TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY.
CRUZ WEEK 6 1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint
of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is
now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial,
reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and
getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under
the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
1
being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.).
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
2
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
3
618, 73 Phil.)
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to
fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of
the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual
method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
 TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 2

extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to
restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of
the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and
for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in
the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice
Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth,
rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer
uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes
acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations
derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is
already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
5
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not
relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with
the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of
liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2
and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
4
law.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO.,
INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch
III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21,
1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in
the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the
order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent,
Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City
to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals,
hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid
collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment
and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent
manner in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers
aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed
on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for
damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively,
of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary
attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged,
by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the
bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No.
25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing
another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but,
in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in
question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused
on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion
to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action;
2) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification,
hence defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 3
defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had
operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause
of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious
and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the
aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case
has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore,
the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely
subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro
Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33
applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of
the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the
aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to
Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to
enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the
arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether
or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa
aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the
offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and
that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of
violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the
Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary
damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence
this appeal on certiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint
in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-
2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b)
presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No.
25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c)
physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d)
existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence
of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that
the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car"
does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The
violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the
protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive
speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act
resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal
Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers'
negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the
same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art.
100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under
 TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 4

Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.
1
Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).

It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may
be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1
nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
2
Palileo, where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after
the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the
course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay
damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such
reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
3
same act or omission of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat that when the criminal
action for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon
arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the
injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in
said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press
a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for
damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners
have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have
opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.

As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having
always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of
the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence,
"the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are
intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule
111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
4
required in the proviso." But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery
of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party
considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of
the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of
the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does
not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no
legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino
Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident occurred
along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner;
a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by
respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two
separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo
Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver
Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit
and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes
Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck
driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was
bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and
that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.
Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on
the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal
indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by
a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position, his jeep was bumped at the
rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the
left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment,
stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of
P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as
actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine
and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in
Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of its
findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having
been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as
he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803
with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino
Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 5
Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief
against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the
grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a
cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner
Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner
sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the
case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent civil
action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal
action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964,
requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same
would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was
denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised
to a higher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last two
mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations
that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228,
wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter actively
participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the
Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner
prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with petitioner
that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803.
Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to
petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as
the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages from the accused
Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No.
SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the
civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil
Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code
As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a
distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this
case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from
the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at

Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and
collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and
lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the
same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered
extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages,
litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must
consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2)
defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or
lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed
reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the
institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or
culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter
is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31,
the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence,
'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles
were drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may
also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch
as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be
made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not substantive but
adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature
superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not
barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228,
presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in
negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 6
civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed
simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for separate
application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to base
his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said
Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as
his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver
Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie
Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep
driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the
car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear
of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that
accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by
Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver
Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil
action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil night arise did not exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end
result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal
was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent
Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private
respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to
proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and February 23, 1971
dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
1
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision dated
2
April 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 43, which denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action
for damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents -
the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by
their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently
bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September
30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
3
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as
such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43
of the court.
4
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the petitioners as defendants denied liability for
the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They
thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part
of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence,
the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their
position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary
5
liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their
driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the
pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that
since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the
criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal
action. which was already dismissed.
6
In an Order dated September 4, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit
and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 7
7
same court in its subsequent order of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
8
In the herein assailed decision dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the
trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged
was the petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed
out [by the trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even
allege the basic elements for such a liability, like the conviction of the accused employee
and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate
and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under
Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art.
2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency. (Underscoring
in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its
9
resolution of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners' present recourse on their submission that the
appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to
dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of
action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
10
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two
courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-
10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van
with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City,
the minor son of said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit
and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendant's employee,
who drove said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed without regard to
traffic condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of
the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered multiple body injuries which led
to his untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's employee, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before
MTC-Branch III, entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide," but the same was dismissed because pending litigation, then remorse-
stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late
minor Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of defendant's
employee;

9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised,
would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being
made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the
subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior
conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and
the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for
the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence
required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which
diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of
their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an
11
obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
12
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto; and 2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
13 14 15
contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana ); or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
16 17
action. Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here,
the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act
of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of
the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
18
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.
19
Article 1161 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
20
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from
in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly
from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his
21
initiatory pleading or complaint, and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of
the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff
should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency
22
of such employee.
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the
negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 8
of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the
defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based
23
on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Since there was no
conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the
petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-
24
Claim, repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on
their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to
recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in
any business or industry.
25
Citing Maniago v. CA, petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been
dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was
filed while the criminal case against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case
against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case
No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them
against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the
pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made
when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the
conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for
the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON
VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE,
7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
1
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that for
the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted on
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City,
docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case on
December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on February 19,
1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a
separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial and
presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata again
reserved their right to institute a separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio
Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at
Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal Case No.
3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the
Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the
accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an injury by name accident; and that on
January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case
2
No. B-134 for damages.
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under
the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the
same negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of
the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and 'culpa
extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 9
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery. (Report
of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that
upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in
a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate
also the same separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress', to borrow the
felicitous language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to
hod as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only
acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty and
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words the extinction of civil
liability refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes
3
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case
No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil
action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-
delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-
P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or
omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have
only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134
is reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26407 March 31, 1978
EUSEBIO MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LA MALLORCA BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
Alberto S. Plantilla for appellant.
Geminiano F. Yabut & Rafael Monterey for appellee.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No.
2626 entitled "Eusebio Mendoza, Plaintiff, v. La Mallorca Bus Company, Defendant," raised to the
1
Court of Appeals but certified to Us by said court in its Resolution dated July 26, 1966 as only
questions of law were raised therein.
The facts are stated in the Resolution of the appellate court:
On April 3, 1950, at Plaridel, Bulacan, a collision occurred involving a freight
truck of the plaintiff and a bus of the defendant. A criminal case for damage to
property thru reckless imprudence was brought against defendant's driver,
Claudio Arceo, (Criminal Case No. 1230, CFI-Bulacan). resulting in the
conviction of said driver, which conviction was affirmed by this Court in CA-
G.R. No. 11602-R. in the said criminal case, the plaintiff made express
reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. In affirming the judgment of
conviction imposed upon the accused by the lower court, this Court modified
the fine imposed, with the observation that the freight truck of the plaintiff
therein involved and damaged was worth only P5,000.00 and not P7,000.00
as found by the trial court.
On May 8, 1956, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages against the
herein defendant, based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code, which separate
civil action (Case No. 2137) was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon a
finding that plaintiff's action, instituted exactly six years, one month and five
days from the date of the accident (which occurred on April 3, 1950) had
already prescribed, which order became final without plaintiff having appealed
therefrom.
Subsequently, or on August 26, 1957, the plaintiff instituted the present action,
based on the alleged subsidiary liability of the defendant company under the
Revised Penal Code. A motion for pre hearing under Rule 8, Sec. 5 of the
Rules of Court was filed in the lower Court in consequence of which the lower
court, by order dated Dec. 3, 1958, ordered the dismissal of the case. The
order of Jan. 20, 1959 denied the motion for reconsideration.
From the order of the lower court dated December 3, 1958 dismissing the
instant action on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2137 was a
bar to the present action, the plaintiff has appealed, alleging that the following
errors were committed by the lower court:
1. In holding that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2137 operated as a bar to the
filing of the present action; and
2. In dismissing the complaint.
We agree with the plaintiff-appellant. The lower court committed a reversible error in declaring that
the dismissed of Civil Case No. 2137 operated as a bar to the filing of the present action.
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that the essential requisites for the existence of res
judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction on the merits; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the first and second actions: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of subject matter, and (c)
2
identity of cause of action.
A careful study of the case at bar presents a dispute as to only one of the above elements:
Whether or not, as between Civil Case No. 2137 and the present action, there is Identity of causes
of action.
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 10
We hold that, the two actions, namely, the civil action based on quasi-delict (Civil Case No. 2137)
and the civil action based on c liability (Civil Case No. 2626), are two separate and independent
3
actions based on distinct causes of action.
The test of identity of causes of action is stated in tills wise: It lies not in the form of an action but
on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of
4
action.
Civil Case No. 2137 was an action for damages based on culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176 to
2194 of the New Civil Code for which the defendant-appellee, as employer, was to be made
primarily and directly liable for reason of his own negligence, either in the selection or supervision
5
of his driver; the present action stems from the conviction by final judgement of defendant-
appellee's driver in the previous criminal case filed against said driver for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 1230), damages for which defendant-appellee, as
employer, is made subsidiarily liable under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the above-stated test, it is evident that res judicata cannot be a defense against the filing
of the present action by petitioner. Defendant-appellee could thwart an adverse decision in Civil
Case No. 2137 by proving his due diligence in the selection of its employees, but this same
evidence will fail in the present action for his liability is inseparable from that of his driver once the
6
latter is finally convicted.
In the case of M.D. Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (22 SCRA 559), this Court declared
the same principle in simpler terms:
The importance of this issue is due to the fact that appellant's alleged
diligence in the selection of its employees and in exercising supervision over
them would be a good defense should the action be bard upon a quasi- delict,
but not ff predicated upon a liability springing from a crime.
The question presented before Us has already been resolved in the case of Jocson v.
7
Glorioso, where the issue under consideration is "whether the previous dismissal of an action
based on culpa aquiliana precludes the application of the plain and explicit command of Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code." There, this Court ruled in the negative having adopted this Court's
8
decision in a previous case, Diana v. Batangas Trans, Co. where it was held:
Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve
two different remedies, it can hardly be said that there is Identity of reliefs in
both actions as to make the present case fall under the operation of Rule 8,
Section I (d) of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is a mistake to say that
the present action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another
action between the same parties involving the same cause. Evidently, both
cases involve different causes of action. In fact. when the Court of Appeals
dismissed the action based on culpa aquiliana (Civil Case No. 8022), this
distinction was stressed. It was there said that the negligent act committed by
defendant's employee is not a quasi crime, for such negligence is punished by
law. What plaintiffs should have done was to institute an action under Art. 103
of the Revised Penal Code (CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). And this is what plaintiffs
have done. To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of
defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to
which they are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our
duty to prevent.
This Court then concluded:
On the same principle then, the previous dismissal of the action based on
culpa aquiliana could not be a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
required by Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
What clearly emerges then is the controlling force of the principle that once
there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer according to
the plain and explicit command of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is
subsidiarily liable, if it be shown that the commission thereof was in the
9
discharge of the duties of such employee.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered setting aside the orders of the lower court dated
December 3, 1958 and January 20, 1959 respectively dismissing the present action and denying
plaintiff-appellant's motion for reconsideration. Let the case be remanded below for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Assailed before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which
2
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil
Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
(PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-
478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type
jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting
to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment
to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC
of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the
venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of
the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the
bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there
3 11
was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
4
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses
are not available to testify in the civil case.
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 11
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her
husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She
went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go
there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
5 6 7
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in said case, together with other
documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the
8
three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. Counsel for
respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted
in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners
compromised that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
9
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was
marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
10
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-
89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers
per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and
in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left
side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other
words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando
Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on
another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took
place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed
by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which
he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the
right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the
Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was
bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was
about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to
overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the
criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two
drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering
the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual
damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
12
defendants are also to pay costs.
13
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
14
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE
OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court,
we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda.
De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko
15
Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.
16
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision of the
17
Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
18 19 20
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos should not be admitted in
evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
21
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c)
the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue
involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the
22
witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules
for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no
opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed
exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the
23
criminal cases instituted against their employees.
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 12
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to
object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to
24
prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in
a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and
25
given the importance it deserves.
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the
same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan
26
and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in
evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner
PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should
not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban
which was given in the criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and
eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in
the criminal case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony
of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process
in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the
admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that
the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
27 28
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals, this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, admitted
in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners
assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the
raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a
ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein
petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find
such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be
29
entitled.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how
the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
30
based on, quasi-delict. Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a

good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the
above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon
Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who
was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-
described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus
with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio
Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very
fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was
forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers
side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which
maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as
shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July
12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached
as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described
motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless
imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit
Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules
and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x
31
x"
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the
bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was
his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
32
Revised Penal Code.
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section
3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
33
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 13
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
34
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if
based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based
35
on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused
is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second
instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not
possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished
by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of
the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence
in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
36
the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
37
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings
of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
38
Supreme Court. Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
39
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant
our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus
which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial
court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct,
would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim.
Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court.
Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could
explain why he should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the
truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine

Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the
jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before
the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how
the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it
was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep
when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact,
however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two
statements would be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received
legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the
statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of
March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV
Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan
was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the
Philippine Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than
having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was
40
running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance
41 42
of the diligence of a good father of a family. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
43
the selection and supervision of their employee.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
44
them.
45
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. CRUZ WEEK 6 14
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that
it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of
various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment
procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very
good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of
evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe
operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned
to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the
herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its
employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough
to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same
does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that
is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do.
The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual
46
containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. How then can all the drivers of
petitioner PRBLI know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one
manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00
as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
47
jeep. As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,
must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
48
to P50,000.00. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
49 50
good. The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00. The
award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by
51
law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the
award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary
damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.