Substation Automation

Basic Substation
ABB, Peenya Automation Philosophy
ABB Ltd. INPSS-SAS - 1

Rajiv Krishnan
ABB Limited, Bangalore
2007-04-26

rajiv.krishnan@in.abb.com
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Structure and philosophy

 System overviews

Conventional RTU Decentralised RTU SAS5xx

Network Control Centre

GPS

Mimic Board RTU Master RTU Station HMI Station HMI Gateway
GPS

Sub-RTU Sub-RTU

Prot Prot Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot

Process
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Hardwired Serial connection

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 Distributed functionality

n All those functions are implemented

at the bay level for each bay
individually
n Synchrocheck per bay
n Interlocking
n Disturbance recorder
n Select before operate
n Runtime supervision
n Time tagging
n Event buffer
n When station level is lost the
following functions are still available
n Control at the bay level
n Time synchronization
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 Distributed functionality

n Depending on the system

configuration the following
functions can be distributed
Station HMI
GPS
Gateway n Master clock for time
synchronization
n Gateway
n Station HMI

Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot

n They work completely
independent
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 Station wide interlocking
n Can be done hardwired or via inter bay bus
n Hardwired solution has some advantages like -
n Works when the inter bay bus is broken
n Works when another control IED (especially the one from the coupler bay) is
out of service
n Makes it easier to extend the system later on no need to touch the software of
the other bays involved
n Makes it easier to extend the system later on when customer wants to use
new products for extension with new protocol (e.g. IEC61850)
n Hardwired solutions disadvantages are
n Extensive cabling
n More chances of loose or broken connections
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 Protection IED integration

n ABB protection IEDs can be

100% integrated
n Full information available
Station HMI Gateway SMS530
GPS n Complete remote access for
parameter setting and DR upload
n Completely independent of the
control IED, direct connection to
the station level
Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot Ctrl Prot n Optical interface
n Separate SMS PC can be added if
required by using the same
communication infrastructure
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 Four level of control access

Level 4
NCC
Network Ctrl. Center
n The different levels
Release
Release
Level 3 n Control from remote (NCC)
RCS
Remote Ctrl.
n Control from the station level
Release
Bay Control Unit in remote Mode
Level 2
Bay Control Unit
n Local control via Control IED
Local Ctrl.

Direct Control off Release n Local direct control

Level 1

n For all levels the same security

checks and safe operation
No Interlocking violation
procedure applies except for the
Direct Control
local direct control
No Blocking

Open/
Close
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 High reliable system components

n Bay control IED

n High reliable control devices
based on same hardware as
protection devices
n Direct optical connection to the
interbay bus
n Dust protected casing
n High temperature range
n Integration of protection
functions
n Direct VT and CT connection
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 High reliable system components
n Industrial computer or industrial server
n Industrial Server
n RAID (Redundant Array of
Independent Disks) technology
n Redundant hot plug hard disk
n Redundant hot plug power supply
n Very short MTTR (Mean Time To
Repair)
Highest availability
n General features
n EMC shielded
n Protected from dust
n High temperature range
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 High reliable system components

n Industrial Gateway COM581

n Rugged design
n Based on protection platform
n No moving parts
n Optional redundant power supply

n Star coupler
n No moving parts
n All connection via fiber optic
n Optional redundant power supply
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 High reliable system components

n All connections between bay

level and station level uses glass
GPS
Receiver fiber optical cables
Control
IED
n Long distances
Gateway

n Immunity against EMC

Star

Station
Coupler
Protection n Maintenance free
IED
Computer
/HMI n High availability

n As less components in a row as

Glass Fiber Optical Cable possible to increase availability
and keep number of different
components low, less spare
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parts
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 Architecture Aspects - Independent HMI
failed
failed n For a high reliable remote link

n Destructive human
manipulation on station PC will
not effect the remote link

Application
failed OK n Unmanned substations where
normally the operation is from
remote
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 Architecture Aspects - Redundant HMI

n Weakest component in the system

is the station HMI
failed

OK

Applications
n For manned substations where the
station is mainly controlled from
the station HMI
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 Architecture Aspects - Redundant Gateway

n Weakest component for remote

NCC NCC
communication is typically not
the gateway its rather the
communication link itself
n A redundant gateway makes
only sense when there is also a
redundant remote link
Applications
n For unmanned substations
where the station is controlled
only or mainly from remote
OK FBS
failed
n Control from remote of high
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importance
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 Architecture Aspects - Redundant Interbay Bus
n The interbay bus is the highest
reliable system component
n Makes only sense with redundant
gateways or station computer
n The cables of first and second
OK OK channel have to be routed
separately
OK OK OK

Application
n Redundancy makes only sense in a
harsh environment (e.g. when
always construction work is going
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on)
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Communication Aspects
 Communication: Inter bay bus
n Typical situation in substation
n In normal situation the substation is more or less quiet: Some measurements will
change slightly
n During an operation: The amount of information exchanged is rather low, some
commands, some status indication changes, some changing measurements
n A trip happens e.g. busbar trip: Suddenly many status and measurement changes
appear DR are started and there is a need of transferring a lot of information in a
very short time
n ABB Solution: LON
n Event driven bus handles the event burst more efficient than cyclic polling buses
n Priority messages guarantee a defined and short response time for critical
messages
n The LON bus combines both parts and therefore fits perfectly to the requirements
for a SAS
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n Time synchronization and peer to peer communication is supported

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 Communication: Redundant Inter Bay Bus
n No critical part in view of ABBs system concept
n Inter bay bus has the highest availability of all components within the SAS
n Redundant IBB makes system more complex and expensive with no real
customer benefit
n No availability improvement (see availability calculation later)
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 Communication: Integration of 3rd party IEDs
n IEC60870-5-103 is the standard protocol used for 3rd party
IED integration
n For ABB IED integration LON is preferred because
n IEC103 defines only a reduced part of signals that can be transferred
reduced informational content
n Reduced performance for IEC103 integration. Typically a bus speed of
9600 or 19200 baud is used
n IEC103 is a master slave protocol so when several masters at the
station level exists the connection has to be done via a front-end
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 Communication: Remote link

n Basic information that has to be clear when offering a remote

connection are:
n Protocol name, version, supplier
n Type of tele-control network
n Transmission technology
n Modem
n Specific protocol characteristic
n Data volume
n Signal addressing
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 Communication: Remote link

n Control authority
NCC 1 NCC 2 NCC 3
n No priority: Station level and remote
control centre have the same priority
n Priority selection between station level
and NCC: All NCCs have the same
priority (Authority between the
different NCC has to be managed
directly between the NCCs)
n Differentiate priority between the
several NCCs: This will be handled in
the SAS only on special request, clear
description of the control handling
philosophy form customer side is
required
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 Communication: Redundant Remote link

NCC n The master (NCC) polls both lines

all the time
n This is the best solution for
redundant remote links
n The NCC is polling all the data
from both gateways
n Both communication links are
constantly supervised
n The NCC handles the switchover
and the data management
n No loss of data at the station level
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 Communication: Redundant Remote link
n The master (NCC) polls only the active
NCC line
n The stand-by line may not be supervised
or if supervised only via a check
command
n In this situation the gateway of the not
active line needs to delete all the
appearing messages until the line is set
to active
n Or if the stand-by line becomes active
the NCC sends as a first command a
reset command to reset all the old data
in the gateway
n Risk of losing or doubling events
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 Communication: Remote link

n Redundant gateway with only one remote

NCC link
n Fall-back switch (FBS) is required to
handle the switching of the active
gateway to the communication link
n Same characteristic like when master
only polls one line from the gateway
point of view
n The stand-by link between fall-back
switch and gateway cannot be supervised

FBS
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Availability
 Increase of availability

Availability = Probability that an item will be in operable

condition at any point of time along its life cycle.

MTBF
A=
MTBF + MTTR

Two parameters to increase the availability:

n Increase MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure)

n Reduce MTTR (Mean Time To Repair)

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 Increase of availability
MTTR MTTR MTTR
MTBF MTBF MTBF

Start Time

in Operation Repairs

MTBF: Influenced by
- Component selection
- Continuous monitoring
- Environment
- Redundancy

MTTR: Influenced by
- Time to locate failed module
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- Time to exchange module

- Time to put system back into operation
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 Increase of availability

Increase MTBF:
n High quality components and subsystems
n Reduce number of components
n Redundancy where it makes sense
n only critical system part should be designed redundant
n redundant parts means also higher costs in hardware and engineering
n redundant parts means also higher maintenance costs
n Distributed system architecture increases system availability
(system with graceful degradation or functional redundancy)
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 Increase of availability
Reduce MTTR:
n Self supervision, diagnostics must be available
n Reduce repair time
n only with a short repair time a system increases the availability
significantly
n all parts also the redundant parts must be supervised. As a result of a
fault, the system will not crash, but must be repaired.
n to provide a very short repair time (without repairing) spare parts must
be available
n the time to repair will be reduced significantly if spare parts can be
replaced without any additional configuration work (e.g. hot-swap in
industrial server)
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 Increase of availability

Critical System Parts (MTBF)

n Event printer 8,000 hrs
n Personal computer 22,500 hrs
n RTUs (PLCs) 25,000.. 150,000 hrs
n Ethernet switch 100,000 hrs
n Industrial personal computer 125,000 hrs
n Protection IED 870,000 hrs
n Star coupler 925,000 hrs
n Ethernet hub 1,040,000 hrs
n Optical connection 11,750,000 hrs
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 Example Calculation
Example 1: Single HMI with single inter bay bus

1
HMI

Station
2 PC

3
Interbay Bus

Starcoupler Starcoupler
(Redundant Power (Redundant Power
4 supply) supply)

BCU Mimic BCU Mimic

8
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16 x 400kV 18 x 220kV
Feeder Feeder
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 Example Calculation
Example 2: Redundant HMI with single inter bay bus

1
HMI HMI

Station Station
2 PC PC

3
Interbay Bus

Starcoupler Starcoupler
(Redundant (Redundant
4 Power supply) Power supply)

BCU Mimic BCU Mimic

8
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16 x 400kV 18 x 220kV
Feeder Feeder
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 Example Calculation
Example 3: Redundant HMI with redundant inter bay bus
1
HMI HMI

Workstation Workstation
2

Ethernet Ethernet
6 Switch Switch

Gateway Gateway
7 SC SC

Redundant
Interbay Bus
5 Intelligent Intelligent
Star coupler Star coupler

3
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BCU Mimic BCU Mimic

8

16 x 400kV 18 x 220kV
Feeder Feeder
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 Example Calculation
Availability comparison
of systems with with repair no component repair
different redundant
components: Availability MTBF Availability MTBF
[%] [years] [%] [years]
Example 1 99.981 4.8 99.979 4.4
Example 2 99.998 52.6 99.988 7.5
Example 3 99.991 10.6 99.979 4.4

Example 2 has best availability

- weakest component is redundant (Station HMI)
- simple architecture
- high reliable star coupler (no intelligence)

Example 3 has lower availability

- redundancy of all components (also high reliable components)
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- complex architecture
- less reliable star coupler (intelligent)
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 Conclusion
Redundancy Chart
Availability
MTBF for repair
Redundancy at the correct place
Costs
To increase the system availability
significant parts with the lowest MTBF
should be redundant first. More
components cause a shorter interval to
repair faulty parts and increases
investment as well as maintenance
costs.

number of redundant
components
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