stems from the Middle
East. All the others have been converted by the sword or money since more than
500 years. . . . After Barbur came conversion. The problem is: The Muslims dont
see themselves as Hindus, that is, as Indians. We have failed to convince them
that they are from amongst us.62
The vhp has links with both the rss and bjp, which strengthens these organi-
zations efforts to realize Hindutva. The rss supplies the general secretary for the
vhp, and the upper ranks of the vhp usually have historical ties to the rss, simi-
lar to the bjp-rss relationship. The vhp, however, does not allow any active pol-
itician to be in its executive body.63 Despite this, the bjp has voiced its support
for vhp objectives, including its bid to build a temple on the site of the Babri
Mosque in Ayodhya. Likewise, the vhp has endorsed the bjp in its electoral cam-
paigns.64
Similar to the rss and bjp, the vhp has sought to bring other Indian religions
into its fold. It has invited Sikhs to participate in its meetings and events, and
the Dalai Lama attended its second meeting in 1966.65 Islam and Christianity,
however, are considered foreign religions and not welcomed within the vhps
ranks. Anthropologist Thomas Blom Hansen argues that Hindu unity became
the battle cry for protection against the threat posed by Muslims both within
India and in neighboring countries. Blom Hansen quotes an rss journalist for
the Organiser: We Hindus are magnimonious [sic] peopledocile, gentle, god-
fearing, considerate for others. . . . Well, Muslims did beat Hindus time and again,
not because Hindus lacked bravery or sacrice, but just for one reasonDis-
unity. . . . After centuries of humiliation the Hindus Atma [soul] has arisen like
Phoenix from the ashes. Hindus want to possess what is theirs.66
Unlike previous attempts to create a unied version of Hinduism, the vhp has
chosen to focus not on the ancient Hindu scriptures, such as the Vedas, but rather
on religious practices, most notably the bhakti tradition of devotion to gods and
their avatars. In doing so, the vhp has emphasized popular Hinduism, not the
Hinduism of elite Brahmans. Focusing on the common practices of Hinduism
has in turn made the religious agenda of the vhp resonate more with the masses.
The vhps biggest success in mobilization has been in its organization of mass
processions, yatras, drawing on popular bhakti traditions. In 1983 the vhp orga-
nized an Ekatmatayajna Yatra for national unity. Three main envoys of activists
carried giant water pots from the Ganges Riverwhich is believed to be a Hindu
Ayodhya 65
deity and has the power to cleanse and grant salvationthroughout India, fol-
lowing traditional pilgrimage routes. The procession used the Ganges as a sym-
bol of Hindu unity, literally carrying the river to the people and binding them
together. The yatra was enormously successful; the vhp estimated that around
60 million people participated in the event, and it helped to create local vhp
chapters throughout the country.67
The vhp spearheaded a liberation movement in 1984, aimed at cleansing Hindu
sites of non-Hindu elements, most notably by attempting to remove neighbor-
ing mosques. Targeted sites included a temple devoted to Krishna in Mathura,
a site to Shiva in Benares, and Rams celebrated birthplace in Ayodhya.68 Along-
side the liberation movement, the vhp embarked on another yatra in 1984, as a
sacrice to liberate the birthplace of Lord Ram. The procession began in Sita-
marhi, the celebrated birthplace of Rams wife, Sita, and progressed to Ayodhya,
then onto Delhi, where it planned to demand that the Babri Mosque be unlocked
and Hindus have access to the site. The procession, however, was stopped short
of Delhi by the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi.69
The call to liberate Ayodhya became the symbol, sine qua non, of Indias weak-
ness and the need for unity to redeem the Hindu nation. Anthropologist Chris-
tiane Brosius contends, The formulation of a crisis that required radical agita-
tion, laid out in the narrative of the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri mosque
controversy, is based on the suggestion that both Ram and Mother India had to
be liberated from their imprisonment. Their liberation equals the liberation
and reassertion of the Hindu people, and the constitution of ideal nationhood
and governance. Similarly, Blom Hansen argues that the Ayodhya controversy
provided the cause and imperative for Hindu unity: Hindu culture, always
inclusive, tolerant, and syncretic but also always lacking a clear center, a clear-
cut identity, unity, and sense of cohesion, has nally come into itself, as a nation,
through the Ram janmabhoomi movement [to build a temple on the site of the
Babri mosque].70
Hindu nationalists continued to build on their initial success of using yatras
to mobilize the population. In 1985 the vhp organized another procession across
northern India, this time carrying life-sized depictions of Ram and Sita behind
bars.71 In 1986 the district court of Faizabad ruled in favor of a Hindu-sponsored
petition to allow the Babri Mosque to be unlocked and opened to the public,
triggering riots throughout the country.72 The following year Hindu national-
ists organized the Ramshilla Yatra, which collected bricks from throughout the
Hindu world for the construction of a temple. Bricks came from the kilns of
66 Ayodhya
villages and cities, not only throughout India but also from as far away as the
Caribbean, United States, Canada, and South Africa. On November 9 the pro-
cession reached Ayodhya and kar sevaks, Hindu activists, were allowed to lay the
cornerstone in the ritual of shilanyas. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi backed the
procession and even laid a stone himself.73
In 1989 the Ramayana was aired as a yearlong tv miniseries; it was enormously
popular and dubbed The [tv series] Dallas of India.74 The following year Hindu
activists organized a chariot procession through ten states with the goal of rais-
ing support for the construction of a Hindu temple at the site of the Babri
Mosque. The military blocked the procession on the outskirts of Ayodhya and
Lal Krishna Advani, the leader of the bjp, was arrested.75 An estimated thirty
Hindus were killedlater called martyrs for Ayodhyain clashes with the mil-
itary. Following this yatra, Advani appeared on the cover of India Today dressed
as Ram behind bars.76 Despite the involvement of bjp leaders in the controver-
sial procession, the party won 119 seats in the 1991 national elections and nearly
20 percent of the overall vote. Moreover, the bjp won state elections in Uttar
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajastan.77
On December 6, 1992, an estimated 300,000 Hindu activists gathered in Ayod-
hya for a rally. The activists climbed the fences surrounding the site and, with
pick axes, shovels, and their bare hands, destroyed the mosque in a matter of
hours. The incident, broadcast across the country, ignited nationwide riots that
left 1,700 to 3,000 dead and more than 5,500 injured, in addition to sparking riots
in Pakistan and Bangladesh.78 In response to the Ayodhya incident, the Indian
federal government restricted Hindus from entering the mosque, dismissed the
bjp-led governments in their four ruling states, banned three Hindu activists
groupsthe vhp, the Bajrang Dal, and the rss (in addition to two Muslim
group)and called for the reconstruction of the mosque.79
Hindu and Muslim activist groups petitioned the state and federal courts for
a legal ruling on ownership of the site. In February 1993 the government issued
a white paper on Ayodhya, outlining its history and arguing for the reconstruc-
tion of the mosque. The same year the bjp issued its own white paper, which
argued, The ceaseless struggle to re-establish their rights and rebuild the temple
at the Janmabhoomi implies their continued and persistent attachment to the
site and such an attachment has no other explanation except that it was in con-
tinuation of an older tradition, namely, a pre-Babur tradition, namely, their devo-
tion to the place where Sri Rama was born. The chronology reveals that the
Hindus never ceased claiming the site and brings out their relentless struggle
Ayodhya 67
to regain it.80 The bjp white paper claims that the emperor Babur destroyed a
Hindu temple devoted to Ram and used the pillars from the temple to build
the Babri Mosque over the actual birthplace of Ram; therefore, the site should
be returned to Hindus. Muslim organizations disagree with this story, asserting
that Babur did not destroy a Hindu temple but that Babur was known for his
tolerance toward other religions, especially Hinduism.81 The government and
organizations on both sides hired archaeologists to survey the site, but contra-
dictory evidence has not resolved the disputed narratives.82 In 1993 district courts
allowed Hindus to resume their worship of Ram on the site of the demolished
mosque.
Tensions over the status of Ayodhya continue. On the eighth anniversary of
the mosques destruction, in December 2000, Indias parliament censured prime
minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a member of the bjp, after he stated that a Hindu
temple should be built on the ruins of the Babri Mosque and that this was an
expression of national sentiment.83 In February 2002, prior to the tenth anni-
versary of the mosques destruction, Hindu kar sevaks traveling by train from a
rally in Ayodhya through the state of Gujarat were attacked; their train was set
on re, killing all of the passengers. In retaliation, riots broke out in Gujarat.84
In March 2003 the government announced plans to excavate the site at Ayodhya
with the intent of answering if a temple had once stood where the ruins of the
mosque now lay. In September 2010 the Indian High Court ruled that the site
should be split into thirds, with Muslims, Hindus, and the Nirmohi Akhara sect
each getting a portion, and the specic site of the Babri Mosque going to Hin-
dus. Muslims groups claim they will appeal the verdict.85
Ayodhya: From Sacred Space to Hindu Nation

The transformation of the battle for Ayodhya from bids for control of the site
to a symbolic struggle for the redemption of India stems from three interrelated
factors: the creation of Hindu nationalist organizations, the use and interpreta-
tion of the Ramayana as a tool of mass mobilization, and democratic competi-
tion.
The rst two incidents of violence in Ayodhyain the 1850s and in 1949
focused primarily on one group trying to seize control of the sacred site. The
rst two episodes occurred following the decline of power of the local polity.
In the 1850s the Sunni offensive was part of a larger movement of Islamic revival
occurring on the subcontinent. Violent Islamic uprisings occurred in the North-
West Frontier and Titu Mirs insurrection in Bengal.86 The Ayodhya uprisings
68 Ayodhya
also occurred around the time of the last attempt of the indigenous military and
Mughal political elites to shake off the British and restore power. The 1857 upris-
ing, like the attacks on the Hanumangarhi Temple, ended in defeat and with the
mass annexation of the subcontinent to British rule.87 These attacks involved
underlying social and political factors, such as the loss of status, demographic
changes, and reduction in political clout.
The 1949 outbreak of violence between Hindus and Muslims in Ayodhya
occurred on the heels of Partition. The majority of resources devoted to protect-
ing and promoting Muslim rights on the subcontinent were invested in the cre-
ation of Pakistan.88 Hindu activists, on the other hand, were strong and mobi-
lized. This shift in power and resources provided a window of opportunity for
Hindu activists. The rss in particular had the resources to mobilize large num-
bers of individuals sympathetic to the Hindu nationalist agenda; it was named
as the most likely organization connected with the placement of idols inside the
Babri Mosque and the riots that followed. The federal governments quick reac-
tion to the incidentthe censure of the rss and the closure of the mosque
stayed the violence but did not resolve the underlying dispute.
By contrast, the current wave of violence surrounding Ayodhya, beginning in
the 1980s, has become about much more than just the status of the sacred site;
the battle has taken on mythic proportions, symbolizing the fall of India and
its people to foreign occupiers, and the need for liberation of not only Ayodhya
but the entire subcontinent and Hindu people everywhere.
The changes in rhetoric and scope are the result of three well-equipped orga-
nizationsthe rss, vhp, and bjpthat have a common goal: to unify all Hindus
and make India Hindutva, a country and region dened by Hindu culture and
history. Each organization targets a specic audience. The rss aims to indoctri-
nate and mobilize Indian youth for their national agenda. The vhp seeks to coor-
dinate religious leaders and plan religious events for the Hindu nationalist goal.
And the bjp works within the Indian government, striving to attain seats of
power at the state and federal levels. Furthermore, the groups are well organized
and led by charismatic gures. The organizations also have fostered ties to com-
munities in the diaspora, making them capable of reaching a large number of
Indians through their activities and fund-raising. The result of these organiza-
tional efforts is that large numbers of Indians have given active or tacit support
to the Hindu nationalist agenda. This support is visible in the numbers that have
participated in yatras and in votes for the bjp and its political and social agenda.
The success of the Hindu nationalist movement, therefore, lies in these groups
Ayodhya 69
organization skillstheir leadership and ability to mobilize the masses through
common beliefs and practices of Hinduismfor Hindu nationalist ends.
All three of these organizations have used religious resources to mobilize the
masses. The groups have drawn on Hinduisms militant past, most notably Hindu
Sadhu warriors battles to defend land and faith against the Muslim Mughal
leader Aurangzeb in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They have also
conjured up the more aggressive side of Hinduism, calling on deities like Durga,
the goddess of power, to emphasize Hindu strength. These groups have identi-
ed a two-pronged threat to the Hindu nation: foreign religions, specically
Islam and Christianity; and secularism, which is a foreign idea and not authen-
tic to India. Instead, they advocate for the return of Indian values and norms in
politics and ideals based on Hindu scriptures, practices, and beliefs.
Hindu nationalist rhetoric is also saturated with the perception of threat both
to Ayodhya and to the Hindu nation. The rss, the bjp, and the vhp have all
dened India as a nation that is weak, vulnerable, and under attack from foreign
threatsmost notably Muslims and Muslim nations. Although Hindus make
up 85 percent of India, they claim that India and the Hindu nation is under
duress from the religious other. They cite Indias occupation by Muslim rulers,
followed by British (Christian) occupation until independence in 1947. More
recent examples of threats to the Hindu nation include the 1981 conversion of
an untouchable village to Islam, believed to be funded by money from Arabian
Gulf States.89 They also name cyclical are-ups in Kashmir as a source of threat
to the Hindu nation, particularly Pakistans actions in the region and the pres-
ence of mujahideen, Islamic holy warriors, in that conict.90 Hindu nationalists
further point to neighboring Bangladeshs declaration that it is an Islamic repub-
lic as yet another example of the Muslim threat to the Hindu religion and cul-
ture. Thus, despite being the majority, these organizations have built a case around
the threats posed to the Hindu nation by foreign forces.
Ayodhya became the symbol of Hindu victimhood and pollution by Indias
foreign occupiers, and reclaiming the site became the symbolic source of Hindu
redemption. Hindu nationalists have interpreted the Ramanaya as the symbolic
and literal need to drive out the modern-day foreign demons of India (Islam
and Christianity) and redeem India. Although the rss, vhp, and bjp claim to
promote Hinduism as a culture and a civilizationnot as a religionthey have
dened cultural Hinduism using religion. Cultural Hindus are those Indians
who are Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh. Cultural Hindus are not Muslim or
Christian; these are the religions and identities of foreign invaders. To become
70 Ayodhya
a true member of the Hindu nation, therefore, requires returning to authentic
Indian religions. These identity boundaries are, at their core, religious; religion
is the salient distinction between who is part of the Hindu nation and who is
not.
Finally, democratic competition has played an important role in promoting
the Hindu nationalist agenda. The erosion of the Congress Partys dominance
and legitimacy, starting in the 1970s, opened the door for other parties to enter
mainstream politics in India, including the Hindu nationalist bjp. Beginning in
1989 the bjp has had a foothold in both the central government and several state
governments in India, allowing for the Hindu nationalist agenda in general, and
goals for Ayodhya in particular, to prosper. The 1992 destruction of the Babri
Mosque prompted the central government to dismiss the bjp-run government
in Ayodhyas state, Uttar Pradesh, on the grounds that it provided a permissive
environment for the mosques destruction.91 Despite being censured, the bjp
performed strongly in state and general elections in the 1990s, eventually hold-
ing a simple majority in parliament in 1996 and placing Vajpayee in the premier-
ship for a brief stint. In 1998 Vajpayee again became prime minister after the bjp
formed a government through the National Democratic Alliance, which ran the
country until the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance formed the govern-
ment from 1999 to 2004.92
More recent developments, specically the 2004 and 2009 elections, suggest
that the bjps failure to improve the lives of Indias poor resulted in its weak per-
formance at the polls and loss of the premiership. In 2004 the bjp chose the slo-
gan India shining, in an effort to ride on a feel good campaign. Several observ-
ers argued that this approach backred, particularly in the face of continued
privation for the nations poor. One journalist asserts, It seemed to be a cruel
joke in a nation where a third of the people still live on less than $1 a day and
human development indices are largely appalling.93 Following the elections the
partys leader Lal Krishna Advani admitted that the slogan was not wrong . . .
but not appropriate. In response to the election results, political scientist
Ashutosh Varshney contends, The conclusion is inescapable. The less econom-
ically privileged sections of India and the minorities have spoken loudly, clearly
and unambiguously, and the privileged have in all probability not even stepped
out to vote.94
In 2009 general elections again revealed the limits of the Hindu nationalist
agenda. The bjp lost 17 seats in the Lok Sabha, reducing its numbers to 138 and
performing poorly in several key states, including Uttar Pradesh. Furthermore,
Ayodhya 71
the National Democratic Alliance lost the key alliance of the Biju Janaata Dal,
weakening its overall strength as the opposition to the Congress-led United Pro-
gressive Alliance, which formed the government following elections.95
Thus, it appears that the appeal of the Hindu nationalist agenda has limits.
Specically, the bjp has been held accountable to the everyday economic demands
of Indias masses, and these needs have outweighed the ideological pull of Hindu
nationalism. While Hindu nationalism is unlikely to go away, its appeal may be
checked, particularly at the polls.
72 Ayodhya
5
buddhist violence in sri lanka
Defending the Dhammadipa
The civil war in Sri Lanka was one of the bloodiest and most protracted conicts
in recent history. Considerable attention has been paid to Tamil acts of violence,
particularly those of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte), or Tamil
Tigers, and their efforts to attain an independent homeland on the island. Com-
paratively less attention has been paid to the rise of Sinhalese nationalisma
social and political agenda aimed at making the island Sinhalese and Buddhist
and the role it has played in shaping dynamics on the island.1 Sinhalese nation-
alism has at times involved violence; at its most extreme it inspired a Buddhist
monk to assassinate the countrys prime minister in 1959 for failing to make Sri
Lanka a Buddhist state. How could the teachings of the Buddha and the norm
of ahimsa, nonviolence, produce an assassin and inuence the bloody civil war
in Sri Lanka?
This chapter looks at the roots of Sinhalese nationalism and how Buddhism
became intertwined in the bid to make modern-day Sri Lanka the Dhammad-
ipa, a land and people chosen to make Buddhism shine in glory.2 It begins with
the emergence of Buddhist nationalism under British colonialism, focusing par-
ticularly on the rise of an educated middle class and their role in reinterpreting
Buddhism in light of current social and political circumstances. It then looks at
how democracy created the conditions for Sinhalese- and Buddhist-centric pol-
itics, which alienated the islands minorities and dragged the country into civil
war. Modern-day Sinhalese nationalism, rooted in local myths of being a reli-
giously chosen people and of special progeny, demonstrates that even a religion
perceived as inherently peaceful can help fuel violence and hatred in its name.
Buddhism in Sri Lanka

Most scholars agree that missionaries introduced Buddhism to Sri Lanka around
the third century bce. However, Sinhalese lore asserts that the Buddha himself
visited the island three times during his life, 250 years before Buddhist mission-
aries came to the island. In these visits the Buddha designated the island and the
Sinhalese as the Dhammadipa, the land and the people of the Buddha, whose
purpose is to protect and promote his teachings.
Sinhalese legend, a mix of lore and history, further tells that Sinhalese ances-
tors came to the island around the fth century bce.3 The island was uninhab-
ited before the arrival of the rst Sinhalese, Vijaya, who then proceeded to pop-
ulate the island with his offspring. In 237 bce two Tamils usurped the Sinhalese
throne and ruled for a reported twenty-two years. Ten years later the Tamil king
Elara ascended to power and ruled for forty-four years. Elaras rule came to an
end after a fteen-year-long battle with the Sinhalese warrior King Dutugamunu,
who eventually succeeded in killing Elara and gaining the throne.4 Sinhalese
tales of Elara often depict him as an illegitimate ruler and threat to Sinhalese
society, whereas Tamils describe his rule as just and tolerant and Dutugamunu
as a merciless ethnic cleanser.
Following Elaras demise, the Sinhalese Kingdom ourished on the island.
The kings built massive monuments to Buddhism and constructed a sophisti-
cated irrigation system that allowed for cultivation of the islands Dry Zone. It
was in this time that the Sinhalese epic the Mahvamsa was written, depicting
the battle of King Dutugamunu and his victorious defeat of Elara. Dutugamunu
is described as the hero, an ideal Buddhist leader and protector of the faith:
Dutugemunu conquered by the sword and united the land [Sri Lanka]
without dividing it among our enemies [i.e., the Tamils] and established
Sinhala and Buddhism as the state language and religion He is a Buddhist
warrior that fought to defend the faith.5
In addition to the battle between Dutugamunu and Elara, the Mahvamsa

depicts a special relationship between the Sinhalese and Buddhism, in which
the island and the people are charged with defending and promoting the teach-
ings of the Buddha. The chronicle also describes the ideal ordering of society,
74 Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka

in which the Sangha, the Buddhist monastic order; Sinhalese kings; and the
population all work together to defend and propagate the faith. The king is
charged with protecting and promoting Buddhism by supporting the Sangha,
which maintains the texts and traditions of Buddhism. The Sangha in turn rein-
forces the king by endorsing his leadership and offering council. The general
population also supports the system by providing material aid to Sangha, such
as food from crops and recruits, in addition to patronizing temples and sacred
sites.6
Finally, the Mahvamsa represents an idealistic golden era in which order and
prosperity reigned, a golden era lost and in need of restoration. The Mahvamsa
also chronicles succeeding Sinhalese kings and their critical role of defending
and propagating Buddhism. Monks have updated it ve times since its original
draftin the twelfth century, in the 1750s, in 1871, in 1933, and most recently in
1977claiming to present an unbroken history of the Sinhalese Buddhists in
Sri Lanka from the time of the Buddha.7 Despite the inclusion of historical infor-
mation, the Mahvamsa is a combination of myth, history, lineage, religion, and
politics. It later became a tool for the creation of Sinhalese Buddhist national-
ism and a document that determined the divine right of the Sinhalese to inhabit
the island.
Colonial Rule and the Construction of Sinhalese Nationalism

Most scholars of Sri Lanka date the origins of Sinhalese nationalism to the mid-
1800s and identify the cause as a reaction to British occupation of the island.8
Anthropologist Stanley Tambiah claims, There is no doubt that Sinhala Bud-
dhist revivalism and nationalism, in the form we can recognize today, has its
origins in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9 Unlike its prede-
cessorsthe Portuguese (150568) and the Dutch (15681796)the British intro-
duced dramatic changes on the island, including the dissolution of the monar-
chy, the establishment of mass education, and the creation of large tea plantations.
British colonialism introduced these changes to make the island more produc-
tive for the Crown. However, British policies had the unintended effect of threat-
ening the order of society, which in turn prompted the Sinhalese to form a new
identity based on a reinterpretation of the Buddhist faith; this was the birth of
Sinhalese nationalism.
Of all the changes introduced to Sri Lanka by the British, perhaps the most
signicant was the creation of mass education. Before this change the educated
were conned primarily to the religious elite, particularly the Sangha, the Bud-
Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka 75

dhist monastic order.10 Mass education opened up literacy, history, and other
topics to people outside of the Sangha. These new skills created a stratum of
society that was neither the Sangha nor the peasantry, changing traditional social
order. In turn, it was the emergence of a literate middle class that came to play
an important role in the development of Sinhalese nationalism.
Increased literacy rates among the population fostered the creation of jour-
nals, newspapers, and other forms of print media and their consumption. These
media outlets bound people together through information in a way that was
new and made possible only through literacy. By the end of the 1800s both Sin-
halese and Tamils had their own publications, including the Sinhala Bauddhaya,
which is still published today, and the works of Tamil Arumuga Navalar.11
Mass education also exposed the population to new ideas and ways of think-
ing, including Western concepts of race and identity. Of particular importance
were the concepts of history, race, and language as a source of identity. British
and local scholars researched the historical roots of the different groups on the
island. Most scholars named the Sinhalese to be of superior Aryan stock and
their language of Indo-European lineage. The Tamils, on the other hand, were
linked to the Dravidians of southern India, which scholars deemed to be lower
on the racial ladder.12 The racial hierarchy between the Sinhalese and the Tam-
ils has persisted, despite the fact that it is not correct.13
The British imported Christian missionaries to run schools; inevitably, these
schools produced religious converts within both Sinhalese and Tamil commu-
nities, converts that spread new belief systems and created subidentities within
both Sinhalese and Tamil groups.14 Christian missionaries also exposed the island
to the different roles that ministers play as religious authorities, including as
councilors, educators, and providers for the communities needs; these relation-
ships were different than the Buddhist monks had with the population.
The Buddhist Sangha reacted strongly to these drastic changes, and the intro-
duction of Christian-run schools in particular fueled a religious backlash. The
emergence of schools outside the Sangha presented the masses with a new author-
ity gure, the teacher, which competed with the monk as the source of knowl-
edge. Coupled with a rising educated middle class, the Sangha now faced new
criticism from the population. In particular, monks were criticized for not being
more active in society and politics and for not taking a greater role in the lives
of the people. Monks therefore began to perform new roles in society, such as
serving in prisons, hospitals, and the military, and began to broadcast messages
on the radio.15

The new role of monks in public life even included formal debates with Chris-
tian clerics over their respective faiths. The most famous debate occurred in 1862
between the Buddhist monk Migettuvatte Gunananda and David de Silva, a
Methodist, in the city of Panadura. The debate lasted two days and drew a
reported ten thousand spectators, who ultimately declared Gunananda the win-
ner. The debates are credited with sparking a Buddhist revival on the island.
Religion scholar David Little claims,
Gunanandas victory symbolized the beginning of the Buddhist revival in

Sri Lanka, which would gather strength in the rest of the nineteenth and
into the twentieth century. Part of the revival was the revitalization and
reactivization of Sinhala-educated monks and lay people. . . . Part of it, too,
was the emergence of Buddhist newspapers that mobilized sentiment in
favor of Buddhist education, confrontation with the missionaries, construc-
tion of temples, and so on. But most of all, the Buddhist revival supplied
the basis for a new Sinhala identity reconstructed in opposition to the iden-
tity fostered by the missionaries and the colonial administration.16
The competition even received international attention. U.S. colonel Henry Steele
Olcott, a key leader of the Theosophical Society, later came to the island to learn
about Buddhism.
In addition to mass education, the British instigated other policies that greatly
affected social dynamics on the island. The British made English the govern-
ments language and in doing so produced competition between ethnic groups
to learn English and attain coveted posts. Christian missionary schools were the
best place to acquire English, and those that refused to attend these schools had
trouble competing with those who did.17
The British also took actions that changed identities on the island. They con-
ducted censuses based on religionas opposed to caste or class or other catego-
riesand comprised demographics of the islands population, which changed
the way these groups saw one another. The census also presented information
about relative numbers of groups. Whereas Tamils thought of themselves as one
of two majorities, the census made them aware of their minority status. Follow-
ing the census the British created policies aimed at protecting their rights as a
minority group.18
British historians and officers also sketched narratives of the islands demo-
graphic history, including the borders of former kingdoms. They created docu-
ments that would later be used by ethnic groups attempting to determine his-

torical rights to territory. For example, the Cleghorn Minute, a document produced
in 1799 by the rst British officer to govern the island, delineated the borders of
the Tamil Jaffna Kingdom. This document has been used by modern-day Tam-
ils to cite territorial dimensions of a separate Tamil state.19
As part of its efforts to expand the islands tea industry, the British imported
hundreds of thousands of Tamils from southern India to work the plantations,
which changed demographics on the island. Although ancestrally connected to
Tamils living on the island, the Tamils from India formed a new group in soci-
ety. For the Sinhalese, however, they were a threat to the demographics of the
island, adding to the minority group already there. By 1949 estate Tamils num-
bered more than nine hundred thousand.20
British transformation of the island created a popular interest in history, race,
and religion. Prior to the British, Buddhist monks were the ones charged with
maintaining and interpreting the teachings of the Buddha. Monks were also the
ones that recorded history, most notably through the Mahvamsa, which chron-
icles the political and religious developments of the island.21 Mass education
and other changes to the island prompted literate individuals to investigate,
record, debate, and interpret history outside the Sangha, which led to new inter-
pretations of not only history but also Buddhist doctrines.
The archetype of the new historian was the nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury activist Anagarika Dharmapala. Born Don David Hewavitarne to a wealthy
merchant family, Dharmapala was educated in Christian schools and not part
of the Sangha. However, he self-identied as a new authority gure in Sinhalese
Buddhist society, a person outside the Sangha, yet one who conformed to many
of its practices, including service to society and a vow of celibacy.22
Dharmapala was the principal architect in what historians Richard Gombrich
and Gananath Obeyesekere have termed Protestant Buddhism, the reinterpre-
tation of Sinhalese Buddhism in reaction to the threat of Christian missionaries
and British changes to society. Dharmapala targeted the newly emerging literate
middle class with his interpretation of Buddhism. He took the Sanghas code of
conductpreserved in the Vinaya texts of the Tipitaka, the Pali canon of Bud-
dhist scripturesand created a code for the Sinhalese people, which included
two hundred rules that covered topics ranging from hygiene, travel, and funer-
als to civic behavior. These new codes contained not only traditional Buddhist
practices but also elements of Western, Christian piety, particularly concerning
the behavior of women, and thus fused together the new and the old for the
creation of etiquette dened as pure and ideal Buddhist norms. Dharmapala

also called for greater reliance on the Pali canonthe primary scripture for
Theravada Buddhismfor Buddhist beliefs and practices, encouraging the lit-
erate to read the texts for themselves. He stressed the importance of individuals
taking responsibility for their own salvation and the prosperity of the faith.23
In addition to reinterpreting faith and history, Dharmapala criticized the
Sangha for not being more active in worldly affairs, particularly the village
monks. He chastised monks for being too focused on their own salvation and
asserted that monks had responsibilities to the wider community and to the
world. Gombrich and Obeyesekere observe that Dharmapalas insistence that
monks leave the temple, serve their constituents, and become involved in world
affairs reect the inuences of Christian missionaries on the island and the var-
ious roles they performed.24
Thus, Dharmapalas Buddhist revival, while drawing on the past, also bor-
rowed from Christianity and the British to create a modern Buddhist identity.
Dharmapalas Buddhist revival emerged in response to colonialism and the many
changes it brought to the island. But the emergence of Buddhist nationalism
also affected relationships among other groups on the island, especially follow-
ing Sri Lankas independence.
The Politicization of Sinhalese Nationalism

British colonialism set the stage for Sinhalese nationalism, but independence
and democracy became the spark that set the re of discord and violence between
Sinhalese Buddhists and others on the island. Prior to the islands independence,
the educated classes began to form social and political organizations with the
aim of strengthening society under British rule. Initially, Sinhalese Buddhists,
Tamils, and Christians founded the Ceylon Reform League in 1916, which became
the Ceylon National Congress in 1919. The congress was composed of educated
elites who attempted to affect political change through civil society and, in par-
ticular, to advocate for greater political representation within the British admin-
istration.
Just prior to the countrys parliamentary elections in 1931, the British drafted
the Donoughmore Constitution, which attempted to mitigate the potential for
ethnic and religious majoritarian politics on the island. The constitution estab-
lished complicated multiethnic executive committees that would control gov-
ernment departments and, in theory, would prevent one ethnic group from
dominating the political landscape. The constitution also called for womens
suffrage and the right of lower-caste citizens to vote. Several Tamil groups boy-

cotted the constitution because they felt it did not grant them sufficient securi-
ties against majoritarian politics.25 The Tamil boycott of the Donoughmore
Constitution marked the beginning of majoritarian politics on the island. Dis-
agreements between Tamils and Sinhalese over British-established minority
quotas in government jobs and the need for reserved seats in parliament per-
sisted through independence.
Alongside the creation of civic organizations in preindependent Ceylon, Bud-
dhist religious leaders became more active in politics by forming their own
organizations and eventually endorsing political parties. Initially, Buddhist monks
backed emerging Marxist parties and trade unions, identifying with the Marxist
ideal of supporting the disenfranchised working class. At the same time other
monks began to mobilize for Buddhist- and Sinhalese-specic ends, creating the
All Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 1935, an umbrella organization aimed at coor-
dinating efforts to protect Buddhist interests. That same year the politician S. W.
R. D. Bandaranaike founded the Sinhala Maha Sabha, also with the goal of pro-
moting Buddhist interests. The Sinhala Maha Sabha emerged as the dominant
political voice within the Sangha, eventually winning out over the Marxist-ori-
ented monks.26
After World War II the British administration began to lay the foundation for
Ceylons independence, including the call for national elections. The role of
religion and, specically, the participation of Buddhist monks in the political
process was a subject of intense debate. In 1946 Buddhist monks issued the Vidy-
alanakara Declaration, which called for them to participate in politics and social
mobilization.27 That same year the monk Walpola Rahula published The Heri-
tage of the Bhikku, arguing that monks had always played a critical role in poli-
tics and, in fact, political activism was the fulllment of their duties. Rahulas
book sparked a debate within the Sangha and the wider Sinhalese population
over the role of monks in politics. The Maha Bodhi Society, the All Ceylon Bud-
dhist Congress, and several high-ranking monks all opposed Rahulas assertions,
claiming that monks should not participate in elections or hold office. Despite
these voices of dissent, Rahula formed the Ceylon Union of Buddhists (lebm)
in 1946, with the aim of using elections to protect the nancial and political
rights of the Sangha and to promote Buddhism on the island.28
In the 1947 national elections, all major Sinhalese parties had Buddhist monks
who endorsed their campaigns.29 The United National Party (unp), formed out
of the Ceylon National Congress, won, and Don Stephen Senanayake became
prime minister, later to become the rst prime minister of independent Cey-

lon in 1948. Although Senanayake espoused a secular ideology, he implemented
policies that favored the Sinhalese as an ethnic group. In 1949 he passed legis-
lation that denied citizenship to more than nine hundred thousand estate Tam-
ils brought to the island under British rule to work on the tea and coffee plan-
tations.30 He also made references to historical Sinhalese kings and initiated
an irrigation project to the Dry Zone of the island, harkening back to projects
constructed in the golden age of the Sinhalese Kingdom. He made official vis-
its to Buddhists temples and monuments, emphasizing his personal identity
as a Sinhalese Buddhist.31 In response, Tamils withdrew from the unp and
formed the Tamil Federal Party in 1949, under S. J. V. Chelvanayakam. In 1950
the new party called for greater regional autonomy and a federation-style gov-
ernment.32
Despite the unp-led governments overtures toward Buddhism, some Sinha-
lese felt that these actions were not enough. In 1951 Bandaranaike, the founder of
the Sinhala Maha Sabha, formed the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (slfp). Oxford-
educated and initially Christian, Bandaranaike converted to Buddhism in the
1930s. He drew from the writings of Dharmapala and advocated Buddhist reviv-
alism throughout the country. He called on the Mahvamsa to argue that the
islands history and destiny were uniquely Sinhalese and Buddhist; the govern-
ments role, therefore, should be to preserve and ensure this destiny. He argued
that nationalism based on Sinhalese-speaking Buddhists was the only solution.33
Bandaranaikes message resonated with Sinhalese and provided his political party
with a popular base that would bring him to power in the coming elections.
Alongside the emergence of Bandarainakes call for Sinhalese Buddhist nation-
alism, debates over the proper relationship between the Sangha and the govern-
ment persisted. In 1954 the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress formed the Buddhist
Committee of Inquiry, a panel of seven Buddhist monks and seven laymen who
aimed to evaluate the health of Buddhism on the island. A report, The Betrayal
of Buddhism, was issued in 1956, coinciding with the 2,500th anniversary of the
Buddhas enlightenment and with Sri Lankas national elections. The report
argued that Buddhismand the Sinhalese as the protectors of Buddhismhad
been under siege for more than four hundred years, rst by Tamil invaders and
then by colonial powers, which had left their institutions weak and vulnerable.
The threat to Buddhism, however, was more than just one of military occupa-
tion; it was also cultural, specically the cultural threat posed by the Christian
missionary schools.34 Moreover, the current government had failed to protect
Buddhism and had left it prey to these various threats.

To remedy the perceived marginalization of Buddhism, the committee pro-
posed, rst, to create the Buddha Sansana Act, which would establish a govern-
ment council aimed at protecting Buddhist interests.35 Second, the committee
argued for the withdrawal of government grants to Christian schools. And, third,
it called for the government to give preferential treatment to Buddhist schools.
This report and its recommendations became the foundation of Bandaranaikes
1956 election campaign.36
That same year D. C. Wijayawardena, a wealthy and educated layperson, wrote
Revolt in the Temple, to commemorate 2,5000 years of Buddhism, of the life of
the Sinhalese race, and of Ceylons history. He argued that for more than two
thousand years the Sinhalese have been inspired by the ideal that they were a
nation brought into being for the denite purpose of carrying the Torch lit by
the Buddha. The author cites the Mahvamsa to legitimate this claim: The
Mahavamsa relates that the Buddha, on the day of His passing away, addressed
the Sakra, the king of the gods, thus: My doctrine, O Sakra, will eventually be
established in the Island of Lanka. . . . Do thou, therefore, guard well the king
and his train and the Island of Lanka.37 The author further asserts that Bud-
dhism is the religion of the state: the king had always been Buddhist, and the
Sangha has always participated in politics through their council to the king. The
book served as another set of demands on the government to restore Buddhism
to its place as the official religion of the island and to promote and protect the
faith.
The 1956 elections proved to be the turning point in the islands modern his-
tory. Both Buddhist monks and various Sinhalese and Buddhist organizations
joined forces to defeat the unp and elect Bandaranaike and the slfp in its place.
The Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, an umbrella organization of Buddhist monks
and laity, formed with the express purpose of defeating the unp. Monks staged
a hunger strike in front of the parliament and referred to the government as
Mara, or the devil. The organization and efforts of the monks in backing the
slfp were so successful that, as Tambiah states, it is no exaggeration to claim
that the 1956 elections . . . were the climatic and singular moment in twentieth-
century political life when a signicant number of monks organized to win an
election.38 Bandaranaikes campaign capitalized on the fears and demands artic-
ulated in books such as The Betrayal of Buddhism and Revolt in the Temple to
demand a government committed to the protection of Sinhalese and Buddhist
interests.
Despite the rise of Buddhism in Sinhalese politics in the 1940s and 1950s, the

Tamils did not follow with religious claims of their own. Hinduism played an
important role in Tamil mobilization against British Christian inuences in the
mid-1800s. But Tamil leaders of the twentieth century did not call on Hinduism
to mobilize Tamils against the Sinhalese nationalist threat, nor did Hindu lead-
ers on the island emerge and form organizations aimed at political mobilization.
The lack of Hindu-based mobilization is particularly curious, given that estate
Tamils and indigenous Tamils were divided by history, geography, and interests
but had Hinduism in common. In the end, discrimination against the Tamil
language, rather than religion, proved to be the more salient point of mobiliza-
tion for Tamils.39
The newly elected slfp government promised to revitalize and restore Bud-
dhism to its precolonial state, to make Sinhala the dominant language of the
country, and to foster Sinhalese culture and identity.40 Bandaranaike implemented
new legislation, the most explosive of which was the 1956 Sinhala Only Act,
which aimed to make Sinhala the countrys official language. The act initially
called for Sinhala to be the language used in government and universities, which
would put non-Sinhala speakers at a disadvantage for employment and educa-
tional opportunities.41
The Sinhala Only Act raised immediate protest from minority groups, who
demanded its revocation. Tamils staged sit-ins around the capitol, which
prompted counterdemonstrations by Buddhist monks. These demonstrations
degenerated into riots in which more than one hundred people were injured,
followed by the looting of an estimated forty-three shops, most of which were
Tamil, and around 113 arrests.42
The government attempted to mitigate tensions over the Sinhala Only Act
by softening its specications. Negotiations between the government and the
Tamil Federal Party resulted in the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, which
called for the use of Tamil as an administrative language along with Sinhala and
for the creation of district councils, which would allow Tamils greater autonomy
and control of their political and social destiny.43 Monks and other Sinhalese
nationalists staged mass demonstrations, sit-ins, and hunger strikes outside Ban-
daranaikes home to protest the pact. One monk even claimed in front of a crowd
of ve thousand demonstrators that the pact would lead to the total annihila-
tion of the Sinhalese race.44 In the end, Bandaranaike gave in to the protesters
demands and abandoned the agreement.
Amid the tensions and disappointment surrounding the collapse of the Ban-
daranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, a new and bloodier round of riots exploded in

May 1958, after a band of Sinhalese gathered at a railway station and attacked a
train that was believed to be carrying Tamil passengers. In retaliation, a train
carrying Sinhalese passengers through a Tamil town was derailed. In the same
town the former mayor, a Sinhalese, was shot and killed while driving his car.
News of the assassination was broadcast through the country and blamed on
Tamils, which then prompted bands of Sinhalese to take to the streets in several
cities. After four days of violence, the government declared a state of emergency,
called out the troops, and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. But before the vio-
lence could be contained, bands of Tamils launched a counterattack against Sin-
halese in the northern and eastern provinces. These groups burned homes,
attacked Sinhalese shermen, and sacked Buddhist temples before the violence
could be successfully put down.45 Bandaranaike modied the Sinhala Only Act
in an attempt to appease the Tamils and end current tensions. In response, a
Buddhist monk assassinated Bandaranaike on September 26, 1959, while visiting
the prime minister in his official home. Part of a larger conspiracy, the monk
claimed to kill Bandaranaike for the greater good of his country, race and reli-
gion.46
Bandaranaikes wife, Sirimavo, was elected to office as a member of the slfp
in 1960. Her tenure in office was underscored by the implementation of a nation-
alist Sinhalese Buddhist agenda, to the detriment of both Tamils and Christians
on the island. Her government reversed all ambiguities with the Sinhala Only
Act and made Sinhala the exclusive language of the government administration
throughout the island. She further proposed legislation that would place all
schools under government authority, including, most notably, the Christian-run
schools that were still administered by missionaries from the West; Catholic
schools in particular were targeted. As part of this legislation, which was fully
implemented in 1967, Christian schools were required to teach Buddhism.47
The slfp policies also affected Christians in the military. Following indepen-
dence, Christians made up a signicant portion of the military and in particular
the officers corps. Policies created under the slfp-led government, such as the
Sinhala Only Act, discriminated against the non-Sinhala speaking officers, as
did preferential appointments of Sinhalese Buddhists in various positions
throughout the government. In 1962 Christian officers, primarily in the army
and the police, attempted a coup against Sirimavo. The plan was uncovered prior
to its execution, and the band was arrested. Following the coup attempt, Siri-
mavo purged the government and military of Christians.48
Sri Lankan politics largely followed the pattern of preferential policies toward

Sinhalese Buddhists under the slfp and those aimed at greater reconciliation
under the unp. In the 1965 elections, Dudley Senanayake and the unp defeated
Bandaranaike, and the new government attempted to mitigate Tamil grievances
with the 1965 Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact. The pact, similar to the 1957
Bandarainake-Chelvanayakam Pact, sought to establish greater regional auton-
omy for Tamils. A slfp and unp alliance in parliament, however, defeated the
initiative.49
Alongside Tamil grievances over the increased preference to Sinhalese and
Buddhism in politics and education, there were Sinhalese that believed the gov-
ernment was not doing enough for the majority on the island. In 1971 the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (jvp), a Marxist-inspired revolutionary movement, forced
the government to look at grievances within its own ethnic group. Founded by
Rohana Wijeweera in the late 1960s, the jvp was an organization bent on affect-
ing radical change in Sri Lanka by popular, violent revolution.50 The movement
consisted primarily of Sinhalese youth but also included monks and used tem-
ples as meeting places. In a 1971 offensive, the jvp managed to capture several
rural villages, which its members held for a few weeks before the government
brutally put down the uprising. An estimated two thousand to three thousand
were killed, mostly jvp members.51
Following the 1971 jvp uprising, the government, now back under control of
the slpf through a unity government, introduced radical reforms aimed at appeas-
ing discontented Sinhalese. Bandaranaikes government renamed the country
Sri Lanka, harkening back to the name of the Sinhalese Kingdom. She instituted
major reforms to the Soulbury Constitution, drafted in 1946, including making
Sinhalese the sole language of Sri Lanka, revoking the protection of minority
rights, and giving Buddhism the foremost place [in the Republic of Sri Lanka]
and making it the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism.52 The gov-
ernment also implemented greater restrictions on university entrance require-
ments and regional quotas based on ethnicity, new policies that favored the Sin-
halese over the Tamils. Between 1969 and 1974 the number of northern Tamils
admitted into university science programs dropped from 27.5 percent to 7 per-
cent.53
The 1972 constitutional reforms set in motion a new era in Tamil politics.
Tamils began to call for withdrawal from the government and the creation
of an independent homeland. The most visible political leader of the Tamils,
S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, formed the Tamil United Front (tuf) in 1972, later to
become the Tamil United Liberation Front (tulf), and forged an alliance between

Tamils in the north and estate Tamils. Alongside the efforts of the tulf to work
through the political system for change, militant Tamil organizations emerged
during this time, including the Tamil New Tigers (tnt), the Tamil Eelam Lib-
eration Organization (telo), the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
(plote), the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (eprlf), the Eelam
Peoples Revolutionary Organization of Students (eros) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte), which eventually killed off the competition and
emerged as the primary insurgent group in the 1980s.54
In 1976 the tulf drafted the Vaddukoddia Resolution, which officially called
for the creation of an independent Tamil state on the island. The drafters chose
the name Eelam, hearkening back to what the tulf identied as a historical
Tamil homeland that existed prior to colonization.55 The Vaddukoddia Resolu-
tion also called for all Tamils, estate and indigenous alike, to defend the home-
land by force and to throw themselves fully in the sacred ght for freedom and
to inch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist state of Tamil Eelam is reached.56
The resolution received the backing of both the estate and indigenous Tamil
parties, which was a rst for the movement.
The Sri Lankan government made another overture toward national unica-
tion in 1977 under the unp and the leadership of Junius Richard Jayewardene.
The new government promised economic reform and an era of social tolerance,
what Jayewardene termed dharmistha, alluding to the Indian Buddhist king
Asoka, who introduced an era of peace and prosperity to the subcontinent. As
part of his new policy of tolerance, Jayewardene promised to modify wording
in the constitution, to give the Tamil language a more prominent place, and to
allow district councils more authority.57 The government further promised to
redress grievances surrounding university admissions policies.
But despite the conciliatory actions of the new government, voices within the
Tamil community argued that it was too little too late. Riots broke out in 1977,
leaving an estimated 100 Tamils dead and making more than 25,000 homeless.58
In 1979, following the death of 14 Sri Lankan police in ltte raids and the bomb-
ing of an Air Ceylon airliner, the government passed the Prevention of Terror-
ism Act, which gave sweeping powers to the police and military to conduct
operation against suspected terrorists, the overwhelming majority of whom were
Tamil.
The nal push toward civil war came in 1983, after ltte forces killed 13 Sri
Lankan soldiers in a raid in Jaffna. The following day riots broke out in Colombo.
Angry Sinhalese mourners looted and burned Tamil shops and houses, eventu-

ally killing between 2,000 and 3,000 people and forcing from 70,000 to 100,000
Tamils into refugee camps, or just over 60 percent of the Tamil population in
the area.59 An estimated 35,000 Tamils ed to India and, within the coming year,
the number is believed to have reached 125,000.60 From this point the Tamil bid
for a separate homeland took a more militant trajectory, which quickly led to
full-scale civil war.
After the 1983 riots Indias prime minister Indira Gandhi offered her countrys
services as a mediator between Tamils and the Sri Lankan government. Follow-
ing Indiras assassination by her Sikh bodyguard in 1984, her son Rajiv contin-
ued to negotiate for a peaceful resolution to the escalating civil war. In 1987 India
deployed 7,000 Indian troops to Sri Lanka as the Indian Peacekeeping Force
(ipkf). The ltte atly rejected efforts to peacefully end the conict and began
to attack the ipkf shortly after their deployment. The Indian government
increased the number of soldiers in the region, eventually reaching between
75,000 to 100,000 troops at its zenith and costing the lives of more than 1,250
soldiers before their withdrawal in 1990.61 A ltte female suicide bomber assas-
sinated Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, in retaliation for his involvement in the
civil war.
Simultaneous to Indias efforts to resolve the civil war, Sinhalese-led violence
against the Sri Lankan government entered a new phase of escalation. Follow-
ing a 1985 ltte attack on Buddhist pilgrims in Anuradhapura, in which 150 civil-
ians were killed, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists began to form organizations
aimed at protecting Buddhism and defending the homeland against the Tamil
threat. In 1986 militant monks founded the Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (msv).
The msv acted as an umbrella organization that sought to coordinate efforts of
other Sinhalese nationalist groups and work with political parties, specically
the slfp, to maintain territorial unity of Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Buddhist sov-
ereignty over the island.62
The msv drew heavily on the Mahvamsa to justify its goals. It described its
followers as sons of the soil and called for unity and sovereignty of the
motherland and the need to keep all Sinhalese under one umbrella. Several
scholars note that this language harkens back to the Mahvamsa to represent
the unication of the country under the gloried hero Dutthagamani and that
the ancient Sinhalese kings unied the island as part of their role of protecting
the Sangha, which in turn protected the teachings of the Buddha. Also reminis-
cent of the Mahvamsa, the msv argued that force was necessary to repel the
Tamil threat and defend the Buddhist state. To this end, the msv believed that

monks should be foot soldier[s] in the revolutionary struggle.63 The organiza-
tion sought to mobilize all members of the Sinhalese population through
speeches and demonstrations, the creation of literature, and the organization of
union strikes.
The jvpthe same revolutionary organization that attempted to overthrow
the government in 1971also remobilized during this period for militant action
to defend the motherland. Along with the msv, the jvp took up arms to protest
the signing of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, which it believed would
compromise the territory and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. That same year the jvp
launched an insurrection aimed at overthrowing the Sri Lankan government
and thwarting the implementation of the accords. The organization had almost
no external support for its operations but, rather, relied on the charismatic and
innovative leadership of Rohana Wijeweera, along with popular support and
the structure of the Sangha to organize and violently challenge the government.
They assassinated unp politicians; raided military installations; bombed govern-
ment buildings, including the parliament; and violently attacked infrastructure
such as power plants and the state-run media. Keeping with its Marxist roots,
the jvp also organized widespread strikes, boycotts on Indian-made products,
and mass demonstrations. From 1987 to 1989 an estimated forty thousand to sixty
thousand people were killed as a result of jvp and msv agitations.64
The unp won control of the Sri Lankan government in 1988, under the lead-
ership of Ranasinghe Premadasa, who articulated two goals in his campaign:
the end of terror caused by the jvp and the complete withdrawal of the ipkf. The
governments vow to dismember the jvp was, ironically, aided by the jvps threat
to kill family members of Sinhalese soldiers in the Sri Lankan army, which alien-
ated their popular base.65 In 1989 the government captured and assassinated
Wiljeweera, and by 1990 they had succeeded in killing off the organizations key
members, effectively destroying the movement. Premadasa negotiated to have
the ipkf withdraw from the island by March 1990.66 Although Premadasa kept
his promise, the ltte assassinated him in 1993.67
The 1994 elections ushered in the Peoples Alliance government, headed by
Chadrika Kumaratunga. This new government revitalized negotiations with the
ltte. In January 1995 the government and ltte agreed to a cease-re and several
rounds of talks. In negotiations the ltte made four demands for the northern
part of the country: the end of the embargo, the end of Sri Lankan shing busi-
nesses, the removal of a key military camp, and the legal right for ltte members
to carry weapons. The government agreed to all demands except the removal of

the military camp.68 In response the ltte withdrew from negotiations and
resumed ghting in April 1995.
Amid this violence the government used military and diplomatic methods
aimed at ending the war, including efforts to rebuild civil society in Jaffna after
its capture in 1995 and by holding elections in which the ltte was defeated and
forced to retreat to the jungles.69 In 2000 the Norwegian government began to
work with members of the ltte and the Sri Lankan government on a resolution
to the conict.70 Parties agreed to a cease-re in February 2002, followed by talks
in Thailand later that year.71 But despite international efforts, the cease-re did
not hold.
Eventually, in 2009, the Sri Lankan government succeeded in defeating the
ltte militarily, through a combination of cutting resources to the Jaffna penin-
sula, interdicting military supplies, initiating military offensives, and killing sev-
eral key ltte leaders, including its founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Despite mil-
itary victory, Sri Lanka still faces the initial conditions that led to the Tamil
separatist movement. The country does not have a sense of civic identity that
includes all ethnic and religious groups on the island, and Buddhist national-
ism continues to dominate politics and social cohesion.
The Lingering Consequences of Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka

Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism formed in reaction to British colonization, which
brought a mixture of religious threatsparticularly through Christian mission-
ary schoolsand other drastic changes to society, including the abolition of the
monarchy, introduction of an educated middle class, an identity based on race
and religion, economic changes, and competition for government jobs. These
changes to society prompted groups on the island to see themselves in new ways
and to create new forms of identity that differentiated themselves not only from
their colonial powers but from one another as well.
Buddhism played an inseparable role in the creation of this new identity.
David Little argues, Several things stand out about the new Sinhala identity. It
was to an important extent formed in reaction to colonialism, and its religious
componentnamely Buddhismwas essential. In a word, it was religion that
rst provided a framework for the Sinhala to challenge the ideological domi-
nance of colonialism. Moreover, this new identity bore with it all the marks of
incipient nationalism, and as such it represented a long-term threat to the polit-
ical culture nurtured by the British.72 Race and language also shaped the new
Sinhalese nationalism. But the belief that the Sinhalese are a special race chosen

to protect and promote the Buddhas teachings and to make Buddhism shine
in glory is critical for understanding the rise of Sinhalese nationalism. Race, in
other words, is tied to the special charge of the Sinhalese as protectors of the
faith.
The interpretation of sacred textsparticularly the Mahvamsa, the ancient
text depicting the archetypal king who heroically defends land and faith from
external threathas also played an important role in Sinhalese nationalism. The
nineteenth-century Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist Dharmapala called on all
Sinhalese, as de facto Buddhists, to unify, embrace their faith, and defend the
sacred land of Sri Lanka from foreign elements, namely British colonialism.
Dharmapala based his call for Sinhalese Buddhist activism on the Mahvamsa
but reinterpreted it in light of modern-day circumstances. Ironically, Dharma-
pala also built on the examples of Protestant Christianity, which was winning
converts throughout the country, to create a new form of Buddhism that was
more responsive to people and their everyday needs.
With the advent of democracy, political leaders drew from Buddhist nation-
alism to mobilize popular support. Bandaranaike invoked the Mahvamsa to
identify what he claimed to be a chronic threat to the Buddhist islandexter-
nal invasion and foreign occupation by Tamils and colonialistsand the need
to take action to defend the teachings of the Buddha. Bandaranaike and the
authors of Revolt in the Temple and The Betrayal of Buddhism further drew on the
Mahvamsa to argue that the Sangha had a historical role in politics on the island
and that the presence of monks in campaigns was a natural extension of this
role.
Religious leaders, specically Buddhist monks, played a key role in the emer-
gence of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism and its role in postindependence pol-
itics. Prior to independence monks became active in politics by supporting var-
ious political parties and advocating specic policies, including the Sinhala Only
Act and the Buddha Sansana Act, which called for protecting Buddhist interests.
The relationship between monks and political partiesespecially the slfp
created expectations that Buddhism would have a preferential place in Sri Lankan
politics. Unfullled expectations and a sense of betrayal from the government
led to the assassination of the prime minister by a Buddhist monk in 1959.
Broken promises from the government also inspired monks to form various
organizations, such as the lebm, the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, the jvp, and the
msv, with the aim of protecting Buddhism against non-Buddhist threats and
even against the Sri Lankan government. The governments attempts to create

regional autonomy for the Tamilsin 1956, 1976, and 1986all collapsed under
intense pressure from monks performing sit-ins and hunger strikes and foment-
ing riots. The jvp and msv in particular called on monks to use violence to defend
the motherland against territorial concessions to the Tamils. Both groups iden-
tied this goal through their interpretation of the Mahvamsa and the belief
that the Sinhalese people were chosen as a special race to defend and propagate
the teachings of the Buddha. The jvp and msv organized militant operations
through various temples and monasteries to challenge the government. The
counterinsurgency against these groups resulted in between forty thousand to
sixty thousand deaths. Radical Buddhist monks, in other words, have contrib-
uted to considerable bloodshed on the island.
The emergence of Buddhist insurgent groups illustrates the dangers of ethnic
and religious promises in campaigns. Raised expectations and unfullled prom-
ises create the conditions for a backlash. With the rise of bloody confrontations
between Buddhist revolutionaries and the government, Sinhalese Buddhist
nationalist groups ceased to be an asset to political parties and power politics.
Furthermore, campaigning along religious and ethnic lines resulted in the alien-
ation of minority groups, calcifying democracy into majoritarian politics and
driving Tamils to secession, eventually plunging the country into civil war.
The Sri Lankan government succeeded in defeating both the Tamil and the
Sinhalese Buddhist insurgencies on the island. But the underlying conditions
that created these insurgencies have not been resolved. Sinhalese Buddhist nation-
alist rhetoric has not been replaced with a Sri Lankan identity inclusive of all
ethnic and religious groups on the island. Until a new civic Sri Lankan identity
is created, politics will most likely continue to fracture along ethnic and reli-
gious lines.

6
defending the dar al islam
Jihads in the Nineteenth Century and Today
Jihad is perhaps the example that comes to most peoples minds when consid-
ering the role of religion in violent conict and war. Particularly after the Sep-
tember 11th attacks in New York and Washington dc, most Americans are con-
cerned with the role that Islam has played in mobilizing individuals and groups
for war against the United States. Despite popular perceptions, however, jihad
is not a perpetual or inevitable Islamic occurrence. Islam has not been in a con-
stant state of war against non-Muslims.
Looking back across history, three major waves of jihad are visible: an offen-
sive wave that spread Islam in the early days of the faith, a defensive wave in the
1800s, and the current wave that includes Al Qaeda and other groups using vio-
lence in the name of their faith. These waves reveal that jihad is subject to inter-
pretation and that these interpretations are the product of individuals grounded
in specic circumstances; understanding why jihad has been called at some
times and not at others requires looking beyond scripture and doctrine to social
and political circumstances that fuel the call for war in the name of the faith.
Studying these waves of jihad, particularly the jihads of the nineteenth cen-
tury and today, reveal that these calls have surprisingly similar messages. Leaders
in the nineteenth century and today have called for jihad in response to per-
ceived threats to the faith, including corrupt Muslim leadership, social decay,
and threats posed by foreign, non-Muslim inuences. In both waves charismatic
leaders, most of whom were not trained clerics, have called for all Muslims to
rise up and ght these domestic and international foes, which they see as threat-
ening to the very existence of the faith. As revolutionaries, these leaders demand
the purication of the Muslim world and the creation of rightly guided leaders
that uphold the faith. The major difference between the jihads of the nineteenth
century and jihads today is the resources available to the current groups, includ-
ing information technology, nances, and training. These resources have allowed
jihadis to network and spread their ideas in a way that the previous generation
could not.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The rst section offers background
information on the doctrine of jihad, including the way that jihads have tradi-
tionally been called, their goals, the Quranic passages they draw from, and cur-
rent calls for jihad. The second section investigates a major wave of jihads in the
nineteenth century, called largely in response to colonial expansion. The third
section traces the rise of the current wave of jihads, beginning in the 1970s, and
the interpretations that fueled these acts of violence. The fourth section com-
pares the two cases, arguing that the calls for jihad were remarkably similar in
both waves but that the current wave of jihads has proted from better commu-
nications technology, which has allowed certain groups to go global.
Islam and the Doctrine of Jihad

Traditionally, the doctrine of jihad is an aspect of Sharia law andlike all other
categories of the lawhas been subject to debate and interpretation by various
scholars and jurists over time. John Esposito, an expert on Islam, summarizes
the concept of jihad: The doctrine of Jihad is not the product of a single author-
itative individual or organizations interpretation. It is rather the product of
diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and applying the principles of
sacred texts in specic historical and political contexts.1 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to understand who has the authority to call for jihad, by what means, and
for which goals, to make sense of the waves of jihad in history and today.
In its broadest sense jihad means to struggle, to strive, or to make an effort to
follow the path of God; this struggle occurs both in the spiritual and in the
physical world.2 The spiritual jihad, often called the greater jihad, involves the
individual struggle that people face in their walk as a Muslim, including resis-
tance to earthly temptations and the submission to the will of God. The lesser
jihad is the physical struggle to spread and defend the faith, including by force.
The distinction between the lesser and greater jihad comes from an ahadith of
Defending the Dar al Islam 93

the Prophet after he returned from battle. He is quoted as saying, We have
returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad.3 The greater and the lesser
jihads are understood as four actions: the jihad of the heart, which involves over-
coming ones sinful nature; the jihad of the tongue, which is ordering good over
evil; the jihad of the hand, which involves disciplinary measures; and the jihad
of the sword, which is ghting and defending against nonbelievers.4 Therefore,
the term jihad has many meanings, both spiritual and physical.
The Quran has several passages that address ghting and war but they do not
have the same message. For example, Sura 2:190 states, Fight in the way of Allah
against those who ght against you, but begin no hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth
not aggressors. Sura 22:39 states, Sanction is given to those who ght because
they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them victory. Sura
9:12 states, And if they break their pledges after their treaty (hath been made
with you) and assail your religion, then ght the heads of disbeliefLo! they
have no binding oathsin order that they may desist. The Sword verse, Sura
9:5, asserts, Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wher-
ever ye may nd them, and take them (captive), and prepare for them each
ambush. But if they repent, and establish worship and pay the poor-due [zakat],
then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. And Sura 9:29 states,
Fight against those who do not believe in Allah nor in the Last Day and do not
make forbidden what Allah and His messenger have made forbidden, and do
not practice the religion of truth of those who have been given the Book, until
they pay the jizya off hand, being subdued.5
Religious scholars have debated how to interpret these different verses with
varying conclusions. Religious historian Reuven Firestone notes, The Qurans
message on this topic [jihad], however, is actually far from consistent. The verses
on warring are numerous, amount to scores in number, and are spread out over
more than a dozen chapters. . . . Some quranic statements may or may not even
refer to war, depending on how one views their context, but are nevertheless
considered by post-quranic tradition as articulating divine pronouncements on
the subject. Some scholars have argued for a hierarchy of verses, placing the
Sword verse as a last resort. Others have argued that the passages were revealed
to the Prophet in connection to the circumstances of the community, calling
rst for nonviolence, then defensive force, culminating with offensive force when
the community was strong enough to initiate attack against unbelievers.6 Other
scholars have argued that when these passages were transmitted to the Prophet
determines their importance, making the last verses, the Sword verse, the most
94 Defending the Dar al Islam

important.7 These verses, in other words, have not produced a consensus about
when Muslims should ght and to what ends.
The classical legal doctrine of jihad, which is the lesser jihad, is an attempt to
comprehend the messages of the Quran and Sunna and apply them to actions
toward nonbelievers. This doctrine begins by dividing the world into two spheres,
the dar al Islam, which is the abode or land of Islam, and the dar al harb, which,
literally, is the land of war.8 Legally, the dar al Islam is territory governed by a
just Muslim ruler and ordered by Sharia law. The dar al harb is all other land
and marked by chaos, inequality, and corruption. In the legal understanding of
jihad, it is the duty of those in the dar al Islam to spread their order, justice, and
belief in one God to the dar al harb, by force if necessary. More recent scholars
of Islamic jurisprudence have called this offensive jihad.9
Despite this bifurcation of the world and the classication of all non-Muslim
territory as the land of war, this does not mean that jihad against nonbelievers
is perpetual or even inevitable.10 Classical law provides guidelines for how and
when to conduct offensive jihad, but these guidelines are subject to interpreta-
tion. The guidelines assert, rst and foremost, that offensive jihad is a collective
duty; it is fought by members of the dar al Islam together for the good of the
whole community. By classical standards the leader of the dar al Islam must call
for a raid against the dar al harb once a year, preferably to those most threaten-
ing to the community. This call can be delayed if conditions are not ideal. Before
a Muslim ruler attacks the dar al harb, he invites the local inhabitants to either
become Muslims or pay a poll tax, jizya, and a land tax, kharadj.11 Typically this
invitation was open only to People of the Book, or other monotheists. If they
become Muslims or if they submit to taxes, then war does not occur. Most schools
of law consider lands where non-Muslims pay the poll tax as dar al harb. How-
ever the Shai school names a third sphere, the dar al sulh or dar al ahd, which
is the land of treaty between the dar al Islam and dar al harb.12
Furthermore, classical law describes who is exempt from participating in
offensive jihad, specically women, children, the elderly, the mentally ill, slaves,
and the inrm. Sources also outline the proper procedures for methods of war-
fare, when soldiers can ee the battleeld, who is protected during battle, and
when jihad ends. All these issues are debated in the different schools of law, cre-
ating variations of opinion.13
Along with offensive jihad to spread the dar al Islam, there is the obligation
for all Muslims to defend the faith if attacked; this is defensive jihad. If Muslim
land and people are attacked, all must ght to defend the faith, including those

exempt under offensive jihad; ghting, therefore, is fard ayn, or an individual
obligation incumbent on all members of the umma (the worldwide Muslim
community).14 The imperative for all to ght is not only for the defense of land
held by Muslims and their inhabitants but also for the very survival of the faith.
The classical texts suggest that, unlike the organized nature of offensive jihad,
the response to attack is a spontaneous reaction, not one issued or organized by
the communitys leader.15
After the initial expansion of Islam in the seventh century, defensive jihad has
predominated Islamic holy wars. For Shia Muslims, offensive jihad has not been
an option since the time of their imams disappearance in 874 ce, because an
imam is required to call and organize offensive holy wars. Likewise, the use of
offensive jihad in modern-day Sunni Islam has been rare. Ideal leadership in
Sunni Islam is for one rightly guided ruler, the caliph, to preside over the entire
Muslim community. But as early as 756 ce, multiple Muslim dynasties emerged
with different leaders, making the legal ideal of offensive jihad under one leader
impossible and forcing new interpretations of the doctrine.16 Moreover, the frac-
tioning of the umma led to ghting between Muslims. Intra-Muslim ghting
prompted debates about the denition of a Muslim, a Muslim ruler and his ter-
ritory, and the right to use force against other Muslims. This latter point is of
particular importance for current jihads, which have been directed not only at
external, non-Muslim enemies but also at Muslim rulers and Muslim popula-
tions deemed un-Islamic.
Finally, in addition to jihad, there is another option besides force for Muslims
living under non-Muslim leadership, which is emigration, or hijra. The example
of hijra comes from the Prophet, who left Mecca with his followers in 622 ce
and settled in Medina as a means of escaping the hostilities of those opposed to
the message of the Quran. At several points in history, hijra has been interpreted
as an option for Muslims in the dar al harb. Jihad movements have called for
hijra as a means of consolidating forces and resources for attack against the dar
al harb.
Fighting jihad comes with both earthly and eternal rewards. Those who die
in battle to defend or spread Islam are believed to receive unique blessings; they
become shuhada, which literally means witnesses. This belief stems from pas-
sages in the Quran, such as Sura 2:154: Say not of those who die in the path of
God that they are dead. Nay rather they live.17 The doctrine is also strongly
informed by Hadith of the Prophet and the Sunna of the early Muslim commu-
nity. It is generally believed that those who die in defense of the faith will be

free of sin and thus pardoned from judgment in the nal days. They will go
straight to paradise, where they will occupy a special place; they even are allowed
to return to earth to ght on behalf of the faith.18 There are also popular beliefs
that young men who die in battle will be greeted by seventy virgins upon their
arrival in paradise.19
Martyrdom is strong in both Sunni and Shia Islam. Sunni Islam looks to the
example of the early Muslim community, particularly the battle deaths that
occurred in the return from Medina to Mecca and the early wars of expansion
in the rst years of the faith. Shias look to the history of their imams, all of whom
died violently, except for the twelfth imam, who is believed to have gone into
hiding and is not dead. In particular the death of Husseinson of Ali, grandson
of the Prophet, and titled sayyid al-shuhada, prince of martyrsin the Battle of
Karbala is exemplied in Shia Islam.20
Martyrdom in Islam has been identied as a key component for individuals
willing to ght as mujahideenand to die for the faith today. For example, Pal-
estinian suicide bombers and those that carried out the September 11th attacks
are believed to have been motivated by martyrdom. However, the violent means
of Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants today are not exclusively directed toward
attaining eternal salvation. These groups have earthly goals for which they are
working and which are equally important for explaining religious mobilization
and the use of force.
Furthermore, martyrdom in Islam is debated. There are interpretations that
call for spiritual martyrdom; they argue that Muslims who keep the tenets of
the faith and strive in the greater jihad are the true martyrs, not those that die
in battle. Interpretations also exist that claim the true martyrs are those who suf-
fer in daily physical struggles, such as starvation, poverty, and even women who
die while giving birth.21 Therefore, while martyrdom is a powerful doctrine in
Islam, it is not universally supported as death on the battleeld in defense of the
faith.
Finally, the current-day motivations and calls for jihad cannot be understood
without outlining the writings of several key interpretations of jihad. First, the
writings of Ibn Taymiyya (12681328) have contributed to radical Islamic groups
in the modern era, including Al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.22 Taymi-
yyawho lived during the fall of the Abbasid Dynasty to the Mongols and
whose family had to ee from Baghdad to Damascusoffered a revitalized call
for jihad against internal and external threats to Islam. Taymiyya was a member
of the ulamatrained religious scholarsand adhered to the Hanbali school

of law in addition to practicing Islamic mysticism, Susm. Taymiyya argued that
faith and action were intrinsically bound in Islam, as were religious, social, and
political power. He called for the faith to return to its foundationsthe Quran,
the Sunna, and the examples of the Prophet and his companions in the Golden
Age of Islam.23 He exemplied the hijra of the early community as one means
of protecting and purifying the Muslim community. In addition, Taymiyya was
outspoken against the impiety of the Mongol rulers in the region who claimed
to be Muslim but did not conform to many of its practices, particularly the
implementation of Sharia law. He issued several fatwas legitimating the use of
force against the Mongols; these fatwas were used to justify the future use of
force of Muslims against other Muslims believed to be unfaithful in their prac-
tice of Islam.24
Ibn Taymiyyas interpretations of Islam and staunch call to protect the purity
of the faith impacted Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (170391), the founder of
what has become known as Wahabbism. Like Taymiyya, Wahhab interpreted
Islam through the Hanbali school of jurisprudence to argue that the decline in
the Muslim world was due to Muslim leaders straying from the true path of
Islam. He stressed the need for Islam to return to its basicsthe oneness of God,
the Quran, the Sunna, and the example of the pious ancestors of the Golden
Age of Islamand to end reliance on the interpretations of previous scholars.
He called for a return to pure Islam by waging war against resisters and nonbe-
lievers, non-Muslims and Muslims alike, and by cleansing the faith from deviant
innovations, including Susm.25 To realize these goals, Wahhab formed an alli-
ance with Muhammad ibn Saud, a local tribal chief in the Gulf region. Together
they used each others resources to consolidate power, unite the tribes of Arabia,
and pave the way for a future Saudi nation, which was formally declared in 1932.26
Modern jihadis, building on the ideas of Taymiyya and Wahhab, have called
for a return of Islam to its pristine state at the time of the Prophet and his com-
panions: stressing the oneness of God and relying solely on the Quran and the
Sunna. They, therefore, often identify themselves as Salayya, referring to the
pious ancestors and the Prophet.27 Some Salas have called for jihad to ght
what they believe to be domestic and international threats to the faith, rst in
the 1800s and then again beginning in the mid-1900s.
Jihads of the Nineteenth Century and Jihads Today

Violent jihad is not a perpetual state in Islam; it is called by leaders in response
to specic circumstances. Thus, to understand why jihads emerge at some points

Table 3. Jihads of the nineteenth century
Location Date Opponent Leader Madhi
Nigeria 180410 Hausa Kingdoms Usmandan Fodio No

Iran (Persia) 180413 Russians Abbas Mirza No
India 1810 British Abd al-Rahman Yes
India 181898 Sikhs, British Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi Yes
India 1820s83 British Titu Mir No
Indonesia 182138 Dutch Iman Tjanku Bonjol No
Indonesia 182530 Dutch Dipo Negaro No
Iran 182628 Russians Fateh Ali Shah/Ulama No
Algeria 183243 French Abd al-Qadir No
Algeria 184347 French Bu Mazah Yes
Indonesia 18731904 Dutch Sultan Ibrahim No
(Ache) Mansur
Sudan 188185 British Muhammad Ahmad Yes
Iran 1891 British/Shahs Ali Shiraz No
Sudan 1898 Egyptians/British Abd Allah ibn No
Muhammad al-
Taayishi
Somalia 18991920 British/Italians Muhammad ibn Yes
Abd Allah
Morocco 1912 French Ahmed El-Hiba No
Libya 192331 Italians Umar al-Mukhtar No
in time and not at others, it is important to investigate who is calling for jihad,
under what circumstances, what their message is, and who embraces it. Look-
ing back in history, it is possible to identify three major waves of jihad in Islams
history: the initial spread of Islam through offensive jihad in the years immedi-
ately following the Prophets death, a surge of defensive jihad in the nineteenth
century, and the current onslaught of jihads throughout the Muslim world,
including bin Ladens international declaration of jihad against the United States.
Important for understanding the current jihads around the globe is the sec-
ond wave of jihads, a series of defensive wars that began in the early nineteenth
century and peaked around the 1880s. Charismatic Muslim leaders from a vari-
ety of regions called for jihad and mobilized local Muslims for holy wars. These
leaders called for jihad in reaction to foreign threats but also in response to Mus-
lim leadership that they believed to be corrupt and failing to uphold the tenets
of Islam. Several jihadi movements succeeded in mobilizing tens of thousands
of mujahideen to ght these threats and required decades to successfully put
down.

Nineteenth-century jihads, with few exceptions, were in reaction to the rising
presence of colonial forces throughout the Muslim world. Historian Rudolph
Peters notes, In the initial stages of European expansion into the Islamic world,
Moslems in many places forcefully resisted the new situation and appealed to
the doctrine of jihad in order to mobilize the population, to justify the struggle,
and to dene the enemy.28 Colonizing forces included the British in South Asia,
the Middle East, and North and sub-Saharan Africa; the French in North Africa;
the Dutch in Indonesia; the Russians in current-day Iran; and the Italians in
Somalia and Libya. Local Muslim leaders called for jihad against their coloniz-
ers in all these regions, as illustrated in table 3.
The advent of European colonialism into the Muslim world brought Western
and Islamic ideals into direct contact. This confrontation produced two polar-
ized camps within Islamic thought. The rst group sought to accommodate
Western ideals into Islam; they viewed resources from the West not as incom-
patible with the faith but rather as tools that could prosper the tradition. This
group included scholars such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (181798), Muhammad
Abduh (d. 1905), and Muhammad Iqbal (18751938) of South Asia; and Taha
Hysayn (18891973) in Egypt. These scholars stressed the nonviolent form of the
greater jihad in an effort to curb the negative image of Islam in the West.29
The second group called for jihad to ght what they perceived to be an immi-
nent threat to the faith. The leaders of these jihad movements came largely from
outside the ulama. This era witnessed a rash of Muslims leaders claiming to be
the Mahdi, the expected one destined to restore justice and order before the
end of time.30 Mahdist movements included Abd al-Rahman (1810) and Sayyid
Ahmad of Barelewi (1831) in India, Bu Mazah in Algeria (1839), Muhammad
Ahmad in Sudan (1881), and Muhammad ibn Abd Allah in Somalia (1899). Peters
notes that number of Mahdis was probably due to two factors. First, the condi-
tions for the coming of the Mahdicorrupt and cruel leaders, the oppression of
the masses, and difficult socioeconomic conditionswere pervasive in most of
these regions. Egypt and Sudan had undergone particularly difficult economic
conditions, and its citizens were subject to heavy taxation from their occupiers;
these measures even led to famine in Sudan. The masses, therefore, were most
likely waiting for divine intervention to restore order. Second, as Peters also notes,
the approaching Muslim Millennium in 1882 (ah 1300) may also have increased
popular expectations for the coming of the Mahdi and inspired the surge of self-
proclaimed restorers of justice.31 Jihadi leaders also emerged who did not declare
themselves to be the Mahdi, including Titu Mir of India (1820s83) and those

leading the uprisings against the Dutch in Indonesia and the Persian uprisings
against the Russians and the British (see table 3).
By and large, the ulama in various countries did not support the jihadi move-
ments but rather tried to work toward reform within their new social and polit-
ical environments. Members of the ulama in nineteenth-century Sudan, Egypt,
and India often sided with their colonial powers, condemning jihadi uprisings
as unlawful.32 Generally speaking, the ulama sought to work within the new
political structure of colonialism rather than to declare war against it.
The goals of these jihadi movements were twofold. First, these leaders and
their constituents called for defensive jihad to protect land, faith, and commu-
nity from occupying colonial forces. The advance of non-Muslims was under-
stood as the dar al harb encroaching on the dar al Islam and therefore required
action to repel the invasion. For example, the nineteenth-century Indian Muslim
scholar Shah Ad al-Aziz declared all land under British occupation in India to
be part of the dar al harb. His declaration inspired Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi
to call for a jihad against the British.33
As important, these movements typically understood their current demise to
be the result of corrupt Muslim rulers and clerics, particularly their failure to
implement Sharia law, as the reason for their weakness. They further argued that
the success of European powers in conquering the dar al Islam was punishment
from God for straying from the true path of Islam.34 Therefore, a second goal of
these movements was to establish Islamic leadership based on the example of
the Prophet and his companions and reestablish Sharia as the law of the dar al
Islam. These movements often referred to themselves as Salayya, connecting
their uprisings to the example laid out by the Prophet and his companions.
Those leaders who did take up arms against the encroaching colonial pres-
ence used several religious doctrines and resources as a means of mobilization.
Naturally, they used the doctrine of jihad; however, their interpretations of jihad
did not conform to the legal doctrine. Their interpretations of jihad were not
offensive, which required the caliphate or imam to declare raids on an annual
basis. Nor were their interpretations purely defensive either, which was supposed
to be a spontaneous reaction to imminent threat. Moreover, these uprisings were
directed not just against foreign threats but also against the Muslim authority,
which is not the classical understanding of defensive jihad, although it has its
historical precedents, most notably in the writings of ibn Taymiyya and ibn al-
Wahhab. This form of jihad thereforenot unlike the holy wars of Nur al-Din
and Salah ed-Dinwas both organized and defensive in nature.

The belief in the Mahdi also became an important tool of mobilization in
the nineteenth century. Mahdist uprisings sparked some of the more successful
campaigns in this era, including a jihad in Sudan that succeeded in establishing
an independent state from 1885 to 1899 and took British and Italian forces twenty
years to put down.35 In addition to the belief in the Mahdi, many of these lead-
ers also called for hijrathe retreat of Muslims from the dar al harb with the
goal of creating a nearby sanctuary. For example, Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi
moved into the northwestern frontiers of the Indian subcontinent and declared
war against the Sikhs with the goal of creating a dar al Islam free from British
and corrupted Muslim inuences.36 Likewise, Abd al-Qadir carved out a sphere
of inuence in the Algerian hinterlands with the intent of maintaining the dar
al Islam in those areas.37
The hajjthe pilgrimage to Meccawas another asset for nineteenth-century
jihads. The hajj draws Muslims from all across the umma, the worldwide Mus-
lim community, offering an opportunity for Muslims from around the globe to
share ideas and information about religious, social, and political happenings.
The annual pilgrimage to Mecca became an important point of contact for these
various movements. For example, it is believed that Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi
drew inspiration for his hijra and jihad from his 1821 pilgrimage to Mecca.38
Despite the fact that most jihadi leaders came from outside of the religious
leadership, these movements still consulted the ulama regarding the legality of
their uprising and asked for fatwas. The Algerian Abd al-Qadir, for example,
consulted scholars regarding his jihad against the French. In 1837 he wrote to
the Moroccan al-Tusli to ask for a fatwa on the use of force against local tribes
that refused to pay taxes to support the war effort. He also consulted several
scholars on whether or not Muslims under French rule in Algeria were required
to emigrate, receiving fatwas from Egyptian and Turkish members of the ulama
on this question. Likewise, Muhammad Ali of the Sudan wrote to various Mus-
lim leaders throughout the region asking them to accept his authority as the
Mahdi.39 Thus, despite leaders of nineteenth-century jihads coming largely from
outside the ulama, these movements still consulted the ulama and other Mus-
lim leaders for legal advice and recognition.
Overall, in spite of their success in mobilizing Muslims against their occupi-
ers, these jihads lacked critical material resources to expand their causes. The
greatest material resources these movements had were the organizations they
formed and the men they mobilized. The Egyptian Ahmad Urabi raised twenty-
ve thousand troops to challenge the British in 1882. Likewise, a few campaigns

did enjoy a period of success in fending off foreign forces. For example, Sayyid
Ahmad of Barelewis organization, the Path of Muhammad, existed for nearly a
century before the British were nally able to crush its last remnants in the
North-West Frontier in India.40 The jihad in Sudan created an independent state
from 1885 to 1899. The nal destruction of the Somali jihad in 1920 required the
combined efforts of the Italians and the British. Ultimately, therefore, these jihadi
movements could not be sustained in the face of colonial numbers and mate-
rial.
Despite the emergence of so many jihadi movements during this time and
the fact that they were likely conscious of one another, either through contact
from the hajj or through correspondence and solicitations for legal advice, they
could not join forces to create a united transregional force against their occupi-
ers. Even in neighboring countries, such as Morocco and Algeria, jihadi move-
ments did not join forces against common enemies. This lack of unity is most
likely due to two factors. First, these movements did not have access to rapid
sources of communication that could have facilitated cooperation; they had to
rely on correspondence by post and meetings at Mecca. Lack of communication
undoubtedly slowed the process of coordinating efforts of leaders and their
jihads across the umma. Second, these movements were also personality driven
and organized around a charismatic gure. Competing charismatic gures likely
hindered cooperation in regions that experienced multiple uprisings, such as
India, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. In the last case, the Moroccan Sultan Abd
al-Rahman handed over the Algerian jihadi Abd al-Qadirwho was seeking
refuge in Moroccoto the French in 1846.41 Thus, despite jihadi uprisings across
the ummah in the nineteenth century, these movements did not join forces.
Likewise, Muslim religious and political elites did not join forces with jihadi
movements, which further hindered their success. As previously mentioned,
most of these movements were as equally critical of their European colonial
occupiers as they were of their Muslim religious and political elites. The jihadis
goals were not only to expel colonial powers but also to depose Muslim leaders
believed to be corrupt. Thus the jihadis, the ulama, and Muslim political and
intellectual elites were not united against the common threat of colonial occu-
pation. This lack of political and religious unity most likely affected the success
of these movements.
Virtually all of the nineteenth-century jihadi uprisings across the umma ended
with colonial military powers killing the movements leaders and most of their
constituents. Although this took timeparticularly in India, the Sudan, Soma-

lia, and Libyathe end of these jihads occurred largely through the protracted
use of force.
Jihads Today
In November 1979 a Saudi named al-Utaibiwho claimed to be the Mahdi
organized a group of around 1,300 to 1,500 mujahideen from several countries
and stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca, holding around 6,000 pilgrims hos-
tage. He and his followers demanded the resignation of the Saudi royal family,
which they perceived as corrupt and failing to uphold the tenets of Islam, from
political leadership. The Saudi military, aided by French special forces, engaged
in a two-week-long siege of the mosque before nally crushing the uprising and
executing the leaders of the movement.42
This event, although unique in many ways to the jihads that followed, was
the beginning in what has become a surge of jihadi movements around the
globe. In particular, 1979 was a pivotal year for the current wave of jihads. Prior
to the storming of the Grand Mosque, a mass movement, headed by the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini, succeeded in toppling the Shahs regime in Iran, creating the rst
Islamic republic and demonstrating that Western inuences and secularism
could be shaken off. Also in 1979, a month after the Grand Mosque seizure, Soviet
forces invaded Afghanistan, sparking the Afghan mujahideen resistance and,
later, the birth of Al Qaeda.
The events of 1979, and the jihads to follow, were the culmination of several
prior key historical events. The 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel preempted an
attack by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in particular, is important for understanding
the current wave of jihads. Following independence from colonial rule, Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria had attempted to modernize their societies by embracing sec-
ular governments and nationalism based on a pan-Arab identity.43 The Six-Day
War demonstrated that both of these tools of modernization had failed. Islamic
revivalists cast the humiliating defeat in religious terms, claiming that it was a
sign that these nations secular leaders had turned from the path of God and
only the overthrow of these regimes and the return to Islam could save them.44
This catastrophic event, therefore, became the cornerstone for revivalist Islam,
the call to return Islam to central positions within society and government.
Furthermore, in the Six-Day War, Israelin addition to seizing the West Bank,
Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsulasuccessfully captured and held the Old
City of Jerusalem, which hosts the compound of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount. This site, which is sacred to both Jews and Muslims, contains the Dome

of the Rock Shrine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Israels capture of these sites was
both humiliating and threatening to Muslims across the umma.45 Moreover, the
Six-Day War also placed roughly three million Palestinians under Israeli mili-
tary occupation. The plight of the Palestinians, the overwhelming majority of
whom are Muslim, has become an emotional issue for the worldwide Muslim
community and one of bin Ladens main grievances.
Similarly, the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War and the oil embargo to the West
inuenced the current wave of jihads. The 1973 attack of Egypt and Syria against
Israelalthough ultimately a failure in defeating Israel and recapturing land
from the Six-Day Warstill managed to surprise and inict suffering on the
Israeli military. It therefore was regarded as a success to many in the Muslim
world, an example that the Arabs could ght back. The 1973 opec oil embargo
against the West, in retaliation to U.S. military support to Israel, heightened that
sense of empowerment. It demonstrated both to Arabs and the Muslim world,
as well as to the West, that the Middle East could exert pressure on powerful
countries, particularly on the United States.46
Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the newfound strength of oil
states through opec also brought nancial prosperity to Muslim nations in the
Persian Gulf region. This boon in revenue has become an inuential resource
for the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia in particular has devoted portions of its wealth
to international Islamic organizations primarily geared toward providing social
services to Muslims around the globe. Along with nancial aid, the Saudi gov-
ernment has exported its particular brand of Islam, Wahabbism, which is believed
to be inuencing violent Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world.47
These historical events gave new meaning and impetus to ideologues who
began writing essays in the mid-1900s, well before the wave of jihads that began
in 1979. Egyptian Hasan al-Banna (190649), the founder of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, and his protge Sayyid Qutb (190666) authored numerous books that
critiqued the current state of leadership in the Muslim world and the need for
an Islamic revival to return Muslims to the right path.48 Qutb used the term
jahiliyyaha Quranic term that describes the state of ignorance of the world
prior to the revelation of the Quranto describe the current-day Muslim world,
which had become lost and corrupted by weak Muslim leaders and Western
secularism.49 In Milestones Qutb calls for jihad to free Muslims and all men from
the bonds of ignorance: The reasons for jihad . . . are these: to establish Gods
authority in the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance
provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to

end the lordship of one man over others, since all men are creatures of God and
no one has the authority to make them his servants or to make arbitrary laws
for them. These are the reasons sufficient for proclaiming jihad.50 Qutb asserted
that it was the governments role to provide the moral framework and instruc-
tion that would lead Muslim societies out of jahiliyyah and into the right path
of Islam.51
Mawlana Abul Ala Mawdudi of India/Pakistan (190379) is also one of the
ideological founders of the current wave of jihads. Mawdudi argued that West-
ern culture and ideas were inherently bankrupt and corrupt. In the article Self-
Destructiveness of Western Civilization, Mawdudi contends that the West is
destined to fail because of its arrogance and rebellion against God: The miser-
ies of the First World War, nancial breakdowns, ever-increasing unemployment,
a spectacular rise in sexual diseases, disintegration of the family system, all of
these are very clear indications for those who have insights to conclude the reper-
cussions of tyranny, disobedience, lustfulness and dishonesty.52 In an effort to
return Islam in South Asia to the right path, he formed the Jamaat-i-Islamii in
1941, a political party that continues to shape political and social life in Pakistan.
His books have been translated and distributed throughout the world.
In Shia Islam Dr. Ali Shariati (193377) of Iran was instrumental in foment-
ing the Iranian Revolution. Shariati drew on the foundations of Islamic
thoughtthe Quran and the Sunnato offer what he believed was a fresh
interpretation of the faith for a new generation of Muslims.53 Similar to Banna,
Mawdudi, and Qutb, Shariati believed that Islam offered both an authentic
worldview for Iranians and the template for a total way of life, spiritually, socially,
politically, and economically. From the 1960s until the revolution, while the Shah
was exiled in Iraq and Paris, Shariati wrote and spoke extensively throughout
Iran, calling for people to return to their faith, targeting the younger generation
in particular. His teachings became so popular that the Shahs government
arrested Shariati in 1975, allowing him to leave Iran in 1977. He died in Paris in
1978, just months before the revolution toppled the Shah.
These thinkers, although not trained as religious scholars, were highly edu-
cated in Western institutions. Hasan al Banna studied at Cairos Dar al-Ulum, a
school designed to train teachers in Western thought. Mawdudi worked as a
journalist. Sayyid Qutb also studied at Dar al-Ulum in addition to studying in
the United States. Shariati received his doctorate in sociology from the Sorbonne
in Paris.54 Despite (or perhaps because of) their Western educations, these schol-
ars have been instrumental in interpreting Islam in a modern context and bring-

ing to bear resources and organizational skills that have allowed these move-
ments to spread and gain momentum.
Similar to the jihads in the nineteenth century, the current wave of jihads is
largely in response to perceived or actual threats to the faith. First, many of these
movements have formed in response to what they perceive to be impious and
corrupt domestic leaders. Countries that have attempted to implement secular
agendassuch as Egypt, Pakistan, India, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, and Iranall
witnessed the emergence of radical Islamic groups who named secularism as a
threat to the faith. For example, a key Egyptian activist, Abd al-Salaman Faraj,
called for Muslims to violently defend the faith against the Sadat regime in his
booklet The Neglected Duty, circulated in the late 1970s. In it, he argued that jihad
was the forgotten duty of Muslims and that force was not only necessary but
also required for all Muslims to defend and purify the faith from the threat of
secularism:
With regard to the lands of Islam the enemy lives right in the middle of
them. The enemy even has got hold of the reins of power, for this enemy
is (none other than) these rulers who have (illegally) seized the Leadership
of the Muslims. Therefore, waging jihad against them is an individual duty,
in addition to the fact that Islamic jihad today requires a drop of sweat
from every Muslim. Know that when jihad is an individual duty, there is
no (need to) ask permission of (your) parents to leave to wage jihad, as the
jurists have said; it is similar to prayer and fasting.55
This interpretation of the faith inspired the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to assassinate
President Sadat in 1981; Faraj was executed in connection with the assassination.
Likewise, jihadi groups have emerged in reaction to monarchies that they
perceive to be religiously and politically corrupt. For example, the 1979 takeover
of the Grand Mosque was in reaction to the practices of the Saudi monarchy
and the threats it posed as the custodians of Islams most sacred sites. Osama bin
Laden also was critical of the Saudi monarchy, which he perceived as failing to
practice true Islam. In particular, he cited the monarchys alliance with the
United States as threatening to the sanctity of the holy sites in Saudi Arabia. He
thus called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime to ensure the safety of these
sites and the reinstitution of right Islamic practices.56
Following the U.S. deployment of troops in the Middle East, jihadi groups
have named the United States as an international threat for its foreign policy
actions and support of regimes perceived as corrupt and threatening. In 1983 the

newly formed Lebanese Hizbollah used suicide truck bombs to attack the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 U.S servicemen and 58 others, with the
aim of compelling foreign troops to withdraw from Lebanon. The 1991 deploy-
ment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia became one of the key cause de guerre of bin
Laden. More recently, jihadi groups have cited the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq as examples of U.S. intentions to destroy Islam through armed conict
and instability.57
Jihadi groups also name U.S. support of regimes in the Middle East as a rea-
son for war. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamaat Islamiyya called for jihad
against the United States because of its nancial, military, and political support
of the Egyptian government. Bin Laden, in particular, criticized the United States
on this score. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, bin Laden called for a boy-
cott of U.S. goods as a means of protesting their presence on Saudi soil and their
support of Israel.58
Thus, jihadi movements are responding to both domestic and international
threats. It is a two-front war, what jihadis call a war against the near and the
far enemy. Groups like Al Qaeda, however, argue that near and far enemies are
connected. They target the United States not only for its military presence in
the Middle East but also because it props up Muslim regimes that jihadis see as
corrupt and immoral. Therefore, to successfully topple domestic regimes, it is
necessary to rst hit the United States and compel its withdrawal and support
of regimes in the Muslim world.59
Directly related to these perceived threats are the goals for which the Islamist
groups are ghting. First, most groups are calling for the overthrow of secular
regimes in the Muslim world and the instillation of rightly guided leaders that
will implement Sharia law. Moreover, many of these groups are calling for the
recreation of the caliphate, one leader to rule over the entire dar al Islam. In addi-
tion, most of these groups are attempting to push the dar al harb out of lands
and region that they understand to belong to Islam. This includes, most impor-
tantly, removing foreign elements from not only Saudi Arabia and the holy cit-
ies of Mecca and Medina but also Jerusalem and other regions where Islam has
had a history and Islamic sacred sites exist. Transnational groups, like Al Qaeda,
aim to remove threats that face the worldwide Muslim community: corrupt lead-
ership, foreign troops on Muslim soil, and the oppression of Muslims.60
Not all jihadis, however, support the transnational goals of Al Qaeda. Some
groups, like the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah (which is Shia
and therefore not aligned with Sunni Al Qaeda), are more focused on domestic

Table 4. Major jihads of the twentieth and twenty-rst centuries
Location Group Date Opponent Constituents
Saudi Arabia Group not named Nov. 1979 Saudi regime Saudis, Egyptians,
Kuwaitis, Yemenis
Afghanistan Mujahedeen 1979 Soviet Union Afghans, Pakistanis,
Saudis, Yemenis,
Algerians
Egypt Islamic Jihad ~1978 Egyptian Egyptians
government
Iran State 198088 Iraq Iranians
Egypt Gamaat ~1982 Egyptian Egyptians
al-Islamiyya government,
United States
Lebanon Hizballah 1982 Israel Shia Lebanese
Gaza/West Islamic Jihad 1980s Israel Palestinians
Bank
International Al Qaeda 1986 Various countries Various Muslims
Gaza/West Hamas 1987 Israel Palestinians
Bank
Philippines Abu Sayyaf 1989 Philippine Filipinos, possibly
Group/milf/mnlf government, Arabs
Christians
Algeria gia 199098 Algerian Algerians
government,
France
Malaysia, Jemaah Islamiyya 1990s Various Malayans, Filipinos,
Indonesia governments Indonesians
Uzbekistan imu 1990s Uzbek Uzbekistanis,
government, Tajikistanis,
communists Kyrgyzstanis,
Chechens, Pakistanis
Kashmir Lashkar-e-Taiba 1993 India Kashmiris, Pakistanis,
Arabs
Afghanistan Taliban 1994 Pakistan Pashtuns
government,
Afghan
government,
United States
Chechnya Chechen rebels 1994 Russia Chechens, Arabs
International International 1996 United States, Global participants
Islamic Front Israel, Muslim
(Al Qaeda) governments
Philippines Moro Islamic 1997 Philippine Filipinos, possibly
Liberation Front government Arabs
Kashmir Jaish-e- 2000 India Kashmiris, Pakistanis,
Muhammad possibly Arabs
Iraq Al Qaeda ~2004 Iraqi government, Iraqis, Saudis,
United States Yemenis, Egyptians,
Jordanians
Note: milf is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; mnlf is the Moro National Liberation Front;
gia is the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria; imu is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
threats and establishing Islamic states in their respective countries. Hamas is
concerned with ghting Israel and its occupation of what they believe to be
Islamic land and with creating an Islamic state in Palestine. Hizbollah also bat-
tles Israel and aims to give Shias in Lebanon an Islamic voice in Lebanese poli-
tics. These groups, therefore, have specic, nationalistic goals for which they are
ghting, goals that make them different from Al Qaeda.61 See table 4 for a list
of major jihads in the twentieth and twenty-rst centuries.
Islamists have interpreted several religious beliefs and doctrines to support
their violent campaigns against domestic and international foes. Most groups
have referred to their actions as jihad and their constituents as either mujahi-
deen or as jihadis. For example, in his 1998 fatwa, bin Laden states,
The Arabian Peninsula has neversince Allah made it at, created its des-
ert, and encircled it with seasbeen stormed by any forces like the crusader
armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plan-
tations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Mus-
lims like people ghting over a plate of food. . . . All these crimes and sins
committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his
messenger [the Prophet], and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic
history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy
destroys the Muslim countries.62
As with the nineteenth-century jihads, these calls for jihad do not comply with
the classical doctrine of offensive jihad or to the spontaneous imperative to
defend Muslim land and faith. These calls correspond more to the organized
defensive jihads of Nur al-Din and Saladin.
Islamists have also used fatwas to gain legitimacy for their violent actions. For
example, initially bin Laden consulted with religious clerics to attain fatwas to
condemn the presence of non-Muslim troops on Saudi soil. However, beginning
in 1998, bin Laden himself began issuing his own fatwas, calling for the killing
of Americans and jihad against the United States:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their alliescivilians and military
is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in
which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and
the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to
move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, and ght

the pagans all together as they ght you all together, and ght them until
there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith
in Allah.63
Bin Ladens fatwa is followed by some, despite the fact that he does not have the
religious authority to issue these rulings.
Also like the previous wave, this round of jihads has beneted from the contacts
made through the pilgrimage to Mecca. For example, bin Ladens family hosted
high-prole pilgrims in their Meccan home during his youth. After the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, bin Laden used these contacts to meet with key members of
the Afghan resistance and eventually establish organizations geared at recruiting
and training mujahideen for the Afghan cause.64
Another key religious resource used by most of these groups is the doctrine
of martyrdom. This doctrine has been particularly visible in the Palestinian sui-
cide bombings against Israel. Martyrdom also undoubtedly played a role in
motivating the nineteen hijackers on September 11th. It is commonly cited that
groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad profess that those who give
their lives in the jihad against Israel will die a martyrs death; they will go straight
to heaven where they will be greeted by virgins and a host of celestial delights.65
Although martyrdom is a strong individual motivation for jihad, these move-
ments also have earthly goals for which they are working, such as the end of
Israeli occupation, the creation of Islamic governments, and the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from the dar al Islam. Therefore, these groups are motivated both by
earthly and eternal salvation.
Similar to the nineteenth-century wave of jihad movements, most of the lead-
ers of the current wave come from outside the ulama. Examples include Gulbad-
din Hekmatiyar, the Afghan leader of the Hizb-i-Islami; Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi,
the deceased leader of Hamas; Djamel Zitouni, the leader of the Algerian gia
(Armed Islamic Group of Algeria); Khattab, the deceased leader of Chechen
rebels; and bin Laden and Zawahiri, the leaders of Al Qaeda.66 Almost all these
leaders come from educated backgrounds but have not been trained in theol-
ogy or Islamic jurisprudence.
Also like the nineteenth century wave of jihads, these movements have sought
support from members of the ulama. Trained scholars who have backed these
movements include the late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, former partner to bin
Laden during the Soviet-Afghani war; Skeikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of
the Lebanese Hizbollah; the late Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas;

and Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the Egyptian Gamaat.
These men all have had religious training and, by traditional standards, are reli-
gious scholars.67
Unlike the previous surge of organized defensive jihad in the nineteenth cen-
tury, this wave has only had one leader claiming to be the Mahdi, al-Utaubi, who
stormed the Grand Mosque in 1979. Not even bin Laden, with his international
notoriety, assumed this title. This suggests that this current wave of jihads is less
mystical in nature than its nineteenth-century counterpart.
But the major distinction between this current wave of jihad and its prede-
cessor is not the interpretations of religious beliefs and texts for jihad or the
goals for which the groups are ghting but rather the resources available to these
groups. First, these groups have proted from well-trained leaders who have
important skills. Bin Laden held degrees in economics and public administra-
tion. He also had experience running portions of his familys multibillion-dol-
lar business.68 Zawahiri was trained as a surgeon and put these skills to use treat-
ing Afghan refugees during the Soviet-Afghan war. Furthermore, in addition to
being highly educated, many of these leaders are trained, battle-hardened muja-
hideen from the Soviet-Afghan War and wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria,
including bin Laden, Zawahiri, Khattab, and, by some counts, thousands of sol-
diers who returned from Afghanistan to their homes throughout the umma.69
This current wave of jihads, therefore, is punctuated by highly trained and edu-
cated leaders.
The degree of education of jihadi leaders has helped create resilient, efficient,
and effective organizations; this is especially true of Al Qaeda. In the Afghan-
Soviet war, Sheikh Azzam and bin Laden founded a safe house and training cen-
ter for incoming mujahideen, the Beit Al-Ansar.70 In 1984 bin Laden and Azzam
expanded the safe house into the Maktab al-Khidamat (mak), which sought to
recruit individuals with specialized training to aid in the war in addition to
keeping records on international mujahideen that came through the training
camps.71 This organization evolved into Al Qaeda in 1986, the base, or the data
base, as Gilles Kepel translates it. Bin Laden and his cohorts turned the recruit-
ment and training for jihad into what Peter Bergen dubs Holy War, Inc., a mul-
tinational jihad corporation.72
Organizations tend to persist beyond the reason for their creation; Al Qaeda
is no exception to this rule. Leaders of the Afghan campaign, particularly Zawa-
hiri and bin Laden, did not see the threat against Islam subsiding with the end
of the war but rather perceived the emergence of new battles threatening Mus-

lim land and people, including conicts in Palestine, Algeria, Kashmir, Bosnia,
and Chechnya. Following the assassination of Azzam in 1989, bin Laden and
Zawahiri continued to mobilize, recruit, and train mujahideen from all over the
Muslim world with the aim of perpetuating the struggle to reestablish and pre-
serve the dar al Islam.
Bin Laden also created organizations aimed at spreading his message. In 1994
bin Laden began issuing statements to the Muslim world through the Advice
and Reform Committee, a London-based center that aimed to wake up the Mus-
lim world from complicity and challenge the Saudi royal family.73 The rst mes-
sage critiqued the head alim in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz, for his
endorsement of the Oslo Accords and his fatwah that permitted the presence of
U.S. troops on Saudi soil.74 Other messages criticized the Saudi government for
its support of the communists in Yemen, its crackdown on dissident theologians,
its overall need for religious and political reform, and the ulamas need to return
to right interpretations of the faith. These statements helped establish bin Laden
as an ideologue with a vision for transforming the Muslim world.75
In addition to creating organizations, the current wave of jihadis have bene-
ted from safe havens, countries that have allowed these groups to base their
operations within their borders. Afghanistan was not the only safe haven for bin
Laden and his cohorts. Bin Ladens years in Sudan were also instrumental in the
consolidation of Al Qaeda. While in Sudan, bin Laden worked with Sudanese
leader Hassan al-Turabi to mobilize radical Islamic leaders from around the globe
for jihad. Bin Laden also moved his business corporation to Sudan, built up
Sudans infrastructure with his construction business, and helped to route money
for international jihad through his various nancial channels.76 Bin Laden
returned to Afghanistan in 1996, after U.S. pressure on the Sudanese regime to
expatriate him. Shortly after the U.S. offensive against the Taliban in 2001, Al
Qaeda moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan.
Key safe havens also have been provided by open societies in the West. The
sanctuary provided by Western urban centers has helped not only Al Qaeda but
also other groups such as Hamas, the gia, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Lon-
don, in particular, has hosted numerous terrorist and jihadi organizations, includ-
ing the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gamaat and the Vanguard of the Conquest
(a faction within Islamic Jihad), bin Ladens Advice and Reform Committee,
al-Turabis International Muslim Brotherhood, the jihadi website azzam.com,
and the Arab publications Al Hayat and Al Quds al Arabi.77 Similarly, groups such
as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamaat, the Algerian gia and s (Islamic Sal-

vation Front), and former mujahideen from Afghanistan sought refuge in Stock-
holm and Copenhagen.78 The Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamma also set up
bases in and near New York, particularly in the neighborhood of Little Egypt
in New Jersey where Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman lived prior to his arrest in
connection with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.79 Safe havens for
these groups, therefore, exist not only in states such as Sudan and Afghanistan
but also in thriving Western industrial democracies.
Another critical asset available to the current wave of jihadis is communica-
tions technologies. Most jihadi organizationsincluding the Lebanese Hizbol-
lah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Qaeda
have websites today, which have been used to spread ideology, recruit
individuals, and network groups.80 These groups have also proted from social
media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube and their accessibility and global
reach. Al Qaeda has also used cd-roms and videotapes to recruit members, which
Bergen states is a graphic demonstration of how bin Laden and his followers
have exploited twenty-rst-century communications and weapons technology
in the service of the most extreme, retrograde reading of holy war. Furthermore,
these groups have used fax machines, cell phones, text messages, and encrypted
emails to spread their messages and mobilize. Jihadi groups have also established
media outlets and created mass publications such as Al-Ansar and the Lebanese
Hizbollahs Al-Manar, a satellite station. In addition to creating their own media
sources, these movements have proted from high exposure in international
media outlets, using corporations such as cnn, bbc, Al Jazeera, Time, and News-
week to broadcast their grievances and spread the call for jihad against the United
States.81 Various groups have also proted from rapid transportation, particularly
airlines that have allowed their members to travel quickly around the globe.
Modern communications and rapid transportation technologies are a distinct
difference from the nineteenth-century wave of jihads. These technologies have
allowed the current wave of jihadis to spread their message, organize, and net-
work in ways not possible with the previous generation.
Lastly, these organizations have prospered from nancial assets. First, although
difficult to prove, it is generally believed that many of these groups have received
money and other material aid from different states. Iran is reputed as a key spon-
sor of radical Islamic groups, both Sunni and Shia, and is believed to nance
Hamas, Shia groups in Iraq, and the Lebanese and Saudi Hizbollah, to name a
few.82 Saudi Arabia also has been named a state sponsor of violent Islamic radi-
cal groups.83 Several scholars note that competition between Iran and Saudi

Arabia over the export of their brand of Islam has perpetuated the spread of
radical, violent Islam and material assets to prosper various movements.84 There-
fore, state funding appears to be an important dynamic for the proliferation of
radical Islamic groups and the call for jihad.
Many of these jihad groups also have proted from manipulating interna-
tional nancial systems. In 1991 international bank regulators shut down the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (bcci), a Pakistan-based institution
suspected of nancing drug cartels and radical Islamic groups, particularly with
drug money and funding from Gulf States.85 To compensate for this loss, bin
Laden used his familys multinational corporation to route nances for various
groups and projects throughout the 1990s. In 1994 the Saudi government froze
bin Ladens personal assets in addition to expatriating him; these actions, how-
ever, did little to slow nancial ows to various jihad groups.86 Moreover, these
radical groups have continued to prosper through opaque banking systems
banks that have not conformed to international regimes on banking practices
particularly in uae, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.87 In addition, the Hawala
systeminformal money transfers routed through familial, tribal, and business
networkshas worked alongside institutional banking systems to spread nan-
cial resources throughout the globe. Tracking these informal networks has proven
extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies.88
Many of these groups have also accrued nancial and material assets through
international Islamic charities and ngos. The pillar of zakat, the 2.5 percent alms
giving on accumulative wealth, has been the source of signicant funds to Islamic
charities. The money is then given to Islamic ngos to provide services for Muslims
in need around the globe.89 Since September 11th, the U.S. government has taken
measures to identify which charities are fronts for violent Islamic groups and to
freeze their assets.90 Often, however, it has proven difficult to discern which char-
ities are funding what; many of these charities are indeed providing social services
to populations in need in addition to perhaps funding violent operations.91
Another source of revenue for these radical groups is drug trafficking. Afghan-
istan, in particular, continues to have a thriving trade in opium, the largest in
the world by some counts. Prior to the U.S. invasion in 2001, the Taliban were
believed to have assets around $8 billion, the majority of which were earned
through drug trafficking. Prots from opium have increased since the war.92
Likewise, it is reported that bin Laden and Al Qaeda have proted considerably
from drug trafficking, particularly from South Asia to Europe, which supplies
an estimated 80 to 95 percent of heroin in European countries, particularly in

Great Britain. One scholar agues that bin Laden and Al Qaeda see drug traffick-
ing to the West as killing two birds with one stone; the drugs nance their oper-
ations and help to undermine the social fabric of the West.93
Thus, while the message and goals of nineteenth-century jihad and jihadi
groups today are surprisingly similar, the resources available to the current wave
of jihadis have allowed these groups to spread their message, network, and orga-
nize in a way that is distinctly different from the previous wave.
Comparing the Waves of Jihad and Learning from the Past

Comparing this current wave of jihads to its predecessor in the nineteenth
century shows several commonalities and a few critical differences between these
movements. In both waves the call for jihad comes largely from charismatic
leaders who are not part of the ulama and often directly critique it. Both waves
of jihad are also reacting to similar problems: Muslim leadership that they per-
ceived to be weak, corrupt, and neglectful of the tenets of the faith, and interna-
tional threats posed by colonialism in the nineteenth century and Western inu-
ences today. Both waves of jihad have strikingly similar messages. The goal is to
repel these threats by overthrowing secular domestic governments, by creating
an Islamic government that upholds the tenets of Islam and Sharia law, and by
repelling the international threats that bolster these regimes.
Both waves call for defensive jihad, binding on all, to mobilize Muslims to
defend land, community, and faith. Both movements use the doctrine of mar-
tyrdom and call those who died in battle martyrs. Unlike the previous wave of
nineteenth-century jihads, however, current jihads have not seen many claiming
to be the Mahdi.
Despite coming from outside the trained clergy, leaders in both waves of jihads
have been able to mobilize forces willing to give their lives and become martyrs
for the faith. Arguably, jihads in the nineteenth century were able to mobilize
greater numbers, building forces that numbered as high as twenty-ve thousand
in the case of the Egyptian jihad against the British. While perhaps not as great
in numbers, the current wave of jihads has still managed to muster forces that
have inicted pain on their adversaries.
The current wave of jihads differs from its predecessors in the resources avail-
able to these movements. These groups have well-trained leaders who have formed
resilient, efficient, and effective organizations. Current movements also have
proted from communications technology, which has aided their organization
and mobilization. Lastly the current jihads have prospered more from nancial

assets, including state funding, Islamic charities, ngos, opaque banking systems,
informal money ows, and drug trafficking.
These differences suggest that resourcessuch as strong leaders, resilient and
efficient organizations, networks, means of communication and moneyare
critical for the scope and success of jihad movements. This current wave of jihads,
in comparison to its nineteenth-century predecessor, has far greater resources
to commit to its causes. This is evident not only in nancial resources available
to these jihadi groups but also in their access toand manipulation ofcom-
munications technology, the mass media, banking systems, and informal net-
works. These resources have facilitated international organizations aimed, in
part, at striking the United States and its interests.
The way in which the nineteenth-century wave of jihads endedby long,
drawn-out, low intensity conicts with colonial forcessuggests that these move-
ments do not die easily. Groups that operated out of rugged terrain, such as in
northern India and the hinterlands of Algeria, beneted from this difficult bat-
tle space. These protracted wars suggest that jihad movements in areas that are
hard to reach and hard to monitor will be more difficult to rout out. Also, in
several cases these movements continued despite the death of their leaders. Sayyid
Ahmad of Barelewi, for example, was killed in 1831, but his movement persisted
for roughly sixty more years. Barelewis case suggests that charismatic leaders
may be important for organizing movements and mobilizing ghters, but they
may not be essential for the organizations survival. The targeted attacks on bin
Laden and U.S.-born Islamic cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 may have killed these
leaders, but their ideas persist, as do their organizations.
Finally, the nineteenth-century jihads may have ended because they were not
transnationally linked and orchestrated, which limited their resources and abil-
ity to wear down colonial forces. Perhaps had these movements been better
coordinated, they could have been a more formidable obstacle to colonial rule,
particularly for the British, who were in several Muslim regions around the globe.
By contrast, the global networking of this current wave of jihad movements is
well established, suggesting that this wave of jihad will continue for a consider-
able time.

7
zion
The Battle to Dene the Jewish Nation and State
In Genesis 17 Hebrew scriptures promise that Abraham would become a father

of many nations and that he would inherit the land on which he sojourned. The
Jewish nation traces its origins back to this biblical promise.1 The history of the
Jewish nation, however, describes a pattern of exile from and return to this land,
including emigration from the land during a time of famine followed by the
nations liberation and return from Egypt, their banishment by the Babylonians
in 587 bce and return, and their expulsion from Palestine in the rst century ce,
when the Jewish nation was scattered throughout the world, producing many
Jewish communities with different beliefs and practices.
The creation of the State of Israel became a pivotal point in the history of the
Jewish nation, bringing together a spectrum of interpretations on what it means
to be Jewish and what the Jewish state should be, ranging from a religious govern-
ment that upholds the Torah, to a secular state for those with Jewish lineage, to the
Ultra Orthodox understanding of Israel as an abomination that is attempting to
take Gods timing into human hands. Realizing the Jewish state has created not
only conicts with Israels Arab neighbors and the Palestinians but also intra-Jew-
ish ghts over dening the nation and the how the Jewish state should look.
Following Israels stunning victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, these debates took
on a more violent tone, as religious Zionists have worked to implement their
messianic vision for Israel, which includes acquiring all the land of eretz Yisrael
and imposing their interpretation of what it means to be Jewish on the Jewish
nation. At its most extreme the religious Zionist agenda inspired the 1995 assas-
sination of Israels prime minister Yitzak Rabin and several attempts to blow up
the Muslim Dome of the Rock in an attempt to unleash catastrophic messian-
ism, conditions that are believed to hasten the coming of the Messiah.
This chapter traces the origins of interpretations of Jewish scripture and history
that call for violence with the aim of hastening the coming of the Messiah. It begins
by outlining the Abrahamic covenant, Jewish exile from the land, the evolution of
different communities in the Diaspora, and the understanding of the return to
Palestine in the modern era. It then looks at the creation of the State of Israel, var-
ious debates within Judaism over what the state should look like, and the emer-
gence of religious interpretations that call for seizing land and creating a Jewish
state to hasten the coming of the Messiah. The chapter concludes by noting that
interpretations calling for taking land and creating a religious state, including by
violence, have come almost exclusively from rabbis, such as Moshe Levinger and
Meir Kahane, as opposed to individuals without religious training; this is some-
what unique for modern interpretations calling for religiously motivated violence.
Hebrew Scriptures and the Promise of a Great Nation and Land

Hebrew scriptures describe several covenants, or contracts, between God and his
people. Perhaps most important for the creation of the State of Israel is the Abra-
hamic covenant, or Brit bein HaBetarim, the Covenant between the Parts in
Hebrew. The covenant promises to make Abraham the father of a multitude of
nations:
As for Me, this is My covenant with you: You shall be the father of a mul-
titude of nations. And you shall no longer be called Abram, but your name
shall be Abraham, for I make you the father of a multitude of nations. I
will make you exceedingly fertile, and make nations of you and kings shall
come forth from you. I will maintain My covenant between Me and you,
and your offspring to come, as an everlasting covenant throughout the ages,
to be God to you and to your offspring to come. I assign the land you
sojourn in to you and your offspring to come, all the land of Canaan, as an
everlasting holding. I will be their God.
In return, Abraham promises to circumcise males as a sign of this covenant; any

male that is not circumcised breaks the covenant and is cut off from the com-
munity.2
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Genesis 22 reiterates these promises after Abrahams willingness to sacrice his
son. The angel praises Abrahams obedience and renews Gods covenant: By Myself
I swear, the Lord declares: Because you have done this and have not withheld your
son, your favored one, I will bestow my blessing upon you and make your descen-
dants as numerous as the stars of heaven and the sands on the seashore; and your
descendants shall seize the gates of their foes. All the nations of the earth shall bless
themselves by your descendants, because you have obeyed My command.3
The promise of land in the Hebrew scriptures is further renewed in the book
of Exodus, following the Israelites liberation from Egypt after a series of pow-
erful and terrifying plagues. Exodus 23 promises, I will drive them [your ene-
mies] out before you little by little, until you have increased and possess the
land. I will set your borders from the Sea of Reeds to the Sea of Philistria, and
from the wilderness to the Euphrates; for I will deliver the inhabitants of the
lands into your hands, and you will drive them out before you.4
The book of Joshua describes the Israelites conquest of the people through
a divine mandate, the herem, which called for the destruction of all living things.5
Again, God renews the covenant: Every spot on which your foot treads I give
you, as I promised Moses. Your territory shall extend from the wilderness and
the Lebanon to the Great River, the River Euphrates [on the east]the whole
Hittite countryand up to the Mediterranean Sea on the west.6 Hebrew Scrip-
tures describe that the Israelites took the land of Canaan, claimed Jerusalem and
established its kingdom, rst through King Saul, then King Davidwho united
the kingdoms of Judah and Israel and brought the Ark of the Covenant to the
cityfollowed by King Solomon, who built the rst Temple.7
In 587 bce the Israelites possession of the land was lost to inghting and con-
quest by the Babylonians, who sacked the Temple and took the nation captive.
Psalm 137 describes the suffering of the Israelites in exile: By the rivers of Baby-
lon, there we sat, sat and wept, as we thought of Zion.8 The books of Ezra and
Nehimaya describe the Israelites returned to the land following the Persian king
Cyruss defeat of the Babylonians in 539 bce.
The Israelites returned to the land following the conquest of Babylon by the Per-
sians, who were eventually conquered by the Romans. Historical accounts tell that
Roman occupation brought relative stability to the region, but religious and polit-
ical tensions between the Israelites and their occupiers persisted. Mark Anthony
appointed Herod as governor of the region, who was later elevated to king in 40
bce. Herod implemented major building projects in and around Jerusalem, includ-
ing new walls around the city and plans to build a new temple, begun in 19 bce.9
120 Zion
Tensions between Roman occupiers and the inhabitants of Palestine reached
a boiling point shortly after the Temples completion in 60 ce. Militant Jewish
groups, particularly the Iscari Zealots, engaged in plots to assassinate Roman
officers with the hope of ousting Romes presence in the region.10 A military
confrontation with the Zealots in 70 ce resulted in the death of 5,000 Roman
soldiers. This prompted Rome to take harsher measures, and on August 28 Roman
troops killed an estimated 6,000 militants defending the Temple in Jerusalem.11
The Roman offense ended with the total devastation of the site.
In 118 ce the Roman emperor Hadrian announced his intentions to rebuild
Jerusalem. Many Jews saw his efforts as the nal destruction of the city and the
eradication of its holiness. Militants, headed by Simon Bar Koseba, organized
violent uprisings that became known as the Bar Kokhba revolt. The uprising
succeeded in recapturing Jerusalem, which it held for three years until the death
of Bar Koseba in 135 ce. The Romans killed a reported 580,000 Jews and razed
985 villages before taking the city and draining it of all remaining Jews, casting
the survivors into exile.12
Exile and Interpreting the Covenant of Nation and Land

Following the destruction of the Temple, the Jewish nation was exiled from the
land.13 Jewish communities scattered throughout Asia Minor, Europe, and even-
tually the United States, South America, Australia, and East Asia. Sephardic Juda-
ism emerged in Spain and Portugal and later spread to North Africa after expul-
sion from Spain and Portugal in the fteenth century.
The maintenance of Jewish communities outside of Palestinethe Diaspora
along with the destruction of the Temple, compelled new interpretations of the
covenants of nation and land. Ritual sacrice could no longer be performed
without the Temple. A new emphasis on the law emerged, and scholars focused
on codifying, interpreting, and applying it.14 Synagogues, places of prayer and
study, became the focal point of Jewish communities. The importance of Jeru-
salem and the promise of land and a nation remained core elements of the faith,
however, embedded in rituals and scripture. The holiday Tisha BAv, the ninth
day of the month of Av, is a solemn commemoration of the destruction of the
rst and second Temples. And the Passover Seder ends with the words next year
in Jerusalem, renewing the hope for return to the land promised by God.
Despite losing the Temple and being scattered throughout the world, Jewish
populations maintained their culture and philosophy. Moses Maimonides, per-
haps the greatest Jewish scholar of the Middle Ages, wrote extensively on Jewish
Zion 121
law and theology but said surprisingly little on the return to Jerusalem or the
land promised in Hebrew scripture. He drafted a fourteen-volume codication
of Talmudic law and created the Thirteen Principles of Faith, which summarizes
the nature of God and Gods revelation to the Jewish people. Maimonides fur-
ther emphasized that humans could not bring about the messianic age, in which
the prophesized Messiah would redeem the Jewish nation.15
In Europe, following the emancipation of Jewish communities in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, debates broke out over whether or not Jews
should integrate with European society. Those that chose to integrate relaxed
dietary practices and other aspects of the law. Some even embraced Marxism and
socialism. Other Jewish communities decided not to integrate with European
society, choosing rather to remain isolated and continue a strict adherence to the
law. These communities became known as Haredim, or Ultra Orthodox Jews.16
The nineteenth-century concept of Zionismthe Jewish nations return to
eretz Yisraelhas its roots in the writings of Moses Hess, a Jewish intellectual
born in Germany. Hess, inuenced by nineteenth-century discussions on Euro-
pean nationalism and Marxist debates on class struggle, questioned the identity
of Jews in Europe. In 1862 he published Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National
Question. The manuscript argues that the Jewish nation, just like European
nations, will experience its own nationalist awakening. However, Jewish nation-
alism is a blend of religious practice, messianic hope, and collective conscience.
While the majority of the book focuses on identifying and distinguishing the
Jewish nation, he also argues that the land of ancient Judaism is important:
What we have to do at present for the regeneration of the Jewish nation is, rst,
to keep alive the hope of the political rebirth of our people, and next, to reawaken
that hope where it slumbers. When political conditions in the Orient shape
themselves so as to permit the organization of a beginning of the restoration of
a Jewish State, this beginning will express itself in the founding of Jewish colo-
nies in the land of their ancestors.17 Hesss book was not embraced when pub-
lished, but it became one of the foundational arguments for the Zionist move-
ment later that century.18
In the late 1800s waves of anti-Semitic acts in Europeincluding a series of
anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia and the Ukraine, and the Dreyfus Affair in France,
which wrongly accused a French-Jewish officer of spying for Germanyprompted
several movements aimed at creating a homeland for the Jewish nation. The
desire to nd a Jewish homeland, free of persecution from European govern-
ments and societies, became known as the Zionist movement.
122 Zion
In the 1890s Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian-born journalist and author, began
to organize a Zionist movement that aimed to secure land for the Jewish nation.
Reacting largely to the upsurge of anti-Semitic occurrences in Europepartic-
ularly the Dreyfus Affair, which he covered as a journalistHerzl argued that
Jews would never be fully integrated and accepted into European society and
therefore should create their own state. In his 1896 manuscript The Jewish State,
Herzl builds on Hess to argue that Jews are a distinct and unique nation: I con-
sider the Jewish question neither a social nor a religious one, even though it
sometimes takes these and other forms. It is a national question. Herzl expands
on this point to link the nation to land and the need for a specically Jewish
homeland: No human being is wealthy or powerful enough to transplant a
nation from one place to another. Only an idea can achieve that. The State idea
surely has that power. The Jews have dreamt this princely dream throughout the
long night of their history. Next year in Jerusalem is our age-old motto. It is
now a matter of showing the vague dream can be transformed into a clear and
glowing idea. Herzls vision of the Jewish state, however, was not a return to a
primitive existence in the desert. Rather, it will be carried out entirely in the
framework of a civilization. We shall not revert to a lower stage; we shall rise to
a higher one. We shall not dwell in mud huts; we shall build new, more beauti-
ful and more modern houses, and possess them in safety. We shall surrender our
well-earned rights for better ones. We shall relinquish none of our cherished
customs; we shall nd them again.19
In 1898 the rst Zionist Council was called in Basal, Switzerland, with the
purpose of discussing the fate of European Jews in the face of rising anti-Semi-
tism. Future congresses were convened yearly to strategize realizing the Jewish
state, including where and how to obtain land. Herzl proposed a pragmatic
approach to establishing a homeland, suggesting lobbying European leaders to
grant colonial land to the movement and purchasing land from local inhabit-
ants and the Ottomans. Although Herzl initially suggested immigration to
Uganda or Cyprus, members at the conference insisted on Palestine. It was at
these council meetings that myths emerged about Palestine, framed in ways such
as a land without a people for a people without a land, suggesting that the land
was uninhabited and waiting for the return of the Jewish nation.20
Alongside Herzls call for a Jewish homeland, secular socialist Jews, primarily
from Russia and the Ukraine, began to immigrate to Palestine with the goal of
creating utopian Marxist-inspired communities of equality that worked the land
and aimed to make the desert bloom. These communities, organized in kib-
Zion 123
butzim, came in waves known as aliyah, a Hebrew word that literally means to
go up, inferring a return to the land of eretz Yisrael.21 The First Aliyah began
around 1882 and lasted until 1903. An estimated twenty-ve thousand European
Jews immigrated and established twenty-eight new communal and private set-
tlements. The Second Aliyah began in 1904 and lasted until 1914, following
increased mobilization of European Jews for immigration to Palestine. A reported
forty thousand immigrated before the outbreak of World War I. The Third Ali-
yah lasted from 1919 to 1923, bringing around thirty-ve thousand Jews, mostly
from Russia and Poland. Later immigration of European Jews, in the 1920s and
1930s, settled more in the cities and were less concerned with the utopia of the
kibbutzim.22
Not all Zionists were secular, however. In 1912 several loosely organized reli-
gious groups in both western and eastern Europe joined forces to form Agudat
Israel (Union of Israel). Religious groups in the East hoped that Agudat would
work to improve conditions of Jewish communities in Europe. Religious groups
in the West, however, understood the re-creation of the Jewish homeland as a
religious and messianic imperative; bringing together the Jewish nation on eretz
Yisrael would create the conditions of the coming of the Messiah and would be
a cosmic event.23 Agudat, therefore, worked with secular Zionists to secure Pal-
estine for Jewish immigration.
Perhaps the most important individual for shaping what became known as
Religious Zionism was Rabbi Avraham Yitzahk Kook, who became the rst chief
rabbi in Palestine. He believed that secular Zionism was not incompatible with
Judaisms religious counterparts, but that all the activities were part of a divine
plan that would bring about the redemption of the Jewish people and eventu-
ally the coming of the Messiah. Kook asserted that religious values formed the
basis for identication with this society and the Jewish national movement and
that therefore religious practices should be promoted in Palestine. Kook founded
the rst religious Zionist yeshiva in Israel, Mercaz Harav, in 1924. The yeshiva
maintained that delity to religious values . . . did not demand withdrawal or
isolation from the general Jewish society and the Zionist enterprise.24
Alongside the utopian and religious visions of Zionists, a more militant strain
of Zionism emerged, headed by Vladimin Zeev Jabotinsky. Born in Russia,
Jabotinsky believed that forging a Jewish state would require force and that Jews
should organize and train themselves for defense against the inevitable ght for
liberation. Jabotinsky organized the Beitar, an urban-based youth movement
that trained in weapons and martial arts. Israeli historian Eran Kaplan argues
124 Zion
that for the Beitarists, the Zionist revolution meant unleashing the violent and
destructive forces that Jews had suppressed for nearly two millennia. Kaplan
further asserts, They regarded themselves as the modern-day Biryonim, the zeal-
ots of the Second Temple period who rebelled against the Romans.25 Jabotinsky
was also instrumental in forming the Jewish Legion, which fought alongside
the British in World War I, and the Irgun, an insurgent movement that blew up
a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in July 1946, killing ninety-one
British and wounding forty-ve others.26 Jabotinskys Revisionist Zionism became
the main political opposition to the socialist-leaning Labor Party, eventually
helping to form the nationalist Likud Party.
In addition to Jewish mobilization around the creation of a homeland, a form
of Zionism emerged within Christianity as well. Originally called Christian
Restorianism, Christian Zionism purports that Jews returning to Israel is a nec-
essary condition for the Second Coming of Jesus. The nineteenth-century ver-
sion of the argument included the conversion of all Jews to Christianity as part
of that messianic vision. To this end the British and German empires constructed
schools and hospitals in and around Jerusalem beginning in the mid-1800s, with
the aim of serving Christians in the city and drawing converts from Judaism.
Europeans also renewed interest in the history of the city and began archaeo-
logical excavations.27 Christian Zionists helped secure land and, following the
creation of the State of Israel, provided nancial support to the edgling state.
Not all European Jewish communities embraced Zionism, however. Herzl
attempted to recruit powerful assimilated Jewish families to the cause of Zion-
ism, such as the Rothschilds, but was unsuccessful.28 The biggest opposition to
Zionism, however, came from the Haredim, whose understanding of the faith
focused squarely on upholding the Torah. Religion Historian Karen Armstrong
argues, The Orthodox were appalled by the Zionist movement in all its forms.
. . . Any human attempt to achieve redemption or hasten the end by taking
practical steps to realize the Kingdom in the Holy Land, was abhorrent. To take
any kind of initiative amounted to a rebellion against God, who alone could
bring Redemption; anyone who took such action was going over to the other
side, the demonic world. Jews must remain politically passive. This was a condi-
tion of the existential state Exile. Armstrong also describes the response of mys-
tical JudaismKabbalismto Zionism in a similar light: In the mythical world
of Judaism, the land was inseparable from the two most sacred realities, God
and the Torah. In the mystical journey of the Kabbalah, the land was linked sym-
bolically with the divine presence the Kabbalist discovered in the ground of his
Zion 125
being.29 Thus, both the Haredim and the Kabbalists rejected Zionism as a blas-
phemous attempt by humans to do what only God could doreunite all Jews
and return them to the Promised Land.
These different interpretations of Zionismand those that opposed them
carried over to society and politics in Palestine. Jewish studies scholar Dina Porat
argues that prior to Israels independence in 1948, Zionist identity was not forged
in opposition to Arabs, which it largely ignored, but in opposition to Jews who
did not subscribe to Zionism and chose to stay in exile, such as the assimilated
Jews and the Haredim, and to the differing forms of Zionism that emerged in
Palestine. Porat argues, There was a Zionist consensus shared by a mainstream,
whose parts agreed at least on the general outline of the movement: Zionism
was characterized by constant criticism and opposition coming even from within
the consensus.30 It was this dispute, Porat argues, that became a cornerstone
of the Jewish people.
The Jewish genocide in Europethe Holocaust, or Shoah in Hebrewfur-
ther changed the understanding of the Jewish nation. No longer was the cre-
ation of a Jewish state a socialist or nationalist ideal; it became imperative, par-
ticularly to European Jews who lost an estimated 60 to 75 percent of their
population.
From Hebrew Scriptures to the Creation of Israel

In 1947, as the British prepared to end its mandate rule, the newly created United
Nations proposed a plan to partition Palestine into two areas: one that would
become the State of Israel, which included the eastern Galilee, the upper Jordan
valley, the Negev, and the coastal plain; and the other that would become an
Arab state consisting of the western Galilee, the lower Jordan valley, Nablus,
Jenin, Ramallah, and Hebron. In this arrangement Jerusalem would become a
corpus separatum between the two states and, together with Bethlehem, would
be placed under international control.31 The Zionists accepted the plan, despite
disagreeing with some of its details; the Arabs, however, rejected the proposal.
The two sides went to war, ultimately ending in an armistice between Israel and
Trans-Jordan in March 1948. Jerusalem was partitioned between Trans-Jordan
and Israel into East and West Jerusalem, respectively, with a demilitarized zone
restricting access between the two sides. Trans-Jordan gained control of the entire
Old City with its Muslim, Christian, and Jewish sites. Jews who had been living
in the Old City were forced to ee, as were Arabs who had been living in west-
ern suburbs of Jerusalem.32
126 Zion
The creation of the State of Israel posed new problems for dening the Jew-
ish nation and the covenant of land. Although the creation of a Jewish state
offered a homeland for Jews, the way in which Israel should be governed was
hotly debated between different Jewish communities. The prewar divisions
between different Zionist and religious groups persisted and, alongside these
intra-Jewish tensions, conicts with Arab and Muslim countries added an addi-
tional layer of conict to the newly formed state.
The new state faced challenges in dening citizenship. In 1950 the Israeli gov-
ernment created the Law of Return, which states, Every Jew has the right to
come to this country as an oleh [a person making aliyah] and become a citizen.
The two exceptions stated in the 1950 law were Jews who engaged in activities
against the Jewish people or posed a threat to the state. The immigration of Jews
with non-Jewish spouses, and debates over determining Jewish lineage, com-
pelled the government to amend the Law of Return in 1970 to include a child
and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and
the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, except for a person who has been a Jew and
has voluntarily changed his religion. The 1970 amendment further states: For
the purposes of this Law, Jew means a person who was born of a Jewish mother
or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another reli-
gion.33 The law was amended again in 1989 to determine that Messianic Jews
Jews who recognize Jesus as the Messiahwere not eligible for immigration.
This controversy was revisited in 2008; Israels Supreme Court reversed the 1989
decision and granted Messianic Jews the right to Israeli citizenship.34
In addition to grappling with who is Jewish under Israeli law, Israel also faced
ethnic and racial tensions within its Jewish communities. The Jewish nation is
divided between Jews that hail from Europe, or the Ashekenazim; Jews that trace
their ancestry back to medieval Spain, or the Sephardim; and Jews that come from
the Middle East and Africa, or the Mitzrahim. Ashekenazim migrants brought
with them European culture, values, and the mindset of the Enlightenment,
including democratic principles, equality, and the belief in a secular society that
relegates religion to private life. These values became the dominant inuence of
Israeli politics and society. Sephardic and Mitzrahi Jews were subsumed under
these cultural paradigms and, in some respects, treated as second-class citizens.
Religious tensions also persisted after 1948. Israel was founded as a Jewish
democracy, which created tensions not only with reconciling religion and democ-
racy but also with deciding which interpretation of Judaism would dene the
faith.35 At the time of independence the majority of Zionists were secular and
Zion 127
envisioned Israel as a modern, secular state. The countrys rst elections were held
in February 1949, less than a year after Israel received independence and while the
country was still at war with its Arab neighbors. David Ben Gurions Maipai (Work-
ers) Party won the most seats and formed an alliance with Mapam (a Marxist-based
Workers Party) and the United Religious Front, which included the Agudat Party.
Almost immediately, tensions broke out between the socialist ideals of the
workers parties and the expectations of the religious parties to include Jewish
law in the founding of the new state. In an effort to reconcile the small but inu-
ential religious communities in Israel, particularly the Agudat Party, the govern-
ment embraced modern Orthodoxy as the official form of the faith, despite the
fact that modern Orthodoxy made up only a small portion of the population.
Modern Orthodox practices determined the form of kosher food laws upheld,
marriage, divorce, burial, and other religious rituals. Upholding Orthodoxy as
the state-recognized form of Judaism has continued to cause friction with the
majority of the population, which is secular, in addition to other interpretations
of the faith, such as the Sephardim and Heredim, as well as those in the Conser-
vative and Reform movements.
Alongside debates over which form of Judaism should be upheld by the state,
the Haredim continued to reject the Zionist creation of the State of Israel in its
entirety. The Holocaust disproportionately affected the Haredim in Eastern
Europethey were largely wiped out. In the 1920s, prior to the Holocaust, a
small Haredim population, numbering fewer than ten thousand, lived in Jeru-
salem to be close to the Temple Mount.36 As in Europe these communities chose
isolation, cloistering their members into closed communities, where they focused
on studying the Torah and strict adherence to Jewish law.37 The most extreme
of these communities continued to reject the creation of the State of Israel, refus-
ing to serve in the Israeli military or send their children to public schools. They
maintained an attitude of exile inside the land.38
In contrast to the Haredim, religious Zionists chose not to isolate from soci-
ety but to interact with the outside world, with the goal of bringing the central-
ity of the Torah to Israel. Building off the legacy of Rabbi Kook, religious Zion-
ists continued to spread their theology after the creation of the State of Israel,
opening religious high schools, summer camps, and more yeshivas. The religious
Zionists doctrine is the belief that historical events and processes reect Gods
plan and, properly interpreted, instruct man of what he should do.39 This com-
bination of interpreting current-day events through the lens of scripture would
have important consequences as events unfolded in the region.
128 Zion
Finally, the post-1948 borders of Israel, while constituting a viable state, did
not include the most sacred land of eretz Yisrael. Israel did not gain access to
Hebron, which has the Tomb of the Patriarchs. It did not have access to Rachels
Tomb, which was on the edge of Bethlehem. It did not include Jericho, Nablus,
or Beit El, which were all important sites to Judaism. Most important, the Jew-
ish state did not control the Old City of Jerusalem, which hosts the Temple
Mount, the historical site of the First and Second Temples. The Jordanian author-
ity forbade Jews from visiting the Old City, often compelling visitors to present
baptismal certicates to visit Christian sites.40 Thus, although the state of Israel
had been created, eretz Yisrael had still not been realized to many.
In May 1967 rumors of an Israeli offensive against Syria heightened tensions
in the region. The rumors prompted the creation of a Syrian, Egyptian, Jorda-
nian, and Iraqi alliance aimed at deterring Israeli military action. On the morn-
ing of June 5, Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
and Iraq. By June 10 Israel has succeeded in capturing the Golan Heights from
Syria, the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem
from Jordan.41 In un Resolution 242 the United Nations condemned Israels sei-
zure of these lands as illegal and called for its immediate withdrawal; these inter-
national demands were not heeded.42
The stunning victory of Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War was understood by
some as much more than just an earthly event. Political scientist Ehud Sprinzak
describes the religious interpretation of the war: The great Israeli victory was
for [religious Zionists] a clear sign that Jehovah, the God of Israel, did not des-
ert His people in their worst moment. Not only did He save the nation from
what appears in May 1967 as a certain disaster, but also He gave the Israelis huge
territories which the nation had not controlled since the days of Kings David
and Solomon. The miracle that happened to the people of Israel was so clear
that the excited religious youngsters [Yeshiva students] convinced themselves
that heavenly redemption was just around the corner.43 Alongside this religious
interpretation of the 1967 war, political scientist Ian Lustick argues that Israelis
victory, and the various interpretations of the sources of this success, further
divided Israeli society and produced a new wave of inghting: Ironically, the
transformation of Israel from a country distinctive for its national pride, dedica-
tion, intimacy and lan to a nation bitterly divided over basic assumptions about
its collective life can be traced to the consequences of Israels military triumph
in 1967, especially the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip.44
Israel took immediate actions to secure Jerusalem and the Old City as its own.
Zion 129
On the night of June 10, the day the armistice was signed, Israeli forces removed
around 650 residents of the Maghribi Quarter, then bulldozed all 153 homes of
the neighborhood, including two mosques. The space was cleared to create room
for the anticipated hoards of Jewish pilgrims wishing to visit the Western Wall.45
The international community condemned the destruction, which was in viola-
tion of the Geneva and Hague Conventions on the protection of cultural prop-
erty.
The Israeli government also took political and legal actions aimed at solidi-
fying its control over Jerusalem. On June 27, 1967, the Knesset passed the Protec-
tion of Holy Places Law as part of its overall legislation that unied East Jerusa-
lem and the West Bank as Israeli property. The law ensured free access to all the
holy sites, protection of sites from vandalism or destruction, a seven-year prison
sentence for those who violated these laws, and the placement of all holy sites
under the jurisdiction of the Israeli minister of religious affairs. The act did not
specically state that it would uphold the status quo, however.46 Shortly after
the passage of this law, Zerah Warhaftig, the Israeli minister of religious affairs,
declared that the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif was the property of Israel by
biblical right; according to II Samuel 5:612, the ancient Israelites had purchased
Jerusalem from the Jebusites in the time of King David around 1000 bce. Along
with this claim he promised, however, not to remove the Muslim sites currently
on the Temple Mount.47 On June 28, 1967, the government expanded the city
limits to incorporate vacant lands and Jewish neighborhoods into the city and
to exclude Arab pockets, ensuring that the majority of the citys voters would
be Jewish.48
In addition to seizing the Old City of Jerusalem, the territory taken in the
1967 war sparked what became known as the settler movement, which consists
of both secular and religious groups. Secular groups, such as Menachem Begins
Movement for the Whole Land of Israel, aimed to pressure the government to
absorb the territories largely for security benets and for Jewish expansion. Their
motivations, therefore, were nationalist and not driven by the desire to control
particular sacred sites.
The Israeli government began its incorporation of the territories by imple-
menting a rapid building program of Jewish settlements, modeled after the early
settlements created by Zionists at the turn of the twentieth century. The govern-
ment targeted the newly annexed parts of Jerusalem, building enormous apart-
ment complexessuch as Gilo near Bethlehemand lling them with Jewish
Israelis.49
130 Zion
Although initiated under the Labor Party, the Likud government, which took
office in 1977, began a rigorous building program in the territories. Ian Lustick
reports,
Between 1977 and mid-1981 the Likud government spent $400 million [U.S.
dollars] in the West Bank and Gaza, built twenty settlements in areas con-
sidered off limits by the previous governments, and increased the number
of settlers living in the West Bank, minus the Jordan Valley and East Jeru-
salem, from approximately 3,500 to 18,500. . . . By the end of Likuds second
term, in August 1984, some 113 settlements were spread over the entire West
Bank, including a half-dozen sizable towns. Some 46,000 Jewish settlers
lived in the area (excluding expanded East Jerusalem), and housing and
services were under construction to absorb 15,000 additional settlers each
year.50
Government-sponsored settlement projects in East Jerusalem and the West Bank

continue to cause domestic and international conict.
Alongside government-sponsored settlements, those with expressly religious
goals, inspired by Religious Zionism, moved into areas. During Passover in 1968,
a group of settlers, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, moved into a hotel in Hebron
and refused to leave. This group began the rst religiously motivated settlement.
Religious Jews chose Hebron because it houses the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the
burial site of Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, and Jacob. This small band of settlers later
established one of the largest settlements in the West Bank, Kiryat Arba, which
sits on the outskirts of the city.51
Levinger and his followers were settling the land acquired in the 1967 war
with a cosmic purposecreating the conditions for the coming of the Messiah.
Levinger, who received his rabbinical education at the religious Zionist yeshiva
Mercaz Harav, believed that possessing eretz Yisrael was a necessary rst step for
creating the messianic age. When asked in an interview if his actions were destroy-
ing the peace process with Arabs, Levinger asserted that the advance of the Jew-
ish people, the fulllment of the Redemption, of the morale and integrity of the
Jewish people and of Eretz Yisraelthese are more important than any hypo-
thetical peace. It is through all this that the world will have peace. Levinger and
his followers went on to establish settlements in downtown Hebron, outside
Bethlehem, and around Nablus.52
Rabbi Meir Kahane was another inuential adherent to the religious settler
movement. Born in the United States, Kahane founded the Jewish Defense League
Zion 131
in 1968 with the aim of protecting Jews from anti-Semitism by whatever means
necessary.53 The jdl was credited with planting bombs outside of Soviet offices
in the United States to protest of the Soviet treatment of Jews, exacerbating race
riots in New York in the 1970s, and the assassination of Alex Odeh, an Arab
American, in 1985.54 Kahane immigrated to Israel after the Six-Day War, became
part of the settler movement in Hebron, and founded the Kach Party. Similar to
Levinger, Kahane argued not only that the return to Palestine and creation of
Israel is a divine mandate for all Jews but that returning to the land would bring
the Messiah:
For me the word Zionism means Gods order that we live in Israel. And to
have this state is a miracle that comes from God. As far as Im concerned,
we are living the end of time. We are living a messianic era. . . . The Jews
have come back from hundreds of countries just as the Bible said they
would. We had a brilliant victory in the Six-Day War. . . . If the Jews become
religious again and do what God wants, then the Messiah will come today.
. . . If we deserve him, he may come at this instant, in glory and majesty.
And if we dont deserve him, hell come all the same, but in the midst of
terrible sufferings. This is why I am ghting today. I am ghting so that the
Jews become good Jews, so that there is not a catastrophe at the coming of
the Messiah.55
The Kach Party ran in the 1984 elections and won one seat in the Knessett, occu-
pied by Kahane. The party was banned from running in future elections, how-
ever, due to its racist ideology. Kahane was murdered in 1990, by an Arab Amer-
ican, while at a fundraiser in New York.
The year following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Israel was taken by
surprise and suffered considerable casualties, the umbrella organization Gush
Emunim, the Faithful Block, was founded with the aim of becoming the cen-
tral body for the religious settler movement. Their motto is The Land of Israel,
for the People of Israel, according to the Torah of Israel.56 Building from Lev-
inger, one of the movements principle founders, Gush Emunim upholds the
belief that the Messiah will come once the Jewish nation returns to the Prom-
ised Land, the belief propagated in religious Zionists yeshivas.57 But as impor-
tant, members of Gush Emunim see themselves as a Jewish vanguard, the self-
proclaimed herald of the re-Judaization of Israel, over against a state and a
society culturally dominated by a secular and quasi-socialist conception of Zion-
ism.58 Gush Emunims goal, in other words, was not only to acquire land but
132 Zion
to wake up the Jewish nation and lead its return to what it believes to be the
right interpretation of the faith. Taking land was just one step in that awaken-
ing.
Religious settlers, including those affiliated with Gush Emunim, have used
various violent and nonviolent tactics to achieve their goals, including staging
hunger strikes, holding demonstrations, illegally seizing land, purchasing land,
lobbying the government, running for office, encouraging charitable donations
from Jews overseas, and, later, instigating assassinations, bombings, and attacks
on Arab individuals and property. They have gained nancial and political sup-
port through their ties with several Likud governments, which have provided
the bulk of funding for settlement expansion.59
In addition to efforts to secure the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Jewish land,
religious settlers also set their sights on Jerusalem. Groups such as the Temple
Faithful, Kach, and Gush Emunim focused on regaining the Temple Mount. At
their most extreme, fringe groups made at least three attempts to blow up the
Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque: an attempt in 1980, linked to Kach and
Gush Emunim; an attempt in 1983, connected to Gush Emunim; and an attempt
in 1984 by a group of skilled explosives experts that escaped unidentied.60 These
underground movements were attempting not only to change the physical sta-
tus quo of Jerusalem but also to invoke catastrophic messianism, the belief that
a major catastrophesuch as a war between the Jewish and Muslim nations
would bring the Messiah, who would restore order and justice to the world.61
Perhaps the single worst incident of settler violence against Palestinians
occurred in Hebron in 1994, when Baruch Goldstein, a U.S.-born medical doc-
tor, opened re on Palestinians praying in the Tomb of the Patriarchs during
Ramadan, killing twenty-nine. Goldstein was a member of the Kach Party and
inuenced by Kahane. He was outraged by Palestinians shouting insults at the
settlers, but perhaps more outraged by Israeli soldiers failing to do anything
about the insults. Goldstein was killed while attacking the Palestinians, and a
monument was made in his honor at Kiryat Arba.62
Parallel to the growing settler movement, Ultra Orthodox Sephardic and Mitz-
rahi Jews began to mobilize for greater political representation in Israel. In 1984
they founded the Shas Party (what they call a movement), which aims to rep-
resent the religious and ethnic interests of these marginalized groups. Shas cam-
paigns to return the crown of Torah to its glory, raise religion to higher levels,
and thereby re-insert morality into Israeli life.63 Shas has made one of its objec-
tives education and has pushed for religious education in Israels public schools,
Zion 133
especially curricula that would teach children the Torah and, in doing so, bring
back entire families to the faith.64 While some Haredim in Israel have chosen
not to vote, continuing their posture of rejecting the State of Israel on religious
grounds, Shas has persuaded many to go to the polls. Moreover, Shas has reached
out to Arabs and Bedouin, arguing that all these groups have been marginalized
by secular Ashekezi parties.65
In December 1987 the death of four Palestinian laborers in a car accident at
the Gaza checkpoint led to a series of events that ignited growing Palestinian
frustration toward Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jeru-
salem.66 The massive Palestinian intifadauprising or shaking off of Israeli
dominationlasted more than six years before negotiations at Oslo produced
a shaky peace between the two sides. The intifada prompted the creation of a
new militant Islamic organization, Hamas, which vowed not only to end Israeli
occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem but also to install an
Islamic government to rule over the Palestinian people. This program is also
shared by another Islamic militant organization in Palestine, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.67
The 1993 Oslo Peace Accords ended open hostility between the Palestinians
and the Israelis, at least temporarily, and marked the rst time that the plo (Pal-
estine Liberation Organization), headed by Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli govern-
ment recognized each others authority. However, the framework for the accords,
Land for Peace, was not embraced by the fringes on either side of the conict.
In Israel religious Zionists understood giving up parts of eretz Yisrael to be her-
esy. On November 4, 1995, following a rally in Tel Aviv, Yigal Amir, an Israeli
educated in a religious yeshiva, assassinated Israeli prime minister Yitzak Rabin,
who had brokered the land for peace agreement with the Palestinians. Amir
claimed that he was acting on orders from God and cited the Pursuers Decree,
a legal edict in Jewish law that obligates a person to stop another if he or she
presents a mortal danger to Jews.68 The Israeli population was shocked by the
assassination. Israeli sociologist Nachman Ben-Yehuda argues, The assassination
of Rabin by a religious Jew who used Halachic justications, and was part of a
religious nationalist milieu, seemed to have awakened many secular Jews to the
fact that they live under a cultural hegemony of the orthodox and ultra-ortho-
dox versions of Judaism.69
Tensions between Israel and Palestine reached another boiling point in Sep-
tember 2000, when Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat agreed
to return to the United States and resume peace talks with U.S. president Bill
134 Zion
Clinton. Rumors circulated that a new proposal was on the table for Jerusalem,
including the controversial plan to place the Old City under the protection of
the un Security Council.70 Amid these tensions, right-wing Israeli nationalist
and leader of the Likud Party Ariel Sharon visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount on September 28the ve-year anniversary of the signing of Oslo II,
which gave Palestine authority over Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin, Nab-
lus, Qalqilya, and Tulkaram. He was accompanied by members of his party and
approximately a thousand Israeli security forces.71 The visit ignited riots in Jeru-
salem, then throughout the West Bank, touching off the Second Al Aqsa Inti-
fada.
The goals of this intifada were expressed both in secular and religious terms.
Various groupssuch as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, connected with Arafat
and his political party, Fatahsprang up in the wake of the September 2000
outbreak of violence, voicing secular nationalist goals, specically the creation
of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Other groups, however,
particularly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, aim to end Israeli occupa-
tion but also to create an Islamic state in Palestine, one that would ensure the
maintenance of Sharia law and the Islamic culture of Palestine.
Conclusion: The Continued Struggle to Dene the Jewish State

The history of Judaism, particularly after exile from Palestine in the rst century
ce, shows that there has never been unanimity on understanding the covenant
of nation or land laid out in the book of Genesis. Prior to the Enlightenment,
Judaism focused on studying the Torah and observance of the law. The Enlight-
enment introduced new possibilities for European Jews and, with these oppor-
tunities, fresh debates on what it means to be Jewish. Some Jews chose assimila-
tion; others chose to remain in communities that focused on adherence to the
law.
The birth of Zionism and immigration to Palestine further complicated
debates over what it means to be Jewish. For secular Zionists, being Jewish is a
racial distinction, the criteria by which Jews in Europe were discriminated against
and, in the case of multiple pogroms and the Holocaust, the grounds for their
murder. Immigration to Palestine was a necessary condition to live free from
persecution. For religious Zionists, the return to Palestine is understood as the
beginning of the redemption, the rst step in the return of the Jewish nation
not just to the land but also to God. For the Haredim, Zionism is an abomina-
tion, an attempt by humans to do what only God can do; Zionism should not
Zion 135
be embraced, but the focus of the truly devoted should remain on the Torah and
strict adherence to the law.
The creation of the State of Israel has continued these debates over what it
means to be Jewish and what a Jewish state should look like. Although Israel
was founded as a secular state, religious voices in the country have continued to
push for greater inclusion of the faith in public life. More recently, the push for
stronger religiosity and adherence to religious law sparked the creation of a new
religious party, Shas, that has prompted some Haredim to participate in elec-
tions to inuence policies of the Jewish state, the same state they consider to be
an abomination.
Religious interpretations of Zionism have come largely from rabbis. Religious
schoolsyeshivashave been particularly important for understanding the rise
of a specic interpretation of the Jewish nation and the land of Israel. Rabbi
Kooks yeshiva, Mercaz Harav; its offshoot yeshivas; and religious high schools
see the return of all Jews to the land of Israel as the harbinger to the coming of
the Messiah. Historical events are understood as signs of the messianic age, when
everything will be made complete. Extreme understandings of this vision have
perpetrated acts of violence against Palestinians and coreligionists, and even the
assassination of Yitzak Rabin.
Battles over dening the Jewish nation and state also show that historical cir-
cumstances can be interpreted as signs from God. Although Israels aims in the
1967 war were not religiousit strove to preempt a combined Arab attack by
disabling the core of its military capabilitiesIsraels capture of the West Bank,
Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and Jerusalem has religious mean-
ing. Religious Zionists interpreted the miraculous victory as another step in the
redemption of the Jewish nation and the coming of the Messiah.
Militant Jewish groups emerged following the success of the 1967 war with
the goal of appropriating all land believed to be Jewish and cleansing the Tem-
ple Mount/Haram al-Sharif of its non-Jewish elements. These groups have used
a variety of tactics to achieve these aims, including terrorism and assassination;
there have even been failed attempts at blowing up Muslim sites on the Holy
Compound. In addition to Jewish militant groups, secular Israeli groups have
also worked toward appropriating as much Arab land as possible, including in
Jerusalem. Secular groups want land not for religious reasons but for Zionist-
nationalist aspirations: growth and security. Religious and secular Zionists are
united by the goal of seizing as much land as possible, but they differ in their
reasons for wanting the land; religious militant groups aim to hasten the com-
136 Zion
ing of the Messiah, while secular militant groups desire an expanded Zionist
state.
Although Israel has existed for more than sixty years, debates over what it
means to be Jewish and what the Jewish state should be continue. Rabbi Marc
Gopin argues,
There is a long history of antagonism between secular and religious Jews,

well as among Jews of different religious orientations. At the same time,
this is particularly traumatic to Jews because it calls into question some
vital myths that have been the key to survival in a hostile world. The myths
of Jewish brotherhood and the care for fellow Jews at all costs have been
central beliefs that buttressed the struggle for survival in deance of the
wishes of religious enemies for two thousand years. Furthermore, the myth
of Jewish unity has always been tied to the existence of an overarching, evil
enemy. But this myth has masked serious divisions within the Jewish peo-
ple, which has always existed and has always been avoided, at least officially.
Gopin goes on to argue that, in the case of Israel, the Israeli-Arab conict has
masked differences in the Jewish nation. But should this conict be resolved,
Israeli society will be forced to seriously consider the reality of these divisions,
whichat its most extremecould result in civil war.72
Zion 137
8
how religious violence ends
Spiritualizing the Battle
The previous ve case studies have shown that all the worlds major religions
have motivated, engaged in, or condoned violent conict at some point in his-
tory. Violent interpretations of Islam have played a role in battles over Jerusalem,
bids to defend the dar al Islam, and efforts to defend specic practices and beliefs
of the faith. But other religions have perpetrated religious violence with the
same goals in mind. Jews and Christians have also fought for possession of Jeru-
salem, Hindus have used violence to gain control of Ayodhya, and Buddhists in
Sri Lanka have justied the use of force to preserve the Dammadipa, a Buddhist
nation mandated to protect and propagate the teachings of the Buddha.
However, each of the cases in this book also have shown that none of these
religions have been consistently violent; rather, all have gone through distinct
periods of violence and periods of peace. Belligerent-sounding passages in reli-
gious scripturessuch as the Sword verse in the Quran or the Ban in Hebrew
scripturesare, by themselves, not sufficient for explaining why religious vio-
lence occurs at some points in time but not others, because scriptures are con-
stant, but religious violence comes and goes. Rather, it is the interpretations of
scripture and doctrine that fuel religious violence. Interpretations of scriptures,
beliefs, and doctrines are the product of individuals and the social and political
circumstances in which they live. Specically, if threats and political opportuni-
ties prompt leaders to produce interpretations that call for violence to defend
the faith, these interpretations resonate with a core of the faithful, and the groups
have sufficient resources to mobilize and take action, then religious violence is
likely to occur.
Interpretations Calling for Religiously Motivated Violence

The chapters have shown that waves of religious violence can be traced back to
specic interpretations that have called for adherents to take up arms to defend
the faith. For example, nineteenth-century violence in India occurred as a result
of calls for jihad to defend Islam in South Asia that were perpetrated by Muslim
leaders such as Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly. Likewise, in India, violence followed
the emergence of militant interpretations of Hinduism; the most notable of
these were the works of twentieth-century scholar Vinayak Damodar Savarkar,
who coined the word Hindutva, and K. B. Hedgewar, who created the Rash-
triya Swayamsevak Sangh (rss), which stresses a militant interpretation of Hindu
identity. Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka can be traced back to the nineteenth-
century interpretations of Dharmapala and Walpola Rahula. The same pattern
is visible in Jewish militancy, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day War, in which
Rabbi Moshe Levinger argued that seizing the West Bank and Gaza Strip would
hasten the coming of the Messiah. Likewise, Christian calls to liberate Jerusalem
from indel hands during the Crusades were inspired by the interpretations
of clerics and lay religious leaders, who argued that it was a Christian duty to
take back the Tomb of Christ.
These and other leaders have drawn from several religious sources to gener-
ate sophisticated and persuasive interpretations that call for violence in defense
of the faith. Obviously, scriptures play a central role in creating and validating
calls for religiously motivated violence. Most religions have scriptures that con-
done the use of force or that describe sacred battles. However, scriptures are con-
stantmost have been present and unchanged for more than a thousand years
yet religiously motivated violence occurs at some points and times but not at
others. Therefore, scriptures that describe battles or that call for violence against
others, by themselves, do not explain the conditions under which religiously
motivated violence occurs.
Moreover, with specic calls for religious violence, such as Pope Urban IIs
speech for what became the First Crusade, the justication for the use of force
is much more complicated than pointing to one or two verses of scripture to
make the call. Rather, leaders make rich and theologically persuasive arguments.
Urban II reportedly drew from the Old TestamentHebrew scripturesto
How Religious Violence Ends 139

describe Christians as the chosen race and, in essence, suggest they are the true
Israelites that must defend Jerusalem from an accursed race. The call to vio-
lence, therefore, is rarely as straightforward as pointing to a passage of scripture.
Leaders also draw from religious doctrine and law to develop interpretations
that call for religiously motivated violence. The early Christian Just War Doc-
trine played a role in justifying the Crusades, particularly the call to defend fel-
low Christians from Muslim advances in the East. The doctrine of jihad, histor-
ically, also has conditions and restrictions under which it can be called and even
who can call for war. Unlike scripture, doctrine and law are the product of inter-
pretation and change over time and according to circumstances. Therefore, inves-
tigating how doctrine and law are employed to justify violence in the name of
faith offers important clues for the conditions under which religiously motivated
violence occurs.
Other important secondary sources for generating interpretations that call
for violence are religious folklore and local legends. In Sri Lanka leaders such
as Dharmapala and Bandaranaika drew heavily from the Mahvamsaa local
text that describes how its kings have defended the faith, including through war-
fareto justify religiously motivated violence. Similarly, Hindu nationalism
gained momentum by interpreting the Ramayanaa legend that describes the
invasion of foreign demons, the capture of a pure woman, a heroic battle that
defeats the enemy, and the restoration of the womans honoras an example of
foreign threats facing the nation and what to do about those threats. In Chris-
tianity and Islam heroic tales of martyrs who gave their life in defense of the
faith are important symbols of religious sacrice. Tales of crusaders and their
miraculous adventures in the Holy Landdepicted in poems, legends and,
songshelped fuel religious zeal and mobilize groups to engage in crusading.
Similarly, legends of jihadis who confronted the enemy in battle and miracu-
lously survived, helped ignite passion in young men wishing to ght in defense
of their faith.
Finally, preexisting interpretations that call for religiously motivated violence
are an important source for justifying new calls for holy wars. Current jihads
are built on the scholarship of preexisting calls for violence in defense of the
faith, including the works of ibn Taymiyyah, who justied killing Muslim lead-
ers who did not uphold the faith; Qutb and Faraj, who called jihad to change
the status quo; and Mawdudi, who created the template for an Islamic state.
Each of these ideologues offered important interpretations that helped shaped
current jihads, including bin Ladens call for war against apostate regimes and
140 How Religious Violence Ends

the United States. Similarly, the writings of nineteenth-century ideologue Dhar-
mapala inuenced Buddhist nationalist agendas nearly a hundred years later.
Thus, interpretations themselves become valuable resources for generating new
calls and justications for religiously motivated violence.
The Conditions under Which Interpretations Take Root

These case studies have shown, however, that interpretations of scriptures call-
ing for violence and other religious resources are not by themselves sufficient
to cause religious violence. Leaders interpret scriptures, beliefs, and doctrines to
explain what is wrong, how things ought to be, and the path to make things
right. But for these interpretations to take hold and result in violent acts, the
threats and sense of urgency articulated by religious leaders need to reect the
worldview of practitioners. In other words, the ideas of religious leaders must
be believed and followed for these interpretations to result in violence. Com-
prehending the conditions under which the faithful believe the call for violence
to defend the faith and are willing to take up arms and possibly sacrice their
lives is another essential piece for understanding why religiously motivated vio-
lence occurs.
Therefore, to understand why individuals call for violence in the name of the
faith and why adherents embrace these calls, it is necessary to understand the
social and political circumstances in which these communities live. The cases
of religiously motivated violence examined in this book show that real or per-
ceived threats to religious communities are present in all cases. In other words,
these communities feel as if their faith is being attacked and the faithful need
to take action to repel these threats. In extreme cases some groups feel as if the
very survival of the faith is at stake. Under these conditions all options are on
the table, including killing fellow adherents believed to be compromising the
faith.
The case studies reveal that, in particular, radical changes to the structure of
society, politics, and group identity tend to produce a religious backlash. For
example, British colonialism in Sri Lanka introduced drastic changes to the
structure of government and order of society, including disbanding the Sinha-
lese monarchy and constructing a bureaucratic government in its place. These
changes affected not only the political order of the island but also the religious
establishment, which received support from the monarchy. Mass education also
changed society. Increased access to education created a middle class that was
neither peasant nor merchant. This new class demanded employment that the

traditional Sinhalese socioeconomic structure could not provide, which led to
competition within the educated class for limited jobs in the government that
broke out along ethnic and religious lines. Finally, the presence of British occu-
piers and Christian missionaries prompted a search for identity in Sri Lanka
that drove both the Sinhalese and Tamils to differentiate themselves from their
occupiers; in doing so, they distinguished themselves from each other. For the
Sinhalese Buddhists, religion played a salient role in their new identity. The
changes introduced by British colonialism, intentional or not, undermined the
social and political order of Sinhalese societywhich was based on Theravada
Buddhismprompting calls by religious and secular leaders for Sinhalese to
assert their Buddhist identities and distinguish themselves not only from the
British but also from their non-Sinhalese Buddhist neighbors, including Tamils
and Christian converts.
Similarly, the Muslim world underwent a rash of calls for jihad beginning in
the nineteenth century, following the incursion of Western colonial powers into
South Asia, East Asia, and Africa. Colonialism brought radical changes to soci-
ety and introduced Western forms of government, law, and philosophy to most
of the areas they occupied. These changes produced new interpretations of the
faith, some of which argued that Western ideals and technology were compat-
ible with Islam, such as those espoused by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad
Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal, and Taha Hysayn, while others argued that these new
ideas must be resisted. Extreme interpretations called for jihad to ght and repel
what was believed to be a threat to Islam.
External actors are not the only source of radical change. Internal or domes-
tic threats to the order of societyfor example, radical changes in governments
and the ideologies they promotehave also produced a religious backlash. Fol-
lowing independence from the British, the Indian government, led by Jawaha-
rlal Nehru and the Congress Party, instituted a secular socialist agenda for the
country. Alongside this agenda was the promise of social and economic progress
for the country. However, after thirty years of setbacks and corruption and two
years of suspended liberties under emergency rule, Hindu nationalist parties
seized on these popular disappointments to call for a new ideology based on
Hindu culture instead of the ideas of Indias former occupiers.
Likewise, Israel was created as a secular, socialist Zionist state. From its incep-
tion, religious Zionists disagreed with this ideology, calling for a Jewish state
based on the Torah. Following the success of the 1967 Six-Day War, which brought
religious sites such as Jerusalem and Hebron under Israeli control, and the set-

backs of the 1973 war, religious parties began to gain momentum and campaign
for greater inclusion of religion in society and politics. At its most extreme, this
brought Kach into the Knesset on the platform of the sacredness of Israeli soil
and the need to remove all non-Jews from the land.
Major social and political calamities can also cause leaders and religious adher-
ents to reinterpret their faith. Following Israels victory over its Arab neighbors
in 1967, the Six-Day War became proof to Islamists that Western ideologies and
pan-Arabism (as opposed to pan-Islam) were practically and morally bankrupt;
only the return to Islam as the authentic ideology of Muslims could restore the
dar al Islam. Similarly, the surprise attack on Israel in the 1973 war led religious
settlers to push for greater inclusion of religion in Israeli society and politics,
calling the crisis a sign of Gods disfavor. Major calamities, in other words, cre-
ate the conditions under which people question the order of the world around
them.
Military invasion and occupation can also produce calls for violence in defense
of the faith. Sheikh Abdullah Azzam called for Muslims throughout the word
to take up arms in defense of fellow Muslims following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. These seasoned jihadis spread throughout the Muslim world fol-
lowing the demise of the Soviet offensive, aided by the creation of transnational
jihad movements such as Al Qaeda. Similarly, following the U.S. stationing of
troops on Saudi soil, and then the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Al
Qaeda called for jihad against the United States. Bin Laden perceived U.S. for-
eign policy as threatening not only to holy sites in Islammost notably the holy
cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalembut also to the dar al Islam, the terri-
tory and people deemed central to the faith. Likewise, Hamas and Hizbollah
were both forged under the conditions of war and occupation.
The counter-Crusades, headed by Saladin, were also formed in response to
foreign invasion: the arrival of Western crusaders and their occupation of Jeru-
salem and surrounding areas. In this case the presence of crusader kingdoms
prompted previously divided Muslim forces in the region to close ranks, under
Saladins guidance, and push foreign occupiers out of the region. Religious schol-
ars aided Saladins mission by calling for jihad against this foreign threat.
Finally, there is another cause of religiously motivated violence that is gener-
ated less by threat and more by opportunity. Religious agendas can become
powerful tools for garnering political support; using religion as a source of
political mobilization, however, comes with dangerous side effects. Specically,
governments that make promises to religious groups may become the target of

religious violence for not delivering those promises. For example, the Sri Lankan
Freedom Party (slfp) campaigned on a platform that promised preferential treat-
ment to Buddhism, a promise that resonated with the countrys Buddhist major-
ity. However, when the government made concessions to the Tamil minority, a
Buddhist monk assassinated the prime minister in 1959. In the 1980s the Sri
Lankan government faced a militant Buddhist revolutionary movement, headed
by the Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (msv), which launched attacks against the
Sri Lankan government with the aim of overthrowing the regime and installing
a Buddhist theocracy in its place. The fratricidal conict between the Buddhist
revolutionaries and the government is blamed for the deaths of between forty
thousand to sixty thousand Sri Lankans. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood
turned to violence against the state after the 1954 Egyptian coup, which they sup-
ported, did not lead to Islam playing a central role in the Nasserite regime. The
Muslim Brotherhood made several attempts to assassinate Gamul Abdel Nasser
in retaliation for broken promises. These cases show that political promises to
religious groups, made with the intention of gaining votes or support, run the
risk of never satisfying the more extreme elements within the faith.
Within many of these cases, the perception of threat to the faith is somewhat
ironic. Hindus in India make up over 80 percent of the population, yet the state-
ments of the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), Vishva Hindu Parishad (vhp), and
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (rss) are saturated with the language of threats
from Muslims and Christians, which they claim are threatening Hinduism
through conversion, and the threat posed by Indias Muslim neighbors. Simi-
larly, Buddhists make up over 80 percent of the population in Sri Lanka, yet
leaders in the Buddhist community have described the threat posed by millions
of Hindus only a short boat ride away. Likewise, Pope Urban IIs speech in 1095
that called for an armed attack against advancing Muslim forces spoke of the
potential for Muslim encirclement of Christendom and the existential threat to
the faith. More recently, bin Laden spoke about U.S. intentions to eradicate Islam,
a worldwide religion of more than a billion adherents, including millions who
live in the United States. Clearly, these are not the United States intentions, but
the message appears to be resonating with some Muslims.
In some cases more than one type of threat, or threats and opportunities, can
work together to create the conditions for religiously motivated violence. For
example, new interpretations of Buddhism emerged largely in response to the
drastic changes introduced by British colonialism, an external actor. But these
new understandings of Buddhism did not result in violence until they became

part of the slfps political campaign in the 1950s. In other words threats gener-
ated the extreme interpretations of Buddhism on the island, but these interpre-
tations did not result in religious violence until they became part of a political
agenda that seized the resources of the state.
Likewise, the current wave of jihads has its theological roots in the writings
of religious activists from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, including Mawlana Abul
Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Salaman Faraj and Ali Shariati. These activ-
ists were deeply critical of the secular regimes in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran, and
called for mass mobilization and jihad to overthrow corrupt governments. How-
ever, jihads did not emerge throughout the umma until external actors, particu-
larly the Soviet Union and the United States, became a named source of threat.
Key Resources for Religiously Motivated Violence

The case studies also reveal that a religious groups resources affect the scope of
religious violence. Social resources, including educated leaders, networks, and
organizations, are particularly important. Nearly all the incidents of religious
violence within and across the case studies presented in this book occurred under
leaders who were both charismatic and highly educated. In the modern cases
most leaders received their education in Western-modeled schools, giving them
valuable tools for organizing and maintaining opposition movements. More-
over, very few leaders were trained as clerics; in fact one of the growing trends
in more recent religious violence is that leaders have come from outside the
trained clergy and often critique their leadership. Militant Judaism is the one
exception to this trend. Key leaders, including Meir Kahane and Moshe Levinger,
were trained rabbis. Furthermore, a militant strain of religious Zionism comes
from Rabbi Kooks Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and subsidiary schools, which profess
that historical and current events reveal the coming of the Messiah.
Effective organizations are also important in inuencing the scope of religious
violence. Hindu attempts to claim the Babri Mosque in 1949 and 1992 followed
the creation of Hindu nationalist organizations, particularly the rss but also,
later, the vhp and the bjp. These organizations mobilized Hindus throughout
the country in a series of yatrasreligious processionswith the call to liberate
Rams birthplace from Muslim hands. Mobilization efforts ultimately resulted
in the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992 at the hands of an estimated three
hundred thousand Hindu militants. Moreover, these organizations were success-
ful in mobilizing votes that helped put the Hindu nationalist agenda in the cen-
tral and state governments.

By contrast, the overwhelming failure of the Christian Crusades to maintain
control of areas in the Holy Land was largely the result of poor leadership and
lack of organization. The First Crusade succeeded in capturing Edessa, Antioch,
Nicaea, and Jerusalem despite the troops lack of organization and material
resources; their success was aided by the element of surprise and the weakened
military strength of Muslim dynasties in the region. However, subsequent
attempts to gain greater territory and defend captured land largely failed. The
absence of leadership and organization, particularly as the Muslim dynasties in
the region joined forces under the command of Saladin, ultimately led to the
collapse of Christian control of the Holy Land.
The current wave of jihads has made excellent use of the social, material, and
technological resources available to these groups. Leaders like Qutb and Faraj
called for jihad beginning as early as the 1950s; however, jihads did not prosper
until leaders organized groups and mobilized resources for war. This is particu-
larly true of Al Qaeda, which has been able to convert its call for jihad into lethal
attacks against the United States in Saudi Arabia, Africa, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghan-
istan on U.S. soil. The effectiveness of these calls to holy war, therefore, is depen-
dent on effective leaders, the organizations they create, and networks that spread
the ideology and recruit and train ghters.
Finally, some movements have proted from democratic systems as a resource
to further their agendas. The rise of religious violence over Ayodhya occurred,
as part of efforts to use the contested sacred space to whip up electoral support
for parties that would support making the site exclusively Hindu. In the 1984
elections in India, the rss encouraged its ranks to vote for Rajiv Gandhi and the
Congress Party after the party announced its support of rss goals, particularly
concerning the status of Ayodhya. When the Congress Party failed to produce
visible changes, the rss then backed the bjp in the 1991 elections, and the bjp
won 119 seats in national electionsnearly 20 percent of the overall votein
addition to winning elections in four states. It was under bjp rule that Hindu
nationalists destroyed the Babri Mosque.
Similarly, Israels right-wing Likud Party joined forces with secular and religious
Jewish militants to defeat the Labor Party in the 1977 elections. Once in power,
Likud aggressively expanded the nascent program of seizing land in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip and building settlements, despite international condemnation of
these actions. It is evident that both Hindu and Jewish militants had preexisting
designs on sacred land and sites. It was when these groups formed alliances with
political parties in exchange for voter support that their plans gained momentum.

However, in both of these case studies, the relationship between religious
groups and political leaders was fraught with tensions. Following the destruc-
tion of the Barbri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, the bjp was censured at the fed-
eral level, and the governments were dismissed in the four states in which the
bjp ruled. The Hindu groups that bore responsibility, including the rss, were
outlawed. Although the rss regained its status and the bjp went on to dominate
elections in 1998, Congress regained the upper hand in the 2004 elections after
the bjp was unable to improve the lives of the countrys poor. Likewise, the Likud
Party was forced to rein in Jewish militants, particularly after their failed attempts
to destroy Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. The Israeli government banned Kach
from elections in Israel after the group was deemed racist by Israels Supreme
Court. Thus, the relationship between political leaders and religious groups has
its limits in a functioning democracy.
The Goals for Which Religious Groups Are Fighting

The case studies also show that, within these causes of religiously motivated vio-
lence, goals for which the groups are ghting also vary, and in most cases there
is a connection between the ends and means that groups choose to realize their
goals. Some groups have specic and limited goals, such as asserting a specic
religious ideology or transforming governments, religious groups, or societies
to comply with a particular interpretation of the faith. These goals correspond
to the concept of earthy salvation described in chapter 1, the desire to transform
the world in the here and now to conform to a particular interpretation of the
faith. For example, Hindu nationalists have a specic agenda; they wish to cre-
ate a government based on their interpretation of Hindu faith and culture. Orga-
nizations such as the rss, vhp, and bjp have used youth clubs, pilgrimages, and
the democratic process itself to realize their goals. Similarly, religious political
parties in Israel, such as Kach and Shas, have used the democratic process to
work through the political system to change policies and the society.
For groups that have goals in the realm of earthly salvation, violence is instru-
mental; it is a resource to further their goals. For example, violence can be a tool
used to draw attention to the cause, to bait a government or state into confron-
tation and perpetrate a victim narrative, or to gain recruits through rebellious
behavior. Al Qaeda, for example, has used violence to advertise its cause, fulll
its prophecies, and entice recruits. In cases like these violence could occur at dif-
ferent points throughout a movements existence. In other cases violence could
be the last resort in a series of actions aimed at realizing change or when other

avenues are blocked. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, has used
violence as a means to challenge the system and then has also abandoned vio-
lence when it did not serve its goals. A similar pattern is visible in religious
groups in Iraq and India. Thus, violence is a means to other ends for those with
earthly salvic goals.
But not all groups have earthly salvation as their goal. For some, the battle is
being fought almost entirely on a spiritual plane; these groups are locked in
what Mark Juergensmeyer calls cosmic war. In a cosmic war the violence is real,
but the goals are ethereal; they involve the hastening of the Messiah, the destruc-
tion of this world to usher in the millennium, or the eradication of evil and tri-
umph of righteousness. For groups that believe they can achieve eternal salva-
tion through their actions, violence becomes a sacred duty; it is cleansing and
ritualistic. This mindset makes cosmic warriors especially deadly. Cosmic war-
riors are few relative to those seeking earthly salvation. But they are difficult to
counter because their goals are not of this world. The best means through which
to challenge cosmic warriors is to challenge their interpretation of the faith.
Finally, most groups are not seeking purely earthly or eternal salvation; most
groups contain elements of both goals. First, each religion studied in this book
describes not only a quest for eternal salvation but also the desire for redeeming
the here and now. Similarly, there are groups that contain both earthly and eter-
nal goals. For example, Al Qaeda has earthly goals: the demise of corrupt Mus-
lim leadership, the reunication of the Muslim umma, and the return of Mus-
lims to what they believe is the right path of the faith.1 However, Al Qaeda also
draws on images and themes of cosmic war, such as battles between good and
evil and the promise of instant salvation for martyrs of the faith. Religious Zion-
ism, in addition to securing land for Israel, also holds the belief that the creation
of Israel and the return of all Jews to the Holy Land will bring the Messiah.
Hindu nationalists seek to create what they believe is the return to a precolonial
culture and ideology for India, but they also draw on themes of spiritually and
literally cleansing India of foreign invaders, themes that stem from their inter-
pretation of the Ramayana. Within each of these cases, one form of salvation
predominates over another. Hindu nationalists are more concerned with this
world and suicide bombers are focused largely on the hereafter, but movements
as a whole contain both salvations.
Furthermore, members within an organization or movement may have dif-
ferent motivations or goals. For example, a 2008 study on primary documents
captured from Al Qaeda found that the organizations leadership was frustrated

by its rank and le engaging in acts of violence, especially violence that directly
or indirectly targeted other Muslims, because it compromised the organizations
strategic goals.2 This debate within Al Qaeda suggests that the leadership has
more earthly goals, such as transforming the Muslim world politically and
socially, while the rank and le may be focused more on eternal salvation and
becoming martyrs.
The presence of earthly and eternal salvation, while limiting the options of
outside actors, does not preclude the possibility of religiously motivated violence
coming to an end. There are options for those ghting religiously motivated
violence that range from nonviolent engagement to the use of force.
How Religious Violence Ends

If perceived or real threats to the faith cause leaders to interpret scriptures that
call for violence, a core of faithful believe these interpretations to be true, and
these groups have resources and the ability to mobilize, then religiously moti-
vated violence is likely to occur. This causal argument suggests that interdicting
one of these variables would prevent religiously motivated violence from erupt-
ing. The different chapters reveal important clues about which variables to tar-
get for lasting solutions to religious violence.
One possible avenue for undermining the call for violence in defense of the
faith is to address the threats that fuel these interpretations. However, the case
studies suggest that assuaging threats is a difficult undertaking. First, threats are
as much perceptual as real and addressing these perceptions may require more
than addressing the immediate cause of insecurity. For example, Hindu nation-
alists perceptions of threats from Muslim and Christian missionaries stems from
a reading of history that connects these religions to Indias British and Mughal
rulers and the belief that these empires sought to destroy Hindu culture and
faith. In other words, the perception of threats is as much about an interpreta-
tion of history as it is about current realities; undoing current perceptions of
threats requires reinterpreting the past.
Grievances are also difficult to resolve, because most movements have mul-
tiple grievances that confound addressing these problems in a meaningful way.
Al Qaeda, for example, stated that the presence of U.S. military in Saudi Arabia
was a cause de guerre, as was the United States spread of culture and values, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its alliance with Israel. Al Qaeda has also taken
issue with local Muslim leaders, including the Saudi Royal family, the Egyptian
regime under Hosni Mubarek, and the Shia-dominated government in Iraq, call-

ing for their demise. Finally, Al Qaeda has criticized Islamic scholars, the ulama,
for failing to uphold the true tenets of the faith and leading the masses astray.
Attempting to resolve one grievance will leave the other problems unattended,
but addressing all grievances is a near impossibility.
Aside from the challenge of addressing threats, it is possible to target a group
or movements resources, although trying to interdict these assets runs into chal-
lenges as well. In theory, cutting off a movements resources should prevent it
from growing and being effective in its violent operations. However, current
efforts to interdict Al Qaedas resources have shown that effectively cutting off
supply lines is difficult and that organizations persist despite limited resources.
After September 11th the U.S. government tried to freeze Al Qaedas nances,
deny the organization safe haven in Afghanistan, target its leadership, and shut
down its websites. Despite these efforts, and the considerable resources they have
denied Al Qaeda, the organization persists and its messages continue to spread
and inuence jihadi movements. Thus, it appears that targeting resources alone
is unlikely to undermine a movement and its call for religious violence.
Attempting to undermine the perception of threats and reduce the resources
available to a group does not target the root of the problem, which are the inter-
pretations themselves. The chapters in this book show that interpretations, once
generated, persist and reemerge in the future. Preexisting interpretations that
called for religiously motivated violence are an important source for justifying
new calls for holy wars. Interpretations themselves, in other words, become valu-
able resources for generating new calls and justications for religiously moti-
vated violence.
To get at the heart of religious violence, therefore, the ideology itself needs to
be challenged. This is a process that religious sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer
refers to as redirecting the mythology.3 Redirecting the mythology demands
more than just discrediting leaders or attempting to undermine a groups
resources; it requires offering alternative interpretations of historical and con-
temporary events, interpretations that do not describe the religion as under
attack or that do not call for violence as a necessary means of defending the faith.
Redirecting the mythology is no easy undertaking, but historical evidence
shows that it is possible. The strongest example of redirecting the mythology
comes from the Christian Crusades. Crusading was a romanticized and popu-
larized aspect of Christianity for several hundred years. Not only did lords and
other elites risk everything to undertake religious and military expeditions aimed
at liberating the Holy Land, but commoners rose up as wellin the Peoples

Crusade, the Shepherds Crusade, and the Childrens Crusadeembarking on
the expedition and often dying en route. For those that undertook the armed
pilgrimage and survived, they returned home heroes and were distinguished by
special crosses they wore on their garments. For those that died, the church
promised remission of sins and instant salvation.
For Christianity, crusading is a thing of the past. Political circumstances helped
pave the way for the end of crusading, especially the break up of Christendom
and the reconguration of polities in Europe. However, the strongest explanation
for the end of crusading comes from the radical transformation that European
Christianity underwent, beginning with the Renaissance in the fourteenth cen-
tury and the Reformation in the sixteenth century. The Renaissance introduced
a new era of reasoning and thought based on the revival of classical literature and
art from Greek and Roman antiquity. The renewal of the classics invigorated new
ways of thinking about human destiny and divinity.4 Alongside the Renaissance,
and perhaps in reaction to it, new interpretations of the faith began to emerge
that challenged traditional thinking of the church. The birth of Protestant Chris-
tianity introduced new ways of practicing the faith, emphasizing the importance
of reading scriptures, prayer, and belief as the path to salvation. Within most Prot-
estant denominations, saint and relic worship became superstitious practices of
the past. The enemies of Christ were no longer literal foes but spiritual ones, such
as the daily struggle to live a Christlike life and to overcome temptation and resist
the force of sin. The transformation brought about by Protestantism spiritualized
the battle; it was no longer a literal ght. For Christians, these changes have made
the idea of crusading a curious and romantic episode of the past.
Another example of redirecting mythology comes from Mahatma Gandhi,
who drew from the Bhagavad GitaHindu scripture that depicts a battleto
ground his theory of nonviolent civil disobedience against British occupation.
Gandhi built on themes of the Gita, like duty and sacrice, to argue that the
story is not about a literal battle but an allegory in which the battleeld is the
soul and Arjuna, mans higher impulses struggling against evil.5 In the struggle
for independence from British rule, Gandhi even introduced the idea of non-
violent martyrs, the satyagrahis, who give their lives to persuading adversaries
through ahimsa, or doing no harm. Gandhis interpretations, in other words,
spiritualized the battle to describe humanitys daily struggle against the forces
of evil and the necessary path of nonviolence for change.
All religions are familiar with the spiritual battle, the struggle to resist temp-
tation and live out ones life in a way that follows the tenets of the faith. Islam

is no exception. Jihad, in its broadest sense, means to struggle, to strive, or to
make an effort to follow the path of God; this struggle has both a spiritual and
a physical dimension.6 The spiritual jihad, often called the greater jihad, involves
the individual struggle that people face in their walk as a Muslim, including
resistance to earthly temptations and submission to the will of God. The lesser
jihad is the physical struggle to spread and defend the faith, including by force.
Currently, jihadis are emphasizing the lesser jihad, the physical struggle, as a
necessary means to defend the faith. Some ideologues, such as Faraj and Azzam,
argue that physical jihad is required by all Muslims and that the violent struggle
to defend the faith is perpetual and unending.7 However, these interpretations
are radical departures from the mainstream understanding of Islam and what it
means to be Muslim; their call to arms have not been embraced by the majority
of Muslims and have gained the following of only a tiny, extreme fraction of the
umma. But, as history demonstrates, these and other bellicose interpretations
could be picked up at a later date and used to mobilize groups bent on violence.
Discrediting interpretations that call for religiously motivated violence requires
not only challenging their validity but also offering alternative visions in their
place. Juergensmeyers argument that religious violence ends when the mythol-
ogy is redirected suggests that eradicating myths altogether is not the goal; rather,
redening interpretations of scripture, doctrine, and religious folklore that tell
people how they should behave is how violent interpretations are undone. In
other words, it is necessary to change the message, not just discredit it.
All religions have the potential to change the message from the physical to
the spiritual struggle. However, as the Crusades show, redirecting the mythology
requires time and reemphasis until interpretations calling for violence no lon-
ger seem plausible. The militant language remainssuch as Christian hymns
that claim a mighty fortress is our God, a sword and shield victorious or onward
Christian soldiers, marching as to warbut the meaning has changed entirely,
and the passages reference not a physical battle but a spiritual one.8
Aside from new messages, redirecting the mythology requires the right mes-
senger as well. Just as interpretations calling for violence require legitimate or
charismatic leaders for adherents to believe them, so do pacic interpretations.
Arguably, Gandhi himself was as important as the message he delivered; his life
was his message. It is hard to imagine that Gandhi would have had the impact he
had, and still continues to have, had he not fully embraced his message. Christi-
anity has also produced those who live the message of the spiritual battle, includ-
ing Martin Luther and John Wesley and the religious denominations they sparked.

More recent examples include Martin Luther King Jr. and Bishop Desmond Tutu.
From these cases it appears that the messenger is as important as the message.
In addition, the path to spiritualizing the battle is not a linear one, nor is it
universally embraced by adherents. The hard core will remain. Not all Hindus
have embraced Gandhis message, as evidenced by the physical militancy of the
Hindu nationalist movement described in this book. Likewise, Christian extrem-
ists with violent intentions exist today. Liberation theology in Latin America
fused a Marxist argument of class struggle and revolution to Christianity and, in
some cases, the need for violence to overthrow existing political regimes. Chris-
tian-inspired abortion clinic bombing in the United States had a brief but bloody
episode in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the trend of spiritualizing the battle persists in
both these traditions and provides a counterweight against violent interpretations.
Finally, there are risks associated with spiritualizing the battle. Specically,
new interpretations of a faith challenge the status quo and can lead to inght-
ing and fratricide. The new interpretations of Christianity, advanced by Martin
Luther and his followers, unleashed a fury of bloodletting between Protestants
and Catholics over control of Christendom that lasted for around a hundred
years. There is evidence to suggest that directly confronting interpretations in
Islam that call for violence will also let loose a period of inghting and instabil-
ity. Takr violenceattacking Muslims that militants believe are not adhering
to the right path of the faithis already occurring. The good news is that this
violence does not appear to be winning the Muslim majority over to the mili-
tants interpretation of the faith and, in fact, is turning potential recruits away.9
However, challenging the militant voices and their interpretations will almost
certainly come at the price of instability and bloodshed.
While religious violence will never completely endthere will always be
those for whom force is justied in the name of faiththe appeal of taking up
arms can be minimized by countering ideological calls for violence with alter-
native paths. Examples of nonviolent spiritual struggles are potential inspira-
tions not only to those within the faith in which they are generated but to those
outside the faith as well. Gandhi, a Hindu, inspired Christian minister Martin
Luther King Jr. to pursue a nonviolent path toward change, and both Gandhi
and Martin Luther King Jr. inspired the Tibetan Buddhist Dalai Lama to spiri-
tualize his own battle for survival against Chinese occupation. It is possible that,
as the message of these individuals continue to spread and inspire, their actions
will prompt leaders in other faiths to reinterpret history and scriptures in new
ways, and the path to salvation will no longer be stained with blood.

notes
Introduction
1. Bin Laden, Jews and Crusaders; Andrew Sullivan, This Is a Religious
War, New York Times, October 7, 2001.
2. For example, see Ahabbir Hussain Imam, Think Tank: Two Views; Can
the Koran Condone Terror?, New York Times, October 13, 2001.
3. For example, see After the Attacks: The Organization; Old War Escalates
on a New Front: The Trail of Relentless Martyrs, New York Times, Sep-
tember 16, 2001; John F. Burns, The World: Martyrdom; The Promise of
Paradise That Slays Peace, New York Times, April 1, 2001.
4. For example, Bernard Lewis argues, In the course of the twentieth cen-
tury it became abundantly clear in the Middle East and indeed all over
the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared
with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become
poor, weak, and ignorant. What Went Wrong?, 151. See also chapter 3,
Social and Cultural Barriers, in which Lewis identies three barriers to
Islams modernization: women, science, and music (6481); and chapter
4, Modernity and Social Equality, in which Lewis argues that Islam is a
barrier to social equality to the slave, the woman, and the unbeliever
(8295).
5. Axel and Kase, Kamikaze, 169, 78, 77.
1. Religion
1. White House, National Security Strategy.
2. Views of Muslim-Americans Hold Steady. These observations are
echoed in Prothero, Religious Literacy. Jeff Stein, Can You Tell a Sunni
from a Shiite? New York Times, October 17, 2006.
3. Juergensmeyer, Brief Argument, 22733. Religious scholar Ninian
Smart notes that although religious studies, or the study of world reli-
gions, has its origins in the nineteenth century, it has become an aca-
demic discipline only in the late 1960s; see Methods in My Life, 1835.
4. As noted by Fox, Overlooked Element.
Examples of works on religion as a social and political force in inter-
national relations include Dark, Religion and International Relations;
Johnston and Sampson, Religion; Haynes, Third World Politics; Esposito
and Watson, Religion and Global Order; Philpott, Religious Roots, 206
45; and Cuba at the Crossroads.
Works on religion in international relations also discuss the role of
ethics in the global arena. Some examples include Epp, Power of Moral
Sanction; Thompson, Words and Deeds; and Ramsey, Just War.
International relations scholarship on religion as a cause of war and
violent conict focuses primarily on religions contribution to ethnic
conict. See, for example, political scientist Jonathan Foxs research on
religions impact on ethnic conict: Islam, Religious Causes, and
Two Civilizations. Works by other scholars include Fawcett, Social
Change; Thomas, Religion and International Conict, in Dark, Religion
and International Relations, 123.
5. Jervis, Interim Assessment. Quote from page 37.
6. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
7. For an example on the religious inuences on abortion in the United
States, see Ginsburg, Saving Americas Souls, in Marty and Appleby,
Fundamentalisms and the State, 55782. For an example of the religious
inuences on federally funded stem-cell research in the United States,
see Michael Lind, The Right Still Has Religion, New York Times,
December 9, 2001; Katharine Q. Seelye with Frank Bruni, The Presi-
dents Decision: The President; A Long Process That Led Bush to His
Decision, New York Times, August 11, 2001; The Stem Cell Debate: The
Embryonic Journey and Its Milestones, New York Times, December 18,
2001.
156 Notes to pages 810

8. See, for example, Iannaccone, Looking Backward.
9. Religious scholar Ninian Smart advocates for this understanding of reli-
gions inuence on society; see Methods in My Life.
10. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, 37, 43, 44.
11. Geertz, Cultural System, in Lessa and Vogt, Reader in Comparative Reli-
gion, 7980.
12. Weber, Sociology of Religion, 2829.
13. Ninian Smart describes religion in terms of seven dimensions, of
which one is the material dimension. The other six dimensions include
the practical and ritual dimension, the experiential and emotional
dimension, the narrative or mythic dimension, the doctrinal and philo-
sophical dimension, the ethical and legal dimension, and the social and
institutional dimension. Worlds Religions, 926. This concept is
expanded in Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred.
14. Christian Smith uses social movement theory to offer a very useful dis-
cussion on the resources that religion brings to mass mobilization.
Smith notes legitimization for protest, moral imperatives for justice,
powerful symbols, self-discipline, trained leaders, nancial resources, sol-
idarity, preexisting communication channels, and identity as resources
that religion gives to a social movement. See Correcting a Curious
Neglect, in C. Smith, Disruptive Religion, 921.
15. This denition of nations is proposed by Connor, Ethnonationalism;
Anderson, Imagined Communities; and A. Smith, Ethnic Origins.
16. Smart, Methods in My Life, 1835. Quote from page 24.
17. Salvation is a Christian term, deriving from the Latin root salvus, to
make safe. Soteriology is the theology of salvation. This term, therefore,
is inherently Christian. However, it will be used for the sake of simplic-
ity and clarity. Examples of literature that explore comparative under-
standings of salvation across religions include S. Kaplan, Different Paths;
Smart, Worldviews; Reeder, Source, Sanction, and Salvation; Klostermaier,
Liberation; Brandon, Saviour God; Rall, Religion as Salvation; and Parker,
Idea of Salvation.
18. For a basic outline of Christian beliefs, see Cox, Christianity, in
Sharma, Our Religions; for Islam, see Islam, in Forman, Religions of the
World, 42791; for Judaism, see Steinberg, Basic Judaism; for Sikhism, see
Sikhism, in Forman, Religions of the World, 15661; and for the Bahai
faith, see P. Smith, Babi and Bahai Religions.
Notes to pages 1116 157

19. Scholarship on Hindu and Buddhist notions of salvation include Conze,
Buddhist Saviours, in Brandon, Saviour God, 6782; Smart, Work of
the Buddha, 16073; and Klostermaier, Liberation.
20. Weber, Sociology of Religion, 138206.
21. The concept of obtaining enlightenment is elucidated in Conze, Bud-
dhist Saviours, in Brandon, Saviour God, 6782, esp. 7374.
22. Biardeau, Hinduism, 1730.
23. Examples of works on these groups include Hatina, Islam and Salvation;
Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon; and H. Ahmad, Hamas.
24. Aho, Religious Mythology, 130.
25. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 36.
26. Esposito and Watson, Religion and Global Order, 9.
27. For Hamas, see H. Ahmad, Hamas; for the Hezbollah, see Ranstorp,
Hizballah in Lebanon, 3747.
28. See Marty and Appleby, Glory and the Power, 89128.
2. The Causes of Religious Violence

1. Works that consider the use of the Just War Doctrine include F. Russell,
Just War; Ramsey, Just War; and Johnson, Modern War, to name a few. Sev-
eral works compare Christian just war ethics with Islams ethics in jihad.
These works include Kelsay, Islam and War; and Kelsay and Johnson, Just
War and Jihad. A work that considers ancient Israels ethics in war is
Niditch, Hebrew Bible. A study that considers Hinduisms concept of a
just war as expressed in the Mahabharata is Mehendale, Reections. A
work that considers the role of Buddhism in shaping Japanese Bushido
ethics is Adolphson, Gates of Power. A look at Buddhist ethnics in war
includes Aho, Religious Mythology, 12742.
2. See, for example, C. Smith, Disruptive Religion; Wiktorowicz, Islamic
Activism; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.
3. Ramet, Balkan Babble; Marty and Appleby, Religion; and Bangura, Search
for Identity.
4. Marty and Applebys ve-volume series includes Fundamentalisms
Observed, Fundamentalisms and Society, Fundamentalisms and the State,
Accounting for Fundamentalisms, and Fundamentalisms Comprehended,
which includes theories and common themes between different move-
ments.

5. Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, 3; Almond, Appleby,
and Sivan, Strong Religion, 94.
6. Heilman, Defenders of the Faith; Heilman, Orthodox, in Arian and
Shamir, Elections in Israel, 13554.
7. See, for example, Juergensmeyer, Terror, 4483.
8. Juergensmeyer, New Cold War? Other examples of works on religion and
nationalism in violent conict and war include Sugar, East European
Nationalism; Sugar, Nationalism and Religion; and Van der Veer, Politics
of Devotion, in Lorenzen, Bhakti Religion.
9. There are examples of movements trying to construct interpretations of
political Islam that are compatible with democracy and tolerant of other
faiths and practices, but they have yet to be realized in a state. See Baker,
Islam without Fear.
10. A short list of books focusing on bin Laden and Al Qaeda include Anony-
mous, Through Our Enemies Eyes; Bergen, Holy War, Inc.; Bergen, Osama bin
Laden; Burke, Al Qaeda; Wright, Looming Tower; and Gerges, Far Enemy.
Examples of literature on suicide terrorism include Pape, Dying to Win;
Bloom, Dying to Kill; and Oliver and Steinberg, Road to Martyrs Square.
11. An important exception to this is David C. Rapoports work, including
Fear and Trembling. See also Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
12. Some of the literature on suicide terrorism has made this comparison;
see, especially, Pape, Dying to Win; and Bloom, Dying to Kill.
13. A small sample of works that consider religions obligation to nonviolence
include Windass, Christianity versus Violence; and Yoder, When War Is Unjust.
An example of Islams obligation to peace includes Muhaiyaddeen, Islam
and World Peace. Hinduism and its obligation to peace is largely the prod-
uct of two twentieth-century scholars, Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan. Works by Gandhi include Non-Violence and Satyagraha. An
example of Radhakrishnans work is Religion and Society. Works on Bud-
dhisms contribution to peace are many in number. Key works include
Thich Nhat Hanhs Being Peace; Runner, Celebrating Peace; the Dalai Lama,
Disarmament; and the Dalai Lama, Heart of Compassion, to name a few.
14. Freud and Girard disagree on the source of this hostility. Freud believes
it is the result of the Oedipus complex; see Freud, Totem and Taboo.
Girard believes it is the result of competition with the other, what he
calls mimetic desire. See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 14368.

15. See Juergensmeyer, Violence.
16. Juergensmeyer, Sacrice and Cosmic War, 1089. This theory is further
developed in chapter 2 of Juergensmeyer, New Cold War?
17. Juergensmeyer, Sacrice and Cosmic War, 10611.
18. Little, Sri Lanka; Esposito, Islamic Threat; Armstrong, Battle For God;
Lawrence, Defenders of God; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan, Strong Religion,
chap. 2; Juergensmeyer, New Cold War?, 2641.
3. The Christian Crusades

1. For a brief overview of medieval Christianity, see Esposito, Fasching, and
Lewis, World Religions Today, 6070.
3. Armstrong, Holy War, 58, 59, 58.
4. Armstrong, Holy War, 58.
8. Tyerman, Twelfth Century, esp. 555.
9. For example, see Meier, Crusading Propaganda, 113.
10. Armstrong, Holy War, 59; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 21.
11. For early Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem, see Armstrong, Jerusalem,
20212, 26667; and Armstrong, Holy War, 5460. For debates on early
crusading and its similarities to pilgrimages at this time, see Riley-Smith,
First Crusade, 2325; and Tyerman, Twelfth Century.
12. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 23; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 56;
Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 2443; Armstrong, Jerusalem, 267; Tyerman,
Twelfth Century, 567.
13. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 34, 5455; Tyerman, Twelfth Cen-
tury, 56675.
15. Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 21157,
esp. 217; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 21; Armstrong, Jerusalem, 271.
16. Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 243.
17. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 5, 1819; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?,
5; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 243.
18. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 6; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 1619.

19. Urban II, in Robinson, Readings in European History, 31216.
20. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 15; Urban II.
22. Urban II.
23. Madden, Concise History, 1718.
24. Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 34, 5055.
25. Eyewitness, quoted in Madden, Concise History, 18.
26. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 272; Madden, Concise History, 1820.
27. Madden, Concise History, 12; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 3637. Subsequent
Crusades were even better organized and funded, often receiving nanc-
ing from papal indulgences and regional taxes. Riley-Smith, What Were
the Crusades?, 4549.
30. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 272.
33. Madden, Concise History, 33, 34.
34. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 274. Madden disputes these accounts as gross exag-
gerations. Concise History, 34.
35. Nichols, Poetic Places.
36. For a compilation of chronicles, poems, and epics about the Crusades,
see Stevenson, Literature of the Crusades.
37. Tasso, Jerusalem Delivered; Nichols, Poetic Places. See also Nicholson,
Love.
38. Meier, Crusading Propaganda, 34, 113.
39. Armstrong, Holy War, 18485. Some of these orders, such as the Knights
of the Hospitalers of Saint John, still exist today. For more on the Hospi-
talers and Templars, see Riley-Smith, Templars and Hospitalers; and Bar-
ber, New Knighthood.
40. Armstrong, Holy War, 186; Armstrong, Jerusalem, 282.
41. Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 24; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in
Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 217.
42. Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 2627; Armstrong, Jerusalem, 25960.
43. Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 28; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in
Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 217.

45. Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 217; Arm-
strong places the Turkish seizure at 1073. Jerusalem, 269.
46. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 273; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-
Smith, Oxford History, 217; Riley-Smith, First Crusade, 5860.
48. Phillips, Crusades, xiv.
49. Ibn Tahir al-Sulami, Translation of Extracts; Irwin, Islam and the Cru-
sades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 22022.
50. Phillips, Crusades, xiv; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith,
Oxford History, 22527.
51. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 289; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-
Smith, Oxford History, 227.
54. Marshall, Warfare, 14547, 159.
55. Hamblin, Muslim Military Theory, in Kedar, Horns of Hattin, 22838,
esp. 229.
56. Marshall, Warfare, 14755.
57. For more on the Battle of Hattin, see Kedar, Battle of Hattin Revisited,
in Kedar, Horns of Hattin, 190207.
58. Hindley, Saladin, 7.
60. Hamblin, Muslim Military Theory, in Kedar, Horns of Hattin, 228.
61. Mayer, Henry II of England; Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-
Smith, Oxford History, 235.
62. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 1833, 23.
63. Irwin, Islam and the Crusades, in Riley-Smith, Oxford History, 25254,
245.
64. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 25, 2728.
65. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 25.
66. For details on Catharism, see Madden, Concise History, 12429; for details
on the Albigensian Crusade, see Madden, Concise History, 12933.
67. Gallagher, Canon Law, 192.
68. Gallagher, Canon Law, 193.
69. Kamen, Spanish Inquisition, 137.
70. Werblowsky and Wigoder, Oxford Dictionary, 35152, 672.

72. Dickson, Stephen of Cloyes, in Sargent-Bauer, Journey towards God, 83105,
86.
73. Madden, Concise History, 12227; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?,
26.
74. Esposito, Fasching, and Lewis, World Religions Today, 7173.
76. The Anglican Church retained these practices.
77. Anabaptists, for example, believed that baptism should occur only when
an individual is a consenting adult. This belief has been carried on in
modern-day Baptist and other Protestant denominations.
79. See, for example, Maalouf, Crusades through Arab Eyes; Sivan, Modern
Arab Histographies; and Hillenbrand, Crusades.
80. Bin Laden, Jews and Crusaders.
4. Ayodhya
1. Ayodhya is also transliterated Awadh and Oudh.
2. The bbc places the number around two thousand killed. See bbc News,
Timeline: Ayodhya Holy Site Crisis, September 30, 2010.
3. The Guardian cites two thousand killed and a hundred thousand made
homeless from the unrest. Burhan Wazir, Militants Seek Muslim-Free
India, Guardian, July 21, 2002.
4. Norvin, Classical Hinduism, in Forman, Religions of the World, 12842.
5. See Bhagavad Gita, December 1, 2012, http://www.bhagavad-gita.us/.
6. For a complete translation of the Ramayana, see Ramayana.
7. Ramayana.
8. K. N. Panikkar notes that the mosque was actually constructed under the
supervision of Mir Baqi, who was a member of Baburs court. Although
Baqi inscribed Baburs name on the completed mosque, there is no
direct evidence that Babur ordered the construction. See Panikkar, His-
torical Overview, in Gopal, Anatomy of a Confrontation, 2237, esp. 27.
9. Hardy, Muslims of British India, 1725.
12. McLeod, Who Is a Sikh?, 2361.
13. Gold, Organized Hinduism, in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalism
Observed, 53195, esp. 539, 542.

14. Shah Wali Allah is also transliterated as Shah Wali-Ullah. For more
details on Wali Allah, see A. Ahmad, Political and Religious Ideas.
15. The debate over how to formulate and apply Sharia law created a
schism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One camp believed
in relying on the commentaries produced by key Islamic jurists in each
of the schools of Islamic jurisprudencethe Maliki, Hana, Shaa, and
Hanbali in Sunni Islam and the Jafari school in Twelver Shia Islam. The
other camp believed that fresh interpretations, ijtihad, by Islamic schol-
ars and jurists should be applied to formulate Sharia. This latter camp
was usually in opposition to the established ulama and qadis (judges) of
their day. See Esposito, Islam, 12224.
16. Hardy, Muslims of British India, 2930; Esposito, Islam, 12023.
17. Sayyid Ahmad is also called Shayyid Ahmad Shahid. For more details
on Sayyid Ahmad, see Abbott, Jihad; and Abbott, Transformation.
19. Abbott, Transformation, 288.
20. Hardy, Muslims of British India, 5152, 17374.
21. Van der Veer, Gods on Earth; Bakker, Ayodhya; Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi; and
Van der Veer, God Must Be Liberated.
22. Van der Veer, God Must Be Liberated, 28889; and Elst, Ramjanmab-
hoomi, 141.
23. Srivastava, British, in Gopal, Anatomy of a Confrontation, 3857, esp. 44.
24. For more on the 1857 uprising, see Hibbert, Great Mutiny.
25. Mukherjee, Colonialism and Communalism, in Gopal, Anatomy of a
Confrontation, 16478.
26. Brass, Language, 121.
Observed, 539.
Observed, 543.
29. Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, 1118, 2232; Gold, Organized
Hinduism, in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalism Observed, 555; Hardy
cites the founding date of Arya Samaj as 1883. Muslims of British India,
139.
30. This story is similar to the account found in Genesis 22, except that in
the Genesis account, which is revered in Judaism and Christianity, Abra-
hams son Isaac is named as the potential sacrice, not Ishmael. Isaac is

recognized as the son through which the Israelites descended. Ishmael is
recognized as the one through which other Semitic peoples descended,
including todays Arabs.
32. Savarkar, Hindutva; Gold, Organized Hinduism, in Marty and Appleby,
Fundamentalism Observed, 54647.
Observed, 540; Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, 3379.
34. Embree, Function, in Marty and Appleby, Accounting for Fundamental-
isms, 61752, esp. 628.
Observed, 548.
36. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 53.
37. Rahman, Muslim Modernism.
40. Adams, Ideology, in D. Smith, South Asian Politics, 37197, esp. 373.
41. Flynn, Cows and Music, in Crane and Spangenberg, Language and Soci-
ety, 3954, esp. 4043.
42. Nasr, Communalism and Fundamentalism, esp. 126.
43. Adams, Ideology, in D. Smith, South Asian Politics, 374. This is, however,
with the notable exception of the Sunni association of ulama, the
Jamiyyat-i Ulama-i Hind, which backed the Indian National Congresss
bid for independence from British rule. See Y. Friedman, Attitude.
44. Van der Veer, God Must Be Liberated, 290.
45. Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi, 14554.
46. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, 56; Jaffrelot, Hindu
Nationalist Movement, 8090.
47. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, 6, 34; Jaffrelot, Hindu
Nationalist Movement, 27481.
48. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, 3334.
Observed, 55961.
isms, 63942; Saxena, Hindu Trade Union Movement.
isms, 617.

52. Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 1; Thakur, Ayodhya, esp. 653.
53. Graham, Hindu Nationalism; Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalist in
India, 2930.
54. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalist in India, 3031.
55. Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement, 31425.
56. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalist in India, 3637.
57. Malik and Singh note that of the twelve top members in the bjp, only
two were never part of the rss. Hindu Nationalist in India, 3953.
58. Van der Veer, Hindu Nationalism, in Marty and Appleby, Accounting for
Fundamentalisms, 65368, esp. 65355; Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Move-
ment, 34568.
Fundamentalisms, 65458.
60. The vhps website boasts several charities in India and abroad, all main-
tained by donations. See Vishva Hindu Parishad, September 5, 2007,
http://vhp.org/vhp-glance/seva/all-india-activity.
61. Religious Conversions.
62. Interview with an rss supporter, quoted in Brosius, Empowering Visions,
213.
63. Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 181; Van der Veer, Hindu Nationalism, in
Marty and Appleby, Accounting for Fundamentalisms, 655.
64. Malik and Singh, Hindu Nationalists in India, 12829.
Fundamentalisms, 65460; Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 180.
66. rss journalist, quoted in the Organizer, October 1990; Blom Hansen, Saf-
fron Wave, 17475.
Fundamentalisms, 65361.
68. Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi, 151; Van der Veer, God Must Be Liberated, 292.
Fundamentalisms, 66263; Hardgrave, India in 1984, esp. 133.
70. Brosius, Empowering Visions, 240; Blom Hansen, Saffron Wave, 176.
71. Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi, 152.
72. Thakur, Ayodhya, 655; Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 3.
Fundamentalisms, 66364; Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi, 15859; Van der Veer,
Religious Nationalism, 3; Thakur, Ayodhya, 655.

74. Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 8.
75. Stoler Miller, Presidential Address, esp. 789; Van der Veer, Religious
Nationalism, 5; Thakur, Ayodhya, 653.
76. Cover of India Today, May 15, 1991.
77. Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, 1; Thakur, Ayodhya, 653.
78. Thakur, Ayodhya; Monshipouri, Backlash; Ghosh, Bangladesh at the
Crossroads.
79. Parikh, Debacle at Ayodhya, esp. 674; Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism,
7.
80. White Paper.
81. Akbar in particular was known for his tolerance toward other faiths.
Two examples are his abolition of the pilgrims tax and the poll-tax for
non-Muslims during his reign. See Thakur, Ayodhya, 646.
82. When the Ayodhya conict ared up in the 1980s, the following key
questions were asked: Was a temple destroyed to build a mosque? Was
the Babri Mosque built with pieces of a ruined temple? Is the site of the
Babri Mosque the same as the celebrated birthplace of Ram? Archaeo-
logical evidence from excavated sites around Ayodhya has been inter-
preted by different parties both in the negative and the affirmative to
these questions. But there is little if no evidence that can answer each of
these questions denitively. Moreover, there is no written evidence from
the time of the mosques construction, either in Muslim or Hindu docu-
ments, that affirm the destruction of a temple preceding the erection of
the mosque. See Panikkar, Historical Overview, 2730; and Bernbeck
and Pollock, Ayodhya, Archaeology, and Identity.
83. bbc News, Ayodhya Defeat for Vajpayee, December 7, 2000, http://news
.bbc.co.uk; and bbc News, Row over Vajpayee Remarks, December 7,
2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
84. Wazir, Militants.
85. bbc News, Timeline.
86. For more details on Titu Mir, see Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 4453.
87. For a summary of the 1857 uprising, see Hardy, Muslims of British India,
6191.
88. Haq, Religion and Muslim Politics, in Ansari, Muslim Situation in India,
6073.
isms, 63233; Van der Veer, Hindu Nationalism, in Marty and Appleby,

Accounting for Fundamentalisms, 660; Michael T. Kaufman, Lowly Hin-
dus in India See Islam as Their Salvation, New York Times, August 14,
1981.
isms, 618, 633.
91. Paul Brass claims, In December 1992 the chief minister of the entire state
of Uttar Pradesh, who allowed the [Babri] mosque to be destroyed, indeed
deliberately saw to it that the numerous police, paramilitary, and military
forces stationed in the vicinity took no action to prevent its destruction,
was a man of the bjp, the then ruling party. See Theft of an Idol, 22.
92. bbc News, Indian Elections 1999, April 18, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/static/special_report/1999/08/99/indian_elections/default.stm.
93. Soutik Biswas, How Indias Elections Were Won and Lost, bbc News,
May 15, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3711395.stm.
94. Advani and Varshney, quoted in bbc News, bjp Admits India Shining
Error, May 28, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_
asia/3756387.stm.
95. bbc News, Congress Hails India Polls Victory, April 13, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7962722.stm.
5. Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka

1. Sinhalese is synonymous with Sinhala, meaning the people that speak
Sinhala. This chapter uses Sinhalese to denote the people, and Sinhala to
denote the language.
2. Geiger, Mahvamsa, quoted in Kemper, Presence of the Past, 26.
3. For more on the origins of the Sinhalese, see K. de Silva, Managing Ethnic
Tensions; Kemper, Presence of the Past; and Gombrich and Obeyesekere,
Buddhism Transformed.
4. Dutugamunu has numerous transliterations. Dutugamunu will be used
unless a direct quote spells his name otherwise.
5. Geiger, Mahvamsa, quoted in Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma, 5.
6. Gombrich and Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed, 5.
7. Kemper notes that the extensions to the Mahvamsa are commonly
called Culavamsa, or continuations. See Presence of the Past, 42.
8. See, for example, Little, Sri Lanka, xiii; K. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Ten-
sions, 36; Gombrich and Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed, 202.
9. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 5.

11. Little, Sri Lanka, 24 and 4041, respectively.
12. Little, Sri Lanka, 1516, 3738.
13. Ganath Obeyesekere and Romaila Thapar, cited in Krishna, Postcolonial
Insecurities, 39.
14. Gombrich and Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed, 208. Christians make
up roughly 8 percent of the islands population today.
15. Gombrich and Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed, 208, 22528.
16. Little, Sri Lanka, 18.
18. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 1112; Little, Sri Lanka, 1516.
19. K. de Silva, Traditional Homelands, 3046.
20. Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, 68.
22. Gombrich and Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed, 2056. For more on
Dharmapala and his teachings, see Vipassan Fellowship, http://
vipassana.com/resources/dharmapala/index.php. See also Roberts, For
Humanity. For an accolade to his life, see Thero, Anagarika Dharmapala.
25. For more on the Donoughmore Constitution, see J. Russell, Communal
Politics. The Donoughmore Constitution was replaced by the Soulbury
Constitution in 1947. K. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Conicts, 29, 50; Tam-
biah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 910.
26. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 1213, 15; Little, Sri Lanka, 61; K. de Silva,
Managing Ethnic Conicts, 65; Roberts, Ethnic Conict.
28. Rahula, Heritage of the Bhikku; Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 17, 2324, 19.
33. J. Russell, Communal Politics, cited in Little, Sri Lanka, 60.
34. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 3036, 42, 3033; Little, Sri Lanka, 64. See
also All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, Betrayal of Buddhism.
35. Sansana means, roughly, the Buddhist church; it is the community of
Buddhist believers.

36. Little, Sri Lanka, 66; Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 3435.
37. Wijayawardena, Revolt in the Temple, 3.
39. For more on the emergence of Tamil nationalism, see de Silva and Peiris,
Pursuit of Peace.
40. Deshapriya, New Sinhala Nationalism, in Azam, Ethnicity, 14663, esp.
14849.
42. Manor, Expedient Utopian, 261.
43. Little argues that had this pact been fully implemented and allowed to
take hold, ethnic tensions on the island may not have escalated into civil
war. See Little, Sri Lanka, 67.
44. Monk, quoted in Manor, Expedient Utopian, 28586.
45. Manor, Expedient Utopian, 28891.
46. Monk, quoted in Talduwe Somarama.
47. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 65; Little, Sri Lanka, 7273.
50. For more on the jvp, see Moore, Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries,
593642. See also Gunaratna, Sri Lanka.
51. Moore, Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries, 600601, 593.
53. Wilson, Nationalism, 47, quoted in Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, 76.
54. Little, Sri Lanka, 77; Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, 77; P. de Silva,
Tamil Paramilitary Nationalism, in Gamage and Watson, Conict and
Community, 89107, esp. 93; Samaranayake, Responses of the State, 127
28.
55. Little, Sri Lanka, 78. For a historical Sinhalese critique of the denition
of the Tamil homeland on the island, see K. de Silva, Traditional Home-
lands.
58. Senaratne, Political Violence, 62; K. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, 288.
59. Krishna offers estimates of the dead, noting that two thousand was the
governments toll. Postcolonial Insecurities, 52. Little places the number of
refugees at seventy thousand. Sri Lanka, 89. Tambiah cites between eighty
thousand and one hundred thousand refugees. Buddhism Betrayed?, 71.

60. K. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, 200.
61. K. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, 21819, 23344; Samaranayake,
Responses of the State, 132.
62. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 8081. For more on Buddhist organiza-
tions and networks, see Matthews, Patriotic Organizations.
63. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed?, 80, 88.
64. Moore cites forty thousand deaths. Thoroughly Modern Revolutionar-
ies, 593. Samaranayake puts the number at sixty thousand. Responses of
the State, 132.
65. Moore, Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries, 63840.
66. K. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, 242.
67. Samaranayake, Responses of the State, 135.
70. bbc News, Norways Role in Sri Lanka Peace Plan, February 1, 2000;
bbc News, Norway Opens Up Sri Lankan Peace Talks, January 31, 2003.
71. For the text of the cease-re, see Peace Agreements.
72. Little, Sri Lanka, 18; Rogers, Social Mobility, 588; K. de Silva, Managing
Ethnic Tensions, 31, quoted in Little, Sri Lanka, 18.
6. Defending the Dar al Islam

1. Esposito, Unholy War, 64.
3. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 10, 118; and Esposito, Unholy War, 28.
4. Johnson, Holy War Idea, 61.
5. Quran, Suras 2:190, 22:39, 9:12, 9:5, and 9:29. Sura 9:29 taken from Peters,
Islam and Colonialism, 14.
6. Firestone, Jihad, 4751. Firestone demonstrates in his book that this
hypothesis does not conform to the order in which texts were revealed.
7. Peters, Jihad, 2.
9. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 10550; Johnson, Holy War Idea, 7699.
10. Khadduri, War and Peace, cited in Kelsay and Johnson, Just War and Jihad,
63.
11. Kelsay and Johnson, Just War and Jihad, 62; Peters, Islam and Colonialism,
1319.

13. For details on all these issues and their variants within the different
schools of law, see Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 1537.
14. Lambton, State and Government, quoted in Peters, Islam and Colonialism,
15.
15. Johnson, Holy War Idea, 63.
16. Johnson, Holy War Idea, 64, 139.
17. Suras 2:154, 3:16971, 9:2022, 47:4, 61:11, and 3:15758, 55.
18. Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia, 5859.
19. Juergensmeyer, Terror, 78.
22. This contribution can be seen especially in bin Ladens 1996 fatwa.
Kepel, Jihad, 317. For Taymiyyas inuence on radical Islamic groups in
Egypt, see Peters, Jihad, 4354, 14970.
23. Peters, Jihad, 4354; Esposito, Unholy War, 4546.
25. Esposito, Islam, 11718.
26. Esposito, Unholy War, 48; Esposito, Islam, 18790.
27. For more on Salas, see Wiktorowicz, Sala Movement.
29. Esposito, Unholy War, 77; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 110.
30. Both Sunnis and Shias believe in the Mahdi. In Sunni Islam the Mahdi
is an individual who will rise up, often in the midst of calamity and
great injustice, and restore order to society in preparation for the end of
time. In Sunni Islam the Mahdi could be any Muslim and appear any-
where and at any time. In Twelver Shia Islam the Mahdi is understood
to be the hidden imam who will return to restore justice and rule over
the Muslim community as its one rightly guided leader. In this case the
Mahdi is believed to be the same imam that went into hiding in 874 ce.
As with the Sunni understanding of the Mahdi, this gure will vindi-
cate his loyal followers, restore the community to its rightful place, and
usher in a perfect Islamic society in which truth and justice will prevail.
See Esposito, Islam, 47.
31. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 42103, 6389, 65. The Muslims use a lunar
calendar; its years are shorter than a solar year.

32. Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 5052, 67.
34. Esposito, Islam, 12324.
35. Esposito, Islam, 120; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, 3940, 44.
42. Wright, Looming Tower, 8894.
43. Esposito, Islamic Threat, 7073, 76.
44. It is important to acknowledge that Israels success in the Six-Day War
also inspired Jewish radicalism, including Jewish terrorism, for the
opposite reasons. Fueled by Israels stunning victory, radical settler
movements moved into the newly acquired territories in the West Bank,
citing religious obligation to hold the land as justication. See Newman,
Gush Emunim.
45. Examples of current-day organizations that call for violently liberating
Jerusalem include the Lebanese Hizbollah, Egyptian groups, and the Pal-
estinian Hamas, to name a few. For the Lebanese Hizbollah, see Rans-
torp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 4951; for Egyptian terrorist movements, see
Esposito, Islamic Threat, 133; for Hamas, see Jihad.
46. Esposito, Islamic Threat, 17.
47. Bronson, Thicker Than Oil, 14451.
48. Lia, Society of Muslim Brothers, 5460; Esposito, Islamic Threat, 121.
49. This interpretation of jahiliyyah was rst coined by Mawlana Abul Ala
Mawdudi; see Zoller, Muslim Brotherhood, 79.
50. Qutb, Milestones; Bergesen, Sayyid Qutb Reader, 39.
51. Shepard, Sayyid Qutbs Doctrine, esp. 52728.
52. Mawdudi, Self-Destructiveness, in Moaddel and Talattof, Modernist and
Fundamentalist Debates, 32531. Quote from pages 32829.
53. Sachedina, Ali Shariati, in Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 19192.
54. For Hasan al Banna, see Esposito, Islamic Threat, 12627; for Mawdudi,
see Esposito, Unholy War, 50; for Sayyid Qutb, see Esposito, Islamic Threat,
127; and for Shariati, see Sachedina, Ali Shariati, 178.
55. Faraj, quoted in Jansen, Neglected Duty, 200.

56. See, for example, Bin Laden, Al Islah (London), September 2, 1996.
57. See, for example, Letter.
58. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 80.
59. Gerges, Far Enemy.
60. Bin Laden.
61. See, for example, Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs; and Norton, Hezbol-
lah.
65. It is important to reiterate, however, that martyrdomwhile now com-
monly associated with Islamic terrorist groupsalso has secular coun-
terparts, including nationalist ideologies, Marxism, and anarchism.
66. For Hekmatiyar and Rantisi, see Juergensmeyer, Terror, 72; for Zitouni,
see Kepel, Jihad, 30810; for Khattab, see Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 40; for
bin Laden and Zawahiri, see Esposito, Unholy War, 318.
67. Kepel, Jihad, 318. For Fadlallah, see Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon, 2530.
69. Kepel, Jihad, 300; Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 3031, 40.
70. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 51; Wright, Looming Tower, 9498; Anonymous,
Through Our Enemies Eyes, 98102.
71. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes, 98102.
72. Kepel, Jihad, 315. Holy War, Inc. is the title of Bergens book.
73. This committee is also known as the Advice and Reformation Commit-
tee; see Lawrence, Messages to the World, 3; Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 9192.
74. Lawrence, Messages to the World, 314.
75. Gerges, Far Enemy, 11950.
76. Wright, Looming Tower, 16369; Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes,
13743.
77. Esposito, Unholy War, 14; Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 38; Kepel, Jihad, 3034.
78. Kepel, Jihad, 303304.
79. Wright, Looming Tower, 17677.
80. Weimann, www.terror.net.
81. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 2729, 3738.
82. Kashan, New World Order, esp. 1415.
83. Prados and Blachard, Saudi Arabia.
84. Kepel, Jihad, 67; Esposito, Unholy War, 108.

85. Beaty and Gwynne, Outlaw Bank; Through Our Enemies Eyes, 34; Joseph
Finder, The Worst of All Possible Banks, New York Times, May 2, 1993.
86. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes, 3336; Esposito, Unholy War, 14.
87. For more on international banking regimes, see Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering, June 30, 2003, http://www.fatf-ga.org/. For
U.S. initiatives on combating terrorist funding, see U.S. Department of
the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 30, 2003, www.
ustreas.gov/ofac.
88. Jamwal, Hawala.
90. The Patriot Act, which President Bush signed into law on October 26,
2002, aims to investigate and arrest patterns of terrorist nancing. See
U.S. House of Representatives, Patriot Act Oversight.
92. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies Eyes, 42; Karen de Young, Afghani-
stan Opium Crop Sets Record: US-Backed Efforts at Eradication Fail,
Washington Post, December 2, 2006.
7. Zion
1. Muslims and Christians also trace their religious lineage back to Abra-
ham, making these three religions the Abrahamic Faiths.
2. Gen. 17:514, Tanakh, 23. For a commentary on Genesis 17, see Speiser,
Genesis.
3. Gen. 22:1518, Tanakh, 32. The Quran tells a similar story, but in the Mus-
lim account, Ishmael was the one that God commanded Abraham to
sacrice; see Sura 37:10411.
4. Exod. 23:3031, Tanakh, 12122.
5. For the Jewish Bible accounts of the herem, see Josh., chaps. 17, and I
Sam., 14:47. For more on the herem, see Niditch, Hebrew Bible.
6. Lev. 20:24, Josh. 1:45, Tanakh, 188, 337.
7. For the Jewish Bible accounts of these kings, see I Sam., chaps. 931; II
Sam.; and I Kings, chaps. 12.
8. Ps. 137:1, Tanakh, 1272.
9. Wilkinson, Jerusalem under Rome, in Asali, Jerusalem in History, 75104,
esp. 8083.
10. For more on the Zealots, see Rapoport, Fear and Trembling, esp. 66872.

11. Wilkinson, Jerusalem under Rome, in Asali, Jerusalem in History, 86;
Armstrong, Jerusalem, 152.
12. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 16263; Goldenberg, Nations, 4849.
13. Jewish nation is used here, from the latinization of Yehudim, meaning
from the tribe of Judah.
14. Codication of the law began in the fth century bce, during Babylo-
nian exile. But following the destruction of the second Jewish Temple in
Jerusalem in 70 ce, scholars further shaped the law, which became the
Talmud. Study and debate of the Talmud remains a vital part of the Jew-
ish faith today. Armstrong, Jerusalem, 156.
15. Lustick, Land and the Lord, 24. Maimonidess silence on returning to the
land has led one modern Jewish anti-Zionist movement to conclude
that he did not advocate a human-led initiative return to the land and
that the return to Jerusalem should be instigated only by God. See Mai-
monides. See also Judaism and Zionism: Bring Back Maimonides,
Economist, November 12, 1988.
16. For discussions on the Haredim, see Heilman, Defenders of the Faith; and
Heilman and Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism, in Marty and
Appleby, Fundamentalisms Observed, 197264.
17. Hess, Rome and Jerusalem, in Hertzberg, Zionist Idea, 11634, 133.
18. Isseroff, Biography.
19. Herzl, Jewish State, in Hertzberg, Zionist Idea, 209, 213. For more on
Herzl, see Kornberg, Theodor Herzl.
20. Armstrong, Battle for God, 149, 151.
21. Armstrong, Battle for God, 183.
22. New Aliyah.
24. Don-Yehiya, Book and the Sword, in Marty and Appleby, Fundamental-
isms and the State, 264302. Quote from page 267.
25. E. Kaplan, Jewish Radical Right, 14. See also Lacquer, History of Zionism,
esp. 33883.
26. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 51.
28. Isseroff, Jewish State. See also Kornberg, Theodor Herzl, 162.
30. Porat, Forging Zionist Identities, in Rotberg, Israeli and Palestinian Nar-
ratives, 4772. Quote from page 57.

31. un General Assembly, Future Government of Palestine.
32. Dumper, Politics of Jerusalem, 17475. Armstrong sites an estimated sev-
enty thousand to one hundred thousand Arabs who ed from western
Jerusalem. Jerusalem, 386.
33. Law of Return. The Law of Return was criticized internationally for
dening citizenship based on racial ties. See Guberman, Law of Return,
1950.
34. Israeli Court Rules Jews for Jesus Cannot Automatically Be Citizens,
New York Times, December 27, 1989; Israeli Supreme Court Sides with
Messianic Jews, Free Republic, April 21, 2008.
35. Ben-Yehuda, Halachic State, in Berkowitz, Nationalism, 10939.
36. Heilman and Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism, 224.
37. Heilman, Quiescent and Active Fundamentalisms, in Marty and
Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, 17396. See also Soloveitchik,
Migration, in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, 197
235.
38. Heilman, Quiescent and Active Fundamentalisms, 180.
39. Don-Yehiya, Book and the Sword, 269.
41. For more on the 1967 war, see Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, 14589.
42. un Security Council, Situation.
43. Ehud Sprinzak, Three Models, in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms
and the State, 46290, esp. 46970.
44. Lustick, Land and the Lord, 2.
45. Dumper, Politics of Jerusalem, 162. Armstrong puts the number of dis-
placed at 619. Jerusalem, 4023.
46. Dumper, Politics of Jerusalem, 163.
47. II Sam. 5:612, Tanakh, 47677, cited in Dumper, Politics of Jerusalem, 164.
51. Mergui and Simonnot, Israels Ayatollahs, 122223; Kepel, Revenge of God,
14090.
52. Mergui and Simonnot, Israels Ayatollahs, 124, 12223.
53. Backgrounder.
54. For more on the jdl, see Dolgin, Jewish Identity.

55. Kahane, quoted in Mergui and Simonnot, Israels Ayatollahs, 4344.
57. Don-Yehiya, Book and the Sword, 265; Kepel, Revenge of God, 15772.
58. Kepel, Revenge of God, 140.
60. Lustick, Land and the Lord, 6869; Kepel, Revenge of God, 16365.
63. Heilman, Orthodox, in Arian and Shamir, Elections in Israel, 13553.
64. Willis, Shas, in Arian and Shamir, Elections in Israel, 12139, esp. 126.
65. Willis, Shas, in Arian and Shamir, Elections in Israel, 131.
66. For a summary on the outbreak of the rst intifada, see T. Friedman,
From Beirut to Jerusalem, 37072, 561610.
67. Mishal and Sela, Palestinian Hamas, 3437; and Hatina, Islam and Salva-
tion.
69. Ben-Yehuda, Halachic State, in Berkowitz, Nationalism, 105.
70. bbc News, International Jerusalem High on the Agenda, September 26,
2000.
71. David Horowitz, Visit by Sharon Provokes a Day of Violence, Irish
Times, September 29, 2000.
72. Gopin, From Eden to Armageddon, 116.
8. How Religious Violence Ends

1. For more on Al Qaedas goals, see Gregg, Fighting the Jihad; and
Gregg, Fighting Cosmic Warriors.
2. Stout, Huckabey, and Schindler, Terrorist Perspectives Project.
5. Gandhi, quoted in Fischer, Gandhi, 1516.
7. See, for example, Azzam, Martyrs; and Jansen, Neglected Duty.
8. Baring-Gould and Sullivan, Onward Christian Soldiers; Luther,
Mighty Fortress.
9. Stout, Huckabey, and Schindler, Terrorist Perspectives Project.

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index
Abbasid Dynasty, 37, 43, 47, 97 apocalypse, 4, 19, 33

Abdel Rahman, Omar, 112, 114 Aquinas, Thomas, 20, 37
Abduh, Muhammad, 100, 142 al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 135
Advani, Lal Krishna, 62, 64, 67, 71 al-Aqsa mosque, 1, 44, 45, 105, 110, 133, 135
Advice and Reform Committee, 113, Arafat, Yasser, 13435
174n73 Arya Samaj, 58, 164
Agudat Israel (Union of Israel), 124 Augustine of Hippo, 20, 37
Agudat Party, 128 Aurangzeb (emperor), 55, 70
ahimsa, 73, 151 avatar, 5254, 6465
Awadh. See Ayodhya
Ahmad, Muhammad, 99100
al-Awlaki, Anwar, 1, 117
Albigensian Crusade, 46, 162
Ayodhya, 2, 5, 5471, 138, 146, 147
Aligarh University, 60
Azzam, Abdullah, 11113, 143, 152
Ali Jinnah, Muhammad, 61
Ali, Saiyd Amir, 60
Babri Masjid Action Committee, 61
aliyah, 124, 127 Babri Masjid Coordination Commit-
All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 8081 tee, 61
All-India Babri Masjid Action Com- Babri Mosque, 52, 54, 57, 61, 6569, 71,
mittee, 61 14546
All-India Muslim League, 60 Babur (emperor), 54, 6768
Almoravids, 37 Bahai, 16, 157
al-Mukhtar, Umar, 99 Bajrang Dal, 67
Amir, Yigal, 134 Bakr-Id, 58
Anselm, 20, 37 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, 83
Bandaranaike, Siramavo, 8485, 90 Christian Zionism, 125
Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D., 8084 Church of the Holy Sepulcher, 34
Bank of Credit and Commerce Inter- colonialism, 6, 27, 73, 75, 79, 89, 90,
national (bcci), 115 100, 101, 116, 14142, 144
al-Banna, Hasan, 1056 Communalism, 5758, 6162
Barelewi, Sayyid Ahmad, 100103, 117 Congress Party (India), 6263, 71, 142,
Bar Kokhba (Bar Koseba) revolt, 121 146
Battle of Hattin, 45 Council of Claremont, 37
Battle of Jaffa, 46 Council of Limoges, 36
Battle of Manzikert, 37, 43 Council of Trent, 51
Beit Al-Ansar, 112 counter-Crusades, 33, 43, 143
Beitar, 12425 Crusaders, 3336, 4046, 51, 110
Bhagavad Gita, 53, 151 crusader knights, 17
Bhakti, 17, 5354, 65 cuius regio, eius religio (the rulers reli-
Bharat, 59, 64 gion is the religion of his land), 51
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (bjs), 6264
Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), 54, 6272, Dammadipa/ Dhammadipa, 6, 7374,
14447 138
Biju Janaata Dal, 72 dar al ahd, 95
Bin Baz, Abdulaziz, 113 dar al harb, 9596, 1012, 108
bin Laden, Osama, 12, 10, 12, 23, 29, 51, dar al Islam, 28, 95, 1012, 108, 111, 113,
99, 105, 1078, 11017, 140, 143, 144, 155 138, 143
Brahmo Samaj, 58 dar al sulh, 95
Brit bein HaBetarim (Covenant Dar al-Ulum, 106
between the Parts), 119 Dayananda, Saraswati, 58
Buddha Sansana Act, 82, 90 Deobandi College, 59, 60
Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, 81, 90 Dharmapala, Anagarika, 29, 7879, 81,
Bushido, 17 13941
Byzantine Empire, 37, 39, 43, 47 dharmistha, 86
Dome of the Rock, 6, 18, 43, 45, 1045,
Carolingian wars, 36 113, 119
Catharism, 46 Donoughmore Constitution, 7980,
Ceylon National Congress, 7980 109
Ceylon Reform League, 79 Dreyfus Affair, 12223
Ceylon Union of Buddhists (lebm), Durga, 70
80, 90 Dutugamunu (king), 74, 168
Chelvanayakam, S. J. V., 81
Childrens Crusade, 48, 151 East India Company, 57
Chisti Su order, 56 Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Libera-
Christian Restorianism, 125 tion Front (eprlf), 86
200 Index
Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Orga- Haredi/Haredim, 22, 122, 12526, 128,
nization of Students (eros), 86 13436
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 97, 1078, 11314 Hawala, 115
Ekatmatayajna Yatra, 65 Hebron, 126, 129, 13133, 142
Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, 82, 90 Hedgewar, K. B., 29, 59, 139
Elara (king), 74 Hekmatiyar, Gulbaddin, 111
eretz Yisrael, 6, 22, 118, 122, 124, 129, herem, 120
131, 134 Hess, Moses, 12223
hijra, 96, 98, 102
Faraj, Abd al-Salaman, 107, 140, 14546, Hindu Mahasabha Party, 5, 23, 52,
152 5859, 6465
fard ayn, 96 Hindutva, 5, 23, 52, 5859, 6465, 69,
Fatah, 135 139
Fatimid Dynasty, 4344, 47 Hizbollah, 17, 18, 108, 110, 112, 114, 143
fatwa, 1, 2, 98, 102, 110, 111, 113 Holocaust, 39, 126, 128, 135
First Crusade, 3335, 37, 4043, 4647, Hospitalers, 36, 42, 161n39
51, 139, 146 Hysayn, Taha, 100, 142
fundamentalism, 20, 22, 2528
ijtihad, 16364n15
Gamaat Islamiyya, 1089, 112, 113 Indian National Congress, 60
Gamaat and the Vanguard of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (ipkf), 87
Conquest, 113 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, 88
Gandhi, 6063, 113, 15153 intifada, 13435
Gandhi, Indira, 62, 66, 87 Iqbal, Muhammad, 100, 142
Gandhi, Rajiv, 63, 67, 87, 146 Iranian Revolution, 17, 19, 106
Gaurakhshini Sabha, 58 Irgun, 125
globalization, 2728 Iscari Zealots, 121
Goldstein, Baruch, 133
Grand Mosque, 104, 107, 112 Jabotinski, Vladimin Zeev, 12425
Gratian, 20, 46 Jahan, Shah, 5455
greater jihad, 9394, 97, 100, 152 jahiliyyah, 1056, 173n49
Gush Emunim, 13233, 173n44 Jammat-i-Islami Party, 6061, 106
Jamiyyat-i Ulama-i Hind, 165n43
Hamas, 1718, 29, 10814, 13435, 143 Janata Party, 6263
Hana, 16364n15 Jayewardene, Junius Richard, 86
Hanbali, 16364n15 Jerusalem: battles over, 4, 136, 138; and
Hanuman, 53 crusading, 5, 32, 36, 38, 4044, 46,
Hanumangarhi Temple, 54, 57, 69 47, 139, 143, 146; as a Jewish holy
Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, 45, city, 18, 12023, 125, 12836, 140, 142,
104, 130, 13536 173n44; as a Muslim holy city, 1,
Index 201
Jerusalem (continued) Likud Party, 125, 131, 133, 14647
4346, 108, 143, 147, 173n45; pilgrim- Livonian Crusade, 46
age to, 3435, 48
Jewish Defense League, 22, 131 madrasas, 44
Jewish Legion, 125 Maha Bodhi Society, 80
jihad: against the United States, 4, 51, Mahdi, 100102, 104, 112, 116, 172n30
10810; contemporary, 2, 6, 10417, Maktab al-Khidamat (mak), 112
140, 143, 145; doctrine of, 24, 17, Maliki, 16364n15
938, 140, 152, 158n1; in history, 6, Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (msv),
28, 4446, 5657, 9293, 98104, 8788, 9091
11617, 139, 142 Mawdudi, Mawlana Abul Ala, 6061,
jihadi: contemporary, 6, 93, 98104, 106, 14045
1078, 11217, 143, 150, 152; in history, Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, 29, 124, 131, 136,
56, 98104 145
jizya, 55, 9495 Messiah: and catastrophic messian-
Just War Doctrine, 2021, 25, 140 ism, 6, 119, 133; Christian, 18, 127,
148; Jewish, 122, 124, 13132, 13637,
Kabbalah/Kabbalahism, 125 139, 145, 148
Kach Party, 22, 13233, 145 Mir, Titu, 68, 99, 100
Kahane, Meir, 29, 119, 13133, 145 Mitzrahi/Mitzrahim Jews, 127, 133
kamikaze, 7 Mohammed, Khaled Sheikh, 1
kar sevaks, 6768 Movement for the Whole Land of
Khalsa, 55 Israel, 130
Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 60, 100, 142 Mughal Empire, 5, 54, 59, 69, 70, 149
kharadj, 95 Muhammadan Educational Confer-
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 104 ence, 60
Kibbutz/Kibuttzim, 124 mujahideen, 56, 70, 97, 100, 104, 11014
Kiryat Arba, 131, 133 Muslim Brotherhood, 105, 113, 114, 137,
Knights of the Temple. See Templars 144, 148
Kook, Rabbi Avraham Yitzahk, 29,
124, 128, 136, 145 Naga Sadhus, 57
Koseba, Simon Bar, 121 Naqshbandiyah Su order, 5556
Kumaratunga, Chadrika, 88 National Mahommedan Association,
60
Lance of Christ, 34, 40 nationalism, 15, 81, 89, 104, 122; Bud-
Law of Return (Jewish), 127 dhist, 73, 75, 79, 81, 89, 90; Hindu, 5,
lesser jihad, 9395, 152 18, 54, 5859, 61, 64, 77, 140; Jewish,
Levinger, Moshe, 29, 119, 13132 122; religious, 2023, 25; secular, 23;
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Sinhalese, 5, 7276, 79, 89, 90
(ltte), 73, 8789 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 61, 62, 63, 142
202 Index
Nur al-Din, 101, 110 tember 11th attacks, 1, 2021, 30; as
transnational terrorist group, 89,
Old City of Jerusalem, 104, 126, 129, 17, 31, 92, 97, 143, 148; and United
130, 135 States, 30, 10810, 146
Oslo Peace Accords, 113, 134, 135 Quran: and doctrine of jihad, 9396,
98; to justify violence, 1, 2, 19, 1056,
Palestine: ancient, 11819, 121, 135; con- 138; American knowledge of, 9
temporary, 28, 107, 103, 12324, 126, Qutb, Sayyid, 105, 106, 140, 14548
13236; under Islamic rule, 43
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 17, 111, 114, Rabin, Yitzak, 6, 119, 134, 136
13435 Rachels Tomb, 129
Partition (Indian), 52, 6162, 69 Rahula, Walpola, 80, 139
Passover Seder, 121, 131 Ram (Indian avatar), 5254, 61, 66, 67,
Path of Muhammad, 56, 103 68
Peace of Augsburg, 51 Ramayana, 5354, 67, 68, 70
Peoples Crusade, 39, 48 Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yajna
Peoples Liberation Organization of Samiti, 61
Tamil Eelam (plote), 86 Ram Janmabhoomi Seva Commit-
Peter the Hermit, 3840, 48 tee, 61
pilgrimage, 3237, 3940, 48, 51, 53, 54, Ramshilla Yatra, 66
57, 66, 102, 111, 147, 151 Rantisi, Abdul Aziz, 29, 111
Poor Fellow Soldiers of Jesus Christ, Rashtra Sevika Samiti, 63
42 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (rss),
Pope Alexander II, 36 29, 59, 62, 6365, 67, 69, 70, 139,
Pope Clement VII, 50 14447
Pope Gregory VII, 37 Raymond of Aguiles, 40
Pope Gregory IX, 47 Reformation (Protestant), 3233,
Pope Leo IX, 36 4950, 151
Pope Nicholas II, 36 relics, 3234, 40, 50
Pope Paul III, 51 Renaissance, 32, 151
Pope Urban II, 32, 33, 3739 Richard the Lionhearted, 41, 45, 46,
Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 88 78, 86
Pursuers Decree, 134
Saint Augustine of Hippo, 20, 37
al-Qadir, Abd, 99, 102, 103 Saint Bernard, 20, 46
Qadiri Su Order, 56 Salayya, 98, 101
al Qaeda: and its leaders, 1, 23, 29, Salah ed-Din (Saladin), 33, 4346, 49,
10812, 14849; and radical Islam, 110, 143, 146
1, 9, 17, 2021, 92, 97, 104; and its Sangha (Buddhist monastic order),
resources, 11416, 147, 150; and Sep- 29, 7576, 78, 7982, 8788, 90
Index 203
Sangh Parivar, 62 Su/Susm, 45, 55, 56, 98
satyagrahis, 151 Sword verse, 3, 19, 94, 138
ibn Saud, Muhammad, 98
Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar, 29, 5859, takfir/takfiri, 153
139 Taliban, 2, 8, 109, 113, 115
sayyid al-shuhada (prince of martyrs), 97 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
Seljuks, 37, 3940, 4344 (telo), 86
Senanayake, Dudley, 85 Tamil Federal Party, 81, 83
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, 85 Tamil Jaffna Kingdom, 78
Senanayake, Don Stephen, 8081 Tamil New Tigers (tnt), 83
Sephardic/Sephardim, 12728, 133 Tamil Tigers. See Liberation Tigers of
September 11th: and al Qaeda, 1, 7; Tamil Eelam (ltte)
Muslim response to, 2; as reli- Tamil United Front (tuf), 85
giously motivated violence, 1920, Tamil United Liberation Front (tulf),
23, 97, 111; U.S. response to, 710, 30, 85, 86
92, 115, 150 ibn Taymiyya, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad
settler (Jewish), 22, 13033, 143, 173n44 bin, 9798, 101, 140
Shaa, 16364n15 Templars, 36, 42
Sharia law, 18, 5556, 61, 93, 95, 98, 101, Temple Faithful, 133
116, 135, 16364n15 Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif, 42,
Shariati, Ali, 1067, 14545 45, 105, 12830, 133, 13536
Sharon, Ariel, 135 terrorism, 2, 7, 9, 2021, 2324, 30, 86,
Shas Party, 13334, 136, 147 136, 173n44; suicide, 2, 21, 23, 30
Shepherds Crusade, 4849, 151 Theosophical Society, 77
Shintoism, 7, 16 Theravada Buddhism, 5, 29, 79, 142
Shiv Sena, 64 Third Crusade, 41, 4547
Shoah. See Holocaust Third Lateran Council, 46
shuhada, 96 Tipitaka, 78
Sikhs/Sikhism, 1617, 5557, 59, 65, 70, Tisha BAv, 121
87, 102 Tomb of Christ, 34, 37, 43, 139
Singh, Guru Govind, 55 Tomb of the Patriarchs, 129, 131, 133
Sinhala Maha Sabha, 8081 True Cross, 34
Sinhala Only Act, 8384, 90 al-Turabi, Hassan, 113
Six-Day War, 6, 1045, 118, 129, 132, 139, Twelver Shia Islam, 16364n15, 172n30
14243, 173n44
Soulbury Constitution, 85 ulama, 29, 55, 97, 100103, 111, 113, 116,
Sri Lankan Freedom Party (slfp), 150, 16364n15, 165n43
8185, 87, 90, 14445 Ultra Orthodox Jews, 6, 22, 118, 112,
Steele Olcott, Henry, 72 133, 134
Stephen of Cloyes, 48 umma, 56, 96, 1025, 112, 145, 148, 152
204 Index
United National Party (unp), 8182, William of Tyre, 41
8686, 88
United Progressive Alliance, 7172 yatras, 6566, 69, 145
United Religious Front, 128 yeshiva, 29, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134,
Unur, Muin al-Din, 44 136, 145
Urabi, Ahmad, 102 Yom Kippur War, 105, 132
Uttar Pradesh, 63, 67, 71, 167n91
Zangi, Imad al-Din, 44
Vaddukoddia Resolution, 86 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 29, 11113
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 6264, 68, 71 Zionism: Christian, 125; religious, 2, 6,
Vidyalanakara Declaration, 80 29, 124, 13132, 136, 145, 148; secular,
Vishnu, 5354 122, 124, 12526, 132, 135; and vio-
Vishva Hindu Parishad (vhp), 6267, lence, 2, 125
6970, 144, 145, 147 Zionist: Christian, 125; movement,
12223; religious, 6, 11819, 124,
Wahabbism, 98, 105 12829, 13134, 13536, 142, 175n15;
West Bank, 104, 12931, 13336, 139, 146, secular, 12428, 130, 135, 13637, 142;
173n44 and violence, 125
Wijeweera, Rohana, 85, 88 Zionist Council, 123
Index 205

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THE PATH TO

Heather Selma Gregg

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Set in Sabon Next by Hannah Gokie.

List of Illustrations viii

Love, Peace, and the Two Salvations

Love, Peace, and the Two Salvations

the causes of religious violence

From Social Movements to Hastening the Apocalypse

Religiously Motivated Violence Before and After September 11th

20 The Causes of Religious Violence

The Causes of Religious Violence 21

22 The Causes of Religious Violence

The Causes of Religious Violence 23

Theories of Religiously Motivated Violence

24 The Causes of Religious Violence

26 The Causes of Religious Violence

The Causes of Religious Violence

The Causes of Religious Violence 27

28 The Causes of Religious Violence

The Causes of Religious Violence 29

30 The Causes of Religious Violence

Context Leaders Followers Resources

What social and Who is Why do followers Which resources

The Causes of Religious Violence 31

the christian crusades

From Pilgrims to Holy Warriors

The Christian Crusades 33

34 The Christian Crusades

The Rise of Crusading

The Christian Crusades 35

36 The Christian Crusades

The Christian Crusades 37

Urban II also called for the liberation of Jerusalem:

38 The Christian Crusades

The Christian Crusades 39

40 The Christian Crusades

The sacred armies, and the godly knight,

The Christian Crusades 41

42 The Christian Crusades

The Christian Crusades 43

44 The Christian Crusades

The Christian Crusades 45

46 The Christian Crusades

Crusade Date Opponent Goal(s) Result

Peasant Crusade, Muslims Liberate Jerusalem Ambushed and defeated by

The Christian Crusades 47

48 The Christian Crusades

The Decline of Crusading

The Christian Crusades 49

50 The Christian Crusades

The Christian Crusades 51

The Hindu Nationalist Battle for Hindutva

On December 6, 1992, an estimated 300,000 Hindu activists gathered in the

Ayodhya and the Ramayana

Historical Overview of Ayodhya and the Rise of Hindu Nationalism

Ayodhya: From Sacred Space to Hindu Nation

buddhist violence in sri lanka

Defending the Dhammadipa

Buddhism in Sri Lanka

In addition to the battle between Dutugamunu and Elara, the Mahvamsa

74 Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka

Colonial Rule and the Construction of Sinhalese Nationalism